38 Sta.
Rosa Development The said land was inspected by the
Corporation vs CA (GR No. 112526,
10/12/2001)
FACTS:
The case is a petition regarding
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) order of
compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s
property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development
Corporation (SRRDC), was the
registered owner of two parcel of land
situated at Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna. According to them, these lands
are watersheds which provide clean and
potable (drinkable) water to the
Canlubang community and that 90 light
industries are located in that area.
They were alleging respondents usurped
its rights over their property thereby
destroying the ecosystem. Since the said
land provides water to the residents,
respondents sought an easement of a
right of a way to and from Barangay
Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta.
Rosa sought ejectment against
respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed
a case for compulsory acquisition of the
Sta. Rosa Property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
Compulsory acquisition is the power of
the government to acquire private rights
in land without the willing consent of its
owner or occupant in order to benefit the
society.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Municipal and Agrarian Reform Officer,
and upon consensus of the authorities
concerned, they decided that the said
land must be placed under compulsory
acquisition.
Petitioners filed an objection on the
ground that:
· The area is not appropriate for
agricultural purposes.
· The area was rugged in terrain
with slopes 18% and above. (which
falls under the exception in
compulsory acquisition of CARP)
· The occupants of the land were
illegal settlers or (squatters) who by
no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
· Whether or not the property in
question is covered by CARP despite
the fact that the entire property
formed part of a watershed area prior
to the enactment of R.A No. 6657. NO
· Whether the petition of land
conversion of the parcels of land may
be granted? Conduct re-evaluation
HELD:
Watershed is one of those enumerated
by CARP to be exempt from its coverage.
· Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that
Any watershed or any area of land
adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of
Natural resources as a protected
area.
· Watersheds may be defined as an
area drained by a river and its
tributaries and enclosed by a
Page 1
 boundary or divide which separates it
from adjacent watersheds.
We cannot ignore the fact that the
disputed parcels of land form a vital part
of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. The protection of
watersheds ensures an adequate supply
of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an
intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.
Although evidence of petitioners is
strong, the Supreme Court opines that
the area must be maintained for
watershed purposes for ecological and
environmental considerations despite the
88 families who are beneficiaries of the
CARP. It is important that a larger view
of the situation be taken because of the
thousands of residents downstream if the
watershed will not be protected and
maintained for its natural purpose.
Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion
of protection of watersheds as an
intergenerational responsibility, they,
however ordered to DARAB to conduct a
re-evaluation of the case since the said
land falls under exception.
39. Collado vs Court of Appeals (GR
No. 107764, 10/4/2002)
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed
with the land registration court an
application for registration of a parcel of
land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal.
Attached to the application was a
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
technical description, stating “this survey
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.”
The Solicitor General filed oppositions to
the application. Petitioners (Edna
Collado and her co-applicants) allege
that they have occupied the Lot since
time immemorial. Their possession has
been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. They paid all real
estate taxes and submitted evidence to
prove that there have been 9 transfers of
rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled in
favor of the petitioners for having
presented sufficient evidence to establish
registrable title over the property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioners have registrable title
over the Lot. NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights
over the parcel of land prior to the
issuance of EO 33? NO.
HELD:
(1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is
inside the literal description of Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR). Their
main claim over the Lot is that “all
Presidential proclamations like the
proclamation setting aside the MWR are
subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which
established the MWR) has a saving
clause that the reservations are “subject
to existing private rights, if any there be.”
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title
Page 2
12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion
de Leyes de las Indias which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain." Upon the Spanish conquest of
the Philippines, ownership of all "lands,
territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by
the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the
"Maura Law" partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the
Indies. The Maura Law was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment"
or registration of all agricultural lands,
otherwise the lands would revert to the
state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898. In 1903, the United States
colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, which was
described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,
was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands
of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading,
selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the "issuance of patents to
certain native settlers upon public lands,"
for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions
and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the
Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural
Resources First Set_ Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the
government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to
argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of
the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated in the Philippine
Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural
Resource: The term "natural resource"
includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal,
minerals, lakes, and submerged lands,
but also, features which supply a human
Page 3
need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefit of a community, and
are essential to the well-being thereof
and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational
purposes."
(2) An applicant must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying
for is part of the public domain and that
he has an interest to warrant registration
in his name arising from an imperfect title
(may have been derived from old
Spanish grants or titles). In the case at
bar, petitioners were unable to acquire a
valid and enforceable right or title
because of the failure to complete the
required period of possession (at least 30
years).
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of
EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot
as a watershed. Since then, the Lot
became non-disposable and inalienable
public land. At the time petitioners filed
their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot
has been reserved as a watershed under
EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of
petitioners’ application.
