—

paradigm
a new
for understanding
today s world ^~

Alain Tour aine

 A New Paradigm
for Understanding
Today's World

Alain Touraine

Translated by Gregory Elliott

polity
First published in French as Un Nouveau Paradigme pour comprendre le inonde
d'aujourd'hui by Alain Touraine © Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2005.

This English translation © Polity Press, 2007

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A New Paradigm
for Understanding
Today's World
To Jacqueline Blayac, for all the work we have done together
 Contents

Introduction: A New Paradigm

PART ONE When We Referred to Ourselves in

Social Terms
1 The Break
9/11 • Fear • A world in decline • Where is meaning to
be found?

2 Globalization
From the post-war states to the globalization of the economy
• A n extreme capitalism • The rupturing o f societies
• Alter-globalism • From society to war ° A globalized world

3 Europe: A State without a Nation

8
Decline of the national state? Is European unity possible?
• European Union and United States of America • The
European state • European powerlessness • The absence o f
European consciousness

4 The End of Societies

The social representation of society - The European mode o f
modernization • Society and modernity ° The crisis o f
representation - The three deaths of European society
• Irruption o f democracy ° The return o f the political
• Farewell to society • The war above us • When system and
actors separate off ° The rupturing of the social bond • Are
we witnessing the end o f social movements? ° Conclusion
vi Contents

5 Revisiting the Self 71

What is modernity? • The victory of modernity • The end of
social thought • Emancipatory individualism • Forms of
social determinism • From focusing on the world to focusing
on the self • The awakening of the subject

PART TWO Now that We Refer to Ourselves in

Cultural Terms

6 The Subject 101

The subject and identity • The sources of the subject
• Defence of sociology • The individual subject • Rights
• Are we all subjects? • The negation of the subject • A
related note • The subject, social movements and the
unconscious ° Proximity • The subject and religion • The
subject and the school • The experience of being a subject
° The anti-subject • Between gods and societies

7 Cultural Rights 144

Political rights and cultural rights • Minorities, multiculturalism,
communitarianism • Redistribution and recognition • The new
social movements ° Modernizations - Entry into the
post-social world • Sexual rights • The limits of cultural
mixing • About the 'veil' • Communities and
communitarianisms ° Liberals and communitarians
• Secularism • Intercultural communication • Return to
new ideas

8 A Society of Women 184

A n altered situation • Equality and difference • Sexuality and
gender • The woman-subject • The role of men
• Post-feminism

Argument: By Way of Conclusion 208

Bibliography 211
Index 216
 Introduction: A New Paradigm

For a long time we described and analysed social reality in political terms:
order and disorder, war and peace, government and state, king and nation,
the republic, the people, revolution. Then the industrial revolution and
capitalism freed themselves from political power and emerged as the 'basis'
of social organization. We then replaced the political paradigm by an
economic and social paradigm: social classes and wealth, bourgeoisie and
proletariat, trade unions and strikes, stratification and social mobility,
inequalities and redistribution - such became our customary analytical
categories.
Today, two centuries after the triumph of economics over politics, these
'social' categories have become confused and exclude much o f our lived
experience. We therefore need a new paradigm, for we cannot revert to the
political paradigm, above all because cultural problems have assumed such
importance that social thinking must be organized around them.
We must position ourselves within this new paradigm in order to be able
to name the new actors and new conflicts, representations of the ego and
collectivities, disclosed by a fresh look that reveals a new landscape before
our very eyes.
The search for the central point in this new landscape immediately leads
us to the theme o f information, which refers to a technological revolution
whose social and cultural effects are visible all around us. But the most
important thing is the point Manuel Castells has rightly stressed: the
absence o f any technological determinism in this information society. This
clearly separates us from industrial society, in which the technical division
of labour was inseparable from the social relations o f production. A new
2 Introduction: A New Paradigm

situation has been created on account of the great social flexibility of infor-
mation systems. Such a claim contradicts the all too frequent discourses
on the invasion o f society by technologies, but it is acceptable to those who
define globalization primarily by the dissociation between a globalized
economy and institutions which, only existing at lower levels - national,
local or regional - are unable to control economies that operate on a much
vaster scale. Perception of violence, wars and repressive systems leads to
the same conclusion: this world of organized political violence is no longer
a social world. Modern states were created through wars; today's conflicts
have no political or social function. A war is no longer the other side of
a social conflict.
A l l these remarks converge on the same point: the collapse and dis-
appearance of the world we called 'social'. This judgement should not be
a cause for surprise, since millions of people deplore the rupturing of
social bonds and the triumph of a disruptive individualism. We must
take as our analytical starting-point this destruction of all the 'social'
categories, from social classes and social movements to institutions or
'agencies of socialization' - the term given to the school and the family
when defining education as socialization.
The non-centrality of 'social' categories is so radically new that we find
it difficult to abandon the sociological analyses we are used to.
It is not easy to speak of a 'non-social' analysis of social reality.
However, this expression is no more strange than that of political societies,
which was applied both to the Absolutist monarchies and national states
when reference to God and the social expression of religious beliefs lost
the central place it had occupied. We can even outline a process of devel-
opment leading from collectivities based on external principles of legiti-
macy - especially religious ones - to others whose legitimacy was political,
then to collectivities that conceived themselves as economic and social
systems, and finally to our kind of social existence, which is invested on
the one hand by the non-social forces of interests, violence and fear, and
on the other by actors whose objectives are personal freedom or mem-
bership of an inherited community - objectives that are themselves not
specifically 'social'.

II

Briefly set out as above, does this hypothesis put an end to any sociologi-
cal analysis? This question will become increasingly urgent as we approach
the end of Part One of this book, which is devoted to the 'end of the social'
- a phenomenon at once fascinating and disturbing.
 Introduction: A New Paradigm 3

The disappearance o f societies as integrated systems and vectors of

general meaning simultaneously defined in terms o f production, significa-
tion and interpretation, confronts us with an objective world of which, as
Jean Baudrillard has rightly said, the virtual world is an extreme expres-
sion. A n absolute realism o f this kind expels from the social field anything
foreign to it: war and all forms o f violence, upsurges in irrationalism, the
crisis o f individuals overburdened with problems for whose solution they
no longer find aid in civic or legal or religious institutions.
The anxiety, even dread, generated by the loss o f our customary
reference-points are further exacerbated by the omnipresence of economic
criteria o f judgement, which in no way respond to intensity of demand,
but create it through the choices made by economic decision-makers to
keep the prices o f most products high or, alternatively, low. The traditional
idea that the price o f a product depends on supply and demand is ever less
applicable. A n d among the products created by advertising, propaganda
or the politics of war are images o f ourselves and our subjectivity. As a
result, we feel we have lost all distance, all independence from constructs
- ideological in fact - that determine both our attention and the objects
we attend to.
But I am going to suggest some ways of escaping this image o f a world
that imprisons us. Part Two of this book will endeavour to construct the
image o f a society that has become 'non-social', where cultural categories
replace social categories, and where each person's relations with herself are
as important as mastering the world used to be.
Each time our view o f ourselves, our environment and our history
changes, we have the impression that the old world has collapsed in ruins
and that nothing is emerging to replace it. This is our sense today, but as
in the past I am going to try to construct a new representation o f social
life and thereby avoid the agonizing impression o f a loss of all meaning.
I hope that these initial sentences will not read as i f they were herald-
ing a catastrophe. The end of a world is not the end o f the world. The
upheaval we are living through is no more profound than those humanity
experienced i n recent centuries; and it is no more alarming to evoke the
end o f the social - in particular, the undermining o f social categories of
analysis and action - than it was in the past to evoke the end of specifi-
cally political societies and, earlier still, religious societies.

Ill

But just as we should not believe in the inevitability o f catastrophes, so it

must be admitted that the changes which are occurring cannot be reduced
to the emergence o f new technologies, to an expansion of the market, or
4 Introduction: A New Paradigm

to altered attitudes towards sexuality. The idea this book wishes to defend
is that we are changing paradigms in our representation o f collective and
personal life. We are emerging from the era when everything was expressed
and explained in social terms; and we must define the terms in which this
new paradigm is constructed - one whose novelty makes itself felt in all
aspects o f collective and personal life. I t is high time we knew where we
stand and which discourse on the world and on ourselves can render them
intelligible to us. Let us therefore start by registering the break that is
rapidly separating us from a still recent past, before we seek to define the
character o f this paradigm switch.
The aim of this book is to present the transition from one paradigm to
another, from a social language about collective life to a cultural language.
This transition is accompanied by a mutation caused by the rapid devel-
opment o f a direct relationship o f the subject to itself, without passing
through the meta-social intermediaries that pertain to a philosophy o f
history. This mutation, which is o f great importance in its own right, has
a still broader significance: collectivities turned outwards and to the con-
quest of the world are replaced by different ones, turned towards the inte-
rior o f themselves and of each of those who live in them. The last chapter
of this book will describe this major reversal, whose principal actors are
women.
To start off with at least, the approach pursued here may seem surpris-
ing or difficult to understand. But any inconvenience is easy to avoid:
readers should allow themselves to be carried along by the text. As you
read on, things will become easier and your critical reactions will be easier
to express because you will have understood that all the themes o f this
book are closely inter-related, without an unduly strict discipline being
imposed on the line of argument. A paradigm is not a puzzle.
As the contents page indicates, the book is divided into two parts. The
first analyses the end o f the social and the phenomena o f social decom-
position and de-socialization. I t is entitled 'When We Referred to Our-
selves in Social Terms'. The second part is called 'Now that We Refer to
Ourselves in Cultural Terms' and in it are to be found the two notions at
the centre o f the new paradigm: the subject and cultural rights.

IV

This introduction is limited to defining the transition from one mode o f

social analysis and action to another, in order to avoid endless questions
about the relationship between the truth and the various ways o f con-
structing it. We can understand ever more clearly the impatience with
which Michel Foucault wished to distance himself from the very general
 Introduction: A New Paradigm 5

categories that have partially paralysed political philosophy. He immersed

himself in concrete acts of creating and maintaining an order. He con-
structed the notion of discourse as the main object of his own work - and
with such success that in the United States one spoke of nothing but
narratives.
A discourse is a mode of domination that incorporates speech, rules and
classifications in a system o f domination or a 'microphysics o f power'.
Discourse is the tool o f an ever more tightly knit domination. Already for
Marx, economic categories were the discourse o f the capitalist class in
power.
I f I have not put discourse in the title o f this book, but paradigm, it is
so as to indicate straight away that my aim is to bring to light historical
entities that can never be reduced to forms o f domination, but where
protest, conflict and reform loom as large as the constraints of govem-
ability and census (and even larger). A paradigm is not only an instrument
in the hands o f the dominant order, but equally a construction of defences,
critiques and liberation movements. A l l these forms o f resistance are based
on non-social principles of legitimation. Any paradigm is a particular
form of appeal to some version or another o f what I call the subject, which
is the assertion, whose forms vary, of human beings' freedom and capac-
ity to create themselves and to transform themselves individually and col-
lectively. Subjectification - that is, the creation of the subject - can never
be confused with the subjection o f individuals and social categories. We
are not imprisoned; we are never reduced to saying that there is nothing
we can do. The idea o f paradigm makes room for the light as well as the
shade. While a discourse can be wholly devoted to surveillance and pun-
ishment, a paradigm highlights freedom as well as alienation, human
rights as well as an obsession with money, power and identity.

Paris - lie d' Yeu-Sassello

 PART ONE
When We Referred to
Ourselves in Social Terms
 he Break

9/11

On 11 September 2001 the United States of America received a body blow.

The symbols of the country's economic and military power - the twin
towers o f the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington - were attacked by suicide-planes. The towers were completely
destroyed and the deaths ran into the thousands. The population and
authorities o f New York reacted calmly, but this first attack on American
soil triggered a shock that convulsed the whole of American society.
President Bush quickly decided to pursue Osama bin Laden and the al-
Qaeda network in Afghanistan, where the terrorists were hiding among
the Taliban who had subjected the country to an extremist conception o f
Islamism and to their military power. World public opinion accepted this
retaliatory war, even i f it did not achieve its goals and got bogged down
in the ambiguities o f Pakistani politics.
This brief summary o f events that are still on everyone's mind should
not feature in an analysis of the deep changes in contemporary societies.
A n d yet it was rapidly evident, in particular for someone who found
himself at the New School University in the heart of Manhattan in Feb-
ruary and March 2003, that this shock brought about such profound rup-
tures throughout American society and in the whole world that it was
impossible not to take this dramatic event as the starting-point in an analy-
sis whose objective is different. I t signalled a long-term change.
Mention of 11 September above all prompts some scrutiny o f American
policy. How should we define its transformation, long in the making but
now dramatically evident? Since the collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1989,
the United States had dominated the global political stage so completely
10 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

that it did not have to develop a geo-politics. A l l the talk in the United
States and throughout the world was o f economic globalization, new tech-
nologies, the situation o f women, and so on. Bill Clinton was the master
of this formidable economic power and conducted a multilateralist
policy. Then all o f a sudden, the day after 11 September 2001, the official
language - that of the government and the establishment - changed
completely.
Economic problems disappeared from the front of the stage, mastering
new technologies seemed less gripping, and the public space was entirely
taken up with a bellicose language that was more geo-political than patri-
otic. A wounded America examined itself: 'Why don't they like us?' asked
Norman Mailer. But this soul-searching soon vanished before the imper-
ative o f capturing Osama bin Laden. Before long, condemnation focused
on Saddam Hussein, who in fact had no special relationship with al-
Qaeda; and very soon, in front o f a U N Security Council hostile to war,
President Bush and Tony Blair were seeking to prove the need for
intervention.
President Bush explained that the United States was threatened in the
short term by chemical and biological - perhaps even nuclear - warfare,
obliging it to resort to a pre-emptive war.
In the weeks preceding the military attack on Iraq, the American
political stage was almost entirely occupied by the President and Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The Democratic Party did not intervene.
Over and above their technical prowess, the major T V stations were mere
appendices of military HQ. The BBC World Service alone provided infor-
mation. I n the print media only the New York Times, the sole genuinely
national newspaper, adopted a certain independence o f stance after a long
silence and began to discuss the government's declarations and intentions.
In short, this country, where public opinion disposes of numerous, diverse
media, fell silent.
For months the only voices heard were those o f President Bush and his
Defense Secretary; and, still more, the voice of God, which the President
often heard and to whom the Cabinet prayed.
This country, which had been the first secular modern state, became
obsessed with its divine mission: the defence o f Good against Evil. These
words are to be taken in their most literal sense. I t is because America con-
sidered itself the leader o f the camp of the Good that it was able to con-
vince itself, through lies, falsehoods and intensive propaganda, that Iraq
headed the camp of Evil. I f we recall the actual weakness o f Iraq, already
conquered once without difficulty and which succumbed again almost
without a fight, we can get the measure of the unpredictable character of
the mutation of a country which, a few months earlier and following
President Bush's election in conditions verging on illegality, seemed wholly
 The Break 11

preoccupied with managing its own power and taking great strides on
the road of new technologies, outstripping Europeans incapable of
taking decisions and Japanese bogged down in an interminable banking
crisis.
One further remark, which is perhaps the most important for those who
are not Americans. The United States, which had created the system of
the United Nations (particularly the Security Council), rejected any inter-
vention by the international organization in its conflict with Iraq, while
seeking to obtain a majority in the Security Council by charging Secretary
of State Colin Powell with the humiliating task o f defending the official
position with arguments that carried no conviction. For two years the
United States went on justifying unilateralism. I t was responsible for
defending Good against Evil, it claimed, and would i f necessary conduct
several wars at once. I t expressed its contempt for 'old Europe' in brutal
terms and at the same time successfully sought to fracture the European
Union, whose member states were incapable o f agreeing an international
policy.
Some people think that the present period is merely an episode and that
the return of the Democrats to the Presidency will sooner or later put an
end to this ideological policy. But the latter was developed more than ten
years ago. Not since Wilson have we seen in the United States so signifi-
cant a group o f ideologues - and of high intellectual calibre - elaborate a
new conception of the role of the United States i n the world by commit-
ting their country to a series o f conflicts that might one day lead it to a
confrontation with others.
Eighteen months after 11 September, the break with the past took even
more brutal forms. Iraq, liberated from Saddam Hussein, rejected its
liberators but without descending into civil war or forming a united resist-
ance front. Harassed by the guerrillas, the American army resorted to
torture, like most armies that feel surrounded by a hostile population. A n d
as i f to render the identification o f its country with Good even more scan-
dalous, it increased its use of the most humiliating sexual abuses. Is not
the change of historical period and, behind that, o f societal type becom-
ing so dramatic as to force us to question ourselves on breaks that go far
beyond the political and military initiatives of the sole superpower?
In recalling facts that are familiar to everyone, my aim is not to give my
opinion on the policy developed by Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and a
whole host of others i n the service o f President Bush, but to register at
the very outset o f this book a mutation which, over and above the inter-
national policy o f the United States, affects the whole world. August 1914
was experienced as a mortal break in Europe; September 2001 marks the
end not only of an era, but above all o f a certain conception and a certain
modus operandi o f American society and o f the whole world.
12 W h e n We R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s In S o c i a l T e r m s

This sense of a break has been felt throughout the world. I t was further
reinforced with the re-election o f President Bush.

Fear

After the fall of the Communist state and empire, the talk was exclusively
of civil society and the relaxation of norms in all spheres - and hence o f
the liberation of individuals. None o f these themes was superficial and
none can be ignored when we undertake a general analysis o f social life.
But what we have experienced and understood in the last three years is
that the life of societies, even the wealthiest, most complex and best pro-
tected among them, remains dominated by fear, violence and war.
Many draw the conclusion that it is still necessary to prioritize weapons
over technologies, mistrust over trust - a notion that played such a central
role in the formation o f capitalism. The grip o f fear, this sense of a mortal
threat that is coming closer, this determination to conduct war against Evil
in the name o f a protective God, are not inventions, are not American
nightmares. September 11 is the date of a particular attack committed in
New York and Washington. But it had been preceded by others and fore-
shadowed others. In various points of a very diverse Arab-Muslim world,
we have seen the proliferation of 'volunteers' for a death that strikes them
as well as their enemies. Those who are called 'terrorists' on one side, and
'heroic fighters' against the enemies of God and Nation on the other, are
also warriors. I n a vast swathe of the world, attempts at modernization
have failed; and attempts to create Islamic states, having secured major
victories (especially in Iran), have been exhausted and seem in retreat. A n d
in France, as in the United States, over and above all social realities, there
emerges the idea of a holy war that must be conducted in the name o f
Good against Evil.
A t a lower level of violence, in many countries, even in a France armour-
plated in its republican consciousness, we see society fragmenting into
communities. A t the end o f the European nineteenth century, the transi-
tion from communities to society, from collective identities to the rule of
law, had emerged as a major advance. Are we living through a converse
movement - a return to communities imprisoned in themselves, led by an
authoritarian government, and rejecting other communities as enemies?
Many will say that these threats and conflicts are indeed dangerous, but
that it is artificial to reduce the West to the war policy o f George W. Bush
and that the authors of the attacks form only a tiny minority in the Islamic
world. Once, the whole of Latin America seemed to be in flames. But the
fires were extinguished and the military dictatorships, which presented
themselves as the only agencies capable of putting an end to the
 The Break 13

guerrillas and unleashed a much more bloody violence, fell in their turn.
N o one is satisfied with the current situation, but no one reduces the life
of the continent to a dependency endured by countries deprived o f any
possibility of acting. Even Africa, where there is such a mass o f misery
and poverty, cannot not be reduced to ethnic struggles and bloody
dictatorships.
Indeed, let us not conclude, before even having begun our reflection,
that war and communitarian violence will destroy everything in their path.
But let us not be satisfied either with considering these struggles to the
death as so many accidents or exceptional cases. For, i f we look around
us, we shall see societies that have been destroyed, turned upside down,
and manipulated. We have always known that public life was more often
dominated by the passions than the interests. But increasingly in today's
world, the passions aim to negate the other rather than struggle with it.

A world in decline

Forced to leave their countries on account of poverty, social violence and

wars, hundreds o f millions of human beings are thrown onto the roads
and into refugee camps. Some o f them, particularly in China, find a way
of surviving in the cities - or even of embarking on a new type o f social
life. But these 'ex-peasant peasants' (as Farhad Khosrokhavar calls them),
all these unemployed youth attracted by the reflections o f urban con-
sumption but who cannot integrate into middle classes protected by re-
distributive states, and, with them, so many others belonging to various
categories from top to bottom of the social scale o f all continents, expe-
rience geographical and socio-cultural changes that destroy them, rather
than ushering them into modernity.
We have acquired the habit in our part o f the world of observing that
advances in living standards and policies o f social solidarity abolish or
reduce the great poverty characteristic of industrialization at the outset.
Yet we no longer believe, even in the richest countries, that it is enough to
endure half o f a century o f hard work in order to arrive at a better way
of life. I n the richest countries, whose citizens are the best protected, the
balance sheet o f recent decades is negative. Social inequalities are increas-
ing; social scales are becoming too compressed; the 'golden boys' are not
at the top o f society, but beyond it, and the insecure and excluded are not
at the bottom, but below the scale, suspended in a void.
The conquests o f the working-class movement and the power o f trade
unions had made it possible for the welfare state to create remarkable
systems of social protection in the industrialized countries. But today
they are losing their power and everywhere fall-back strategies must be
14 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

organized to safeguard an acceptable level of cover for illness, the payment

of pensions, care for dependants, and recourse to ever more costly medical
treatment and examination. These delaying actions are not conducted by
the poorest categories, but on the contrary by those with the greatest
capacity for exerting direct pressure on the state: by threatened middle
classes rather than by the poor and weak. The latter, the most disadvan-
taged, fade into obscurity, sink into marginality or illegality.
Must we conclude from these pessimistic observations that our societies,
which experienced immense social innovations in the past, are now
reduced to silence, as i f everywhere the din o f war and crusades was sti-
fling activity, all social, internal conflict - especially in the Western coun-
tries? I t is true that the new social movements which emerged after 1968
were rapidly exhausted and that the hopes placed in them by different cat-
egories o f intellectual - and first o f all by myself - have been disappointed.
The small groups of the extreme left, while they afford political expression
to those who no longer recognize themselves in the traditional parties, can
offer neither a long-term strategy nor objectives o f struggle.
So it is not to the old left and the very old extreme left that we must
look for new ideas. Even i f the influence of the working-class movement
remains considerable i n our institutions and our ideas, and even i f the
post-1968 anti-authoritarian movements have had a real influence on
the situation of patients i n hospitals, immigrant workers, homosexuals or
defenders of local cultures, 'social problems' have not led to the creation
of major 'social movements'. The close link that once joined the economic
demands and political struggles o f wage-earners has been broken and it is
the parties of the left that have suffered most from this separation. France
has witnessed the virtual disappearance of the Communist Party; and the
unforeseen electoral defeat of Lionel Jospin in A p r i l 2002 requires o f the
French left, as o f that in many countries, an almost complete redefinition
of itself. Outside of the United States, the parties o f the right are defined
exclusively by their submission to the superpower. ;

Where is meaning to be found?

A l l these negative observations pertain to the much larger theme o f the

decomposition o f society, o f de-socialization, which will take up much
space in subsequent chapters. But to these two images which force them-
selves on our observation - de-socialization (i.e. the decline o f the social)
and the permeation everywhere o f myriad forms o f violence, rejecting all
'social' norms and values - we must add a third, which is as obvious as
the first two: a rise in cultural demands, both in neo-communitarian form
and in that of an appeal to a personal subject; and the demand for cul-
 The Break 15

tural rights. Once we spoke of 'social actors' and social movements. I n the
world we have already moved into, we shall invariably have to speak o f
personal subjects and 'cultural movements'.
We no longer believe in progress. We are acutely anxious about the
decomposition o f cities and rural zones, about social violence and holy
wars alike. This does not condemn us to a pessimism all too easy to live
with for most members of the world's middle classes. But it does prompt
us to pose the question: where is the movement, the force, that will stop
war to come from?
This book would like to offer an answer to that question by exploring
the deepest changes that have occurred in our societies. It takes the risk o f
setting itself an objective that is very difficult to achieve, because it is
impossible to live without searching for answers to the threats that hang
over us and the transformations that have already led us to make the tran-
sition from one type o f society to another.
I have opted in this first chapter to give more space to events than analy-
sis or the formulation of a general view within which particular points
would assume their place. This reportage, which remains removed from
theoretical issues, is intended to help us to situate the main actors in a con-
crete historical situation.
The principal actor is obviously the United States. But the immensity
and diversity o f the social space in which it develops make it difficult not
to succumb both to the demonization of its government and the fascina-
tion exercised by a country that governs the whole world's mass con-
sumption and communications, and which enjoys an overwhelming
scientific and technological lead over other countries.
How to proceed? We must, I believe, regard the United States as the
quintessential refugee country and, at the same time, as a country o f con-
quest, discovery and conflict that rendered its internal life at once fasci-
nating and disturbing. Today, despite the massive arrival o f Hispanics, the
United States is less concerned with its internal problems than with its
international role. From the Vietnam War to the occupation of Iraq, this
prompted a rise in debates, divisions and even confrontations that render
today's United States a country closer to the United Kingdom in 1904 than
the United States of 1954. This country, turned inwards and proud of its
success, is now confronted with popular movements and state policies that
attack its hegemony and its military ventures.
The 'Western world', a vague but real entity, has dissolved and we have
seen an abrupt decline in the role o f Great Britain. A n all-powerful
America is much less interested than it used to be in Europe and Latin
America. Between the United States and China there exist only some very
secondary decision-making centres, of which the European Union is the
most visible, and a confused mass that is called the Islamic world, torn
16 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

between attempts at modernization that have already failed and attempts

at fundamentalist regression and bellicose ventures.
This rapid geopolitical sketch is first o f all intended to indicate that we
should not look to the strictly political level for an explanation of con-
temporary developments but to the global level, and a purely political
analysis is insufficient for these purposes.

As I have already indicated, my starting-point is that we are witnessing the

decomposition o f the 'social'. The analysis of social reality in specifically
social terms succeeded the 'political' world that had dominated us for a
long time, and which began with Machiavelli and, passing via Hobbes and
Rousseau, lasted until Tocqueville. The crisis and decomposition of the
social paradigm of social life have created a chaos into which have rushed
violence, war and the domination of markets that elude any social
regulation - but also the obsession with identity of the various
communitarianisms.
Social organization, threatened from 'above' by what we call globaliza-
tion, can no longer find resources for its recovery within itself. I t is 'below',
in an increasingly radical and passionate appeal to the individual, and no
longer to society, that we seek the force capable o f resisting violence o f all
kinds. I t is in this highly diverse, individualistic universe that many seek
and discover a 'meaning' no longer to be found in social and political insti-
tutions - and which alone can generate the demands and hopes capable of
creating a different conception of political life.
Are not the three themes that I have just mentioned - (1) the decom-
position o f the social; (2) the rise of forces situated above society: war,
markets, communitarianism, personal and interpersonal violence; and
finally (3) the appeal to individualism as the principle o f a 'morality' -
interlinked? Is it not the decline of the social that provokes both a rise in
violence and recourse to the personal subject?
In my view, the central proposition on which a positive social analysis
can be reconstructed is that the invasion of the social field by impersonal
forces (which can be called non-social) can no longer be contested by social
reforms won by a social movement. I t can only be done by appealing to
principles o f action that are themselves non-social, since they directly
involve human rights. When everything is a matter of life and death, public
interventions are insufficient to resolve problems. Life is not only that
which is; it is also the movement whereby actors, rather than identifying
with an external value or goal, discover in themselves, in the defence of
their own freedom, their capacity for acting in a self-referential way, as did
'society' previously. I n this way a meaning is created that resists the logic
of power and markets, and equally that of communitarian integration. But
it must be added, even before presenting these hypotheses in greater depth,
 The Break 17

that this self-conscious subject is in no way reducible to an attitude of

internal meditation, of a quest for the self by eliminating the influences
exerted on the ego by the external world. It asserts itself above all by strug-
gling against what alienates it and prevents it from acting in accordance
with its self-construction. The personal subject struggles against the forms
of social life that tend to destroy it, but equally against the type of
individualism that is manipulated by the stimulation of markets and
programmes. A t the same time, in countries and categories that define
themselves primarily by the domination they suffer, communitarian
demands develop in negative fashion. They offer powerful support to self-
assertion as a subject, but also constantly tend to destroy it.
Rather than being an emancipatory word, the subject is action and con-
sciousness that invariably assert themselves only in their fight against the
organized forces which, while imparting concrete existence to the subject,
risk overturning it, in accordance with the familiar model of religious,
political and social movements which, in the name of a god, the people,
or liberty and equality, seized power and suppressed personal freedoms,
like Lenin at the end of 1917.
The subject is neither a 'dash of spirit', nor a tool in the hands of the
founders of public or private administrative apparatuses.
We shall only be in a position to formulate a definition of the new para-
digm at the end of Part One. But we can already see that it is defined
neither as a stage in progress nor as an ideology or representation of the
world. The decomposition of social and cultural entities enclosed in them-
selves, in the manner of the holistic systems analysed by Louis Dumont,
releases increasingly uncontrolled forces of change - as is the case with
globalized capitalism. It also releases various types of crisis, rupture and
violence, which also express the general process of de-socialization (i.e. the
dissolution of mechanisms of affiliation to groups and institutions capable
of perpetuating their integration and managing their transformation).
However, it likewise liberates a relationship to oneself, a consciousness of
freedom and responsibility that was imprisoned by institutional mecha-
nisms whose role was to impose values, norms, forms of authority and a
set of social representations on everyone. This dual separation can just as
easily result in the undermining (even disappearance) of the specifically
social space, as in the emergence of different institutions.
The analysis I am undertaking is normative: it is based on the idea that
in today's society there exist forces destructive of social actors, which
operate by invoking natural necessity, and, facing them, forms of the
subject (religious, political, social or moral), which resist whatever threat-
ens freedom. Between the two, institutions persist (or are even reinforced)
that strive to impart form to the autonomy of the social. For, today as yes-
terday, it is not inevitable that good will prevail or evil triumph; nor is it
18 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

certain that the social world is sufficiently strong to resist the power of the
elements it has itself unleashed. While my analysis is normative, it is not
apologetic.
As a sociologist, obviously I am not seeking to destroy sociology. But it
must be clearly understood that there is no convincing reason to identify
sociology with the analysis of an exclusive path (or step) o f moderniza-
tion. Let us not forget that i f 'social' categories are disintegrating today,
they replaced 'political' categories less than two centuries ago. Moreover,
sociological analysis does not take shape in isolation from the observable
facts. I would not speak o f the crisis of the social, o f the rise of non-social
violence, and o f the personal subject i f all these phenomena were not
already observable around us and within us.
I appeal here neither to a past golden age nor to a new conception of
progress. I t is of our experience that I speak, and in the first instance of
the historical situation in which the paradigm change that this book seeks
to account for occurs.
 Globalization

From the post-war states to the globalization of

the economy

After the Second World War, both in the new countries founded on the
ruins of the colonial system and in the Communist countries and the
majority of Western countries, voluntaristic states emerged that sought to
create a new nation, to restore an economy destroyed by war, or to rapidly
improve workers' living conditions.
The welfare state, established in Britain in 1943 by the Beveridge
Plan, was certainly very different from the French system of social
security created in 1945. But in both cases, as in others, the key figure
in economic and social life was clearly the state, both because it alone
possessed sufficient resources to give impetus to an economic policy,
and because immediately after the war social and national upheavals
dictated a profound transformation of the laws and very definition of
political life.
Accordingly, the state intervened in all domains (economic, social and
cultural), often in authoritarian fashion, but, in the case of most Western
countries, with the intention of combining profound social reforms and a
transformation in national consciousness with economic reconstruction.
In Europe hopes of achieving a form of economic development more
attuned to social problems than the American model persisted for a long
time. Thus, Michel Albert has contrasted Rhenish capitalism (i.e. of a
German variety), in which co-management and unions play an important
role, with Anglo-Saxon capitalism, whose objectives are exclusively eco-
nomic. A n d it was only at the end of the twentieth century that Rhenish
capitalism came to seem more of a handicap than a driving force, amid
20 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social T e r m s

the triumph of international markets and the rapidity with which liberal
decision-makers could act.
In fact, all the economic aspects of this state interventionism more or
less rapidly fell into decay, especially in countries that no longer possessed
efficient public administration and where there was corruption. However,
until the beginning o f the twenty-first century the idea that the national-
ization o f economic activities was vital for the country's progress persisted
in some countries. I n France, in particular, a quasi-religious conception of
nationalization was created; and during the great strike of 1995 one could
still hear rail workers and their friends extol the state as the bearer of uni-
versal values in the face of a bourgeoisie that only defended particular
interests.
Despite this resistance, the new mode of modernization, based on
free enterprise and the central role of the market in allocating resources,
was rapidly established everywhere. Thus, control and regulation of the
economy were less and less based on objectives or norms foreign to eco-
nomics. Throughout the last quarter o f the twentieth century, the inter-
ventionist state was virtually universally (and completely) replaced both
by a state that primarily sought to attract foreign investment and facilitate
national exports, and by firms that increasingly formed part of transna-
tional entities and were combined with financial networks which, relying
on new mathematical techniques, can derive significant profits from the
circulation of information in real time. These rapid changes are the direct
result o f an internationalization o f production and exchange that was to
result in the globalization o f the economy.
M y intention is not to describe this globalization of the economy in
detail. But we must situate it in historical terms in order to be able to
understand its impact on the break-up of contemporary societies.
Let us therefore return to the period that began in the mid-1970s up
until the fall o f the Berlin Wall, and ended with the attack that destroyed
the towers of the World Trade Center in New York. This period began
with the oil crisis - in other words, a massive transfer of resources from
Japan and Western Europe to the oil-producing countries, which placed
their reserves i n New York banks so as to generate interest - something
that already indicated a form of globalization of the economy. For at least
thirty years, despite the aggressiveness of the Soviet camp at the beginning
of the period, the Western world had taken a considerable lead in virtu-
ally all sectors o f industrial and economic life, where the United States
assumed an increasingly dominant position. A n economic view of history
became established, according ever more importance to economic and
technological factors in social change. The globalization of markets; the
growth of transnational firms; the formation of networks whose crucial
importance has been clearly highlighted by Manuel Castells; the new effec-
 Globalization 21

tiveness o f a financial system capable o f transmitting information in real

time; the diffusion by the mass media, advertising, and firms themselves
of mass cultural goods that were invariably American - all these
phenomena, by now familiar to everyone, have created a globalization
characterized, according to many analysts, both by a rapid expansion o f
participation in international trade and by the ascendancy o f a capitalism
whose decision-making centres are invariably American. A n d indeed the
world now seems controlled by a virtually limitless expansion of the
American model.
However, from the outset ecologists stressed the impossibility o f a gen-
eralization o f this model; and protesters were soon demonstrating in all
parts o f the world, while uprisings against the United States multiplied.
More recently, the serious consequences o f the stock-market crisis, trig-
gered by strong speculation on technological stocks and shares, have
increased distrust o f large firms, which appear less as the vanguard o f
modernization than as agents of rampant speculation, or as sources o f
direct enrichment for their directors. A t the turn of the century, anti-
capitalist movements came to dominate an important section o f public
opinion, resulting in a capacity for massive mobilization of discontented
wage-earners and consumers. Thus, we are witnessing the formation of an
important movement o f opposition to globalization - a movement which
soon chose to change its name, in order to make it clearer that its aim was
to construct a different kind o f global organization (alter-globalization).

An extreme capitalism

I f the theme of globalization has assumed central political importance, it

is for a reason that is not so much economic as ideological: those who sung
the praises of globalization most loudly in fact wanted to impose the idea
that no mode of social or political regulation o f a globalized economy was
any longer possible or desirable, since the economy was situated at a global
level and no authority capable o f imposing limits on economic activity at
this level existed. The very idea of globalization in effect contained the
desire to construct an extreme capitalism, released from any external influ-
ence, exercising power over the whole o f society. I t is this ideology of a
capitalism without limits that has provoked so much enthusiasm and so
much protest.
The long history o f national capitalisms is profoundly bound up with
the general history of each country. This is no longer the case today, for
the only powerful institutions at a global level - banks and especially the
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization - seek
to impose an economic logic on states, rather than social and political
22 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

objectives on economic actors. For many years, this enthusiasm for glob-
alization was contested above all by the defenders of local or national
interests and of products requiring national protection in order to ensure
their survival in global competition - European and N o r t h American
farmers, for example. Despite everything, the World Trade Organization
was decisively strengthened when China became a member of it. A n d local
resistance has largely fused into a planetary movement of opposition both
to global capitalism and to American power, which is its main support.
The Porto Alegre World Social Forum has been its Mecca.
Some think that the undermining or decomposition of national soci-
eties and states constitutes a step towards the creation of a political and
cultural life at a global level as well as an economic one. Does not this idea
conform to what we have long observed - namely, the constitution of
increasingly large social entities? I n this respect, the formation of national
states, imposing their power on local lords or collectivities, towns or
monasteries, was sufficiently protracted and tumultuous for us to be pre-
pared for the development o f a global society being slow and difficult, but
also inevitable.
Such a hypothesis cannot be excluded. But when we seek to identify a
more limited period, we feel ourselves being pointed in the opposite direc-
tion: not towards the formation of a global society, but towards a growing
separation between economic mechanisms, which operate at a global level,
and political, social and cultural organizations, which only act at a more
limited level, losing all capacity for interaction with the global level. As a
result, what is called society is breaking up, since a society is defined by
the interdependence in the same territorial entity of the most diverse
sectors of collective activity. Accordingly, does not the globalization of the
economy necessarily entail the decline of the national state and, conse-
quently, an ever more massive deregulation of the economy?
These rapid indications enable us to bring out the main cultural and
social implications of globalization. The most obvious is the creation of a
mass society in which the same material and cultural products circulate in
countries with very different living standards and cultural traditions. This
by no means signifies a general standardization of consumption and the
'Americanization' of the whole world. On the contrary, we see diverse, con-
flicting currents combining. The first is the cultural influence exerted by
the major firms of consumption and leisure: Hollywood is indeed the
dream factory of the whole world. But it will also be observed that it does
not thereby bring about the disappearance of local products. For we are
witnessing a diversification of consumption in the richest countries. In
New York, London or Paris, there are more foreign restaurants than before
and one can see more films from other parts of the world. Finally, we are
also witnessing a resurgence of forms of social and cultural life that are
 Globalization 23

traditional or nourished by a desire to protect a regional or national

culture which is under threat. But everywhere, as a result o f these con-
flicting tendencies, the decline of traditional forms o f social and political
life and o f national management of industrialization is accelerating.
The clearest case is that o f the trade unions. I n France, for example,
unionization of the private sector has become very weak, above all in
small and medium-sized firms. English trade unionism, dominated by the
mine workers' union and the left, was defeated by Margaret Thatcher and
has not recovered from this defeat. In the United States, where the rate o f
unionization is higher, unions have little influence and the era o f Walter
Reuther and the large autoworkers' union is very distant.
In the 1980s and 1990s, when the Soviet empire was fracturing, the
theme of the information and communications society, based on the
development o f the Internet and financial networks, became established
in world public opinion. This was a fairly brief but decisive period, during
which war and imperialisms seemed to be stripped o f meaning by the end
of the struggle between the two blocs and the undermining o f what used
to be called the Third World. Social thought assigned key importance to
the analysis of a new type o f society, with broader contours than indus-
trial or post-industrial society, and even than the information society,
which had been defined by technologies that created what Georges
Friedmann had called a new industrial revolution. This type o f thinking
was also different from that which had governed analyses focused on the
confrontation between capitalism and socialism, or on the problems o f
many countries' dependence on an external decision-making power.
The information society was created by entrepreneurs o f a new kind,
enthusiastic and swept along by a new conception o f society. This was true
of the Linux group, created in California by veritable knights (or monks!)
of computer science, who developed an ethic of enjoyment opposed to the
Puritanism so well described by Max Weber, and which at a different level
plays the role once performed by the Saint-Simonians in France at the
beginning o f industrialization. This information society is built on a new
mode of knowledge, new investments, and a changed representation o f the
objectives o f work and social organization.

The rupturing of societies

But are we really dealing with a new society? I n previous types o f society,
the technical mode o f production was inseparable from a social mode o f
production. I n industrial society, the organization o f work as defined by
Taylor and then Ford consisted in transforming manual work so as to
obtain the greatest possible profit; and payment by productivity, which was
24 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social Terms

so widespread, was above all an extreme form o f class domination. I n con-

trast, the world of information is purely technological - that is, its tech-
niques are socially neutral and do not in themselves have inevitable social
consequences. Does this mean that it no longer contains any relations of
domination? Obviously not. But class conflicts, i f they can be called that,
are now situated at the level of overall and especially financial manage-
ment, rather than at the level o f work and the organization o f production.
Industrial society was based on the factory or the workshop; and it was
at this level too that trade unions emerged, with their demands, their
strikes and their collective bargaining. The image suggested by globaliza-
tion is that of networks o f information and exchange which might possess
practically no material existence; and the transformation of firms over the
last twenty years has often consisted in outsourcing sectors of production,
in fragmenting, and thus considerably reducing, the size o f firms. The now
classic image o f a central core o f the firm made up o f 'symbol manipula-
tors', as Reich calls them, captures the decline in importance o f 'produc-
tive' workers well.
Major conflicts now take shape around the orientation o f historical
change, of modernization. To adopt an important distinction, the social
movements formed in one type o f society are replaced by historical
movements that respond to a type of management of historical change.
Globalization, it must be repeated, is an extreme form of capitalism that
no longer has any counterweight. The class struggle thus disappears not
because relations between employers and wage-earners have become
pacific, but because conflicts have been displaced from internal problems
of production to the global strategies of transnational firms and financial
networks.
The movements opposed to globalization devote most o f their time to
criticizing the policy o f the United States and the richest countries, while
seeking to impart form to the very many grass-roots movements consti-
tuted in various countries. But they have not hitherto been able to propose
a general analysis o f the conflicts that are taking shape at the global level.
The ecological movement finds itself in a similar situation. I t defends
nature, the Earth; it attacks those who destroy the environment and
defends the idea o f sustainable development - that is, the interests o f those
who are too remote in space or time to make themselves heard. But it
comes up against the resistance of states and has obtained only limited
results.
The notion of social classes became established in an age when the
various categories of wage-earners, starting with manual workers, were
predominantly defined by social relations experienced in work. When we
refer to globalization, it is necessary to use general categories; and the
category of classes is insufficiently general. Moreover, what is most often
 Globalization 25

referred to today is humanity, future generations, or poor nations, rather

than a socially defined category. The definition o f the historical actor is
no longer given in social terms but in a different kind of vocabulary, more
directly implicating the dignity o f certain individuals, the conditions for
the planet's survival, or the diversity o f cultures. Specifically social notions,
like that o f social class, lose their explanatory power and mobilizing force.
The dominant role o f the market, competition and coalitions o f
interests, not to mention corruption, is nothing new. A n d i f we refer to
'neo-liberalism', it is precisely because the late nineteenth century was
dominated by liberalism, before trade unionism and the 'working-class'
parties introduced new modes of regulation o f the economy by the state,
and elements of universal social protection, as well as a redistribution o f
income. What is new is the fact that competition no longer pits compara-
ble countries against one another, as was the case when Great Britain,
Germany, the United States or Fiance entered into competition and at the
same time signed economic and political agreements to open up markets.
It sets the rich, more or less 'social-democratic' countries against countries
where wages are lower and unions non-existent (and where there some-
times exists a vast sector of forced labour). It has hitherto been impossi-
ble to co-ordinate social and fiscal policies inside the European Union.
This new situation must be accepted. I t would be futile to think that bar-
riers could be erected around a national economy. Such a policy would
have - in the past has had - very negative results. State intervention must
no longer serve to keep non-competitive firms in existence or to offer guar-
antees to certain social categories, for political reasons and in defiance of
all economic rationality. The resistance of the European countries to this
transformation is considerable, but it is increasingly in retreat.
No political problem is more important for these countries, and for
those that have adopted a comparable social model, than the search for a
new mode of political intervention which does not damage competitive-
ness but nevertheless protects the population against the brutality o f a
liberal economy over which most countries can exert no influence. The
specifically political difficulty of this problem is demonstrated by the
number of governments, in numerous countries, that have come a cropper
over it. Even greater is the difficulty o f developing a set of interventions
in favour o f those whose personality is shattered or exhausted in the face
of repeated aggression, and of those who can no longer find a j o b that
suits them. A n d as social protection must be strengthened at the same time
as the struggle against inequality, it is difficult to fix in abstracto the extent
of the budgetary shift acceptable to a population that aspires to measure
the progress made.
Those who find these tasks too difficult to accomplish, and want the
state to make do with offering aid to those who already demand the most,
26 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

lead their country to ruin. There will always be an acute tension between
the race for creativity and competitiveness and the endeavour to enable the
maximum number o f inhabitants o f each country to construct their lives
and have an influence on their environment.
European firms have made great progress and have internationalized
themselves. But the European effort i n terms o f the production, diffusion
and application o f knowledge remains insufficient; and to varying degrees
there is a pervasive failure to equip each person with the possibility o f
being a well prepared, well protected, well informed and clearly oriented
actor in social life. N o solution is to be found either in the preservation of
the current welfare state, or in the acceptance of an unrestricted liberal-
ism. Only a renewal of our ideas about society and its transformation can
enable us to conceive the social policies that will allow us to supersede the
welfare state, by altering its objectives and especially the modalities of
public intervention.

Alter-globalism

Let us sum up. Globalization does not define a stage of modernity, a new
industrial revolution. I t occurs at the level of ways of managing historical
change. I t corresponds to an extreme capitalist mode of modernization -
a category that should not be confused with a type of society, such as
feudal society or industrial society. A n d war, be it hot or cold, belongs to
this world of competition, confrontation and empire, not to that o f soci-
eties and their internal problems, including their class struggles.
A very diverse range of demands has gathered around the general theme
of anti-globalization, seeking to converge in the project of an alternative
globalization. The success of the Porto Alegre forum derives from the
fact that it has attempted to assemble social movements and currents o f
opinion which aim to give a positive meaning to the demonstrations in
Seattle, Gothenburg, Genoa, and many others elsewhere, which had a pre-
dominantly critical function. A movement has thus been organized, as
powerful as it is diverse, that challenges the most important leaders o f the
global economy.
A wave of sympathy has accompanied these Davids defying the Goliaths
of international finance. A n d the state o f the economy, so often presented
as a step in progress, now seems to many to be a construct that serves the
privileged and harms the poorest. I f the anti-global movement has re-
baptized itself alter-globalist, it is (as we have said) in order clearly to indi-
cate that it is not against the global opening up of production and trade
and that it is fighting for a different globalization - one which would not
ride roughshod over the weak, local interests, minorities, and the environ-
 Globalization 27

the exclusive benefit of those who already possess wealth, power

.itluence.
i'he alter-globalist movement occupies as important a place today as
socialism did in the early decades o f industrial society. Both struggle above
all against the capitalist direction of the economy and society. Conse-
quently, both have attacked and do attack a mode of development, rather
than a type of society defined by forms of production, organization and
authority. The alter-globalist movement calls for democratic management
of major historical changes. This role is, and will remain, different from
that o f trade unionism in industrial society, which was a social movement
of central importance in a given type o f society. But the weakness of alter-
globalism, which is as manifest as its success, derives from the fact that it
has not succeeded in clearly defining in whose name, on behalf o f what
interests or what conception of society, it is fighting. As a result, a certain
confusion has set in between the defence o f certain established interests
and demands actually being pressed in the name of the most directly dom-
inated categories. Conversely, it would be an error to regard this move-
ment simply as a loose coalition o f minority groups. The same error was
made in connection with the initial movement to defend the Larzac
plateau, which wasn't backward-looking, but on the contrary undertaken
by innovative farmers fighting against the unproductive extension of a mil-
itary camp. The alter-globalist movement is a key component o f our age,
because it is directly opposed to globalization as the ambition to eliminate
all forms o f social and political regulation of economic activity.
I n conclusion to this evocation of globalization, what are we to say o f
the period in which it has dominated economic reality and social thought?
That we have made the transition from a period dominated by the struc-
tural problems generated by a socio-economic system to an age in which
it is the triumph of capitalism - hence o f a certain way of managing his-
torical change, o f modernization - which occupies the central position.
This is the principal meaning of globalization. We must now examine what
followed the great turning-point o f 11 September.

From society to war

It is more difficult, but even more necessary, to define what sets this short
period, which I have defined in a figurative way as one symbolically extend-
ing from the fall o f the Berlin Wall to the destruction of the towers o f the
World Trade Center, apart from the great break that put an end to it and
saw the spirit o f war triumph. Contrary to what is often said, the period
of globalization remained characterized by the accelerated circulation of
goods and services, but also of cultural works and practices - and even of
28 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

social and political representations. I t was no longer the logic o f a type o f

society that was being imposed, but it was not yet that o f a crusade or an
empire. The period primarily defined by globalization was dominated by
finance capital more than by industrial capital, which led to the bursting
of the technological bubble. But it saw a mode o f transformation o f the
world that remained multilateral. The United States did not yet consider
itself exclusively invested with the duty of saving the world. A n d those
who were opposed to globalization, while formulating just criticisms o f it,
did not realize that it was precisely during this period that a multicultural
sensibility asserted itself. I n the current phase of American policy, multi-
culturalism has been abandoned. I t is no longer a question o f under-
standing the other and recognizing the differences between the Western
cultural model and the Islamic model, for example, but o f combating
Islam - or rather those who wage war in its name. The wave of anti-
Americanism, which has continued to grow, especially since the beginning
of the Second Intifada and the Iraq war, too often intimates that there is
no change in a world completely dominated by American power. On the
contrary, the changes are profound and rapid: a civil vision has been
replaced by a military vision. In the years prior to 2001, the United States
- and consequently most o f the world - which lived in a society dominated
by economic and technological problems, and by the rise o f new social
movements - in particular, feminism and political ecology - still had a
sense of living through a comprehensive transformation o f the world that
was not entirely in the hands of governments. Globalization was releasing
the economy from all the other sectors o f society, and society was domi-
nated by the economy; the new warriors were not yet in power.
The transition from a logic o f society - or, more precisely, of social
change - to that o f war can also be seen among the Islamists. Major
projects to refound Islamic republics, in the spirit of Khomeini, failed and
were abandoned. Those who prepared and carried out the attack of 11
September were combatants with a different objective: to destroy and
terrorize the enemy, like the Palestinian fighters, in a logic which has been
(and still is) that of activists in a national cause ready to die for the liber-
ation of their country.
Even i f we cannot see the transition from one logic to another with suf-
ficient clarity, we have a strong sense that our categories for analysing
social life are rapidly disintegrating, are no longer o f use to us. Our
internal problems are now governed by events that happen at a global or
continental level. We are gradually stopping defining ourselves as social
beings. Well before the idea o f a holy war became established, we already
spoke less frequently of the problems of work and professional life. They
were masked by the problems of employment - that is, unemployment and
job insecurity. A n d when the wage-earners of a factory closed by its
 Globalization 29

owners for reasons o f relocation, even though it was profitable, went on

strike, occupied the factory, blocked the roads, or threatened to blow
everything up, television viewers were moved by their misfortune, but did
not associate themselves with any protest.
We have gradually discovered that the events, the political conflicts, the
social crises that occur in our vicinity are governed by distant events. Local
circumstances do not really contain the meaning of the events that unfold
there, even though the local situation adds a secondary meaning to events
that are predominantly explicable at a global level.
Since the Second World War we have known that it is necessary to look
to the world stage for an explanation o f local news - notably with the Cold
War and the extension of the Communist regime to a vast China. Further
still, in the course of recent years it has become clear that the centre-point
of global conflicts is the strip o f land shared by Israelis and Palestinians.

A globalized world

France, more so than other countries, is experiencing the indirect conse-

quences o f this confrontation, because Jews and Arabs form large com-
munities there. They have long lived side by side in relative calm, but since
the second Intifada, which has transformed the guerrilla movements into
fights to the death, we have seen the construction of 'communities' in
neighbourhoods and secondary schools; insults and abuse have been
exchanged between Jews and Arabs. Anti-Semitic acts have increased
markedly in quantity and gravity, and a vigorous publicity campaign has
been launched in America to denounce the anti-Semitism that is sup-
posedly resurgent in France, raising the spectre o f the campaigns formerly
waged against Captain Dreyfus and recalling the anti-Jewish laws o f
Vichy. However, the attacks are of a different kind: racist references have
become rare; on the other hand, attacks on Israel predominate and Jews
are accused o f using the Shoah they suffered to repress the Palestinian
national movement with the utmost violence. A t the same time, small neo-
Nazi groups have been desecrating Jewish and Arab graves.
How can we fail to see that the explanation for anti-Semitism in France,
inseparable from anti-Arab racism, is to be found in Jerusalem as much as
Paris? We must turn to the war to the death tearing Palestine apart for the
reasons for an anti-Israelism containing an anti-Semitism reinforced by
themes derived from French reality - in particular, the unequal way in
which France treats Jews and Arabs. A n d it is almost uniquely against
Arabs that we see the development of a racism tempered by the fact that
anti-Islamism is primarily cultural.
30 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social T e r m s

The attack o f 11 September 2001 in New York cannot be reduced to its

local dimension either: it was a challenge, launched by al-Qaeda, to
American power and the second Iraq war has bolstered this interpretation
from one month to the next. The Islamic world and the United States
are confronting each other and each camp can strike at any point on the
globe.
But this situation has also led to the emergence o f humanitarian action,
conveyed in the theme o f the need to intervene in the affairs o f a state that
massively violates the basic rights o f a section o f its population. A n d ,
despite the weakness o f their resources, it is from Amnesty International,
the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières and Médecins du Monde that
we receive the most reliable information on the dramas and scandals trou-
bling the world, whereas our governments seem to be bogged down in sub-
altern problems and Europe itself seems incapable of intervening beyond
its own borders.
How can we discuss the idea of globalization without referring to what
contrasts most starkly with it, provoking such passion - the idea o f a clash
of civilizations as expounded by Samuel R Huntington in his book o f that
title? Whereas the idea o f globalization suggests a world dominated by
firms or economic and financial networks, vectors o f goods, services,
shares and interests, Huntington's thesis resorts to the notion o f civiliza-
tion, the word being employed in the plural - that is, in a very different
sense from the one given it in eighteenth-century France, and which cor-
responds more closely to the German idea o f Kultur. He does so in order
to argue that the principal conflicts in the contemporary world involve
much more than economics and politics: the opposition o f global com-
plexes, predominantly cultural and especially religious, sustained by states
that have a strong mobilizing capacity.
In fact, this general idea is applied to two rather different kinds o f con-
flict. First, it is applied to confrontations that are simultaneously cultural,
social and political, like those that tore Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia apart.
Next, it is used o f conflicts for world domination, like that opposing the
West to the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, the one opposing the United
States to Islam today, and the one which will oppose it to China tomor-
row - unless the latter decides not to wait before committing its power to
the struggle for world domination. Between these two types o f extreme
exist what are known as 'intermediate' cases - in particular, those where
the struggle essentially aims at the conquest of political power and where
cultures (in the first instance, religions) are simply 'resources' mobilized by
the contending parties against one another.
Samuel Huntington depicts a multi-polar world for us and stresses the
decline of the West, which long believed that it enjoyed a monopoly on
modernity and power and that it alone embodied the idea of universal-
 Globalization 31

ism. His thesis would be weak i f it merely staged a very unequal struggle
between a central empire and peripheral societies or states incapable of
genuinely challenging it. On the contrary, however, Huntington shows us
a West (i.e. the United States) losing its hegemony and threatened by the
rise o f other civilizations.
Conversely, those who put globalization at the centre o f their represen-
tation o f the world show that it is dominated by American hegemony, since
global networks are to a very large extent in the hands o f the Americans.
A n d it is against them that the alter-globalist movements have been
created.
The contrast between the two theses is so total because they are in
part complementary. The reason for the massive approval enjoyed by
Huntington's approach is that it highlights the increasingly central role o f
cultural affiliations and beliefs - in particular, religious ones - in conflicts
that several generations of analysts have sought to explain in purely eco-
nomic or political terms. I n this respect, Huntington is surely right to
speak o f Islam where so many other authors only want to hear talk of oil.
But such cultural phenomena are implicated in policies and struggles that
discount state boundaries. I n particular, as we know, al-Qaeda recruits
activists who are often highly integrated into Western countries. I t is there-
fore neither economics nor civilizations that should be placed at the centre
of analysis, but the forces for mobilizing the resources required for polit-
ical action.
We must go beyond this initial observation. The political world is dom-
inated by the confrontation between the United States (and its most loyal
allies) and Islam (or what is called such). Whether or not we accept it,
Huntington's thesis today calls for a more positive statement about the
relations between religion and politics in a world which is experiencing,
and has just experienced, major conflicts whose actors refer to themselves
as religious. Was it gratuitous i f I began this book with the thunder-clap
of 11 September 2001 in New York and the world's entry into a state of
war, which has since increasingly taken the form o f terrorist attacks and
hostage executions that propel us into a state o f utter barbarism and are
an obstacle to understanding the causes of these battles and to seeking
solutions to them?
To take the analysis forward, we must return to our starting-point of
globalization, in as much as it signifies, over and above the globalization
of exchanges, the separation between economy and society - a separation
that contains within it the destruction o f the very idea o f society. We have
seen a process o f separation between the objective power o f the United
States and the subjective, national, religious, or whatever resistance of
groups or nations that can now only defend themselves subjectively, by
appealing to their ethnicity or history. It is when this subjectivity and this
32 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

need for identity develop i n a political vacuum that the relations between
nations can be reduced to a war between enemies defined by their forms
of worship, their religions or their laws.
In an already distant past, Khomeini's Iran attacked the United States.
Similarly, in Afghanistan, Sudan and Algeria in particular we have seen
Islamist political groups create or seek to found new Islamist republics.
But after the triumphant years came the defeats - especially that of the
Taliban in Afghanistan. A n d the great politico-religious enterprises have
given way to forms of bellicose behaviour, to attacks on the American
hegemonic power, in which al-Qaeda would appear to be the main agent.
One hundred years ago, Lenin was to be heard defending the idea of
the role o f the revolutionary vanguard, and then, sixty years later, we saw
the birth of the idea o f the foco, fashioned in Latin America, to foreground
the role o f a vanguard that was even smaller - and even more cut off from
the 'masses'. Today, we are dealing with a guerrilla o f kamikazes carrying
out armed actions whose impact on public opinion is enormous, but who
do not refer to any religious project. Many of these self-sacrificial terror-
ists seem to be motivated by hatred of the enemy. I n the Palestinian case
the religious component of the movement has been limited (even at
the outset, when the role o f Christians influenced by Marxism was so
important).
Thus recent history has turned its back on Huntington's thesis. But is it
not refuted by world history as a whole? I t was in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries that we experienced wars of religion. Thereafter,
competition between states, economic struggles, and totalitarian ambi-
tions inspired wars i n which religion played only a secondary role, except
with the entry onto the stage o f peoples or nations who were seeking to
win their independence, as was long the case with Poland. I n short,
Huntington's thesis, which is brilliant and clearly presented, emerged at
the historical moment when it was least applicable.
 Europe: A State without
a Nation

Many analysts regard the decomposition of 'society' and the undermin-

ing of national states under the impact of globalization as a normal stage
in the formation of ever larger entities. A n d their main argument rests on
the creation of the European Union, where they today perceive a political
will, a culture, and a shared awareness of citizenship being fashioned. The
creation of an integrated Europe is in fact an extraordinary success. But I
do not see a national state asserting itself at a European level. On the con-
trary, what is interesting about the construction of Europe is that it is born
out of the separation between a global economy, continental economic
management, and the renewal of local life and preservation of national
identities. That is why the historical importance of this construct cannot
be dissociated from the very restricted role it plays in the profound changes
in social life I am seeking to expose.

