Atty.
Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
CASE DIGESTS
LEGAL ETHICS
A. PRACTICE OF LAW
1. G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.
JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management
Facts:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Renato Cayetano
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his
oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Pertinent provision of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
regarding the required qualifications for COMELEC is as
follows:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having
hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and
project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban
poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by
the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative.
Issue:
Whether or not Christian Monsod possesses the required
qualification of having been in the “practice of law” for at
least ten years.
Ruling:
Yes. “Practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."
In the light of the various definitions of the term “practice
of law" and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
2. A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO
Facts:
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of
Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.
Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of
Taggat Industries, Inc. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. Taggat Industries, Inc.
("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of timber concessions from the government. The
PCGG sequestered it sometime in 1986, and its operations
ceased in 1997.
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a
criminal complaint against Ruthie Lim-Santiago. Taggat
employees alleged that complainant, who took over Taggat
after the death of her father, withheld payment of their
salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996
to 15 July 1997.
Respondent Atty. Sagucio, as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation
of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent for violating Rule
15.03 Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
contends that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well and should have
inhibited himself. Furthermore, complainant claims that
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even
harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and
sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of
engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence
to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s
fee for the months of January and February 1995, another
P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000
for the month of April 1996. Complainant seeks the
disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working
as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and
counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
adverse resolution of the criminal complaint. Respondent
claims that when the criminal complaint was filed,
respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years, thus, no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his
appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
from complainant but claims that it was only on a case-to-
case basis and it ceased in 1996.
IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation
("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest,
and violating the prohibition against the private practice of
law while being a government prosecutor imposed a
penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law.
Clearly, Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel
and labor concerns of Taggat and undoubtedly dealt with
and related with the employees of Taggat which lawyer
owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent
owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in
which he previously represented him."
As to the propriety of receiving "retainer fees" or
"consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being
an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government
prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do
any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal
profession.
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the
Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Rule
15.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility but finds respondent liable for violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code against unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
duties." A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not
apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of
the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct.” This
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private practice of
[his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with [his] official functions." Complainant’s
evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent
represented conflicting interests.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer
will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment. In the present case,
we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled
the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint
filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the
criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly,
respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during
that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who
conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used
any confidential information from his previous
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the
criminal complaint.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor.
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as – x x x
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s
self to the public as a lawyer. Respondent argues that he
only rendered consultancy services to Taggat
intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat
from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long
as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same
falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his
legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated
that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee."
Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent
clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to
disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute
infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for
government employees engaging in unauthorized private
practice of profession is suspension for six months and one
day to one year. We find this penalty appropriate for
respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
3. A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN,
ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG,
DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R.
QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. RIVERA, EDUARDO C.
RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ
and DENU A. AGATEP vs. ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA
Facts:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3,
1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan
and the other above-named complainants, against Atty.
Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan. In his letter-
complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified
two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243,
Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10,
1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized
the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214,
Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26,
1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries
appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last
entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on
December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have
notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December
10, 1998.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct in
the performance of his duties.
Ruling:
Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of
his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the
affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo.
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta vs. Llosa, wherein Atty.
Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing
that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court
held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and
thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six months, this being his first
administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales vs. Ramos,
we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G.
Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six
months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in
his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In
Mondejar vs. Rubia, however, a lesser penalty of one month
suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty.
Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the
document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's
first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-
month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in
order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for
revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be
imposed upon him.
4. JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council
of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional
Director of the National Police Commission, Regional
Office XI, Davao City.
Facts:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of
the RTC. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received confidential information
that administrative and criminal charges were filed against
Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional
Director of NAPOLCOM, as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service per A.O. No. 183.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the JBC,
Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases
filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all
dismissed. No administrative case was disclosed by Judge
Qutain in his PDS.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy
Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher Lock requested
from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Orders
dismissing the criminal cases and from NAPOLCOM
certified true copies of documents relative to the
administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain,
particularly A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
NAPOLCOM furnished the OCA a copy of A.O. No. 183
showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from
the service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering
the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in
support of his claim for reimbursement of expenses.
In a letter addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied
having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC.
He alleged that he never received from the Office of the
President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him
from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain
within ten (10) days from notice why he did not include in
his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public, the
administrative case filed against him, and the fact of his
dismissal from the service.
In his letters, respondent explained that during the
investigation of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM
Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him
that if he resigns from the government service, he will no
longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he
tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM
which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the
DILG; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS because
he was of the "honest belief" that he had no more pending
administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his
resignation "amounted to an automatic dismissal" of his
administrative case considering that "the issues raised
therein became moot and academic"; and that had he
known that he would be dismissed from the service, he
should not have applied for the position of a judge since he
knew he would never be appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively
liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. An examination of the
PDS submitted by Judge Quitain with the JBC, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public, reveals that
he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in
having answered "yes" to Question No. 24, but without
disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the
government service. Judge Quitain deliberately did not
disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the
government service. At the time he filled up and submitted
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his PDS with the JBC, he had full knowledge of the subject
administrative case, as well as A.O. No. 183 dismissing him
from the government service.
Respondent filed his Comment contending that before he
filed his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no
knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from
the NAPOLCOM service as the case was "secretly heard and
decided."
OCA submitted its Memorandum stating therein that it was
adopting its earlier findings. Based on the documents
presented, it cannot be denied that at the time Judge
Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of
A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from government service. OCA
maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Quitain concealed his administrative
charges and dismissal in the PDS and filed his application
with knowledge of said charges and dismissal.