40 Director of Forestry vs. Villareal
(GR No. L-32266, 2/27/1989)
FACTS: The said land consists of
178,113 square meters of mangrove
swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied
for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the
land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including
the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. After trial, the application
was approved by the Court of First
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Instance of Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Forestry then came to this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari
claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed. It is undisputed
by the parties that the land in dispute is a
mangrove land HOWEVER the legal
nature of mangrove swamps or
manglares are still in contention. Director
of Forestry claims that it is forestall and is
not disposable. On the other hand,
Private respondents insists that it is
alienable as agricultural land.
ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps
classified as public forest lands?
RULING: YES. Part of our public forest
lands, they are not alienable under the
Constitution or are they considered
public agricultural lands; they may be
acquired under private ownership.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should
be understood as comprised within the
public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of
the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted
and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional
assuming the requisite conditions, to
justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our
statement in the Amunategui case that
Page 4
the classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. That determination having been
made and no cogent argument having
been raised to annul it, we have no duty
as judges but to apply it.
It follows from all this that the land under
contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for
which a minor forest license had in fact
been issued by the Bureau of Forestry
from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered
forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and
consequent ownership claimed by the
private respondent in support of his
application for registration. To be so, it
had first to be released as forest land and
reclassified as agricultural land pursuant
to the certification the Director of Forestry
may issue under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The Respondent even showed, a survey
of the land and its tax declaration to
support its claim, however the court held
that the same is insufficient especially
now that the land is a forest land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of
private respondent is DISMISSED, with
cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
41 Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Corporation vs Court of Appeals, GR
No. 88883, 1/18/1991)
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991
FACTS:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9)
hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet, was located sometime
between December 25, 1930 and
December 31, 1930, a period of six (6)
days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, better known
as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-
called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of
mineral claim was duly recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder sometime
on January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim,
together with other mineral claims, was
sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge
Mining Company, the earlier corporate
name of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein
petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on
November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner
Atok has been in continuous and
exclusive ownership and possession of
said claim up to the present .
Atok has paid the realty taxes and
occupation fees for the Fredia mineral
claim. The Fredia mineral claim together
with other mineral claims owned by Atok
has been declared under Tax Declaration
No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 an application for lease
was filed by Atok covering the Fredia
mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent
Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a
certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon,
Page 5
Benguet. He constructed a house
thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462.
When he first constructed his house
below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that
it was not necessary for him to obtain a
building permit as it was only a nipa hut.
And no one prohibited him from entering
the land so he was constructing a house
thereon. It was only in January 1984
when private respondent Consi repaired
the said house that people came to take
pictures and told him that the lot belongs
to Atok. Private respondent Consi has
been paying taxes on said land which his
father before him had occupied .
On January 1984, the security guards of
Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security
Officer of Atok, that a construction was
being undertaken at the area of the
Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano
Reyes instructed the cashier to go and
take pictures of the construction.
Feliciano Reyes himself and other
security guards went to the place of the
construction to verify and then to the
police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint
for forcible entry and detainer against
Liwan Consi , which was dismissed after
due hearing by the MTC of Itogon in favor
of Liwan Consi. Petitioner ATOK
appealed to the RTC of Baguio, which
reversed the decision of the MTC,
ordering defendant Liwan Consi to
vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral
claim, restoring possession thereof to the
plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company. Defendant Liwan Cosi was
further ordered to remove and demolish
the house he constructed in the premises
of the land of Fredia Mineral claim.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
In a petition for review filed by Liwan
Consi with the CA, the CA rendered its
decision dismissing the subject forcible
entry action, and further rule in part that:
Liwan Consi had a possessory right over
the property which may mature into
ownership on the basis of long-term
possession under the Public Land Law.
Thus, it held that both Consi and ATOK
are of equal footing with regards to the
subject lot, holding possessory titles to
the land. The petitioner through its long
term occupancy while respondent mining
firm being the claim locator and applicant
for lease on the mineral claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term
occupation of land of the public domain
vests him with such rights over the same
as to defeat the rights of the owner of that
claim. NO.
HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet
and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corporation
case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies
with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as
though secured by patent (Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record
pointed that the petitioner Atok has
faithfully complied with all the
requirements of the law regarding the
Page 6
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral
Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim
converted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed
it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as
the purchase of the land or obtaining of a
patent over it. As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok .
As in the instant petition, the record
shows that the lot in question was
acquired through a Deed of Sale
executed between Atok and Fredia
Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and
Atok have exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired
before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject
to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private
respondent contends that his
predecessor-in-interest has been in
possession of said lot even before the
war and has in fact cultivated the same.
Since the subject lot is mineral land,
private respondent's possession of the
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
subject lot no matter how long did not
confer upon him possessory rights over
the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil
Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall
be preferred; if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates
of the possession are the same, the one
who presents a title; and if all these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner
ATOK has been in continuous and
exclusive possession of the Fredia
mineral claim while private respondent's
possession started only sometime in
1964 when he constructed a house
thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior
possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the former
being "the one longer in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal
viewpoint it was really petitioner who was
in actual physical possession of the
property. Having been deprived of this
possession by the private respondent,
petitioner has every right to sue for
ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court,
it can further be declared and held that
petitioner Atok has the exclusive right to
the property in question.