Decline of the national state?

Much has been said about the decline of the national state. In particular,
Europeans, who increasingly feel that they belong to larger or smaller ter-
ritorial entities than a state, define these entities in economic or cultural
terms, and less and less in institutional or political terms. But we cannot
make do with such vague claims. First of all, because many Europeans in
modern history have felt that they belonged primarily to a city and its
region: Amsterdam, but also Leiden and Hamburg, Florence and Sienna
- so many city-states that for a time at least played a major role, before
being incorporated into a national state.
34 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s In S o c i a l Terms

The national state had three main functions: creating a state bureau-
cracy capable o f intervening in economic development; exercising control
over morals and sentiments, as Norbert Elias in particular has shown in
his studies o f Absolutist monarchy and especially the Versailles court; and
waging war, in order to construct a national territory or fend off attack
by enemy states. How do things stand today with the national state? A n d ,
in the European case, can we speak of its decline or disappearance -
hypotheses that could be extended to Latin America or other parts o f the
world?
The administrative and economic activity o f the state has expanded, but
at the same time it is outflanked by the consequences o f economic glob-
alization and European construction itself. The state's role in training
and education, but also in moral control and repression, has markedly
decreased, in part as a result o f scientific advances, in part because o f the
triumph of a consumerist, hedonistic individualism. In sum, the national
state is much less of a general framework for collective identification than
it used to be. Britons, Germans or the French no longer identify their
national consciousness with the policy o f their state. I n contrast, it might
be thought that European integration has strengthened national con-
sciousness in Italy, because the whole country had to make great efforts
to become a full member of monetary Europe. But this national con-
sciousness was very weak, given the relative failure o f Italian unity in the
nineteenth century. The citizens of other countries like to mock European
nationalisms. However, this is to confuse the present with the past. The
national flag floats over many more buildings - even private ones - in the
United Sates or Sweden than in France or Italy. What persists is a feeling
of superiority on the part of the 'old' countries, which succeeded in
projecting their weapons, their languages and their products into vast
territories.
The primary objective behind the creation o f Europe, and in the first
instance of the European Coal and Steel Community, was to make wars
between European countries impossible. None o f them now dreams o f
triggering a new conflict, which could spill as much blood and create as
much horror as previous conflicts. The desire to render impossible wars
that had in fact already become so, as a result of the humiliation at the
moment of the final settlement after the fall o f Germany and Japan, was
not artificial. I t engaged the six countries that had taken the initiative o f
European construction in a new form of political existence, even though
no one at the time spoke o f a federal Europe, while de Gaulle for his part
referred to a Europe des patries.
The success o f the Europe created by Schuman, de Gaulle, Adenauer,
Monnet, De Gasperi, Spaak and others can be explained in the first
instance by the absence o f theoretical and ideological debates throughout
 E u r o p e : A S t a t e w i t h o u t a Nation 35

its history. Europe progressed step by step, accompanying the global

dynamic o f liberalization, and was kept united by the existence o f the
Soviet threat.
The great achievement o f the European states was the creation o f what
Jacques Delors has called the 'European social model', of which he was
the finest artisan. A t the end o f the Second World War, Great Britain, and
then France, created systems o f social security that differed from one
another, but which embodied the idea of the welfare state - an idea that
continues to characterize the European countries, and in the first place the
Scandinavian ones, which are nevertheless very reticent about a political
Europe. These countries, benefiting from the legacy o f working-class
struggles and the strength o f socialist parties, have enabled their citizens
to live in conditions which were but a distant hope for the generations of
activists who paved the way for the great post-war social reforms. This
makes it difficult to speak of the disappearance of the national state in
countries where public expenditure reaches or exceeds half o f the national
product. Countries o f social solidarity, the European countries have also
become countries o f memory - or refusal o f memory - in so diverse a
fashion that the endeavour has accentuated the differences in national con-
sciousnesses, while attenuating their mutual hostility.
Europe is the most convincing example of the creation of a supra-
national political and economic entity. But this achievement has been
experienced by its population as the fruit o f an initiative taken by politi-
cal leaders who were firmly committed to the American side during the
Cold War. The movements from below that relied on a strong current o f
anti-Americanism, and denounced European construction as a manoeu-
vre o f 'American global big capital', articulated the deep disappointment
of many, over and above parties, at the retreat o f the reforms and hopes
generated by the Liberation, which had been supported by Communist
parties that wielded great influence at the time, especially in France and
Italy. But these movements of opinion did not succeed in transforming
themselves into political parties.
European construction was thus seen as the work o f political leaders
and high functionaries whose actions had no democratic legitimacy. This
Europe, to which social democrats and Christian Democrats lent decisive
support, was realized thanks to the personal links between certain French
and German politicians: de Gaulle and Adenauer, Giscard d'Estaing and
Schmidt, Mitterrand and Kohl, who were certainly all democrats, but were
not responding to a clear popular will. The construction o f Europe was
not carried out under the control of public opinion; it was a subject in
which only polling organizations took an interest.
The image o f Europe long remained intermediate between a project of
continental unity and an instrument o f American domination. A raft o f
36 When We Referred to Ourselves in Social Terms

measures for twinning towns, students or professional groups has done

more to make people sensitive to the diversity o f the continent than to
create enthusiasm for its unity. But it is true that the European idea has
remained alive and has even come to be more and more accepted, allow-
ing for reinforcement of the Commission's intervention in the economic
and social life of the European countries and their citizens.
A Europe without Europeans is being constructed. The extent of the
achievement impresses the whole world; the nationalism of the major
European powers has vanished; people everywhere say European, so as to
avoid saying German or Italian. For their part, the Spanish feel more
strongly European than the rest because this adjective symbolizes the
success of their major project: to rejoin the leading group of countries o f
the continent and put an end to two centuries in which they lagged behind
their neighbours.
Europe's advances are impressive, but they do not confer on the
European Union any weight in international affairs. For their part, the
inhabitants of the various European countries identify themselves as such
only when they do not wish to be identified with their country.
I f I reflect on my own development, I first of all register a reduction in
my sense of being French. I loved this country, which was the only one I
knew in my childhood, and whose language had given shape to my emo-
tions and ideas. I was at once naturally and willingly French. The first
wound that put an end to my total identification with France dates from
June 1940: its capitulation had been humiliating. Later, after the Libera-
tion, I discovered the mediocrity o f my country before and during the war;
and I felt the need to distance myself both from my student milieu and
French life. I sought to open myself up to other parts o f the world, without
my attachment to my country ever dissolving. Professionally, I made
numerous stays in the United States, Canada, Italy, Spain, and many other
countries; and I attached myself to Latin America almost as i f to a second
country, while remaining very French. In very different forms, I am con-
vinced that most Europeans have undergone an evolution analogous to
mine: an abandonment of any nationalism and openness to the diversity
of the world, while remaining profoundly attached to the country that has
shaped them, as much by its institutions, language and literature as by its
history.
It was only gradually, and above all with the preparation of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, that the European Economic Community began to be trans-
formed into the European Community and then the European Union. I t
was now impossible to leave Europe to construct itself by itself. A specific
policy had to be developed to achieve the successful creation, despite
British abstention, of a single currency and a project of enlargement that
has resulted in the incorporation of the centre and east o f the continent.
 E u r o p e : A State w i t h o u t a N a t i o n 37

The French accepted the treaty by the skin of their teeth. Other countries
would have rejected it, had their citizens been consulted.
The question now being posed by everyone, even i f most participants in
European construction remain supporters of an empirical definition of it,
can be formulated as follows: will Europe be a national state, as England
and France have been? Will a European consciousness and identity soon
exist? A n d will Europeans refer to themselves by this name, rather than as
English, Germans, Italians, when they introduce themselves to Americans
or Japanese?

Is European unity possible?

A great step forward was taken when the idea o f a European Constitution
emerged. Germans like Jurgen Habermas and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, moti-
vated by their profound hostility to any German nationalism, took the lead
in a campaign in favour of the creation of European citizenship. But the
momentum was short-lived. The idea of a Constitution was re-launched,
but in more pragmatic fashion, when it came to the incorporation o f new
member states. The attempt is all the more imperative in that states defend
their particularisms, their national interests. The success of this draft Con-
stitution (which remains uncertain as I write) is paradoxically accompa-
nied by a regression in European sentiment. Now, as a result, the only goal
of the European Constitution is the survival o f the Union. Highly useful
and deserving the support o f a large majority, this Constitution will not
found the 'constitutional patriotism' to which Habermas refers. I n many
countries there would not be a majority for such a document and impor-
tant electoral successes have been achieved by opponents of the European
idea - in Belgian Flanders or the Netherlands, following Austria and the
Scandinavian world, which is still hesitant about Europe. In France, to the
surprise of many, the Socialist Party, which has been a consistent sup-
porter of the European idea, has split and one of its leaders is building
his projected presidential candidacy on a victory of the ' N o ' campaign.
As Europe expands, diversifies, and intervenes more in the life of its
member states, it seems to be closing in on itself, on its internal problems,
while not always playing a significant role in world affairs. What European
can mention Europe's inability to prevent the massacres in Bosnia and
impose a peace on the belligerents without a strong sense o f shame? What
European can be content with Europe when the names of Sarajevo,
Vukovar and Srebrenica are pronounced?
Well before the invasion o f Iraq by the United States, with the support
of numerous European countries - above all, the new members of the
Union liberated from Soviet domination - doubt set in as to the
38 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social T e r m s

possibility of creating a European society and a European national state.

Today, the federal idea has receded; it is scarcely mentioned. Europeans
have certainly received a 'European' passport that defines their new nation-
ality, but for all that can we speak o f European citizenship, in the sense in
which the French hailed each other by the name o f citizen during the
revolutionary period?

European Union and United States of America

Like many other inhabitants o f the globe, Europeans live in a multiplicity

of times and spaces. They think of themselves as simultaneously situated
at the local, regional, national, global and sometimes even European levels.
They retain only a vague national memory, as they do not live in a present
without a past or future. Are they united by shared consumer habits? That
is not clear. Italians do not resemble the Dutch any more closely than they
used to, even i f they can speak together o f the same Formula 1 stars or
ecological disasters. I have already made the point: the attenuation o f
national identities is not compensated for by the creation of a continental
identity.
It is true that the first generation o f new members o f the European
Union has grown remarkably close to the starting group. Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Ireland have genuinely entered Europe or rediscovered their
place in it; and the same will probably be true, after initial turbulence, o f
those great countries Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Even so, can we speak of a European society? That was possible to
a certain extent when the 'European social model', contrasting with
American liberalism and the Japanese model of the large firm, was a
potent reality based on the redistribution o f income via taxation and the
distribution of equal benefits to all or benefits which helped the weakest
more. But are we not now obliged to refer to the problems and decline o f
this model? How can we be unaware of the universal imposition o f the
liberal conception o f economics, whose criteria o f macro-economic policy
are the reverse o f the European social model, since balanced budgets
appear as the key to economic progress, by contrast with Keynesian
policies?
The European model is certainly far from having disappeared: the gap
between state levies on the national product in Europe and in the United
States (and also the United Kingdom since Mrs Thatcher) remains great.
As for France and Germany, they have been severely rebuked by the Com-
mission, but are not reducing their budget deficits more rapidly.
 E u r o p e : A State w i t h o u t a N a t i o n 39

I n sum, by dint of its very caution Europe is an effective agent for the
construction in Europe of the liberal model that is globally triumphant,
rather than the creator o f a different model.
Should we conclude that Europe has lost its original dynamism, that it
is growing weaker as it expands, and that it ultimately weighs little in the
process o f globalization? It is true that Europe is less and less interven-
tionist, without being as liberal as the directors of the World Trade
Organization would like it to be. I t retains some limited room for taking
initiatives, defined in rather negative terms - that is, the abolition o f obsta-
cles to the free circulation o f goods, capital, information and even people.
This pessimistic conclusion has been reinforced i n a period when Europe
has lagged significantly behind the United States in the use o f new infor-
mation and communication technologies. Such inferiority is accompanied
by a rise in unemployment. I n France, consciousness of decline has
prompted acute anxiety and led to the outbreak o f the 1995 strike, which
went far beyond demands for public services. This strike, which provoked
a lively controversy between intellectuals and trade unionists, led some
activists to demand massive state intervention in economic life - some-
thing that was impossible and primarily evinced absolute opposition to
liberal policies. Some countries, especially France, find it very difficult to
leave behind the dirigiste planning model that was for so long predomi-
nant on the left - and this despite the economic collapse o f the Soviet
model. I n France, defence o f the public sector, augmented by the nation-
alizations o f 1981, remains the principal condition of social progress for
many; and this approach is charged with anti-European sentiment. I n
Europe as a whole, few aspire to a return to the managed economy, but
growing doubt surrounds the efficiency of the European social model.
The attack o f 11 September and the American war on Iraq have divided
Europe: a large number o f countries supported the United States; others
- France in the forefront - were opposed to the unilateral decisions o f the
United States and were supported i n their rejection o f war by a large
proportion o f public opinion. This further weakened the European
Union.

The European state

We must conclude from all this that i f the European countries have avoided
turning i n on themselves, it is not because they now form a single nation,
but because they are constructing a state. This state already exists i n fact,
since a large part o f Europe possesses a single currency and much o f the
business o f national parliaments is given over to adapting their countries'
40 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social Terms

laws to European directives. But what prevents Europe from being a

genuine state today is that it has no international policy.
Even i f it intervenes economically in different regions o f the world,
Europe has no political weight, in particular in the Middle East. One o f the
most important points in the draft Constitution is the creation of the req-
uisite conditions for pursuing a foreign policy, for a European geopolitics.
This point is crucial. Faced with the policy of confrontation decided and
pursued by the United States, above all since 11 September, we must hope
that a European foreign policy endeavours to establish relations o f a dif-
ferent kind with the Islamic world, or at least some o f the countries from
which it is made up. Europe has taken an important decision in accepting
the principle o f Turkey's adhesion to the European Union, given that most
of that country's territory lies in Asia and its (long) history is bound up with
a victorious Islam, even though Atatiirk imposed a secularization on it that
has had an enduring effect. Turkey, which has never been colonized and
which has been growing closer to Europe for more than a century, has
already taken important steps towards combining a liberal economy, polit-
ical democracy and Islamic culture. A n d it does not seem impossible that
we might see similar trends develop (and even prevail) in Iran. A space con-
ducive to a European policy might thus open up which would be based on
countries equipped with a state capable o f making decisions and that have
experienced attempts at modernization. This is not true of much of the Arab
world. The difficulty here consists less in the obstacles encountered by such
a projected international policy than in Europe's fear of altering its rela-
tions with the United States. Europe has placed itself in a situation o f mil-
itary dependence on the United States and the technological gap in this
domain has greatly increased since the 1980s, so that the Europeans' room
for manoeuvre is very restricted. The solution that was once evoked by many
- the construction of two pillars o f N A T O and the Atlantic Alliance - has
lost all credibility following the Europeans' confession o f powerlessness to
resolve the problems of ex-Yugoslavia (and today Great Britain's own posi-
tion suffices to render such a solution inconceivable). The Europeans would
have to be in a position to take important diplomatic initiatives in certain
Islamic countries or i n other parts o f the world so as to rediscover a certain
capacity for autonomous action vis-a-vis the United States, while obviously
avoiding a confrontation that they are not in a position to sustain.

W i l l the Europeans prove incapable o f assuming any global mission? Or

will they be increasingly absorbed by the internal problems o f their own
continent? Here we re-encounter the opposition we have already signalled
between public opinion and governments. In most of the European coun-
tries, public opinion aspires to a unified international policy and expresses
a desire for greater independence from the United States. But none o f this
translates to governmental level.
 Europe: A State without a Nation 41

European powerlessness
European powerlessness not only manifests itself at the level o f interna-
tional politics: the greater part of the global scientific and industrial elite
is attracted by the United States on account o f the quality of its research
centres and major universities.
It is therefore time for Europe, overcoming the weaknesses and power-
lessness o f each of the European countries, to create a network o f insti-
tutions and research centres of excellence capable of rivalling the United
States - or o f collaborating with American universities and laboratories
on an equal footing. But we are far from being able to attain such a goal;
and i f European research policy has grown in scope, it is at the price o f
an administrative cumbersomeness that discourages all those who do not
participate in very large projects.
Europe is thus still very far from constituting a genuine state, but it is
nevertheless tending towards it. On the other hand, as I have said, it is
impossible to speak of a European nation and still less of a European
homeland or Heimat.
The enlargement of the European Union is further exacerbating its
weakness as a nation. The fact that all member countries belong to the
same 'cultural' area, defined in very general terms, does not prevent
nations and governments from being very different from one another. Can
it be said that Waterloo and Aboukir are memories shared by the English
and the French? Has the classical opposition between Protestant countries
and Catholic countries disappeared, like the one dividing tea-drinkers
from coffee-drinkers, and those who use oil for cooking from those who
use butter?
Many French, Italians or Germans feel less out o f place in New York
than in many European cities. Great Britain likes to look towards the high
seas - that is, the United States - whereas Italy feels itself Mediterranean.
These differences, derived from a long history, are one of Europe's major
attractions. Why wish for a European culture when we already possess
more than twenty? Europeans remain convinced of the need to construct
Europe; they accept the extension of the Union's competence; they recog-
nize that the indisputably European countries which have just entered the
Union have the right to do so. A l l that, they say, is reasonable, indicates
good management, and forms part o f the logic of the great European
project. But where in all this are the sense of belonging, collective memory
and social projects that impart a concrete meaning to the national idea?
A n d what is the basis for the idea that Europe should replace national
states in the collective life o f the citizens o f European countries?
On a political or practical level, such a debate does not have much
importance, since the European Union itself has abandoned the idea o f
42 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

completely replacing states and transforming itself into a United States o f

Europe. But in order to understand the changes that are profoundly trans-
forming our lives, it is important to recognize that the undermining o f
national states and political systems is not compensated for by progress in
European construction. A n d we must exclude the rather widespread idea
that we are primarily living through a change of scale. I n fact, the
traditional framework o f nation-states is not being reconstructed at the
European level and does not compensate for the effects of globalization.
Is this a cause for regret? Yes, for Europe does not have the international
influence that its population and level o f development call for. Yes, also
and above all, because Europe appears as a zone o f weak progress or even
stagnation, in a world turned upside down by the accelerated growth o f
China and by American hegemony. This does not preclude us from think-
ing that it is more agreeable to live in Europe.
We must dispense with the illusions o f an extreme 'Europeanist' dis-
course and recognize that the reasons for the decline o f a certain vision o f
social life are to be sought at a different, more fundamental level. Once
this false response has been excluded, it is necessary to confront what I
call the 'end o f the social' and draw the conclusions for our analyses.
The weakening o f Europe derives from the fact that it does not believe
in its future. I t is discontented with American hegemony, but insufficiently
so to seek to play a geopolitical role equal to that o f the United States or
China. This does not mean that it aspires to become neutral, for it is well
aware that it belongs to the world o f the privileged. A n d i f public opinion
is sometimes more disposed to taking action, governments fear provoking
a conflict with the United States. From this point of view, the Americans
are not wrong to pass severe judgement on the Europeans, who have
'neither the weapons, nor the ideas, nor the will'.

The absence of European consciousness

It is indeed the weakness o f European society (or societies) that explains

Europe's difficulty i n acting like a state. This observation should convince
us that Europe's prospects depend on the capacity of those who govern it
to respond to the interests and demands of its members and to be 'repre-
sentative', like the democratic governments o f recent centuries.
In the methods hitherto employed for constructing Europe, everything
has created an obstacle to the European state being democratic. The idea
of Europe did not emerge from the popular will or a large movement o f
opinion, as I have already mentioned. The Commission has remained well-
nigh independent o f a Parliament that is not regarded i n any country as
a legislative centre. This accounts for the low participation in European
 Europe: A State without a Nation 43

elections. There exists, it is true, a strong current o f opinion in favour of

strengthening the Parliament's powers and even its right to overturn the
Commission. But this tendency, which has already made some significant
changes possible, is counteracted by the enlargement o f Europe, which
gives all countries the impression that it is increasingly difficult for them
to influence the decisions taken in Brussels. I f the power o f the Commis-
sion has diminished in recent years, it is instead in favour o f the Council
of heads o f state and government, as the European idea grows more
distant from federalism.
European construction nevertheless has so many advantages that only
a small minority rejects it. But it is so unexciting that it transforms the
European countries into critical observers o f world history. A n d this
absence of motivation in a world where vast territories are modernizing
by imposing major sacrifices on themselves heralds a decline, which is slow
at first and accepted without difficulty, but which will become more rapid
and provoke increasingly serious internal crises.
Europe is no longer a continent o f fighters; it has become a continent
of those in retreat.
However, let us not push the critique too far. Are we principally respon-
sible for the weakness o f European initiatives, in particular i n the inter-
national domain? No. One o f the main causes of the transformation of
European politics is that the new unilateralism practised by the United
States, flouting the United Nations system that it had itself established,
has deprived the European countries o f virtually any influence and has left
Latin America without a role. Phrases like 'the Western world' are virtu-
ally meaningless. The things that closely united Western Europe and N o r t h
America at the time o f the Soviet danger have disappeared; and the United
States alone is engaged in the global defence o f Good against Evil.
From this we must conclude not only that Europe is a state without a
nation, but that this state is weak, implementing a policy which is more
managerial than political. A n d since Europe is not a nation, it is in the
intellectual, scientific, artistic and cultural sphere that a set o f countries,
cities, intellectual currents, schools and research centres is taking shape,
which we must ask to be more creative and more independent o f the
United States; more cosmopolitan and multicultural as well.
 The End of Societies

The social representation of society

To repeat the point, the idea behind this book is that over and above dra-
matic events and long-term economic changes, we are living through the
end of a type o f society - most importantly, of a representation of society
in which the Western world has lived for several centuries.
This faltering paradigm was built on the idea that society has no other
foundation than a social one. I t was not the first paradigm to become
established, when the religious order o f the world disappeared. I t was in
fact the political order that took the place of the latter - in the first
instance, the state. The formation of modern states, o f Absolutist monar-
chies, but also of city-states, and later of national states, was the major
product of this period, which can also be called the age of revolutions,
from those that brought about the overthrow of Absolutist monarchy - in
Holland, England, the United States, and most o f the Spanish colonies o f
America - to the more recent revolutions that erupted all over Europe or
developed outside it.
It was the development o f industry which, much later, put the economy
and the forms of organization bound up with it at the heart o f social life.
It was then that a specifically 'social' representation of society took shape.
But the succession of these two representations of social life clearly
occurred within the same vast historical complex. For more than four cen-
turies, uniting the two successive types of society, the idea obtained that
social life was its own end, that the integration of society and the ration-
ality of its functioning, as well as its capacity to adapt to change, were the
main yardstick of good and evil. Deviance and crime were defined as a
threat to social order; and family or institutional education was called
 T h e End of S o c i e t i e s 45

socialization. These facts are well known, but they must be mentioned
here, since our central claim is precisely that we are living through the end
of the 'social' representation of our experience. This break is as significant
as the one that put an end to the religious representation and organiza-
tion of social life several centuries ago.
This definition o f such a vast historical complex comes up against two
objections. The first is that the countries which constituted themselves as
states and societies also had two other main activities: foreign trade and
war. The European was the man o f great expeditions to the east and the
west; and he created huge empires charged with supplying wealth to the
metropolis. However, the Portuguese and Spanish empires did not give rise
to societies o f the type presented here, whereas, according to Fernand
Braudel, the Netherlands and England very rapidly transformed expedi-
tions and conquests into societies that knew how to transform gold and
silver into machines, knowledge and laws. The other activity that played a
central role in European countries was war, and even i f it was a factor in
the rationalization of production, as was evident in the arsenals, it remains
the case that struggles between the major states for hegemony in Europe,
and the more or less long and destructive wars they entailed, mobilized a
significant proportion of state resources. This objection must remain
without a response, given how constant and costly European wars were.
But we must follow Max Weber and the majority o f modern historians
who reveal how, behind this military history, that of princes and soldiers,
a different type o f society was formed - one of bourgeois and artisans,
public and private administrators, and which was also a society o f the
creation and massive diffusion of knowledge.
Here we encounter the second, more important limitation o f the idea
of society. I n the age o f Enlightenment, English and French domination
provoked national reactions often inspired by a voluntaristic policy o f
entering into a world that was too exclusively in the hands o f the English
and French. Herder was its finest representative, pleading for the right o f
the Germans, Baltic peoples, and inhabitants of the Balkan countries to
have a place in the new type of society. But these reactions were still situ-
ated within the central model. This was not the case with the nationalisms
which, in the name of the particular essence o f a culture, a history or even
a biological origin, broke with the Franco-British model (or at least
wished to).
The violence of Fichte, especially in his attacks on the French language,
and a long tradition o f defending a nation defined as creator o f a partic-
ular culture and imaginary, marked Germany, which at other times became
the finest representative of industrial society with its workers, employees,
civil servants and entrepreneurs. There is no need to underline the fact that
in many countries secularization was limited, allowing what were often
46 When W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

very strong bonds between state ideology and Christian morality to

survive; while in other countries (like France) the opposite development
prevailed, with secularism becoming more an instrument of struggle
against the Catholic Church than a pure agent of rationalization. But all
these factors of diversity did not destroy the unity of the 'social' vision of
collective life.
How are we to explain the existence of this purely 'social' vision and
organization of collective life? I t cannot have been imposed solely by a
government, when it was so often in the name of society and the nation
that princes were overthrown. The purely 'social' character of society and
self-foundation of society display a boundless belief in the capacity of
such societies to transform themselves. Accordingly, they defined them-
selves as 'active' and were intent on situations that had been created pre-
vailing over those that had been inherited, without fixing limits to the
capacity for self-creation and self-transformation.
In my early books I used the word historicity to refer to this capacity
for self-production, showing the rise of this historicity in stages, from the
sphere o f consumption to that of distribution and then those of organi-
zation and production in the strict sense. M y usage of this word was
different from its habitual meaning, which refers to the position of a fact
or an entity in an overall process of development. I wanted to show that
society had a growing awareness of producing itself, rather than being
defined solely by quasi-natural evolutionary processes. The use I made of
the notion of historicity was not well received, but I am retaining it. For
this is the key thing: our societies regarded themselves as being self-created,
offspring of their own efforts, not only by employing material resources
in the service of major projects, but in setting as their main objective the
construction, consolidation and defence of societies whose interest, in the
broadest sense of the word, including equal opportunities, is the most
important principle for assessing forms of behaviour and defining good
and evil. To speak of sociologism is beside the point, as i f it was a ques-
tion of reinforcing an extreme or even reductionist kind of thinking. We
are indeed dealing with a general conception, but one in which most soci-
ological schools situate themselves and that long constituted the basis for
our law and social organization.

The European mode of socialization

A l l societies regard themselves as sacred. In the case of European soci-

eties, however, this sacred status came to them only from themselves. I t is
not based either on a god or on the dynamic of history - and still less on
a situation defined in natural terms. A n d the morality that it develops and
 T h e E n d of S o c i e t i e s 47

teaches is purely civic. I have spoken elsewhere of human rights, but here
it is the duties o f citizens that are in question. A n d even i f patriotic enthu-
siasm declined in European countries with the onset o f European con-
struction and the globalization of the economy, this attachment of a
religious type, but purely secular, to the homeland is to be found in many
countries, large or small, and especially in the United States.
This extreme, constant reference o f society to itself is characteristic o f
a mode o f development - one that reduces the protection o f an inheri-
tance or acquired interests to a minimum. A n d it is only in open societies,
capable o f conquering markets and controlling their environment, that this
entirely 'social' vision o f social life can develop and that the notion o f
society can acquire the status o f a principle for assessing forms o f per-
sonal or collective behaviour in the social whole. I am referring here to a
way of augmenting a society's capacity to act on itself. But this analysis
would not be complete or sufficient i f it did not penetrate into the inter-
nal life o f societies so as to apprehend their dynamism and internal
conflicts - but also their elements o f weakness.
This type of society acquired its power by concentrating all resources
in the hands of a ruling 'elite' that possessed knowledge, managed accu-
mulation and production, and governed public life. These ruling elites were
composed of adult males belonging to the Western world and the colo-
nizing countries. Defined as inferior, by contrast, were manual labour, the
body, emotion, immediate consumption, private life, the world o f women
and o f children. I t is not enough to say that women or manual workers
were regarded as inferior: it is inferiority that assumed different guises,
among them women and workers. Such a polarization, o f which Claude
Lévi-Strauss remarked that it evokes the steam engine, which opposes a
hot pole to a cold pole in order to generate energy, creates tensions and
conflicts between those above and those below, the haves and the have-
nots. Hence the consistent importance o f class struggles, revolutions and
ideological debates in these societies.
Western societies were thus defined by the accumulation of resources in
the hands of a ruling elite and by the potency of social conflicts, which
prevented the rulers transforming themselves into rentiers and privileged
persons. Our societies were masterful. Thanks to the use o f force and
reason, they dominated nature and made themselves its masters. Oriented
outwards, constantly proclaiming their goals and strategies, they suc-
ceeded in putting the overwhelming majority to work i n order to fulfil the
objectives fixed by firms and their directors.
By contrast, they turned their gaze away from individuals themselves.
They loved thought and science, but they distrusted consciousness, in
which they saw the mark o f the religion which exerts such a negative
influence, especially on women. State education syllabuses faithfully
48 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

corresponded to the image that these societies wished to have o f them-

selves. The school was to transmit knowledge, educate the mind, impose
discipline, and make the differences between individuals disappear behind
the uniformity of the rule - that is, by everyone's submission to the forms
of thought and life which ensure the success of production and reward the
best. I n economic life the ideology of the ruling elite reduced workers to
being humdrum or even lazy individuals, but who could be set in motion
by giving them material gratifications. F. W. Taylor provided a classic for-
mulation of this representation of workers and of the means o f making
them work for the maximum profit o f the employers.
Class society? Obviously, since the concentration o f resources in it is
extreme and, as a result, so is the distance that separates the higher cate-
gories from the lower ones. But the expression would be misleading i f it
led to the deepest root of these class relations being situated in the
economy itself and, in particular, in property relations. Defined by
modernization, our societies were class societies in a broader sense.
Class struggles played an essential role in them, for the simple reason
that this model rests entirely on society's action on itself. I t does not appeal
to any principle above or below it. I t speaks of power, money, knowledge,
and also of revolutions and institutions. I t is rationalist, secularized, and
retains nothing of the old communities, whereas the Arab world or the
Chinese world, to take two important cases, preserved forms o f organiza-
tion, authority and belief inherited from the past for longer. By contrast,
everything is 'social' in the European model o f modernization. That is why
the general idea of society is only an abstract expression o f this European
model. This is what Tonnies understood when, at the outset of modern
sociology, he contrasted society with community.
It should be stressed that the central position occupied by the idea of
society, and the definition o f the latter as a social system endowed with
mechanisms o f functioning and change, had as its counterpart a rejection
of any analysis and any form o f social organization which considered the
actor in terms other than those o f the place she occupied in society. Sub-
jectivity was thus regarded as a raw datum to be transformed into objec-
tive analysis, so that nothing was able to oppose the general interest of
society; and all egotism and resistance had to be overcome in the name of
reason and progress.

Society and modernity

The idea of modernity, to which the following chapter will also be devoted,
is opposed to that of a society which is its own foundation, its own legit-
imacy. Instead, it asserts that it exists only because it recognizes the exis-
 T h e E n d of S o c i e t i e s 49

tence of non-social foundations of social order and defends them. I t tes-

tifies to this by the importance attached to reason, which is universalistic
and does not depend entirely on its role in the functioning o f society. This
universalism, which contains the idea of human rights, is in no way
inscribed in the notion o f society, as conceived by Western thinking. It is
even intellectually preferable to emphasize the opposition between the dis-
course o f modernity, which subordinates social organization to non-social,
universalistic principles, and the discourse o f society, which grounds social
norms solely in the interest o f society.
Mention o f this opposition seems even more necessary when we remem-
ber that the Western mode of development, based on the idea o f society
and the importance given to its internal conflicts, is not the only one, even
i f it acquired an exceptional importance bound up with its economic and
political success. The Western model rested on an extreme choice. A l l the
others associated past and present, combining universalistic references
with the defence of particularisms. There even exist cases when develop-
ment was rejected in order to preserve a certain degree of communal exis-
tence. We should take this argument to its conclusion and say that the
various types o f modernization combined (1) references to modernity, (2)
references to the Western model o f society, and (3) very different forms o f
reference to a communitarian heritage or ideal.
Western societies are constantly troubled by a conflict between a vision
that is systemic and utilitarian and an appeal to universalistic principles.
Other societies, even i f they do not appeal to either o f these two poles, are
drawn to the past, from which they then cannot separate themselves,
except in authoritarian fashion. But to achieve the requisite break, they
can either appeal to the Western conception of society (and then run the
risk o f nurturing sociologism), or defend renewed communitarian values.
Many have been tempted to define this society by utilitarianism, and
hence by the triumph of the interests over the passions that are instead
supposedly unleashed in societies where charismatic authority prevails
over legal rational authority, to adopt Weber's notions. However, this idea
remains superficial, because it allots the central role to different forms of
behaviour. But the principle of society - that is, the European model of
modernization - is that it subordinated everything, passions and interests
alike, to the functioning of society. Society is made up of struggles that
are often dominated by interests, but also by the spirit o f conquest and
modernization which brings the imaginary into play and transforms the
figures of inferiority into subjectivity. The latter in turn develop emanci-
patory projects, that o f women like that of the colonized, at the origin of
the unleashing of passions, to the point where the opposition between
interest and passion, far from marking a clear dividing line between actors,
appears quasi-artificial.
50 When We R e f e r r e d to Ourselves in Social Terms

The world o f the interests and that o f the passions are always linked.
For example, Marx believed that human beings are guided by interests, but
the historical events he analysed are charged with passion, as is the class
struggle.
Conversely, societies that approximate to the pole o f modernity always
risk getting entangled in a double language - a communitarian language
and a universalistic language - which will undermine their action.
These considerations not only concern the so-called 'underdeveloped'
countries; they also refer to concrete situations in 'developed' countries,
for there is not one o f them that succeeds in creating something new solely
out of new materials and dispensing with any communitarian reference.
That is one o f the reasons why the entirely self-legitimated model o f
society, which was the main instrument o f European and Western victo-
ries for so long, demands such attention. A model interposed itself be-
tween past and present that was bereft o f historical definition, since its
particular character was to found society only on itself, and hence without
any reference to evolutionistic or historicist conceptions.
This European model of modernization wrested such a lead that it could
identify itself with modernity and convince itself that no other path to
modernization exists, so that this collection of countries, regions and cities
would form a long caravan in which each animal places its hooves in the
tracks o f the one preceding it. The Netherlands, then Great Britain and
the United States were conscious of being, or having been, at the head o f
the caravan, although at times Germany and then Japan believed them-
selves capable o f stripping them o f first place and the French regarded
themselves as having best thought out this model. The pretensions o f the
Soviet Union never amounted to anything more than militant propaganda.
The European model o f modernization can be called male, in as much
as here no opposition is more complete than that o f the conquering, inno-
vative male and the female confined to reproduction. Here woman is not
held in contempt; she might even be glorified on occasion, but without
ever being released from her confinement. The distance separating women
from key decisions seems to increase with the acceleration o f moderniza-
tion, reaching its extreme point in France in 1848 with the creation o f
universal suffrage for all men - and hence the elimination o f all women
from public life.
But the European model of modernization takes a different form in each
of the countries where it is applied. I t was in Amsterdam, and then
Holland and England, that economic activity first achieved its independ-
ence from political power. By contrast, France, along with Great Britain
the first country to create a national state - the future political model that
dominated the world - assigned this state a central role in implementing
modernization in all its aspects. Later, from the eighteenth century, a not
 T h e E n d of S o c i e t i e s 51

yet unified Germany asserted its claim to found a particular type of mod-
ernization, superior to the others, more profoundly rooted in the history
and culture o f a Volk.
Outside Europe, all modes of modernization have combined in a more
or less conflictive manner entry into modernity with the defence, or even
renaissance, of an older culture and society. Some of these countries had
achieved a level o f knowledge and technology superior to that o f the
Western countries. But only the latter were able to give impetus to the
dynamic o f modernity by transforming science into techniques and inno-
vations, by creating a national spirit - and by recognizing individual rights.
Most modes of modernization were also undermined and distorted by the
subordination o f the countries concerned to a colonial power which
increased the distance between Westernized elites and peoples locked in
tradition and social disorganization. This led to the failure of some
attempts at development (and even induced dramatically negative tenden-
cies to de-modernization).
In short, no mode o f modernization in the world developed a compa-
rable vision to that o f Western Europe: making society not a means but
an end. I t is therefore reasonable to prioritize analysis o f this Western
model, whose ascendancy over the whole world, once very great, seems to
have declined in the period of the military and political success o f the
Leninist-Maoist model, and then resumed its forward march after the
defeat o f the Soviet empire, until its triumph with its concentration in
the United States, while Europe lacked the will to act and Japan seemed
paralysed.

The crisis of representation

The European model o f modernization was created around a definition o f

all the categories of organization and social thought in specifically social
terms - that is, o f functions performed by actors and institutions to ensure
the integration o f society and its capacity to adapt to necessary changes.
This model, classical for more than a century, accords great importance
to representation: political forces are thought to represent social actors -
in particular, social classes. I n a different sphere, the representation o f an
individual consists in indicating her social function and social environ-
ment: clothing, postures, everything must define the social position o f the
character; and her personal characteristics emerge all the more clearly in
so far as the social contexts o f the one being represented are clearly indi-
cated. Today, these socially defined portraits have faded. References to the
social environment have become indirect. By contrast, individual charac-
teristics are reinforced, to the extent of restoring vigour to a genre that
52 When We Referred to Ourselves in Social Terms

was no longer o f interest to historians: biography. When the painter ceases

to represent a notable or a dancer and seeks to paint her outlook on reality,
rather than the reality itself, her works cease to be figurative. Individual-
ism becomes established and detaches itself from any social environment,
to the point where any form o f representation tends to disappear.
A n example of less importance illustrates this crisis o f representation.
Fashion used to highlight individual differences within established social
models, as Georg Simmel stressed. When it attained autonomy vis-à-vis
the social hierarchy, with the first great couturiers of the twentieth century,
fashionable clothing no longer characterized a social class; it became an
interpretation o f the body of the woman. A n d i f Yves Saint Laurent so
clearly dominated the couturiers o f the last half-century, it is because he
dared, to a greater extent than others, to dress a naked body. Those who
did not follow his example did not return to representing some social type,
but fabricated theatre decor, played with colours and forms - and took
risks that qualified them as 'avant-garde'.
These two examples are not isolated. Representation is no longer sought
after anywhere: it even becomes a sign of mediocrity. I n these domains as
in others, we have emerged from what, in a word that can now be more
clearly understood, I call a social conception of society, where every actor,
individual or collective, is defined by a social situation. Hence the impres-
sion we have today o f plunging into the 'abstract' and no longer possess-
ing guides to help us when we tour society.
A l l our categories for describing and analysing society have been com-
pletely disrupted by the end of social realism, from the novel to architec-
ture. I n this long period, politics and economics yielded cultural and social
creations of great value. We should not forget this, but we must also detach
ourselves from this heritage. The social sciences have a particularly serious
lag to make good. A l l too often, they still speak o f social reality in terms
that no longer correspond to the cultural model in which we have been
living since the end of the nineteenth century. This must be one o f our
main concerns: to challenge the categories that formed the basis for the
classical sociology that has come to the end of its road. The sociology of
systems must give way to a sociology of actors and subjects.
This is not easy, because the European model found one of its purest
expressions in the social sciences, which are precisely defined by their
ability to explain personal conduct in terms o f the functioning of the
system. Many jurists and institutionalists, from Hauriou to Jean
Carbonnier, specialist in private law, have represented the tendency that
dominated sociology from the outset: that of Émile Dürkheim. Sociology
has achieved its greatest success when denouncing the illusions of social
actors, showing them that behind an appearance of freedom our behav-
iour was determined by concealed social mechanisms. Tell me what your
 The E n d of S o c i e t i e s 53

social origin is, and I will tell you what your career in the education system
will be. Indicate your profession and your income, and I will tell you what
your rational political choice is (even i f you do not always make it). Each
study published seemed to destroy an illusion and a wide public discov-
ered the importance o f inequality, stratification, and increasing or decreas-
ing social mobility, of which it had a spontaneous awareness that scholarly
studies readily confirmed. As for economic studies, they were invariably
identified with the investigation of rational choices, allowing them to
exclude certain variables that were too complex and too vaguely defined -
those o f subjectivity - in order to devote themselves to the study of the
relations between the elements o f the economic system.
Obviously, this 'sociologistic' standpoint never completely triumphed in
sociology. But it nearly always occupied a dominant position, from
Durkheim to Parsons; and it has continued up until our day to reap success
by bringing out social inequalities more clearly. But the domination o f
'classical' sociology has finally been destroyed, not so much under the
impact of intellectual critique as on account o f the decomposition o f insti-
tutions and norms.

The three deaths of European society

The Western model o f development was efficient and brutal in equal

measure. It long benefited from its lead to conquer the world, adding the
profits o f colonization to those o f an industrialization based on advances
in knowledge of which the nineteenth-century German university was the
best instrument. But this triumph, however impressive, could not last
forever. The period which we are leaving behind is that not of its zenith,
but of its decline and decomposition.
In the multiplicity and complexity o f historical trajectories, we can dis-
tinguish three major processes of crisis: (1) loss of dynamic tensions; (2)
subjection to a repressive dictatorship; (3) dissolution of voluntarism in
the market economy.
The diversity of these developments, the first of which was generally
democratic in spirit, and the second clearly anti-democratic, while the third
created mass society, must remind us, as we evoke these three major cur-
rents in contemporary history, of the complexity of society in the Euro-
pean sense: it was at once produced by its labour and discipline, shot
through with radical social conflicts, and capable of strong self-regulation.

(1) The least dramatic and often most positive form taken by this decline
was the democratization o f a society where fundamental conflicts found
institutional solutions or mediations. The history o f the working-class
54 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

movement in industrial society is a perfect illustration o f this evolution.

The exploitation of the proletariat led to a social movement often charged
with a violence at once endured and invoked, but which ended up forcing
recognition o f social rights - first in Great Britain and Germany, later in
the United States and France - thanks to the arrival in power of 'left-wing'
governments, that is, governments associated with the trade union move-
ment or inspired by it. I n very different forms, colonial domination was
overrun, and finally overthrown, by movements of national liberation that
took the most varied forms - armed nationalism, Gandhian non-violence,
an alliance between nationalists and Communists (a model that became
established in much o f the world). ¥'m&\\y, feminism, born out o f the move-
ment for women's right to vote in Great Britain and the United States,
ended up securing abolition of the most extreme forms of dependence
and inferiority inflicted on women by European male society, virtually
without violence, but with very profound effects on the transformation o f
morals.
The European bow slackened. European societies and those that fol-
lowed their example became less unjust, less violent and better controlled.
The counterpart o f these achievements was a loss o f conquering
dynamism and the growing weight of social intermediaries and protected
categories. This development resulted in the creation of vast systems of
social security, which brought workers effective protection against unem-
ployment and accidents at work. Later, other policies of solidarity, cul-
tural animation, and personal education developed, which attained
consummate form in the Scandinavian countries.

(2) A t the opposite end of the spectrum we find the authoritarian, dicta-
torial and even totalitarian state form whereby, in many countries, higher
or middling categories fended off both working-class opposition and sec-
ularization, by conquering society in the name o f nationalism, itself sup-
ported by the repressive will of armed forces, based on an ideology that
extolled the unity o f the nation or the people against the parties. There
are huge differences between the reactionary Mediterranean dictatorships,
Nazism or Japanese military imperialism, and the prolonged victories of
Leninism-Maoism. But everywhere the model o f society was destroyed in
favour o f an absolute state power and it took a long time to rediscover,
under the earth scorched by state violence, the remains or new shoots of
a 'civil' society.

(3) Finally, very different from this second type but distinct in orientation
from the first, a third process challenging the European model of society
was the triumph of the market. During the major period o f liberalism's
triumph, society exists less and less: it is the markets - particularly finan-
 T h e End of S o c i e t i e s 55

cial networks - that govern an economic life in which mass consumption

is making rapid progress. Communications technologies facilitate relations
between firms, cities or individuals, rather than favouring the construction
of a new type o f society. Television delivers a large quantity o f informa-
tion on stock markets in Europe and America, but very little information
is provided on the life o f firms, even when it involves a merger or serious
strike that has significant consequences for employment. Moreover, it is
expectations o f profits on shares that cause a rise in the stock market, a
movement that can in its turn prime increased production. The latter is no
longer the primary factor; it is merely the indirect result o f anticipated
profits.

A t a more immediate level, commentators constantly refer to the 'crisis o f

confidence' behind falls in consumption and investment. Simultaneously,
the reputation o f entrepreneurs, even o f some o f the greatest among them,
is severely undermined by fraudulent manoeuvres. For its part, the power
of the trade unions has diminished; it rested above all on the working class,
which has fragmented in the literal sense.
This third exit from European society led to the economic and social
system that possessed most influence at the end of the twentieth century,
and which has assumed its consummate expression in the United States:
mass society. I t is what allowed that country to carve out a dominant posi-
tion (which was held by the European system, and above all the British
Empire, in the nineteenth century). The social democracy established in
Europe and in the major Commonwealth countries certainly ensured the
durability of the system o f social protection for the most part. But state
interventions have increasingly been directed towards middle categories or
the best integrated small wage-earners, without succeeding in checking the
fall o f the most disadvantaged categories, further accelerated by interna-
tional migration.
Many o f the best works o f sociology in Europe are devoted to assess-
ing the operation o f social policies in the domains o f education, health,
urbanism, pensions and, more widely, social security. Some commentators
have been inclined to interpret the attested failures, or proven renuncia-
tions, as the sign of the triumph of capitalism. They are right in part,
since the operations o f the market increasingly often take precedence
over social policies, but also because the well-off, educated population
makes better use of certain services and knows how to secure important
advantages, while the crisis in state education largely stems from a dated
pedagogy more attuned to the needs of society than o f those being
taught.
However that may be, in these early years o f the new century, at a time
when ex-Communist countries in which state management assumed highly
56 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

inefficient forms are becoming members of the European Union, the

European model, over and above the particular case o f the welfare state,
is decomposing apace.

Irruption of democracy

It was during the first phase of modernization that political categories were
applied to all domains of social life. The overriding concern was to ensure
order against disorder, internal peace against violence, and the integration
of society against the arbitrariness of a prince or warlord.
The national state - a phrase that sums up the most important political
creation in the European model - warrants its renown, because it overran
the Absolutist monarchies and founded a political entity - the nation -
which in turn established strong links with civil society. The notion of
citizenship rests on the recognition of political rights. That o f national
state does not contain any reference to democracy. Great Britain was the
first to give civil - i.e. economic - society its independence and make it the
basis of its legitimacy. The other country that invented the nation-state -
France - associated only the people with the state and the nation, a notion
invented by the state which reduces society to its reflection, as it mirrors
society. The historical memory of the French readily combines the Revo-
lution and Napoleon in a central phase of its history which François Furet
extended to the end of the nineteenth century - that is, up until the decline
of peasant, bourgeois and patriotic France.
In many other countries, the state was less strong or did not exist; and
it was the will to form a nation that led nationalism to accord such strong
legitimacy to the state that it merged completely into it and always looked
more to it than it did to society.
Accordingly, democracy is not always part of the European model o f
society, while revolution is a significant component. This observation
applies even more clearly to countries where the national state was not
created and remained the prisoner of an empire, as in the case of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. But it existed only in limited fashion in the
United States, since the main problem o f that country - the state o f
the black population - led to a civil war and was resolved only in the last
quarter of the twentieth century as the result of action that was simulta-
neously democratic, revolutionary and populist.
In France, democracy was undermined by the long refusal to grant
women the right to vote. I t invariably served to legitimate the power of oli-
garchies, rather than to construct a political system in which the majority
controlled executive power through representation by means of parlia-
ments or référendums.
 T h e End of S o c i e t i e s 57

One would be tempted to say that democracy, even when tainted by oli-
garchy and class power, was more a British than a European reality. I n
other words, it triumphed in a country that was more imperial than
national, since it remained defined by the union o f several nations. This
further reinforces the idea that the nation and democracy are notions
which are more opposed than complementary. The French have recently
demonstrated it. Enlightened public opinion, invited to choose between
the notions o f republic and democracy, has moved increasingly sharply
towards the republican ideal, while displaying limited interest in equality
- the central value of democracy. Thus, the more revolutionary and
national than democratic inspiration that put France back on its feet at
the Liberation, under the joint leadership of de Gaulle and the Commu-
nist Party, was not replaced by an advance of social democracy when it
became exhausted.
By contrast, the national state, which has never been referred to as much
since its imminent disappearance began to be announced on a daily basis,
owed its enduring importance and resistance to globalization itself,
because it was and remains the political expression o f society, in the strong
sense given this word in the European model.
We must speak o f social movements in almost identical terms. They too
occupy a central position in the model o f society, since it rests on a great
concentration o f resources, the formation of a dynamic ruling elite, and
conflicts verging on rupture. A n d in the case of the social movements to
an even greater extent than in that of the nation-state, the political space
is better defined in terms of revolution than democracy. To the extent that
the latter word could be used by the Communist movement, whose centre
- the Soviet regime - was never seriously able to claim to be a democratic
power. I t signified that the priority was ensuring the well-being of the
people, which made it synonymous with revolution. This has nothing
to do with the idea of a government formed and changed from the
bottom up.
A t the opposite end o f the spectrum was the formation, initially in Great
Britain, o f an alliance between social movements and democracy. That
between the trade union movement and democracy was sealed in Great
Britain thanks to the Fabians and the idea of industrial democracy. From
it emerged a social democracy that elsewhere evolved towards Commu-
nism, and elsewhere still ceased to be hand in glove with the working-class
movement, whereas in some cases (especially Scandinavia) it ensured a
lasting alliance between a powerful trade unionism and an egalitarian
democracy.
The French case is less satisfactory: the figure o f Jean Jaurès has
remained the most elevated, even though he did not accede to the leader-
ship o f the Socialist Party, because with identical vigour he was deputy
58 When W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

for the Carmaux miners, defender o f great democratic causes, and an

active Dreyfusard. Virtually unique, his case underlines the weakness o f
the links between the working-class movement and democracy.
National liberation movements offer a picture that is far from homoge-
neous: they have rarely been democratic in inspiration, even though they
have been supported by currents o f democratic opinion (revolutionary, in
fact) in the colonial metropolises.
Only in the last chapter o f this book shall we deal with the issue of the
women's movement, which was and remains profoundly democratic. But
we must mention here that this case is very different from the others,
since the women's movement developed in the main after the fall o f the
European model.

The return of the political

Critical analysis of the national state must not lead us to forget that
it forms part of the model that I call society, whereas other types o f
state not only do not pertain to it, but strive to make all aspects o f
society submit to the construction o f their own power. Nationalism is the
imposition o f the interests o f the state on the nation and the whole
of society. Where does the boundary between the nation-state and
nationalism lie? Above all, between the existence and the non-existence,
the strength or the weakness, o f society - particularly its national
component.
Wherever there is great political, social or cultural heterogeneity, when-
ever a country is shot through with profound regional differences or insur-
mountable linguistic or religious barriers, the national state is transformed
into a nationalist will, into the assertion o f the unity of a nation that does
not in fact exist. Nationalism is a purely political project that seeks to
'invent' a nation by assigning a state uncontrolled powers to bring forth a
nation and even a society. When it is devoured by nationalism, the national
state ceases to be a component of society and the latter risks being
destroyed. Nationalism is very far removed from modernity and it is
doubly dangerous for democracy. This is so, firstly, because it functions
from the top down, and hence in the opposite way from democracy; and
secondly, because it replaces the complexity of social relations with sheer
assertion of an affiliation that is then defined less by its content than by
the nature of its opponents. Nationalisms have made a powerful contri-
bution to destroying society by imposing a logic of war on it, a division
of the world between friends and enemies, which blocks the functioning
of society.
 T h e End of S o c i e t i e s 59

It is the disintegration of society, a globalizing model, which has liber-

ated a specifically political space, so that a return to political thinking and
its growing autonomy (even its ascendancy over sociology) is among the
most important aspects of the decline and fall of the European model of
modernization, whose pivot was the notion of society. The return of the
political is not a return to the political paradigm that preceded the social
paradigm. It is the collapse of the latter that causes the political to be
reborn, but this time as a subsystem.
This resurgence of specific reflection on the political is such an impor-
tant aspect of the crisis of the European type of society that we cannot
present the latter without mentioning this change in social thinking, the
main effect of which has been the development of analyses and theories
focusing on democracy.
It is in France that this transformation of social thinking, and the return
of the concept of the political, has taken the most spectacular form, for
France, unlike Italy, Great Britain and the United States, had not produced
an important political thinker for a long time. Tocqueville and his con-
temporaries were the only important set of thinkers of the political in the
intellectual history of France, at the beginning of the nineteenth century;
and Élie Halévy found himself very isolated at the end of the same century
when he ventured to undertake a specifically political analysis.
The main reason for the absence of political thought in France is the
importance accorded to the French Revolution and the Empire, but also
the influence of the 'social' historians of the revolution - Albert Mathiez
and Georges Lefebvre, in particular. The dominance of 'left' historiogra-
phy, at once social and political, impelled the French to defend the notion
of anti-fascism and oppose that of totalitarianism. For when it came to
fascism, the Communists - an essential component of the left - were on
the right side, whereas in the analysis of totalitarianism they found them-
selves on the side of Leninism and Stalinism - in other words, of bitter
opponents of democracy. This is why the work which had the greatest
influence in the return of the political was that of François Furet, who
imposed on intellectually inferior opponents the need for a specifically
political analysis of the French Revolution, enabling French thought to
abandon its mistrust of Hannah Arendt.
On the terrain of ideas, it was Raymond Aron who led the switch of
direction in social thinking, both by his personal oeuvre and by his effec-
tive critiques of the intellectual weakness of the Althusserian current,
which sought to rationalize a comprehensive analysis of society of a
Marxist variety. His intellectual courage, demonstrated several times,
enhanced the influence of his ideas. I n less spectacular fashion, but
through a more developed reflection, Claude Lefort was the theorist of the
democracy Fiance had never in fact had.
60 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

Farewell to society

The European model o f development, identified with the notion of society

and hence with the idea that the social has no foundation apart from itself,
is therefore on the way to extinction, even though some o f its aspects reap-
pear in other modes o f development. Some thought that Latin America
and other parts o f the world were taking over from Europe and giving its
mode o f development a new lease o f life. This might have happened, but
most o f the continent opted either for integration into the American
economy, or for adherence to the Cuban ideology - that is, the Commu-
nist model. Both these options were harmful: the former was particularly
so in the case of Argentina, the latter in that of Venezuela and Guatemala.
I n Brazil, meanwhile, following the failure of liberal ventures and then
after the dictatorship of Vargas and the phase o f military dictatorship, a
model o f development was established that resembles the European model
in some respects, including intellectually. A n d Brazil is aware that its
history depends above all on itself.
But it is only in Chile that we can speak of the European model: strong
organization o f the state and often extreme social struggles. The long dic-
tatorship of Pinochet at first sight seems to constitute a complete break
with the European model, but this is too summary a judgement: let us not
forget the authoritarian dimension of the German Empire and the violent
repression o f the Paris Commune in 1871. This particularity of Chile
renders it an original country, but does not warrant talk of a new stage in
the existence of the European model.
Finally, this model is neither a version of modernity, nor a form of cap-
italism or socialism, which nevertheless emerged from its ranks. I t com-
bined these two types of economic management to construct a type of
society that was entirely self-created and self-legitimated. I n other words,
the European model did not propose a third way between capitalism and
socialism. On the contrary, these two types of economic management
emerged as particular, contrasting forms of the European model.