Ruling:
Yes. SC fully agrees with the disquisition and the
recommendation of the OCA. It behooves every
prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the
appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness
for judicial office, including such circumstances as may
reflect on his integrity and probity. These are
qualifications specifically required of appointees to the
Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service
for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 by no less than the
former President of the Philippines. He insists that before
he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support of his
application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No.
183; and that he was denied due process. He further
argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him
were dismissed, and considering the fact that he resigned
from office, his administrative case had become moot and
academic. Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact
that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that
he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the
newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. In the
Mindanao Times, Judge Quitain stated in one of his
interviews that "I was dismissed from the Napolcom office
without due process." It also reads: "Quitain, who was one
of the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept
unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from the government service."
Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was
denied due process. The documents submitted by the
NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him
summons informing him that an administrative complaint
had been filed against him and required him to file an
answer. Respondent, through his counsel, filed an Answer.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to
explain one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity
to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Furthermore, cessation from office by his resignation does
not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint
filed against him while he was still in the service nor does
it render said administrative case moot and academic.
Judge Quitain was removed from office after investigation
and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal
from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately
misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the
Judiciary.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and
integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of
the Judiciary. We have often stressed that the conduct
required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond
reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion
that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice, which
would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found
guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal. However, the Court received a letter
from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating
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that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective
immediately as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 10,
Davao City.
The resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by
the Court without prejudice does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction
that the Court had at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent
acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased
to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court
retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official
innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary
rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent,
the respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served
well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V.
QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have
warranted his dismissal from the service had he not
resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby
meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that
he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other
privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits
which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and
appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of
the government, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations.
5. Adm. Case No. 2984, August 31, 2007
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO vs. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative
Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice
of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already
seventy-one years old and barred from the practice of law
for fifteen years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia’s disbarment are as
follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his
retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 1) misappropriating and converting to his personal
use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted
to him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo, situated
in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I;
and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00
entrusted to him for payment of taxes and
expenses in connection with the
registration of title of Bernardo to
another property in a subdivision known
as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents,
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without
funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.
The Supreme Court En banc declared the respondent, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and
hereby imposes on him the penalty of disbarment.
12 years later in 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that
he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. The
Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the
petition for reinstatement.
8 years thereafter in 2007, Mejia filed the present petition
for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for
reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or
opposition was filed against the petition.
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the
law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since
Mejia’s name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At
the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and
pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long
repented and he has suffered enough. Through his
reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children
and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court decides that the public interest
in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will
continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry
as a counselor at law.
Ruling:
Petition is granted.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the
bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The
Court will take into consideration the applicants character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the application
for reinstatement.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a
publication containing his religious and social writings. He
also organized a religious organization and named it El
Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and
Mind.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.
6. A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
Facts:
In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez sought
the suspension or disbarment of Respondent Atty. Leonard
de Vera (1) for misrepresentation through his concealment
of the suspension order rendered against him by the State
Bar of California; and (2) for violation of the “rotation rule”
enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491.
The first ground concerned an administrative case filed
against Atty. de Vera before the State Bar of California. The
action arose from an insurance case he had handled
involving Julius Wills III, who had figured in an automobile
accident in 1986. To settle the case amicably, Atty. de Vera
received -- on his client’s behalf -- a $12,000 check, which
he then deposited in his personal account. Because of his
irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for three years, upon
the recommendation of the hearing referee. The case was
not decided on the merits, because Atty. de Vera resigned
from the California Bar. Later, his resignation was accepted
by the Supreme Court of California.
On the second ground, complainant averred that
respondent’s transfer of membership from the Pasay,
Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) IBP Chapter
to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was a circumvention of
the rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made the transfer
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
for the sole purpose of becoming IBP national president.
Complainant stressed that respondent neither resided in
Agusan del Sur nor held office there.
A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the
letter-request of respondent, asking the Supreme Court to
schedule his oath-taking as IBP national president. On the
other hand, AM No. 05-5-15-SC referred to the letter-
report of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP Resolution
removing Atty. de Vera from the latter’s positions as IBP
board member and executive vice-president, for
committing acts inimical to the board and the IBP in
general.
The controversy in these two consolidated cases started
when the IBP board approved the withdrawal of a Petition
docketed at the Supreme Court as “Integrated Bar of the
Philippines et al vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. - SC-
R165108.” Subsequently, during the plenary session held
at the 10th National IBP Convention, respondent allegedly
made some untruthful statements, innuendos, and blatant
lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to
withdraw the Petition.
On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to
IBP National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of
the IBP board membership of Atty. de Vera, who had
allegedly committed acts inimical to the board and the IBP
in general. The following day, during its 20th regular
meeting, the IBP board resolved by a two-thirds vote to
remove respondent from his positions as a member of the
board of governors and as the executive vice-president
(EVP) of the IBP.
On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy
in the EVP position, brought about by the removal of Atty.
de Vera. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago was formally elected and declared as EVP.
On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished
that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005, during its last
regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new EVP in the
person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar. On June 28,
2005, IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme
Court's approval of Atty. Salazar's election and assumption
of office as national president, in the event that Atty. de
Vera would be disbarred or suspended from the practice of
law; or should his removal from his positions as member
of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP
be approved by the Court. Protesting the election of both
Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, respondent also denied
having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its board. He
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
maintained that his removal from his two positions had
been done without due notice and due process.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. de Vera committed
malpractice which amounted to moral turpitude in the
State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course
of his practice of law.