Page 7

42 Palomo vs Court of Appeals [G.R.
No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
FACTS:
In 1913, some 440,530 square
meters of land in Albay were reserved for
provincial park purposes by virtue of EO
No. 40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land
were registered in the name of Diego
Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated
these lands to his heirs Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the
aforesaid original certificates of title were
lost during the Japanese occupation,
Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950. The
Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911,
3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in
October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay
issued Proclamation No. 47 converting
the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos
contended that they have been in
possession of the subject lands and have
introduced improvements thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of
Titles issued to the petitioners valid?
HELD:
NO.
Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899,
the lands, whether agricultural, mineral,
or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
crown. Private ownership of land could
only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial or
Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or
Title by Purchase and (4) Informacion
Posesoria or Possessory Information title
obtained under the Spanish Mortgage
Law or under the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by
petitioners were not signed by the judge
but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the
signature of the Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question
were not classified as alienable lands.
Since the lands were made part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes,
they form part of the forest zone. Thus,
they cannot be the valid subject of
alienation.
43 Republic vs Southside
Homeowners (GR No. 156951,
9/22/2006)
FACTS:
The subject matter of these proceedings for
declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a
total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as
the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where,
military officers, both in the active and retired
services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally
constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock
corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP
military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to
secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of Title in its name
to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084
on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed
of Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then
Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The
total purchase price as written in the conveying deed
was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
Page 8
 It appears that in the process of the
investigation conducted by the Department of Justice
on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the
aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and
eventually referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the
examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported
signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel
V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173
directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No.
15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s
Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel
within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC
of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent
SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a
forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the
application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of
the purchase price; and c) the property in question is
inalienable, being part of a military reservation
established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked
(and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated
October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No.
15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant
SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits
"1" and “2,” respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as
expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro
Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093
and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit “A”
is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his
signature appearing in the same document and denied
ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary
public holding office outside of the LMB premises.
Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have
had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of
the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented
an opposing expert witness in the person of Police
Inspector Redencion Caimbon who testified that
Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs.
Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise
testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr.
Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the
contract price.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7,
1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
Republic’s complaint as it considered the parcels
covered by the deed in question as no longer part of
the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to
the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period
material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be,
and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful
private conveyance? NO.
RULING:
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the
inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same
having not effectively been separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus
reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject
to sale or other disposition until again declared
alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates,
jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like
the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private
appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified
and declared as disposable and alienable public land.
And until a given parcel of land is released from its
classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation
as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a
military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is
devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp or
for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area
subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed
part of the FBMR as originally established under
Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent
SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner
Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land
is within military reservation,”and even dared to state
that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the
government and therefore removed from the concept
of public domain per se its own evidence themselves
belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the
Deed of Sale technically described the property as
situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio
Page 9
which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a
military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its
underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423.
In the process, it has invariably invited attention to the
proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the
nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title
embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and
hence, beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale
purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its
authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite
classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into
a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAI’s
unyielding stance that would have the Republic in
estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB
Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should
have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped
by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly
sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time
of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987
Constitution forbids private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain, except through lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances
and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt
on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a
conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature
on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert
corroborated Palad’s allegation on
forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the
PNP, however, disputes the NBI’s findings. In net
effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel
each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila,
possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad
nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City
to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was
then brought to the Rizal Registry and there stamped
“Received” by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or
at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No.
15084 was issued. In other words, the whole
conveyance and registration process was done in less
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while
in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s
authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another
city just to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public
land application to purchase required under Section 89
of the Public Land Act. There is also no record of the
deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying
an application to purchase, inclusive of the
investigation report and the property valuation. The
Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto
Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the
LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court
attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B.
Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition
Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at
the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining
to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI
states that the “deed of sale specifically meritorious
Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full
payment of the agreed purchase price” An official
receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove
payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203
as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to
present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus
validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does,
that its presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which
appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never
been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses
for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB
the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix
of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible,
SHAI’s witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the
limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared
void and cancelled
44 Republic vs Alagad (G.R. No. L-
66807 January 26, 1989)
FACTS: On or about October 11, 1951,
defendants filed an application for
registration of their title over a parcel of
Page 10
land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with
an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in
survey plan Psu-116971, which was
amended after the land was divided into
two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area
of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an
area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in
survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application
on the stereo-typed ground that
applicants and their predecessors have
not been in possession of the land
openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 and the
land has not ceased to be a part of the
public domain. It appears that barrio folk
also opposed the application.

