I- PPRACTICE OF LAW DEFINED interfere with the Commission's judgment.

interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
Cayetano v. Monsod G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991Facts: amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to prayed, for has been clearly shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. considerations of wisdom, which only the appointing authority can decide
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari
and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and thec o n s e q u e n t a p p o i n t m e n t o f M o n s o d a s C h a i r m a n o f t h e C o m m i s
sion on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a C h a i r m a n a n d s i x C o m m i s s i o n e r s w h o s h a l l b e
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
t h e i r appointment, at least thirty -five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA G.R No L-19450
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member
FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with
of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He
crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said accused
has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
than ten years.At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private prosecutor in
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
certain attorneys from practicing.
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised Rules of
"associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Monsod's confirmation,
implicitlyd e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e p o s s e s s e d t h e n e c e s s a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s r RULING: The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
e q u i r e d b y l a w . T h e j u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d b y t h e Commission in the exercise within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
BAR MATTER NO. 553 MAURICIO ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to
move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now,
Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisement.
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week
of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that
can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors,
are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. A battery of paralegals,
counselors and attorneys backs up these specialists.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US, which
now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely
making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed;
whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed.
The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot
be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of
the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret
marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such
is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well
as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs
no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between
a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court
also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
PRACTICE OF LAW CONCEPTS
A.C NO. 6593- MAELOTISEA GARRIDO VS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO
Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross immorality,
in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
complaint arose after the petitioner caught wind through her daughter that her husband was
having an affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child with her;
and the same information was confirmed when one of her daughters saw that her
husband walking in a Robinsons mall with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and effort given yielded results telling
her that Atty. Valencia and her legal husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June
1993, her husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their
residence, and has since failed to render much needed financial support. In their defense, they
postulated that they were not lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality,
so as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and
thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed
when they were not lawyers?
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where
circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they
academic or moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E.Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, the contention of
respondent that they were not yet lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption
from sanctions; good moral character was already required as a condition precedent to
admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Garrido and Valencia wereshould
ered with the expectation that they would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal
needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by
themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the
detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of
his other marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral
values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As such, their
disbarment is affirmed.
A.C NO. 5830 MARY D. MALECDAN VS. ATTY. PERCIVAL PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW KOLLIN
Facts:
Hence, Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio and
Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in
violation of the lawyer’s oath. On November 25, 1999, Mary D. Malecdan (complainant) entered into a
deed of sale with the Spouses Washington and Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio
City, where the money received by Eliza Fanged as full and final payment was deposited in the account
of Atty. Artemio Bustamante who was then counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out,
however, that the said lot was the subject of a controversy between the former owners and the Fanged
Spouses. When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the
latter, through her new counsel respondent Atty.Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of the contract.
Later, the parties entered into a compromise settlement. In the Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion, it was Atty. Pekas who signed as counsel for Eliza Fanged. And as counsel
for Eliza Fanged, he also signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999. The money was
then transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for in the compromise settlement. When the
complainant’s duly authorized representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released
to her, Atty. Kolin refused to do so, on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter.
Hence, Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio and
Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in
violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution, finding respondent
Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to respondent Atty.
Pekas. Atty. Kollin will be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years, while the complaint
against Atty. Pekas was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kollin are guilty of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath.
Held: Yes, Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kolin are guilty of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath. It is a settled
principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice of law, the
primary purpose of which is to render public service. 26 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 27 A lawyer is expected, at all times, to uphold the integrity
of the legal profession. In this case, the amount which the respondents took for themselves as
attorney’s fees belonged to a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the
owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in
fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be
believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming
party’s knowledge, apply the amount for themselves as attorney’s fees. If there was someone liable for
the respondents’ attorney’s fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a
real "compromise" as to the manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the
complainant was not present when the said agreement was made.