Ruling:
Yes. There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the
part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation
of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California. The Court cited Maquera, according to which a
judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction may transmute into a similar judgment
of suspension in the Philippines, only if the basis of the
foreign court’s action included any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction. The Court
opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his
client’s father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty.
de Vera was impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds
for his own personal use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized
use of his client’s funds was highly unethical. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about
this matter. The conduct of Atty. de Vera -- holding on to
the money of his client without the latter’s acquiescence --
was indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It was
clear that by depositing the $12,000 check in his own bank
account and using it for his own benefit, respondent was
guilty of malpractice, gross misconduct, and unethical
behavior. He violated his oath to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court decreed
that, where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering
the amount involved in this case, the Court considered the
penalty of suspension for two years appropriate. The Court
found that the transfer by Atty. de Vera of his membership
to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was within his rights. He
could not be deemed to be guilty of unethical conduct or
behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility
nor the Lawyer’s Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be
the IBP national president or prohibited them from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing that goal.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
7. G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ALBERTO MINA, HON.
ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES
Facts:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner)
filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan vs.
Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with
the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent
in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should
take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a
Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the
Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone. The MeTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to
restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari
proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002,
resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
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de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant,
even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002
with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002
Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar
Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial
dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC
denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration
and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the
ground that the RTC had already denied the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Cruz, a third year law student, may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
litigant.
Ruling:
Yes. In Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No.
730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student
appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior
courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer.
Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. -
In the court of a justice of the peace, a
party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally
or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified
in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a
law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
8. A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
He assailed the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and
the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP
By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is
found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws
(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule,
which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
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the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership
in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby
organized an official national body to be known as
the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of
all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
He contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to
be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession
and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and
thereby null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a
deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent.
Ruling:
No. The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as
distinguished from bar associations that are organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is
voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of
which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose
of carrying out its objectives and implementation of
regulations in the practice of law.
The provisions assailed does not infringe the
constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid
exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its
existence with regulatory measures to implement. The
name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney
for being a delinquent member of the bar.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
In In Re: Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which
the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said:
"The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court —
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this
is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the
legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the
duty. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in
judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed.
It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only
with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to
protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty
that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to
pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of
Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal.
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Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
B. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER
I. The Lawyer and The Society
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law of and legal processes.
9. G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 27, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, CLAIMING TO BE AND ACTING AS
TANODBAYAN-OMBUDSMAN UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
Facts:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing
him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however
proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal
informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has
also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court
was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful
on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the
conviction of poor and small offenders.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against
Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to
explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his
freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the
rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed into error.
Issue:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
Ruling:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
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disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to
Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others. It is one of the bounded
duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officer (Section 20
[b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements
necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court
betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the
Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the
country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional
guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of
is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom
of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There
is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity
of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the
court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and
authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that
of a private practicing lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court
but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his
statements, particularly the one where he alleged that
members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no
relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty
both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.
10. A.C. No. 5838, January 17, 2005
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO
vs. ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO
Facts:
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991,
they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale
notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his
notarial register. Complainant spouses averred that about
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six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute
with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafa through falsification of a public
document. During the trial of the case, German presented
in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the
authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The
spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said
deed.
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact
that the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal
formalities of a duly notarized document, including an
impression of respondent’s notarial dry seal. Not being
persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they
could not have forged the signature of herein respondent.
They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and
notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of
respondent’s seal or signature on the subject deed of sale
or elsewhere.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the
allegations against him. He denied having notarized any
deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to
respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio
General and Jacob Law Office where as a matter of office
procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior
lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that
notarization was done. Respondent added that he
normally required the parties to exhibit their community
tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge
the documents before him as notary public. He would have
remembered complainants had they actually appeared
before him. While he admitted knowing complainant
Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s husband and co-
complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years
from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of
sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination
of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that it
was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild. He
suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his
signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent
stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was
supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on
vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone
to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with
the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the
document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal
scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation which the IBP noted that the
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale
was different from his signatures in other documents he
submitted during the investigation of the present case.
However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent
because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his
notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial
dry seal and notarial register. It thus recommended the
respondent’s commission as notary public be revoked for
two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should
not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2)
years upon receipt hereof.
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties,
complainants did not categorically state that they
appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. The records show that complainants themselves
were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document;
what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as
well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent
on the deed.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Hidalgo is guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public.
Ruling:
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial
functions, the IBP reasoned out that the responsibility
attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of
his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted
everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other
mechanics of the document for notarization to the
secretary there can be a possibility that even the
respondent’s signature which is the only one left for him to
do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter
as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the
supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the
office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept
by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody
else.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby
found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his
duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his
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commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if
he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from
an appointment as a notary public for a period of two
years from finality of this resolution.
11. A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005
ARTURO L. SICAT vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR.
Facts:
Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola of
committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in notarizing a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Said SPA was
purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez, of the JC Benitez
Architect and Technical Management. Said company had a
contract with the Municipality of Cainta for the
construction of low cost houses.
What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was
notarized more than 2 months after the death of Benitez,
the person who supposedly executed it. P P3,700,000 was
paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management for
services not rendered (as consultants).
Ariola claims that the document he notarized was
superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, and
therefore he should be exonerated – the document was
cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence legally there
was no public document that existed.
Issue:
Whether or not Ariola can be held liable for the act of
notarizing the SPA.
Ruling:
Yes. Notaries public should not authenticate documents
unless the persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them and personally appeared
before the, to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.
His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act.
Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a year.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
12. A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012
NESA ISENHARDT vs. ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL
Facts:
This case stemmed from the verified complaint filed with
the IBP by Nesa G. Isenhardt seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real for allegedly notarizing
a document even without the appearance of one of the
parties.