Issue: WON that applicants and their

predecessors have not been in
possession of the land openly,
continuously, publicly and adversely
under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894

HELD:
The case, then, has to be decided
alongside these principles and
regretfully, the Court cannot make a
ruling, in the first place, because it is not
a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in
possession of no evidence to assist it in
arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We
therefore remand the case to the court a
quo to determine whether or not the
property subject of controversy is
foreshore. We, consequently, reverse
both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court and reinstate the Republic's
complaint.

Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources Page 11

 A. Administrative Legalization
(Free Patent)
RA 10023 Residential Free Patent
Possession in the concept of an
owner, constructive or actual
GR: Actual occupation without
interruption
XPN: force majure
Bona fide claim of ownership:
publicly accepted and acquisition of
property is valid (law, prescription,
delivery, not the sale, donation,
succession)
No age limit, minors can apply
provided with a legal guardian
Dead applicants can be subrogated
by surviving heirs, as long as they
are qualified to apply
No limit, you can file as many as you
can. Limit under sec 4:
RFP Max 200 sq (high urbanized
750 sq 1st Municipalities
Supporting documents:
Approved plan based on survey
With survey map and technical
description
Affidavit of two interested persons
(witness)
Sketch
Isolated cases: certification from
RTC that the land has no pending
registration case
REGISTRATION in CENRO: apply in
the place where the property is
located
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Apply. CENRO posting (15 days).
Process the claim within 120 days
from the receipt except if there is an
opposing claim.
Approval.
Forwarded to PENRO – determine
sufficiency, may approved or
disapproved
Approved: Notify the applicant
forward to Registry of Deeds
Deny: appeal to the secretary of
DENR
SPECIAL Patent – mode of
disposition with legislative/executive
Issued upon proclamation of
executive or act of Congress to
dispose land that is part of the public
domain
Filipino citizen, legal age
It is not automatic, you need to apply
Submit an approve plan and
technical prescription
Steps: similar with other types
File in the DENR
DENR will endorse it to the land
directors
You survey your own land and
submit to the Land Management
Bureau will validate it.
Approved by the Geodetic Engineer
Special Patent is submitted in Sec of
DENR , they will sign the special
patent
Example: PD 1085 – issued by
president
Special patent is different from
Page 12
 SP – legislative and executive FP-
administrative because you have to
apply in DENR
SP – the land of PD, FP- it must be
zoned as a residential area
CADASTRAL – Act 2259 new
PD 1529 – separate chapter or
cadastral registrations
Purpose: means of lands under
Torrens System
Nature:
45 SIAN Enterprise vs. FF Cruz (GR
no. 146616, 8/31/2006)
500 SCRA 406 (2006)
That the foreshore area had been
reclaimed does not remove it from its
classification of foreshore area subject
to the preferential right to lease of the
littoral owner.
Facts:
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation
(WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease
application over the foreshore land
adjacent to certain lots registered in its
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
name. It eventually withdrew the
application and filed a petition for
registration over the same foreshore
land with the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo. The case was, however,
archived as WESVICO‘s representative
could no longer be contacted, and later
on, WESVICO has ceased operations.
F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the
Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore
lease application over a foreshore land,
a portion of which is adjacent to the lot
previously occupied by WESVICO. Sian
Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN) purchased the
properties previously owned by
WESVICO from the Development Bank
of the Philippines. It subsequently filed a
foreshore lease application over the
foreshore land adjacent to the properties
it bought from DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of
the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s
foreshore lease application overlapped
that covered by its foreshore lease
application, SIAIN filed a protest 8
alleging that it being the owner of the
property adjoining the overlapping area,
it should be given preference in its
lease.
F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not
be given preferential right since the area
in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖
and that the ownership was not by
means of accretion. This argument has
been sustained by the Land
Management Bureau.
Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary,
SIAIN was upheld, declaring that there
was no basis to declare the area as
―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz however
appealed to the Office of the President
which overturned the decision of the
Page 13
DENR Secretary and found that the area
is reclaimed. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence,
the present petition. SIAIN contends that
the evidence overwhelmingly proves
that the disputed area is foreshore land
and not reclaimed land which thus
entitles it preferential rights over the
ISSUES:
Whether the disputed land is a
―foreshore‖ or ―reclaimed‖ area
FORESHORE AREA
HELD:
That the foreshore area had been
reclaimed does not remove it from its
classification of foreshore area subject
to the preferential right to lease of the
littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the
reclamation that brought the disputed
foreshore area into existence. Such
foreshore area existed even before F.F.
Cruz undertook its reclamation. It was
―formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.‖
Following Santulan, the littoral owner
has preferential right to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the
President, as affirmed by the appellate
court, littoral owner WESVICO cannot
be considered to have waived or
abandoned its preferential right to lease
the disputed area when it subsequently
filed an application for registration
thereover. For being a part of the public
domain, ownership of the area could not
be acquired by WESVICO. Its
preferential right remained, however. Its
move to have the contested land titled in
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more
than proves its interest to utilize it.