The war above us

It now remains for us to consider an essential aspect o f this ideal type,

which I deliberately left to one side so as not to separate it from problems
that occupy a predominant position in the current state of affairs. I refer
to war, since all analyses of European history assign the utmost impor-
tance to the struggles for hegemony between the great European powers.
The self-production o f European national societies prevented the forma-
tion of an integrated European system and furthered the establishment of
 T h e E n d of S o c i e t i e s 61

a succession o f treaties based on the need to regulate competition between

the main countries, treaties that did not all last as long as that o f West-
phalia (1648).
The idea o f society has been so strong that a famous formula could
claim that war was the continuation of politics by other means. This 'civil'
vision of war, which could be applied to the Napoleonic wars, at least in
the initial phase when the first consul and then emperor transported with
him into the conquered countries the ideas and institutions o f the French
Revolution, is no longer applicable to the totalitarian regimes of the twen-
tieth century, constructed around notions o f war, conquest, dictatorship
of the proletariat, and crusade. I f this book opened by evoking 11 Sep-
tember 2001 in the United States, it was so as to dramatically underscore
the break which has transformed that powerful society, in the forefront in
all domains, into a force of war combating the forces o f Evil in the name
of a mission entrusted by God to the United States so that it can save the
world he created.
The status of war has therefore changed. It had played a central role in
the formation of the rationalized, 'bureaucratic' states that became the
central actors in a modernization which first of all consisted in imposing
the king's authority and his civil and military administration on the nobil-
ity. It is the converse movement that we have been living through since the
end of the First World War. Begun as an armed conflict between European
states, it was transformed into a massacre in which the whole o f Europe was
destroyed; and in several national societies it led to the victory of dictators
for whom political violence was at once a means and an end.
No political force has had as much influence in the twentieth century as
Leninism-Maoism, which imposed on its societies the absolute power o f
a state-party-army officially charged with eliminating class enemies. There
was no Soviet society - only a set of mechanisms for subjecting the dif-
ferent elements of a potential society to a totalitarian power that would
not have maintained itself i f it had not controlled a formidable military
and police power. The only time the Soviet Union assumed the shape of
a society was when it once again became a fatherland for which human
beings, whether Russians or of some different nationality, died. Only on
the battlefields of Stalingrad and in a besieged and famished Leningrad
did Russian society re-emerge behind the Soviet regime, so that Russian
society remained a society of the dead.
War has ceased to be the continuation of politics and an extreme form
of mobilizing resources that make possible the clash of arms and nations
and the triumph o f the strong over the weak, of weapons over well-being.
War is no longer at the heart of societies, as it was during the centuries of
the modernization o f a Europe that benefited from it by dominating the
world, at the same time that it created major states, each of which sought
62 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social Terms

to destroy the others. War is now above societies; it signifies destruction,

not combat; death, not victory.
Who regards the Hiroshima bomb as the instrument o f the final victory
of the United States over Japan? We all see in it the death, through the
explosive blast and the fatal radiation it released, of thousands and thou-
sands o f the city's inhabitants. A n d this image o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki
is on our minds at a time when the United States, having fought Commu-
nism as it had fought Nazism for the freedom of much o f Europe and
other countries, lets itself be carried away by a dishonest discourse towards
the unilateral construction of a boundless empire. W i t h this there looms
over the world a threat o f destruction and chaos that does not defend the
interests o f a social group or nation, still less its needs in oil, but o f one
politico-religious conception contending with another.
The space that used to consist in the relations between 'societies' is today
invaded by the forces o f war, money, fear and violence. Resisting them,
however, with varying degrees o f success, is modernity as defined here,
whose principles are embodied in institutions that are primarily instru-
ments constructed for the defence o f liberties, like laws on the one hand
and family and state education on the other.
The public space is not a vacuum, but it is now virtually empty of rep-
resentative politics. We are advancing in the opposite direction from the
one we so recently envisaged. We have remained marked by the idea that
modernized societies accorded ever increasing importance to 'civil society'
and hence to social actors, so that politics was approximating ever more
closely to social conflicts and movements. Half a century after the first
major working-class strikes, social-democratic governments recognized the
social rights o f workers. A little later, in much o f Europe and the major
countries of the Commonwealth a welfare state was created whose budget
in France, for example, is greater than that o f the national state. Struggles
between states seemed to be marginal in our part o f the world and war-
like conflict seemed confined to the Third World and totalitarian regimes.
Wars between 'great powers' would entail such risks for humanity, it was
argued, that an agreement had been arrived at to limit the use of nuclear
weapons and prevent their spread. This schema, which accorded more
importance to social and cultural problems than to specifically political
battles, and above all to war, has been brutally contradicted by reality.
What dominates the world today, less than fifteen years after the col-
lapse o f the Soviet empire, is the clash between Islamist groups prepared
for anything, including suicide, and the American empire, which possesses
the most powerful weapons but has not succeeded in taking total control
of Afghanistan, Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries.
The centre of this world is today the very limited geographical zone
where Israelis and Palestinians dispute the same land and prefer a war to
 T h e E n d of S o c i e t i e s 63

the death to a compromise that would establish a Palestinian state. The

bloody attack in Madrid in March 2004 heralds others in Western Europe,
the United States, and the territories occupied by them. The whole world
is holding its breath and waiting to find out whether the leaders o f al-
Qaeda will be destroyed, or whether the list o f attacks that have already
struck the West is going to be extended and create enduring traumas. I n
the early years of the twenty-first century, the world has passed from the
vocabulary of economics to that o f war, at the same time as it feels ever
more immediately threatened by a direct clash. What was expected was the
triumph of civil society; instead, we have a clash between politico-religious
complexes that dominates the whole world. Even i f one does not share the
views o f Samuel Huntington, it must be acknowledged that he has under-
lined the importance o f these global clashes between opposed civilizations
better than anyone else.
Let us not push this analysis too far. I t would be absurd to claim that
social realities have dissolved in the cauldron o f war. Dozens of millions
of human beings are killed by warlike violence. We must not confuse their
extreme misfortune with the sense o f insecurity felt by many countries
where life nevertheless remains very acceptable for the majority o f inhab-
itants. On the other hand, we must maintain the idea that the institutional
self-regulation of societies has diminished - when it is not in the process
of disappearing. The statue o f society, which was once erected in the heart
of the public space, today lies in pieces.
Faced with the forces of war and all forms of violence, we no longer
believe in political and trade union action. Only forces that are based on
a non-social legitimacy, like the defence o f human rights, can successfully
oppose the forces o f war, which are likewise not based on specifically social
principles, defined in terms o f the general interest o f society.

When system and actors separate off

The decomposition of society in the most modernized societies attains its

extreme forms when the link between system and actor is broken, when
the meaning of a norm for the system no longer corresponds to the
meaning it has for the actor. Everything then takes on a double meaning
and the individual wishes to assert herself by her opposition to language
and society. This rupture is less easy to perceive than material destruction
or growing criminality, but we must appreciate it i f we wish to understand
where the collapse of the idea o f society might lead and, consequently,
how urgent it is for us to construct a different representation of collective
life and our personal lives.
64 When We R e f e r r e d to Ourselves in Social Terms

The most significant and visible o f these crises is the place o f work in
each person's life. The reduction in the working week, the increase in the
number of holidays and, even more, the prolongation o f retirement have
led many analysts to speak o f the end of work. Our life, which was for so
long dominated by the problem of production and the need to survive, is
now dominated by consumption and communications. The accelerated
reduction in working hours is experienced by most people as a liberation
and not as the loss o f a creative experience.
This discourse, which is to be heard all around us and is favoured by
intermediate categories, often prompts two kinds o f objection. The first
derives from the highest categories. Can a hi-tech society function only
with temporary and casual workers? How can it be forgotten that the
number of technicians, specialists and professionals of all orders, o f
'symbol manipulators' (in Reich's words), has greatly increased? Certainly,
these categories invariably find themselves protected on the labour market
by their skills. But they are no longer interested in the success o f the firm,
because they have learnt that the firm might be destroyed by competition,
might relocate its activities, or might brutally divest itself o f its older
workers. They think about their own success, their career, their ability to
grasp situations and explore new domains. A n d this is also how re-
searchers, innovators, and professionals in the public sector, academic or
medical, behave, well aware as they are of the (probably incurable) weak-
nesses of their institutions. They embark on new European or global proj-
ects, or even emigrate to master new forms of knowledge.
The other type of objection derives from below. How bitter it is to hear
the end of work and expansion of free time being celebrated when one
is unemployed or a casual worker, when one works in a declining sector
or sees one's own qualification lose its value with the emergence o f new
technologies!
In fact, we have lived through such a profound alteration of situation
and attitude that we cannot spontaneously perceive it. The main social
conflicts used to have their source in work relations; now it is to be found
at the level o f the globalized economy, whose consequences make them-
selves felt on local employment and stir up opposition combining defence
of the local and critique of the global. One aspect of this change is that
what affects us most directly is what once used to seem most remote -
something well conveyed by the idea of sustainable development, or,
conversely, that o f a climate change which will drastically alter the life of
the overwhelming majority, whereas our everyday experience is, in part
at least, delivered from the constraints it used to impose on us. The
share of skilled work permitting a certain autonomy has greatly ex-
panded compared with unskilled work, despite the marked increase in
casual work.
 T h e End of S o c i e t i e s 65

Work more than ever traces the line demarcating the central, superior
part o f society from its periphery. I t is true that many think of work solely
as a way of ensuring holidays and a guarantee of resources at retirement.
But for as many people, i f not more, work has a more important place,
irreducible to the hours directly devoted to it. Thus, training, retraining,
technological games, or information are at the heart o f free time. They
should not simply be regarded as leisure activities. Formerly, the great
divide separated those who lived from their labour and those who lived off
their capital. Today, the separation lies between those whom we can call
specialists (or professionals) and those who possess no qualification, that
require genuine training and who are increasingly to be found in the service
sector.
A n d who spares a thought for the dirty jobs that exist the world over,
where production is low, where the population lives on nothing but foreign
aid, smuggling or other illegal activities, like the production, trafficking
and sale of drugs? The economic world is no longer the vast entity in which
everyone was guaranteed a job and a wage. The industrial wastelands are
expanding, but the mobility of qualified professionals is also on the rise.
Many lack work; for others it is their main reason for living. The separa-
tion between economy and workers, system and actors, is the best defini-
tion of the current crisis. Before our very eyes the logic of the markets,
which governs firms, and the protection o f careers, which is what wage-
earners aspire to, are becoming separated. But globalization is going to
oblige all countries, whether industrialized or not, to press their advan-
tages and thereby make the best use o f their 'human resources', their skills,
and to raise their level of production.
Accordingly, the inhabitants of the industrialized, rich countries should
not any longer rely on the quality of their inheritance. Relocations are
already hitting them hard, but is it not foreseeable (even logical) that those
who work a lot and earn little will win out over those who do not work
much but have high incomes? But it is more easy for us to denounce the
ills suffered by the Third World than to lower the barriers that we our-
selves have raised in order to defend our agricultural or industrial produce.
To summarize: work is losing none o f the importance it had in the life
of the majority of people at the height of the industrial period. What is
disappearing before our eyes is the civilization o f work. Jiirgen Habermas
speaks in this regard o f the dissociation o f the historical content of civi-
lization from its Utopian content.
What has just been said about work can be generalized, or at least
extended, to other important domains of social life. Everywhere we find
the same separation between the meaning of an activity for society and its
meaning for the person who performs it. But the meaning for society
always tends to be weaker than the meaning for the actors themselves. We
66 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

are therefore living in societies which are discontented with themselves, but
where everyone forms more positive projects and expectations for them-
selves. This is the opposite o f the situation we experienced for so long,
when individuals brooded in a society that was rather pleased with itself.
In short, we are witnessing a transfer of values from society to individu-
als and we are moving, as and when we can, into a new form o f the eco-
nomic world.
Let us take the case o f schools. Ideas here are still confused and choices
very difficult. In many countries, France among them, schools were
assigned the mission of preparing, socializing, workers and citizens.
Schools said that it was not for them to take account o f the differences
between pupils; this (so the representatives o f state education thought)
would result in them being more concerned with the most active pupils,
from privileged backgrounds. Schools were not at the disposal o f pupils,
but must aid them to acquire general knowledge, to respect the organiza-
tion o f society and nation, and to acquire a sense o f discipline. Such was
the spirit of the German and French secondary schools, classical or scien-
tific, before (in the German case) the upheaval introduced by Nazism. This
conception is clearly encapsulated in the definition o f education as a social-
izing factor and the complementary idea that successful socialization is
what creates free, responsible individuals. This conception thrived for a
long time on the de facto monopoly o f state secondary schools, on the high
professional quality o f teachers, and in an economic situation that guar-
anteed a place in the adult world to the overwhelming majority o f pupils.
Such a conception of school life is still alive, as is the discourse. But they
are in disarray and complaints are to be heard on all sides. The French
debate on secularism has only served to increase the confusion. How can
one still consider the pupil simply as a future member o f society? Can one
take blindness or bad faith so far as not to see that, by refusing to take
account of the psychological, social and cultural situation of pupils, one
increases the privileges o f those who belong to an educated milieu, who are
better informed, and who are therefore in a position to construct projects
for the future? Should we not have the courage to say that schools, which
should encourage equality, tend to reinforce inequality by multiplying the
obstacles in the way o f those who come from underprivileged backgrounds
and cultural minorities, as is indicated in the French case by the low number
of children from immigrant families who rise up the social scale?
Teachers are upset by having to transmit knowledge to many pupils who
show no interest in the syllabus and are bored at school - where they still
sometimes find themselves at an adult age. But it must not be forgotten
that many children and families know that their future largely depends
on their scholarly success. Contrary to massively widespread stereotypes,
many veiled Muslim girls share this conviction, want to do well in their
 The End of S o c i e t i e s 67

studies, and do not see why they should have to choose between their
religious beliefs and their professional future. Confronted with major
problems, teachers frequently adopt defensive attitudes. I t is true that the
personal behaviour o f teachers is often more open and innovative than
their collective discourse. But the distress on both sides is considerable and
will only increase with greater pressure for everyone's cultural rights to be
respected - rights to beliefs, to lifestyles, and so on. The already dated idea
of the school as a sanctuary o f public life, whereas religious forms o f
behaviour are confined to the private sphere, will rapidly become unsus-
tainable because it will be perceived by a growing number o f pupils and
parents as repressive and unjust.
A n important acknowledgement of the need to individualize teaching
has been made in France by college teachers, who have had the courage
to recommend retention o f the single college so as to avoid increasing the
social segregation that exists in the lycées. This presupposes an individu-
alization o f teaching, given the heterogeneity of the classes in colleges. The
need for an apprenticeship in rational and even scientific thinking must be
asserted with the same force; and here Nobel Prize winners like Georges
Charpak in France have taken initiatives that have been crowned with
success.
General orientation o f teaching towards the pupil is still held up to
ridicule by some; and the permissiveness o f some teachers, like the excesses
of some educationalists, have led many parents and teachers to demand a
return to a more traditional form o f teaching, based on knowledge acqui-
sition. But the altered conception of the school is too profound to depend
entirely on the vagaries o f the political conjuncture. We shall not return
to a conception o f teaching as socialization, since the social system -
society - no longer exhibits the solidity of the past and the individualiza-
tion o f learning, and hence in teaching today the support given to each
pupil's initiatives is already producing results.
Similar observations could be made of other sectors. What we are living
through is not the collapse o f a sandcastle, but the exhaustion o f social
policy focused on society, its functions and its integration. We are already
all caught up in the transition from a society based on itself to self-
production by individuals, with the help of transformed institutions. Such
is the meaning o f the end of the social I am referring to here.

The rupturing of the social bond

N o theme is more widespread today than the rupturing o f the social bond.
Neighbourhood groups, the family, mates, the educational or professional
milieu seem everywhere in crisis, leaving the individual - above all, when
68 When We Referred to Ourselves in Social Terms

young or elderly, without a spouse or family, a foreigner or migrant -

condemned to a solitude that leads either to depression or to a search for
artificial, dangerous relationships, as in the case of groups whose leaders
base their influence on strength and aggression.
But however important these themes and the seriousness of criminality,
which is indeed on the rise, it is arbitrary to focus on only one side of the
behaviour of individuals, who also know how to invent collective or indi-
vidual activities - activities that afford them more satisfaction than inte-
gration into groups to whose norms they must submit. We should not
imagine either a subject that is wholly creative, or an individual ruled from
without by markets and media.
The negative consequences o f this social vacuum above all hit the
weakest, most dependent categories and, in the first instance, those
expelled from the world o f work or to its margins: the long-term unem-
ployed, permanent recipients o f state aid, temporary or part-time wage-
earners, and the working poor - these form considerable masses whom it
is well-nigh impossible to conceive o f or even count, so hidden are they in
the obscurity o f social classifications.
For many years, Latin American sociologists have been debating
whether underemployment conduces to the formation o f a reserve army
that enables capitalism to exert pressure on wages, or, on the contrary,
encourages the proliferation o f marginal individuals dispersed outside the
organized labour market. The second hypothesis has proved to be the
correct one: it captures urban marginality better and, consequently, better
accounts for the populisms that have so often, and so fleetingly, mobilized
wage-earners.
What we know about migrants who have left their towns and villages to
seek work in the richest countries - the United States, Germany, or even
France - remains very vague, as i f these categories remained truly on the
margins of society. We speak of 'suburbs', 'neighbourhoods', even of
'estates', composed of buildings constructed with public funds before and
especially after the Second World War to house low-income families. So
often invoked, these men and women are in fact invisible people. This sit-
uation takes an extreme form when one looks at the camps of refugees dis-
placed by wars, in Africa, Lebanon and Jordan, where the majority of the
Palestinian population lives without proper resources. Violence, fear and
death are ubiquitous. The action that emerges in such situations also
belongs to this world o f social vacuum, where action tends to become
impossible, where the death with which one strikes the enemy as well as
oneself is the most appropriate response to situations of social decompo-
sition and exclusion.
To an interviewer who asked him, 'Which social category do you most
hate?', a young man without a stable j o b who had passed from one train-
 The E n d of S o c i e t i e s 69

ing course to the next, gave this answer: 'First and foremost, the police.'
This reply is so logical that it requires no comment. 'And next?', asked the
interviewer. 'Teachers and social workers,' replied the young man. 'But
why?', asked the astonished interviewer. 'Aren't they trying to help you,
not to exploit you?' The young man replied: 'Because they lie to us, mislead
us. They call on us to integrate into a disintegrated society.' This answer
has a relevance beyond the specific case o f the population to which the
young man belonged. For many the world has lost all meaning, and non-
meaning can only provoke acts o f pure hatred - self-hatred, and hatred of
the environment - or an unrest without any objective, at the heart of a
mass culture haunted by images o f violence.
Among the workers and migrants from the poor countries, it is women
who suffer this loss o f any sense of themselves most. They used to form
a category defined by its inferiority, but which nevertheless had recognized
functions. The decomposition o f the old system may well have prepared
for the advent of new actors and new types of culture and society, but it
also leads to an ever more complete submission to the domination of the
market. Notwithstanding some exaggeration, the image o f the woman
manipulated as a sexual object and subject to male violence contains much
truth - and we can no longer reject feminist accusations about the fre-
quency and gravity o f the violence suffered by women.

Are we witnessing the end of social movements?

Must we go so far as to call into question the theme to which I have myself
assigned so much importance - that o f social movements? First o f all, we
must note the undermining o f this notion. It used to evoke the working-
class movement, national liberation movements and feminism. Today, I
read in the metro station I am entering that a 'social movement having
occurred among a certain category of the workforce, several metro sta-
tions will be closed until further notice'. How can we fail to be disturbed
by the loss of substance in this great notion, now used to refer to any work
stoppage, whereas the idea o f social movement was reserved for conflicts
between organized social actors whose stake was the social mobilization
of the main cultural resources of a society? Was not the working-class
movement, for example, in conflict with the world of the employers for
access to the resources created by an industrialization that both camps
valued equally? Invoked for any old purpose, the notion o f social move-
ment loses any content and becomes useless.
As we leave behind the long phase dominated by the idea o f society,
our first move is to abandon an analytical tool that has seemingly lost all
its force. Some will add that it was high time to study more concrete
70 When W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

problems more positively - collective negotiations, conflicts, or the devel-

opment o f public social policies, for example. But many observers, o f
whom I am one, while acknowledging the importance o f more restricted
research, also seek to identify the new actors and new issues, and hence
the new social movements o f today, which are doubtless more cultural
than social. Such will be the aim o f Part Two of this book.

Conclusion

The key thing today is not to describe the success or ruin of the model of
society that was the instrument o f the West's triumph, but to reject both
the optimism o f progress and the pessimism of sociological critique that
has registered nothing but collapse. What matters is whether individual-
ism, which is replacing social utility as the central focus of thought and
action, will succumb to the sirens of marketing and television pro-
grammes; or whether it will prove at least as demanding and combative as
the idea at the heart o f Western society was. I t is so easy to blame con-
temporary individuals for their egotism and lack o f a sense o f history! As
easy as it was to blame society for its taste for norms and instrumental
reason.
Certainly, we must see how the individual is manipulated by propaganda
and advertising. But we must also discover the social actor present in this
individual and even the subject who lies within her and fights against mass
society, the impersonality of markets and the violence o f war. For nearly
half a century, social thinking, especially in France, sought to be r i d o f the
subject, as i f the latter were betraying its idealist discourse and privileging
the rich against the poor, because the rich speak better. This was a pathetic
battle at a time when the world was dominated by totalitarianisms, wars
and confrontations.
Might the end o f society lead to the birth o f the subject! Many reject
this optimistic hypothesis. I simply ask them to recognize that this is the
main issue in our society: how are we to defend and enhance the creative
freedom of the subject against the waves o f violence, unpredictability and
arbitrariness that increasingly roll over the social space?
 Revisiting the Self

A t first sight, the idea of modernity does not seem to add much to the
analysis of what I have called the 'social' paradigm o f social life. Do we
not call modern that which is created and constantly transformed? Does
not the long classic opposition between community and society make the
latter the synonym o f modernity? D o we not think that modernity casts
out thrones and altars so as to allow society to manage itself, regarding
its integration as a central need that must serve as a criterion for assess-
ing behaviour? We are proud of regarding ourselves as citizen-members of
a nation and as depositories of sovereignty, and hence able to make or
change the law; and just as proud o f being workers whose activity is useful
to the collectivity, to the society that recognizes it through various sorts
of remunerations, particularly monetary ones.
The triumph of the idea o f society was nowhere as complete as in the
Western world, which took the lead over the rest o f the world precisely by
identifying itself with modernity.
Consequently, does referring to the 'end o f the social' mean anything
more than that 'modernity is exhausted'?
Many analysts are tempted to claim that modernity itself lies in ruins
and to announce our entry into the postmodern. To speak thus means, in
particular, asserting the disappearance of any central historical principle
for defining the social whole. This is an intellectual stance with such
general, radical consequences that it entails for those who adopt it a sense
of virtually infinite possibilities o f conceptualization, which they grant
themselves; and, by the same token, serious risks o f theoretical and
practical disorganization, to which they are exposed. I have always kept
my distance from this intellectual approach, however important and
fertile.
72 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

What is modernity?
I first of all want to propose a definition o f modernity which counter-
poses thinking focused on society to thinking centred on modernity, and
which is clearly encapsulated in an expression that will be employed
several times here: modernity is defined by the fact that it imparts non-
social foundations to social phenomena, that it subjects society to princi-
ples or values which, in themselves, are not social. This may be a cause for
surprise.
It is clear that such a definition of modernity leads us in a different direc-
tion from that heralded by the word 'society'. I have mentioned that self-
produced societies, defined by their instruments and their oeuvres, do not
appeal to any non-social principle, whether in their analysis or their action.
But this internal analysis, which must be retained, must also be completed
by further characterization. How does an 'active' society, at once creative
and conflictive, form itself in opposition to social systems organized for
their reproduction, equilibrium and integration - what we call communi-
ties based on non-social principles, be they religious, traditional, or some
combination o f the two? Is the transition from community to 'society' to
be explained by the imposition on the totality o f social life o f the domi-
nation exercised by a ruling elite? This explanation seems weak, for vio-
lence can create power but not the capacity for self-transformation and
rationalization. This leads us to define modernity by the intervention o f
anti-communitarian principles.
Only such principles can challenge the established order. But what are
these principles? The most varied answers have been given to the question;
and the list is long. We must reduce it as much as possible, in order to
identify non-social principles for orienting action that are genuinely fun-
damental. Following an inventory of the components of modernity which
are generally regarded as the most important, two seem to me to be indis-
pensable to the existence of modernity. They are the conditions o f exis-
tence for freedom and creativity within social systems, which naturally
tend to reinforce themselves rather than to form free actors.
The first principle is belief in reason and rational action. Science and
technology, calculation and accuracy, the application o f the results o f
science to increasingly diverse areas o f our existence and society are
necessary, quasi-obvious components o f modern civilization for us. The
important thing is to stress that reason is not based on the defence o f col-
lective or individual interests, but on itself and on a concept of truth that
is not apprehended in economic or political terms. Reason is a non-social
foundation of social life, whereas the religious or the customary were
defined in social terms, even i f they referred to transcendent realities, since
the sacred is a social reality.
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 73

The second founding principle of modernity is recognition of the rights

of the individual - that is, the assertion of a universalism that accords all
individuals the same rights, whatever their economic, social or political
attributes. Such a formula does not aim to close the debate on the place
of communities in contemporary individualistic societies. But that does
not mean that what since 1789 we have called human rights, which are
inscribed in numerous constitutions and obviously in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, are not recognized by us as a force super-
seding all communities and all principles of order.
Here then is the conclusion of this brief analysis of modernity. A
modern society is based on two principles that are not social in kind:
rational action and recognition of universal rights for all individuals. We
should not be surprised by this conclusion, for full-scale modernity can
only be the opposite of the communitarian model. As I have just defined
it, modernity is no longer a form of social life, but a pair of opposed and
complementary forces that give a society total control over itself: every-
thing here is creation, action, work, on the one hand, and, on the other,
unlimited freedom and the rejection of any 'moralization' of public life
that would restrict the actor's freedom. Is not what we say about ourselves
each day, as well as what we say about others and social organization itself,
dominated by this desire for effective action and this desire to assert, in
the face of all forms of domination, the inalienable rights of each and
every one - and hence the principle of equality between human beings,
which has no real meaning apart from this?
These conjoint principles clearly define modernity, since they reject any
social order that is not created by its own forces and which is subordinate,
for example, to a divine revelation - an opposition so complete that it has
provoked direct conflicts between religion and modernity, as was evident
in the Catholic world under the papacy of Pius I X . The idea of secular-
ism is inseparable from that of the rights of the individual, for i f religions
proclaim beliefs and revelation that are universal in scope, they do not in
any way define the rights of the individual as such, but, on the contrary,
the equal submission of all individuals to a divine will or revealed truth.
When a spiritual power controls the temporal power or is mixed with it,
a community is created, defined by the adhesion of its members to the
body of beliefs and practices of a religion, whose observance the tempo-
ral power must enforce.
But what is the relationship between modernity and the Western mode
of modernization? The Western social model, because it is organized
around the idea of a self-created society, comes under the principles of
modernity. It is movement, self-transformation, destruction and recon-
struction of the self. More clearly still, it believes in the use of reason,
respects verifiable, transmissible and applicable truth, and thinks that in
74 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social Terms

this way it can improve not its degree of integration, but the life chances,
action and satisfaction o f needs o f all members of society.
Consequently, the link between the Western idea o f society and that o f
modernity is strengthened as the self-production of society gives us greater
confidence in our capacity to be modern. I t would be absurd to claim that
Western society has the same relations with modernity as all the other
types o f modernization; that all follow paths which make them progress
towards modernity in the same way, passing through forms of organiza-
tion and mobilization that often distance them from it. A n d it is this very
kinship that obliges us to stress at greater length the separation - even
opposition - between our ideas o f society and modernity, whereas what
unites them is almost too visible, since we know that the idea of moder-
nity was born within societies o f a Western type - and not within closed
communities.
The societies that have been called industrial or post-industrial do not
isolate rationality from rationalization, a method of production that
resorts to calculation, but whose main aim is to increase the control of
capitalist profit over workers' labour.
A t the same time, the universalistic affirmation o f the rights of each
individual was likewise limited in industrial society, where the talk was also
of social rights - that is, the rights of workers. This could lead to the inter-
pretation o f those rights as being bound to result in the establishment of
a society o f workers, a classless society - a notion that reintroduced a
model o f society and was therefore poles apart from the individualism of
human rights. Only modernity in itself militates against any confusion
between the freedom of each person and social integration.
The distance from full-scale modernity is even greater when we consider
the societies o f early modernity (at least in the Western world), for reason
was then bound up with the formation of the modern, 'bureaucratic' state,
which was invariably an Absolutist monarchy or oligarchy. The freedom
of the citizen was defined more by duties than by rights.
But no society, not even the most advanced technologically, can be iden-
tified with modernity. What opposes the two notions is that society, com-
pletely contrary as it is to a communitarian logic, also tends to its own
reinforcement. I t therefore gives preference to the 'general interest', and
hence to everyone's duties, over individual rights. Instrumental rationality,
which seeks efficiency in achieving results, cannot be confused with moder-
nity either. A n d this distinction is so charged with meaning that it occupies
a central place in sociological thought, thanks to the Frankfurt School and
a whole line o f works that are among the most important in sociological
thinking, from Horkheimer and Adorno, via Marcuse, to Habermas.
Conversely, no modernization is a necessary and sufficient condition for
attaining modernity. The march to modernity occurs by concentrating
 Revisiting t h e Self 75

many elements derived from other societies. The completely new is never
fashioned exclusively out o f what is new; it is equally constructed out of
old materials. Modernity is a creation that exceeds all its fields o f appli-
cation, for all have another side - that of the reinterpretation o f the pre¬
modern. The idea o f society is always centred on itself, both by those who
deal with the functions and utility o f forms of behaviour and by those
who everywhere perceive the instruments and effects o f a domination. I n
contrast, the idea o f modernity contains an insurmountable tension
between, on the one hand, reason and the rights o f individuals and, on
the other, the collective interest. Citizenship and civil rights are also a polit-
ical expression of rationality, but one that is opposed to the integration
and reinforcement o f society, since rights are opposed to duties.
Moreover, the two principles o f modernity do not form a single unit
and can be set in competition with one another. Rational action is not
always in accordance with individual rights and the latter are no less fre-
quently exercised against rational thinking.

The victory of modernity

The relations between the idea of society and that of modernity emerge
more clearly still when we assess the evolution of societies linked to moder-
nity: do they reinforce themselves to the extent that modernity becomes
identified with the reign o f interests? By contrast, does social organization
dissolve into a modernity that imposes constant change? Or - third solu-
tion - do the two orders o f reality increasingly separate in a dynamic that
protects secularization and secularism?
Let us successively examine - and exclude - these three responses. The
first is the one that best satisfies the pessimism o f realists, who are per-
suaded that interest always prevails over rights and principles, and that the
interdependence of the elements o f social life becomes so great that it no
longer allows room for the openness represented by modernity: we must
make do with avoiding excessively brutal infringements o f rational think-
ing and human rights, but we must also adapt to poorly defined, chang-
ing situations o f which we are not the masters. This empiricism enables us
to avoid the most serious errors, even i f it does not lead to us behaving in
accordance with the principle of any modernity.
The second solution is attractive only to those who impart an elemen-
tary meaning to modernity - that of constant change - which is far
removed from the one that it seemed to me necessary to confer on it.
Above all, the idea that general, enduring problems are dissolved in a
present that is itself fragmented by incessant change is very far removed
from our lived experience, since we increasingly pose ourselves long-term,
76 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

fundamental problems about democracy, the encounter between cultures,

our right to intervene in human life, and so forth.
The third solution, which is enjoying renewed popularity at the begin-
ning o f the new century, refers simply to the separation between public life
and private life. I t is defended by those who would like to restrict religion
to the private sphere and who consider schools to be a sanctuary where
the teacher must only recognize the rational individual and ignore the cul-
tural, social and psychological situation o f each pupil.
The selection of a different solution defines the raison d'être o f this
book. What is most often announced, by optimists and pessimists alike, is
the triumph of interest and calculation, accelerated change and the diver-
sification o f consumption, such that the most developed societies are also
the most modern. By contrast, I defend the idea not that the internal logic
of societies is devouring modernity and transforming it into rationaliza-
tion and instrumental individualism - an idea that was more valid in the
past than the present - but that the model o f society is decomposing with
increasing rapidity before our very eyes, whereas the principles of moder-
nity are striving to impose themselves ever more directly. I n fact advanc-
ing onto the ruins o f society are, on the one hand, various uncontrolled
forces - those o f the market, war and violence - and, on the other, moder-
nity, whose rationalism and concern for universal human rights are central
elements that make themselves heard ever more directly, without taking
the form of an imaginary perfect society.
Our world is increasingly dominated by force, but it is also increasingly
concerned with moral choices that now occupy a central place in political
life. For several decades, following the exhaustion of conservative sociol-
ogy, which regarded society as a system capable of regulating its functions
and adapting those who lived in it to systemic requirements, we have been
besieged by thinking that reduces all aspects o f social life to the defence
and reproduction of domination. This critical approach produced many
works of high quality, but it inevitably plunged into a spiral of self-
destruction: is not critical thinking itself useful to the triumph of a dom-
ination whose formidable power it demonstrates, and which contrasts with
the weakness o f its opponents? I n truth, since the beginning of the new
century the success of this thinking has declined, but it remains very
strong, basing itself on the denunciation o f violence and arbitrariness.
Neo-liberal thinking, which takes the opposite view and wishes to be the
study of 'rational choices', proposes an empirical hedonism that has the
advantage of not contradicting our desires, but does not extend any guar-
antee of free choice to those influenced by marketing. This hedonism is
likewise very far removed from what I call modernity.
It is necessary to break completely with all forms of thinking bound up
with the defence of the social system, at once capable of developing and
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 77

imposing values, norms, and forms of authority, and defining statuses and
roles. For modernity is the exact opposite of the self-creation o f society.
What we are living through is the destruction of society - that is, the
social vision of social life, the set of categories in which we have lived like
a suit of armour for more than a century. We see crumbling around us
societies o f production and social struggles, whose dynamism gave us a
lead of several centuries over the rest of the world. It is only to be expected
if many can see nothing but the ruins of such a grandiose construct. I
myself constantly stress the return of violence and war; and I have empha-
sized the triumph of the market over work and creation. But in the face
of the black clouds that loom so large in our sky, I also perceive the ever
more brilliant presence of a modernity whose principles (belief in reason
and recognition of universal human rights) are asserted over the ruins of
social systems.
Far from being plunged into a world where only interest and pleasure
survive, we are ever more clearly confronted with our own responsibilities
as free beings. I have already made the point: on the ruins o f the social
systems there appear two increasingly obvious forces, neither o f which is
social: the naturalized forces o f the market, violence and war, on the one
hand; and the equally non-social, because absolute and universal, appeal
to rights and reason, on the other. Our history is no longer defined by its
meaning and ultimate destination, or by the spirit o f a time or people, but
by the clash o f natural forces - markets, wars and catastrophes - with
modernity, with the subject.
Why speak of 'modernity'? Why not refer to 'values' or, more tradi-
tionally, to 'Enlightenment philosophy'? I avoid the idea of values, which
sometimes refers to a religious conception and sometimes to the most clas-
sical sociology, for- which values are at the apex o f the system of norms
and social organization and can therefore only refer to society itself, like
all forms of the sacred.
For its part, the idea of modernity refers, over and above society's action
on itself, to the sources o f rights, the presence o f the universal in the social.
It is good i f the content given to the idea of modernity here evokes the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, for the latter, through its political as well
as its intellectual expressions, is infused with the same confidence in the
creation of self by self, thanks to transcendence of the forms of social
closure that prevent recognition of the universalism of rights and reason.
I f the notion o f society was creative for so long, it was (as I have said)
because it appealed to modernity against the communities that it overthrew,
and hence to universalistic principles like reason and the universal rights of
each individual. But today, modernity is superseding society in its turn.
Because sociological critique has accurately identified more domination
than rationality in the functioning o f societies, and more duties than rights,
78 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

it has become increasingly difficult for us to believe that the human being
becomes a free, responsible individual by integrating into society, its norms
and laws. On the contrary, we have an ever stronger sense o f what opposes
the individual to society and, equally, society to modernity, because the
modern individual is increasingly defined by her relationship to herself and
modernity is the constant appeal, beyond social norms and duties, to a uni-
versalism o f rights that can certainly degenerate into a hedonism manipu-
lated by commerce and media, but which can equally be the locus o f an
appeal to the subject in its emancipatory universalism.
Modernity was for a long time borne along by the idea o f society; it can
only develop today by dispensing with it, combating it even, and by taking
possession o f the subject - which is increasingly directly opposed to the
idea o f society.
The idea o f modernity appeals to no transcendent principle. On the con-
trary, it asserts that the creative freedom of each one - o f each individual
or category o f individuals - is the highest good, that it does not presup-
pose any foundation other than itself. This explains why modernity is never
identified with some particular society or government, or with some par-
ticular current o f ideas or type o f teaching. Just as modernity was rein-
forced by the transition from community to society, so it is strengthened
- and to an even greater extent - by the supersession o f society. I t detaches
itself from any social expression, like a religion separating itself from any
Church or ritual practice.
The ruin o f society certainly has as many negative aspects as positive
ones. As I have said, de-socialization leads to the destruction o f social
bonds, to solitude, to a crisis o f identity. A t the same time, however, it lib-
erates people from imposed affiliations and rules. N o t only is modernity not
undermined by it, but it becomes the sole force of resistance to all forms o f
violence; and it is to modernity that responsibility falls for reconstructing
institutions that will no longer serve society - re-baptized the 'general inter-
est' or 'common good' - but the creative freedom o f each individual.
This conception o f modernity and human rights typically comes up
against two opponents. The first, which is more visible today, is embodied
in Islamic or Asian milieus that refuse all universality to the Western model
and claim that theirs, determined by a communitarian conception o f social
life and by the preservation o f the traditional family, has proved more
effective than ours, affected as it is by the many forms o f personal and col-
lective decomposition. The writings o f Lee Kuan Yew, powerful, author-
itarian master o f Singapore, are regarded as perfectly representative o f
this tendency, which Michael Ignatieff opposes to that of Western
Enlightenment philosophy. I n reality, this kind o f thinking does not
propose a definition of modernity: it defends a different model o f mod-
ernization that it deems more effective - something which is not in itself
unacceptable.
 Revisiting t h e Self 79

The second opponent is stronger intellectually, and must be more closely

attended to. It derives from the great tradition that goes back to Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and even beyond him to Hobbes, which defines democ-
racy by the rule o f the general will - in other words, by the maximum
possible respect for popular sovereignty. This conception has been attacked
from its right by economic liberalism and from its left by the idea of class
struggle, but remains predominant, especially in the United States. In this
connection, Ignatieff appropriately evokes American exceptionalism as
displayed on the occasion o f the creation of the permanent International
Criminal Court, and hence American opposition to the idea of human
rights as redefined in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Here there is a conflict between two conceptions o f democracy, pertain-
ing to two different analyses of the same historical situations.
The American conception, approved by all those who put the idea o f
nation first, is so optimistic and so far removed from the realities o f a great
country, as Rousseau had already noted, that it ends up leaving society,
with its centres o f power and zones of exclusion, its traditions, its ideolo-
gies, and (why not?) its state religion, to manage itself in the name of its
own sovereignty, without it being possible for any major external princi-
ple to be opposed to it. This conception was that o f the revolutions and
the ideal o f the first generations of political movements - above all, of the
Utopias, since the most potent were invented during the phase when the
political 'paradigm' held sway.
But in the transition from one period to the next, in penetrating soci-
eties that were less and less controlled politically and more and more dom-
inated by capitalist interests, bureaucracies, ruling elites, and international
financial and economic networks, this sovereign conception lost its power
and dissolved into the often opaque practices o f representative democracy.
A t the same time the idea o f democratic individualism, which is also that
of human rights, gained ground. It is based on a profound distrust of polit-
ical power and all forms o f domination - a mistrust consistently justified
throughout the twentieth century, which (as is well known) was dominated
by totalitarianisms, authoritarian regimes, and crises o f the market. We
have come so far on this road that we must reject any approach in terms
of sovereignty, which is unquestionably foreign to totalitarianism, but
whose dangers outweigh its advantages. It is the idea o f human rights,
combined with that o f the subject, which offers the best defence against
all forms of social domination.

The end of social thought

The central position assigned modernity - that is, the creative freedom o f
the actor, not the requirements and functions of social systems - results
80 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

from the observation made at the end of the previous chapter: we are living
the 'end o f the social'. For the break to be complete, it remains to exclude
more firmly than I have hitherto done the forms of social thought that
corresponded to the 'social' representation of collective life, which repre-
sented a very important part o f sociological analysis.
We must recognize the impact of the transformation o f social reality on
sociological thinking. They must both advance, in the domain of social
ideas as in that of social behaviour, towards a new vision of collective life
and also o f individual behaviour, to which the idea of modernity has in-
troduced us. The theme o f the end of the social, of the need to eliminate
the idea of society, completely changes (as we are well aware) our way o f
thinking and talking.
We can no longer think about social phenomena sociologically and should
not do so. This is less difficult than it appears at first sight, since, in societies
other than ours, the social has been conceived in political or religious terms.
The potent and, all things considered, optimistic image o f a society that
confers from above a meaning on everyone's social life has always been
accompanied and contested by that of a society enclosed in itself and
reduced to the language of internal domination. Today, this closure is no
longer that of armies subject to an all-powerful head. I t is the domination
that filters into all the parts o f society, and above all into actors them-
selves, as Michel Foucault showed so powerfully, whereas central power is
undermined, for it is under attack from a capitalism that allows econom-
ics to dominate society. I n this connection, American radical feminists
have convincingly shown that the words and notions that make it possible
to describe women's situation and behaviour have as their principal func-
tion imposing an authoritarian reference on the model o f stable, asym-
metrical heterosexual relations. The peculiarity of forms of domination is
to pass themselves off as natural - and hence non-imposed.
Sociology has largely drawn on these two conceptions o f social systems.
During the years of post-war reconstruction, it was dominated by the
oeuvre o f Talcott Parsons, who constructed, almost down to the last detail,
the plan o f a society organizing its four main functions: selection of polit-
ical ends, employment of economic resources, socialization o f actors, and
punishment of deviance. A generation later, a critical sociology began to
be diffused in virtually all Western countries, which discovered the effects
of domination in the words, gestures and practices of each sector of social
life. I n the United States the student movement, action in support o f black
people's demands for civil rights, and also the struggle against the war in
Vietnam shattered the intellectual good conscience o f post-war America.
'Critical functionalism', perhaps because it offered a universal key to
social analysis by inviting us to discover mechanisms for constructing
and transmitting generalized domination in all domains, had great success
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 81

in intellectual circles and restored vigour to the critique of dominant

ideologies and practices that had lost much o f its force with the decline of
Marxism, increasingly reduced to the language of totalitarian regimes. But
its utility is more apparent than real. For what is the domination in ques-
tion and for whose benefit does it operate? I f it is not that o f a god or a king,
whose power has been undermined to vanishing point in societies where
science, public and private bureaucracies, but also all forms o f political par-
ticipation have gone on gaining ground, it can only be that of society over
itself, of social order - above all, when the latter seeks to allot itself scien-
tific and rational foundations. The domination suffered has been associated
with the search for a social order founded on itself. This corresponded to
the social rationalism of the nineteenth century, but also to the totalitarian
Utopias of the twentieth, which generally criticized the old social order either
in the name of natural realities, or in the name of a struggle against forms
of power like that of employers. Social order still imposes itself or seeks to,
it is true; and we are forever seeing ethics o f the general interest, the common
good, and social integration reborn. But what must be rejected is the idea
that social order is imposed by itself and destroys, along with traditional
social affiliations, individualistic or libertarian demands.
The application of critical sociology to a knowledge of women's action
clearly reveals its weakness. For just as it is easy to demonstrate the power
and antiquity o f male domination, so it is necessary to recognize the vic-
tories won by women's movements in the political and economic order -
above all, in the process o f controlling reproduction. The idea o f the dom-
ination of sexuality by the social order - that is, by an image o f the family
based on the heterosexual couple - is too vague and seems very weak com-
pared with that which denounces male power and aspires to a specifically
female liberation. This objective cannot be confused with the struggle
against a society conceived as defending its own interests, which possesses
less mobilizing force.
But let us return to the key thing. As soon as we exclude the idea o f
society as a principle for assessing social behaviour, we must abandon the
tools of classical sociology. I n effect it becomes impossible, at least in prin-
ciple, to speak o f institutions, to conceive of education as a process of
socialization, or to define the actor by the network of her roles and role
expectations. What, then, might social action signify? What sociological
orientations might replace the functionalism and critical thinking which
are declining with the worsening crisis of the idea of society?
The first, very prominent in the United States in particular, and which
I have already rapidly mentioned, consists in applying an economic type
of thought to sociology, and endeavours to understand the choices of
actors and hence the often very complex forms assumed by the rational
pursuit of interests.
82 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in Social Terms

A second type of research, which is rapidly spreading, is devoted to

analysing the negative consequences of the disappearance of the 'social
bond' and attempts to recreate it.
The third domain of studies is devoted to actors rather than systems,
and more broadly to the study of agency, as in the case of Anthony
Giddens and his London group. The great oeuvre of Jürgen Habermas,
which is devoted to rediscovering, via a study of communication (and no
longer o f consciousness), a Kantian-type universalism, is a major and
enduring influence in this domain of sociology, which is the largest, most
active and most original. The present book is related to this kind of
research.
What all the schools o f living sociology share is that they start out from
the social actor and reconstruct, beginning with her, her expectations and
interactions, the social field in which she acts. This switch of standpoint
occurred in the space of a few years and in spectacular fashion. Such ideas
are ubiquitous today in our daily lives. Nevertheless, they remain the object
of profound mistrust in intellectual circles. For thirty years at least, was it
not the main aim of intellectuals to eliminate all reference to the subject?
D i d some not go so far as to say that the totalitarian regimes had pro-
tected the philosophies of subjectivity? D i d not extreme critical thinking
refuse to recognize the existence of social actors? I t spoke only of victims,
so that the voice of the dominated did not even need to be taken heed of,
since the meaning of their action could never penetrate the actor's con-
sciousness. France played a major role in generating such ideas, which were
diffused in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and many other
countries, particularly in Latin America. Its central line of influence was
structuralism, which excluded the idea and the intentions of the actor, and
regarded the text as an object that should be studied in itself, without ref-
erence to its conditions of production. Sociology let itself be dragged
along in this current, based on a scientific approach to its works. I t thus
created a growing gap between real social policies and the discourse of
intellectuals defending their forms of knowledge, including against the
demands of a growing number of youth and adults.
Practical sociologists can no longer integrate this representation of
society into their observations. How can they speak of society's total
ascendancy, its dominance? On the contrary, the reality they observe is the
decomposition of systems of classification and hierarchy, the prolifera-
tions of acts of incivility or defiance, the spread of forms of behaviour
involving evasion, escape, or innovation. A decidedly strange blindness is
required to go on defining our society predominantly as a system for repro-
ducing inequalities and privileges. N o t that this idea is unfounded; on the
contrary, it is supported by repeated observation, in particular in studies
on the recruitment of elites. But how can we assign central importance to
 R e v i s i t i n g the Self 83

such control mechanisms when, in all domains from educational partici-

pation to museums, from the use of photography to geographical mobil-
ity, the most striking thing about this society where forms of participation
have expanded is the diversification o f trajectories and innovations, open-
ness to the international world and new communications technologies?
Unquestionably, discourses on forms of social determinism, and on the
increasingly elaborate control exercised by authorities over citizens become
simple consumers, are ill-suited to fragmented societies, which are con-
stantly changing and criss-crossed by the lightning flashes of war.

Emancipatory individualism

Effective and brutal, the Western mode of modernization conquered the

world in the name o f society. But its strength began to diminish when the
dominated rebelled against their masters. The working-class movements
first of all, then the national liberation movements, and now the feminist
and ecological movements - closely linked to one another - have made
inroads into the total domination exercised by the ruling elite, composed
of European, adult, male property-owners.
Workers, the colonized, women, and minorities of various types then
created a subjectivity for themselves. A n d it has become impossible to do
no more than deplore the exploitation of so many dominated categories,
as i f the latter could only be victims; and no less impossible to call, like
Zola, on the intelligence and generosity of educated youth to give a
meaning to the rebellion of those who can only shatter the contradictions
of the dominant system. A t a certain point, the victims cease to be nothing
but victims; they become conscious of their situation, protest, speak out.
This is a key moment, already witnessed when skilled workers, who more
often than not were employed by workshops rather than factories,
analysed their situation in terms o f class domination; and above all defined
what they were - workers - what they were fighting against - profit - and
in the name o f what they demanded their rights - progress and modernity.
These workers were not completely alienated or crushed: bolstered by their
skills and a craft that often put them in a favourable position in the labour
market, they spoke in the name of universal rights - equality, freedom,
justice. A n analogous history transformed the colonized from oppressed
peoples into national liberation movements. A n d later I shall refer to
women's achievement of self-awareness, which was essentially formed
through the demand to dispose freely of their own bodies.
This rise in subjectivities convulsed a mode o f reasoning that placed cre-
dence only in objectivity, impersonal reason, calculation and interest. It
further anchored the Western model in modernity, since the assertion o f
84 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

human rights, at once individual and universal, is one o f the fundamen-

tal components of modernity. This appeal to what might be called the right
to subjectivity made itself heard with all the more force in that the Euro-
pean model o f modernization, based on the construction o f society, was
entering into crisis and collectivism was assuming a sombre aspect.
This renewal of subjectivities, like all the liberation movements that pre-
ceded it, invariably took positive forms. But it sometimes assumed nega-
tive forms, as when it issued, for example, in a new communitarianism, in
the same way that the workers' liberation movement engendered Commu-
nism. In these cases, subjectivities are swallowed up by apparatuses of
power which, while speaking in their name, transform them into then-
opposite, since they define each individual by his adhesion to a commu-
nity that recognizes no minority or opposition.
This appeal to individual distinctiveness can also go so far that it is
inverted, becoming anti-modern. Social life then seems no more than a
direct clash between the freedom of the market, a degraded form o f
reason, and identitarian proclamations, which are equally degraded forms
of individualism. These two forces are opposed, but they combine to fore-
close any space of free action on the part o f social and cultural actors
whose subjectivity is now recognized only as a remnant from the past.
In its liberal form, social life amounts to an unregulated market: each
presses the other to appropriate a product, which she defines as a good
bargain. This generalized competition nurtures interest groups and forms
of corporatism that no longer refer to the general interest. The spring o f
Western modernization then slackens, with the agreement and to the
applause of the majority, since such relaxation restricts the omnipotence
of the ruling elite - but at the price o f a growing powerlessness to accept
the responsibilities, risks and hopes nurtured by investment, production
and work.
The uprising of the dominated reduced the level of tension in Western
society, but this was accompanied by a fall in long-term investments and
projects, in what sociologists call the 'model of deferred gratification',
which is replaced by a desire for immediate, constantly growing
participation.
More or less rapidly, depending on the country concerned, we are
approaching the point where the capacity for accumulation will have dis-
appeared and where consumption will take precedence over production,
to such an extent that future generations will be made to bear the weight
of increased public debt. Our societies could then become markets,
bazaars, where each group would strive to sell what it produces and to buy
the goods and services it needs at the best price. Other countries will avoid
this entropy by concentrating their resources and decision-making power
in the hands of new elites, which operate by means of war rather than pro-
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 85

duction, which possess arms rather than markets, and which also impose
a new slavery by reducing workers' living standards as far' as possible. The
undermining of our societies, which is explained by the exhaustion of their
traditional model o f development, therefore leads on the one hand to
increasing autonomy and domination of the world o f war and, on the
other, to the triumph of short-term consumption over long-term develop-
mental projects.
This leads us to pose the fundamental question to which this book
would like to respond: is a new model o f modernization possible? Can a
new dynamic emerge in our relaxed societies? I t cannot be created by
imposing new internal tensions, since our history has been dominated for
a century and a half by the overthrow of forms of domination and the
relaxation of tensions. We must therefore look in the opposite direction.
What is the principle that might prevent our societies from sinking into
a generalized exhausting competition, but without resorting to the spirit
of power, conquest and crusade to re-galvanize society and impose new
constraints and sacrifices on it? It is individualism. It is true that this word
has a bad reputation. It has served to eulogize personal interests and indif-
ference to the lot of the majority; and when it lauds the success of the
affluent, casting the situation of the insecure and the excluded into obscu-
rity, it is literally intolerable and justifiably becomes the target of attacks
by those who defend solidarity, justice and equality.
But we are looking for a different answer: does a form o f individualism
exist that might replace the will to conquer and the creation o f high inter-
nal tension which account for the effectiveness o f the European model of
modernization? While the whole of Part Two of this book is given over to
seeking an answer to that question, is it possible to indicate in a few lines
here what such an answer might consist in and, consequently, how our
societies might escape the opposite and complementary dangers of sub-
mission to the rules o f the market and imprisonment in a communitari-
anism that inevitably leads to war?
We have referred to the liberation movement whereby the dominated,
rejecting their submission, conferred a subjectivity on themselves, asserted
themselves as beings of right who rejected injustice, inequality and humil-
iation. Why not look at a theoretical level for an answer that would give
the liberation movements - those of the working class, colonized nations,
women, and various minorities - their full significance, by affirming that
in a world which can no longer be constructed around conquest and man-
aging extreme tension, it is the quest for the self, the resistance of the self
to impersonal forces, that might enable us to preserve our freedom?
This form o f resistance contains self-affirmation, not only as a social
actor but as a personal subject. The destruction of the idea o f society can
only save us from a catastrophe i f it leads to the construction of the idea
86 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

of the subject, to the pursuit of an activity that seeks neither profit, nor
power, nor glory, but which affirms the dignity o f all human beings and
the respect they deserve.
Let us now return to the reasons for the decline of the notion o f society.
The key point in the debate is whether the individual is formed by becom-
ing a citizen or, on the contrary, by detaching himself from the norms, sta-
tuses and roles which organs of authority and 'agencies o f socialization',
like the school and the family, can no longer force him to accept. The first
idea was at the very heart o f the construction of societies of a democratic
type. Whereas authoritarian, populist or communitarian societies call for
the transcendence of individual interests in favour o f maximum partici-
pation in a collective entity - a people, a race, a religious belief, a language
or a territory - the greatness o f our liberal democracies is that they con-
ceived institutions as milieus for the production o f free, responsible indi-
viduals, concerned to act in accordance with universalistic criteria. This is
how we arrived at the idea o f the subject.
Two contrasting phenomena then occurred: the disintegration o f the
ego defined as a set of roles; and the rise o f a conscious, reflexive indi-
vidualism defined as the demand for oneself, by an individual or a group,
of a creative freedom that is its own end, which is not subordinate to any
social or political objective. The individual then ceases to be an empirical
unity, a character, an ego; in a converse dynamic, it becomes the supreme
end that is substituted not only for God but for society itself. The indi-
vidual was produced by society, in her most concrete behaviour, as well as
in her thinking. Now the opposite is true. The creative affirmation at the
heart of modernity resists social organization and, depending on whether
its self-assertion is satisfied or not, assesses it in positive or negative terms.
This language, which is neither difficult to understand nor more fragile
than that which made the individual a social being, warrants careful atten-
tion, for it completely excludes various habitual representations of the
relations between individual and society.
Should such a conception be attacked and condemned as idealist? But
why is it more idealist to say that the individual seeks to be recognized as
free and responsible than to claim that he defines himself with reference to
the values and norms o f society? On the contrary, I am very careful not to
appeal to the notion of value because it always mixes up concrete forms o f
social life with a definition of good and evil. The peculiarity o f modernity
is that it does not appeal to any principle or value external to itself. I t is
genuinely self-creative, in a way that suits agnostic minds but also certain
forms of religious thought - those which stress the direct relationship
between the believer and God, in abstraction from any social attribute.
As a modern phenomenon, the individual therefore escapes social
determinism, in as much as she is a self-creating subject. Conversely, the
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 87

social individual is determined by her position in society. We have experi-

ence of both: I know that I think and eat like the members o f my social,
national and cultural milieu; and I can easily identify the social deter-
minants of my behaviour, since it resembles that o f those who resemble
me socially. But with equal conviction I feel that I assert my freedom by
repelling various pressures that cannot wholly resist my rejection. The
experience o f my freedom has the same power as the experience o f our
social determinations. I do not need to search on the periphery of forms
of social determinism for zones o f indeterminacy. Why should we not per-
ceive our freedom with the same vigour as the determinants that limit us?
A n d how could we profess democratic ideas i f we no longer accepted the
idea that we have a certain freedom to choose between good and evil? Ana-
lysts who see nothing but victims and the forces dominating them are at
once short-sighted and arbitrary. Has not our history in recent centuries
been largely dominated by social movements that have altered and trans-
formed our life ever more profoundly?