________________________________________________________________________________
A.C. No. 7902 : September 30, 2008 TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, v ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ,
Complainant seeks the disbarment of Atty. Godwin R. Valdez from the practice of law for gross
malpractice, immoral character, dishonesty and deceitful conduct. The complainant alleges that despite
receipt of legal fees in compliance with a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any
of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant’s requests for a report
of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected demands for return of the money paid to
him. The respondent also did not inform him that he was entitled to prepare a Counter-Affidavit to
answer the complaint for Other Light Threats. Hence, on December 28, 2006, Torben Overgaard was
constrained to file an administrative complaint against Atty. Godwin R. Valdez before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, allegingthat the respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Antonio S. Tria,
to whom the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, foundthe respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17, Canon
18, andRule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In his Report dated January 29, 2008,he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)years.
The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-126, dated March 6,2008, approved
the recommendation of Commissioner Tria, and further ordered the complainantto return the
PhP900,000.00 to the complainant within 60 days from receipt of the notice.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law
Ruling:
Atty. Godwin R. Valdez to have committed multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as
attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society
render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the bar. The practice
of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must
maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond
reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. The respondent demonstrated not only appalling indifference
and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a wanton disregard for his duties as a
lawyer. It is deplorable that members of the bar, such as the respondent, betray not only the trust of
their client, but also public trust. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.
Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the
profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law.
AM NO. 2266 HERMINIO NORIEGA VS. ATTY EMMANUEL SISON
FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a hearing officer
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for
him to engage in private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila. Sison,
in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is with the permission
of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he
provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that he never
represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where,
in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison”,
and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his name as
Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices
were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by evidence. The
allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison
has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a
part to a case without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute
private practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid
as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment
against him.
Atty. Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes TolentinoA.C. No. 667
Facts: Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent, with the help of
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to Tolentino with the
promise of financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Linsangan presented the sworn
affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced him to sever his lawyer-client relations
with Linsangan and use Tolentino’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. Further,
Linsangan’s calling card was also attached wherein it appeared that aside from legal services, financial
assistance was offered as well.
Issue: Whether Tolentino is guilty of misconduct
Held: Yes. The court adopted the IBP’s finding of unethical conduct, whereby it found Tolentino to have
encroached on the professional practice of Linsangan violating Rule 8.02, which prohibits a lawyer
from stealing another lawyer’s client or induce the latter’s client to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending
venture with his clients as borrowers, Tolentino violated Rule 16.04 The court further added that
Tolentino violated Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides “A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO
BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.” Hence, lawyers are
prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Moreover, Rule 2.03 should
be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT,
FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as
a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. The calling card contained with the
phrase financial assistance, was clearly used to entice clients to change counsels with a promise of
loans to finance their legal actions. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. Additionally, the court said that a lawyer’s best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Hence, Atty. Tolentino was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
QUALIFICATIONS
Facts:
Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal mayor of Calapan, he
and other co-conspirators murdered the former municipal mayor of Calapan, for which they were
held guilty and sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by the Supreme court the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence, Gutierrez was granted
conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted on
condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The widow of the
murdered victim then filed a complaint with the Supreme Court asking that Gutierrez be removed from
the rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Issue :
W/N the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of disbarment
Held:
NO. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court because of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. “Moral turpitude” includes everything contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the
respondent, Lontok, was granted absolute or unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime of
crime of bigamy. It was held that such pardon releases the punishment and blots out existence of guilt,
so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. In
the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his
term. It was not a full pardon which could have blotted out the offense committed. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking advantage of
his official position, and with the use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude warrants
disbarment. Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic preparation and satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
admission: the lawyer must adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES AND PTR, RULES OF COURT: RULE 139-A, SEC. 9,10
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: BOOK 2, SEC 139 a. GOOD REGULAR STANDING
ADMIN CASE NO. 4749 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS VS. ATTY FRANCISCO LLAMAS b. REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper
PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated FACTS:
“IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag, for his alleged
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his affair with Gina Espita who happens to be a former studentof the respondent back when Ms. Espita
IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees was a first-year college student. Finally, inthe most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant
up to the present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to had her seven childrensign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag presented as
this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, evidencethe pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie
1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number Espita, the brother of Ms. Espita and the source of the
for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of the children of Atty. And Mrs Nunag. In the
"limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with Ms.Espita, and being live-in partners,
as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992. have had two children with the latter. Atty. Nunag denied the allegations by presenting Argumentum ad
Misericordia.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions. ISSUE: Should Atty. Narag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating
the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which
provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead
or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default
thereof for six months shall warrant suspension ofmembership and if nonpayment covers a period of
1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It
does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Respondent's
failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year
HELD:
Atty. Narag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented against him,
but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable court, being disbarred by
virtue of The Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides Rule 1.01:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
2014 CASE
FACTS
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative complaint for disbarment
against her husband, herein respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation
to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered
a Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the respondent
committed an act of gross immorality when he abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The
Court pointed out that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Re–opening of the Administrative Investigation, or
in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the respondent on August 25, 1998. He
averred that he was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as he was
allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce additional vital documentary evidence.