Complainant alleged that respondent notarized a Special
Power Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by her. The
SPA authorizes complainant’s brother to mortgage her real
property. Complainant averred that she never appeared
before respondent. She maintained that it was impossible
for her to subscribe to the questioned document in the
presence of respondent since she was in Germany at that
time. Complainant submitted that because of respondent’s
act, the property subject of the SPA was mortgaged and
later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.
Respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He
narrated that spouses Wilfredo and Lorena Gusi
approached him to seek advice regarding the computer
business they were planning to put up. During one of their
meetings, the spouses allegedly introduced to him Nesa G.
Isenhardt, sister of Wilfredo, as the financier of their
proposed business. Respondent further narrated that
spouses Gusi and the complainant, went to his office to
have the subject SPA notarized. He maintained that the
parties all signed in his presence, exhibiting to him their
respective CTCs. Complainant even presented to him the
original copy of the TCT of the property subject of the SPA
evidencing her ownership of the property.
Respondent concluded that complainant’s cause of action
had already prescribed. He argued that a complaint for
disbarment prescribes in two years from the date of
professional misconduct.
Moreover, respondent noted that the SPA in question
authorizing the grantee Wilfredo Gusi to mortgage the
property of complainant was not used for any transaction
with a third person prejudicial to the latter. The
annotation at the back of the TCT would show that the
property subject of the SPA was instead sold by
complainant to her brother Wilfredo. Thus, he submits that
the SPA did not cause grave injury to the complainant.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution which
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. IBP Commissioner Dennis
Funa, after due proceeding, found respondent guilty of
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gross negligence as a notary public and recommended that
he be suspended from the practice of law for one year and
disqualified from reappointment as notary public for two
(2) years.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross negligence as
a notary public.
Ruling:
Yes. SC sustained the findings and recommendation of the
IBP.
Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he made it appear that
complainant personally appeared before him and
subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to mortgage
her property.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signs it is the same person who executed it,
personally appearing before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable
the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party’s free act.
Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him
and subscribed to the SPA subject of the instant case. His
contention, however, cannot prevail over the documentary
evidence presented by complainant that she was not in the
Philippines on 14 September 2000, the day the SPA was
allegedly notarized.
Anent respondent’s claim of prescription of the offense, we
agree with the Investigating Commissioner that the rule
should be construed to mean two years from the date of
discovery of the professional misconduct. To rule
otherwise would cause injustice to parties who may have
discovered the wrong committed to them only at a much
later date. In this case, the complaint was filed more than
three years after the commission of the act because it was
only after the property was foreclosed that complainant
discovered the SPA.
The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless
ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by
parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is
of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the
grantee for the purpose it was intended because the
property was allegedly transferred from complainant to
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated
between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act
of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the
parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. A notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries
public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing
documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
notarized documents will be undermined.
A lawyer commissioned as notary public having thus failed
to discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of
his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years
and suspension from the practice of law for one year, are
in order.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty.
Leonardo M. Real is hereby REVOKED. He is disqualified
from reappointment as notary public for a period of two
(2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
13. ADM. CASE No. 3319, June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed for disbarment
against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of
complainant, Leslie Ui.
Complainant Leslie Ui prayed for the disbarment of Atty.
Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed
immorality by having intimate relations with a married
man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children.
Complainant testified that respondent’s mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband
since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank
where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. It was thus
highly improbable that respondent, who was living with
her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by
her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.
Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it
was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
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married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated
that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because
he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate,
respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to
have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her
Answer had she known that the same was altered.
Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling
reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to
Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the
fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married
before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988.
Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
testified and admitted that he was the person responsible
for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987
to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines dismissed the complaint for Gross Immorality
against Respondent is for lack of merit. But Atty. Iris
Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully
attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will
merit a more severe penalty.
Issue:
Should the complaint for disbarment be dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal
affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship
with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent
believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
is flouting those moral standards." Respondents act of
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged
moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage
attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable
to believe the averment of respondent that she merely
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which
was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant
as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily
recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to
fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at
bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply
stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly
improbable.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less
than the highest degree of morality.
14. SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.
Facts:
Figueroa and Barranco were sweethearts since their teens.
Their intimacy eventually resulted to a son born out of
wedlock. At this point (1964) Barranco promised Figueroa
that he would marry her when he passes the bar
examinations. After four takes, he finally passed but did
not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their
relationship ended. Years later, he married another
woman. When Barranco was about to take his oath to
enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint
relaying to the court what happened between her and
Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to
dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and
because for the past years, he has become elected in the
Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various
civic organizations and has acquired a good standing
within his community while the case was pending. The
court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended
that Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa
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reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of
Barranco which led to its delay.
Issue:
Whether or not Barranco should be allowed to take his
oath despite the accusations of Figueroa.
Ruling:
Yes. The maintenance of an intimate relationship between
a man and a woman, both of whom had no impediment to
marry and voluntarily carried on with the affair, does not
amount to a grossly immoral conduct even if a child was
born out of the relationship. His previous acts may be said
to be a question to his moral character but none of these
are “so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.” Her allegations that she was forced to have
sexual relations with him cannot lie as evidenced by her
continued cohabitation with him even after their child was
born in 1964. The ignobleness of his treatment of Figueroa
is sufficiently punished by the 26 years that he has been
prevented from entering the profession he has worked so
hard for.
15. A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P.
MARTINEZ
Facts:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty.
Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final
judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving
moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City.
Atty. Martinez was convicted of the crime involving BP 22.
He was also involved in another Estafa case pertaining to
his legal services rendered on the victim of Doña Paz
tragedy. The victim he represented filed a complaint
because of the compensation that the victim had received
from Sulpicio Lines which was later deducted by Atty.