Forms of social determinism

When individualism seems to be reduced to consumer choices, the idea

reappears that behaviour is subject to forms of social determinism - to
such an extent that the main problem becomes to preserve a small margin
of indeterminacy in order to take account of factors independent o f the
collective situation. We have long been taught that the rich voters tend to
cast a right-wing vote, the poor a left-wing one. But the most interesting
question ultimately is why not all wage-earners vote for the left (far from
it!) in a country where wage-earners form the great majority o f the work-
force but where their diversity is on the increase and where many hard jobs
are done by foreigners. Determination only obtains i f behaviour, which
expresses itself in terms o f preferences and tastes, is strongly correlated
with the place occupied by the actor in the social hierarchy. Yet such obser-
vations have much weaker explanatory power than those that consider
actors in their real social relations.
We must therefore adopt a balanced conception of modernity. I t is
neither the destruction o f the established order in the name o f the most
powerful economic interests, nor the triumph of rational thinking, as nine-
teenth-century rationalists had it. We cannot separate the conquests o f
modernity from the dangers it contains and against which it must arm
itself. Modernity shatters communities, the established order, and its defen-
sive stability. But rational thought and the idea that human rights exist are
not merely abstract principles. Conceptions and ideas o f rights are much
more than forces of supersession and critique; they give rise to what can
88 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

be called social life - that is, to the world o f the acquired as opposed to
the world of the transmitted. Consequently, we must keep a constant
watch over the modalities of the reinforcement o f society, sometimes in
the name o f modernity itself, for it can lead to the self-destruction o f this
modernity. The threat is permanent. Rationalism, like the rationalization
of industrial labour, can also serve to destroy actors' consciousness.
More complex, at least in appearance, is the inversion that can lead to
respect for rights being transformed into an instrument of oppression.
How can we be unaware that the defence o f cultural rights can also turn
into an obsession with the identity, homogeneity and purity of the group,
the rejection of minorities and differences? I n the name of cultural rights,
communities are constructed that impose their laws, which they disguise
as rights. In the name o f an identity and a tradition, authoritarian rulers
seek to impose principles, and even practices, that negate freedom of con-
science and free cultural choices.
The rationalized universe and communitarian regimes can also act in
concert to deprive us of the exercise of cultural rights and, more broadly,
modernity itself, of space. A t each stage of modernity the same dangers
have emerged. Thus, during the French Revolution it was in the name of
liberty and the nation that regions and social categories were destroyed. A
century later, the working-class movement forced respect for social rights.
But it was in the name o f the working-class movement that the dictator-
ship of the proletariat was imposed and that the social rights which were
beginning to be recognized were destroyed. The universe of social actors
could only be formed by fighting on two fronts simultaneously: against
the reproduction of traditional values and forms of authority and, at the
same time, against an authoritarianism that was technocratic as well as
communitarian.
How can modernity safeguard itself against the danger of self-destruc-
tion that dominated much of the twentieth century, via all the forms of
rationalized organization in the service of new communitarianisms -
which in the case of Nazism went as far as genocide? Only by recognizing
that modernity can be realized solely through rational thinking and respect
for universal human rights, and hence by making its main goal the cre-
ation of actors whose freedom and responsibility are precisely based on
the two principal components o f modernity. When the biologist Axel
K.ahn adopts for his own purposes his father's invitation to be 'reasonable
and human', he expresses this idea in the most direct manner. 'Reason-
able' is inseparable from 'rational'; and 'human' above all signifies respect
for the rights of others. Modernity does not manifest itself in the creation
of the 'best of all possible worlds', but on the contrary in the subordina-
tion of all forms of social organization to a central goal: producing indi-
viduals capable of inventing and defending their own capacity to combine
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 89

rational thinking and basic human rights in social institutions that are con-
cerned with both efficiency and liber ty.
This conclusion is valid for every part of the world. Where the com-
munitarian threat is enhanced by the experience o f dependency, it is the
appeal to reason that plays the most emancipatory role. I n contrast, in the
richest or most 'developed' countries it is the appeal to human rights that
offers the best protection against the regime o f interest, of money as a
caricature of rationalization.
Here we finally return to our starting-point. Talk o f social determinism
entails that the logic of society impose itself on the intentions and inter-
ests of actors. Yet on the contrary, the decline o f the notion of society
entails the decline of the idea that behaviour is subject to forms of social
determinism. Numerous sociologists and historians have observed the
undermining of transmitted statuses, of familial, social, national, etc.
affiliations; and, consequently, the replacement o f external explanations
of actors' behaviour by different ones, which are increasingly proximate to
actors' relations to themselves. To illustrate the point, it will suffice to refer
to studies of education. Schools, it has long been argued, transmit social
inequalities (this, let it be said in passing, represents progress compared
with the naive ideological assertion that schools are a powerful levelling
factor). This leads to them being regarded as a black box and to the claim
that educational outcomes are determined by the preceding social situa-
tion. This was a decisive move, whose success was so great that it abounds
in sociology manuals. But now analyses of the 'institutional effect' con-
ducted by François Dubet have demonstrated that educational outcomes
are more dependent on the nature o f communication between teachers and
the taught in schools - which refers directly to the standpoint of actors
and their interactions. Today, the theme of forms o f social determinism,
which was once illuminating, is primarily an obstacle to understanding the
social actor. Modernity - that is, the central orientation of modern actors
to the assertion of their own freedom - is primarily inflected by a logic of
the actor who seeks to assert herself as such.
Were a majority of sociologists to continue to support the old repre-
sentation o f social life and the complementary theme of social determin-
ism, sociology itself would lose its vigour and perhaps its life, for what
must be undertaken as a matter o f urgency is the study of actors, their
relations, conflicts and negotiations. Were sociology to put off its indis-
pensable modernization, it would condemn itself to being nothing more
than a closed chapter in the history o f ideas.
But this transformation is already well underway. The success of 'Cul-
tural Studies' proves it. Initiated in Great Britain by Stuart Hall, the dis-
cipline was developed by Margaret Archer and soon conquered a major
position in American academia and beyond. What does this research
90 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d t o O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

programme involve, i f not the study o f actors who are invariably in a

minority position or subject to domination? Studies o f ethnic minorities,
women's behaviour, or sexual minorities are subjects that have prompted
a large number of important works. The development of Jeffrey Alexan-
der's work clarifies this transformation in sociology. Having achieved great
authority thanks to his set of books on the history of sociological theory,
and in particular on the work o f Talcott Parsons, he has become the
leading author in a cultural sociology that breathes fresh life into
Durkheim, at the same time as it reinvigorates this vast domain, above all
by calling for a study of the performative character o f actors.

From focusing on the world to focusing on the self

We must now examine the location that should be assigned to the types of
society and culture that are arising before our very eyes. Two main ques-
tions stand out. (1) Can we give a historical expression to the transfor-
mations described? Are we dealing with a new stage of modernity, a form
of postmodernism, the birth of a post-industrial society, or a communi-
cation society? (2) D o the other modes of modernization undergo muta-
tions comparable to those of the Western world or, on the contrary, are
we witnessing the collapse of a part o f the world which is losing control
and self-consciousness?
First o f all, then: in what terms should we conceive the changes that
have just been analysed? I t is highly unlikely that it is in the economic terms
of stages of growth, changes in capitalism - or even o f relations between
market economy and public intervention. For at the outset we recognized
that globalization, economic phenomenon par excellence, was detaching
itself from the national or local societies it overarches, provoking in these
societies significant reactions of defence or rejection, but which for the
most part remain separated from specifically social movements.
A n approach in terms of modes o f work and forms o f production is
attractive to many more sociologists. I t is no accident i f the renaissance o f
sociology in Europe, following the Second World War, was the interna-
tionally recognized initiative of Georges Friedmann. I n the first instance,
this sociology studied the transition from a craft society to a production
society dominated by the manufacture of mass materials by workers
subject to a strict division of labour and often to imposed work rates. Then
it became interested in the communication society, organized into net-
works and transmitting information (more and more often in real time).
The more that human societies have increased their ability to transform
their environment - at the increasingly great risk o f destroying it - the
more those who live in these societies have regarded themselves as the
 R e v i s i t i n g the Self 91

masters and creators o f nature itself, and have sought the meaning o f their
action in the use o f reason and new organizational methods.
During a period that corresponds above all to the great success o f indus-
trial society, our focus was directed outwards, towards the conquest o f
space and time, towards the creation of new materials and new appara-
tuses. Reason seemed everywhere triumphant, both within us and in the
world; and scientists (so people thought) were soon going to occupy the
place which had once been that o f representatives o f forms o f spiritual-
ity. Perhaps even the accelerated development of techniques helped sepa-
rate the world of production from the lived experience of human beings.
But today we must recognize the naivety o f those who believed in progress,
whether they belonged to the capitalist system or the Communist world.
It would be superfluous to state here, following so many others, that the
negative aspects o f progress have become more evident than its positive
features. M y conclusion is very different. We have been so transformed in
all the aspects o f our existence, both positively and negatively, that we have
returned towards ourselves, towards our ability to act, invent, react, in
such a way that we have ceased to define ourselves as the masters o f nature
and regard ourselves as responsible for ourselves, as subjects. To speak o f
self-consciousness here is problematic, for this term seems to refer us to a
human nature, collective or personal, which we can observe in the same
way we do stars through a telescope. I n fact, the subject is not conscious-
ness o f the ego or the self, but the pursuit of a self-creation beyond all
situations, all functions, all identities. We want to exist as individuals amid
techniques, rules, forms o f production, power and authority, but also amid
assertions o f identity and war-like drives. We live in a world that is less
and less 'natural', which we know is o f our own creation, so that our action
is carried out on the effects o f our action rather than on an environment.
Ecologists, who study the impact of our action on the environment rather
than the characteristics o f the 'natural milieu' (as it was still called half a
century ago), are well aware o f this.
Our morality no longer consists in adapting to the laws of the universe
or adhering to the word o f a god, even among those who have such beliefs.
It is no longer based on the pride of creation and the generosity that it
can contain. It is the anxious quest for the subject, the being for itself, as
the sole principle o f self-grounded evaluation, while all social moralities,
in particular national or republican ones, have long since demonstrated
their powerlessness or harmfulness. We are leaving - we have already left
- behind the era when the nature o f the machines or techniques employed
defined a society. A n d notwithstanding the importance of communica-
tions in contemporary societies, it is in terms of relations with the self,
rather than o f communication with others, that the new type o f social life
is defined.
92 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l Terms

This new analytical orientation not only leads to understanding and

respecting different cultures, as long as they recognize general principles
like the practice o f rational thinking and respect for individual rights
without which intercultural communication is impossible. I t must lead us
further - towards an alteration o f the ways in which we approach such
problems. I t is a question not only o f clarifying what enables two cultures
to communicate, but o f examining whether an awareness o f the differences
between cultures can be transformed into an evaluation, by the actor
himself, of his own forms o f behaviour. This is a radical alteration o f
standpoint: it no longer involves knowing whether two or more cultures
are compatible, but observing how actors create themselves or disintegrate
during the transition from one culture and society to another, and above
all the role played in this by beliefs, attitudes and prohibitions. D o they
facilitate or, on the contrary, complicate the transition from one culture to
a different one, taking care to avoid defining cultures as so many fortresses
that all foreigners have difficulty in penetrating?
Such an intention decentres and re-centres the actor's behaviour in a
new way. First o f all, it involves grasping and analysing the difficulties
encountered by 'immigrants' in making the transition from one culture to
another. I t is not a question of defining the relations between different cul-
tures, but the nature of the behaviour that enables actors not to be defeated
by the difficulties they encounter.
Various pieces o f research, in particular that o f Nikola Tietze who has
studied the experience o f immigrant Turks and Algerians in Germany and
France, have shown that the presence of strong convictions facilitates the
transition from one culture and society to another. What is being meas-
ured here is the ability of actors to behave as subjects - that is, to create
and follow their own path - and not the nature o f the relations that obtain
between two or more cultures. I t is no longer the compatibility between
different cultures that is in question, but the ability o f individuals to trans-
form a series of lived situations and incidents into a personal history and
project. We can venture the hypothesis that those who have succeeded in
managing their personal history have more consciously - that is, in a way
less determined by the obstacles they encounter - selected their forms of
behaviour and have attained a higher level o f self-judgement. This
approach makes it possible for us to know the personal and collective field
that gives meaning to what is called their history. Ahmed Boubeker is right
to introduce here the notion of ethnicity, detaching it from any commu-
nitarian dimension, but equally, of course, from purely economic or social
categories. Ethnicity is the capacity of an individual or group to act in
accordance with its ethnic situation and origins. It is intimately bound up
with the orientation o f action.
Can sociology do without such general considerations? Should it devote
itself to more useful work, which would consist in describing, for example,
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 93

particular aspects o f observable social reality? Would it not be better to

distance ourselves from imposing machinery which, behind an appearance
of intellectual rigour, is too often incapable of illuminating the observable
facts?
I admit that this preference presents itself, but it is impossible to accept
such a complete renunciation of any general explanation. We urgently
need monographs and field work that bring out facts, types of situation
and forms o f behaviour. But we have an even greater need for a general
conception o f social life. Observations that are not integrated into a
general interpretative framework lose much o f their interest. Conversely,
a general view that does not help us decipher the available evidence quickly
succumbs to arbitrariness and, when no longer subject to verification, loses
its utility. Let us therefore set aide these overly general remarks and con-
front real problems. The most important of them is that sociological expla-
nation is no longer to be found in references to technological, economic
or even political developments. This does not mean that sociology must
construct entities wanting historical definition. But there is a world of
difference between an evolutionistic approach and the effort we must
make in order to understand our society.
The idea that imposes itself on us, from the fall o f the Berlin Wall to the
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York, is the break-up o f soci-
eties: wars, revolutions, accelerated technological change, conquests, migra-
tions, but also rapid enrichment and impoverishment; globalization of
exchanges, but also poverty and misery. The society described by classical
sociology resembled a stone castle: ours resembles fluid landscapes.
The most common reaction to the disintegration of the social order has
been to assert the all-powerful role of the rational pursuit o f interest. Our
societies now supposedly function in accordance with economic, not
social, goals; and economic analysis should therefore replace sociological
reflection. But this hypothesis confines study to decision-makers and, even
in this domain, proves insufficient. A different vision of the world, which
tends to replace a rapidly declining classical sociology, is one that every-
where discovers communities obsessed with their identity. But where are
these communities that are camped in front o f one another? Can we forget,
when analysing the clash between post-Khomeini Iran and the West, that
the internet offers information whose distribution is prohibited by the gov-
ernment? That technologies, customs, songs and clothes spread everywhere
despite their proscription by regimes? The Orient is not merely an inven-
tion of the West: they permeate one another, even i f the first is subject to
the second.
Only an analysis organized around the ideas of the subject and subjec-
tification can get up close to observable behaviour. More directly still, we
must remember that our societies have acquired an increasing capacity to
act on themselves, in particular through social policies that aimed to bring
94 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

about a certain redistribution o f wealth and to guarantee everyone a

decent level of social protection. They have also done so by giving rise to
new actors and by transforming the representation we have of ourselves,
others, and a world in which its elements are increasingly interdependent;
and above all, by making the defence o f the subject the main objective o f
democratic institutions that seek to resist the pressure of money and the
forces o f war.
A final reflection is required, one that is possibly too weighty for the
shoulders of a sociologist. If, ultimately, we must return to the subject, it
is also necessary to pronounce the most potent name of the anti-subject:
evil. This word seems to imprison us in a religious vision, or a different
conception of the universe, from which the idea of the subject is excluded.
The answer to this objection is that there is no more evil than there is good,
God or devil. There are those who discover the subject in themselves and
in others; they are the ones who do good. A n d there are those who seek
to kill the subject in others and in themselves; they are the ones who do
evil. The latter is not an essence, but the result of human action. Horrors,
massacres, human sacrifices, genocides, torture, killings do not merely
form an overwhelming sum of violence and destruction, which are liter-
ally unspeakable, as concentration camp survivors - in particular, Jorge
Semprun - have put it so well. Among those who do evil there is an extreme
volition, a passion for humiliation and degradation that far exceeds the
desire to kill. For a very long time, we were unable to approach God except
through the intermediary of a Church. Today, moral philosophies no
longer go through the intermediary of Churches, which lie in ruins or
abandoned. A n d it is through a consciousness o f evil that we hear, whether
or not we are believers, the appeal to the subject.
A t the beginning o f the twentieth century, we believed that the human,
inseparable from the social, was going to abolish dangers and illusions,
gods and demons. As we enter the twenty-first century, we understand that
the world of the human has finally been invaded by both the inhuman and
the superhuman. The social no longer represents the exclusive expression
of the human. The subject o f this book is this decline o f the social and
the human, and hence the advance o f the inhuman in the unbounded space
of totalitarianism and terrorism, and still more in the human life that I
call the subject, which takes many forms.

The awakening of the subject

It is when globalization on the one hand, and neo-communitarianism on

the other, seek to seize hold o f our attitudes and our roles that we are
impelled to search within ourselves for our unity as subjects - that is,
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 95

as beings capable of acquiring and displaying a self-grounded self-

consciousness, which is what distinguishes the subject from the ego, and
even from the self, which is formed by internalizing the images that others
have of us. The individual or the group are not subjects when they lord it
over forms of practical behaviour. The subject is stronger and more con-
scious of itself when it defends itself against attacks that threaten its
autonomy and capacity to grasp itself as an integrated subject, or at least
struggling to be one, to recognize itself, and be recognized as such.
When I say, for example, that women struggle to be recognized as sub-
jects - and even conceive themselves as subjects more than men do - I not
only mean that they demand equal rights - in particular, a wage equal to
that of men when they do the same work. The assertion of the specific
rights o f women has long been added to such demands for equality, and
is encapsulated in the activist formula: 'A child i f I want one, when I want
one.' I t is an awareness both of the domination they have suffered and of
a particular existence, and hence o f particular rights, that makes a woman
a subject, which directs her main action towards herself, to the assertion
of her specificity as well as her humanity. For a long time man asserted
himself as man by his ability to work and fight. These male, 'virile' qual-
ities seem to us today to be so many expressions of the model o f man's
domination of woman - a model rejected by men themselves.
But we must go further, beyond contemporary images o f the subject, to
the general movement that causes the subject to re-emerge. We might refer
here to the liberation o f slaves. I n the modernizing, European model, and
a fortiori in communitarian societies, objectivity rules; it identifies the king
with the kingdom like the landowner with his land. Subjectivity, in con-
trast, is the expression of the dominated, be she slave, woman, or worker.
As the social movements undermined forms o f domination, the dominated
discovered a subjectivity liberated from its inferiority. Today, this subjec-
tivity is no longer merely lived; it is claimed, demanded as a right.
Liberation movements, from peasant movements and popular revolu-
tions to workers' strikes and the new social movements that already
demanded cultural rights, not only undermined or abolished forms of
social domination. Those who were treated as objects, sometimes even as
the property of their master, emerged from the shadows and silence,
became subjects. The subject is the one who not only says I , but is con-
scious of his right to say I . That is why social history is dominated by the
demand for rights: civil rights, social rights, cultural rights, whose recog-
nition is so urgently demanded today that they constitute the most hotly
debated topic in the world in which we live.
But let us not forget that there exist many false paths where the subject
in formation can get lost. A l l forms o f nationalism that have communi-
tarian roots and refuse to accept the social or cultural heterogeneity of
96 W h e n W e R e f e r r e d to O u r s e l v e s in S o c i a l T e r m s

their nation operate as active processes of de-subjectification. Closer to us,

the old Western cultural model, following the successes achieved by social
movements, is most often reduced to nothing but a set o f markets in which
subjects are sometimes sold like slaves of a new type - female prostitutes,
exploited sans-papiers, foreigners who are the victims of ethnic or racial
riots. These few observations are offered simply in order to indicate the
immensity o f the field to be explored and the necessity o f guarding against
naively progressivist discourses according to which freedom is the only
outcome of slavery.
The greatest present danger is the one I have already mentioned -
namely, that the idea of the subject is corrupted by an obsession with iden-
tity. I t is false, in the name of the idea of the subject, to defend a right to
difference. This notion, which contains some positive aspects, is also full
of dangerous consequences, since for many it involves a right to closure,
to homogeneity, and hence to the ethnic and religious cleansing whose
destructive effects have been experienced in many parts of the world. The
right to be a subject is the right for each and everyone to combine her par-
ticipation in economic activity with the exercise of her cultural rights, in
the framework of recognition of others as subjects. Those who refuse this
expanded conception o f human rights and, consequently, the very idea of
the subject, imprison themselves in a repressive attitude, based for some
on the necessary unity of an open world, and for others on the urgent need
to protect or restore endangered cultures.
Authoritarianism, ignorance, and isolation are obstacles to the produc-
tion of the self as a subject, which affect some people more than others.
A t the same time, these obstacles are reinforced by education and the
dominant values, which tend to assign each person his place and integrate
him into a social system over which he can exercise no influence. To adopt
Amartya Sen's idea, what counts over and above well-being is the freedom
to be an actor (agency). A n d i f we have already largely entered into this
new universe dominated by the search for the self, it is still all too often
reduced to the pursuit o f individual well-being that seriously impoverishes
what constituted the grandeur of the idea of the welfare state.
The subject is not synonymous with the ego. The ego is the changing,
always fragmented entity with which we identify even though we know
that it has no enduring unity. As Pirandello says in Six Characters in
Search of an Author, 'the drama lies all in this - in the conscience that I
have, that each one of us has. We believe this conscience to be a single
thing, but it is many-sided.'
This theme is widespread in contemporary experience and must be taken
to the limit, for it is only on the ruins of a fractured ego that the idea of
the subject can be established. For the latter is the opposite of an identi-
fication with oneself, of a self-regard that would make us lay claim to each
 R e v i s i t i n g t h e Self 97

of our thoughts and each of our acts as i f they belonged to us as subjects,

whereas we can only grasp ourselves as subjects by creating a vacuum in
ourselves that expels everything pertaining to the ego. Nearly all religions
have attributed the utmost importance to this detachment from the ego,
whether it takes the form of meditation or prayer, but not always in order
to liberate the subject. The latter is formed in the will to escape the forces,
rules and powers that prevent us from being ourselves, which aim to reduce
us to the condition o f components o f their ascendancy over activity, and
in the interactions of each with all. These struggles against what deprives
us of the meaning o f our existence are always unequal struggles against a
power, against an order. The only type o f subject is the rebel subject,
divided between anger at what she suffers and hopes for a free existence,
for self-construction - which is her constant preoccupation.
The words employed here should not mislead readers. They do not seek
to foreground heroic acts, exemplary behaviour, but what most o f us live
through in a more or less vague way, yet with a level of awareness that
grows rapidly as soon as the ideas presented here are diffused in common
language, in the popular press and on television, which in turn transform
most people's expectations. This cultural alteration is enacted above all by
women, for it is inseparable from the collapse o f male domination and the
emergence of a new culture liberated from male dependency. A n d by the
same token it liberates men and women from the obsession with produc-
tion and conquest, enabling them to enter into a culture o f consciousness
and communication together.
 PART TWO
Now that We Refer
to Ourselves in
Cultural Terms
 D

The Subject

The subject and identity

The decomposition of social frameworks leads to the triumph of the indi-

vidual, de-socialized but capable of fighting both the dominant social
order and the forces of death. Individualism rapidly shattered into multi-
ple realities. One of its fragments has disclosed to us an ego that has
become fragile, changing, subject to all the forms of advertising, to all the
propaganda and images o f mass culture. Here the individual is merely a
screen onto which the desires, needs and imaginary worlds manufactured
by the new communications industries are projected. This image of the
individual who is no longer defined by the groups he belongs to, who is
increasingly undermined, and who no longer finds the guarantee of his
identity in himself, since he is no longer a principle of unity and is
obscurely ruled by what escapes his consciousness, has often served to
define modernity.
The subject is formed in the will to escape the forces, rules and powers
that prevent us from being ourselves, that seek to reduce us to the condi-
tion of a component of their system and their sway over everyone's activ-
ity, intentions and interactions. These struggles against what strips us o f
the meaning of our existence are always unequal struggles against a power,
against an order. The only kind o f subject is a rebel one, divided between
anger and hope.
The distance that separates the self from the subject, however, is not
reducible to these definitions. A n d I readily acknowledge that the idea o f
self has taken on such a considerable extension that it no longer seems to
leave much space for the idea of the subject as I have employed it. We
are increasingly drawn into the search for self-identity, which Anthony
102 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

Giddens analysed earlier and more fully than most o f those who have
referred to it since the 1980s. I t is the idea o f reflexivity, applied to this
analysis, that has taken his analysis in a direction I feel I am moving in
myself, even though the representations of the individual which are pre-
sented to us on all sides feel alien to me. Self-presence, self-reflection,
authenticity and also intimacy, love and commitment - all these words
refer us to a self-presence that begins with a presence to the body, to
breathing or movement. This individualism oriented towards self-presence
is eminently modern, as Anthony Giddens convincingly argues, for it
involves as complete a detachment from social roles as possible. I belong
to the vast current o f ideas that stresses the transition from the world of
society to that of the individual, the actor oriented towards herself.
But when I refer to the subject, I nevertheless refer to a reality which is
very far removed from that presented by Anthony Giddens and so many
others. Two differences strike me immediately: the first is that I define the
subject in its resistance to the impersonal world o f consumption, or that
of violence and war. We are continually disintegrated, fragmented and
seduced, passing from one situation to the next, from one set of stimuli to
others. We lose ourselves in the crowd of our situations, reactions, emo-
tions and thoughts. The subject is a summons to self, a will to return to
the self, against the flow o f ordinary existence. For me the idea o f the
subject evokes a social struggle like that of class consciousness or national
consciousness in earlier societies, but with a different content, without any
externalization, entirely directed towards itself - while remaining pro-
foundly confiictive. That is why the first images to spring to mind to
illustrate the idea of the subject were those o f resisters, o f freedom
fighters.
The second difference is the one I have just indirectly mentioned. The
subject never identifies completely with himself and remains located in
the order o f rights and duties, in the order of morality and not that of
experience.
It is for these two reasons that I resist the idea o f love as the quest for
intimacy, however powerful the idea. Duties towards oneself and the rights
that mark the presence of the subject in each individual exceed all rela-
tions. The love relationship itself, which rises above sexual relations, seems
to me to be more like the encounter and mutual attraction of two bearers
of subjecthood than an intense quest for interiority, which impoverishes
more than it enriches. I do not situate my reflection in the universe of iden-
tity; and this word frightens more than it attracts me. The subject is the
opposite of identity and is lost in intimacy, even when it traverses these
realities and is traversed by them. Conversely, I am led to say that the
subject is the conviction that inspires a social movement and the reference
to institutions which protect liberties.
 The Subject 103

In many places solid institutional guarantees have been created that

protect individuals and collectivities against the forces generated by the
decomposition o f the social space which seek to impose arbitrariness and
violence everywhere. For want of a better vocabulary, we might speak o f
the replacement of one type o f institution by another. Those that imposed
rules and norms are replaced by those whose goal is to protect and rein-
force the individuals and collectivities that seek to constitute themselves
as subjects. The defence of the citizen against the state is primarily a
defence of the subject; and the family or school, models of old-style insti-
tutions, are widely engaged in an effort to transform themselves. This
development comes up against the fear o f introducing disorder behind the
noble ideal of the child's personal autonomy, but both are propelled by
the failure of traditional methods and by the increasingly urgent demands
of those who will not tolerate being regarded as human resources
amenable to efficient employment in the service of the state or firm.
It is always possible to confer on the individual a more solid basis than
the immediate experience o f herself. The individual is not only never
reducible to herself, but is accompanied in ideas by her double, who is
situated in the order o f right, whereas she develops in the order o f
experience, perception and desire. The less strong a society's capacity to
transform itself is - the less strong what I call its historicity - the further
removed from the concrete individual is the double who grants her rights,
just as the groups she feels she belongs to impose duties on her. These
rights do not belong to a social being, defined by an activity and a rank;
they are simultaneously individual and universal, as are the rights
accorded all human beings as God's creatures, or as beings o f reason who
participate in the great adventure of progress. The individual long sought
her right to exist in a universe that was the vector of meaning by obeying
a divine message or by advancing towards universal progress - even i f this
affirmative consciousness was never separated from a critical, combative
consciousness, seeking to destroy the obstacles that separate the individ-
ual from the source o f her right.

The sources of the subject

Historians and sociologists of modern societies have most often defined

the subject as the product o f historicity, o f our ability to know and trans-
form the world — an evolution rendering recourse to the higher world
from which we received our rights increasingly unnecessary. The heavens
become transparent and the image o f the gods (or God) dissolves; we
no longer believe in progress, but in development policies. We have long
been dominated by this view o f modernity defined as rationalization, as
104 Now t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

secularization, to the point o f identifying secularism with political moder-

nity. But our struggles against prohibitions rapidly diminished; good
receded at the same time as evil. Passions calmed and our lives, formerly
dominated by the world of need, appeared increasingly exposed to numer-
ous, unforeseeable catastrophes: wars between societies and cultures, eco-
nomic crises, the brutal growth of the illegal economy, climate change
rendering survival on the part of the planet impossible, and so forth. The
individual was undermined at the same time as the collectivities he
belonged to; and the old struggle between pleasure and authority, so res-
onant in Freud's time, dissolved into a tolerant conformism.
Some respond to this pessimistic vision by asserting that citizenship, or
membership of a class or nation whose mission it is to liberate humanity,
are the motor forces; that it is they that give individuals a consciousness
of being masters o f themselves. They forget that only collective action,
political and social, can protect us against the forms o f power and domi-
nation which, i f they are not halted in their tracks, destroy individuation
when the latter forgets the conditions that make it possible.
We long sought the meaning o f our life in an order o f the universe or
a divine destiny, in an ideal city or a society o f equals, in endless progress
or absolute transparency. But these endeavours (which are still present)
have been exhausted, because such ideal worlds have come to seem increas-
ingly remote and even imaginary, as our capacity for acting, and hence for
producing change, increased and as recourse to a supreme end froze the
present. As a result, the heavens are emptied of their divinities; guardians
of the temple, dictators, secret police agents and even, in some hidden
recesses, advertising executives have replaced them. As these new powers
have triumphed, we have returned to ourselves, discovering ourselves in
our most concrete reality: citizens, first o f all; then workers, to liberate our-
selves from the power o f the 'bourgeoisie'; and now cultural beings, in
order to resist the commercialization o f all aspects o f existence, beings
of gender and sexuality plunging into our innermost depths to escape
ideologies o f the soil, the people, or the community.
The more our life has depended on ourselves, the more we have become
aware of all aspects of our experience. A n d every time we had to retreat
as social actors, we strengthened ourselves as personal subjects. We only
fully become subjects when we reach our ideal of recognizing ourselves -
and having ourselves recognized - as individuals, as individuated beings,
defending and constructing our singularity, and, through our acts of resist-
ance, conferring meaning on our existence.
Does this mean that we are living in a world of subjects? To believe that
would be as absurd as to see only saints, heroes or militants in past
societies. But our age leaves no more room for indifference or total
ambivalence than did others. We know there are circumstances where it is
 The Subject 105

necessary to choose, to recognize or deny oneself as a subject. We are

attracted, ruled, manipulated by the forces that dominate society, even
more than we are by the ruling elites of society itself. A n d we seek to
employ our freedom as subjects as rarely as possible, for its price is high.
But today as in every past culture, there is no figure of the subject without
sacrifice and without joy.

Defence of sociology

Are the lines that I have just written foreign to sociology - that is, the pos-
itive, verifiable knowledge o f social situations and social actors? Not in the
least: I would even say that no other sociology is possible today. Just as it
is impossible to describe a society while neglecting the religious phenome-
non - something that does not render criticism of those who appropriate
the divine, and transform it into a sacred phenomenon whose management
they assume, any less necessary - so it is impossible today not to recognize
the presence o f the subject, when criticism and struggles against imperi-
alisms, nationalisms and populisms - but also against the reign of money
and growing inequality - are accumulating. It is impossible not to refer to
human rights, and hence not to recognize that the number o f human beings
who assess their acts and their situation in terms of the ability to create
themselves and live as free, responsible beings is on the increase.
Those who see around them only victims and machines o f domination
and death are half-blind. They do not see, alongside the injustice and
death, the assertion o f the will to struggle against it; they ignore the suc-
cesses achieved in these struggles. The gods have not only made way for
warriors and jurists. We always need a double of ourselves: she it is who
affords us rights and, consequently, a moral sense - the sense o f good and
evil. A n d this double, by dint o f coming closer to us, o f being ever less
objectified in a superior, distant world, enters into each of us. A n d we then
act in the name of higher principles, at the same time as we punish our-
selves for our inability to live up to them.
I n an initial phase, this moral consciousness still bears a close resem-
blance to a religious creation. Natural law is simultaneously nourished by
old traditions and a vector of individualism. Thus we came to place our
faith in economic progress and the triumph of reason, in the fatherland,
in revolution - and even in a project o f perpetual peace. But we have now
left behind the long period when we believed that we could satisfy our-
selves with temporal objectives - the power, wealth, glory and immortal-
ity promised to great men.
Today, our morality is less and less social. I t is increasingly distrustful
of the laws o f society, of government lectures, of the prejudices with which
106 N o w that W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

each group protects its superiority or its difference. A m i d the events in

which we are immersed, what each person seeks to do is to construct her
individual life, with her difference from all the rest, and her capacity to
give a general meaning to each particular event. This search cannot be for
an identity, since we are increasingly composed o f fragments o f different
identities. I t can only be the quest for the right to be the author, the subject
of one's own existence and one's capacity to resist everything that deprives
us o f it, rendering our life incoherent.
This image o f the individual is increasingly presented to us as the human
being who asserts herself as a being o f rights, above all the right to be an
individual - that is, not M a n in abstraction from all attributes, but the
human being endowed with her civil rights and social rights, her rights as
a citizen and a worker, and also (and especially) today her cultural rights,
those of choosing one's language, one's beliefs, one's way of life - but also
one's sexuality, which is not reducible to a gender constructed by the
dominant institutions.

The individual subject

Faced with representations o f history that see instrumental reason, utility

and pleasure supplanting a consciousness or soul lodged in human beings
by a creator; faced with the idea that modernity is the secularization and
'disenchantment' of the world (in Max Weber's famous term), I am per-
suaded by the idea that the subject, for so long having been projected by
human beings outside themselves - into a paradise, a free city, or a just
society - has entered into each individual, to become self-affirmation as a
bearer of the right to be an individual capable o f asserting himself against
all the impersonal forces that destroy him. The death of God has not led
to the triumph of reason and calculation or, conversely, to the liberation
of desires. I t has also led each individual to assert himself as the creator
of himself, as being the end o f his own action, dominating the kaleido-
scopic movement in which all the fragments o f the ego clash, blend and
are destroyed.
Such is the path that has been pursued up to this point and it leads to
a more in-depth analysis o f the meaning assumed by the idea o f the subject
here. But is it not arbitrary to resort to this idea, when everything seems
to draw us towards the disappearance o f religions or moralities that tend
to repress the drives, without forgetting that others - those who appreci-
ate the dispersion o f the subject, this disposition that protects us from
authoritarian powers and beliefs - might find this notion of the subject
inhibiting?
 The Subject 107

For the sociologist, the subject is not only a notion constructed through
a general intellectual initiative; it must be observable - that is, present itself
to the consciousness o f social actors, at the same time as it is located by
the analyst in a social situation that corresponds to the maximum number
of its characteristics. Now, it is precisely at the point when the cultural
image o f society becomes established, when we observe the major switch
in action and representation from the external world to the internal world,
from the social system to the personal or collective actor, that the idea
emerges of the subject as the ideal o f the actor, o f the individual who
wishes to be an actor. Here I hope readers will allow me to cite a name -
one constantly on my mind as I was elaborating the notion o f subject: the
name o f Germaine Tillion.
A n ethnologist from the first generation o f Marcel Mauss's pupils, at
the start o f the war she joined the Resistance, founding a network to which
she gave the name o f Musée de l'Homme. Deported to Ravensbrûck, she
survived through an astonishing combination o f circumstances and after
the war became the president of the former deportees to this camp, while
continuing her ethnological work in Algeria. During the Algerian War,
having declared in favour o f independence for this French territory, she
took a public stand against torture, but also against bomb attacks. The
interviews she conducted with Yacef Saadi, F L N head in Algiers and thus
the person with principal responsibility for the bloody attacks that suc-
ceeded one another there, brought home to me that this woman represents
an almost perfect example of what I call the subject. For she took a stand,
assumed all the risks, but without ever giving up saving lives - and she dis-
covered in her interlocutor internal debates similar to her own. Engaged
in numerous struggles, she never abandoned saving individuals.
Full o f passion, wisdom and respect for every human being, this woman
is almost one hundred years old as I write her name. Her life is largely
unknown to the general public, even i f she is respected and loved by many
people who have known her or know o f her activities. What fills me with
admiration for her is that she has served great causes, but without ever
identifying completely with any o f them, because she put human rights
and the struggle against violence above everything else.
But i f the most luminous figures play an indispensable guiding role, their
action would have no impact i f it was not relayed by organizations and
decisions whose content in terms o f subjectification is certainly much
weaker, but which ensure the creation and reinforcement o f the subject's
institutional defences. It is thanks to this collective action, and in partic-
ular to representative democracy, that guarantees are afforded to everyone
- individually and collectively. On the other side, by contrast, we find the
figures of evil, with their henchmen, their hired co-conspirators, and all
those individuals who seek to derive some minor personal advantage from
108 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

the adventure o f Evil. This constant tension justifies political action as

an instrument for defending the freedoms and interests o f the greatest
number.

Rights

During the period when forms of behaviour were defined and assessed in
social terms, norms and values privileged the submission of actors to the
needs of society. Conversely, the notion of the subject becomes established
at the end o f a long history o f impoverishment of these ideals, constitut-
ing an essential aspect of what is called secularization.
The subject is not the actor bereft of any 'objective' external principle
for guiding her behaviour. On the contrary, the subject is the one who has
transformed herself into the principle for guiding her behaviour. 'Be your-
self - such is the highest value. Consequently, the only norms that are
imposed on her are negative: they instruct her not always to obey the
authorities, not to believe in the necessity o f all forms of social organiza-
tion - in particular, as regards everything involving personal life. This
explains, for example, the strength of the resistance on the part o f so many
Catholics to the present Pope's decisions in matters o f private morality.
Even i f we rarely have the strength to defend the rights of the individ-
ual against those of the community, we feel the liveliest distrust o f insti-
tutions that are charged with punishing deviants and criminals, or even
with taking care o f minorities and the disabled. We are always afraid that
what is called the interest of society ignores the right of each person to be
treated as a subject, respecting what we call basic human rights. This
attachment to human rights is accompanied by a loss of confidence in,
and of respect for, institutions and collective actors, especially political
ones, which were for so long vectors of popular sovereignty, and whose
legitimacy was for a time superior to that of all other institutions.
I f we are still attached to them, it is because their presence protects us
from the arbitrariness o f dictatorships and violence, whose most immedi-
ate effect is to destroy any reference to the subject. I f one allows oneself
to be carried away by dreams that reveal the reality o f our lived experi-
ence better than the discourses constructed by the authorities, we can
imagine forms o f social life that would be increasingly deprived of insti-
tutions. Political decisions would be taken at the end o f an unusual contest
between characters that were more symbolic than real. Schools would no
longer have buildings or syllabuses; and their teachers would no longer
form a particular social body. Extremely varied techniques - in particular,
encouragement of the imaginary and reasoning - would be put in the
service o f each individual. I t is in the domain of justice that changes would
 The Subject 109

be most necessary: have we not long been searching, albeit with little
success, to counterpose liberty, equality and fraternity to all the forces
destructive of the subject that are ill-concealed behind the terrible obliga-
tion to defend society?
This evocation of the subject via imaginary representations could lead
to a misinterpretation i f we did not immediately recall that the notion of
the subject is closely bound up with that of rights. The subject, such as we
conceive it and defend it today, is not a secularized version of the soul,
the presence of a supra-human reality, divine or communitarian, in each
individual. On the contrary, the history of the subject is that of the
demand for increasingly concrete rights, which protect cultural particu-
larities that are ever less generated by voluntary collective action and by
institutions producing affiliation and duty. It is this transition, from the
most abstract rights to the most concrete, that leads to the reality of the
subject.
The more that universal rights are linked to membership of the human
race, the less they have real consequences - aside from the abolition of the
death penalty. Political rights are more real, although they are exercised
within a given collectivity - a city or nation, in particular. Social rights are
the more effective in that they apply to specific situations, like collective
agreements. The main objective of the long struggles of the working-class
movement was to add to political rights, which are potent in their univer-
salism but too remote from everyday lived experience, social rights invari-
ably defined as the rights of particular professional categories. Establishing
a link between the universalism of political rights and the specificity of
social rights is so difficult that the working-class movement split amid the
violence of the debates. Part of the Second International, which was to
identify itself as social democratic, kept social rights within the democratic
framework; the other part, initially in a majority, counterposed social rights
- workers' rights - to bourgeois liberties, leading to Leninism-Maoism,
whose power dominated half the world for fifty years. I shall analyse more
precisely the way in which history is repeating itself as new cultural rights
lead some of their defenders in the direction of communitarianism, while
others seek to assimilate particular cultural rights and general political
rights, without forgetting those who, in the name of a narrow conception
of the Republic, are opposed to the idea of cultural rights.
Today, the rise of communitarianisms that are authoritarian and deter-
mined to keep women in a situation of dependence and inferiority explains
the reluctance of some countries, like France, to recognize cultural rights,
in the name of republican universalism. However, over and above the
debates conducted in a particular conjuncture, it is impossible not to rec-
ognize the importance of cultural rights - that is, the power of demands
based on a culture or gender within the population itself. A n d political
110 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

parties will have to end up recognizing that cultural rights are inseparable
from political rights and social rights. The subject does not assert itself
outside o f the social and cultural characteristics o f those who regard them-
selves, and wish to be recognized, as subjects.

Are we all subjects?

Do all o f us consider ourselves subjects? I f by that is meant a clear, shared

awareness o f being subjects, the answer is no. But we can discover the mark
of the subject in all individuals, in the same way that others have recog-
nized the presence of a 'soul' or the right to be a citizen in each individ-
ual. A n d our work precisely consists in discovering i n us all a reference to
oneself as a subject, while detaching it from contrasting representations,
such as those imposed by the social order or by the ideologies that
dominate intellectual life. For the role o f the sociologist is also to create
situations in which each individual is encouraged to develop his deep
demands, beyond meaningless formulas. This role was performed previ-
ously, and differently, by 'committed intellectuals', who did not belong to
any political or other form of organization, but who wanted to highlight
basic demands. Without such committed intellectuals - who are not
organic intellectuals - no democracy could exist, so strong are the pres-
sures that operate to subordinate the demands o f individual and collec-
tive subjects to the interests of what is termed society. But it is also these
intellectuals who screen the presence of the subject.
Too many o f them accepted the idea that social reality is in itself dom-
ination, so that there is freedom only in the liberation o f desires, of the
will to power, or - an older idea - o f the hopes embodied in the revolu-
tionary spirit. This ideology never corresponded to what could be
observed, but for a long time it appeared untouchable, because it seemed
to protect against the most brutal forms o f the exercise o f power and
repression. A n d indeed, the critical utility o f this social thinking, for which
there are no actors but only victims, was considerable and is still. But it is
increasingly impossible to confine ourselves to a purely critical approach,
when the new forms o f social movement that have developed inhabit our
everyday life.
Let us take an example. The dominant discourse on women casts them
as victims. But ask women, especially those who participate in feminist
activities, and you will find that the sense of victimhood is much less strong
than the conviction that women have won many victories and are today
creating a new cultural universe. Women's discourse on themselves is more
suffused with hope and initiative than men's, for the latter reject unduly
rhetorical discourses on virility and masculinity.
 The Subject 111

Similarly, formerly colonized peoples, new immigrants, and believers in

Islam are too often defined by what they suffer - as i f they were incapable
of being the agents o f their history. I n the name of liberating the domi-
nated, people proceed as i f they were not capable of fashioning their own
liberation and transforming themselves into agents o f the transformation
of their situation. Nothing is more disturbing than the ease with which
those who wish to be actors in the struggle against forms o f domination
deny the possibility o f creative, emancipatory action. This is a strange view
of the world, which constantly speaks of the domination people endure,
but ignores emancipatory thinking and action.
For the consciousness of the subject to take shape, three components
must emerge and combine. First o f all, a relationship to the self, to the
individual being, as the bearer o f basic rights. This marks a break with the
reference to universalistic principles, or even to a divine law. The subject
is its own end. Secondly, today as yesterday, the subject only takes shape
if it consciously enters into conflict with the dominant forces that deny it
the right and possibility to act as a subject. Finally, each person, as a
subject, proposes a certain general conception of the individual.
The subject is not a pure exercise of consciousness: it requires conflict
for collective action to take shape. Nevertheless, it is always individual.
Even when it plunges into collective action, it feels itself to be the defender
of a universal right. This was obviously the case at the time of the Dec-
laration o f the Rights o f M a n and the Citizen, but not in the age of nation-
alisms and communitarian beliefs. It is perhaps again the case today, when
so much importance is assigned to humanitarian problems and eliminat-
ing forms of inhuman treatment. The abolition of the death penalty in
many countries marks a retreat in arguments motivated by the 'protection
of society' and the victory o f the idea that human life is above the law.
Many countries or regions are torn apart by civil wars and other forms
of violence. Others are retreating into communitarian, ethnic or religious
affinities. The idea o f the subject seems to be being diluted there. However,
the exhaustion o f political ideologies and o f regimes that identified
defence of the subject with the triumph of a party, a leader, or a form o f
social organization, while it has created a vacuum that can lead to chaos,
can also lead to a return to the self, to the consciousness o f the subject.
It is impossible to describe a priori, and in general terms, the conditions
conducive to the emergence, in an individual or a group, o f the con-
sciousness o f being a subject. The models offered by education - that is,
the expectations evinced by those who encourage or fail to encourage a
young person to take herself as the goal of her action, to search for herself
- are o f great importance. Often, it is an adult friend or relative who has
a decisive influence on a younger person. Relations o f friendship between
the young are a common way for them to gain access to themselves, but
112 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

attention to the other can also distract from the self. We must be rather
distrustful o f intimacy, as of silence, for it is always liable to stifle self-
consciousness. I t is always better to combine engagement in active life with
the move to return to the self.
We have for so long been judged by what we did, and not by the con-
ditions in which we lived, that we find it difficult to combine a more reflex-
ive vision with an active conception o f human beings. Certainly, we have
no desire whatsoever to be once again defined by our situation at birth,
for that would seem to us to mark a serious regression. But we find it
increasingly difficult to accept being defined exclusively by our actions -
that is, being judged by categories that are those o f employers, private or
public, whose respect for the personality of the wage-earners they employ
is not always their main concern. A n d even those o f us who continue to
accord very great significance to working life feel the need to take some
distance from their activities, to return from time to time to themselves,
and to pose questions that would once have seemed incongruous: am I
happy? A m I doing what I really want to do? A m I capable o f under-
standing X? A m I certain that at this moment intolerable things are not
happening, that a serious injustice is not being committed? These ques-
tions that I ask myself, these judgements which I make on myself and the
world, are the equivalent o f the observations that I as subject make on
myself as a social actor. This explains why the appearance o f the subject
can occur in any situation.
It is just as imperative to protect the idea o f the subject against inter-
pretations that are at once moralizing and psychologizing. The subject is
not the person who 'realizes' themselves, as they say, or who performs the
functions entrusted to them well - the good worker, good citizen, good
father or mother. The emergence o f the subject is not bound up with the
end o f meta-narratives referred to by Jean-François Lyotard, for personal
meta-narratives are worth just as much as the collective meta-narratives
whose disappearance he noted. The life of the personal subject is as dra-
matic as the history of the world. The subject is no more at ease in the
society of money and violence than in the Communist perversion of the
hopes and struggles of the working-class movement.
The reality of the subject runs through all the scenes of history. The
subject is no more present in our civilization than in others. However,
because it is no longer embedded in the construction o f a sacred world in
modernity, it is in our society that it is most frequently confronted with
itself. Liberated and fragile, it can now finally appear as such following the
dissolution of its distant projections.
We are all tempted to attribute to the subject an image that is clearly
discrepant with lived experience. Adventurer, generous, victorious over all
intrigues, at once moving and ridiculous: is D o n Quixote an image of the
 The Subject 113

subject? I f he was not, an entire nation would not recognize itself in him.
For the French chivalry he seeks to imitate also represents nostalgia for a
Spain that was falling into bourgeois mediocrity, which would soon dis-
tance itself from its European neighbours by lagging far behind them,
which would forget what accounted for its grandeur as well as its ruin. But
we must not succumb to the attraction of insane dreams. The subject does
not protect itself from the present by leaping towards the future or fleeing
into the past. We lose sight o f it when we believe we have unearthed it in
one of our imaginary lives. The subject is in us, here and now - a living,
anxious quest for the meaning of each of our gestures and each o f our
thoughts. That is why it is never more present in us than when we are in
love, for one of the principal meanings of such relationships is the dis-
covery of two subjects by one another, at the heart o f their mutual desire.
The subject is borne along by the efforts we make to liberate ourselves
from the place assigned us. The most extreme attempt to attain oneself as
a subject is to descend into the self, to break all the ties that bind us to
what is called reality and spend a Season in Hell, so as to arrive at
'Morning' (penultimate text): 'Quand irons-nous, par-delà les grèves et les
monts, saluer la naissance du travail nouveau, la sagesse nouvelle, la fuite
des tyrans et des démons, la fin de la superstition, adorer - les premiers!
- Noël sur la terre!' 'Le chant des cieux, la marche des peuples! Esclaves,
ne maudissons pas la vie.' ('When shall we go beyond the shores and the
mountains to acclaim the birth of the new work, the new wisdom, the
flight of tyrants and of demons, the end of superstition to adore - the first
worshippers! - Christmas on earth!' 'The song of the heavens, the proces-
sion o f peoples! Slaves, let us not blaspheme life.') Different images might
be superimposed on those of Rimbaud: that of meditation or a dialogue
with death.
What most troubles those who seek to impart concrete historical content
to the idea o f the subject is that this word in itself summons up images of
mastery in the first instance. Is not the subject the one who imposes his
will on the world, who transforms it in his own image, or who establishes
order and laws where chaos and violence obtained? We are still haunted
by this image o f the conquering subject, full o f virtii, inherited from the
Italian Renaissance. The figure we imagine as the subject o f history is the
direct opposite o f the subject of the prince, who is dependent on a master.
But these images, which are still present in our collective memory, no
longer inspire us with confidence. For two centuries it has not been the tri-
umphant prince who held our attention, but the slave who rebels in the
name o f her labour, her people, her gender - to the extent that we recog-
nize the presence o f the subject more where there is lack than where there
is abundance. D o not dependency and solitude protect those who endure
them against the illusions o f greatness and power? We instinctively look
114 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

for what seems to us most human on the part of the exploited, the scorned,
the forgotten. But in this altered situation a representation persists which
must likewise be excluded. According to it, the subject is grasped only in
real-life situations, with reference to power possessed or endured, in rela-
tion to the other, whether friend or enemy, who is always capable o f dic-
tating a vision of the world, be it triumphant or despairing. But it is also
by extricating ourselves from all representations o f the subject as agent o f
history, as bearer of a society, that we can see the true figure o f the subject
emerging - that is, the individual or collective subject who is no longer
guided by the values, norms and interests o f society, or by privation, frus-
tration and revolution.
But how can those who look outside of themselves, towards power or
enemies, succeed in returning to themselves and attaching themselves to a
consciousness o f their existence, to the discovery and production o f them-
selves as the ultimate goal o f their action? We are emerging from an age
when history was the subject, sometimes even a piece o f history arbitrar-
ily sliced up in historical time. Thus, we spoke o f industrial society, o f the
Soviet revolution or regime, as real characters. A n d in a transitional phase
I myself referred to the historical subject, whereas now I only want to speak
of the personal subject (which in no way reduces it to individual cases). We
were incapable of talking o f the personal subject, and understanding our
culture's return to the search for the self, when we were imprisoned in this
anthropomorphic or even theomorphic approach to history; and classical
sociology placed a further obstacle in our path by treating society as a
character, of the same kind as the jurists are fond of calling the legislator.
This personalization o f historical epochs had a predominant influence
until the First World War. Thereafter, the scale o f the destruction and
death caused by wars and dictatorships, the presence on every continent
of concentration and extermination camps, and mass killings - all this
makes it difficult, in fact impossible, to discern a human face amid the
ruins.
During the second half of the twentieth century, above all in the rich
West, we have sometimes had the impression of once again being thrust
into historical complexes similar to those of the years before 1914. But
globalization renders attempts to isolate a type o f society (or even civil
society), and to describe it as the fruit o f rational debates and choices
made by virtue o f the procedures established by a constitution, illusory.
A t a time when war to the death is raging between Israelis and Palestini-
ans, when the United States has suffered the terrorist attack of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 and then invaded Iraq, and when Africa is breaking up under
the blows o f poverty and internal wars, can we conceive the new century
in terms of a step towards a type o f society? I n fact, since the beginning
of the First World War we have ceased to be defined by history.
 The Subject 115

The negation of the subject

During this phase of decomposition o f our historicity, o f our place in
history and our ability to define ourselves with categories derived from
society, political life or economics, critical functionalism, impregnated with
Marxism, which everywhere detected the operation o f a form o f domina-
tion behind the values o f society, enjoyed its moment o f glory. A n d in fact,
during the long decades of the Cold War, and again after 11 September
2001, there seemed to be no free space between submission to American
interests and total solidarity with their enemies. Categories like liberalism,
socialism, democracy, social movement, and reform have been eliminated
or construed in a sense contrary to that given them by their inventors.
A n d in fact the most rejected, scorned and distorted idea was that of
the subject. I n the name of the (incontestable) observation that scientific
knowledge had progressed from Copernicus to Darwin, and from Marx
to Freud, by discovering laws that are those o f systems, and which con-
tradict consciousness and subjectivity, a determinist ideology became
established wherein behaviour is simply the reflection of a lived situation
and a domination endured. We thus had imposed on us the image o f a
world without actors, since the latter could now only intervene by aggra-
vating the contradictions of the system o f domination. History was
abolished in a quasi-religious sacrificial approach - the only possible
expression o f the dominated, the exploited and the manipulated.
In these long years, when war, terrorism and radical critique seemed the
only possible forms of historical action, few individuals and groups sought
to defend the idea that the political system remained open and that democ-
racy and respect for rights were real issues. Then, gradually, the hunting
down o f the subject subsided, so crying was the intellectual and political
impotence o f the hunters. But it was not so much some people's reflection
as self-assertion by new social movements that restored life to the idea of
the subject.
In the 1960s, above all in the United States and France, culture invaded
politics. The production of the self was identified less with work and more
with sexuality and interpersonal relations. Since 1968 I have myself placed
the personal subject more firmly at the heart of my thinking and analysis.
A n d during the early years o f the new century, I have focused my efforts
on the recognition o f women as the main agents of the return o f the
subject - and hence o f the alteration in our culture, which has made a tran-
sition from the conquest of the world to the quest for the self.
This historical sketch would be perilous i f it suggested that the ideas
presented here correspond to a precise moment in history. Likewise, the
break with functionalism and with a purely critical vision of society, and,
more broadly, with all philosophies of history, could lead us in directions
116 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

other than the one I have chosen to take - in particular, to a consumerist

individualism or to an ego nourished by biology and psychotherapy, in
short, an ego far removed from what I call the subject. Individualism is
triumphing over collective engagements on all sides, but what distinguishes
the theme of the subject from other approaches to contemporary individ-
ualism is similar to what separates the study of social movements from
economic interpretations of collective action.
Much obscurity and misunderstanding seems to surround the notion of
the subject as I conceive it. This always surprises me when I meet with it.
Are we not used to observing that individuals or interests bear within
them, on a long- or short-term basis, a higher act, word and meaning? A n d
do we not from time to time learn that obscure individuals, who might be
unknowns, all of a sudden find themselves illuminated by the light pro-
jected onto them by the higher cause of which they become the witnesses
or defenders? Someone who has run great risks in the service of a moral,
political or social cause is a figure of the subject, but a simple witness can
be as well. A n d it little matters that these individuals, once the moment of
illumination has passed, fade into the shadows. On the other hand,
someone who is the bearer of a higher sense o f action cannot be totally
unaware of the fact. He knows his exemplary nature, even i f he seeks to
escape it.
How do we recognize the presence of the subject in an individual or col-
lectivity? By the engagement of the individual or the group in the service
of the image of what seems to be their raison d'être, their duty, their hope.
Their raison d'être, for the idea of creation or self-creation is ever present.
Their duty, because the figure of the subject establishes its pre-eminence
over all the other aspects of personal or collective life. Their hope, because
the latter is the counterpart o f creation. He who becomes a subject re-
ascends towards himself, towards what gives meaning to his life, what
creates his freedom, his responsibility and his hope. These terms might cer-
tainly be replaced by others, but there cannot be great differences between
one figure of the subject and another.
Is it artificial to look everywhere for such figures, defined here in terms
so elevated that they might appear idealized? A n d why should forms of
behaviour regarded as the most positive, or those that inspire respect, be
more rare or less robust than other types of behaviour? For the analysis
to remain balanced, the best thing is to adopt the clear distinction made
by François Dubet between three components of experience - pursuit of
interest, adherence to a group and its norms, and the behaviour o f the
subject - while specifying that each of these categories has a negative
equivalent. Corresponding to the pursuit of interest is the destruction o f
the interests of others. Opposed to adherence to a group is rejection of the
other, whether an individual or a group. Contrasting with the behaviour
 The Subject 117

of the subject is the refusal of the subject, which is expressed in particu-

lar in racism - and which can extend to the actor herself.
Those who see in social life nothing but instruments of a form of dom-
ination, and perceive only victims where I see actors, reject in principle the
type of analysis I am conducting in this chapter. But such a position is, in
reality, extreme and scarcely tenable. Conversely, is it necessary to remind
ourselves that virtues do not surmount all obstacles and do not possess
the same effectiveness in all situations? Having defined the general char-
acteristics o f the subject, we must obviously take account o f the specificity
of each historical situation, for the idea of progress, or of universal peace,
or o f the individual who wins her freedom and her responsibility, corre-
sponds to a specific social type and historical situation.
But let us not lose sight of the essential point: in each type o f society
there exists a non-social foundation of social order and, as a result, forms
of behaviour that aim at an objective which is likewise defined in non-
social terms and which I have often called meta-social. This proposition
is simply the logical continuation of the 'end o f the social' noted in Part
One o f this book.
This behaviour lakes different forms depending on whether it involves
the actor herself, her interpersonal relations, or her commitment to a col-
lective goal or against an opponent. They may or may not be determined
by behaviour of other kinds; and they can also be combined with very dif-
ferent feelings and attitudes. However that may be, the general features of
the kinds o f behaviour that reveal the subject are to be found everywhere,
at all levels and in all situations.
Do they involve heroic conduct, forms o f sainthood or self-sacrifice?
The error induced by such images is not so much that they lead to an exclu-
sive focus on exceptional cases, which invariably approximate to self-
sacrifice. What is arbitrary is to forget that the highest forms o f behaviour
are always combined with others, of a lower level, but whose presence is
more obvious. N o individual or group is entirely a subject. It is always
more accurate to say: 'There is something of the subject in such behaviour
or such an individual.'
But it is only by bringing out the different figures of the subject and
forms o f subjectification that we can achieve an accurate knowledge of
social relations, whereas too often the only things highlighted are the con-
straints people endure, destructive failures, the powerlessness imposed in
the name of force or the general interest. A sociology of actors cannot
exist i f the world is populated by victims trapped in false consciousness.
I can already hear the objection. I am elaborating a 'liberal' concept,
well attuned to our age, whereas the stress on economic structures and
forms of domination corresponded more closely to a society still inflamed
by the major class conflicts specific to industrial society. This observation
118 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

cannot be ignored, even i f it barely conceals a social determinism of ideas

that actually reduces them all to nothing but ideologies. I n fact, in the era
of the welfare state and social democracy, alongside apparatus ideologies
(socialist or Communist), certain social movements, currents of ideas,
community efforts already contained a figure of the subject. Today, when
the neo-liberal model is everywhere triumphant, we do indeed witness the
flourishing of an ideology that I have always contested, which would have
the market be the master of everything. But a new figure o f the subject is
also taking shape, which, more than the preceding one, is defined in terms
of consciousness and projects. I n every epoch we encounter both figures
of the subject and forces or organizations that destroy it.