On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. The
respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their
children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their children had already forgiven him
on June 10, 2010 at their residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated affidavit
prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim. The
respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that he has been punished
enough. He alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating osteo–arthritic
pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his arthritis and his right knee injury. He further claimed
that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of
Lieutenant Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief and
recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and
affidavits in support of his petition for readmission.
Issue:
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the
applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law.
HELD:
The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must
be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral
act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent, while
still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the woman for whose sake he abandoned
his family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not be sufficient ground
to grant respondent’s plea. It is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was
supposed to evidence the forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and
the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the respondent is
hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that
he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all his properties to
his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed
changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from later on executing another last will
and testament of a different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the
Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he
had already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal profession. Time and again
the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those
who continue to display unassailable character.
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral
Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries. The above-mentioned
cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter. Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member
of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in
the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension
to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

A.C NO. 10179 ONG VS. DELOS SANTOS
FACTS:
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was instroduced to respondent Atty. William Delos Santos
by Sherrif Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls and personal
transactions between them. Ong and Delos Santos became friends. In time, according to Atty. Ong,
Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of cash. To
reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Delos Santos bragged about his lucrative
practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Delos Santos financial stability, Ong handed him on
January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metronak check No. 0110268
postdated February 29, 2008.
However, the check was dishonored when it was presented for the reason that the account was closed.
Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the
latter just ignored him. When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong filed criminal suit for estafa and for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint.
ISSUE:
By issuing the worthless check, did Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Every lawyer is an officer of the court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character ins not only a condition precedent relating to his
admission into the practice of law but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his
membership in the Philippine Bar. The court demands of him to remain a competent, honourable and
reliable individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral
character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
G.R No 1542017 Ferdinand Cruz vs. Alberto Mina
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year
law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-
lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal
case. However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice
in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of
trial.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant.
Ruling:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is
conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OF APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Contempt of Court (Rules of Court 71, Sec 3)
G.R No. L-23959
Facts: Petitioners PAFLU, Entila and Tenazas were complainants in Case No. 72 ULP Iloilo
in the Court of Industrial Relations. The complainants were represented by Cipriano Cid &
Associates thru Atty. ANastacio Pacis and Quentin Muning, a non-lawyer. After trial, the court
rendered a decision in favour of the complainants; a portion of that order granted respondent
Quentin Muning, a non-lawyer atto rney’s fees for professional service. Thus a petition was filed
seeking review of the order made by the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 72-ULP Iloilo.
Issue:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services rendered?
RULING:
Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one,
he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas
or with PAFLU and he cannot therefore, recover attorney’s fees. Public policy demands that
legal work in representation of party litigants should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications for the protection of the courts, clients and the public. The permission of a non-
lawyer to represent a party litigant in court does not by itself entitle the representation to compensation.
For Section 24 Rule 138, of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 24. Compensation of Attorney’s
Agreement as to Fees –An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services imports the existence of an attorney
-client relationship as a condition for recovery of attorney’s fees.