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were
WESVICO‘s petition for registration
which, as stated earlier, was archived by
the trial court, pursued but eventually
denied, WESVICO would not have been
barred from filing anew a foreshore
lease application. Parenthetically, the
petition for registration of WESVICO
was archived not on account of lack of
interest but because it ceased
operations due to financial reasons.
46 Director of Lands vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (GR No.
14869)
FACTS:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were
conducted to settle the title to a
considerable tract of land in the Province
of Rizal. The Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila (church) and other private
parties were claimants of 13 cadastral
lots that comprised the contested
property. The lower court ruled in favor
of the private claimants. Upon appeal,
the church invoked that the composition
title of the church with the Spanish
Government included the subject
property. The church then presented one
witness and rested. The private
oppositors then called their respective
witnesses to prove title by possession,
and rested. The church thereafter made
an offer to present additional testimony
intended to show that the possession of
the private claimants had been
interrupted and that it was merely
possession through the tolerance of the
church. However, the counsel for the
oppositors objected to the entry of
Page 14
additional testimonies which was
sustained.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in refusing the
entry the church’s additional
testimonies? YES
Not proper for the RTC to deny the
evidence presented by the Church
because it will defeat the purpose of
cadastral proceedings.
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The object of a cadastral petition is that
the title to the various lots embraced in
the survey may be settled and
adjudicated. It is in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, promoted by the
Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a
judicial inquiry and investigation leading
to a judicial decree. In one sense, there
is no plaintiff and there is no defendant.
In another sense, the Government is the
plaintiff and all the- claimants are
defendants.
As a general rule, courts should adhere
to the usual rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence that governs registration
proceedings. However, in registration
proceedings where so many parties are
involved and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, opportunity should be given to
parties to submit additional corroborative
evidence in support of their claims of title,
if the ends of justice so require. This case
was remanded back to the lower court
with the church being allowed to admit
additional testimonies in the interest of
justice and ascertainment of truth.
47 Abellera vs Farol (GR No. 48480,
7/30/1943)
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Can you raise a defense of res
judicata? NO
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner,
vs.
MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL.,
respondents
Facts:
Abellera, in a previous case concerning
the same real estate involved herein,
sued Hermegildo Balanag and others
who are either the same parties in this
case or the latter's predecessors in
interest, alleging ownership of the land.
But his complaint was dismissed by the
Court of First Instance on two grounds:
(1) prescription in favor of defendants;
and
(2) the deed of donation of these lands
to him had not been formally accepted
according to Article 633 of the Civil
Code.
Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment
of the trial court was affirmed on the
second ground aforementioned. It
appears in that decision of this Court
that after the perfection of the appeal,
Abellera executed a public document
formally accepting the donation of the
land, and presented and deed of
acceptance together with proofs of
notification of acceptance to the donor,
as ground for new trial.
In July of 1918, or four months after the
above-mentioned decision of this Court,
petitioner herein brought another action
for recovery of the land against the
same defendants in the previous case.
The second suit was later dismissed by
the Court of First Instance and
transferred to cadastral case No. 5
which included the hacienda in question
that had in the meantime been
subdivided into lots.
Page 15
The latter through counsel moved that
Abellera's claim over the lots concerned
be dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata and prescription.
Issue:
Did the cadastral court, on the
ground of res judicata, have any power
to entertain the motion to dismiss
Abellera's claim and bar him from
presenting evidence to prove his
ownership of these lots?
Ruling:
NO.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in
cadastral cases when two conditions are
present: (1) analogy or need to
supplement the cadastral law, and (2)
practicability and convenience.
The principal aim is to settle as much as
possible all disputes over land and to
remove all clouds over land titles, as far
a practicable, in a community.
To attain this purpose, the cadastral
court should allow all claimants ample
freedom to ventilate whatever right they
may assert over real estate, permitting
them, in keeping with the law of
evidence, to offer proofs in support of
their allegations.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that
while in a cadastral case res judicata is
available to a claimant in order to defeat
the alleged rights of another claimant,
nevertheless prior judgment can not set
up in a motion to dismiss.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
In cadastral cases, you cannot raise a
defense of RES JUDICATA in a motion
to dismiss. The parties are invited by the
government to prove their ownership
over a land. Granting a motion to
dismiss will defeat the purpose of the
cadastral registration proceeding.
Use it as affirmative defense instead.
CA 141 Prohibited Alienations
GR: Lands acquired under free patent
are not subject of any commerce or
satisfaction of debt.
XPN: If in favor of the government.
48 Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No.
68109, 7/17/1991)
Is the sale valid if it is given in favor
of a child?
