QUASI-DELICTS

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a QUASI-DELICT and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover DAMAGES
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a QUASI-DELICT. (n)
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover DAMAGES. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover DAMAGES, but the courts shall mitigate
the DAMAGES to be awarded. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the DAMAGES caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for DAMAGES caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for DAMAGES caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the DAMAGES caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for DAMAGES caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter
what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person
shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
(n)
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice
within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a
government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for DAMAGES to third persons. The amount of the bond
and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official. (n)
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for
death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers. (n)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for DAMAGES for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision. (n)
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the DAMAGES resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for DAMAGES caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the
inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without
precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering DAMAGES may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909)
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for DAMAGES caused by
things thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for QUASI-DELICT is solidary. (n)
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is
expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when
the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
ELEMENTS OF QUASI DELICT/TORTS
1. act or omission
2. damage or injury is caused to another
3. fault or negligence is present
4. there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
5. causal connection between damage done and act/omission
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
DAMAGES for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of
the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7,
1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila
awarded DAMAGES in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the DAMAGES to P1,000 with legal interest from
the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals
found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was
careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law
and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent DAMAGES
suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article
1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the
Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar
simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903
of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this
action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,),
but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection
or supervision of his servant or employee.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as QUASI-DELICTs, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules
of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of QUASI-DELICTs and the employer's
primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set
forth: that a QUASI-DELICT or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent
from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could
not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director."
(Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that
before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la
del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of
the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility
of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek DAMAGES only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and
to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of QUASI-DELICT or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the defendant-petitioner.

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of DAMAGES from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for
the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted,
the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial,
reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
 Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering
the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal.
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was
prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial,
he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when
appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the
pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in
the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to QUASI-DELICTs.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as
culpa aquiliana or QUASI-DELITO, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply
says, "Obligations derived from QUASI-DELICTO shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII
of this Book, (on QUASI-DELICTs) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover DAMAGES twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is
not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or QUASI-DELICT, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish
jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for DAMAGES due to a QUASI-DELICT or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a DOUBLE RECOVERY.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of
liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of
law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language
in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers
to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover DAMAGES on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a QUASI-DELICT only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
QUASI-DELICT, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill
is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the DAMAGES caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is
not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not
relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with
the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment
of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San
Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming
daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the
company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question,
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his
exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins
to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting
safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a
little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body
at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station
for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in
a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these
melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the
darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which
he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and
the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be
a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First
Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his
conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff
himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks
on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the
train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this
distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference
between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between
persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . . ."
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction
which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the
plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a
failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by
any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and
should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with
safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on
and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk,
and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according
to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is
also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and
other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and
for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
COMPANY

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his
father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in
the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the
city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son
of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed
the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not
in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which
both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit
was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the
power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin
wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find,
hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a
little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys
then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and
obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but
could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed
putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the
neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the
metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises, nor
how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the
accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those
found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and
it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the
construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found
appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where
they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the
rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering
and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's
brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we
may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from
visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were
aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence of
record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are
plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the
property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or some
of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the
rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in
rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley
extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the
company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the
company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway
and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being
used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the
discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen,
and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly
justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps
under its possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators
were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with
the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence
is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an
oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where
not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were
likely to roam about in pastime or in play
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as
a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that,
despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by
the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and
yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according
to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him,
or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise
due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability
of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor
can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age
at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of
the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under
the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at
which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain
responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases
such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for
his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor
over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible
therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may
petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No.
68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the
sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of
that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that
the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this court in
the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while
"There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the
plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the
7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of
Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to
seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this
jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely
denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance,
the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it.
This produces the event giving occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of
the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place
wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining causes
of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that
having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the
negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on
the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but
whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered
trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in
question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below,
without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance
and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue
City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-
appellees

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II,
for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in
this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same
accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated
the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11,
1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to
property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that
the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is
defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and
Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971.
The issue is whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency
of the criminal action.

Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the
operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal
connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on QUASI-DELICT.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other
civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in
which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can
be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on QUASI-DELICT
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on QUASI-DELICT. The concept of quasidelica as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of QUASI-DELICT in the law
itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors
responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based
on a QUASI-DELICT until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a
discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard
Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant
Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard) are
corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th
Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative
defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of defendant BENIGNO
TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly acknowledged responsibility for the
acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident complained of, was under their
control and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as
security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot
and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to defendant
SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached
as Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring
negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by
respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay
was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article
2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state
facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a QUASI-DELICT since it does not mention any negligence on the
part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties.
Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p.
106). Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable
under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, QUASI-
DELICT. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989 states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in the
verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well as precedents
laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard
Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is
hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that QUASI-DELICTs are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a QUASI-DELICT
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action can
proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents' argument that
since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2116 and
2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed
with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's
act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could
not have been part of his duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only:
acts done within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for
damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a
delict and not on a QUASI-DELICT as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is
to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA
243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties is called a QUASI-DELICT and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as
the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as QUASI-DELICT only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to
make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is
that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA
33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on
the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are
liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it
was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are
actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at
the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can
furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless
of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than
that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more
just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision
is immediately executory.
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and
PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.