Martinez. On Sept. 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors
passed a resolution approving the report and the
recommendation of its investigating commissioner. On
Dec. 3, 2003 respondent filed a reinvestigation.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of issuing worthless check is
one involving moral turpitude.
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
2. Whether or not the act of the respondent is considered
to be a ground for disbarment
Ruling:
1. Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It
involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
In People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, where the
erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we
held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the
land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of such offense
2. In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the
appropriate penalty. Of all classes and professions, the
lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is
their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of
the body politic.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
16. A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O.
TANSINGCO
Facts:
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code").
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton
("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document against
Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and
respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a
counter-charge for perjury against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11,
1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the
following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time
resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don
Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S.
citizen and thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name – agreed that the property
be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton,
requested me to prepare several documents that
would guarantee recognition of him being the
actual owner of the property despite the transfer
of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s
free and undisturbed use of the property for his
residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan
which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing
the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and
is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed
that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment, respondent claimed that complainant
filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,
because respondent refused to act as complainant’s
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and
due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San
Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San
Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification,
the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension
from the practice of law for six months.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the
IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old
and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of
his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is
his only means of support for his family and his six minor
children.
IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP
had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had
already been referred to the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Tansingco is liable for
violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer should not render any service or give advice
to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which
he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating
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the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a
U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.
Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent
admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the
parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the
prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the
title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided
"some safeguards" by preparing several documents,
including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee
Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property
despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
lands by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus,
he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an
act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may
be suspended.
17. A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
Facts:
The controversy involves 3 consolidated cases revolving
around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor
and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera.
Let’s concentrate on the disbarment case questioning Atty.
de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar and his removal as Governor and EVP of the
IBP.
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed
before the State Bar of California. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius
Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986.
Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of
Julius who was given authority by the son to control the
case because the latter was then studying in San Diego
California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the
case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the
case which he then deposited to his personal account.
The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for three years. Atty. de Vera opted to
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resign from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
(On the second issue re removal from IBP) At the 10th
National IBP Convention at Camp John Hay Convention
Center, Baguio City, it was alleged that Atty. de Vera made
some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in
connection with the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw a
petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.
IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President
Cadiz a letter praying for the removal of Atty. de Vera as
member of the IBP Board for committing acts which were
inimical to the IBP. Later, the IBP Board resolved to
remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of
Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.
Issue:
Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to
the person of Attorney Leonard S. Devera (sic) wherever
he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
Ruling:
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar
of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.
The judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Judgment of
suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a
similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if
the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.
Moreover, the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as
lawyer. The judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Considering that there is technically no foreign judgment
to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of
the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie
evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts
upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer
was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove
that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
However, there is substantial evidence of malpractice on
the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
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recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of
the State Bar of California.
Atty. de Vera vehemently insisted that he did not
misappropriate his client's funds as the latter's father (the
elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this
explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis
testified under oath that he "expected de Vera might use
the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father
and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has
impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own
personal use.
(At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.)
The unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is
highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Atty. de Vera himself admitted that he used his client's
money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own
fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial
evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now
has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself
supplied. The act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his
client's money without the latter's acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account
and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He
caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble
profession to which he belongs.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court does not agree with the
plea to disbar Atty. de Vera from the practice of law. The
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power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the
amount involved here – US$12,000, the penalty of
suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for
just and valid cause.
The IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient
power and authority to protect itself from an intractable
member whose removal was caused not by his
disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as
inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in
general. The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right
in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's actuations during
the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the
role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP.
The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the
IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of
its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its by-
laws.
18. G.R. No. 1203, May 15, 1903
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D.
TERRELL from the practice of law.
Facts:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to
show cause in the CFI Manila, on the 5th day of February,
1903, why he should not be suspended as a member of the
bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of
the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been
notified that the said organization was made for
the purpose of evading the law then in force in
said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro
Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to
him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his
counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges,
denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto.
After reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in
the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell, wherein he
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was charged with estafa, and after reading the said
affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges
aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and
thereupon made an order suspending him from his office
as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk
of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the
order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based.
Issue:
Whether or not Terrell should be suspended as a member
of the bar.
Ruling:
Yes. We have carefully considered these facts, and have
reached the conclusion that they were such as to justify the
court below in arriving at the conclusion that the
knowledge and acts of the accused in connection with the
organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such
a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from
practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their
objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws
against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to
malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for
which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the
conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the
case of the United States vs. Terrell was acquitted on the
charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of
crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this
proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be
condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of
law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from
the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year
from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
19. G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION],
HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO
SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred
that the respondent justices have violated Rule 5.10 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’
and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the
1987 Constitution.
“Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal
views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion
of political partisanship, a judge shall not make
political speeches, contribute to party funds,
publicly endorse candidates for political office or
participate in other partisan political activities.”
Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged
a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by
President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in
Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452and356 SCRA 108) is,
petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due
process.-According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of
his ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the
three justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan
made manifest their bias and partiality against his client.
Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language
when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha naman kaming gago,’
(Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
characterized the motion as insignificant even before the
prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto,
(Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant
Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder.
(Ibid.)
Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July
2003, a motion for their disqualification.-The petitioner
also asked the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last
January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President
Arroyo as President on the ground of ‘permanent
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disability’ even without proof of compliance with
the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g.,
written declaration by either the President or
majority of his cabinet; and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on
that same ground of permanent disability.
In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form
of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on
matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition
assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for
gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit.
The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a
recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, the Court strongly
warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary
sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its
Member.
Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the
Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end. In fact,
on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune,
Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
“What is the legal effect of that violation of
President Estrada’s right to due process of law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo
unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair
play were not observed. There was no fair play
since it appears that when President Estrada filed
his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party
- GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting
to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After
the justices had authorized the proclamation of
GMA as president, can they be expected to
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their
own act?”