NO, it s not valid as long as it is
within the 5 year prihibitive period.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
filed by Severino Gayapanao and his
siblings questioning the decision of the
IAC in upholding the validity of the sale of
the land between their father Constantino
and their sister. The 2 hectare land,
subject of this case is part of 10 hectare
homestead land registered in the name
of Constantino Gayapanao under OCT.
The final order of the Director of Lands
for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937. On November 15,
1938, Constantino Gayapanao executed
a private deed entitled kasulatan ng
bilihan in favor of Simeona Gayapanao
and his husband.
RTC’s decision: The contract of sale
between Simeona Gayapanao and her
father is null and void for having been
executed with the 5 year prohibitory
Page 16
period provided under Section 118 of the
Public Land Law
CA’s decision: It reversed the decision of
the RTC and uphold the validity of the
sale.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in
upholding the validity of the sale?
RULING:
No, the provision of law which prohibits
the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead within 5 years after the grant
is mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five (5) years
from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions cannot
be subject to encumbrance or alienation,
nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to the expiration of said period. The only
exception mentioned by the law is the
sale or encumbrance in favor of the
government or any of its branches, units
or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have
consistently ruled that a sale of
homestead within the five (5) year
prohibitive period is void ab initio and the
same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire
validity through the passage of time.
49 Republic vs Garcia (GR No. L-
11597, 5/27/1959
Even if only a portion is sold, within
the 5-year prohibitive period, it is null
and void.
Facts:
Garcia was granted a homestead
patent for his 23.21 hectares of land.
After 3 years and 3 months later (April
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
14, 1950), he sold 19 hectares to the lot
to several persons. For this reason, the
CFI of Cotabato decreed the reversion
of the property in favor of the
Government for violating the selling the
property within the prohibitive period of 5
years from date of issuance under Sec.
118 of CA 141.
Garcia contends that he did not
violate the said provision since the sale
was not registered and that it was not
the entire land was sold.
Issue:
Whether or not Garcia violated
the Sec. 118 of CA 141.
Held.
Yes, he did.
The Supreme Court held that it is
enough that the property, in whole or in
part, was alienated or encumbered within
the prohibitive period except in favor of
the Government, Sec. 118 of CA 141
partly provides: Except in favor of the
Government or any its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provision shall not
be subject to encumbrance of alienation
from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said
period, but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, association, or
corporations.
Such alienation is a sufficient
cause for reversion to the State of the
Page 17
whole grant. In granting a homestead to
an applicant, the law imposes as a
condition that the land should not be
encumbered, sold or alienated within five
years from the issuance of the patent.
Sec. 124 of CA 141 provides: Any
acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the
provisions of section118, 120, 121, 122,
and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and
null and void from its execution and shall
produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or
permit originally issued, recognized or
confirmed, actually or presumptively, and
cause the reversion of the property and
its improvements to the State.
50 Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs Court of
Appeals (GR No. 104114, 12/4/1995)
Sec 119 of CA 141 Right to
repurchase is 5 years, from the date
of the notice of the sale. The right to
repurchase is implied. A co-owner
can still redeem.
Facts:
A valuable piece of land located at
Meycauyan, Bulacan, with an area of
24,576 sq. m. and covered by OCT No.
0-5290 is disputed by Lee Chuy Realty
Corporation and Marc Realty and
Development Corp. Such land was
originally co-owned by Ruben
Jacinto(one-sixth), Dominador, Arsenio,
Liwayway all surnamed Bascara and
Ernesto jacinto(collectively owned the
remaining five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his
one-sixth pro-indiviso share to LEE
CHUY REALTY which was registered 30
April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras
and Ernesto Jacinto also sold their share
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
to MARC REALTY which was registered
on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never
informed of the existence of the sale
between Marc Realty and the
Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc Realty insists
that Lee Chuy verbally notified of the sale
and was given a copy of the deed of sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY
REALTY filed a complaint for legal
redemption against MARC REALTY and
consigned in court a manager's check for
614,400. MARC REALTY insisted that
the complaint be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action there being no
allegation of prior valid tender of payment
or a prior valid notice of consignation.
On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in
favour of Lee Chuy Realty which stated
that there was a valid tender of payment
and consignation. It also stated that
neither a separate offer to redeem nor a
formal notice of consignation is
necessary for the reason that the filing of
the action itself, within the period of
redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer
to redeem.
On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
with Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was
referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA
reversed the decision of the lower court
and ruled that "a prior tender or offer of
redemption is a prerequisite or
precondition to the filing of an action for
legal redemption” and that "there must be
tender of the redemption price within the
required period because the policy of the
law is not to leave the purchaser's title in
uncertainty beyond the established 30-
day period.
Page 18
MARC REALTY contends that prior
tender of payment is a condition
precedent to the filing of an action in court
in order to validly exercise the right of
legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY
however argues that the filing of the
action itself is equivalent to a formal offer
to redeem, which is a condition
precedent to the valid exercise of the
right of legal redemption.