A related note

In our contemporary societies, it is the world o f the media that most per-
sistently distorts and manipulates the subject present in each individual. I
have already made the point: it does so by separating the image from the
lived, the face from the body. This world o f images detached from bodies,
objects, even landscapes is quite different from the world o f ideologies and
myths, as conceived by nineteenth- and twentieth-century intellectuals.
What their words referred to was constructs, functioning to conceal a form
of power and exploitation, to impose a discourse whose continuity masked
ruptures and conflicts. Most often, this involved them rendering a form of
economic domination invisible. A n d various superstructures or elements
of everyday life were indeed in the service o f the ruling class and the insti-
tutions that protected it.
Today's world of images does not appeal to any hidden power. I t does
not seek to open up what must not be known or understood. Indeed, it
can only develop because the old world o f myths has been emptied of its
'objective' content, to the point where it is reduced to interpretations pro-
duced by intellectuals who make do with referring to a form o f domina-
tion or exploitation that is so ill-defined as to be as readily detectable as
the rainbow behind the rain.
I f this debate is important, it is precisely because it involves the issue o f
ideology and therefore cannot help to clarify what opposes two ways o f
seeing things. On the one side, forms o f behaviour are explained by the
ruses of power, which transfers explanation towards an economic and
political order that is very remote from actors, who for their part are
imprisoned in false consciousness. On the other, counterposed to the world
of images manipulated by the media is the living, concrete individual,
who feels deprived of the meaning of his experience and projects. One
side ascends to the economic system and its structure; the other descends
 The Subject 119

to the intensely present subject, where he feels stripped o f a sense o f

himself.
This critique of the media has often been formulated, but it is rarer for
examples to be given o f the media construction of images that are in open
contradiction with what can be observed. It is not that opportunities are
wanting. Have not the media created an image of youth in the suburbs?
From such problem areas there supposedly emanates a hatred o f society
and an ever more fanatical Islamism - at all events, a fundamental hostil-
ity towards Israel. The studies recently carried out under the direction o f
Michel Wieviorka in different disadvantaged towns or neighbourhoods
have shown how far removed from reality this view o f things actually is.
The subject, as it emerges in many parts of the world, is reducible neither
to embodying hope in a redemptive progress, nor to representing a desire
for help to be given to all those affected by the logic o f domination. I t
finally achieves freedom and transparency through the most direct rela-
tionship o f self to self, which is made possible, even dictated, by moder-
nity, and which takes shape i n sexuality in particular.
This movement o f reversion to the self that constructs the subject in
fact begins in the most intimate dimension o f the individual, in his rela-
tionship to his own body and, more precisely, to his sexual body. This is
because the sexual organs, unlike other parts o f the body (aside from the
brain), contain life, the capacity for reproduction, which means that they
are never a pure means. I n this connection, let us recall that the formation
of the subject becomes impossible i f sex is consigned to an empty space
bereft of meaning, as is the case with pornography, which can certainly
answer to a curiosity but very rapidly becomes destructive by effacing the
person. The subject is equally destroyed by passion when it sweeps the
individual away, like a tornado destroying dwellings.
It remains to follow the often long and winding road that leads from
the sexual organs, via affective relations, to sexuality. I f the latter does not
sink into passion, sexual relations and shared desire make it possible for
the return to occur. But it is always through the transformation o f sex into
sexuality, of life into creation, and into discovery of the other that the
subject is constituted. The subject does not have to pass through sexual-
ity in order to emerge. But it is invariably, and ever more noticeably, by
this route that the return to the self occurs. This approach is as remote
from the idealism that would have human beings directed by higher forces
and ideals superior to human volition, as it is from the materialism o f the
id, the libido, which identifies in the clash between the id and the law, or
in the invasion o f psychic life by desire, the primary force creating the
personality.
The development of ideas and practices has been so rapid that it is easy
today for each person to fill these general formulas with lived experiences,
120 Now that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

with already formulated demands - and even with techniques for search-
ing for the self that are often borrowed from spiritual traditions. But the
meaning of this reflection will only become altogether clear in the follow-
ing chapter, when the idea will be presented that it is in struggles for cul-
tural rights that the return o f the self to the self, from which the figure of
the subject emerges, occurs most successfully.

The subject, social movements and the unconscious

The notion o f social movement has been so frequently abused, and even
prostituted itself so many times, parading on the military front or feast-
ing in the caches o f the secret services, that it seems impossible to attach
a precise meaning to it. However that may be, the central role occupied by
social movements in the specifically 'social' model of development leads
us today to recognize their decline and, above all, their betrayal prior to
their death, lamented more by the powerful and the rich than by the
exploited and excluded. But how can we stop at this righteous anger
against so many activists turned policemen, particularly in the Commu-
nist countries?
I f the dark side of the social movements is that of society, the bright
side is that o f modernity. They stand in fact on the side of reason against
the arbitrariness o f power, but above all on the side o f the universal rights
of the individual. I n any conflict and social movement, we can hear an
appeal to equality, freedom, justice and respect for all. These words are
not the dazzling cover that masks intrigues, interest groups and betrayals.
They emerge from the conflict as lava flows from a volcano, amid the black
stones that attest to earlier eruptions. Those who have not forgotten the
meaning of words employ 'social movement' only when it refers to a break
at the same time as the assertion of one's dignity and the will to re-
appropriate the products of industrialization. We have identified these
breaks and outpourings in the great working-class insurrections - in par-
ticular, in the strikes o f 1913, 1936, and 1947 and 1948, to cite only France.
We felt its presence in May 1968 in Paris, in the 1970s at the heart of the
movement for black civil rights and against the Vietnam War in the United
States. We have also felt its presence in more remote places - in Salvador
Allende's struggle in Chile, in the action of the Zapatistas in Chiapas in
Mexico, and above all in the Poland of Solidarity. This exigency, present
in social movements and exceeding any strategy and tactics, is also to be
found in strikes, protests, rebellions and Utopias that briefly cause a land
seemingly so tightly controlled by the forces of order to tremble.
There is no subject who does not suffer from the misfortune of others,
who does not recognize the social movement when it exists, even when it
 The Subject 121

is concealed by strategies of power or competition. I n this respect moder-

nity employs strong, appropriate words - those engraved on marble or
granite in cemeteries and heritage sites, for often the cry o f rebellion
launched on 2 May is only heard on 3 May, execution day for the maquis.
Often the cry of men and women full o f hope and covered in wounds is
not heard by anyone in prisons, any more than it is in the concentration
or extermination camps.
In as much as it carries the subject on its shoulders, so that it can see
further than the crowd, a social movement is never visible in the pure state.
It is like a soldier in the trenches or a kid singing on a barricade. Likewise,
the subject borne by a social movement is encountered more readily at
twilight, at dusk, than in the midday sun; more readily in hospitals and
cemeteries than in the salons o f the government or opposition. For social
movements do not seek to be integrated into society, but to preserve
the distance that separates the subject and its rights from the social
machinery and its mechanisms of self-control.
The subject, whether or not borne along by a social movement, mani-
fests itself in the consciousness of the actor. We can no more speak of
unconscious adherence to a social movement than o f unconscious reli-
gious beliefs. But this manifestation in consciousness does not signify that
the subject or social movement is wholly in the consciousness of the actor.
In the first instance, this is because the presence of the subject is always
covered, and even hidden, by other levels of reading o f forms o f behav-
iour and attitudes. I t is easier to defend a wage or to demand an improve-
ment in working hours than to be conscious of the presence of a struggle
of wider import. Even i f the latter exists in the minds of the people con-
cerned, it will have to be detached from other types of expression and
demand in order to be clearly perceived.
In general, it is historical events that reveal the existence o f a conflict,
of actors, and what is at stake in the contest. Thus, tensions with the
Islamic world have led some women to adopt extreme anti-Islamic femi-
nist positions, which were certainly latent but which they had not had
occasion to formulate so sharply.
But we must go further: contemporary wealthy societies bathe in an
ideology o f ever more intensive and diversified consumption. A n d just as
repressive thinking suppresses the pursuit of pleasure, our society represses
or hides the presence o f the subject. The desire to be a subject must be
tracked in the unconscious. A n d it is not arbitrary to believe that human
beings, because they can reflect on themselves and express their thoughts
with words, need to give an explanation of their consciousness o f them-
selves. This explanation has often taken a religious form. It has sometimes
borrowed the language o f a philosophy of history. But it is also a more
direct summons o f self to self, which leads to a splitting in two: when I
122 Now that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

say me, I posit the existence o f an I that recognizes the I , which can only
be done by combining the conscious and the unconscious. I t is what seeks
to find the subject who can become one of the Fs and thus enable the indi-
vidual or group concerned to conceive themselves consciously as an I , as
a subject. The latter is not positioned above the individual, like a sign o f
the presence o f God or the spirit. On the contrary, the subject is below
social being, not above it. I t is the recognition o f the singularity of each
individual who wishes to be treated as a being o f right. There is no dis-
covering the subject without a 'self-examination' that descends below con-
sciousness. A sociology o f the subject therefore cannot simply run through
history from one summit to the next. Quite the reverse, it seeks to bring
out in each person their capacity to impart meaning to their own
behaviour.
Should we simply say that the subject, when it is not conscious, is to be
found in the pre-conscious and, in particular, that it is potentially present
and conscious in an individual or group, or even a social category? Cer-
tainly not. The subject withdraws into the unconscious. Should we say that
it is repressed there? No, because it is not a super-ego that bars the route
but the opposite - everydayness, the norms of public life, the urgency o f
practical decisions, the intensity o f emotions, and the pursuit o f interest
or o f the solution to a difficult problem.
The subject seems covered up by the banality o f the ego and its situa-
tions, as a book is covered by the sand of a dune and can no longer be
found, because it has no communication with the sand covering it, perhaps
with a very fine layer but one that reveals nothing o f the buried object.
This would explain why in our lives the subject is mostly absent, as i f it
were unknown. But the real situation is very different. The absence o f the
subject in the conscious world definitely leaves a trace. I n a simple case,
this might be a guilty conscience or vague anxiety about not having
behaved as one should have done, o f having closed one's eyes to suffering,
or o f having closed one's ears so as not to hear a complaint or appeal.
Here the subject is confined to the poorly marked boundary between the
unconscious and the preconscious. But when the subject is plunged into
the unconscious, it cannot re-ascend to consciousness by itself. Its bearer
must be hailed, blamed; a consciousness must be counterposed to its un-
consciousness. I t is invariably the situation itself that shatters the routine
of consciousness and the slumber o f the pre-conscious. For example, the
repression o f a dream or of a demonstration and the blood spilt all o f a
sudden reveal that interests and passions were in play which go far beyond
the consciousness of lived experience. In fact, we often have the impres-
sion o f walking on the ice of a frozen lake, of being in danger o f falling
into the cold water because at some unforeseeable point the less thick ice
will crack.
 The Subject 123

The fragility of experience is felt by many as a form o f religious senti-

ment, on the part o f the one who feels that she is not what she lives and
even feels the presence and absence of faith in her. This same fragility is
felt by civil or military combatants who know that their life is i n danger
and look for support to what seems to them to be most solid: themselves.
Can the analyst bring out the subject buried in the actor? I can answer
in the affirmative, for I have had the experience. The method o f sociolog-
ical intervention, developed and practised for thirty years, which was first
set out in The Voice and the Eye (1978), is in fact precisely defined by this
wish to discover the subject at the base o f individuals or groups through
the researcher's active intervention. The latter, once she is familiar with the
group being studied and has assembled actors engaged in a collective
action as a group, develops what she regards as the most favourable
hypothesis about the actors - that is, what seems to her to approximate
most closely to the subject. A t a certain point, which represents the heart
of the research, she presents her hypothesis to the group, while stressing
her conviction that this collective action is much more important than
the actors themselves think. The hypothesis is willingly taken over by the
group since it accords them great importance. For as long as possible, the
researcher (or researchers) accompany the group's reflective efforts. I f
the hypothesis is correct, the reflection and action o f the group emerge
from it strengthened; i f it is false, it introduces illusions, false conscious-
ness, contradictions in the statements of the actors, and the researcher will
have to recognize her error. This work must be carried out for as long as
possible, which is only justified i f the noblest hypothesis is well founded
and i f it provokes i n the actors a 'realization', constantly encouraged by
researchers who will multiply the interpretations that seem to them most
liable to connect the real actors placed in concrete situations with the
subject and its issues.
The diversity o f techniques of sociological investigation, and possibly a
growing interest in research that studies present or future concrete forms
of behaviour, have probably prevented many from realizing that sociolog-
ical intervention is very different from other types o f investigation. It seeks
above all to isolate and define precise opinions, attitudes, forms o f behav-
iour - in other words, corresponding to the observable acts o f the people
questioned. The closer the investigation to the ego, the greater its chances
of furnishing useful information. Intervention, as its name suggests,
assigns the central role to the researcher. Underlying the complexity o f
forms o f behaviour and situations, she seeks and finds the highest signifi-
cation that could be identified thanks to the intervention itself.
Without pretending to introduce a comparison that would be crushing
for her, the role of the researcher who 'intervenes' is closer to that o f the
psychoanalyst than o f the investigator, even i f the two approaches - that
124 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

of the psychoanalyst in the intervention and that o f the researcher - are

different, even opposed. Such a contrast must, moreover, be regarded as
positive, since it corresponds to that between two problematics. There is
no cause to speak of the subject in the exploration o f the personality. Just
as the super-ego and the id are clearly sketched in Freudian thought, so
the ego itself remains vague. We meet with this in all definitions of the
ego, and psychoanalytic explanation consists in understanding forms o f
behaviour and symptoms, and hence in going back to the history of the
personality, to its deviations, and to what it represses.
There is no more cause to summon the subject when it is a question of
explaining social behaviour: here too forms o f behaviour are construed as
symptoms of membership o f some particular group or social category,
or the desire to belong to it, and hence to conceptions o f the integration
and transformation of society. However, it is unnecessary to refer to an
approach that occupies such a dominant position in the sociology treatises
and manuals.
I refer to the 'subject' only because I situate before the social order, and
outside the dynamic of personality, the representation by human beings
themselves of their own capacity for creation, reflection and evaluation. I
accept that forms o f behaviour are considered to be social when they can
be regarded as so many responses to a social position. But forms o f behav-
iour defined by their orientation towards a figure of the subject - that is,
of freedom, equality and creation - are of a different kind. I t is here that
we encounter religions, social movements, political and cultural, and in
particular in the domain of arts everything that evokes the relation o f
human beings to themselves through which they form value judgements.
The approach I am adopting here is therefore remote only from one part
of sociology, whose importance decreases as the architectural image o f
society blurs.
I hope that this approach will contribute to renewing the interest o f
sociologists in religious phenomena, social movements and the artistic
world. For there are increasingly few who believe that modernity consists
solely in bringing about the triumph o f rationalization and secularization;
and, consequently, in causing movements, hopes and creations that
supposedly only really existed in the night o f old societies to wane like
old moons.

Proximity

Much more positive and important is the relationship between the sociol-
ogy of the subject that I am proposing and the school o f those who, setting
out from the same starting-point, have posed a very different question
 The Subject 125

from mine: how can we reconstruct the social bond, the Bindung (to use
the German word that best corresponds to this line o f inquiry and which,
for this reason, is most often used)?
N o one seriously intends to reject the individualism that is at the heart
of contemporary culture, apart from those who desire an authoritarian
regime. But many sociologists seek to understand it. The subtitle of
François de Singly's book Les uns avec les autres attests to the fact: 'Quand
l'individualisme crée du lien'. Refusing both an extreme individualism and
a communitarianism that is even more dangerous than the evil it wishes
to fight, this school intent upon reconstructing the social bond has dis-
covered and defended the idea that individualism and the social bond, far
from being opposed, are complementary, indispensable to one another.
To summarize the argument in a few words: the individual is constructed
as such, acquires self-esteem, only to the extent that he receives favourable
images o f himself from members o f the local community to which he
belongs. This line o f thinking is inspired by George Herbert Mead's theory
of the self, which sees the self as the internalization o f the images that
others have of it, images which are positive i f they all create and defend
positive social bonds, a sense o f shared belonging, and belief in everyone's
responsibility in the individuation o f each person. This idea, which is very
far removed from the communitarianism that is a response to a feeling of
social exclusion, is nourished by the defence of the individuation of each
person as the end of social exchanges and methods of management.
The role of the Catholic Church, which is more active in Italy than other
European countries, might explain the sensitivity o f Italian thinkers -
Franco Crespi in particular - to this search for the construction of social
bonds based on respect for everyone's individuality. I t is an idea that leads
to the even more central theme of recognition, which Axel Honneth in
Germany has made the focus of his thinking. It is the recognition o f the
other as such that makes communication and even integration possible.
This is opposed to the classical but empty image of the transcendence of
individual interests required to ensure a collective bond. We can easily see
why German thinkers are so actively engaged in an intellectual movement
that expels the monsters which have convulsed Germany and the world.
This kind o f thinking, which is spreading in Great Britain as much as
in Germany and Italy, and has representatives of the highest calibre every-
where, defends the idea that the individual, in order to be a subject, needs
to be recognized by others. This presupposes the attachment of them all
to social and political organization, because the main goal of the latter is
the recognition o f each person as a subject by the rest. This is a great image
of democracy, which does not boil down to the protection o f liberties and
the pursuit of equality, or even to a will to justice, but assigns priority to
the freedom, the responsibility and hence the singularity of each person.
126 N o w t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

For such sociologists, as for me, what is involved is prioritizing an indi-

vidualism that is opposed to democracy defined by the participation of all
in the society created by the will o f all, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau
conceived it, and which historically has more often yielded the worst out-
comes rather than the best.
The contrast between the two ways o f thinking consists in the fact that
I do not believe in the reciprocity between individual and collective. On
the contrary, I stress the force o f the subject who is predominantly ori-
ented towards herself, even in the case o f the amorous relationship,
because the relation to the other can never be completely freed from a
social content - that is, a definition of actors i n terms that distance them
from the quest for the subject. We can wish for a community o f free indi-
viduals, but faced with a social organization invaded by the market, war
and violence, it is necessary to preserve the independence of the subject
even i f entails a certain solitude: the solitude of resistance fighters being
pursued; of the lover always uncertain o f the response that awaits her; o f
the inventor and researcher who must step off the beaten track; o f the ado-
lescent who learns to leave behind the place that has been prepared for her
and recreate the environment she opts for.
The prudent thing is not to choose between these two approaches, but
to recognize the need to create, against a bureaucratic, authoritarian
organization, relations o f reciprocity and mutual recognition, and to feel
with the same strength the need for the subject to construct itself, to give
priority to discovering itself. This can never be fully combined with a
process o f social integration, but demands communication with 'neigh-
bours'. The theme of self-esteem prompts an ambivalent reaction in me.
For the recognition of the other is indispensable to the creation of a space
of freedom. A t the same time, however, power and violence can never be
completely kept on the margins o f our experience o f life. Accordingly, in
order to survive, the subject must always attack or eliminate the domina-
tion it suffers. I have distanced myself from purely critical, denunciatory
sociologies. But my reservations about all theories o f integration and par-
ticipation are just as great.

The subject and religion

I f the subject is an increasingly direct relationship o f self to self in the

most modern societies, it derives from the internalization of a creative,
meaning-endowing principle. This had hitherto been external to human
experience, projected into a transcendent realm separate from the human
world or already established in it, where the subject does not yet appear
directly, but is only embodied in the Utopian image o f the perfect city, in
the appeal to an ideal society, delivered from sin and competing interests.
 The Subject 127

This subject projected outside o f itself, converted into a religious prin-

ciple, speaks before us, outside of us, and pronounces the meaning o f our
lived existence. But the 'objectification' of the subject, because it occurs in
societies that still have little sense of their own creativity, their 'historic-
ity', is separated from human experience by the density of the institutions
that give it a form - a form which is not that o f our everyday life, but not
that of the subject either.
These two opposed and complementary realities are still melded with
one another in the world o f the community. It is when modernity
announces itself that a separation occurs, which will go on widening: a
separation between the world of the subject, on the one hand, projected
and externalized in an image o f the divine, but which tends towards inter-
nalization in the human subject; and the universe of the sacred, on the
other, controlled by Churches and clerics through institutions and prac-
tices. This contrast between the divine and the sacred, between the subject
projected outside itself into a figure of transcendence and the creation of
a world protected by prohibitions and by its monopoly on the human
world's communication with the divine world, is at the heart of the reli-
gious phenomenon.
The divine is remote from the human world but gives it its meaning,
whereas the sacred creates a barrier that allows clerics to speak in the name
of the divine and to regulate communication between the faithful and the
divine. The closer one gets to modernity, the more the sacred enters into
the temporal world, to the point o f becoming confused with a power that
thereby receives a higher legitimacy. There is a constant risk of confusing
the subject with the ideological and institutional construction o f a figure
of the sacred, lodged at the heart o f a religion and, more concretely, o f a
Church. The opposition between them is that o f the two contrasting faces
of the religious phenomenon. The distance of the subject from itself
means that it is nearly always projected, outside the reach of individuals,
into a transcendence that takes various historical forms. It needs to be
made clear at once that this involves what are called modern societies, in
contrast to non-modern communities (which are sometimes to be found
embedded in modern societies), defined (as Louis Dumont puts it) by their
holism - that is, the interdependence o f all their elements, each o f them
being the manifestation of a higher subjectivity, a god or founding myth,
a future project, a return to origins or the more general presence o f a
sacredness that demands sacrifices. I t is when communitarian sacredness
breaks up that the transcendence o f a subject is asserted. But at the same
time a social sacred is formed - the creation of a power and resources of
a socially clearly defined space and time, but which are above all identi-
fied as sacred.
The divine does not always involve the presence of a personal god - far
from it. The most evident fact even is that the more the subject is projected
128 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

by weak, powerless human beings into a remote divine dimension, the

more the spaces and institutions of the sacred are reinforced and strength-
ened. I n contrast, the divine approaches the human world through the
voice o f the prophets. When Jesus appears and the Christian religion is
constituted, the cultural whole is turned upside down. God becomes man,
which prepares for and partially realizes the internalization o f the subject
in the individual, whereas the sacred space is roughly handled by the direct
encounter between God and human beings realized by the existence of
Christ. A n omnipotent God can then become a God o f love.
But the world of the sacred and the religious institutions that adminis-
tered it are rapidly reinforced, to the point where they establish a threat-
ening politico-religious power, but one which is no less o f an obstacle to
the creation o f a theocracy. N o t only does it not destroy faith, but the
latter remains, through prayer, mystical rapture and miracles, in direct
communication with God.
Marcel Gauchet was correct to consider that Christianity marked the
end o f the religious universe. Modernity therefore does not introduce the
replacement o f religious thinking by instrumental rationality and secular-
ization. It is always two-sided: rationalization and the creation o f moral
individualism. Neither o f them has the capacity to put an end to the world
of the sacred, notwithstanding the efforts of some religious reformers. But
nor is the subject destroyed by utilitarianism or by the authoritarianism
of the Churches. I t is transformed, in particular, through the idea o f
natural law, into an increasingly self-creative movement of the subject,
which was embodied above all in Christianity before increasing its capac-
ity for integration and diversification.
A different reading o f this duality of the divine and the sacred might
be suggested which perceives the subject in the attempt to reappropriate
the divine that constitutes the sacred on which collectivities can act. This
creates a link between the social and the divine, wherein we recognize reli-
gion, which is the domain o f communication between the human world
and the beyond. But this is the discourse o f the religious institution, for it
is Churches that administer - and this is their raison d'être - communi-
cations between the social world and the sacred world, which is at once at
its heart and above it. I t is therefore appropriate to stick with the original
formulation, with the idea that the subject discloses itself in its projection
outside of society, in frequent rupture with the administration of the
sacred, which is always associated with that of a power. This is an opera-
tion that dominates (and above all has dominated) much o f the current
world and, in the Christian West for example, created what Jean Delumeau
called Christendom - that is, a community and a complex defined by a
way of administering the sacred, when Christianity itself is defined by a
rupturing of religion, since the texts of the Gospels, whatever the histor-
 The Subject 129

ical conditions of their composition, mark a shattering break between the

social and the divine, and equally between religious institutions and the
figure of Jesus. God, become Man-God, is transformed into an instance
of appeal, more moral than sacred, against the social order and against
the institutions that put him to death.
The sacralization of power, imperial or royal in particular, did not long
prevent secularization - that is, the separation of the social and the sacred.
It liberated a space of transcendence where the divine shone and was lived
as an inner, intimate light, permitting a direct, prophetic mystical com-
munication or possession between the divine and an individual as socially
undefined as possible.
The more secularization progresses, the more the world of the sacred
contracts and becomes specialized and the closer the divine comes to us,
to the point of being redefined historically without thereby renouncing the
transcendence without which it would be lost in an ideology in the service
of power (refusing, where necessary, to define itself in religious terms).
This is a process that has dominated our modernity through the deifica-
tion of the Absolutist monarchy, and then the overthrow of the latter by
the nation in arms, the progress of industry and the dictatorship of the
proletariat, or nationalist ideologies. The subject is ever less divine, but it
increasingly risks becoming lost in secularization - and even becoming an
ideological weapon in the service of an extreme nationalism.
Conversely, great has been the temptation in some periods to conceive
a purely materialist world - that is, one ruled by interest and pleasure. Each
of the great breakthroughs of capitalism - that is, actions carried out to
abolish all controls on and regulation of economic activity by social, polit-
ical, religious or patrimonial decision-makers whose ends are foreign to
economic rationality - has issued in a strengthening of materialism. The
latter, moreover, is not wanting in attractions in so far as the defence of
pure rationality, of what Nietzsche called 'English thinking', is readily
combined with a comprehensive critique of the arbitrariness of princes or
a protest against privileges and superfluous luxury. Materialist thought
flourished most in eighteenth-century Europe and again during the second
half of the twentieth century, when economic activity, freed from the con-
straints imposed by totalitarian regimes or the reformist voluntarism of
social democrats, sought to extend to the whole of social life forms of rea-
soning that were useful for a knowledge of economic activity. But this
materialist current, however imposing, has never been able genuinely to
appear as the terminus of a historical evolution that would have done once
and for all, albeit gradually, with the choice of values. N o society is ever
completely defined as a society of merchants where, to adopt the classical
opposition proposed by Albert Hirschman, the interests would have abol-
ished the passions. Still less have the latter succeeded in getting shot o f the
130 N o w that W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

former. A n d the twentieth century seems to have ended with the exhaus-
tion o f commercial thinking.
To refer to secularization and the disenchantment of the world, as i f we
were witnessing with modernity the triumph o f instrumental reason, cal-
culation and interest, is inadequate. I t would be more accurate to talk o f
an internalization o f the subject that allows the transcendent world to
enter into historical time and institutional space.
Such is the main ambiguity of modernity. I t has encouraged moral indi-
vidualism and the idea o f human rights, relayed by Enlightenment phil-
osophy. But it has also been used by those who aspired to the sacralization
of political power and society. The conflict that opposes these two inter-
pretations to society has often been masked by the fact that the formation
of the national and republican state occurred under the auspices o f human
rights and a civic religion that ended up in the anti-religious persecutions
of the Terror. I n the same way, the construction of Communist dictator-
ships was effected in the name o f the rights and dignity of the workers - a
process that irresistibly evokes the accumulation of wealth and privilege by
the Catholic Church or by others in the name o f the evangelical model.
Today, we are witnessing the undermining o f religious institutions and
the assertion o f less institutionalized expressions o f religious sentiment.
Faith and belief in a party, a Church, a nation and so forth are quitting
the scene, and membership of society loses its communitarian force. I t is
communitarianism itself that attracts the crowds. Society is no longer
sacralized; the sacred therefore once again clings to communities. We thus
find facing each other emotions o f a religious type, open to the outside
world, approaching symbols o f universalisai, and sacralized communities,
above all when they define themselves by natural roots: ethnicity, language,
and so forth. Such a separation between appeals to the divine subject and
management o f the economy and institutions results in individualizing the
relation of the subject to itself and rendering it more intimate, more pas-
sionate. Meanwhile, the world o f the sacred is reduced to the instruments
of power and draws from them neither the capacity to generate affective
reactions, nor the requisite strength to inspire a debate in which ideas
would have a major mobilizing force.

The subject and the school

In order to avoid any moralistic representation of the subject, it is high

time we observed it in concrete social situations, seeking its way amid other
logics o f action, often rejected for contradictory reasons, but finally impos-
ing its presence. I t is to the school that we must first of all turn, because
it involves a sector o f social life where not only ideas but choices made by
 The Subject 131

teachers themselves, and above all by the parents of pupils who are con-
vinced that choice of school has profound and lasting effects on their chil-
dren's whole life, confront one another. But i f this theme can be broached
with a certain serenity in some quarters, that has certainly not been the
case in France, where two or more school systems have been in con-
frontation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The French case is of
especial interest, in as much as the clash of ideologies has resulted in a
veritable war between the secular school and the Catholic school. Follow-
ing a century of confrontation, a law incorporated most private teaching
into a major public service of national education, while recognizing private
schools' freedom to organize. I n order to understand the issue clearly, we
must first of all turn our attention to the notion of secularism.
Secularism was and is an essential component of what can be called the
republican spirit - that is, the discovery of criteria for evaluating individ-
uals and institutions in terms of the common good, the public interest,
patriotism, dominant social norms, and also of the rationality of knowl-
edge. N o t all its defenders have conceived secularism in these terms, but
this republican conception has had - and retains - considerable influence.
This redefinition of good and evil by social usefulness or harmfulness, by
awareness or indifference with respect to the duties of each citizen towards
his local or national collectivity, was counterposed to a conception of
society founded on traditional authorities and religious beliefs.
The debate had concrete stakes: who was going to form the ruling elites
- the Catholic Church or the republican school? Here we encounter the
preoccupations of Jules Ferry and the main founders of the secular school.
Is there any need to recall that in France this ideological conflict took an
extreme turn with the Dreyfus Affair, launched by a combination of
Catholicism and a nationalism extending to anti-Semitism, which led the
army to forge evidence and have one of its officers unjustly deported, pro-
voking an impassioned and ultimately victorious reaction on the part of
the Dreyfusards? The separation of Church and state issued in France in
the sacralization of the political field.
But i f the principle of secularism must be entirely accepted, this does
not oblige us to accept the 'republican' spirit - that is, the limitation of the
school's remit to preparing pupils for social, professional and national life.
A modern society drastically reduces much of its creativity, but also its
realism, i f it does not combine a rational spirit with knowledge of the per-
sonal, psychological and social history of each individual, and with open-
ness to the personal subject who nurtures herself on a collective history
and memory, on the origins of religious thought as well as on struggles to
overthrow social, national and sexual forms of domination.
Just as rationalism must be accepted in a society for it to be modern,
so, far from residing over and above the other components of collective
132 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

and individual life, it must be involved in all aspects of human experience,

including those most resistant to it. Thus, schools should not put the child
in the service of society and should not be a pure place of learning either.
On the contrary, they should be a place for forming social actors and, more
profoundly still, personal subjects. Schools cannot expel religion, sexual-
ity, political commitments and cultural traditions to the sphere o f private
life. But it is true that they must at the same time instil respect for the supe-
riority o f citizenship over forms o f communitarianism.
Because the boundary between this openness and the enforced limits
is never easy to establish, mechanisms for reflecting, deliberating and
arriving at decisions must be established within school and university
establishments. The difficulties o f the task do not render it any less indis-
pensable. The important thing is that in each instance one should seek the
optimal compromise between the diversity of cultures and personalities
and the institutional guarantees o f the two foundations o f modernity:
rationalism and the defence o f personal rights. France today has opted
primarily to assert its refusal o f communitarianism; that is its right and it
seems to be the correct choice. But it must now open itself up much more
to the public expression of the most varied beliefs and cultures, as well as
to the unique characteristics of each individual.
I f the political order has the power to define the rules of social life and
enforce respect for them, it often allots the direction of private life to the
vanquished religious spirit. I f religious references have thus disappeared
from public life, in general there survives a tolerance whereby, in non-
explicit fashion, republican morality restricts itself to what concerns public
life. Such is the compromise: to the law, public life; to religion, traditions
and individual freedom, private life. But such a compromise is not accept-
able for any religion or any spiritual or moral force. I f secularism is defined
by its silence on religious or moral forms of thinking, the domain of
republican morality is greatly restricted, limited to rendering the cohabi-
tation o f individuals and groups with different practices and beliefs
possible. Freedom o f conscience then degenerates into pure tolerance. We
must on the contrary introduce the stronger notion of cultural rights. The
latter are not respected wherever a state ideology or religion is dominant.
But they are equally restricted whenever society regards itself as the source
of good and evil and imposes a republican form of thought and morality.
Hence the astonishing ignorance in which the pupils o f many countries
are kept regarding the history and beliefs of religions, even o f the domi-
nant one among them, and a fortiori of the religious, philosophical and
theological positions that have a major influence in remote regions.
These ideas are distant enough from those professed by the French sec-
ularism inherited from the nineteenth century. But they are no closer to
those that impart an awareness o f belonging to a religiously inspired
 The Subject 133

society and morality to everyone. The difference between what can be

called the American conception and the French conception of education
is profound. The American conception is more integrative, since it teaches
values and norms at the same time as forms o f knowledge; the French con-
ception tends, on the contrary, to a more intellectualistic model o f teach-
ing, which does not take account o f pupils' personality and their social
and cultural situation, in the name o f the wish to treat all pupils in the
same way.
This conception can be defended on the grounds that it helps the for-
mation o f the subject in the individual, by defining it in abstraction from
its concrete social situation - something that can encourage a dynamic o f
personal creativity. But this happy outcome predominantly ensues in the
case of pupils endowed, for personal or social reasons, with a large capac-
ity for receiving new cultural messages. I t therefore involves an elitist
notion, whereas the American conception encourages everyone's integra-
tion into a vast middle class. Neither conception really takes account o f
those who must switch culture, confront family conflicts, and who submit
with difficulty to the rules of educational life. Neither o f them is oriented
to the subjectification of children and young people.
We must reject the principle, so central in the republican school, accord-
ing to which schools exist to provide children with a combination o f
rational thinking and socialization, excluding what pertains to private life.
It is not the intentions o f this educational thinking that must be chal-
lenged, but its actual results. The egalitarian distance between teachers and
pupils, combined with a definition by the former of their work in terms o f
disciplines (mathematics, history, chemistry and so on), in effect favours
pupils from the most educated backgrounds and better-off families. Those
who come from poor, disadvantaged backgrounds - in particular, as
regards mastery o f the national language - find it difficult to overcome the
obstacles placed in their way by the educational system, whereas the others
are aided by their family and their milieu to find their bearings in the pro-
fessional world, to make choices, to conceive their future. The choice
between intervening or not intervening in such a situation must not be
guided by the assertion o f the separation between public life and private
life. For it is imperative for the school to take into consideration the con-
ditions in which a child creates an image o f herself and her future.
I f the word 'subject' seems too weighty to some people here, they do
not have to use it. But let us agree that we are dealing with something other
than 'private life' - with the personality, in fact. Sociological research has
demonstrated that schools obtain better results when teachers define them-
selves by their role as 'communicators' with the pupils and with the admin-
istrative directors o f the school, and not simply by their professional role
as 'teachers' o f biology or history.
134 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural Terms

When teachers shelter behind their discipline to confront pupils with

whom communication has broken down or who are hostile, the results are
bad. The importance of factors in educational success that are internal to
the school has been demonstrated by François Dubet, who has thus dis-
tanced himself from a long tradition representing the school as a black
box whose outcomes were entirely determined by the origin o f pupils, prior
to their entry into the school.
Schools must examine themselves as to their own role, in particular in
educational failure. What must above all be stressed are the obstacles
encountered by children from immigrant families who possess no cultural
capital. These children have few possibilities of social advance, especially
now that the 'social ladder' is broken.

The experience of being a subject

What does the personal experience o f the subject consist in? Does it
involve an intimate experience, like the awareness of having a soul or o f
being located in a place or time when human freedom is waging a great
fight, is exposed to great risks, and requires courage and sacrifice?
I n history the subject has manifested itself in experiences whose impor-
tance was clearly felt. Today, respect for the human person and freedom
has often been engaged in struggles where good confronted evil. I delib-
erately use this expression, which can nevertheless give rise to all sorts of
possibilities. Those who died fighting an enemy who was not only a foreign
invader but a torturer and a racist, especially those who volunteered to
fight, knew that they represented more than themselves and that they were
sacrificing or risking their lives for more than themselves and their com-
munity. I t is too easy to refute these words, to present soldiers and the
dead as mere victims, Verdun and Stalingrad as slaughterhouses. Con-
cealed in this pseudo-realism is an intolerable lack o f respect. There are
far fewer pure victims enveloped in the meaninglessness o f history or the
hidden effects o f wars for oil than the hard-headed claim. A n d many more
men and women than are acknowledged have died fighting evil, aware that
they were sacrificing themselves, protesting, hoping. I n the most dramatic
of situations, it is not easy to prove assertions o f this kind. However,
it cannot be said today that the Jews of Warsaw, the living-dead o f
Auschwitz, the deportees o f Kolyma, and so many others who have been
annihilated, had lost all humanity before being cast into death. To say this
is not to succumb to an infantile heroization, but to feel, through the oral
or written testimony which has come down to us, that those who have been
held in contempt, insulted, reduced to the worst physical and moral misery,
retained something of their dignity, of their will to remain human, o f the
 The Subject 135

spirit o f solidarity. How can it be thought that those who died in such
large numbers at Stalingrad fighting the Wehrmacht had no sense o f the
tragic and glorious role that history had accorded them in taking their
lives, while making them agents of a liberation much more precious than
themselves - these soldiers who fought in the uniform o f a totalitarian
regime? Who would dare to reduce the peasant-soldiers o f Stalingrad to
the combatants of Stalin's army? A n d who can say that none of them knew
anything o f the historical mission they were performing?
It is natural that what first comes to mind is the great struggles, for it is
in such situations that we can perceive on the grandest scale what sepa-
rates the struggle against an enemy from the fight for human dignity. But
when we approach more personal experiences, and hence less spectacular
ones, other difficulties arise: how are we to distinguish between awareness
of the meaning of the lived experience and all the psychological mecha-
nisms whereby we flee ourselves - or, on the contrary, are suffocated by
self-regard? The experience o f being a subject manifests itself above all in
the consciousness not o f an obligation to an institution or value, but of
the right o f each person to live and be recognized in her dignity, in what
cannot be abandoned without stripping life of all meaning. A sense o f
duty, a sense of obligation - these expressions are used by everyone. But
it must be added that only those who feel responsible for the humanity o f
another human being feel that they are subjects. I t is in recognizing the
human rights o f the other that I recognize myself as a human being,
that I recognize that I have obligations to myself. Is this a question of
exceptional, heroic conduct? On the contrary, it is mostly a question of
personal experiences lived in a banal context - that of the family, the
amorous relationship, or the immediate circle o f neighbours. But whether
individual or collective, these experiences are counterposed in full aware-
ness o f the fact to obedience to the laws, customs and commands o f
leaders.
We are not forever deprived of the distance from ourselves that enables
us to look at ourselves as subjects. A n d let us stop playing at being hard-
headed and insensitive to what constitutes for each o f us, intellectuals and
non-intellectuals alike, the most vital part of our life, the most pressing
interrogation o f our experience and the meaning o f our choices and
our hopes.
It is at an intermediate level between 'historic' events and our relation-
ship to ourselves - that is, in the relationship with the other (which can
take the form of a relationship to others) - that the experience of the
subject seem most frequent and most alive. Many of us have had the expe-
rience of recognizing in the other a presence that goes beyond the person
concerned. We are then attracted by the illuminating presence o f a higher
human value that an individual carries within him.
136 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

A l l these remarks seek to make it clear that the relations between indi-
viduals or groups are not exclusively, or entirely, social relations. N o r are
they purely inter-individual relations. Interposed between the two is what
imparts meaning to the struggles o f those who want to be actors and who
also want others to be able to be. The idea o f the subject discloses in me
and i n the other what we might have in common.
It is in a gaze, in a meeting of gazes, in the force o f the presence and
intensity o f revelation or possession that the presence o f the subject, and
of the relation between subjects, is revealed. Our lived existence can be suf-
ficiently controlled, subjugated or corrupted to deprive us o f any presence
of the subject and imprison us in money, hierarchy, repression. But this
poverty, this vacuum, are not inevitable. Whether we experience the
emotion that demands solidarity, or are touched by love or hopes o f
liberation, we do not confine ourselves to a network o f statuses and roles,
of gratifications and punishments, o f acceptance or refusal o f the social
order. Our life is ceasing to be wholly social. There is no social movement
that does not cause us to leave the social order, in the name o f freedom,
equality, justice, or any expression of the presence o f the subject in us and
between us.
One immediate consequence of the distance which exists between the
subject and social organization is that the presence or absence of the
subject does not depend on the social categories considered. Neither
the young nor the old, the rich nor the poor, are closer to being subjects
than others. This contradicts the idea so often expressed in the eighteenth
century that the people does not think, except at the elementary level o f
hunger, fear, or enjoyment. Such extreme class consciousness no longer
corresponds to our ideas, even among the most conservative o f us. We have
instead been accustomed by the Christian tradition and revolutionary
history to believe that the poor, those who suffer and those who are
enslaved, are better representatives of the spirit o f liberation (and hence
subjectification) than the rich, imprisoned as they are by their wealth and
often guilty o f causing others to suffer.
The first shall be last. However important the message, it cannot be com-
pletely respected, for we cannot link the destiny o f the subject to social
organization, even at the price of inverting the hierarchy. Good and evil
can appear anywhere, even i f it is true that the nature of good and evil
cannot be defined without direct reference to freedom, equality and justice.
The subject does not spread its wings above society. N o r is it trapped in
its rules and hierarchies. I t is present in society and history, in collective
and interpersonal relations, but it also develops in them as an exigency, a
protest, a hope.
The subject lives in the world, but does not belong to the world. That
is why the idea of the subject is such a powerful weapon against racism.
I f a social or national group identifies itself with absolute good, with a
 The Subject 137

god, with the future or progress, it must invent the opposite of itself. Belief
in a god induces belief in a devil or in some other principle of evil. Thus
it was that the West, identifying itself with reason, progress and Enlight-
enment, invented the Orient, which is, according to Edward Said's classic
analysis, the site o f unreason, turned to the past rather than the future,
and to particularism rather than universalism. Christendom first o f all
rejected the Jews, from whom Christians had separated themselves even
though Jesus himself was a Jew, accusing the Jews o f deicide. Then the
expanding West, capable o f conquering the world, perceived the colonies
as the opposite o f what had enabled it to triumph. The colonized world,
especially the Arab world, became the locus of Evil, o f what threatens the
Good Empire, as President Bush proclaims. The elimination o f this dan-
gerous pair - God and Devil, pure and impure - renders impossible any
racism, which always presupposes that all meaning attaches to one side,
while the other embodies meaninglessness. The more religious the defini-
tion of the self, the stronger the rejection o f the other defined as other.
Hence the extreme form o f anti-Semitism in a world where segregation is
imposed (shtetl, ghetto). The more social and political the opposition, the
less strong the racism. Hence the transformation o f anti-Arab currents. A
remote (except for colonists) and, above all, social relationship, it is trans-
formed into a relationship o f proximity. Having been political, it becomes
religious; and the religious attentat is now the source o f the strongest reac-
tions o f rejection.
The converse development has occurred in the case of the Jews: reli-
gious hostility has been transformed into a social conflict, to the point
where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict foregrounds political conflict. Over
and above recognition o f the other - an expression that can remain vague
- the important thing is that the appeal to the subject is everywhere
present; in other words, that everyone acknowledges the general conditions
of modernity. The Jews have overwhelmingly entered into modernity; for
the most part, the Arabs have remained outside it. This has created an
insurmountable distance which Israelis and the diaspora interpret as their
superiority, while others deem it the expression o f a form of domination
and exploitation. We must always remember that intercultural communi-
cation presupposes recognition by the relevant parties of universal attrib-
utes in both camps, for the contrasts between them are then limited by the
recognition of elements that allow for both debate and negotiation.

The anti-subject

Those who study the conditions of social peace or social advance have
often identified the main adversary of these processes as the violence that
destroys what has been built, destroying society. That is why the theme has
138 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

been so important for sociology. The twenty-first century opened with a

wave of alarm about sexuality, with growing demands for protection
against deviants o f all kinds, against behaviour that was decidedly mod-
erate following a century - the twentieth - which saw violence triumph
everywhere, from battlefields to extermination camps. But there is no
reason to consider all the horrors committed by violence as so many
attacks on the subject. On the other hand, there does indeed exist a central
core o f violence that escapes social determination. Michel Wieviorka has
understood this so clearly that in a recent book {La Violence, 2004), where
he presents work (including his own) devoted to violence, he feels it nec-
essary to abandon the kind o f explanation he himself helped to dissemi-
nate. This is because violence sometimes reaches an extreme level, betrays
a will to destroy and humiliate, to expel populations from the body o f
humanity, which cannot adequately be explained by a crisis in society.
Without hesitation, Wieviorka names this core o f violence that exceeds all
its social significations cruelty.
It is everywhere. I t strikes at Auschwitz, reveals itself in the murder o f
the Tutsis and o f some Hutus by other Hutus armed with machetes, or in
the murder of two million of Cambodia's seven million inhabitants. A n d
this cruelty can also be observed in prisons, psychiatric hospitals, old
people's homes, reception centres for the disabled or street children,
and so on.
Here we are no longer in the dimension o f the social order: the victims
of cruelty are not rejected by society, they are eliminated from humanity
because it is identified with a nation, an army, a party, or a religion.
Cruelty is not required to destroy opponents - or even enemies; it is
unleashed to dehumanize the human being, to crush its face, and reduce
it to a bleeding mass of flesh and bone that no longer has anything human
about it. Michel Wieviorka has advanced sociology by identifying in
cruelty the anti-subject, just as others had detected in violence the
anti-society.
The emotional shock cruelty causes us, rooted in an agonizing aware-
ness that we cannot explain it, comes from the sensation o f finding our-
selves on the edge o f a precipice. A t the bottom o f it we perceive not a
social crisis, but a human nature that we only designate thus in order to
signify that it is irreducible to the psychological effects o f social organi-
zation. Hence the decisive importance o f a reflection on cruelty, since it
refers us directly, over and above social mediations, to the idea o f the
subject.
But next we must descend again towards the less extreme forms of
destruction o f the subject. Appeals to forces or imperatives higher than
the social system always tend to take a negative form, with dangerous
consequences, when these orientations are identified with institutions
 The Subject 139

equipped with a power for decision-making and repression. I n fact, a

Church, a party, a trade union, a university can never be identified with a
subject - and all the less in that the latter is defined by transcendence and
critique o f the norms and rules whose goal is to reinforce the institution
or organization. Even so, we cannot confine ourselves to the habitual -
and necessary - discourses o f an 'anti-bureaucratic' type against means
that take themselves for ends. For the Church that organizes belief in a
God, the party that prepares for the revolution, or the research centre that
effects a discovery in fact always plays a dual role: it imparts social form
to types of behaviour directed towards a God, a transformation o f society,
or the progress of science; but at the same time, it erects a screen between
the participants and their values by substituting for transcendence a
utilitarianism that strengthens and even legitimates it.
These observations are too well known for us to be in a position to reject
them; and also too well known for us to be satisfied with them. For there
are few important social movements without an organization or even
without a supporting party and, in the same way, religious beliefs and mys-
tical enthusiasms are themselves intimately connected to religious institu-
tions - Churches, cults, or sects. That is why a serious question arises here:
why do we feel ourselves obliged to furnish a non-sociological explanation
of religion, without thereby succumbing to the intellectual facility that
consists in sheltering behind the objective existence o f a divine message or
the interventions o f supra-human forces in human life? Likewise: why are
we dissatisfied with explanations o f social movements in strictly social
terms, such as those supplied, for example, by people who explain them
by an imbalance between what everyone contributes and what everyone
receives? Many sociologists study social movements simply by analysing
the way in which they mobilize resources - members, financial resources,
alliances, means of communication.
It is easy to counterpose to such approaches one that accords a central
place to the idea o f the subject. But can we explain why we adopt this way
of thinking, why we refer to the subject rather than society or a god? The
question is so delicate that I am obviously not going to reply to it by
advancing the pseudo-historical argument that more and more people
think in this way; and are in quest of a religious faith or a social move-
ment that can be explained neither by an objective historical reality, nor
by the 'functions' o f the institutions wherein such religious forms of
behaviour or such social movements manifest themselves.
Neither of these answers, which are the most common, is satisfying. I f
religion is a way of sacralizing society, why not make do with referring to
society? A n d i f religion rests on a revelation, why is the latter transformed
into a Church? If, on the contrary, I perceive religion as the projection of
a weak, almost powerless human subject into a remote beyond, I posit
140 Now t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

both this externalization of the subject and its link to a collective social
experience - i n other words, to historically locatable forms o f organiza-
tion and practice. That is the main reason I speak of subjects as a princi-
ple that escapes the level of social organization and as a force mobilizing
beliefs, resources, solidarity and sacrifices. Between the world o f the gods
and that of societies, there is the world o f the subject - that is, the uni-
verse o f the reflection o f human beings on creative human beings. The
subject is a prisoner, but also a liberator.
The subject can be destroyed not only by power, organizations, or
money; it can also be destroyed by itself. For the more the meta-social,
transcendent guarantees o f the subject disappear, the more the subject
must directly assume, without institutional mediation, the task o f dis-
tancing itself from its social environment. The subject thus risks becom-
ing overburdened with tasks and suffocating itself. From classical
sociology we have inherited the idea of anomie - that is, those crises o f
social organization which provoke a personality crisis. Today, it is no
longer in society but in the subject itself and its self-consciousness that we
seek the cause of personality problems. Alain Ehrenberg has explored this
immense field, where a new analysis o f mental illnesses is being developed
This analysis returns to the expressions whereby we recognize our inabil-
ity to make a clean separation between what pertains to the strbject and
what pertains to the self or the ego. I n the same way, a believer must sep-
arate what pertains to her faith from what pertains to religious practices,
just as a working-class activist must register the difference between
demands that concern union rights and those that proceed from class con-
sciousness. I t is frequently ambiguous efforts, rather than wholly bad ones,
that help to destroy what should be protected and retrieved.
It is often easier to understand what the subject is by describing the
effects of its absence, than by saluting its projects and discourses. For the
march towards an ideal cannot be accomplished without mobilizing a
power, an authority, a strategy. When sociological analysis was organized
around the idea of society or social system, the idea o f anomie and, more
generally, of crises o f social organization gave us a clear understanding o f
the nature of what was destroyed. The absence of the subject, or rather
the loss of the subject, is the loss o f oneself, o f the complex o f forms o f
behaviour that do not refer to any meaning. In one o f the most beautiful
films in Krzysztof Kieslowski's Decalogue, a young, invariably silent man
kills a taxi driver and then, condemned to death, is executed, having simply
entrusted to his lawyer a photograph of his sister, killed some years earlier
in an accident. This only serves to increase our ignorance o f what makes
him a killer and victim of the death penalty. Such an absence of 'psy-
chology' touches on the main thing: what is involved is indeed the human
subject and its disappearance, not social organization and its crises; and
 The Subject 141

the tragic presence of the non-subject helps us to understand more clearly

that the sole expression o f the subject is the progress towards it, towards
itself - a detachment from social bonds of the kind religions have so often
invited us to undertake.