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY
A.M No. P-220 Julio Zeta vs. Felicisimo Malinao
Felicisimo Malinao , Court interpreter was charged with, illegally appearing in court, grave misconduct
in office, falsification, and violation of civil service. It was alleged that Mr. Malinao appeared in the
municipal court of his town , in Zumarraga, Talalora and Sta Rita as an attorney when he is not an
attorney. It was alleged that he instigated persons telling them to commit crimes and tells them not to
be afraid since he has influence over judges. He is unfaithfully filing his time record. Even when he has
been out practicing in the municipal courts, he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary
for those absent days. It was also alleged that he violated civil service law which prohibited a civil
service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without permission from the
Department Head.
ISSUE:
IS THE RESPONDENT AS COURT INTERPRETER ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW?
HELD:
NO. Only members of the bar are allowed to practice law. The fact that respondent court
interpreter appeared a number of times as counsel indicates that he was doing it as a regular
practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice; and his appearance as
counsel, without being a member. The appearance as counsel in various municipal courts
by a court interpreter, without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service
rules and regulations, and the falsification of his daily time record to make it appear therein
that he was present in his office when in fact he was not, are grave offenses which warrant
his separation from the service. Respondent Felicisimo Malinao is dismissed from his
position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar, with
prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
A.M No. 2266 Herminio Noriega vs. Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison
FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged that Sison as a hearing officer
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name “Manuel Sison” in order for
him to engage in private practice and represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the same is with the
permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing
lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free; that
he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC
where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R.
Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when the court staff wrote his
name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”,
notices were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”,
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable and shall be disbar?
HELD: No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by evidence. The
allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison
has committed an act constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a
part to a case without attorney to do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute
private practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance
because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends. Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid
as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of harassment
against him.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND OTHER FORMS OF DISCIPLINE
A.M NO. 139 ELMO S. ABAD ATTY PROCOPIO BELTRAN VS. ELMO S. ABAD
FACTS:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., President of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association,Inc.,of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine
Bar. Respondent Abad’s circumstances, which he has narrated, do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practice law. He should fulfill the two essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
HELD:
Mr. Elmo S. Abad is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to the Court within ten (10) days
from notice, failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment. The proven charge against
respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances,
which he has narrated, do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise
law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)
Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401
FACTS:
Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual harassment. The records show that
the respondent rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly
closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against
her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s action constitutes gross immoral conduct which would result on his
suspension?
They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is gross when
it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s
sense of decency. Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public
Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant
was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in
desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Facts:
Complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation
of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in
Quezon City. In their sworn complaint for disbarment, the complainants
narrated that they inherited from their parents a residential lot. They found
out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that their
previous annotations were cancelled based on a letter request filed by
Atty. Tolentino as well as the RTC’s order granting the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint.
 Durban acted beyond the authority granted him; he was likewise in violation of the provision of Act
ISSUE: WON the actions of Atty Tolentino warrants his disbarment? 1919.
Held:
Yes! A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.
The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. Verily, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity
of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon1 of the same Code not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In 1914, a lawyer named Salvador Laguda filed a petition before the Iloilo CFI recommending that he
is appointing Cesareo Durban as his procurador judicial (legal representative). The judge of the CFI
approved the petition. The authority granted to Durban, a non-lawyer, is limited to the following: appear
in matters signed and presented by Laguda with his own signature and when the latter should send
the said Durban to attend to such matters; that the said Durban should have no authority to make
contracts to represent any person in any justice court; that all contracts and appearances should be
made by Laguda, and that the latter could send Durban to represent him in courts; and finally that said
Durban should not collect any sum for any service.
In one instance however, Durban agreed to represent one Eustaquia Montage in litigating her claim
over a P20.00 worth parcel of land. Durban charged for appearance fees; he even won the case.
Montage paid Durban a total of P50.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Durban engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
HELD: Yes. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 1919, says:
No person not duly authorized to practice law may engage in the occupation of appearing for or
defending other persons in justice of the peace courts without being first authorized for that purpose
by the judge of the Court of First Instance.