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
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Ruling:
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a
decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-
founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In
Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has not
limited his discussions to the merits of his client’s case
within the judicial forum. Indeed, he has repeated his
assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media.
“Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a member of the bar from making such public
statements on any pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia
may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a
potentially dangerous threat to the administration of
justice.”
It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political
activities,” in its statutory context, relates to acts designed
to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate
or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a
public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office
by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of
the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other
justices of the Court at such an event could be no different
from their appearance in such other official functions as
attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the
President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; but it will
not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those
who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to
impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court
20. A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO vs. ATTY.
FLORANTE E. MADROÑO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroño filed by spouses
Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino.
Complainant Venustiano is a member of the Philippine
National Police while his wife Rosalia is a public school
teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also
filed three separate administrative cases against
respondent, which led to the latter’s dismissal from the
judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement benefits.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that
respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty. The cases filed were:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755, for serious irregularity,
filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, for falsification, filed by
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two
others.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, for evasion through
negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal
Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33, filed by respondent
against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code.
The IBP concluded that complainants submitted
convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts
constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition
of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Madrono’s act of filling numerous
complaints against spouses Saburnido constitute gross
misconduct that will warrant the imposition of
administrative sanctions.
Ruling:
Yes. SC agrees with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his
professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at
all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, Rule 7.03 provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against
herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another
individual, as complainants were instrumental in
respondent's dismissal from the judiciary. We see in
respondent's tenacity in pursuing several cases against
complainants not the persistence of one who has been
grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying
to exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public
perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However,
we find that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate
to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we
will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent.
Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a
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punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that
a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
21. A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO
Facts:
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that
Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
“pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later
executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s
calling card. In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing
Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such
calling cards.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached
upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper
calling card of Labiano.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients,
Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical predatory overstep
into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03 and 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty.
Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear
that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through
Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty.
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
22. G.R. No. 104599, March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON
DE YSASI
Facts:
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons
respectively. The elder Ysasi owns a hacienda in Negros
Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as the
farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III
underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was
confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III
filed against his father for illegal dismissal before the
National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked
that his son actually abandoned his work.
Issue:
Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
Ruling:
No. His absence from work does not constitute
abandonment. To constitute abandonment, there must be:
a.) failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason, and
b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. No such intent was
proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the
lawyers for both camps failed to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of
court and especially in consideration of the direct and
immediate consanguineous ties between their clients
especially considering that the parties involved are father
and son. This case may have never reached the courts had
there been an earnest effort by the lawyers to have both
parties find an off court settlement but records show that
no such effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is
not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than
for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
explicitly provides that “(a) lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement.” Both counsels fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of
the court. In the same manner, the labor arbiter who
handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to
the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
labor arbiter “shall exert all efforts towards the amicable
settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction.” If he
ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious
records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren
of any reflection of the same.
23. G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Facts:
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas
Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries.
In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite
sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this
Court, in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the
judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August
25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172, 923.87.
Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was
denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located
in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for
auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the
auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,
1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718,
affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family house
and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the
house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem,
and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of
sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon
their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a
writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his
wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor
Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the
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replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes
Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house
and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff
could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the
judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife
Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was
issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes
was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging
business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and
which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of
Appeals where they filed another petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The said
court gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer encouraged his clients to
avoid controversy.
Ruling:
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint
for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice demands that
the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for the respondents
Agos abetted by their lawyer.
Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted
the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty.
Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what the SC does not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent
futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel
to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he
finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to
advise rather the latter to acquiesce and submit than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s
propensity to litigate.
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Canon 2 – A lawyer shall make his legal
services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence,
integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
24. A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
JONAR SANTIAGO vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN
Facts:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology, lodged a disbarment
complaint against respondent Atty. Edison Rafanan before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging, inter alia,
that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of
Canon 12of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
the latter executed an affidavit in favour of his client and
offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client. The complaint also alleged that
after the hearing of the case, respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. In
his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the
complainant and uttered insulting words nor veiled
threats against the latter. He however admitted that he
executed an affidavit in favour of his client and offered the
same as evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client but interposed the defense that
lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on
substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
essential to the ends of justice." Complainant charged
respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house when the alleged
crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends
of justice.” The IBP, while finding that administrative
offense was committed by respondent for violating the
notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the complaint
for alleged violation of Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the present action was
commenced.
Issue:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative to the
cause of the party which he is actively representing in a
case without violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
Ruling:
Yes. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not
disqualified from being a witness, except only in certain
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cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from
an attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such
rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses
from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the
facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates
are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the
cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and
impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of
competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being
witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as
witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they
do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the
Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients,
we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons: First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer
to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by
law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal
action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent,
as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to
save his clients from a wrong conviction. The Affidavit
executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the
defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on
the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were
at his residence and could not have possibly committed the
crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Second,
paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in
which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In
this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a
preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of
securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and
public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as
expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the
State from useless and expensive prosecutions. The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to
be followed by the trial proper. Nonetheless, we deem it
important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from
accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or
has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness
for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in
which his testimony may become essential to serve the
"ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him
to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
25. A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO
Facts:
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that
Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
“pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later
executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s
calling card. In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing
Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such
calling cards.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached
upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper
calling card of Labiano.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients,
Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical predatory overstep
into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03 and 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty.
Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear
that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through
Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty.
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
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 Canon 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.
26. A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO
Facts:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid
advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667.
A staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number
and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and
can guarantee a court decree within four to six months,
provided the case will not involve separation of property
or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her
husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research revealed that similar advertisements
were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine
Star.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising
and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule
2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to
him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are
not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our
views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by
the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all
the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a
ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.
The case was referred to the IBP and it passed on a
resolution finding the respondent guilty and suspended
him from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
IBP but was denied. Hence, this instant petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Simbillo is guilty for
violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Yes. The court agrees with the IBP Resolution. It has been
repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary
consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession
from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much
money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized
by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing
directly with their clients.
There is no question that respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his
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contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to
violate the rules.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not
altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner,
it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus,
the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use
of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
in Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc.
27. Bar Matter No. 553, June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Facts:
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio
Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a
complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s
advertisements which contain the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of
Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children.
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US
Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article
entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of Philippine
Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s
problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of
it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed
in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it
(John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides,
the advertisement is merely making known to the public
the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
Issue:
Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice
of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not its
advertisement may be allowed.
Ruling:
Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is
composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail
of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however,
the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a
person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of
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his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce,
secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other
circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of
advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as
allowed forms of advertisement:
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list;
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card;
3. Listing in a phone directory but without
designation as to his specialization.
28. Adm. Case No. 2131, May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and
JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L.
SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J.
CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR.
Facts:
In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one
Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay,
asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’ client.
The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”.
Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability and at the same time he
asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker &
McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in Chicago,
Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an
administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using
“Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm
Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is a member of
Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members
in 30 cities all over the world; that they associated with
them in order to make a representation that they can
render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade
and investment.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents should be enjoined from
practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
Ruling:
Yes. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of
Court).
Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the
firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality
to multinational business enterprises and others engaged
in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to
practice law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from
practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
29. July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ
& CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR.,
ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN,
NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN
A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN
Facts:
The case involves two petitions. The first was filed by the
surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip who died on
May 5, 1975 and the other by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14, 1976
praying that they be allowed to continue using in the name
of their firms the names of their deceased partners who
had passed away. The petitioner anchored their petitions
on the following:
1) that under the law, a partnership is not
prohibited from continuing its business under a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner;
2) that in regulating other professions, such as
accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of
the name of a deceased partner;
3) that the Canons of Professional Ethics are not
transgressed by the continued use of the name of
a deceased partner in the firm name of a law
partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use;
4) that there is no possibility of imposition or
deception because the deaths of their respective
deceased partners were well-publicized in all
newspapers of general circulation for several
days; the stationeries now being used by them
carry new letterheads indicating the years when
their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; and
5) that no local custom prohibits the continued
use of a deceased partner's name in a professional
firm's name.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to use in
their firm names the names of their deceased partners.
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. The court cited the
following reasons. First is that Article. 1815 of the Civil
Code provides that “Every partnership shall operate under
a firm name, which may or may not include the name of
one or more of the partners. Those who, not being
members of the partnership, include their names in the
firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner”
thus it is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in
a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners’ and. in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability. Second, the
courts said that a partnership for the practice of law
cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. A partnership
for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on
trade or business or of holding property. Thus, it has been
stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. And lastly while the
court admits that it is true that Canon 33 does not consider
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership
when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the
Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use. It must be
conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits
or allows the continued use of a deceased or former
partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.
30. A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 26, 1999
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R.
GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court
Facts:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges
Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with
grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the
private practice of law which is in conflict with his official
functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized
representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A
typographical error was committed in the complaint which
stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of
63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake
was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which
was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for
execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive
a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio
Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty.
Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the
execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary
restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never
notified of the application for preliminary injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch
220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the
issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent
Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the
wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told her
that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should
change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent
at the same time giving his calling card with the name
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with
office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the
defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that
she could not decide because she was only representing
her sister. To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220
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issued an order granting the preliminary injunction as
threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC,
Branch 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of
the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime
before the hearing of the motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went
to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order
stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment
case. Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her
that the restraining order was only temporary and that the
application for preliminary injunction would still be heard.
Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back
to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant
returned to his office, and informed him that she wanted to
change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the
Law Firm of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and
asking if he could handle her case. Respondent refused as
he was not connected with the law firm, although he was
invited to join but he chose to remain in the judiciary.
Complainant returned to court a few days later and told
him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ
of preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative
case against respondent and the judge. The threat was
repeated but the respondent refused to be pressured.
Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula
claims that the complainant must have filed this
administrative charge because of her frustration in
procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee from the
premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the
complaint against him.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a conflict between the
respondents function as a Branch Clerk of Court and him
engaging into private practice.
Ruling:
Based on the record of this administrative case, the calling
card attached as Annex "B" of complainant's affidavit dated
September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein
respondent was indeed included in the BALIGOD,
GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW
OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
position in said office, the fact remains that his name is
included therein which may therefore tend to show that he
has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be
actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that
his name appears on the calling card as a partner in the
Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices
give the impression that he is connected therein and may
constitute an act of solicitation and private practice which
is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to
be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by
convincing evidence that respondent actually offered to
her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation
committed by respondent in having his name
included/retained in the calling card may only be
considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be
administratively sanctioned."
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an
admission that it is his name which appears on the calling
card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of
legal services. Respondent does not claim that the calling
card was printed without his knowledge or consent and
the calling card carries his name primarily and the name of
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with
address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the
impression that he is connected with the said law firm.
The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional
card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates
Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to,
among others:
"(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with official functions."
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times
must not only be characterized by proprietor and decorum
but above all else must be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch
Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby
reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law
with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will
be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to
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cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any
office engaged in the private practice of law.