Between gods and societies

Between the idealism o f religious visions and then the great modern
Utopias (the egalitarian Republic, the classless society, unlimited progress),
on the one hand, and the non-normative, descriptive analysis of hierar-
chies, forms o f domination, crises, and forms o f collective consciousness
on the other - in a word, between gods and societies - there lies the vast
domain o f the subject, which penetrates deeply into the world o f gods and
human beings, but which enjoys a unity o f its own and cannot be reduced
to either an Olympus or the functioning o f a society.
The domain o f the subject is that in which humanity reflects more on
itself and places itself in the position o f creator of itself, often at the price
of a division whereby conscious woman creates creative woman. The dis-
tance between the two is increasingly reduced as human beings become
more capable o f transforming their environment and especially themselves.
But even i f the distance is abolished, the separation o f the creator from
the created does not disappear. On the contrary, it is then that the human
being becomes subject without any disguise and feels itself engaged in the
invention and defence o f itself as a creator.
We have long had a clearer view of the subject's disguises than o f the
subject itself, o f its incarnations than its 'soul'. However, as the heavens have
emptied and the soul, stripped of any external origin, has become nothing
but self-consciousness, the image of the subject, o f the human being for
itself, has become ever sharper. As religions declined, the space of the
subject was filled and morality replaced what had been the gods' domain.
The error of materialist rationalism was to believe that once supersti-
tion had disappeared, reason would triumph and, like the rest o f our activ-
ities, morality would be governed by the imperatives of reason and the
laws of science. We are far enough advanced in our development - that is,
in modernity - to know that reason has not been the only beneficiary of
modernity and that the idea o f individual rights, always present in Western
thought, has been asserted with increasing force under the influence o f
Enlightenment philosophy. We even see moral judgements regaining
ground in the face o f technological and scientific thinking. The ecological
movement has taught us to recognize our duties to nature - something
that has not led us to dissolve culture into nature, but on the contrary to
introduce moral judgement into the domain of nature.
142 N o w t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

We are more accustomed to hearing the contrary discourse, to discov-

ering in ourselves forces that escape our will, whether we call them drive
and libido, Eros and Thanatos, or the will to power which Nietzsche
wanted to liberate from the morality of the weak established by Chris-
tianity. These thoughts, which have nurtured and dominated the twentieth
century, are not opposed at every point to the ideas I am defending. When
the law and paternal authority exercise their power of repression, we might
certainly think that it is the id which is repressed. But I believe that it is
equally (and even more so) the subject, which lives in a constant struggle
with the norms and powers of society. A n d i n the will to power itself, I
might see the summons to the creation of the self by the self and the rejec-
tion of any submission to external commands, particularly divine ones.
Where the world o f gods dominates human beings, there is no place for
the subject. Religious spirits who seek to fuse with the universe, to iden-
tify with the great A l l , are as far removed from the idea o f the subject as
it is possible to be; and they know it. Likewise, all those who identify with
a technical activity or with servicing one o f the functions of the social
system live in a world foreign to that of the subject. Most often, they deny
the existence o f the subject.
When we compare industrial society with religious powers, it is clear
that the subject occupies a much greater place in our societies than in
others. This observation is reinforced by one that has already been made
- namely, that the social system is decomposing and that, faced with the
impersonal forces of the market and war, the subject is the only actor
capable o f opposing them. But there is no kingdom o f the subject. The
consciousness it has of itself cannot be complete, for the two faces of the
subject - the creator and the created - would then be confused. The subject
is always a return to, a reflection on, itself. A n d it needs to preserve a
certain distance from these practices in order to approach the world o f the
gods - without entering into it, however.
Human beings do not become a Man-God. On the contrary, they main-
tain a dual distance from the divine world and the social world. But it is
indeed they who occupy the central place. They are never reduced to the
ego, and above all perform a constant labour o f subjectification - that is,
of discovery of the subject in all its forms of behaviour and in all the sit-
uations i n which it intervenes.
Is there still a risk of misinterpreting the word 'subject'? I t was used by
Michel Foucault and others in the sense of the subjection endured by the
king's subject. In contrast, by a process o f subjectification I understand
the construction by the individual or the group of itself as subject.
The old French word institution, used in the sense o f education for
example by Calvin, corresponds to the same idea of self-creation. N o t
every subject is a propagandist o f itself. On the contrary, any subject oscil-
 The S u b j e c t 143

lates between reconstructing its environment and a relationship to the self.

This indicates that it is never imprisoned in itself and never identified with
the work of transforming its environment either. The dual activity of the
subject lies here. Narcissism leads to its disappearance. Contrarily, seeing
its own image can send it back to its work or its meditation, without it
being threatened with reduction to itself and dispersion in its work.
The recognition o f the human being as a subject leads to the following
question: what is a human being who is not a subject?
There is nothing to be said about the human being who takes himself
for a god: he disappears into a cloud. But what are we to say o f those who
lose themselves in everydayness, under the stress o f constant solicitation,
in the pursuit o f petty pleasures that seem to us to be the only possible
compensation for the absence o f true happiness? Must such a mediocre
life be accepted? Yes, and all the more so in that our lives are not as
mediocre as we believe them to be.
They are not composed only o f failures. Why would we refer to failures
if there was not first o f all a project, an exigency, a sacrifice through which
we grasp our attempt at subjectification? The human world is not a desert.
It is replete with ruins, battlefields, hospitals full o f dead bodies, and also
of absurd orders and arbitrary positions. But it is also full o f the desire to
live and liberate oneself and, even more perhaps, o f constant reflection on
what gives life and what gives death. What are the themes that most
concern us today? Abortion, cloning, gay marriage, euthanasia. Should an
individual who feels her humanity disappearing be able to ask for help in
terminating her life? I f we concede that intolerable suffering justifies such
an attitude, how can I not accept a man or a woman refusing to be dragged
into dehumanization - no longer being able to regard themselves as free
beings capable o f projects and choices? Yes, euthanasia should be recog-
nized as a right; and all necessary precautions must be taken to ensure that
nothing interferes with the will of the one who feels she is becoming in-
capable o f volition. A n d these 'private' themes are essentially o f the same
kind as the problems that perturb 'public' life: war, conquest, violence and
exile - but also liberation.
 Cultural Rights

Political rights and cultural rights

The decomposition of society, regarded as an organism whose elements

each perform a function, which sets its goals and the means required to
attain them, which socializes its new members and punishes those who do
not respect its norms, leads in our type o f society to an individualism that
resists the application o f the rules of collective life and substitutes for them
the laws of the market, where multiple, changing preferences influenced by
commercial advertising, as well as public policies, are expressed.
However, a different type of change is emerging and this is the one that
will hold our attention here: the demand for cultural rights which, in the
first instance, concerns collectivities.

Minorities, multiculturalism, communitarianisrn

Let us first of all refer to the case of multinational states - that is, the case
of national minorities who demand certain attributes of independence.
The countries of ex-Soviet Europe invariably belong in this category. I n
particular, outside Hungary itself Hungarians form significant minorities
in Slovakia and Romania. A n extreme case is that of the Kurds, who are
present in several states. But it is true that not all Kurdish minorities
demand the creation of a Greater Kurdistan - an idea defended above all
by the Kurds o f Turkey, whereas those of Iraq have succeeded in securing
advantages from the government in Baghdad. We can also place in this
vast category Catalonia and Quebec, which are quasi-states within a state
that retains certain prerogatives - especially on the international level.
 C u l t u r a l Rights 145

These minorities always defend their cultural rights - in particular, the use
of their own language in schools and in administrative affairs. They are
sometimes identified with a religious denomination and the head of the
Church in question then often plays a political role in defending the
community.
A l l these problems are lived with passion and have been the underlying
cause of many bloody conflicts, which are even more bloody when a
national structure is lacking, as in the region of the Great Lakes in Africa
or, for different reasons, in Yugoslavia when the Serbian mini-empire col-
lapsed. These problems have existed for a long time and have played a role
of the utmost importance in the greatest international crises - in particu-
lar, in triggering the First World War.
But when we discuss today what is called multiculturalism, we are not
thinking of this type of situation in the first instance. N o r are we think-
ing of a conflict like that pitting Israelis and Palestinians against one
another, since the Palestinians who live in Israel and possess Israeli nation-
ality do not have a great weight, whereas those who fight for the creation
of a Palestinian state (or even for the elimination of the state of Israel)
have great influence. We are primarily thinking of less institutional situa-
tions, of the creation or the development of 'communities' and minorities
formed following migration, expulsion or exile.
What is new is that nationally, ethnically or religiously defined groups,
which only existed in the private sphere, now acquire a public existence
that is sometimes sufficiently strong to call into question their member-
ship of a particular national society. The more adamantly the states con-
cerned refuse to recognize the existence of these minorities, the more
visible the phenomenon is. This is true of the French Republic, which has
always offered immigrants the opportunity to merge with the national
community, regarded as the bearer of universal values. I n even more
extreme fashion, the Constitution of the United States is reputed to be
ethnically blind, which in part explains the strength of secessionist move-
ments among Afro-Americans throughout history. We are now living
through the undermining of national communities and the strengthening
of ethnic communities. Even in a France that is highly vigilant about
anti-Semitism, and where the social ascent of Jews was spectacular for
several generations, we have seen the re-emergence of a certain Jewish
communitarianism. This phenomenon is the most general, the least
directly political, and, seemingly at any rate, fosters relatively moderate
positions.
We should not confuse this major trend, which is bound up with the
growing importance of international migrations and the formation of new
nations, with communitarianism, defined in the strict sense by the power
of the community's leaders to impose practices and prohibitions on their
146 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

members. This is something that restricts the civil rights of the men and
women concerned and creates, in W i l l Kymlicka's apt phrase, 'internal
restrictions'.
I n principle, communitarianism is defined by contrast with citizenship -
and so sharply that in so far as citizenship is itself defined by the exercise
of political rights in a democratic country, communitarianism inflicts
obvious harm on individual liberties. Accordingly, in this respect liberals
are right to combat communitarianism unreservedly. But the error would
be to believe that such a defence of citizenship against communities
resolves the problem of minorities.
That is why, in order to avoid such misunderstandings, I believe it more
appropriate to refer to 'cultural rights' in their connection, obliging the
democracies to reflect on themselves and to transform themselves so as to
recognize those rights, just as they were transformed - not without major
conflicts - to recognize the social rights of all citizens. Cultural rights are
in fact positively linked to the political rights, and hence citizenship, which
communitarianism contradicts.
A t the start of our analysis, reading Kymlicka, who is a recognized
authority on the study of minorities, helps us to make an important choice:
are we going to study minorities, the defence of their rights, and the way
in which it is inscribed in the political rights of all? Or will our theme
instead be cultural rights? I opt for the second formulation, given that the
first places us in the framework of a sociology of the social system, of the
relations between majority and minorities, of the conditions of social
justice, whereas the second is centred on the subject. This choice between
the standpoint of the social system and that of the subject governs the
development of my analysis.
Since mass production has penetrated, after the domain of industrial
manufacturing, the spheres of consumption and communication, and
since borders and traditions have been overrun by the distribution of the
same goods and services the world over, vast areas of our behaviour, which
we believed to be protected by their inscription in the private sphere, are
exposed to mass culture and correspondingly threatened. I t is in the cul-
tural field that the main conflicts and demands occur, the ones with the
weightiest stakes. This category - culture - seems at first sight rather het-
erogeneous: cultural dependency in the first instance concerns the most
dependent countries, but also ethnic, religious or sexual minorities. I t is
even more visible in large cities, where serious threats hang over the envi-
ronment. Finally, and especially perhaps, it is most visible in the demands
of women, who want their dual demand for equality and difference rec-
ognized, in that it is the vector of a more profound change than those to
which industrial society has accustomed us.
The most important thing is to understand that we cannot consider cul-
tural rights as an extension of political rights, in so far as the latter must
 Cultural Rights 147

be granted to all citizens, whereas cultural rights by definition protect par-

ticular populations. This is the case of Muslims, who demand the right to
observe Ramadan; it is also the case for gays and lesbians, who demand
the right to marry. Here we are indeed no longer dealing with the right to
be like the others, but to be other. Cultural rights do not only bear on the
protection o f an inheritance or the diversity o f social practices; they oblige
us to recognize, contrary to the abstract universalism o f the Enlighten-
ment and political democracy, that everyone, individually and collectively,
can construct conditions o f life and transform social life in accordance
with their way o f combining the general principles of modernization and
particular 'identities'.
In this regard, people often refer to the right to difference. But this
phrase is so incomplete that it becomes dangerous. What is in fact involved
is the right to combine a cultural difference with participation in an
increasingly globalized economic system. This excludes the idea o f moder-
nity lording it over social actors, and equally the idea that a single culture
could answer to the requirements o f modernity.
I f cultural rights mobilize people more powerfully than the others, it is
because they are more concrete and always concern a particular popula-
tion, which is nearly always a minority. As a result, however, demands for
them also expose us to great dangers - those created by all particularisms.
In short, they threaten the very principle o f 'living together'. The idea of
cultural rights seems, in addition, to be directly opposed to that of citi-
zenship. This reflection is not new: it has already been made in connection
with the recognition of social rights, for the latter likewise refer to par-
ticular categories. The latter are sometimes very broad, like the set of
wage-workers, but sometimes much narrower - for example, coalminers,
dock workers, or bakery workers. A n d very often, in fact, the appeal to
social rights has nurtured corporatism and the defence o f professional
interests. More generally and more dramatically, this appeal to social
rights has often been launched by class organizations many of which have
gone so far as to argue that the fullest democracy was the dictatorship of
the proletariat and that political rights could only be granted to those who
lived from their labour, not from capital - that is, off the labour of others.
This intellectual and practical logic dominated much o f the working-class
movement for a century, whereas the search for a compromise between the
universalism of rights and the particularism o f interests only slowly pro-
gressed towards social-democratic solutions.
But reference to cultural rights appeals to concrete totalities that are
more solidly and profoundly defined than citizenship - or even member-
ship o f a class. That is why in women's movements we find much more
than the demand for political rights or even economic equality. Similarly,
immigrant populations do not protest only against economic exploitation
and arbitrary police power.
148 N o w t h a t W e Refer t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

The continuity of struggles for rights, like the transformation and

expansion o f the character o f the latter, can be understood as the inter-
nalization in stages of norms that must be respected and of the punish-
ments to be suffered by those who do not respect them. As so well analysed
by Michel Foucault, the spectacular vision o f torture is replaced by impris-
onment and isolation. In the same spirit, Foucault saw in the liberation of
the 'mad' their subjection to physical and then chemical or even psycho-
logical forms of treatment. What must be added to this set of studies,
which have profoundly marked the human sciences and the thinking of
social reformers, is that the destruction o f each mode o f imprisonment
and constraints is equally connected with the internalization of con-
straints, with the assertion o f the right to freedom or justice which, by the
same token, is extended and assumes increasingly concrete form. The con-
quest of political rights was associated with the creation of republics where
the people had sovereignty. This can turn into a personal or collective
authoritarianism; nevertheless, it has been the reference point for all dem-
ocratic struggles. The transition from political to social and then cultural
rights has extended democratic demands to all aspects of social life, and
consequently to the whole of individual existence and consciousness. The
more constraints are imposed on individuals in all aspects o f their lives,
the more the idea becomes established of an individual who is subject o f
right and whose resistance or struggles are conducted in the name of this
individuality, this right to be oneself.
It is here that we discover the link between the first theme - the exten-
sion and transformation of the constraints exercised by the values, norms
and forms o f organization - and the second - the unification and indi-
vidualization o f the person, who not only resists external constraints, but
above all replaces any transcendent principle and asserts herself as
being at once the goal of her struggle and what gives it its power. We
do not observe a displacement o f areas of conflict, but their integration
to the point where it is in the name of the 1 itself, not of particular
struggles, that the various social movements combine and integrate, con-
sciously engaging i n a crucial struggle between, on the one hand, social
and cultural demands, and, on the other, forces that can be called
natural - that is, non-social - such as violence, war, market dynamics, and
so forth.
The penetration into the individual, her categories of action, the con-
sciousness of her body, and so on, of a multifaceted domination corre-
sponds to the assertion of the subject. The two tendencies are interlinked
while being opposed to one another. When we separate the idea o f the
subject from constant reference to social and political conflicts, the subject
weakens and runs the risk of becoming moralizing. The approach pro-
posed by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish must be complemented
 C u l t u r a l Rights 149

by the idea of resistance, which can only be based on the consciousness of

self as subject and must never forget the existence of these conflicts.
I n the same way, we cannot speak of capitalist domination without
making the working-class movement heard and we cannot refer to male
domination without encountering the importance of feminism.
Let us use everyday language here. What each of us, especially the most
dominated and deprived among us, demands is to be respected, not to
be humiliated, and even - a bolder demand - to be listened to and
understood.
This reference to the most simple vocabulary is indispensable in order
to differentiate the idea of cultural rights from a communalist conception.
The right to a religious life is not only the right of a group to practise its
religion. It is equally the right of each individual to change religions - and
to express an opinion deemed heretical by whichever Church. Certainly,
there can only be collective rights there. A n d the right to be protected by
a collective agreement in one's job or to found a group of a religious type,
for example, is obviously a collective right. But it applies to each individ-
ual, who thus finds himself protected before the courts and opinion when
he decides to withdraw from a trade union, a Church, or an association.
Without the existence of this individual character of any right, we could
not transform tolerance of certain groups into cultural rights. Thus, the
law must only recognize the freedom of exercise of forms of worship i f it
is in a position to protect those who do not wish to be a member of a par-
ticular Church, want to withdraw from it, or perhaps j o i n a different one.

Redistribution and recognition

These initial remarks on cultural rights aim only to situate them vis-á-vis
political rights and social rights - in particular, the rights of workers who
occupied the central position in the movements and conflicts of modern
societies, pre-industrial and then industrial.
We must now enter the debate, of great significance, that contrasts
recognition and redistribution - in other words, cultural or moral demands
and economic demands. This debate has involved many authors, but in
particular Nancy Fraser, Professor at the New School University in New
York, and Axel Honneth, who is Jürgen Habermas's successor in the chair
of philosophy at Frankfurt University.
Such a definition of the problem is certainly not ideal and is more
appropriate for philosophers than sociologists, for it rapidly emerges that
these two orders of demands are at once distinct and inseparable, above
all when they are both defined in terms of justice (in contrast to the con-
ception o f 'recognition' as a condition of self-realization, which is Charles
150 Now t h a t W e Refer t o O u r s e l v e s in Cultural Terms

Taylor's and also mine). A n individual or group reckons itself to be the

victim o f an injustice when it is not accorded the place, the rank that cor-
responds to the degree to which it has realized its worth as recognized by
society. Thus, an economic injustice is experienced as contempt for the
merits of the person concerned. But i f the notion o f justice combines the
two kinds o f demand, they are nevertheless distinct, as are the notions o f
class and status {Stand) in Max Weber. To exclude any other type o f analy-
sis, Honneth completely rejects the idea o f new social movements - and
hence the idea of social movements itself - for the latter seem to him to
be political constructs artificially separated from the complex of com-
plaints, suffering and protests against injustice that emerge from the most
varied categories of the population, as Pierre Bourdieu demonstrated in
The Weight of the World (1993).
Conscious of the existence o f this debate, but keeping my distance from
it, I intend to show at the beginning o f this chapter:

1 that social movements are a very particular category within the vast
complex of actions that involve demands;
2 that these movements are defined by the wish to secure new rights;
3 that the 'new social movements', which are certainly highly diverse, all
demand recognition of a new type of rights - cultural rights;
4 that these demands are new and are not to be found in industrial society
or in pre-industrial societies;
5 that cultural rights, like social rights before them, can become anti-dem-
ocratic, authoritarian or even totalitarian instruments, if they are not
closely linked to political rights, which are universalistic, and i f they do
not find a place inside the social organization - in particular, in the
system for allocating social resources.

(1) Demands can occur at two levels: either to alter the relationship
between the contribution and the remuneration o f a group in a favourable
direction - for example, by obtaining a wage increase or a reduction in
working hours; or - something that is a higher goal - to enhance a group's
decision-making capacity or influence - for example, by securing recogni-
tion of a trade union and its capacity to conduct collective negotiations.
There does not in fact exist any general principle o f unity between
demands.
A social movement, whatever its strength and its form, is situated at a
higher level. I t is the actor in a conflict, acting together with other organ-
ized actors, whose stake is the social use o f the cultural and material
resources to which the contending camps both attribute key importance.
These two dimensions - social conflict and unity o f the field of cultural
references - combine to constitute movements whose prominence is often
 C u l t u r a l Rights 151

striking, but which might also be in statu nascendi. I n industrial society

the actors in conflict, employers and wage-earners, refer to the same
values: work, savings, technology, progress. But they don't agree on how
to make use of the wealth created. We still feel close to the working-class
movement, and even to the movement that marked the first phase of the
modern era, whose demands were political, opposing the emerging nation
to a monarchical or aristocratic power that was destroyed.

(2) When we speak o f cultural rights, we venture the hypothesis that

movements exist which can be called cultural, and which oppose the pro-
ductions of mass culture, but also the general logic of profit, either to
minorities or to categories that feel betrayed by the image projected of
them. This conflict is inscribed in a social field where the production o f
images and representations o f human beings occupies a major place,
expanding as word and image penetrate more deeply into the private or
collective life of increasingly precise groups and, finally, of individuals
themselves.
In this case, as in others, the main goal of the social movement is self-
realization as an actor, capable o f transforming one's situation and envi-
ronment - that is, o f being recognized as a subject, every time the actor
recognizes that her capacity to be a free actor, rather than the product of
social constructs she does not control, depends on the outcome o f a con-
flict she is engaged in. I n industrial societies (and others), no one doubts
the importance of the women's movement, which struggles not only for an
equality of rights and situations, but above all for women's freedom. I n
this respect their main opponents are the producers of images of woman,
either in mass culture, or in the texts that discuss them, and which seem
to women to 'alienate' them and negate their real behaviour and their ini-
tiatives. When they are organized, social movements seek to press demands
successfully (for example, equal pay for equal work in the case of women).
But they are defined above all by a relationship of the individuals involved
to themselves. Here I recall some words used by Axel Honneth: they want
to be respected, not treated with contempt as actors defined by a certain
activity or a certain origin.
However, we must clarify the meaning o f these phrases that are on
everyone's lips: recognition and self-realization. Honneth thinks they refer
to the existence o f positive interactions - that is, referring to the same type
of values as the surrounding milieu. This is the most widespread concep-
tion for those many people who employ the notion o f self-esteem.
Honneth seeks to define the conditions for the good life, which rest on this
principle o f self-respect. This leads him to reject the idea o f social move-
ment and to take an interest in all the forms of pain, all the discontents,
and all the resentments that haunt us. Crushed in this way, the notion o f
152 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

social movement submits to any interpretation. But i f one is convinced, as

I am, that social movements are something other than accumulated pain,
even i f they feed off it, we must impart a different meaning to the words
'recognition' and 'self-realization'. The recognition of the other is neither
mutual comprehension, nor amorous relationship. I t consists in seeing the
construction of the subject at work in the other, such as one senses it at
work in oneself. This construction occurs by elaborating the universal
starting from a particular social or cultural experience. N o t always but
invariably, our affiliations and our beliefs contain an element of the cre-
ation of the self by the self, of the transformation of the actor into a
subject. The worker on strike or the soldier in a war of independence can
identify with justice or with liberation from social or national oppression.
They then feel themselves to be bearers of a universal mission. I t is even
possible for the affiliations most shot through with exclusion - religious
affiliations - to give rise in them to the universalistic consciousness of a
divine message. A n d someone who 'recognizes' the other as subject is
more capable of fighting what is opposed to the subjectification of him-
self or others. Without the recognition of the other combatant, the
battle regresses to the level of a more limited confrontation, economic
or political. A n d self-realization is not the social integration that
makes it possible to attract approving glances from members of the
community.
It can happen that social movements degenerate to the point where they
are transformed into their opposite - communitarian assertion, rejection
of those who are foreign or different, violence against minorities or against
what is called heresy or schism. This happens when collective action is
defined by the particular identity or assets it defends, not by reference to
a universal value; and for this reference to emerge, the first condition is
that the actor or combatant recognizes in another the ascent to the uni-
versal that he senses in himself. When the national liberation movement
becomes nationalism, when the class struggle is reduced to corporatism,
when feminism confines itself to abolishing inequalities between men and
women, they stop being social movements and succumb to the obsession
with identity.
Actions that aim at the redistribution of national income or a firm's
profits can rise to the highest level - that of social movements - just as
much as those which possess a cultural content: those demanding, for
example, to be recognized by a majority. The theme of the relations of
recognition or refusal of recognition between majority and minority
assumes especial importance today, given the growing mix of populations.
The majority recognizes the minority only i f the latter recognizes the rights
of the majority. I f that is not the case, the situation is simply defined by a
balance of forces.
 Cultural Rights 153

Need we stress that this analysis takes its distance from the confused
idea o f multiculturalism? For the hypothesis o f a coexistence between dif-
ferent cultures is meaningless: either the relations between them are
managed by the market or violence; or, as in the present discussion, we
recognize elements o f transition from one culture to another, and above
all the presence o f universalistic elements in several cultures. The absolute
multiculturalist hypothesis is as absurd as that of the cultural homogene-
ity of a city or country. Intercultural relations are the only reality - and
they are what need to be studied, from trampling over the Other to cul-
tural mixing.

The new social movements

(3) Axel Honneth and many others deny the existence of new social
movements (born after the 1960s). According to them, they are merely
arbitrarily isolated elements in a complex o f attitudes or demands mixing
all kinds of objectives: economic, cultural, national, generational, sexual.
This assertion, which also corresponds to the thinking of other sociolo-
gists or philosophers, involves me personally, since I have used this expres-
sion since 1968 and made it the guiding line o f my book on May 1968 in
France, and then the theme of a series o f studies conducted in France with
François Dubet, Michel Wieviorka and Zsuzsa Hegedus {Lutte étudiante
in 1978, La Prophétie anti-nucléaire in 1980, and Le Pays contre l'Etat in
1981) , and then with Dubet, Wieviorka and Jan Strzelecki {Solidarité in
1982) . In addition to these books, which present case studies, there are The
Voice and the Eye (1978), which analyses social movements and sets out
the method I developed to study them; and Le Retour de l'acteur (1984),
which presents critical conclusions on various new social movements at
the end o f the 1970s: the 'Occitanian' struggles against the French state,
the Solidarity movement in Poland, and trade unionism in France. (Since
then, the same method has been used in numerous cases in France and
other countries.)
The general conclusion of these studies is that a number of movements
are predominantly cultural movements, very different from the ones whose
socio-economic orientations had taken root in industrial societies; but that
the 'new wine' had been missed because it had been put in 'old goatskins',
as the Gospel puts it - that is, more concretely, in an ideology and forms
of action inherited from the working-class movement, especially its revo-
lutionary tendencies. I n the case of the feminist movement, it could even
be regarded at one point as a 'front' in a more general anti-capitalist and
anti-imperialist action. The failure o f the long student strike in 1976 in
154 N o w t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

France stems from the same error: the distance between a workerist dis-
course and students' real problems.
I n 1968 I offered an analogous interpretation of the May movement in
France: its main inspiration, which derived from students and youth, was
quite new; and with it culture had entered into the political field. But this
new experience was stifled, especially in the universities, in a revolution-
ary Marxist verbiage that gave preference to dead words over living action.
What does the novelty of these movements consist in? The same thing
as what later inspired the creation of an alter-globalist movement in
numerous countries, but also many movements o f political ecology. Both
foreground the contradiction between uncontrolled technological and eco-
nomic forces and the diversity of species and cultures, local activities and
languages, that helps form the subjectivity o f each o f us; and, more gen-
erally, both revolt against the negation of the actor's subjectivity and self-
respect. Thus, for example, women rebel against being treated as sexual
objects without any limit other than the laws of the market. Another
theme, linked to the first, is the recognition of cultural diversity and hence
of minorities in the face o f the evolutionistic progressivism which
announces that all roads lead to New York (rather than Rome). I t might
be said that the central conflict in which they are involved opposes glob-
alization to subjectivities and, at the heart of the latter, the will to be a
subject - that is, to take as one's main objective integrating the most diverse
experiences into the unity of a self-consciousness that resists external pres-
sure and seduction.

(4) Is it wrong to claim that such objectives are new, that they are differ-
ent from workers' struggles for autonomy in work? I f I make this com-
parison, it is because it was at the centre of the research I conducted at
the beginning of my professional life, which focused on working-class con-
sciousness. The latter did not reach its maximum extent in the most diffi-
cult economic situations, amid crises, wage reductions and j o b losses. N o :
class consciousness is not an effect of the crises and contradictions o f cap-
italism, but o f an awareness o f the conflict between employers and wage-
earners for the appropriation of the wealth created by production. I t was
strongest among skilled workers, whose crafts were broken up by the intro-
duction of 'scientific' methods of work organization (Taylorism and
Fordism, particularly in the metal industries). The high point was reached
in general in the early years o f the twentieth century. I n France we can
precisely situate this moment in the 1913 Renault factories strike. This
result, as we can see, corresponds neither to analyses that reduce every-
thing to interests, nor to those which adopt a moral vocabulary. We are
dealing with a conflict whose stakes involve economics but above all class
- a conflict between two opposed classes as it finds expression in daily
 C u l t u r a l Rights 155

work, for example around productivity based wages. While few or no social
movements exist that do not have economic objectives, only in industrial
societies, defined in the broad sense, are economic objectives the expres-
sion both o f a class conflict and o f the wage-earners' wish to be respected.
New social movements for their part do not have the transformation of
economic situations and relations as their guiding principle; they defend
the freedom and responsibility o f each individual, alone or collectively,
against the impersonal logic of profit and competition - and also against
an established order that decides what is normal or abnormal, permitted
or prohibited.
Is it true, as Craig Calhoun maintains, that such movements have existed
in every age? The arguments advanced in support of this idea are scarcely
convincing. People sometimes take their inspiration from E. P. Thompson,
recalling that the working-class movement defended statuses {Stände) as
much as classes. Certainly, but that involved a working class in the process
of being made, in which professional and local identities had great weight.
Enlarging the controversy, some signal that the 'nationalities' movement
in Europe in the first half o f the nineteenth century was guided more by
a sense o f cultural belonging and a desire for independence than a calcu-
lation o f interest. The formation o f new nations is indeed a complex
process where very different factors intersect. But it is the idea, based on
a collective consciousness, o f a nation freed from foreign domination that
informs national movements. A n d the latter belong in the category of
political movements, predominant in pre-industrial societies when the
major problems were posed in political terms, not social or cultural ones,
in terms o f order or disorder, peace or war, hierarchy or confusion, and
so on. Such movements are therefore very far removed from what have
been called the new social movements. Religious movements are even more
remote.

(5) The final point is one that concerns us every day. The appeal to iden-
tity, it is said, can serve liberal or democratic orientations, but also an
authoritarian communitarianism or even a search for ethnic purity, racial
or religious, that constitutes a real threat. A n d in fact, the notion o f iden-
tity is itself so confused and so dangerous that we should avoid employ-
ing it whenever possible. For it refers to the nation or some religion,
notions that are completely foreign to social movements, in as much as the
latter are centred not on the self-assertion o f a collectivity, but on aware-
ness o f a conflict and the wish to control the use society makes of its cul-
tural and material resources.
In order to avoid such deviations, the cultural movement must be closely
connected with the defence of universal political rights and social rights,
which often take the form of economic objectives. Already, when the great
156 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

struggles were being waged to secure social rights, one tendency, which for
a long time was majoritarian, separated itself off and identified defending
workers with a dictatorship o f the proletariat, which (it rapidly became
clear) would be a dictatorship over the proletariat. Another, which at first
was virtually marginal and mainly present in Great Britain, secured great
victories after 1945 with the creation o f systems o f social protection, and
even earlier, when it was a question of fighting social inequalities by voting
for progressive income tax and establishing free use of certain essential
services, such as education and health. This current, which was initially
called industrial democracy, and then social democracy, asserted the need
to link everyday defence of workers in their work situation to appeals to
expand citizenship.
The same is true today. I n many cases, the assertion o f identity rejects
any principle o f alterity. But it is only by combining cultural movements
with the defence o f political rights for all that it is possible to act in defence
of minorities, while respecting the democratic principle o f the law o f the
majority. Such is the most general problem facing all movements, whether
political or national, social or cultural: to assimilate the principle o f uni-
versal citizenship successfully, but concretely, by embodying it in power
relations and cultural conflicts.
It is on this condition that cultural movements are protected against
their opposites: self-enclosed communitarianisms that do not recognize
any alterity. As regards the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel
Honneth, we must conclude that their respective constructions are in fact
rather similar to one another, because both place the idea o f justice at the
heart of their analysis. That, as readers will have realized, is a position I
do not share, since any analysis of justice bears on the organization o f
society, whereas social movements are always 'figures of right' that must
be established in all situations, not all of which are social. Those who wrote
the first declarations of the rights of man on the basis of natural law
theory, its Christian sources as well as what linked them to the politics o f
the Enlightenment, knew this full well.

Modernizations

The constant reference to modernity makes it possible to distinguish more

easily between a large number of paths to modernization. For there no
more exists a single route to modernization than there does 'one best way'
(the only good way o f working, as Frederick Taylor believed). Modern-
ization relied on economic rationality and juridical developments in the
Netherlands and Great Britain, in very different fashion from French-style
voluntaristic modernization, which was directed by a state, and still more
 C u l t u r a l Rights 157

from the German model, based on invoking the cultural history o f the
nation.
But the most important thing today is to recognize the diversity o f the
combinations between modernity and cultural heritage or political system
that exist throughout the world. For nothing justifies dividing the world
into two camps, as Soviet propaganda used to and as influential circles in
all the countries regarded as modern still do. Those who are blind to the
diversity o f modernizations do not see that on the one hand a mass society
establishes its power in all spheres of production, consumption and
communication; while on the other, cultures imprisoned in themselves -
in particular, in their religious beliefs - have as their main goal not mod-
ernization, but war against the hegemonic power, political and cultural, of
other countries. This extreme situation seems often to dominate the global
landscape, imparting considerable cogency to Samuel Huntington's thesis
on the clash of civilizations and the central role o f religious and ethnic
conflicts, even i f closer examination leads (as I have said) to a more
nuanced conclusion.
It is in fact possible to elude this self-fulfilling prophecy. Modernity has
defenders nearly everywhere and above all enjoys support from those who
want to combine past and future, beliefs and progress. I t would be false
and dangerous in equal measure to regard the enormous Islamized part
of the world as an anti-modernist bloc, willingly imprisoned in the repro-
duction o f a culture by constant reference to sacred texts founding an
immutable order. The same error was committed by those who thought in
Europe that only Protestant countries could modernize, while countries
marked by Catholicism were imprisoned in their clerical communitarian-
ism. The element of truth in such assertions ultimately dissolves in the
enormous quotient o f error they contain.
Let us return for a moment to the debate agitating France in 2004. I t is
false to say that all the girls who wished to retain the veil at school were
proclaiming their attachment to Islamic culture against rationalist, secular
Western culture. A significant percentage of them stated their desire to
combine their family and personal background with the world o f knowl-
edge and professional life for which school prepares pupils. I t is true that
the French, at the point when parliament adopted a restrictive law against
signs of religious affiliation at school, prioritized fear of Islamist funda-
mentalism and disruption of the educational or hospital system. But now
that the necessary brake, desired by the great majority o f the population,
has been applied, we must once again listen to the voices o f veiled girls
who are modernist. For those of us who do not belong to the Islamic
world, this involves bringing a critical judgement to bear on our percep-
tion of the other and our frequent inability to recognize in the other
the same endeavour to combine the modern spirit with attachment to
158 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

traditions and beliefs that we carry in ourselves through forms of nation-

alism or religious life.
What can be called progress is measured at the level o f the recognition
and possible combination of the centre and the periphery, invention and
tradition, modernity and heritages embarked on a road of modernization.
The lowest level of this recognition is mutual rejection, which has no other
outcome than war, and even holy war, jihad against crusade, such as we
see unleashed today.
A t the same time as it is necessary to acknowledge elements o f moder-
nity and attempts at modernization in 'underdeveloped' regions, we must
identify the non-modern (and even non-modernizing) components o f what
are called the 'developed' countries. The most interesting cases are those
where it is via appeals to the past and safeguarding the national interest
that the impetus needed to construct a modern world has been acquired.
The case of Japan is the best known, but it is not the only one. The most
effective ruling elites are not those that speak an exclusively futuristic
language, but on the contrary those which consciously seek to enhance
modernity's compatibility with different social and cultural elements, so as
to reinforce modernizing factors.
Finally, we have learnt to distrust dishonest modernities. We are
indebted to Georges Friedmann for having been the first person, at least
in France, to denounce the false claims of a Taylorist management whose
sole connection with science was its claim to be scientific. A n d we shall
discover ever more frequently, behind the facade of firms and banks that
claim to be the highest symbols o f modernity, lies and illegal conduct.
Accordingly, it is the clear separation between modernity and modern-
izations that makes it possible to escape both the pretension of the most
powerful to identify themselves with modernity and that of the weakest
to defend an artificial cultural relativism.
We find ourselves in a similar situation today to that of the working
class in industrial society. But it is in the cultural order - not the social
order - that the great rifts are emerging. Imprisonment in a proletarian
revolution that rapidly became a ferocious opponent of democracy has
given way to a communitarianism, an identitarian passion, which spills a
lot o f blood and rejects the very idea of democracy. War is setting one
identity against another, one ethnic or religious group against another, one
class or clientele against its neighbour-enemy. What affects us most is that
immigrants settled in a rich, democratic country feel rejected by the pop-
ulation or imprisoned in a ghetto. They then respond to the contempt with
which they are treated by a communitarian introversion full of aggression,
which sometimes finds a scapegoat, but which also seeks to define itself
against the country that has failed to welcome them. When the breach is
deepest, as in the case of the United States, black movements on the
 Cultural Rights 159

extreme left (Malcom X ) or the extreme right (Farakhan) have pressed

their claims as far as independence, disclaiming any desire for integration.
Against this extreme position, South Africa was saved from civil war by
Nelson Mandela. Tendencies to rupture and introversion have developed
rapidly under the impact of the second Intifada and the struggle to the
death between Palestinians and Israelis, but equally as a result of the rapid
creation of ghettos where a communitarian introversion occurs that
increases the pressure on individuals. The latter in turn demand the
freedom to practise their form of worship, helping to strengthen the
defence of an identity that is predominantly religious.
Might such developments, which can lead to a culture war analogous to
the class struggle, and to states claiming to speak in the name of a class
or a religion, take a different turn and bring about a situation in which
cultural rights gradually achieve better recognition? I t is difficult to reply
in the affirmative to this question, even though the future of our societies
will largely depend on their capacity to recognize and encourage cultural
rights. For this involves more than recognizing private forms of behaviour,
tolerated by a state that retains control of the public sphere, thereby
depriving of any real meaning the recognition of cultures which are con-
demned to losing their vitality i f they are not authorized to enter the public
sphere and express themselves in it.
This means reducing the role of norms and institutions in fashioning
'living together', in favour of rules and institutions that allow people to be
different. I n most instances it is the authoritarian state that rejects cultural
minorities or reduces the space allowed women as much as possible. But
rejection of cultural diversity equally occurs in democratic countries, as
France indicates.
In France, rejection of cultural differences is based on a form of repub-
licanism, itself derived from progressive struggles waged against the
Catholic Church in the past. For at least two centuries France has been
divided between a Catholic clan (most often based on the traditional
sectors of society) and a secular clan (nurtured by Enlightenment philos-
ophy and recruiting predominantly from the middle classes linked to the
state and attached to the defence of national consciousness). This pro-
longed confrontation gradually gave way to an armed peace that in turn
led to the consensus on the 1905 law implementing separation of Church
and state, which was drafted in a spirit of tolerance. In return for the dis-
appearance of anti-religious and anti-clerical campaigns, the Republic was
accepted by all Churches. But the upsurge in Islamism has led to the
rebirth of a militantly anti-religious spirit, fuelled by defenders of modern
rationalism. Those who wave the flag of the Republic against the expres-
sion of religious beliefs in schools - in particular, against the Islamic veil
- do not take as their main argument the upsurge in fundamentalism that
160 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

really does challenge important aspects of the school syllabus, and which
must indeed be repulsed. They call for the separation of the private sphere
from the public sphere, and assert that the state and the polity have been
- and remain - the only institutions capable of founding a social order
that serves freedom, whereas religious powers, often associated with tra-
ditional interest groups, defend everyone's freedom badly or not at all. This
position is in fact untenable, for citizenship - a basic value that must not
be sacrificed to any model o f class society or a religiously homogeneous
society - is undermined i f it is not extended to the sphere where most per-
sonal or collective experience unfolds.
However, we must once again stress the gravity o f the problems posed
by such an extension. I n the nineteenth century, many politicians opposed
the recognition o f social rights for fear of breaking with the universalism
of political democracy, which some referred to as formal or bourgeois.
A n d , as I have mentioned, those who called for social democracy in order
to break with bourgeois democracy went on to establish the dictatorship
of the party that declared itself the representative o f the proletariat.

Entry into the post-social world

The problem o f extending political rights, and hence citizenship, to the

vast domain o f cultural conflicts is posed in the same terms.
To confine religious life to the private sphere boils down to imposing an
anti-religious conception on the whole of public life. However, public life
must be enriched by the diversity of cultures. But how is that to be done,
when schools are obliged to teach that which unites - above all, rational
forms o f knowledge - rather than what distinguishes and separates, and
pertains to subjectivity? We may exclude the commonest solution: in many
countries a privileged link exists between political authority and a par-
ticular language, a religion, or a moral system that holds sway in society.
It is difficult, for example, not to see the particular importance of
Catholicism in Italy.
New solutions can only be found in the recognition o f several cultures,
whether this involves religion, language, or clothing. Cultural pluralism is
an imperative in a world in fast motion. Nothing can halt the nomadism
associated with the rapid increase in international exchanges. I n industrial
society the combination o f social democracy with a previously constructed
political democracy occurred through ideas like the struggle against
inequality. In our countries, where production, consumption and commu-
nication have equally entered into mass society, it is more difficult to ensure
cultural pluralism. A n d it is pointless to speak of tolerance, especially
when beliefs about the world and representations of it coexist, each of
 C u l t u r a l Rights 161

which proclaims its universal value. Attempts at ecumenicism can at best

reduce tensions; they cannot put an end to them.
The only realistic response is to establish a link between different cul-
tures and what we call modernity, since the latter is defined by universal
values.
Concretely, we can only recognize cultural rights on condition that what
we recognize as our basic principles - that is, belief in rational thought
and the assertion that personal rights exist which no society and no state
has the right to infringe - are accepted. The principle o f secularism extends
the recognition of personal rights by positing the autonomy of political
society vis-à-vis the principles and practices of religions. This does indeed
involve the basis of democracy in modern society. Positing the existence
of a central core o f modernity does not involve eliminating other cultures,
whether they assert themselves within our society or outside it, but simply
knowing on what conditions the basic principles o f modernity might be
compatible with the diversity of cultures and their forms of intervention
in personal and collective life. These beliefs often have a specifically reli-
gious basis - hence one not open to discussion for believers. However, they
are also concrete expressions which are perfectly open to alteration (and
have constantly been altered).
It is a question not of placing two or more cultures face to face, but of
assessing the prospects for recognizing the free exercise of a religion, a
belief or an ideology in a society that vigorously affirms its conception o f
modernity. Naturally, this line of argument applies to our own schémas o f
belief and practice, which are not necessarily in accordance with the prin-
ciples to which we supposedly adhere. How far removed we are here from
vague ideas that make do with fine declarations about the need to know
one another! Must we 'understand' the stoning of unfaithful women,
arranged marriages, or excision? No, obviously not, despite the protests of
some defenders o f a radical cultural relativism.
What is to be understood by the plurality of modes of modernization
- an expression far preferable to that of multiculturalism - is the recogni-
tion o f the multiplicity of the paths by which a population can enter into
modernity, but always via a mixture o f universal principles and very dif-
ferent historical experiences. We must not in any event identify modernity
and its general principles with our own experience and institutions. We
must not regard a population that is progressing towards modernity as
necessarily advancing towards us. Even i f all roads lead to Rome, this
Rome is composed of districts that are very different from one another: it
is not only the capital o f the old Roman Empire or the seat o f the Papacy.
The most powerful countries have in the past tended (or tend today) to
offer themselves as an example to the world. Their influence should on the
contrary make them aware o f their particularity, which is as always a
162 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

conjunctural, variable mixture of many elements, some of them conform-

ing to the idea of modernity, while others recall historical moments or
enduring trends that have no direct relationship with modernity. N o situ-
ation is pure; none is exemplary. Just as the arrival of new members in the
European Union changes its content and orientations, without thereby
harming the principle of European construction, so the arrival in France
of millions of Maghrébins - even i f a majority of them possess French
nationality and now use French as their everyday language - necessarily
alters the concrete forms of the modernity of France. I n other words, we
should not believe that only one mode of modernization capable of bring-
ing a country into modernity exists; there is not even a single model -
French, Japanese, or American - of modernity. A l l countries and all indi-
viduals have complex relations with modernity, with movements of mod-
ernization or forces of anti-modernization, without this changing anything
in the nature of modernity.
I f the cultural rights of all, individual or collective, must be recognized,
it is because it is necessary to protect all forms and trajectories of mod-
ernization. But each of us must struggle in ourselves and in our society
against what is opposed to the general principles of modernity. We must
discover among foreigners new forms of modernization - and hence the
presence of certain elements of modernity. But they must bring a critical
judgement to bear on their historical experience and cultural practices.
What is involved here is not some pure reciprocal relationship to the other,
recognition of one another, but judgement of the self and the other from
the standpoint of a modernity that some are closer to than others, but
which does not belong to anyone and is not to be confused with any par-
ticular historical reality.
Since modernity is defined by principles that are universal in scope -
rational thinking and the rights of the individual; since any moderniza-
tion introduces the idea of the particularity and even the singularity of
each society undergoing change; and since the two notions can neither be
confused with, nor separated from, one another, it is as impossible to
define a society as purely universalistic as it is to define it by its sheer sin-
gularity. I t is more useful to clarify the complementary character of the
two notions, once we have eliminated extreme solutions, liberal and com-
munitarian, which only retain one of the two dimensions of the analysis.
The following argument is indicated: the other must be recognized as
such, as different, but only i f this other, like myself, accepts the universal
principles that define modernity. That is the condition on which we can
speak of recognition in the sense given it by Charles Taylor, in a text that
has become a classic. The recognition of the other as different, but also
as adhering to the universal principles of modernity, can take very differ-
ent forms: it can enable communication between close cultures; or it can
 Cultural Rights 163

denounce the pride of the most powerful civilization, which refuses to rec-
ognize that which is different from it.
One society can recognize another one, even i f it perceives it as domi-
nant or colonialist. More important are the differences between societies
which accord priority to their particular orientations and their own goals
and those, on the contrary, which privilege assertion of the rights of the
individual. I t is impossible to choose between these two positions; they
both risk lapsing into unilateralism i f they forget one of the aspects of
their existence. We might speak here, once again, of the necessity for
ambivalence that characterizes those who defend the universalism of indi-
vidual rights and, at the same time, the singularity of the path which a
society opts to follow - without being satisfied with either of these posi-
tions, but knowing that to combine them and arrange their complemen-
tarity is the least bad solution.
The more globalization and international exchanges - especially migra-
tion - develop, the more possible and necessary it becomes to combine
recognition of the other with an attachment to rationalism and the asser-
tion of individual rights.
The meeting and mixing of cultures does not occur in general on an
equal footing. Haiti offers striking proof of the fact. Mulattos there are
regarded as superior to the black population in whose name Duvalier took
power, making clear reference to the relations of inequality and domina-
tion existing between categories defined by their skin colour. Black people
commonly avenge themselves, whether as the result of an opening of the
public space, or - more frequently - of the overthrow of the government
by those who in the colonial situation were subjected to extreme forms of
domination. Finally, this revenge can be religious, as is indicated by the
rapid development of cults that are often called Protestant (let us avoid
the word 'sect' used by the traditional Churches to underscore their supe-
riority). They attest to both a reappropriation of remote cultural origins
and to an assertion of their moral superiority by those who have failed in
their attempts at social advance or who have suffered downward mobility.
In all cases, whose diversity can only be summarily evoked here, it is impre-
cise to speak of the defence or destruction of cultural rights. The invoca-
tion of rights is never reducible to identitarian references. We can only
speak of cultural rights, I repeat, when cultural and social forms of behav-
iour demand to be recognized in the name of universalistic principles -
that is, in the name of the right of all to practise their culture, language,
religion, kinship relations, alimentary customs, and so on. A n d it is only
when opposition to a central culture defined as universalistic emanates
from minority cultures (or cultures with inferior status), condemned by
those who identify themselves with universalism, that conflict becomes
inevitable.
164 Now that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s In Cultural Terms

Let us take the example of Turkey, which has already been referred to
in this book, starting in particular from the works o f Nilüfer Gole. She
has very clearly demonstrated the political and national ambition o f rulers
who aspired to found a new type o f society as far removed from post-
Khomeini Iran as from the countries that had been Sovietized or those
that were drawn into an accelerated Americanization (like Puerto Rico).
It is here that the theme o f cultural rights has reached a peak, for it was
not a question o f erasing boundaries in favour o f hybridization, but o f
combining some national elements with others, derived from richer coun-
tries, which threatened to overrun everything i f care was not taken. The
defence of cultural rights emerges as a direct expression o f the action o f
the subject.
A very different example merits particular attention: that of the
Zapatista movement which emerged in Chiapas in Mexico from 1 January
1994. I t has often been inaccurately interpreted, especially by its European
admirers. We remember that the guerrilla movements which dominated the
life o f Latin America led urban youth brought up on the idea of the foco
- that is, the revolutionary vanguard - to support peasant struggles whose
main objective was not recognition o f the Indians, but the fall o f the
regime of domination supported by the United States and international
finance authorities. The general failure o f the guerrilla movements is
explained in the first instance by the fact that they did not take account
of local realities. This assumed an extreme form in the Bolivian expedi-
tion of Che Guevara, who had rejected all contact with Bolivian parties
and trade unions and entered a Guarani-speaking peasant zone where land
reform had been carried out. Aware o f the reasons for this failure, Marcos
wanted to link the defence o f the Maya communities in the Selva Lacan-
dona with a programme for the democratization of Mexico, his idea being
to create a major movement that was simultaneously social and political.
The agreements signed by the two camps envisaged complex ways of com-
bining Mexican law and that of the indigenous communities. The march
on Mexico was to be the starting-point for broader action. The failure o f
this endeavour in no way detracts from its importance, which consists in
the attempt to combine the defence o f communities with a political trans-
formation o f the national state.

Sexual rights

We have seen the development of demands for the recognition o f diverse

forms o f sexuality, for men and for women, and even extending beyond
the distinction between them. The recognition o f homosexuality, which is
still not complete, affects men and women equally, since it involves sepa-
 Cultural Rights 165

rating sexual and emotional life from the reproduction and construction
of a family. Can we speak of the creation o f a cultural category that has
finally been recognized? I do not think so.
In the first place, because there is no more homogeneity among gays
than straights, especially since some homosexual behaviour represents
a protest against prohibitions and a transgression. As the prohibitions
fall away, the search for lasting relations assumes ever more importance,
while the demand for the rights to marriage and parenthood is being
consolidated.
There is no reason on this last point to assign too much importance to
the differences between women and men: when it comes to filiation, the
main thing is the question of the blood tie that is to link generations with
one another. This is a crucial issue, but should not provoke great debate
today, since we have opted for a very favourable attitude towards adop-
tion - when it is not corrupted by financial transactions. The success o f
full adoption, the growing importance of reconstituted families, advances
in artificial insemination - everything conduces to making it the case that
bonds of filiation are no longer all blood ties (far from it).
Why should homosexuals be the only ones prohibited from filiation?
Why should they be forbidden to marry?
The problems become more delicate when we examine not various types
of lasting relationship, but brief or occasional relationships facilitated by
contraception (especially male), and still more relationships detached from
any project of a life in common. N o one will deny that such behaviour is
unlikely to strengthen the subject! But they are not to be judged in this
fashion. I f we accept the idea that the subject creates itself starting from
sexual experience, through the relationship with the other and then with
the self, we must concede the existence of multiple sexual relationships,
one o f whose basic roles is to affirm the autonomy of sexual activity. A n d
i f this line of argument does not convince everyone, let us all agree to
contest as a matter o f priority any regressive conception of sexual life such
as still prevails in many families and schools - especially religious ones.
Domination and liberation are words that form part o f the same general
view of sexuality - that o f the victim - and hence o f the same refusal to
take the actor into consideration. In addition, the theme of liberation is
rapidly mired in confusion, since it refers to a starting-point - domination
- from which it is a question o f liberating oneself, but not to any destina-
tion, since sexual freedom can just as easily authorize the transgression of
social and moral norms as conduce to the elimination o f a prohibition
founding a repressive morality. Analysis should not foreground the various
constraints or forms of liberation that guide sexuality. On the other hand,
we must follow the radical feminists when they denounce the subjugation
of all forms of sexuality to the single model o f the heterosexual
166 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

relationship dominated by the man. As soon as they are no longer judged

from the standpoint of a certain conception of the family, the diversity o f
forms o f sexual behaviour can have no other limits than non-respect for
the dignity o f each individual. A n d I am not unaware of the dangers
involved in any judgement in this matter.
Let us therefore follow the different sexual minorities and the struggles
they wage against the images of 'morality' which imprison them in mar-
ginality and inferiority. I f it is not certain that we can speak of a new gay
and lesbian culture, it is clear that we are dealing with a liberation move-
ment intent on the elimination of all forms o f prohibition and discrimi-
nation. This liberation might also lead gays and lesbians to abandon
practices of transgression, provocation and festive demonstration, which
has created great fascination with them and made drag queens, for
example, one o f the most remarkable creations o f the culture o f
provocation.
It might be thought that the highest point in the demand for cultural
rights in matters of sexual conduct is the demand for recognition o f bisex-
uality or, above all, o f the queer vision - that is, indifference as regards
the nature o f the partner - because such a demand seeks completely to
separate sexuality from family roles and an institutional definition o f
genders. I t would be desirable for all movements defending the cultural
rights o f minorities to be as visible as those successfully launched by gays
and lesbians, and now by transsexuals and transvestites whose importance
has long been ignored.
In other domains, how can we fail to be indignant about the lack o f
respect shown the disabled? Who is not scandalized by the often insur-
mountable difficulties they encounter in some countries taking the metro,
following university courses, or simply finding a street? The success
achieved by the deaf, whose language was invented in France by the Abbé
de l'Épée, but whose disciples met with a much better reception in the
United States - in particular, around Gallodet College - finally extended
to the European countries, including France. Some of them even allot sig-
nificant space to sign language in television programmes. The defence of
the rights o f each disabled category should assume as much importance
in our society as the defence o f victims of work accidents and occupa-
tional illnesses in industrial societies.

The limits of cultural mixing

The recognition of cultural rights becomes increasingly difficult to achieve

as cultural diversity increases and tolerance comes up against obstacles
that are more and more difficult to overcome. That explains the attraction
 C u l t u r a l Rights 167

of cultural mixing - a solution more readily resorted to when central

government is weak.
Thus, in many countries, Brazil foremost among them, the mixing o f
ethnic groups has avoided the creation of cultural boundaries, like those
to be found in the United States and other countries. Cultural exchanges
can go still further and combine, for example, the appropriation o f reli-
gious elements of Catholic origin in indigenous practices with the pene-
tration o f elements o f indigenous origin into Hispanic and Christian
culture. Roger Bastide and, more recently, Serge Gruzinski and Carmen
Bernand have studied this reciprocal borrowing.
In the contemporary world, the penetration of American mass culture
into all countries is so profound that it can produce a spontaneous mixing
of cultures. Is this not the case with pizza, whose origin has been forgot-
ten? Cultural mixing is even more visible in populations where many
writers and thinkers, like Edouard Glissant in the West Indies, stress the
richness o f the hybrid culture and its capacity to make the most o f the
encounter between two traditions.
A n extreme form o f cultural mixing is the 'border culture' - a concept
proposed by certain Mexican researchers who believe that the many
Mexicans who officially or clandestinely settle between the border and the
major cities of the country are not in the process of being Americanized,
even i f they are increasingly differentiated from the Mexicans of their
native region. They thus create a 'border culture', which apparently stabi-
lizes and is not a stage in the socialization that several generations ago led
Chicanos finally to melt into the American population.
Examples of this kind could be multiplied and it would not be incor-
rect to say that we are all more or less culturally mixed, since American
mass culture is mixing more and more with the local or national ways o f
life. But the advantages of cultural mixing do not release us from the need
to defend cultural rights. For there is often a very great imbalance between
majority beliefs and social or sexual minorities, as well as ethnic, national
or religious ones. Societies and forms of worship always mark out bound-
aries, which impose prohibitions and rejections - especially when the
majority culture is openly defined by its break with tradition. Confronta-
tion between cultures, like that between social classes, is never resolved by
an ultimate melding o f the adversaries.