On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent,
Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a
conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided
with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners
sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C.
Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents,
owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for
preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil
Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the
accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of
the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at
an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the
passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident
in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on
petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on
three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries
with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the provision of Sec.
3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its
driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for on
August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was
charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint
filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence",
and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the
criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore,
the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and
does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of physical
injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action
for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised
Penal Code but for their civil liability on QUASI-DELICTs pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same
negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or
create an action for QUASI-DELICT or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking
recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the arguments of
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for
damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort
under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or
reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not
be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the
complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and
exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or QUASI-
DELICT."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal on
certiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil Case
No. 2850, the essential averments for a QUASI-DELICTual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or the
lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a
result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the
vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and
character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the
failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly
excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act
resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No.
4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both
complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an
action for QUASI-DELICT or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for QUASI-DELICT or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon
QUASI-DELICT may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless
of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are
intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso
which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."4 But in whatever way We
view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under QUASI-DELICT by petitioners, whether
as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation
by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the
trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil
Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from
bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent
court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a
religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a
civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on
April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action,
issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related
Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August 27,
1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which
was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3
(a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense
may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4
affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied
by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation, which has
built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code on QUASI-DELICTs such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on QUASI-DELICTs. All the elements of a QUASI-DELICT are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged
to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act
of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and
held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the
residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners
have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection
between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally),
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of QUASI-DELICTa is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa
aquiliana" or QUASI-DELICT, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual"
or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a QUASI-DELICT or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for QUASI-DELICTs or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for QUASI-
DELICTs or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal
liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in QUASI-DELICTs, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming
the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled
"Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to
proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO
VILLA Y CUNANAN,

On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr.,
Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for damages against the private respondents
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan — docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 —
alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle
along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result
of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed
their answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying the other allegations of the complaint
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the ground that
the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3,
Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is
terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case
No. 5114. 5
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836, acquitting the
accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that the
petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal
action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on
QUASI-DELICT.
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an order 9 dated April
13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his order 11
dated May 30, 1979.
Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and
for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the said comment as
answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on September 3, 1979.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission
complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission
charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, 13 like quasi
delict. 14
In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was based upon a
quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:
xxxxxxxxx
4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-asa, Bo. San
Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a bicycle on his way home
to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit
Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of which he sustained
physical injuries which cause his instantaneous death and the bicycle he was riding on was
damaged and destroyed;
5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by defendant
Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in
a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to
persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulations;
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly defendant
Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro
Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred.
xxxxxxxxx
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting
fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct
causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties. In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that:
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e), Section
3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a QUASI-DELICT only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent
Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No.
5114 for damages based on QUASI-DELICT.17
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus
P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat.
When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"
(Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the
plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in
the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely
insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of
justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one party and the
other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"
which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the
essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may
result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it
is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to
specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in
this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence
for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy
as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the
court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that
official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16
They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law,
upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support
its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket.
But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties;
that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight,
although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee
that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-class
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station
for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out
tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class
tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with
the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to
be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said
witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation
whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a
"first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort,
giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was
not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a
passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point
where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay
the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the
conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier —
a case of QUASI-DELICT. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
 A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We will
note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am
protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in
French — "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be the
notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook reading
"First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think
so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within
the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and
mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have been
an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry
was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised — as
it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The
task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with the
same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., v NOEL CORDERO,

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1999 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51671, entitled, Noel Cordero, Plaintiff-Appellee versus American Express International, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers, which the latter then use to purchase
goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent
Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an American Express charge card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The
issuance of the charge card was covered by an Amex Cardmember Agreement. As cardholder, Nilda, upon
signing the back portion of the card, manifested her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement.
An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which
he also signed.[2]
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law,
went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at about 7:00
oclock, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop located at 277C Ocean Gallery, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension charge
card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone call to the American
Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the
counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American
Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and
humiliation considering that it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out
counter. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card. [3]
When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She was able to talk
to Senior Authorizer Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong
attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong American Express
Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in Hong Kong, placed his card
in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. This is the system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the
company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of
unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the
holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved.
Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated. [4]
When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office, its representative said he wants to talk to
respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure observed under the Inspect Airwarn
Support System. However, respondent refused. Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish
the identity of the cardholder.[5] This led to the confiscation of respondents card.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for damages
against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-60807. He prayed for the award of moral damages and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he suffered.
The trial court found that the inexcusable failure of defendant (petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent
herein) of the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the proximate cause of the confiscation and
cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which defendant should be
held liable.[6] On February 20, 1995, the trial court promulgated its Decision
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the trial courts Decision with
modification in the sense that the amounts of damages awarded were reduced

In this case, the inference made by the courts below is manifestly mistaken. Therefore, we are justified in
reviewing the records of this case and rendering judgment based on our own findings.
In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered embarrassment and humiliation because his card was
unceremoniously confiscated and cut in half by Susan Chong of Watsons Chemist Shop.
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the Civil Code:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a QUASI-DELICT and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.[10]
In order that an obligation based on QUASI-DELICT may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for QUASI-DELICT
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a QUASI-DELICTual liability, the contract can be
said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. [11]
Furthermore, to constitute QUASI-DELICT, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage
or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, policy and precedent.[12]
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1, 1991, a person in
Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of respondents card; and that
petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of [respondents]
extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which [petitioner] should be held liable. [13]
We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson
that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had respondent talked to
petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card.
Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of
respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
That respondent refused to talk to petitioners representative can be gleaned from the testimony of Mr. Chen
Heng Kun a.k.a. Johnny Chen during the deposition in Hong Kong
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done
here. It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to
petitioners representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there
was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51671 is REVERSED.