Lee Chuy filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied
Issue:
WON a formal offer to redeem
accompanied with tender of payment a
condition precedent to the filing of an
action for the valid exercise of the right of
legal redemption; is the filing of the action
with consignation equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem
Held:
No.
In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the
Court, citing previous decisions, declared
that the formal offer to redeem,
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the
redemption price, within the prescribed
period is only essential to preserve the
right of redemption for future
enforcement beyond such period of
redemption and within the period
prescribed for the action by the statute of
limitations. Where, as in the instant case,
the right to redeem is exercised through
judicial action within the reglementary
period the formal offer to redeem,
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the
redemption price, while proper, may be
unessential. The filing of the action itself
is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not
a distinct step or condition sine qua non
to the filing of the action in Court for the
valid exercise of the right of legal
redemption. What constitutes a condition
precedent is either a formal offer to
redeem or the filing of an action in court
together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary
period.
The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and
Belisario cases was jettisoned by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that they
do not involve legal redemption by a co-
owner but by a mortgagor. It concluded
that the application of the rules on legal
redemption by a co-owner differs from
the legal redemption by a mortgagor. But
the law does not distinguish; neither
should we. For sure, the principle in the
aforecited cases is applicable regardless
of whether the redemptioner is a co-
owner or a mortgagor. Public policy
favors redemption regardless of whether
the redemptioner is a co-owner or
mortgagor, although perhaps with
unequal force and effect since each is
given a fixed but different period. A co-
owner desirous of exercising his right of
legal redemption is given a period of thirty
(30) days from notice of the sale within
which to avail of the right to redeem.15
Under the free patent or homestead
provisions of the Public Land Act a period
of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance is provided,16 the five-year
period to be reckoned from the date of
the sale and not from the date of
registration in the office of the Register of
Deeds.17 The redemption of
extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on
the other hand, is exercisable within one
(1) year from the date of the auction sale
as provided for in Act No. 3135.
Page 19
Co owner can redeem within 30 days. In other
words, if no claim or offer is made within thirty
(30) days from written notice, no action may be
allowed to enforce the right of redemption.

Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources Page 20

51 MALTOS VS HEIRS OF
BORROMEO
Can you raise good faith as a
defense? NO, you cannot raise the
defense of good faith.
PRINCIPLE: The sale of a parcel of
agricultural land covered by a free patent
during the five-year prohibitory period under
the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the
parcel of land is proper. However, reversion
under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is
not automatic. The Office of the Solicitor
General must first file an action for reversion.
G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14,
2015
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P.
MALTOS, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
EUSEBIO BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS: On February 13, 1979, Eusebio
Borromeo was issued Free Patent No.
586681 over a piece of agricultural land
located in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-9053. On June 15, 1983, well
within the five-year prohibitory period,
Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo
Maltos. Eusebio Borromeo died on
January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that
prior to his death, he allegedly told his
wife, Norberta Borromeo,3 and his
children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo
Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because
the sale was within the five-year
prohibitory period. On June 23, 1993,
Norberta Borromeo and her children
(heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title
against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and
the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
946. EliseoMaltos and Rosita Maltos
(Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer,
arguing that the sale was made in good
faith and that in purchasing the property,
they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title.
Further, the parties were in pari delicto.
Since the sale was made during the five-
year prohibitory period, the land would
revert to the public domain and the
proper party to institute reversion
proceedings was the Office of the
Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds
of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer,
arguing that the deed of sale was
presented for Registration after the five-
year prohibitory period, thus, it was
ministerial on its part to register the deed.
The heirs of Borromeo countered that
good faith was not a valid defense
because the prohibitory period appeared
on the face of the title of the property.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are
the legal heirs of the late Eusebio
Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed
property within the prohibitory period is
valid or binding.
HELD: 1.The five-year period prohibiting
the sale of land obtained under
homestead or free patent is provided
under Section 118 of the Public Land Act,
which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units,
or institutions, or legally constituted
banking corporations, lands acquired
under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date
of the approval of the application and for
Page 21
a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance1 of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations.
The main purpose in the grant of a free
patent of homestead is to preserve and
keep in the family of the homesteader
that portion of public land which the State
has given to him so he may have a place
to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a useful member of the
society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held
that the conservation of a family home is
the purpose of homestead laws. The
policy of the state is to foster, families as
the foundation of society, and thus
promote general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is
predicated on public policy. Its violation
gives rise to the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land and its
improvements to the government at the
instance of the latter. The provision that
"nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior
to that expiration of the five-year period"
is mandatory and any sale made in
violation of such provision is void and
produces no effect whatsoever, just like
what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is
not within the competence of any citizen
to barter away what public policy by law
seeks to preserve.