About the 'veil'

Cultural rights pertain more to rights to difference than rights to equal

treatment. But i f demands for difference are not to evolve in the direction
of communitarianism and intolerance, the movements making them must
168 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

not contradict the practices and ideologies o f difference. Such is the first
condition for complementarity between the rights o f minorities and the
democratic system. Conversely, a Constitution that ignores ethnic differ-
ences, as is the case i n the United States and France, represents an obsta-
cle to protesting against communitarian excesses. This is the case above all
because the inequality o f opportunities between the various ethnic groups,
observed in schools as in employment, indicates that some of these groups
are regarded as inferior and treated as such.
I n the case o f France, many statistics indicate that schools themselves
act as a selection grid to the detriment o f the children of immigrants, in
particular Maghrébins, a low proportion o f whom progress to higher edu-
cation. Whereas there exist three decidedly hierarchical types o f lycée
(general, technological and professional), it is frequently the case that the
classes o f professional lycées are almost completely composed o f the chil-
dren of immigrants. Ordinary racism, which represented the colonized as
inferior beings needing only an elementary education, is replaced in our
more mobile societies by selection mechanisms that are unofficial but
easily detectable. Thus, feminists have been able to show that even in the
absence o f selection procedures the proportion of women drops the
further up the professional hierarchy one goes.
Campaigns against inequality of opportunity are waged in the name o f
classical liberalism. But we know that these campaigns fail, for they have
no purchase on the causes o f inequality. The difficult problem o f positive
discrimination ('affirmative action') is then posed. Its principle is incon-
testable: it is similar to that o f progressive income tax - which is our best
weapon for reducing inequality. I t has secured some notable results in large
firms, but it is ultimately largely ineffective. I t is true that in the United
States, in the large universities that had adopted this policy in favour of
particular ethnic groups, the abolition o f such measures has led to the dis-
appearance o f Afro-American students from the higher levels of studies,
which they had penetrated. But it is also true that the introduction of a
few individuals at this level does not fundamentally reduce the inequality
of which Afro-Americans are the victims. I n order to defend this policy,
we must resort to a different kind of argument, which sits well with the
general position that I am putting forward here.
Positive discrimination makes little difference to the actual situation, but
it attracts public attention to inequalities, as has been shown by the impas-
sioned debates that have taken place in the United States - and today in
France, where the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris, an elitist estab-
lishment protected by an entrance exam, has decided to recruit directly a
certain number o f students from lycées in disadvantaged areas. This case
is all the more interesting in that the director of Sciences Po has raised
students' enrolment fees so as to grant free places to those who are due to
 C u l t u r a l Rights 169

enter by the new channel. Major American studies - in particular, Ronald

Dworkin's - and Supreme Court decisions have rendered more visible the
inadequacies of a democracy which, in the name of equal rights, allows
the development of de facto inequality. But this awareness only becomes
effective when those who are victims of inequality organize in order to
protest against it.
Let us now return to France and the question of the 'veil' or foulard.
Faced with supporters of secularism, there are two orders of discourse.
On one side, 'veiled' girls demand the right to display their faith in schools,
which had hitherto wished to remain free of any expression of beliefs -
especially religious ones. A n d their defenders seek to show that secularism
is not neutral, but on the contrary relies on a separation between the public
world and the private world - something that is, as I have indicated, unten-
able. On the other side, some Islamic movements, those dubbed funda-
mentalist, are inspired by a general refusal of the cultural rights of those
who do not belong to their denomination. The debate therefore brings
together two opposed conceptions of cultural rights. The complexity and
importance of the debate over these problems, and above all the recent
appearance of veiled young women in the lycées and public colleges, jus-
tifies the presentation here of an analysis that grasps the overall historical
situation in which these battles and the debates they have provoked are
located.
For a long time, immigration in France, as in other West European
countries, was based on demands for manpower. It translated into an inte-
gration based on employment and learning the national language. But this
integration allowed for the survival, through several generations, of family
and social customs and forms of organization derived from the country
of origin. The surrounding population had happily accepted foreign
workers who were taking on so many hard jobs, while keeping out of polit-
ical life. But the situation changed with the end of growth and also under
the impact of accelerating cultural changes in the population of the host
country. These changes were more cultural than social, as is indicated by
the formation of groups of youth without work in the French suburbs,
mixing individuals from very different backgrounds. How, in such a con-
fused situation, was it possible to create or maintain an anti-Arab racism
on the one hand, and a sense of community and religious identity, on the
other, so strong that current vocabulary designates as 'Muslims' all those
who come from an Arab country, but also from Turkey, sub-Saharan
Africa, or other territories, when they are not all practising Muslims?
The original French population strongly resented this changed situation,
in particular with the rise of casual employment. The one who feels threat-
ened attributes the causes of her fear to the foreigner, to the one
who comes from without, and whose status is even lower than her own -
170 N o w that W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s In C u l t u r a l Terms

something that threatens the 'poor whites' with marginality, where once
they hoped for upward social mobility for their children. Muslim activism,
and especially the war between Israel and Palestine, has transformed the
social awareness o f exclusion among workers o f Arab, Turkish or other
origin into an ethnic and religious consciousness that has reinforced reac-
tions of rejection in the older native French population. Over a longer
period, this reaction has above all had the effect o f isolating the poorest
and weakest categories when other categories left the world of council
housing to accede to dwellings answering to a higher social status.
Whereas a blending o f the poor from different origins had long been
the rule, ghettos now formed, especially on the periphery o f large cities.
And whereas France, and in particular those who influence its public
opinion, defend republican integration against the communalist danger
supposedly threatening republican citizenship, France at the base is widely
permeated by this communitarianism, to the point where secondary-
school students often define themselves by their religion or that o f their
group of origin rather than by their social situation, their political affilia-
tion, or their sporting preferences.
Between Arabs and Jews, especially the most radical on both sides, there
is a high degree o f aggression. Numerous attacks on synagogues have
occurred and a new anti-Semitism, born out o f an extreme anti-Zionism,
has developed. The more that exclusion and the ghettos expand, the more
defensive community reactions refer to religious affiliation. The first veiled
lycée pupils appeared in Creil in 1989. Despite the proposals o f the Conseil
d'État in favour of negotiations in each establishment, the conflicts mul-
tiplied and religious activists soon challenged school syllabuses deemed to
contradict the Koran, and sometimes also hospital organization, which
was accused o f not ensuring separation between men and women when it
came to treatment and care.
As Parliament assembled a commission and the President of the Repub-
lic created the Stasi Commission, after the name of its head, to reflect on
the appropriateness of a law that would prohibit so-called conspicuous
signs of religious affiliation, public opinion was engaged in an impassioned
debate. I n it two problems were conflated that were in fact distinct: on the
one hand, respect for the cultural rights of veiled schoolgirls; on the other,
defence o f the so-called republican spirit and, above all, o f citizenship
against communitarianisms, especially Muslim ones. This duality of prob-
lems is expressed in a clear separation between two categories of veiled
girls: those who wish to combine modern studies with their religious affil-
iations; and those who, o f their own free will or succumbing to pressure,
play the card o f Islamist attacks on French 'secularism'.
Is the Islamist threat genuine? We have mentioned the refusal o f some
veiled girls to attend biology or history courses, the attitude of some
 C u l t u r a l Rights 171

Muslims who reject male doctors touching their wives, but we do not know
the frequency of such incidents. In the present world situation, however,
it would be unrealistic to deny the existence of an upsurge in fundamen-
talism. This must not stop us from recognizing the fact that the global fear
of Islamic-inspired terrorism confers a probably exaggerated importance
on certain local incidents. I n the French case, a sense of this danger was
sufficiently widespread and strong for a law restricting or prohibiting reli-
gious signs in schools ultimately to be massively approved by public
opinion.
But recognition o f the danger must not lead us to forget the existence
of young Muslim women who wish at all costs to participate in modern
social life - which presupposes their graduation from school. Most
abandon any voluntary sign o f affiliation to a non-Western culture and
dress and live in Western fashion. But since 1989 a number o f them have
wanted to be free, at school and elsewhere, to display obvious signs o f their
religious affiliation. A t the beginning o f the movement, a study conducted
by F. Gaspar and Farhad Khosrokhavar showed that a majority of these
veiled secondary-school pupils were modern, wanted to pursue their
studies and gave them a scientific orientation. Similar studies have yielded
analogous results in the case of Turkey: veiled pupils were not distinct
from the rest as regards their future projects, even when negative pressures
were exerted on them. Since then, there is no doubt that the sway o f the
family, local and religious background over some young pupils has
increased with the exacerbation of exclusion and the growing isolation o f
the ghettos. But the category o f modern veiled girls who want to combine
their native culture with their present and future social milieus has cer-
tainly not disappeared. The report o f the Stasi Commission wanted to see
acknowledgement of the profound differences that exist between the
various categories o f veiled secondary-school girls.
Ally or adversary of this secularism, depending on the circumstances, a
new form of opposition to religious fundamentalisms, particularly o f the
Islamic variety, has asserted itself. I t derives from feminist movements,
which is logical, since religions - in particular, monotheistic ones - have
imprisoned women, often violently so, in dependence on men and excluded
them from public life. Thus, feminists comprehensively attack an Islam
which they accuse o f imprisoning women in an inferiority and dependence
of which the chador is the most visible symbol - at the risk, obviously, o f
impeding any evolution.
The meaning o f these battles between two camps, each o f which is
divided in two by an internal opposition of great significance, is not that
the past resists the future and custom resists reason. What fuels the con-
frontation between cultures is the fact that for much o f the global popu-
lation Western culture, while attractive, is inseparable from a military,
172 N o w t h a t W e Refer t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

economic and political domination that has not diminished, but only
changed its form from the initial modern colonial expeditions to today's
globalization, which is ever more clearly in the service of the American
empire.
Another interpretation, opposed to the preceding one, leads to conclu-
sions that are even more dangerous. This is cultural relativism which, by
eliminating any universalistic reference, in fact precludes communication.
I f this thinking was applied, the poorest countries would also be those
with the fewest prospects of achieving their liberation.
It is good to discover, through the study of a particular historical case,
the general nature of the solution that allows for communication between
cultures, while remaining as far removed from extreme multiculturalism as
from cultural imperialism. I f French society, feeling itself threatened mil-
itarily and culturally, rejects anything that comes from without - that is,
assigns itself a monopoly of the universal and identifies itself with the
latter - it will increasingly be compelled to embark on a crusade, the one
already being conducted by George Bush's United States. Conversely, i f it
inclined to cultural relativism - but this is much less likely than the other
hypothesis - it would imperil its social and political unity. The objective
that imposes itself on us all is to recognize (and have recognized) a core
of universal principles - those constitutive of modernity - and the multi-
plicity of historical modes of modernization, so as to render the greatest
possible number of modes of modernization compatible with the univer-
sal principles of modernity.
The separation and the complementary character of modernity and
modernizations is not only conducive to understanding and respecting dif-
ferent cultures, on condition that they recognize general principles like the
practice of rational thinking and respect for individual rights, without
which intercultural communication is impossible. I t must lead us further,
towards a transformation in the way we approach these problems. I t is no
longer exclusively a question of understanding what enables cultures to
communicate; what is at stake is whether an awareness of the differences
between cultures can be transformed into an evaluation, by the actor
herself, of her own forms of behaviour. This involves a radical switch of
perspective: the issue is no longer whether two or more cultures are com-
patible, but to observe how actors handle the transition from one culture
and society to others, and above all the role played by beliefs, attitudes,
and prohibitions in facilitating or, on the contrary, complicating the
transition.
Such an approach analyses the actor's behaviour in a new way. Initially,
the goal is simply to grasp and analyse the difficulties encountered by
immigrants or others in their transition from one culture to a different one.
It is no longer a question of defining the relations between different cul-
 C u l t u r a l Rights 173

tures, but the kind o f behaviour that enables actors not to be defeated by
the difficulties they encounter. Various pieces o f research have shown that
the presence o f strong convictions facilitates the transition from one
culture and society to others. What is measured here is the ability o f the
actors to behave as subjects - that is, to conceive and create their own
route. I t is no longer the compatibility between different cultures that is at
issue, but the capacity of individuals to transform a series o f lived situa-
tions and incidents into a personal history and project. We can therefore
advance the hypothesis that those who have been able to manage their per-
sonal history have more consciously chosen it, in a way less determined by
shocks to, and loss, of the self. Their behaviour has resulted in them raising
the level o f the judgements they work out about themselves. This approach
enables us to achieve knowledge of the personal and collective field that
confers meaning on what is called history.
We can expand on this remark. Too often, studies of intercultural rela-
tions present them to us as so many roads leading from one city to another,
as i f cultures were comparable to cities, as i f a culture exercised total
control over some particular population. Such situations certainly exist -
in particular, in colonial or quasi-colonial situations like those experienced
by the Indians o f Latin America. But the population o f cultural minori-
ties is attracted by regions whose living standards and labour markets offer
them better chances o f survival or social advance. This is not a question
of communication between two or more cultures, but o f the relations
of attraction exercised by central or privileged categories on the more
dominated. In the industrialized Western countries, minorities are often
composed of a group o f individuals who do not necessarily constitute a
community and, above all, handle among themselves relations of domi-
nation, blending and cultural mixing that render analysis in terms o f the
juxtaposition or separation of two cultures impossible. Each culture is pro-
foundly influenced by its neighbours, especially by those who represent a
pole o f attraction. Such is the case with young Arabs from the Maghreb,
among whom there has developed a consciousness o f religious identity but
also of de facto membership, subjectively experienced, of French society,
which far from corresponds to the stereotypes often presented. Thus, ref-
erence is frequently made to 'young immigrants', even though the young
people concerned were born in France, invariably possess French citizen-
ship and speak French.
Very different is the case of the immigrants who arrived in large numbers
in the United States prior to the First World War, and again in recent
years, who rapidly identified with their host country. A n extreme case is
Argentina which, very rapidly and thanks above all to a French-style edu-
cation system, transformed Italian, German, Swiss and French people into
Argentinian citizens swiftly detached from their native society and culture.
174 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

Communities and communitarianisms

We use 'communitarianism' to refer to very different phenomena. Belgium
and the Netherlands recognize the political and administrative importance
of the cultural 'pillars' of society; and in Belgium the percentage of public
affairs jointly treated by the two principal communities has greatly dimin-
ished. When the French state, having under Napoleon recognized the
Catholic, Protestant Lutheran and Jewish communities, undertook to
organize the representation of Muslims in France and entrust it to an
elected body, it recognized the existence of a Muslim community, without
this implying a communitarian administration of society. We can only
employ that expression in connection with movements which demand, for
a culturally or ethnically defined community, a monopoly on handling the
relations between members of this community and of it as a whole with
the national state or even with international institutions. This conception
of social organization can extend as far as the complete identification of
individuals with a community, be it ethnic, national or religious - an iden-
tification that defines all aspects of their way of life, including the defini-
tion of their rights. I f a government accepted that certain women could
wear an Islamic veil or chador on national identity cards, that would be
tantamount to the state no longer having relations with citizens, but with
members of communities. This is an extreme situation, which would indi-
cate a general undermining and quasi-disappearance of the national state.
The communitarianism that disturbs us today is indeed the one which
places itself above citizenship - that is, recognizes cultural affiliation as
superior to national identity. I t is the relative undermining of national
states that has led to the inflation of this communitarianism, especially
when the latter has found itself confronted with a multinational empire in
which each population felt itself to be in a condition of inferiority, depend-
ency and sometimes slavery.
Between the two types of communitarianism that we have referred to -
one very limited, the other extreme - there exists a third mode of identi-
fication with a community: communitarian introversion, which responds
to the forms of rejection suffered by the members of some minority com-
munity at the hands of the majority or an important section of the
population. Those who are excluded or held in contempt seek, in effect,
to situate themselves elsewhere than the social ladder on which they are
so badly placed and to oppose a qualitative definition of themselves to
their opponents. That is how the transition is effected from an economic
and social definition of a category of poor people to a cultural, ethnic, or
even directly religious definition of the same population. Such a switch in
definitions of the social field is one of the essential elements in the tran-
sition from a socio-economic vision of society to a cultural definition that
 C u l t u r a l Rights 175

corresponds to what I have called post-social situations. The same thing

has occurred as regards the situation of women. Initially defined by an
inequality of opportunity and economic situation compared with men -
which led some to say that woman was man's proletarian - women have
made the transition to more qualitative demands, based on a demand for
freedom and the recognition of differences, combined with equality and
not hierarchy of sexual categories.
When a principal observes the pupils in the courtyard of his lycée group-
ing by nationality and religion, and no longer by social level, political
opinion, or sporting preference; or when a university witnesses a con-
frontation between two student societies, one of which is pro-Palestinian
while the other is Jewish and pro-Israeli, then we are dealing with a 'reac-
tive' communitarianism. A n d we must acknowledge that it is much more
implanted in present-day France than people thought. Such processes of
exclusion go far beyond inequality, and even marginality. They articulate
the rejection of a culture and a nationality. This explains why the defini-
tion of a community in terms of identity is so dangerous. Identity is, in
fact, an ideological construct that leads to the rejection of the category
concerned, by defining it more in terms of its 'nature' than by the domi-
nation that it suffers. The ultimate point in this transition from a socio-
economic definition of a population to a cultural one is supersession of
the community itself and the assertion of an individual religious identity,
of a faith that has its basis in the religious universe, not social life.
Those who assert that membership of a political culture is superior to
affiliation to a cultural community defend one of the basic principles of
modernity; and this is not the perspective from which those who are called
'republicans' in France are to be criticized. I t is because they are opposed
to 'democrats' - that is, to those who attach as much importance to social
and cultural rights as to political rights. With their refusal, they assume
that political modernity is created and maintained by itself, by its own
force and through its rejection of any compromise with foreigners.
We are definitely drawn towards this conclusion: communitarianism and
abstract universalism are opposed and yet complementary. Above all, we
do not need to choose between them; it is necessary to do everything to
recombine them. This can be done, as I hope to have shown, through
processes of modernization, which combine modernity and cultural lega-
cies and projects, personal or collective, in very different ways.
From this standpoint, any assertion of an insurmountable opposition
between two categories of situation - for example, between developed
countries and traditional cultures - would wreck our attempts to establish
communication, and even a certain integration, between poles that seem
to be completely opposed. Thus, it is highly dangerous to oppose the glob-
alized economy and cultures defined ahistorically, thereby imprisoning
176 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

them in an obsession with their identity. Accepting that the world is dom-
inated by an open conflict between American power and militant Islamism
amounts to engaging in a logic o f rupture that will result in all o f us, indi-
vidually and collectively, losing our capacity for acting.

Liberals and communitarians

The social sciences have been taken up for at least two decades, in partic-
ular in the United States, with the debate between liberals and communi-
tarians. The debate remains confused, because one calls liberals those who
claim that economic rationality prevails over any other cultural model in
all societies and all social groups, but also those who defend the idea that
universal rights exist, over and above social differences, which are embod-
ied in the citizenship whose institutions serve each individual in as much
as she is a bearer o f universal rights.
The first aspect o f liberalism is not readily defensible. I t is true that
many forms of behaviour, o f political project, and o f what are called social
movements are guided by the collective pursuit of the satisfaction o f indi-
vidual interests, as in the case of trade unionists who combine to obtain
a wage increase from which each o f them will benefit. But there is a big
difference between an assertion o f this kind, whose utility is limited, and
the mass of individual and collective forms o f behaviour that are guided
by ends other than interest. A n d it is always dangerous to reduce major
international or national conflicts to struggles between interests, just as it
is unacceptable to detect in the action of religious militants nothing but
economic or even political motives.
As for the reference to universal rights, it must take the form o f citi-
zenship. That is what makes human beings equal in abstraction from their
social attributes. But it is precisely here that the other viewpoint is intro-
duced, for social rights, and even more cultural rights, are not reducible
to political rights - and do not equally apply to everyone. Social laws
protect miners, seafarers, or bakery workers. A n d in a much more radical
way, cultural rights protect differences, whether the categories concerned
are in a majority or minority. To seek to reduce everything to political cit-
izenship or the republican spirit, as do a number o f politicians and intel-
lectuals, is strictly reactionary. Certainly, i f the defence of economic and
cultural rights is isolated from the assertion o f political rights, it risks
becoming anti-democratic. A t the same time, however, we must refuse any
definition of rights that takes account neither of social rights nor o f cul-
tural rights, and hence neither o f struggles against employers nor the
defence o f cultural minorities. Political rights on the one hand, and social
and cultural rights on the other, are complementary. To depart from this
 C u l t u r a l Rights 177

open conception o f rights is to fuel an artificial, dangerous opposition

between a liberalism that is a vector o f inequality and a communitarian-
ism that is obsessed with the pursuit of identity and homogeneity.
On the side o f the communitarians we find an analogous duality. The
girls o f Arab or Turkish origin who demand to wear the veil at school are
sometimes seeking, as I have mentioned, to express the resistance o f their
religious culture to the rationalist culture that they encounter in the lycées
and French society as a whole or elsewhere. But they just as often have a
deep desire to enter into the modern world by acquiring the knowledge
dispensed in the lycée, without breaking with their family and cultural her-
itage. To expel these girls would risk creating a clash o f civilizations, which
would be bound to have negative consequences at a time when the 'West'
no longer has a monopoly on power and modernity.

Secularism

The thinking that has been articulated in this chapter leads to conclusions
distant from what is called the French conception o f secularism. But can
I formulate such a conclusion after having asserted that secularism is one
of the main components o f modernity? I have defended the principle of
secularism with so much conviction that I cannot now call it into ques-
tion: separating Church and state, breaking up the holistic constitution o f
society, allotting a central, independent place to political power defined as
the invention of society by itself - these formulations correspond perfectly
to my idea of modernity and to my mind, as in the view of a very large
number o f citizens, constitute an indispensable condition for the realiza-
tion of democracy. A n d what is involved here is clearly an active concep-
tion o f secularism, for suppressing theocracy and the influence of
Churches over government has always been difficult; and the task is
never complete. In France, after a period of intense religious and political
conflict, calm gradually descended, to the satisfaction of the great
majority.
This approach to secularism obviously has nothing to do with the anti-
religious and anti-clerical secularism, which often rests on an elementary
rationalism that would like to extend the requirements of scientific think-
ing to domains other than its own. Some speak in this connection o f
secular religion; but this is merely a remnant from an already distant past.
What is much more important, and enjoys much more support - and
more active support at that - is the idea that schools should above all be
schools o f the Republic. Initially, we are inclined to support this concep-
tion, whose objective is more noble than the nationalism that dominates
schools in many countries. The French citizen and republican formed in
178 N o w that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

French primary and secondary schools does not learn to defend his
country and his flag in all circumstances. Teachers have taught him to
defend political freedom, social justice and a critical spirit in the public
arena. A n d those who condemn republicanism in the name of a religiously
inspired morality obviously have no right to reject or scorn the French
conception of secularism. The school intent on being both republican and
secular, and which is at the same time completely tolerant as regards reli-
gious opinions and options, merits more respect, it seems to me, than one
where religious education is obligatory - and still more than one where
this teaching is based on a state religion, even when the latter amounts to
a morality that is ultimately less dangerous than the totalitarian political
ideologies imposed in so many countries during the twentieth century.
However, once we have acknowledged the qualities o f the secular school,
and even those elements that are indispensable to the defence o f democ-
racy, we must reintroduce themes that have forced themselves on us
throughout this chapter. Schools must not ignore the religious phenome-
non in general and different religious beliefs and practices in particular.
Furthermore, their teaching is truncated and creates inequality when it
maintains that it does not have to concern itself with pupils' social situa-
tion or life history.
Knowledge of the religious phenomenon is indispensable. First of all,
because the history o f religions helps us to understand our history and the
present. But the question then arises: must schools teach that there is
something beyond the social and the political which, in successive cen-
turies and in the various continents, has assumed particular forms - at one
point God, at some other time the universe or nature, and elsewhere again
reason or revolution, or even M a n and natural law, which is religious in
origin but which the declarations o f human rights, from the eighteenth to
the twentieth century, issued from? Or should they make religious facts
known without interpreting them?
It is predominantly a question today of recognizing that most societies
rest on non-social principles, on values defined and respected as situated
above laws and political decisions. We often find a trace o f this in consti-
tutions or what are regarded as founding texts, as is the case in Great
Britain, the United States and France. We are witnessing a renaissance in
moral thinking, the assertion of basic human rights which, as the theolo-
gians of natural law argued, must be defended by all means, including the
refusal to obey political authorities guilty of not respecting these rights.
This formulation clearly indicates the principles of resistance to the sacral-
ization of the political. But it is even more important because of the con-
clusions that can be drawn from it in a global situation strongly marked
by the rise of movements which are at once religious and political, and
irreducible either to terrorism or to a purely spiritual phenomenon.
 C u l t u r a l Rights 179

This brings us back to the central theme of this chapter - namely, that
a large number of contemporary routes to modernization combine reli-
gious components with often old forms of social organization and cultural
life. This is how individuals and groups in which religious and non-
religious forms of behaviour mix, combine, or contradict one another are
often actively led to modernity. I t would therefore be arbitrary, and cer-
tainly false, to declare the modernity to which schools refer and some
particular cultural heritage that does not regard itself as anti-modern
incompatible. The pursuit of continuity is as common as the quest for
rupture.
What concerns those who are not content with the French 'republican
model' is that it pushes a number of individuals towards other cultures
which are indeed completely opposed to modernity. Openness, in contrast,
must help the majority national group (religious or ideological) to adopt
a more critical self-awareness, whereas the 'republican' spirit, especially
when it is on the defensive, tends to defend a culture and civilization en
bloc, while forgetting their heterogeneity and the presence in them of cul-
tural elements that are foreign to modernity, even in contradiction with it.
It is certainly not easy to mark out the boundary between what is
opposed to modernity in minority cultures and societies and what must be
criticized (or, on the contrary, accepted) in the majority culture. But it is
this complexity that can confer on schools their educational value and,
above all, enhance their capacity to advance the maximum number of
pupils in the direction of this core of modernity - without compelling
them to follow the path taken by the majority culture, which (as I have
repeatedly said) cannot be identified with modernity.
Moreover, establishing a clear boundary between public life and private
life amounts to inflicting damage on religious - but also political - think-
ing and action, since all religions have public activities and visibility. Sec-
ularism therefore does not consist in constantly reinforcing the separation
between the private world and the public world, for this division would
increasingly lead, as is already often the case, to schools being on the
margins of the innovations and debates that are emerging, especially
among the young.
I n other words, i f the idea of secularism must evolve, and i f schools
must accord ever greater importance to intercultural communication, at
the same time as they reinforce the principles of modernity, it is not in
order to allow themselves to be hacked into by religious associations that
are often linked to political, ethnic or religious parties. On the contrary, it
is so as to facilitate the access of all, and hence of all minorities, to moder-
nity itself, by facilitating its combination with individual and collective
experiences whose contours meld historically situated cultures and uni-
versal principles.
180 N o w that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

Citizenship must be firmly defended against communitarianism. But it

remains a choice between a narrow citizenship that rejects cultural plu-
ralism and another, more open citizenship which seeks to render the unity
of modernity compatible with the diversity o f cultural histories. A n d need-
less to say, I invite readers to opt for the open conception.

Intercultural communication

The more populations mix with each other in a world that is becoming
nomadic, the more numerous are the encounters that might result in the
absorption of one group by another, or in war between them, but also in
intercultural communication. A n d this is facilitated not so much by every-
one participating in a largely globalized civilization, as by common accept-
ance o f modernity and its basic principles.
What must never be forgotten is that an encounter between societies and
cultures always contains an asymmetry of power: one o f them is majori-
tarian, the other is minoritarian; on the one hand, the colonizer, on the
other, the colonized. This power relationship is always recognized by the
dominated party; it must also be acknowledged by the dominant one,
which in this way will distance itself somewhat from the established order
(which is favourable to it). The encounter even presupposes that the dom-
inant recognizes the superiority of the dominated in some domains, which
are often at the heart o f its cultural identity: a knowledge o f particular
sacred texts or of some literary or musical tradition.
But these remarks must not mask the underlying intention of discourses
on intercultural communication and even on multiculturalism: refusal o f
a monopoly on culture by the most modernist Western countries. This
refusal remains domineering as long as other cultures are described in
terms of exoticism, specificity, or as being inspired by passions regarded
as inferior by superior cultures. But it becomes a positive, even redemp-
tive force when it replaces the spirit of war, which pits the strongest against
the weakest.
It is in the countries that have most strongly identified themselves with
the universal, with reason, with good governance that this aspiration to
intercultural communication is expressed with the most difficulty. Ernst
Curtius brilliantly demonstrated that i f in the nineteenth century France
defended the idea of civilization against Germany (which separated the
Volk from culture, regarded as access to higher values and knowledge), it
is because it regarded itself as a totality completely permeated by the uni-
versal, whereas the Germans, whose national integration was recent and
weak, still felt the great distance that separated the higher values of culture
from their collective experience. This French sense of being the bearers o f
 Cultural Rights 181

the universal, which was even more intense than that which inspired the
English, even though they were more powerful, is explained both by the
Catholic tradition and by the revolutionary break.
However that may be, the radicalism o f French thinking and action
found it hard to accommodate a pragmatic or purely utilitarian vision.
Hence the self-consciousness that renders perception o f others so difficult.
A t the end o f the twentieth century, no European country can any longer-
claim to embody the universal. Moreover, it is in the United States that
this sense is developing today, based on that country's incontestable dom-
inance in the sciences as in military power or technological innovation.
As a result, the richness o f the anthropological work conducted i n the
United States does not prevent that country from appearing to the rest o f
the world to be incapable of understanding others and convinced of the
inherent superiority of all aspects o f its civilization.
I n short, what in the nineteenth century was the illusion o f the French
and the English is today that of the Americans. It is true that the largest
empires or states, and also those that are geared to seeking internal balance
rather than an encounter with other civilizations, are the worst prepared
to develop intercultural communication, whose necessity they sometimes
deny. Conversely, small countries, situated at the crossroads o f economic
and cultural flows, often experience the need to understand those around
them and are thus more predisposed to recognizing the other.

Return to new ideas

Communication is not established between cultures, but between histori-

cal entities that must be defined on the one hand by their relationship to
modernity, and on the other by the specificity o f their road to modern-
ization. To recall that we - concrete human beings, placed in clearly defined
social situations and historical conjunctures - do not only encounter
around us religious cultures and messages, but also life experiences and
projects o f change, individual or collective, is not to deny the interest of a
philosophical and theological comparison between Christianity and Islam.
A n understanding o f the other is only possible i f we replace a compre-
hensive definition o f each culture by articulating its situation vis-à-vis
modernity with the nature o f the modernization it is engaged in.
It is within the first standpoint - the relationship to modernity - that
we find references to the need for a knowledge and use of complex tech-
nologies. But it is within the viewpoints involving modes o f development
that we must place analysis o f relations o f domination. More broadly still,
the theme o f changes in modes of development, and hence o f modern-
ization, can comprise knowledge o f forms of decomposition of the
182 Now that We Refer to Ourselves in Cultural Terms

classical European model of modernization, o f the effects of this decom-

position, and of the possibilities o f reconstructing other forms of mod-
ernization through the transition to the information society and, more
widely, to what I have called post-social society.
Intercultural communication is therefore not only an attempt at mutual
understanding: it involves an act o f knowledge that seeks to situate self
and other in historical complexes and in the definition o f processes o f
change and relations to power. Ultimately, what is being proposed here
therefore consists in defining the relations between actors by the relative
position they occupy in the complex set of dimensions that I encapsulate
in the intersection of modernity and modernizations. Intercultural com-
munication is dialogue between individuals and collectivities that dispose
of the same principles and different historical experiences, in order to
situate themselves with respect to one another.
One dimension is still lacking in this analysis. We can only understand
and respect ourselves i f the overarching themes o f modernity and mod-
ernization are set in motion and transformed, but in the awareness of a
shared history. We often feel ourselves dominated by obscure forces.
Today, we are more aware that it is we who threaten our own survival, that
of our descendants, that of many plant and animal species, and of the cli-
matic conditions that allow us to exist. Obviously, it is not a question of
replacing the security that sheltering gods conferred on us by anxieties
about self-destruction, but of deriving from globalization and the growing
interdependence of all aspects o f life on Earth an awareness of our respon-
sibility. I t is therefore equally our capacity for creating, for transforming,
and for destroying our life and our environment that obliges us to turn our
gaze, so long fixed on nature and the instruments that enabled us to
conquer it, on ourselves. This self-awareness can only be a consciousness
of our shared existence, of our interdependence, and hence o f the need to
recognize in the other not only someone who is in a relationship with the
same modernity as me, but someone whose history is not completely
separated from my own history.
We are not all citizens of the same world, for the latter is not an insti-
tutional and political unit defining the rights and duties o f each person.
On the other hand, we all have the same cultural rights, which basically
derive from our relationship to ourselves and to others. We have lived
through a historical situation where it was society, with its institutions, its
norms, its modes of domination and supervision, that gave rise to actors
- who were then defined as social. I n the course of recent decades, we have
felt with increasing intensity that we were plunging into the opposite sit-
uation. Here it is the creation o f ourselves that determines our capacity to
resist the forces of death and overcome them, whereas the social space is
reduced to a site of encounters, conflicts, or truces between forces that are
 C u l t u r a l Rights 183

opposed, but which are equally alien to social life: on the one hand, those
that derive from the market, war and the destruction of all aspects o f life;
on the other, those that appeal not to the social order or surging desire,
but to the assertion o f the self and o f ourselves as subjects o f our exis-
tence and agents of our freedom.
As a result, the principal object of analysis is no longer society, but
actors who are already more than social, since they are defined not only
by their social affiliations and relations, but also by cultural rights, so that
they are indeed complete individuals and not abstractions, as the citizen
or even the worker remained. Awareness of this switch also enables us to
understand the exhaustion o f the political forms of thinking and action
we have inherited from the past.
 8
A Society of Women

An altered situation

Modern society in the West was created by a subject that had now entered
into each individual and thus left the divine world behind. However, like
all the major resources in this type of society, the subject was concentrated
in the ruling elite, primarily embodied in men. The 'society o f men' both
generated much energy and created tensions that reached breaking-point.
The dominant pole was conquest, production and war - that of men -
whereas the female was the principal figure of inferiority and dependence.
Absent from the ruling pole, woman was as much part o f the subject as
man, but endured domination. There is certainly only one subject, but it
is not equally present in each of the two poles, female and male. The cre-
ative subject is also present in the procreating woman, just as the subject
embodied in the amorous body of woman is also present in the brutal
power of man. The subject, defined as the transformation o f the socially
determined individual into self-creator, is as present in man and woman,
but in a different way. There are also forces o f negation of the subject on
both sides: the break with 'life' on the side of man; submission to the bio-
logical rules o f this life in the case of woman. Modern society, in which
man dominates woman, does not, however, reduce the latter to her subju-
gation. She is also the mother, the body, love. When the Western model o f
modernization decomposes, when its springs slacken, this is what enables
woman potentially to occupy a dominant position in a new type of society,
where man, while losing his power, will not be reduced to a dependence
analogous to woman's in male society.
The neutral formulas I have just employed seem insufficient to many
women today. They would like to condemn the idea (still expressed) that
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 185

women have no soul, are not subjects, more violently. Indeed, this idea has
not completely disappeared, even when it is dressed up in a more elegant
discourse, which extols the beauty o f women while implying that beauty
pertains to women just as mind and consciousness pertain to men - as is
proved by the fact that the majority o f intellectual and artistic oeuvres
have been produced by men . . . A n even more developed discourse like-
wise concludes that women must be referred to in 'objective' terms, i n
terms of the domination they suffer. Does not saying that women are
merely victims of male, heterosexual domination amount to claiming that
they have no consciousness and are incapable of rising above general emo-
tional reactions? The advantage of simple formulas is that they betray the
anti-feminism that inspires them. For there are ways o f fighting male dom-
ination which are replete with anti-feminism.
The sensible thing is to recognize the profound differences that distin-
guish contemporary culture from the culture of an already distant past.
The subject then, and until recently, was still not sufficiently oriented
towards itself and conscious self-assertion. On the one hand, it only
attained itself through its projection into a suprahuman world: that of the
sacred and the divine. On the other, it defended itself more easily through
mutiny and rebellion than by a complex process of self-awareness. Such a
difference is important, but it is insufficient to establish a marked differ-
ence between men and women. It remains the case that the ideology in
which this past culture was situated is that o f an extremely hierarchical
opposition between men and women.
What we are living through is the transformation o f the classical model
of modernity, which is so strongly polarized. The dominated categories -
the people, the workers, the colonized, women - have transformed them-
selves into social movements that have severed the tie of dependency that
made them the slaves of a master. A t the end of the period of the major
conflicts inspired by these social movements, modernization as the West
experienced it - that is, in complete rupture with the old worlds - has lost
its energy and dissolved into the universe of consumption and pleasure,
which is no longer capable of generating genuinely creative ideas or pro-
voking new conflicts. Because they always retained the idea that the new
is not constructed exclusively with the new but also out of the old, other
roads to modernization can avoid this exhaustion, which predominantly
affects the West, in that it pushed the accumulation, polarization and con-
frontation of opposite extremes to the limit.
The only cultural model that might impart new life to a West now spread
over much o f the globe is one which counterposes to the polarization of
one type o f modernization, today in decline, the converse dynamic: the
reconstitution and recombination o f elements which had been separated
so that one dominated the other. This is a model which also advances the
186 N o w t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

idea that the new is created and managed by those - women - who had
represented the main figure o f dependence, but who are now endeavour-
ing to supersede the men/women opposition rather than to replace male
domination by female domination.
This alteration would be impossible i f the situation of woman in the clas-
sical model o f modernity, dominated by man, could be defined in the wholly
negative terms of the dependence or violence they suffered. But that is pre-
cisely how it is most often defined, above all by extreme critiques which deem
male domination so complete that there is no room for resistance, still less
for a counter-offensive. Before clarifying how women can become the main
agents o f the creation of a new culture, we must therefore critically examine
the purely negative definition of the female condition.
The commonest image is that the dependence imposed by the old cul-
tural model, when undermined by the general transformation o f a society
that is more 'active' and less given to describing itself in absolute terms, is
transformed into an even worse dependency than the old one, even though
it apparently contains elements of liberation. With the whole of society
being transformed into a set of markets and tradable goods, and social
actors predominantly pursuing their own economic advantage or pleasure,
women find liberation from the constraints of the old model in the market.
However, they also experience more intense pressure, which ends up
transforming them into sexual objects capable of being bought, sold or
exchanged. This new dependency renders difficult (even impossible) the
transformation o f women into the main actors in the construction of a
new cultural model. Yet the market economy is often accompanied by the
construction of a space that is at once private and open, and at the same
time women achieve genuine economic and general autonomy through
wage-labour.
Women's social inferiority declines (or disappears) more quickly in some
countries, like Great Britain or the Scandinavian countries, and more
slowly in the Latin countries and even France, where women were only
granted the right to vote almost a century after men. The feminist move-
ment then increases in strength and imposes significant reforms, making
possible a balanced view o f the situation o f women, who still suffer
inequality but who have conquered rights and the means freely to run
many aspects of their lives, in particular what they do with their bodies.
The conjunction o f feminism and the advantages derived from the market
economy set in train a transformation in the female condition that is
moderately positive, but sufficiently so for women, conscious o f these
improvements, not to seek to take on a role of fundamental cultural trans-
formation. As I have indicated my intention to explain why they play this
role, I must now justify this hypothesis and, above all, identify the obsta-
cles they encounter - obstacles that can lead them into forms of behav-
iour involving rupture.
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 187

The general hypothesis of this book is a transition from a society that

perceived itself and acted in socio-economic terms, to a societal type that
I have called post-social because the categories organizing our represen-
tation and action are no longer strictly social but cultural. The reason for
this is that our experience is no longer turned upside down by mass society
in the realm o f production alone, but also in that of consumption and
communication. Nothing in us escapes the accumulated complex o f tech-
niques and knowledge; and we respond to them by concerning ourselves
with all aspects of our lives, in order to defend our singular unity, body
and mind. Our relations with authority, like the forms of our imagination,
our sexual experience, like our musical tastes - these change. The general
idea o f the transition from a culture turned outwards to another, turned
inwards and towards self-consciousness, leads directly to the idea of a
culture defined and experienced more intensely by women than by men.
The rhythms and constraints of biological life, and especially o f the repro-
ductive organs, which had been regarded as obstacles to women's role in
public life, now turn to their advantage, first o f all thanks to medical tech-
niques, but above all because the ties between self and self appear stronger
in woman than man, without this difference authorizing us to erect an
insuperable barrier between the two sexes.
Sexual life does not occupy a more important place i n women than men,
but concern with the links between sexuality and personality is greater in
women than men, because men, born in the old, declining cultural model,
remain more strongly situated by their public roles - in particular, their
professional roles. Above all, the relationship to children, even in families
where the father actively cares for them, always remains more intense for
the woman than the man. Even i f some women prefer to avoid pregnancy,
others - more numerous - consider inestimable this unique experience of
the gestation of a new living being, which also gives them an awareness o f
their role in reproducing the species.
The relationship to the body occupies as central a place in today's
society as work did in industrial society or the political status o f freedom
or slavery in political societies. Sexuality is present in every aspect of the
personality and plays a major part in our construction of ourselves.
But in order to understand the feminist movement itself, is it not better
to locate women's action in the broader set o f struggles for equality, for
respect for political and social rights? Many women explain that i f they
struggle, it is in order that all sorts of discrimination and injustice should
be abolished. They want to establish complete equality between men and
women, and thus eliminate all reference to gender in the domain o f
employment and wages. But others above all wish to have their differences
from men recognized at the same time as their equality with them. This
constant debate creates passionate struggles. The women who predomi-
nantly stress equality do so, they say, because any reference to difference
188 N o w t h a t W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

reintroduces inequality and, more seriously still, ends up denning woman

by reference to man. But this reproach is ill-founded, for the rejection of
any gender difference refers not to a male model but to a universal Man,
defined by rights as opposed to particular attributes. I t is precisely this for-
mulation that demands the most radical critique. Who is this Man? The
French text o f 1789 tells us that it is he who enjoys the rights of the citizen,
and hence political rights. But half a century after it was drafted, new
demands based on social rights arose, formulated primarily by wage-
earners, beginning with the right to work, which was the major objective o f
those whose supported the working-class movement. Next came struggles
for cultural rights - the right to speak one's own language, to participate in
the defence of a collective memory. How can such cultural demands not be
extended to the right to assert one's 'gender', one's sexual identity? A man
'without qualities', socially and culturally non-situated, is conceived at such
a remove from any real situation that the assertion o f his rights amounts to
a meaningless declaration which cannot answer to any specific objective.
But this argument, which reduces women's struggles to general themes,
offends the class of women as much as it does many men. In the vast
domain of work and employment, the slogan o f equality extending to the
elimination of any reference to gender has great cogency, and did indeed
contribute to reducing the number of jobs classified as male or female. In
the domain of sexuality and reproduction, however, neutral solutions do
not exist, for it is precisely here that male domination (which has been
defined as control o f reproduction, woman being treated above all as
reproductive and thus dominated by male power) was rooted. Hence fem-
inism's strongest demand - for a woman's right to decide freely whether
or not to have a child: A child if I want one, when I want one.' I t is an
extreme formula, but one whose effectiveness derives precisely from the
fact that women thereby reverse the traditional relationship with the man,
who 'made' a baby for her or to whom she 'gave' a child. We are thus led
to the hypothesis that sums up this analysis: women's self-assertion and
will to creation are located in the order of sexuality. In other words, it is
by demanding a sexuality independent of the functions o f reproduction
and maternity that women truly constitute themselves as a social move-
ment and advance furthest - further than by struggling for equality and
against discrimination.

Equality and difference

But this no longer involves a right to difference. Male domination is

attacked both by the freedom to decide whether or not to have a child and
by the demand for sexuality as a central element in the construction of the
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 189

female personality. This construction is based less on mistrust of men, so

frequent in the United States, than on the will to self-construction.
It is impossible here to avoid the debate on the equality of women and
their differences launched by feminists, which has become as classic as the
debate between liberals and communitarians.
Celebrated anthropologists like Louis Dumont and Clifford Geertz have
maintained that combining equality and difference is as impossible to
achieve as squaring the circle. This judgement might appear to be good
sense, but it is unacceptable. Different objects are readily arranged in a
hierarchy, either according to their price or durability, or by virtue o f the
number o f those who buy one or other o f them. But it is not difference
that is at stake here, but economic or psycho-sociological attributes. It is
difficult to establish a hierarchy between green and blue, tea and coffee,
Churchill and Clemenceau.
In contrast, it is logical to look behind a palpable, readily identifiable dif-
ference not only for other differences, but above all different configurations.
We shall accept without hesitation the fact of the traditional domination
of women by men. Yet it is not explained by their respective characteristics,
but by a cultural pattern that accords a central role to men as conquerors
and hunters. It is not production that prevails over reproduction; it is not
even control of the exchange of women by men. I n my opinion what is at
issue here is a view o f society dominated, in various forms, by an elite con-
trolling resources and responsible for transforming it and its environment
- an elite to which other categories, like women, are subordinate.
It is therefore not a question of restricting ourselves to a difference that
is in itself hierarchically neutral, but on the contrary of bringing out social
and cultural complexes that construct hierarchical relations of inequality.
And I am precisely seeking in this chapter to bring out the change of
cultural model that has seen women accede to the central role - which does
not mean that women have become professionally or intellectually superior
to men, but that they occupy a more central position in the new culture. In
short, the requisite analysis must not be conducted in psychological terms.
To put the point differently: rather than taking the measure of the dif-
ferences between the actors and their relative level, it is important to iden-
tify the complex in which they intervene and the importance o f the
position they occupy in it. This will clarify why women today believe them-
selves to be superior to men and indeed are.

Sexuality and gender

What are we to understand by sexuality? Certainly not merely libido,

desire. Here the word sex is insufficient. Sexuality is the construction o f
190 N o w that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

the personality through sexed affective relations and various forms o f

erotic pleasure. I n order to clarify this distinction, we must clearly distin-
guish between sex and gender - a distinction that has played such a key
role in the development of feminist thinking, especially in the United
States. Gender, say commentators, is a social construction of sexual life.
That definition is well-nigh devoid of interest, since virtually everything in
a culture is constructed, whether food, kinship systems, or the definition
of the sacred. The idea of gender became productive after it had been
enriched by a variety o f post-Marxism that introduced the idea of the
imposition of a domination, the creation of a being dominated by male
power. That is why the most important feminists, Judith Butler at their
head, have denounced the idea of gender and sought to rehabilitate queer
forms o f sexual life. In so doing, they have profoundly transformed femi-
nist thinking. The notion of gender is set to be destroyed, to be decon-
structed, they say, because the categories used to describe women are so
many instruments for imposing on them the monopoly o f the hetero-
sexual relationship, whose pre-eminence stems from the central position
occupied by men in the social function of reproduction and filiation.
This feminist thinking, primarily articulated by American radical les-
bians who are among the most influential intellectuals in their country, but
also outside it, has had many positive effects. Its principal aspect is that it
goes beyond denunciations of the social condition of woman. Obviously,
this does not mean being uninterested in the forms o f injustice, violence
and inequality suffered by women. But it is necessary to go further and
criticize the categories in which these practices are grounded. Many
women are not merely victims, content to denounce what they endure; they
also challenge the social structures that sustain their dependency.
For my part, I want to push the argument in a different direction. I t is
women who are causing our society to make the transition from a master-
ful vision of the world to a vision of the self as creator o f new, free ori-
entations. This corresponds to the great transformation that has led the
classical European cultural model to evolve in the direction I describe in
this book.
The sex/gender couplet, constructed and then deconstructed by radical
feminists, must be excluded from our reflection and replaced by the
sex/sexuality couplet, where by sexuality we mean not a force that shoots
through us (like the Greeks' Eros with his arrow), but the construction o f
a relationship to oneself, as a being of desire, a being o f relations and self-
consciousness, as the actor in the integration of oneself and the world.
Sexuality occupies a central place in the formation o f subject, for it
refers to an individual experience, to the engagement of the personality
around this experience, which is at once a personal lived experience, a rela-
tionship to the other and, more profoundly, a self-consciousness oriented
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 191

towards the relationship to life and death. What is being said here has a
consequence that must be mentioned straight away. Sexuality is the con-
struction of forms of sexual behaviour. I t is therefore necessary to recog-
nize the existence of forms of sexual behaviour that do not contribute to
the construction of a complex sexuality, but which nevertheless attest to
the autonomy of sex, which alone renders the construction of sexuality
possible. This sexual behaviour detached from sexuality as a cultural con-
struct is what we call eroticism. Its ambiguity and importance derive from
the fact that it remains sex in the first instance, but also colours a rela-
tionship to the self and to others. I f entirely detached from everything that
is sexuality, it degenerates into pornography. But we must clearly under-
stand that our sexual culture cannot be constructed simply out of social
or cultural models. A n d eroticism is a condition of sexuality because it
precisely refers to what must be constructed.
Having reached this point, we encounter the fiercely debated question
of the presence of so-called erotic or pornographic programmes on tele-
vision. We should be troubled by this, because the main objective of tele-
vision is to produce televisual objects - in other words, to transform real,
diverse beings into objects constructed by and for television. This is all the
easier in that the characters considered are devoid of relational, emotional
or intellectual reality. Thus television, so adept at decontextualization,
readily accommodates itself to pornography, but finds it more difficult to
bring out the erotic dimension of sexuality; and is completely useless when
it comes to analysing the most constructed sexualities, such as are to be
found, for example, in works of art, whether literary or pictorial.
How can we avoid saying something about prostitution here, since it is
the subject of interminable debate and repeated condemnation? I t is cer-
tainly necessary to protest against the exploitation by pimps of women
forced to leave their country for economic reasons and to offer up their
bodies to men, who are themselves invariably imprisoned in a frustrated
need for sexual satisfaction. Many prostituted women, together with the
men who resort to using them, share the same misery and help to enrich
the pimps. The very mention of prostitution provokes indignation. But
against whom should it be directed? Against prostitution itself or against
misery? Do women in search of significant profit (or who only aim to be
part-time ladies of the night), those who give men a sexual massage, belong
to the same category as the prostitutes who live in slavery and are com-
pelled to give themselves to anyone?
We should beware lest passionate condemnation of prostitution result
only in controlling and punishing the prostitution of the poor without
touching that of the rich. Certainly, what is no longer possible is to regard
the brothel as a pure place of liberation, in accordance with the image
made popular by literature and painting, from Maupassant to Toulouse-
192 N o w that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s In C u l t u r a l T e r m s

Lautrec. But why choose between the defence o f 'sex workers', the con-
demnation o f pimps and the social regularization o f an activity that would
be sufficiently controlled to yield taxes to the state? I t would be hypocrit-
ical not to recognize that prostitution always involves a failure and pre-
vents the women who engage in it from living a free, responsible life. But
we should mistrust condemnations that are intended not to liberate
women, but to increase society's control over men, o f whom it is quite ille-
gitimate to say that they always want to dominate, even destroy, these
women. The very spirited campaigns waged by some feminists against
pornography and prostitution can also conceal a will to extend control
over habits, already strong in the case of women, to men.
Almost by definition, prostitution is an activity with a low level o f emo-
tional exchange, since it primarily involves a woman or man trading their
body - which is the precise opposite o f the construction of the self as a
subject. But this is not a reason for projecting an image o f prostitution
that corresponds only to the most degrading situations, even though it is
true that the latter are very common. As I have said, not only do the mis-
erable men who resort to the poor, most exploited prostitutes live as
destructively as those prostitutes. But 'chic prostitution', which is proba-
bly more easy to bear since it is more agreeable to be rich than poor,
can allow a little room for affective speech and demands. Finally, the
prostitutes, male and female, for whom this option has been the only
way they could meet their desire to change sex, must be considered
separately.
Brazil is probably the country that has explored the melding of sexual
identities furthest and the United States was right to help transsexuals,
who most often live in a state of rejection. I t would be good if, in a country
like France, opinion was not so defensive that it ultimately locks those,
male and female, whom it pretends to want to 'save', into prostitution. The
rejection of transsexuals in France leaves them with virtually no escape
other than prostitution; and it is urgent for the defence front L G B T (Les-
bians, Gays, Bi, Trans) to be strengthened. Too often, the theme o f sexual
liberation, however positive, is used as a pretext for developing and impos-
ing new norms that are not only hygienic in kind, but which compound
the rejection that affects people in a situation o f failure, emotional
deprivation, dependency, or even petty criminality. 'Society' is here more
demanding and less charitable than the Churches, which issue condemna-
tions but do not demand positive repression. A n d in countries where there
is great poverty and crushing unemployment, how can we fail to under-
stand the women who have formed trade unions for 'sex workers', hostile
to repressive measures, and who, in a situation that is impossible to trans-
form completely, at least try to offer prostitutes a minimum o f protection
both from the public authorities and the clients themselves?
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 193

On account o f the prolonged situation o f dependence and inferiority

they were plunged into, women above all seek the integration o f their affec-
tive world. Feelings o f love, erotic pleasure, living as a couple, maternal
role, assimilation o f the family - these are so many affective roles which,
it is implicitly understood, must be integrated with one another. This
objective is so difficult to achieve that no one is surprised when it cannot
be. Such a representation contrasts with that o f men, based on separation
of roles (father, husband or equivalent, lover, and so on) - so many micro-
cosms whose separation is more often accepted in their case than in
women's. This difference in representations is by no means traditional. On
the contrary, woman was formerly subject to the distinct role conferred on
her by social organization; and it was man who was expected to integrate
different ways o f behaving under one name, that o f 'father'. The change
in images and expectations is so obvious that nearly all reflections on the
sexuality o f women focus on their ability to combine various roles,
however different from one another. This underscores the central vocation
of women in the new society: to render forms o f behaviour and attitudes
that are separated and even opposed to one another in modernity com-
patible. Much less is expected from men, and the efforts they make to inte-
grate public life and private life, calculations and emotions, and so on are
viewed with a certain scepticism. I t is certainly not a question here o f
opposing male and female psychologies (nothing is further from my inten-
tion), but o f defining two cultures - the one constructed around the polar-
ization of resources and the other centred on an attempt to reconstitute
the set o f cultural changes. The first cultural model fashions a contrast
between a man adjudged superior and a woman deemed inferior, whereas
the second assumes that the action o f women will succeed in reconstruct-
ing a plural culture for everyone's benefit.
There is an obvious convergence between this evocation o f the creative
new role o f women and the desire of radical feminists to have done with
every 'ideal' image o f woman, a desire that registers what feminism has
long asserted - namely, that everything which defines woman is a form o f
domination. I n fact, it is only possible to envisage this new figure o f
woman i f we abandon any real representation o f the 'ideal woman'. Thus,
on the contrary, we observe women detaching themselves from the defini-
tions given of them which seek to construct a woman-subject to which
they never correspond, any more than real men have corresponded to a
society's male ideal.
The most difficult thing fully to come to terms with is the priority that
women give to the construction of themselves. Their relationship to a man
or woman, like their relationship to their profession or even their children,
cannot be combined in the name of a higher principle situated above social
activities. The only possible principle of action is pursuit of the maximum
194 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

capacity for production of oneself, which signifies giving preference to

those relations that are most demanding and leaving correspondingly less
room for others. The important thing here is not to reason about moral
categories, but about the meaning that each piece o f behaviour has for
each actor.
The opposition between what are commonly regarded as two types o f
feminism can be presented in many ways. But the significance o f the con-
trast must be clearly stated. For the first type it is a question, over and
above even the struggle for equality, of asserting a difference: there are two
sexes, as Antoinette Fouque vigorously puts it. Woman must be defined
by reference to herself, not by reference to her social roles and her rela-
tions with man. What is written in this book, particularly in this chapter,
clearly pertains to this point of view, as is indicated by the expressions
I deliberately use: male culture, female culture, liberation o f women, and
so on.
The second tendency i n feminism is more radical. As I have already indi-
cated, it challenges the category of 'woman' itself. W i t h queer-theory fem-
inists, it believes that women must be liberated from the heterosexual
model that dominates them and sets them in a subordinate position. I t is
necessary to have done with the opposition between man and woman and,
to that end, to fracture the category 'women', which has been constructed
on the basis o f male domination in a normatively imposed heterosexual
relationship. This radical position provokes hostile reactions, such is the
difficulty in denying the man/woman opposition. I t is immediately per-
ceived not only in heterosexual relationships, but also in transsexual expe-
rience and is not challenged in the homosexual relationship. For it is not
true to say that in a lesbian couple one o f the partners plays the role o f
the man. The 'butch' type is not defined as a male type. The most 'de-
socialized' expression o f male and female identities is bisexuality, but it
often involves a relationship with a clearly identified man and woman,
rather than superseding the nature of the partner.
I n truth, nothing authorizes us to affirm that woman is a category
defined by a series of attributes; and the same is true o f man. There is a
great diversity of male and female types, and identification of man with
authority is not only a cultural construct, but far from always correspon-
ding to reality. I f this construct has indeed had great influence, it does not
absolutely impose itself on all members o f a society, except when the latter
is a highly integrated, isolated community.
The conclusion this analysis leads to is that an individual does not have
the same cognitive, affective or sexual forms of behaviour forever; and that
most hetero- or homosexual relations can put only a limited part of the
psychic life o f each partner in a state of communication and complemen-
tarity. However that may be, the queer theme of the fragmentation of the
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 195

personality - in particular, in the sexual domain - is far removed from that

of the subject, which would like to supersede this fragmentation through
the power o f the amorous relation wherein sexual desire, the inter-
subjective relationship, and proximity are combined and together acquire
sufficient force to bring together the other components o f the two
personalities.
What is common to the two themes is the refusal of an integrated vision
of the personality, which would correspond to the integrated vision o f
society I have already contested. Let us go further: we can accept not only
that men and women create these constructs differently, but that each indi-
vidual constructs the failures and successes of their gender. This means that
the central element is the individual, not the gender, and that the latter is
not a general category to which the others are subject, but a factor in the
action which an individual herself performs. Let us note in fact that the
'gender' factor has only two values - women and men - and that there are
other factors, other variables which enter into the more or less successful
(and more or less complex) construction of the subject. I n short, being an
inflexible variable, since it has only two possible states, gender is not the
main definition of the actor. A n d the story that is being told here is not that
of men and women, but that of the subject that constructs itself starting
from a fragmented sexuality o f relations to others and, occasionally, by the
man/woman duality. We must renounce our fondness for any comparative
psychology o f men and women, which should not be difficult given that
with Freudian thought we possess a much more developed analytical instru-
ment focusing on the formation o f the personality during childhood.
Once the road has been cleared, we must choose between the feminist
deconstructionist approach and my own attempt to define not a female psy-
chology (as I have made clear), but the cultural changes thanks to which
women occupy a central role. Such a choice does not make attempts to
decompose the female pointless (it remains indispensable in order to sepa-
rate sexuality from family roles). But it assumes that we go beyond the cri-
tique of the notion o f the female as constructed by male domination.
In this domain as in many others, such a choice signifies that it is indis-
pensable to supersede descriptions of what is suffered and accept the idea
that the main actors are not only victims. That is why, while citing the crit-
ical works of Judith Butler and many other radical feminists with admi-
ration, I predominantly stress the alteration in the culture following the
exhaustion of the voluntaristic classical model and the central role o f
women in this cultural mutation.
The female assumption of responsibility for sexuality is different in kind
from the destruction or the creation o f new prohibitions. It first o f all
involves women rejecting the confusion of their roles in reproduction and
family life with sexuality as such. This is a theme that has been at the heart
196 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

of feminist demands. But we must go further: women demand their right

to pleasure and the recognition of their specific sexuality by asserting that
it is not reducible to a response to the demands of male sexuality. Such an
assertion already has consequences that turn the relations between men
and women upside down. But one can also defend the idea that women
speak in the name of a liberation of sexuality and not only of their
sexuality.
Criticism has thus been directed at the extreme positions of Monique
Wittig, who did not accept being defined as a 'woman' and who wished to
be defined only as a lesbian. For she touched a very raw nerve when, in
terms similar to those of Judith Butler, she said that the category 'women'
has been constructed within male domination and in order to reinforce it,
so that woman can only liberate herself from this domination by ceasing
to define herself as woman. I f we agree to set aside the immediate objec-
tions prompted by such statements, we must acknowledge the importance
of the idea that women seek to have problems of sexuality - in particular,
those most bound up with the creation of the subject - recognized inde-
pendently of the gender of the individuals concerned. Women would then
act in order to transform one of the most important aspects of our society
- sexuality - so as to liberate it from the inferior role it has in the hetero-
sexual relationship, which is regarded as the only 'normal' sexuality. But
there is reason to have doubts about the oft-proclaimed liberation. Many
television clips, generally American in origin, suffused with sexuality
clearly indicate that man still reigns over women subject to his will. Many
women think, in more modern fashion, that it is the direct encounter of
men and women that introduces such a strong erotic dimension. I n any
event, woman appears subject to her sex.
Such a conclusion naturally leads us to say a word on the debate that
opposes defenders and opponents of seduction. To those, male and female
alike, who defend this weapon, regarded as female, for conquering men,
there are many who reply that this conquest is in fact a subjugation, since
the woman is only defined by reference to the desire of the man and
thereby abandons her own personality. This critique is readily admissible
and, moreover, widely shared by women today. But condemnation of
seduction leaves us in a vacuum that can only be accepted with difficulty.
Stripped of seduction, what do affective relations become? The simplest
response that springs to mind is that women and men should seduce each
other mutually. However, this solution of reciprocity is very vague and
what has been said hitherto makes it difficult to accept such a formula-
tion. But if it falls to women to reconstitute the different dimensions of
experience, it is indeed to them too that it falls to handle, to generate, the
relationship of seduction - which would thus be at once reciprocal and yet
predominantly female. A n d this is what is probably being established. The
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 197

image of the seductive man making women succumb to his desire provokes
ever more numerous negative reactions, even i f some women might aspire
to be conquered, without thereby alienating their freedom. I t is now more
commonly accepted that seduction, while remaining exercised by the
two partners, is in the main handled by the woman: the intersection o f
seductions works better when this is the case. This signifies that the con-
struction of the woman by herself through her sexuality governs the sym-
metrical construction o f the man. We have definitely moved into a period
of female supremacy. A n d the world o f seduction precisely helps to give
women the main role in cultural innovation.
How far removed we are from the female victim! This in no way means
that the weight o f inequality and violence does not crush many women,
but simply that over and above this suffering and injustice they are the
bearers, in the name o f the whole population, o f a new cultural model: a
phrase that is to be understood in the broadest sense and which leads us
to expand on the reflections presented hitherto.
Women can only assert their existence as subjects by refusing to define
themselves exclusively by their heterosexual relationship to man and by
the social functions that this relationship leads them to perform. Certainly,
such 'liberation' can take the form o f the proclamation o f a female iden-
tity in itself, and even of the superiority o f women to men. But these asser-
tions are more fragile than they seem at first sight. For in playing the game
of a 'female psychology', one quickly lapses back into representations o f
woman that are so conducive to male domination because it might be
thought that they have been created by it. Women who take this seemingly
easy path soon identify with gentleness, the sense of others, sensitivity -
in short, all qualities alien to man the hunter, soldier and conqueror.
Very different, opposed even, is the motion that invites women in the
name of their freedom to reject, by suppressing the relationship of dom-
ination they suffer at the hands o f men, all polarizations - o f which that
between male and female is the most general form - and to reconstruct
a human experience that has been split into two unequal parts by the
European mode of modernization.
This general enterprise o f reconstruction is evident in many sectors o f
everyday life. Thus, ecologists wish to transcend the opposition between
economic modernity and the equilibria that render life on Earth possible.
A l l forms of psychotherapy offer programmes for re-establishing the bond
between body and mind; and psychoanalysis has oriented its thinking in
this direction for even longer. More immediately still, every day we see not
only male domination being challenged, but also its effects, the most indi-
rect and the most direct alike.
A l l these tendencies, whose list could be extended, not only contest
forms of domination. They also defend against the pseudo-individualism
198 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l Terms

of a consumer society in which each individual is invited to behave accord-

ing to her personal, social, cultural or gender characteristics. Here woman
plays the most important role, for it is she whom commodification most
violently reduces to being an object of sexual consumption and, to a lesser
extent, an indicator of social status. The struggles in which women play a
central role do not aim to replace male domination by female domination.
Nor do they seek the triumph o f a spirit of consumerism in which all rela-
tions of domination would dissolve.
Although weakened by their situation o f dependence, women are the
agents o f the dynamic o f reconstruction of experience because they, col-
lectively and individually, are what is in question. Criticizing 'straight'
thought, Monique Wittig ponders the possibility o f each woman, over and
above a general social critique, asserting herself as a personal subject and
replies 'that a new definition of the person and the subject for the whole
of humanity can only be found beyond the categories o f sex (women and
men) and that the advent of individual subjects first o f all requires the
destruction o f the categories of sex, an end to their use'. As I have said,
for her it is lesbians who most radically destroy the category o f 'women'.
This is an assertion which cannot be proven or refuted, but which attests
to the remarkable role played by lesbians in the great transformation in
thought and action presented here. From Antoinette Fouque, whose think-
ing appeared isolated for a while because it was in advance o f that of
purely critical feminists, to the American queer theorists, who represented
the best in feminism on the cusp o f the twenty-first century, the role o f
lesbians has been a pioneering one, probably because from the start they
are situated outside the obsessive question of dependency on man. But we
are dealing with the majority of women here, and hence with heterosex-
ual women. I t is above all for them that the three dimensions o f sexuality
- the autonomy o f sex, the relationship to the other, and the birth of self-
consciousness as subject - must be interconnected, while making it clear
that it is the last component, whose existence largely depends on the pres-
ence o f the other two, which is the highest meaning of sexuality.
Starting from this central point, it is easier to perceive the cultural
changes that are converging in all domains to create a culture as clearly
defined by the role of women as classical European culture was by the
central role o f men. This conclusion must be formulated in all its radical-
ism: we are not advancing towards a society of equality between men and
women, or to an androgynous society; we have already moved into a
culture (and therefore a social life) oriented (and, as a result, dominated)
by women - we have already entered into a society of women. Such an asser-
tion immediately prompts various objections and sarcasms by way of
response: how can we speak o f female domination when men still possess
the essentials o f power, wealth and weapons, when female wages are infe-
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 199

rior to those of men, and when the signs of male authority and the sub-
mission of women to the image that men create o f them are ubiquitous?
This reminder of obvious realities, which no one disputes, in no way
undermines the conclusion that I am presenting here: yes, men have power
and money, but women already posses the meaning of lived situations and
the ability to formulate it. I t is already much easier to make women speak
about women than it is men about men. The latter are embarrassed by the
images conveyed by the themes o f masculinity and virility. Many want to
be more like women, sometimes even to feminize themselves; and in sexual
relations the images o f penetration, possession and insemination are being
undermined as women more clearly recognize the localization o f their
pleasure and, above all, as men learn to replace the old position o f mastery
by an ability to turn towards the self, as women do. The success of many
techniques recommended by psychologist-sexologists derives above all
from the fact that they are progressively getting rid o f the images o f male
domination, both in life in general and in sexual relations.
The main weakness o f these analyses stems from the fact that they
convey the impression that we are dealing with women liberating them-
selves or already liberated, receiving new representations and new prac-
tices, and capable o f conceiving and achieving by themselves changes that
accord them an innovative, more independent role - but one that does not
meet with resistance from other women. Yet there has been resistance; and
there still is. Such profound changes cannot be accomplished without
encountering opposition and even provoking reactions o f rejection. I want
to signal two o f them here, which correspond to very different situations.
The first context in which women meet with negative reactions is that
of immigrant populations (as indicated by all the cases studied in France),
where very strong control is exercised by brothers over sisters, whether or
not the latter are veiled. The most surprising thing is that before 1990 girls
of immigrant origin were not subject to such strong pressure in these
neighbourhoods. Boys and girls could walk together. Then, rather rapidly,
fathers and especially brothers began to exercise increasingly tight control
over girls. The group turned in on itself, while the great majority o f mar-
riages conformed to the old moral order: arranged unions based on a cer-
tificate of virginity - something that contributed to the development o f
minor surgery to reconstruct the hymen and, among many girls, persist-
ent recourse to relations involving anal sex. Some girls manage to have a
sex life locally; others have the opportunity to quit the neighbourhood; yet
others lead a double life. The goal o f many men in such neighbourhoods
is to prevent young women having a sex life. Anyone who wears a skirt
will thus be stigmatized as a prostitute. She will be suspected o f consent-
ing when she is raped in a 'tournante' ('take your turn' style), while this
practice seems to be developing, under the leadership of the strongest boys
200 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

in the group who, as in a herd of game, wrest a monopoly on the females.

Here there is not only resistance, but regression.
Such a situation can be analysed from a moral standpoint or in an urban
perspective. Either way, it attests to a rejection o f female sexuality - above
all, that of unmarried women. This once again demonstrates that it is
indeed sexuality, more than access to education and employment, which
is at the heart o f women's equality.
Another context in which women encounter much resistance is this. I n
many schools and social milieus, we observe an increasing sexual permis-
siveness. The consumption of porn videos has become general; girls wear
clothing that exposes their bodies. Everywhere people watch M T V or
M C M clips that have become increasingly crude, despite an American pro-
hibition on displaying nudity. This culture, composed above all o f images,
is not (it seems to me) in contradiction with the traditional cultural model:
the girl must please the boy, seduce him and prepare for a marriage that
will take maximum account o f the boy's social background and profes-
sional and economic prospects. For their part, boys are approximating to
female forms o f behaviour, frequenting hairdressers and beauty salons,
even cosmetic surgery clinics.
This generation lives poles apart from the feminist movement, which
had to wage hard battles to bring about changes in customs. There would
certainly seem to be nothing in common between extreme repression and
extreme laisser-faire. Yet both are an obstacle to the formation o f the per-
sonality (in particular, o f young women) through sexuality - an obstacle
that can be as difficult to overcome in the context o f a permissive moral-
ity as in that o f a repressive morality. Thus, women can construct them-
selves by seduction as they can by work, but the creative 'liberation' of
women is rendered impossible by the reduction o f sex to a commodity.

The woman-subject

I maintain that after the break-up and disappearance o f the model o f

initial modernization - that o f an extreme polarization which creates
extreme tensions and conflicts - the only cultural dynamic capable o f
inspiring our society with a new creativity is pursuit of the reconstitution
of social life and personal experience: we are seeking to reunite what was
separated by the first modernization. We are seeking, as the ecologists vig-
orously express it, to bring together nature and culture, and also body and
mind, private life and public life. A n d how can it be denied that women,
constituted and defined by their inferiority, are seeking not to reverse the
balance o f power, but to 'transcend' it, in such a way as to abolish the logic
that determined their reduction to inferiority?
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 201

This general idea is confirmed by the documents - interviews and group

meetings - that we have assembled, but it must be rounded off. Today's
women think less and less in historical terms, especially since the victory
of feminism. The supersession o f the old polarization leads them not to
reject, but to reinterpret, their confinement to the 'private'. Certainly, they
work and, except in particular cases like recourse to maternity leave, they
retain and want to retain the superiority conferred on them by the capac-
ity to bear children. They continue to say: 'A child i f I want one, when I
want one.' For them, children are a source o f power, and it is very rare for
the father to have as strong a relationship with them. More broadly still,
women, while rejecting the old definitions of their gender, accord more
importance to their body and their sexuality than men.
However, the opposition between old and new models, between polar-
ization and reconstitution, cannot completely account for the orientation
of women, since they think more in terms of superseding than o f invert-
ing or compensating for inequalities.
Our analysis therefore is missing an understanding o f what leads women
to seek above all supersession of the men/women relationship, in which
they occupy an inferior position. This moment of the analysis, which
seems so difficult to embark on, is illuminated by the observations made
in research. While wishing to preserve relations of seduction with men
(although transforming them), women vehemently reject the images o f
themselves relayed by the media - especially advertising. This rejection has
been clearly formulated by one of the groups of women we worked with:
the women displayed in advertising, they told us, are not real. Our legs or
our hands are not like theirs. Advertising has invented an image of women
and we are deprived o f our image. I f we look at ourselves in a mirror, we
only see the face and the image that advertising has passed on to us,
making our real bodies disappear.
In other words, it is not by reference to the old model that women
develop a desire for the reconstitution of experience: it is by opposing the
media, which has taken possession o f them. A n d it is once they have
understood that the media destroys both their old image and their new
image that they move on from the theme of their liberation to the recon-
stitution of the culture and their personal experience. The end-point o f
the process remains the same, but the path it has taken now seems to me
to be longer and more complex than my initial reading suggested.
In addition, we now have an answer the question that was posed at the
outset: what is the relationship between women's two struggles - the one
they wage against traditional male domination and the one whereby they
reject their manipulation as a sexual object by the media?
Successive uprisings by dominated categories have always been more
inspired by a general, concrete image o f the subject. The women's
202 Now that W e Refer to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural Terms

movement presses this development to its conclusion: over and above their
national, social and cultural affiliations, women define themselves by their
gender, as sexed beings and, more important still, as beings subject to a
domination exercised over them in their entirety - in particular, over their
bodies. With this a switch in conflicts is effected: from the social conflict
conducted in the name o f control over the economy, we have made the
transition to a struggle by women whose stake is control o f themselves
and the defence o f rights involving all spheres o f their behaviour.
What does 'whose stake is control of themselves' mean? I t means: whose
stake is a direct, conscious reference to oneself, in contrast to a definition
of the self by reference to man, male power and the functions o f repro-
duction. But i f woman is not to be defined by her dependence, she must
redefine her relationship with man. There is no unisex society in which
men and women would become increasingly similar and where the differ-
ences between individuals (or even between types of sexual relations)
would be more important than those that distinguish men from women.
The construction of the female subject will increase the distance between
men and women, because the former cannot live the same corporeal expe-
rience. I t is necessary to assign a central place to the woman-subject and
recognize that sexuality is becoming detached from all social roles - in par-
ticular, from the male construct that is gender. Those who think that
woman is gradually being reduced to nothing but a sexual object in the
process o f the eroticization of society as a whole are therefore completely
mistaken: the liberation o f sexuality affirms the construction o f self as
subject. I t helps to destroy the image o f the woman submitted to male
power - to the power that granted him a monopoly on the heterosexual
relationship in which she was dominated.
It is appropriate, and even necessary, to speak o f the birth of a society
of women. But we must avoid referring to a feminization o f society, for
that would reintroduce the false (and dangerous) idea that women are
endowed with a permanent, general character. The fact that cultural cat-
egories are taking precedence over social categories does not mean that
gentleness is being substituted for force or pleasure for duty. What I am
writing here does not appeal to psychology, but only to the history o f
culture. But it is indeed women who are the bearers o f current cultural
changes. As the dominant actors in the old system (which can be called
male), men established a system o f thought and action which defines, and
constantly dictates, choices. Either it is this or it is that: either it is capi-
talism, or it is the people, which is in power; it is necessary to choose
between nature and culture. This is a system o f analysis that makes knowl-
edge o f individuals, who are rarely cut from one cloth, impossible. In
contrast, at the moment when they are becoming dominant, women them-
selves assert their superiority by their complexity, their capacity to pursue
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 203

several tasks at once. They think and act in ambivalent terms - terms that
make it possible to combine things and which do not dictate a choice. A n d
it is indeed in a world o f ambivalence (no longer in a bipolar world) that
we live. Schools that receive the children of immigrant families can neither
fully integrate them into the majority culture, nor maintain them i n their
native culture. The least bad choice is to combine the two, which gener-
ates dissatisfaction, but avoids the negative consequences of simple solu-
tions. I n work on young men and women in Italy, S. Tabboni was the first
to show that women refused to choose between personal life and profes-
sional life; that in so doing they were conscious o f losing something o f
both, but not completely; and that any other solution would be intolera-
ble for the great majority o f them. For their part, men have the sense of
being imprisoned in the world o f work.
This ambivalence increasingly necessary to individual life (as to inter-
national politics) is an attribute o f the subject, and here of the woman as
subject, since she detaches herself from the logic o f situations and gives
priority to constructing an action directed towards the assertion o f the
free, responsible actor.

The role of men

I delayed mentioning the relationship to the other for as long as possible,

since the danger o f being precipitately reduced to the worn-out image o f
the woman-for-man is ever present. But we do not therefore have to let
ourselves be diverted from understanding an element indispensable to the
construction o f the woman-subject. For i f the subject is indeed directed
towards itself, and i f its formation imposes a break with the duality o f
female and male roles, it remains the case that the relationship to the other,
at once different and similar, is the central moment i n the construction o f
woman as subject.
The other might just as easily be a woman as a man, but it would be
artificial not to define it primarily as a man. The relationship to this man
can be described in social terms, since affective relations are generally only
established within a restricted social horizon. But what gives rise to an
amorous relationship is not the proximity or distance between the part-
ners: it is the encounter, which is never a necessary bond, between desires,
the mutual recognition o f the other as being in the process o f construct-
ing itself, and finally the project o f living together. A relationship is not
only an encounter, a chance; it is the invention of relations and exchanges,
an invitation to spontaneous reactions. This relationship to the other is the
opposite o f submission to a social image o f the woman and the couple
subjected to the man. It invents a non-social link to a space and a time
204 Now that W e R e f e r to O u r s e l v e s in Cultural T e r m s

which are outside social time and space. The subject, whether male or
female, cannot exist i f it does not possess a specific time, space and lan-
guage. A n d it is indeed the addition of these three dimensions - desire,
recognition of the other and the wish to live with the other - that founds
the amorous relationship.
But we must go beyond this initial remark and examine the place of men
in the new culture, in the reconstitution of the complexes that had shat-
tered within the male model, knowing that this operation is performed by
women. I t is impossible to reduce the position of women in the culture of
recent centuries to their dependence, their inferiorization, and their exclu-
sion from public life. Their role in private life, in the family and in the edu-
cation of children suggests different approaches. Now we face the same
exigency in the case of men: i f my hypothesis that it is women who have
responsibility for the great project of reconstituting the world and super-
seding the old polarities is accepted, what will men's role be? I t cannot be
restricted to the realization of the loss of domination. Witness the vio-
lence that accompanies this loss of domination, whether direct physical
violence (that suffered by battered women) or psychological violence (by
breaking social affiliations).
There is no question here of asserting that men, stripped of running the
world they used to dominate, have no recourse but to violence and are
drawn towards this kind of behaviour.
M a n is drawn towards everything that is located beyond the limits of
the social, either in order to destroy it or, on the contrary, to keep open a
social universe whose reconstitution is now the main agenda. The discov-
ery of new worlds, research programmes in all areas of knowledge, remain
(or become) just as strongly male, but are no longer regarded as the
achievements of which the collectivity can be most proud. Science is as
much feared as admired: it can, as we know, provoke catastrophes, just as
it can reveal new sources of energy. Atomic energy was the first to testify
to this ambiguity in the population. The general meaning of social life
increasingly eludes men; they seek in themselves for a meaning they no
longer find elsewhere and in institutions they no longer control. Perhaps
they are attempting to ensure themselves social spaces that would belong
exclusively to them, which would be purely male, whether homosexual or
otherwise. But most often they are seeking to bring to a society obsessed
with the quest for its own equilibrium and survival the openness towards
the outside, the technical mastery of the environment, so indispensable to
societies of reconstruction and reintegration, which are always threatened
with suffocating under the protection they have established.
Such male behaviour is nevertheless increasingly minoritarian. Indeed,
the majority of men seek to integrate into the new society of women,
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 205

because it liberates them from the increasingly crushing responsibility for

conquering nature and transforming the world. A n d the whole o f society
- women, men and children - feels this 'absence' o f men - that is, their
more frequent presence outside social life than within it - to be positive.
Man is a voyager, an explorer of the elsewhere and the future. But he is
also rendered vulnerable because he no longer has the support o f institu-
tions that women now run, seeking to inspire behaviour which accords
with the new functional exigencies of institutions. Men become less con-
cerned about order and the 'correspondence' between actors and systems
than women.
Even so, this does not involve the claim that we are witnessing a new
polarization, with woman occupying the new position and man finding
himself marginalized. Such a formulation would run counter to the idea
I have developed here - namely, that this society o f women aims to recon-
struct the unity o f a world that has been torn between a male universe,
defined as superior, and a female universe, constructed as a figure o f infe-
riority. I n this society, whose main actors are women, human beings
become blends of masculinity and femininity (or, i f one prefers, more or
less solid and enduring montages o f male fragments and female frag-
ments). A n d this blend, this combination of the male and the female,
attests to the construction o f a new type o f society.
I f we must refer to a new male type, it is because the blending o f the
male and the female is more significant among women, whereas a greater
proportion o f male behaviour escapes the mixed society, since men do not
dominate it. Just as male existence tended to be identified with everyone's
existence, so today the new society is described in female terms, which
entails the formation of a male microcosm that is at once highly visible
and deprived o f the central position it used to occupy in the life o f women
and men. M a n becomes more vulnerable, less integrated; and this is the
counterpart o f women's success in reconstituting the world. M a n is more
shaken by outbursts o f violence, unrealistic passions, struck by a new taste
for solitude, in which he finds it difficult to communicate, whereas in the
past he dominated action and speech alike. Thus, i f they are not on the
point o f abandoning the public sphere, men devote more of their activity
to the private sphere.
These reflections will strike many as a provocation, a challenge to
common sense. But we must get used to confronting the profound changes
that have occurred in the relations between men and women. Those that
strengthen the position o f women are more easily detectable than those
that are occurring on the side of men. For we have more difficulty observ-
ing men as characters, given that we used to see them only as markers o f
the law and o f the name of the father.
206 N o w t h a t W e R e f e r t o O u r s e l v e s in C u l t u r a l T e r m s

Post-feminism
Post-feminism has thus set in train rapid changes and has already secured
results that (far) exceed in importance the objectives and achievements o f
feminism itself. For it is primarily post-feminism that has brought about
the cultural alteration of major importance which has seen us pass from
a society o f men to a society of women. These changes do not occur
through the prism o f political life; they permeate the subjectivity o f each
person, because they tend to make each individual a subject.
Moreover, it is on the basis o f due awareness o f what post-feminism is
and o f what it has achieved that we can understand the social scene as a
whole and its new problems. On all sides, people rightly signal the decline
of social and political actors, of parties, trade unions and their ideologies.
The legacy of the working-class movement, which was so powerful (and
creative for so long), is exhausted, just as, a century earlier, the legacy o f
the French Revolution and movements for citizenship was exhausted. But
these social and political actors have made way for other voices and other
figures: those o f the personal subject, which is predominantly woman, but
just as present in cultural minorities - to the point where today we more
readily define democracy as respect for minorities than as the rule o f the
majority. A n d on another side, but in line with this first set o f social actors,
we find organized movements that are ranged against globalization not
because they reject it, but because they have detected in it the extreme form
of a capitalism opposed to any control and any regulation, and which con-
sequently destroys identities, particularities, memories, forms o f savoir
faire and o f speciality.
The inheritors o f the social democrats (and even o f the Communists)
no doubt have a long career ahead of them. But it is clear today that it is
outside this legacy and its representation o f the world that the ideas and
emotions which are transforming society and its authority relations, its
forms o f communication, its relations between individuals and between
groups, are being invented. Politicians must understand the changes that
are underway, even i f they should abstain from seeking to direct them.
Such openness is even more necessary in the case o f intellectuals and ide-
ologues - especially those who for half a century laid down the idea that
no action is possible, because everything in social and cultural life is
imprisoned in a system o f domination. This general thesis was applied
as radically to the question of women as to the situation o f dependent
countries - and with the same errors.
The sway o f the ideologies born at the end of the twentieth century is
still strong, and will long remain so, because it is relayed by numerous
teachers and lecturers to a public that has rapidly expanded. Against this
ideological heritage, I would like everyone to understand that the analysis
 A S o c i e t y of W o m e n 207

I am advancing here in connection with the situation of women, their per-

sonal behaviour and collective action, governs our conception o f society
and culture. We have already moved into a society o f women. That is why
research on women is the best entry-point into society in general.
 Argument: By Way
of Conclusion

The main themes of this argument are closely interrelated; the sequence
of chapters discloses their interdependence in the construction of a new
paradigm. But it seemed to me useful, for those who want to read this
book as well as those who have just read it, to outline more directly and
more briefly the path that led me from an awareness of historical changes
to an analysis o f the principal notions that enable us to understand this
mutation.
1 The starting-point is globalization, conceived not simply as a global-
ization o f production and exchange, but above all as an extreme form o f
capitalism, as a complete separation o f the economy from other institu-
tions - in particular, social and political - which can no longer control it.
2 This dissolution of boundaries of all sorts entails the fragmentation
of what used to be called society.
3 The consecutive collapse o f social categories of analysis and action is
not an unprecedented event. I n the early stages o f our modernization, we
conceived social phenomena in political terms - order, disorder, sover-
eignty, authority, nation, revolution - and it was only after the industrial
revolution that we replaced political categories by economic and social cat-
egories (classes, profit, competition, investment, collective bargaining).
Current changes are so profound that they lead us to assert that a new
paradigm is in the process of replacing the social paradigm, just as the
latter took the place o f the political paradigm.
4 The individualism that triumphs on the ruins of the social represen-
tation of our existence reveals the fragility of an ego constantly altered by
the influence o f the stimulation it is subject to. A more developed inter-
pretation of this reality underscores the role o f the media in forming this
individual ego, whose unity and independence seem to be threatened.
 A r g u m e n t : By W a y of C o n c l u s i o n 209

5 But this individualism also has a quite different dimension: in a

society where we depend not only on techniques of production, but also
on techniques o f consumption and communication, we seek to rescue our
singular, individual existence. This is a creative duplication, because it gives
rise alongside the empirical being to a being of rights, who seeks to con-
stitute herself as a free actor by struggling for her rights.
6 We have always had an image o f our creativity, but for a long time it
was projected beyond our own experience. It took successive forms: God,
the nation, progress, the classless society. Today, without any intermediate
discourse, we directly confer crucial importance on the quest for ourselves.
This volition on the part o f the individual to be the actor o f his own exis-
tence is what I call the subject.
7 The subject exists as a principle of analysis only on condition that its
nature is universal. Like modernity, which is its historical expression, it
rests on two basic principles: adherence to rational thinking and respect
for universal individual rights - in other words, rights that go beyond all
particular social categories. Historically, the modern subject was first
embodied in the idea o f citizenship, which established respect for univer-
sal political rights over and above all communitarian affiliations. A n
important expression of this separation of citizenship from communities
is secularism, which separates Church and state.
8 During the period dominated by the social paradigm, the struggle for
social rights (and, in particular, for workers' rights) was at the heart o f
social and political life.
9 Today, the establishment o f the cultural paradigm foregrounds the
demand for cultural rights. Such rights are always expressed by the defence
of particular attributes, but they confer a universal meaning on this
defence.
10 On the ruins o f the society shaken and destroyed by globalization,
a central conflict emerges between, on one side, non-social forces strength-
ened by globalization (market dynamics, potential catastrophes, wars) and,
on the other, the subject, deprived o f the support of the social values that
have been destroyed. I f needs be, the subject can even be repressed into
the unconscious by the domination of these material forces.
11 But this battle is not lost in advance, for the subject strives to create
institutions and rules of right that will defend its freedom and creativity.
The family and the school are at stake in these battles.
12 Is not this individual, transformed by herself into a subject, con-
demned to isolation, to remain deprived of communication with 'the
others'? The answer to this question is, in the first instance, that there
cannot be communication without a shared language. That is modernity.
But nor is any communication possible without recognition o f the differ-
ences between real actors. Such complementarity is secured when we
210 A r g u m e n t : By W a y of C o n c l u s i o n

clearly separate modernity, which is a common reference-point for all those

who wish to communicate, from modernizations, which always combine
modernity with cultural and social fields that are different from one
another. N o society has the right to identify its modernization with
modernity. Something new is only built out of both new and old
materials.
In particular, the Western countries, which advanced more rapidly
towards modernity than the rest, must recognize both that they do not
have a monopoly on it and that it is present in other modes o f modern-
ization, with the exception o f those completely opposed to it.
13 A return to history: the Western model of modernization consisted
in polarizing society by concentrating resources of all kinds in the hands
of an elite and by negatively defining the opposite categories, which were
constructed as inferior. Such was the effectiveness o f this model that it
conquered much o f the world. But by its very nature, it was constantly full
of tension and conflict that pitted the two poles against one another.
14 I n the course o f the last two centuries, the categories constructed as
inferior - in particular, workers, then the colonized and, virtually at the
same time, women - created social movements in order to liberate them-
selves. They succeeded in large part, which had the initial effect o f atten-
uating the tensions inherent in the Western model, but also its dynamism.
A great danger threatens this part o f the world: that o f no longer being
in a position to conceive objectives and no longer being capable o f con-
fronting new conflicts.
15 A new dynamism is likely to emerge only on the basis o f action that
succeeds in reconstituting what the Western model separated, by super-
seding all polarizations. This action is already in evidence - for example,
in ecological movements and in those that struggle against globalization.
But it is women who are and will be its main actors, because they have
been constructed as an inferior category by male domination and, over
and above their own liberation, they engage in a more general form of
action to reconstitute the totality o f individual and collective experience.
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 Index

actors (social) authoritarianism 54, 60, 88, 96, 150,

link with system 63-7 155-6
social determinism 89-90
sociological research 82, 92 Baudrillard, Jean 3
see also agency Belgium 37, 174
advertising 201 bin Laden, Osama 9, 10
affirmative action 168-9 Bindung 125
Afghanistan 9, 32 see also social bonds
Africa 13, 68, 145, 159 black movements 158-9
agency 82, 96 Blair, Tony 10
Albert, Michel 19 body, the 119,201,202
Alexander, Jeffrey 90 Bolivia 164
Algeria 107 border culture 167
al-Qaeda 9, 10, 30, 31, 32, 63 Boubeker, Ahmed 92
alter-globalization 21, 26-7, 31 Bourdieu, Pierre 150
anomie 140 Braudel, Fernand 45
anti-Arab racism 29, 137 Brazil 60, 167, 192
anti-globalization movements 21, 24, Britain see United Kingdom (UK)
26 Bush, George W. 9, 10-11, 12
see also alter-globalization Butler, Judith 190, 195
anti-Semitism 29, 131, 137, 170
anti-subject 137—41 Calhoun, Craig 155
Arabs 29, 137 capitalism
Archer, Margaret 89 death of society and 55, 60
Arendt, Hannah 59 globalization and 19-20, 21-3, 24,
Argentina 60, 173 26-7
Aron, Raymond 59 materialism 129
Asian modernity 78 modernity 74
Austria 37 underemployment 68
 Index
Castells, Manuel 1
Catholic Church 125, 131, 159
change, modernity 75-6
Che Guevara 164
Chile 60
China 15
Christianity 125, 128-9, 137, 159
citizenship 146, 147, 160, 170-1, 174,
176, 180
civilizations, clash of 30-1, 32, 157
class
democratization of society 53-4
emancipatory individualism 83
European mode of socialization 47,
48
fashion and 52
globalization 24-5
new social movements 154-5
social inequalities 13-14
the subject and 117-18, 136
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel 37
colonial domination 54
communication, intercultural 92,
172-3, 180-3
communications society see
information and communications
society
communism 57, 60
communitarianism
cultural movements 156
cultural rights 145-6, 158-9, 167-8,
170-1, 174-7
definition 145-6
education 132
liberals and 176-7
modernity 72, 73, 78
religion 130
renewal of subjectivities 84
rise of 12-13, 16-17
social determinism 88, 89
the subject and 95-6, 109-10
Western model of society and 49,
50
consumption
death of society 55
defining the subject 102
emancipatory individualism 84-5
217
globalization 22-3
individualism 209
a society of women 187, 198
Crespi, Franco 125
critical functionalism 80-1, 115-16
critical sociology 80-1, 82
cruelty 138
cultural demands, rise in 14-15
cultural globalization 22-3, 30-1
cultural language 4
cultural mixing 166-7, 173
cultural pluralism 160-1
cultural relativism 172
cultural rights 144-83, 209
communitarianism 145-6, 158-9,
167-8, 170-1, 174-7
economic demands 149-53
liberals 176-7
minorities 144-7, 154, 156, 164-6,
179
modernity and modernizations
156-60, 161-3, 172, 179
multiculturalism 145, 153, 180
and political rights 144, 146-7, 148,
149, 155-6, 176-7
post-social world 160-4
religion 132, 149, 157-8, 159-60,
161, 163, 169-71
secularism 161, 169, 170-1, 177-80
sexual 164-6
social determinism 88
the subject and 96, 109-10
cultural studies 89-90
cultures, communication between 92,
172-3, 180-3
Curtius, Ernst 180
deaf people's rights 166
death penalty 111
Delors, Jacques 35
Delumeau, Jean 128
democracy
cultural rights 160-1, 168
death of European society 53^4
irruption of 56-8
nationalism and 58
popular sovereignty 79
218
democracy (cont.)
return of the political 59
subject-social bond relation 125-6
de-socialization 14, 15, 16-17, 78
see also society, decline of
dictatorships 12-13, 53, 54, 88, 156
difference
right to 96, 147, 167-8
a society of women 188-9
disabled people's rights 166
discourse, definition 5
divine, the 127-9, 142
domination see social domination
Dreyfus Affair 131
Dubet, François 89, 116, 134, 153
Dumont, Louis 127, 189
Dürkheim, Émile 52
Dworkin, Ronald 169
ecological movements 24, 83
economic globalization 19-23, 24,
25-7, 28, 31-2, 39
system-actor link 64, 65
economic life
cultural rights 149-53
European mode of socialization 47,
48
a society of women 186
system-actor link 64-6
economic paradigm 1
education
crisis of 55
cultural rights 157-8, 159-60,
168-71, 177-8
European mode of socialization
47-8
modernity 157-8
secularism 66, 131, 132-3, 169,
170-1, 177-9
social determinism 89
the subject and 130—4
system-actor link 66-7
see also schools
ego, the 96-7, 122, 124, 142
Ehrenberg, Alain 140
11 September 2001 see September 11,
2001
Index
Elias, Norbert 34
elites
emancipatory individualism 83,
84-5
European mode of socialization 47,
48
secularism 131
a society of women 189
see also social domination
emancipatory individualism 83-7
emigrants see migrants
employment see work
Enlightenment philosophy 77, 78
eroticism 191
eroticization of society 202
ethnicity 31-2, 92, 168
Europe 33-43
globalization and 25, 26
integration see European Union
(EU)
minorities 144, 145
mode of socialization 46-8
model of modernization 49-51, 53,
60, 73-4, 83^1, 85, 210
return of the political 59
role of war in 60-1
social representation of society
45-6
three deaths of society 53-6
see also specific countries
European social model 35, 38-9
European Union (EU)
European consciousness 42-3
foreign policy 40
globalization 25, 33, 39
international role 15, 37, 39-40, 42
as a national state 37-8, 41-2
the national state and 33-7
powerlessness 40, 41-2, 43
USA and 35-6, 38-9, 40, 41, 42, 43
euthanasia 143
evil
defending good against 10-11,12,
61
the subject and 94, 107-8, 134,
136-7
extreme capitalism 21-3, 24
 Index
failed lives 143
fascism 59
fashion 52
fear 12-13
feminism
birth of 54
emancipatory individualism 83
the end of social thought 80
notion of gender 190
religious fundamentalism and 171
sexual rights 165-6
a society of women 186,187-8,
189, 190, 192, 193-6, 198, 206-7
feminization of society 202
Ferry, Jules 131
Fichte, J. G. 45
filial bonds 165
Foucault, Michel 4-5, 80, 142, 148-9
Fouque, Antoinette 194, 198
France
Algerian War 107
anti-Semitism 29, 131, 170
communitarianism 175
cultural rights 157-8, 159-60, 162,
168- 73, 174, 177-8
democracy 56, 57-8, 59
European integration 35, 36, 37, 41
European model of modernization
50
European social model 35, 38, 39
intercultural communication 180-1
migrants 68, 92, 145, 168-71
political parties 14
racism 29
republicanism 159-60, 170-1, 177-8
return of the political 59
role of the state 19, 20, 35, 39
schools 66, 131, 132-3, 157-8,
159-60, 168-71, 177-8
social movements 153-5
social representation of society 45
a society of women 186
structuralism 82
trade unions 23
transsexuals 192
veiled pupils 157-8,159-60,
169- 73, 177
219
working-class insurrections 120
Fraser, Nancy 149, 156
freedom 83-7
Friedmann, Georges 90, 158
functionalism 80-1, 115-16
fundamentalism 159-60, 169, 171
Furet, François 56, 59
Gaspar, F. 171
Gauchet, Marcel 128
gay men see homosexuality
Geertz, Clifford 189
gender 190
Germany
European integration 34, 35, 37, 41
European model of modernization
50, 51
European social model 38
intercultural communication 180-1
migrants 68, 92
schools 66
social bonds 125
social representation of society 45
Giddens, Anthony 82, 102
globalization 2, 19-32, 208
European Union 25, 33, 39
system-actor link 64, 65
God 106, 128-9, 139
Gole, Nilüfer 164
good
defending against evil 10-11,12,
61
the subject 94, 134, 136-7
Great Britain see United Kingdom
(UK)
Greece 38
guerrilla movements 12-13,32,164
Habermas, Jürgen 37, 65, 82
Haiti 163
Halévy, Elie 59
Hall, Stuart 89
hedonism 76, 78
Hegedus, Zsuzsa 153
Hirschman, Albert 129
historical movements 24
historicity 46, 103
220 Index

history, the subject and 112-14, interests

115-16, 117 passions and 49-50
homosexuality 164-5, 166, 194-5, rights and principles and 75
198 International Monetary Fund 21-2
Honneth, Axel 125, 149, 150, 151-2, Iraq
153, 156 Kurds 144
human rights see rights US post-9/11 policy 10-11, 28, 30,
humanitarianism 30 39
Hungary, minorities 144 Ireland 38
Huntington, Samuel P. 30-1, 32, 63, Islamic world 12
157 cultural rights 157-8, 159-60,
169-71
Hussein, Saddam 10 end of societies and 62-3
European Union foreign policy
identity 40
cultural rights 88, 152, 155-6, 174, fundamentalism 159-60, 169, 171
175-6 globalization and 28, 30, 31, 32
European integration 36, 37, 38 international role 15-16
globalization 31-2 modernity 78, 157-8
the subject 96, 101-3 veils 157-8, 159-60, 169-73, 177
ideologies 118-19,206-7 Israel 29, 62-3, 119, 137, 159
Ignatieff, Michael 78, 79 Italy 34, 35, 38, 41, 125
immigrants see migrants
individual subject 101-2, 106-8, 111 Jaurès, Jean 57-8
individualism 16, 70, 208-9 Jews 29, 131, 137, 145, 170
emancipatory 83-7 justice, cultural rights 150,156
modernity 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 101
social bonds 125-6 Kahn, Axel 88
the subject and 116, 125-6 Khosrokhavar, Farhad 171
industrial society Kieslowski, Krzysztof 140
cultural rights 150, 154-5 Kurdish minorities 144
globalization 23^1 Kymlicka, Will 146
modernity 74
the subject 142
Laden, Osama bin 9, 10
information and communications
Latin America 12-13
society
cultural mixing 167, 173
death of society 55
cultural rights 164
European Union 39
model of development 60
globalization 23-4
sexual identities 192
a new paradigm 1-2
social movements 120
institutions
religious 127, 128-9, 130, 131, 139, Lee Kuan Yew 78
159 Lefebvre, Georges 59
the subject and 102-3, 108-9, Lefort, Claude 59
138-9 Lenin, Vladimir 32
instrumental rationality 74 Leninism 61, 109
intercultural communication 92, lesbians see homosexuality
172-3, 180-3 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 47
 Index
liberals, communitarians and 176-7
liberation movements see social
movements
love 102, 113
Lyotard, Jean-François 112
Maastricht Treaty 36-7
Maoism 61, 109
markets
domination of 16-17, 54-5
emancipatory individualism 84-5
globalization 20-1, 25
modernity 76, 77, 79
a society of women 186
the subject 142
system-actor link 65
Marx, Karl 50
mass culture 167
mass society 22, 53, 55, 187
materialism 129-30
Mathiez, Albert 59
Mead, George Herbert 125
media images 118-20,201
mediocre lives 143
men
domination of sexuality 81
European model of modernization
50
role 193,203-5
sexual rights 164-5, 166
a society of women 184-5, 186,
187-9, 192-200, 201-2, 203-5
as subjects 95, 110
mental illness 140
meta-narratives 112
meta-social behaviour 117
Mexico 164, 167
migrants
cultural rights 145, 158-9, 168-73
education 133, 134, 168-71
female sexuality 199-200
the self 92
the social bond 68, 69
minorities
cultural rights 144-7, 154, 156,
164-6, 179
education 66
221
sexual 164-6
see also migrants
modernity 71, 209-10
cultural rights 157-8, 161-3, 172,
179
definition 72-3
religion 73, 76, 127, 128, 130, 137,
157-8
social determinism 86-9
social movements 120-1
society and 48-51, 59, 60, 62, 71,
72, 73-9
modernization(s) 210
cultural rights 156-60,161-2,
172
intercultural communication 181-3
new model of 85
a society of women 185-6
Western model 49-51, 53, 60, 73-4,
83^, 85, 210
morality
education 132-3, 178
sexual rights 166
the subject and 102, 105-6, 141
multiculturalism 145, 153, 180
national liberation movements 54, 58,
83, 155
national minorities see minorities
national states
communitarianism and 174
cultural rights 164
European Union and 33-8, 39^40,
41-2
formation 45
globalization 21-2, 31-2, 33
irruption of democracy 56, 57
religion 130
return of the political 58
nationalism(s)
awakening of the subject 95-6
disappearance of European 34, 36,
37
the end of societies 45, 54, 56, 58
nationalization 20, 39
neo-liberalism 25, 76
Netherlands 37, 38, 45, 50
222 Index
New York, World Trade Center 9, 27,
30, 31
9/11 see September 11, 2001
non-social society 3, 16-17
oil crisis 20
other, the
experience of the subject 135
recognition of 125, 126, 152, 162-3,
181-2
a society of women 203-4
Palestinian conflict 29, 32, 62-3, 68,
137, 159
paradigm
switching to a new 1-5, 16-18
use of term 5
Parsons, Talcott 80, 90
passions, interests and 49-50
personal subject 114, 115
personality problems 140
political globalization 22, 30-2
political paradigm 1,16, 59
political parties 14, 35
political rights 109
cultural rights and 144, 146-7, 148,
149, 155-6, 176-7
political, the, return of 58-9
politics, war as continuation of
61-3
pornography 191,192,200
Portugal 38,45
positive discrimination 168-9
post-feminism 206-7
post-social world 160-4,187
poverty 13-14
Powell, Colin 11
power see social domination
private sphere 76, 133, 160, 169
production 23-4, 84-5
prostitution 191-2
psychoanalysis 123-4
public space 62
public sphere 76, 133, 160, 169
queer-theory feminism 190, 194-5,
198
racism 29, 136-7
reason
modernity 72, 73-5, 76, 77, 87-9
secularization 130
the subject and 141
recognition
cultural rights 149-53, 162-3
of the other 125, 126, 152, 162-3,
181-2
redistribution 149-53
refugees 68
religion(s)
cultural rights 132, 149, 157-8,
159-60, 161, 163, 169-71
education 66, 67, 131, 132-3,
157-8, 159-60, 169-71
end of societies 63
in a globalized world 30, 31-2
modernity 73, 76, 127, 130, 137,
157-8
social bonds 125
social representation of society
46
the subject 94, 97, 105, 106, 123,
124, 125, 126-30, 137, 139-43
see also secularism
representation, crisis of 51-3
reproduction 187, 188, 201
republican thought 131, 132, 133
republicanism, France 159-60, 170-1,
177-8
research policy, Europe 41
resistance, defining the subject 102
revolution 44, 57, 59
revolutionary vanguard 164
rights
cultural see cultural rights
modernity 73, 74, 75, 76, 77-8, 79,
87-9, 209
sexual 164-6
the subject and 95, 96, 103, 106,
107, 108-10, 111, 135, 141
Rimbaud, Arthur 113
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 79, 126
ruling elites 47, 48, 83, 84-5, 131
see also social domination
Rumsfeld, Donald 10
 Index 223

Saadi, Yacef 107 sexuality

sacred, the 127-9, 130 domination of 81
Said, Edward 137 self-subject relation 119, 190-1
Scandinavia 37, 186 sexual rights 164-6
schools a society of women 187, 188-200,
cultural rights 157-8,159-60, 202
168-71, 177-8 use of term 189-90
modernity 76, 157-8 Simmel, Georg 52
secularism 66, 131, 132-3, 169, Singly, François de 125
170-1, 177-9 slavery 95, 96
sexual permissiveness 200 social, decline of the 14, 15, 16-17, 78
social determinism 89 see also society, decline of
the subject 130-4 social actors 63-7, 82, 89-90, 92
system-actor link 66-7 see also agency
see also education social analysis
scientific research, Europe 41 categories for 52, 208
Second World War a new paradigm 1-5, 16-18, 208
developments after 19, 35 see also sociology
the subject and 134—5 social bonds
secularism rupturing of 67-9, 82
cultural rights 161, 169, 170-1, the subject and 124-6
177-80 social class see class
modernity and 73 social determinism 86-90
schools 66, 131, 132-3, 169, 170-1, social domination
177-9 emancipatory individualism 83, 87
secularization 45-6, 129-30 end of social thought 80-1, 82-3
seduction 196-7 intercultural communication 180,
self, the 181-2
emancipatory individualism 85-7 modernity 76, 77-8, 79
modernity 77, 78 a society of women 188-9, 196,
social bond 125 197- 200, 201-2, 204
a society of women 187, 202 the subject 95, 97, 111, 113-14,
sociological focus on 90-4 117-18
the subject 91, 92, 93-5, 96-7, social inequalities 13-14
101-2, 111-13, 115, 119-20, positive discrimination 168-9
121-2, 142-3 social determinism 89
self-consciousness 91, 95 a society of women 187-8, 189,
self-esteem 126 198-200
self-realization 151-2 social life, globalization 22-3
Semprun, Jorge 94 social model, Europe 35, 38-9
Sen, Amartya 96 social movements 13-14,210
September 11, 2001 cultural rights 147, 148, 150-6,
globalization and 27-9, 30, 158-9
31 death of European society .53—4
US policy after 9-12, 28, 30, 39, 43, emancipatory individualism 83, 85,
61, 62 87
sex workers 191-2 end of 69-70
224
social movements (cont.)
globalization 24, 26-7, 31
irruption of democracy 57-8
rights 109
social determinism 88
a society of women 185, 186
the subject and 95, 120-1, 139
see also feminism
social paradigm 1, 16-18, 59, 71
social representation of society 44-6
social rights 109
cultural rights and 147, 155-6,
176-7
social security 13-14, 19, 25-6
cultural rights 156
death of European society 55
democratization of society 54
European social model 35, 38-9
the self and 96
war and 62
social thought, end of 79-83
socialism, death of society and 60
socialization 46-8, 67, 86
society, decline of
birth of the subject 70
crisis of representation 51-3
emancipatory individualism 86
the end of social movements 69-70
the end of social thought 80-1,
82-3
European 38-9,41-2
European mode of socialization
46-8
globalization 22-9, 31-2
and modernity 48-51, 59, 60, 62,
71, 72, 73-9
non-social 3, 16-17
the political and 58-9
the social bond 67-9
social determinism 89
social representation of 44-6
system-actor link 63-7
three deaths of European 53-6
war and 60-3
sociology
'classical' 52-3, 81, 93
critical 80-1, 82
Index
defence of 105-6
the end of social thought 80-3
focus on the self 90^1
intervention method 123-4
social determinism 89-90
sovereignty, popular 79
Soviet Union, society 61
Spain 36, 38, 45, 63, 144
state education see education
state, the
authoritarian 54
and the Church in France 159
decline of national 33-7
globalization 19-20, 25-6, 30
irruption of democracy 56
religion 130
secularism 131
the subject and 103
structuralism 82
Strzelecki, Jan 153
subject, the 101-43, 209
anti-subject 137-41
awakening of 94-7
between gods and societies 141-3
consciousness of 110-14, 135,
142
see also subject, the, the
unconscious
creation of see subjectification
defence of sociology 105-6
definition 5
emancipatory individualism 85-7
end of society 70
identity 96, 101-3
individual 101-2, 106-8, 111
location of meaning 16-17
media images 118-20
men 203-4
negation of 115-18
personal experience of 134-7
recognizing the presence of
116-17
religion 94, 97, 105, 106, 123, 124,
125, 126-30, 137, 139-43
rights 95, 96, 103, 106, 107, 108-10,
111, 135
school 130-4
 Index
the self 91, 92, 93-5, 96-7, 101-2,
111-13, 115, 119-20, 121-2,
142-3
sexuality 119, 190-1
social bonds 124-6
social movements 95, 120-1, 139
sources 103-5
the unconscious 121-4
women 95, 97, 110, 115, 200-4
subjectification 5, 93-4, 142
subjectivities 83-4
system-actor link 63-7
Tabboni, S. 203
Taylor, Charles 162
Taylor, F. W. 48, 156, 158
teaching 67, 133-4, 177-8
see also schools
technological determinism 1-2
terrorism 9
cultural rights 171
end of societies 63
fear 12
globalization 27-9, 30, 31, 32
US post-9/11 policy 9-12, 28, 30,
39, 43
Thatcher, Margaret 23
Thompson, E. P. 155
Tietze, Nikola 92
Tillion, Germaine 107
totalitarianisms 54, 59, 79, 81
trade 45
see also economic globalization;
markets
trade unions 13-14, 23, 54, 57
transsexuals 192, 194
Turkey 40, 144, 164, 171
unconscious, the 121-4
underemployment 68
unemployment see work
United Kingdom (UK)
cultural rights 156
European integration 34, 41
European model of modernization
50
international role 15
225
irruption of democracy 56, 57
role of the state 19, 35, 38
social representation of society 45
a society of women 186
United Nations (UN) 11,43
United States of America (USA)
communitarians 176
cultural mixing 167
cultural rights 158-9, 168, 176-7
democracy 56, 79
education 133, 168
end of social thought 80
EU and 35-6, 38-9, 40, 41, 42, 43
globalization 20-1, 22, 23, 24, 30-2
intercultural communication 181
international role 15, 28, 30-1
liberalism 176
mass society 55
migrants 68
popular sovereignty 79
post-9/11 policy 9-12, 28, 30, 39,
43, 61, 62
social movements 120
status of war 61, 62
universalism
communitarianism 175, 176
cultural rights 162-4, 175
modernity 73, 74, 76, 77-8, 162-3,
209
the subject 109
Western societies 49
utilitarianism 49
veils 157-8, 159-60, 169-73, 177
violence
modernity 76, 77, 78
permeation of 12-13, 14, 16
the social bond and 68, 69
a society of women 204
the subject and 102, 103, 107, 111,
137-8
see also terrorism; war
war
cultural rights 158-9
emancipatory individualism 84-5
end of societies and 60-3
226 Index
war (cont.)
European integration 34
globalization 27-9, 30, 31-2
modernity 76, 77, 158
national minorities 145
permeation of violence 12-13, 16
post-Second World War
developments 19, 35
social innovation 13, 14
social representation of society 45
the subject 102, 111, 134-5, 142
US post-9/11 policy 10-11, 28, 30,
31, 39, 43, 61, 62
Weber, Max 45
welfare state 13-14
cultural rights 156
death of European society 55
democratization of society 54
establishment 19, 35
European social model 35, 38-9
globalization 26
the self and 96
war and 62
Wieviorka, Michel 119, 138, 153
will to power 142
Wittig, Monique 196, 198
women 184-207
democratization of society 54, 56,
58
emancipatory individualism 83
European mode of socialization 47
European model of modernization
50
role of men and 203-5
roles 193
self-construction 193-4
sexual rights 164-6
sexuality 81, 187, 188-200, 202
the social bond 69
as subjects 95, 97, 110, 115, 200-4
women's movements 151, 153, 154
see also feminism
work
migrants 169-70
place in people's lives 64-5
the social bond and 68-9
a society of women 188, 201,
203
workers
emancipatory individualism 83
European mode of socialization 47,
48
modernity 74
see also social security; working-
class movement
working-class movement 13-14
democratization of society 53-4
emancipatory individualism 83
end of 69
irruption of democracy 57-8
new social movements and 154-5
rights 109, 147
social determinism 88
the subject 120
World Trade Center 9, 27
World Trade Organization 21-2
Yugoslavia 145
Zapatista movement 164