In this case, Section 10187 of the Public
Land Act is applicable since title already
vested in Eusebio Borromeo's name.
Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that the sale was made
within the five-year prohibitory period.
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
Thus, there is sufficient cause to revert
the property in favor of the state.
However, this court cannot declare
reversion of the property in favor of the
state in view of the limitation imposed by
Section 101 that an action for reversion
must first be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
2.
The doctrine of in pari delicto non
orituractio is inapplicable when public
policy will be violated. The in pari delicto
rule is provided under Articles 1411 and
1412 of the Civil Code. Article 1411
pertains to acts that constitute criminal
offenses, while Article 1412 pertains to
acts that do not These provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds
from the illegality of the cause or object
of the contract, and the act constitutes a
criminal offense, both parties being in
pari delicto, they shall have no action
against each other, and both shall be
prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of
the Penal Code relative to the disposal of
effects or instruments of a crime shall be
applicable to the things or the price of the
contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only
one of the parties is guilty; but the
innocent one may claim what he has
given, and shall not be bound to comply
with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the
unlawful or forbidden cause consists
does not constitute a criminal offense,
the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the
Page 22
contract, or demand the performance of
the other's undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting
parties is at fault, he cannot recover what
he has given by reason of the contract, or
ask for the fulfilment of what has been
promised him. The other, who is not at
fault, may demand the return of what he
has given without any obligation to
comply with his promise.
The case under consideration comes
within the exception above adverted to.
Here appellee desires to nullify a
transaction which was done in violation of
the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari
delicto would apply to her because her
predecessor-in-interest has carried out
the sale with the presumed knowledge of
its illegality, but because the subject of
the transaction is a piece of public land,
public policy requires that she, as heir, be
not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family
for her home and cultivation. This is the
policy on which our homestead law is
predicated. This right cannot be waived.
"It is not within the competence of any
citizen to barter away what public policy
by law seeks to preserve." We are,
therefore, constrained to hold that
appellee can maintain the present action
it being in furtherance of this fundamental
aim of our homestead law.
As the in pari delicto rule is not
applicable, the question now arises as to
who between the parties have a better
right to possess the subject parcel of
land. This issue was addressed in
Santos:
What is important to consider now is who
of the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the
Mabborang, Andrea Ivanne P. Laws on Natural Resources
government does not take steps to assert
its title to the homestead. Upon
annulment of the sale, the purchaser's
claim is reduced to the purchase price
and its interest. As against the vendor or
his heirs, the purchaser is no more
entitled to keep the land than any
intruder. Such is the situation of the
appellants. Their right to remain in
possession of the land is no better than
that of appellee and, therefore, they
should not be allowed to remain in it to
the prejudice of appellee during and until
the government takes steps toward its
reversion to the State. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in ruling that while
there is yet no action for reversion filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General, the
property should be conveyed by
petitioners to respondents.
With respect to Appellees' claim for the
reimbursement of the improvements on
the land in question, they are hereby
declared to have lost and forfeited the
value of the necessary improvements
that they made thereon in the same
manner that Appellants should lose the
value of the products gathered by the
Appellees from the said land. We are
constrained to hold that the heirs of the
homesteader should be declared to have
lost and forfeited the value of the
products gathered from the land, and so
should the defendants lose the value of
the necessary improvements that they
have made thereon.
Reversion is a remedy provided under
Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the
reversion to the Government of lands of
the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the
Solicitor-General or the officer acting in
Page 23
his stead, in the proper courts, in the
name of Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore
public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public
domain. The general rule is that
reversion of lands to the state is not
automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor
General is the proper party to file an
action for reversion. The objective of an
action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certificate of title an|l
the resulting reversion of the land
covered by the title to the State| This is
why an action for reversion is oftentimes
designated asj an annulment suit or a
cancellation suit. Since an action for
reversion presupposes that the property
in dispute is owned by the state, it is
proper that the action be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, being the
real party-in-interest.
previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce shall be null
and void and shall produce the effect of
annulling the acquisition and reverting
the property and all rights to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price
theretofore made to the Government
shall be forfeited. After the sale has been
approved, the vendor shall not lose his
right to acquire agricultural public lands
under the provisions of this Act, provided
he has the necessary qualifications.
In this case, a free patent over the subject
parcel of land was issued to Eusebio
Borromeo. This shows that he already
had title to the property when he sold it to
petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus, Section
101 of the Public Land Act applies.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

There is, however, an exception to the

rule that reversion is not automatic.
Section 29 of the Public Land Act
provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the

land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, may convey or
encumber his rights to any person,
corporation, or association legally
qualified under this Act to purchase
agricultural public lands, provided such
conveyance or encumbrance does not
affect any right or interest of the
Government in the land: And provided,
further, That the transferee is not
delinquent in the payment of any
installment due and payable. Any sale
and encumbrance made without the

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