Canon 4 – A lawyer shall participate in the
development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice.
Canon 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve
high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
Canon 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers
in government services in the discharge of their
tasks.
31. A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.
RENOMERON
Facts:
This complaint for disbarment is relative to the
administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel
for V&G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against
Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for
the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the
application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed
of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots
in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements,
respondent suspended the registration of the documents
with certain “special conditions” between them, which was
that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket
from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money
per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon
City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of
the documents. He himself elevated the question on the
registrability of the said documents to Administrator
Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator
then resolved in favor of the registrability of the
documents. Despite the resolution of the Administrator,
the respondent still refused the registration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted in his previous
denial.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance as a public
official.
2. Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to government service in the discharge of official
tasks.
Ruling:
1. Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s
oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man
for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.
2. Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule
1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule
1.03).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney
Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble
calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA
632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA
269). He should therefore be disbarred.
32. A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007
DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
Facts:
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the
assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil
and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees
but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of
her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told
her to wait outside. He would then come out after several
hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each
"appearance" in court, respondent charged her P350.
Page 32
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the
status of her cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent
never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he
was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he
was in the government service from the very start. In fact,
he first met the complainant when he was still a district
attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office
(predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned
as counsel for the complainant's daughter.
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an
action for damages against the Jovellanoses. Because he
was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not
an indigent, he declined. Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who
was a private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not
accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come
up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. Notwithstanding
Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained
adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid
that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant
asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to
issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters
asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously
given the respondent for safekeeping. Because the
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt
dated July 15, 1992.
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. A
few months later or in September 1994, the complainant
again asked respondent to assist her in suing the
Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint.
However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact
with the complainant.
The CBD (Commission on Bar Discipline) concluded that
respondent violated the following provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from a client.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal
service which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for three years and ordered him to
immediately return to the complainant the amount of
P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01,
16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Imbang has violated Rules 1.01, 16.01
and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty
and integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government
service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are
not only members of the bar but also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Government employees are expected to devote themselves
completely to public service. For this reason, the private
practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
Page 33
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 (1) Engage in the private practice of
profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official
function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle
private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he
was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.
Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an
attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he
accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated
the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his
salary.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent
guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the
benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's
fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)
nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as
amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government
lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed
to accept them.
33. G.R. No. 109870, December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
judgment affirming his conviction for violation of the
"Trust Receipts Law" was denied by this Court in a
Resolution dated February 9, 1994, petitioner filed on July
6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL.”
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other
things, granted the substitution but denied the motion for
leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been
already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a
"MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION
TO ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. The Court thereafter
required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion
and manifestation.
The Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner
be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same
impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's
brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest
which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal
liability.
The Solicitor General said:
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to
establish the genuineness and due execution of his
brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair
play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a
criminal case are not duty bound to seek
conviction of the accused but to see that justice is
done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged
in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cuenca is entitled to a new trial
as recommended by the Solicitor General.
Ruling:
Yes. Although in "Goduco vs. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965])
decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that
it is not authorized to entertain a motion for
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly
newly discovered evidence, the rule now appears to have
been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. vs. People" and "People vs. Amparado".
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside
technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor
General, granted new trial to the convicted accused
concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or
affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly
discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the
judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced,
there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be
denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible
under the circumstances considering that the "People"
does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which
reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially
commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike
gesture of impartiality.
34. A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005
OMAR P. ALI vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG
Facts:
This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty.
Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds
of Marawi City. It appears that this disbarment proceeding
is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction;
indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that
the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial
inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against
him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then
SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges
of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his
imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal
case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-
accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached
by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said AO
before this Court through a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition claiming that the Office of the
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to
remove him from office and insisted that respondents
violated the laws on security of tenure and that
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of
the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative
complaint against him (herein respondent), but was
dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order.
Respondent MR was denied with finality.
On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it
has become obvious that respondent had proven himself
unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney
and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the
legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was
nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in
the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law
and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his
ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to
act on applications for land registration on the basis only
of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case
of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they
presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was
duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the
dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said
case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued
by the investigating prosecutor who required him to
produce the various land titles involved in said dispute.
The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment
suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of
venue of this case and penalized with dismissal from the
service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of
Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office
of the President was fully supported by evidence and as
such carries a very strong weight in considering the
professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, which pertained solely to the period of
suspension from the practice of law from a five-year
suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that
time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.
Page 35
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.
Ruling:
We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of
Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the government
service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6
thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency,
then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a
lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath
a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as
established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the
rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil
servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule
6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit
on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the
government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s
confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast
doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege
to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased
complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-
Ombac vs. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been duly proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys.
35. A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.)
Facts:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application
covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land was
previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No.
119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty
was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the
applications to purchase the lands declared open for
disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998);
Page 36
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the
proclamations.
Violation of Rule 6.02: In the complaint, the complainant
claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s
sales application because of his personal interest over the
subject land when respondent exerted undue pressure and
influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo,
for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application
and claim the subject land for himself. The respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates,
sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights
over the subject land. The complainant further claimed
that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the
subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s
deceased wife. As a result, complainant’s sales application
was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently
given due course by the DENR.
Violation of Rule 6.03: The second charge involves another
parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The respondent
persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his
rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result
of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were
transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the
complainant alleged that the respondent met with Manuel
for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over
the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant
claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the
land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was
the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Violation of Rule 1.01: The complainant alleged that the
respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a
qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus,
the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law,
within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment, the respondent claimed that the present
complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by
the complainant. The first one was submitted before the
Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second
complaint is now pending with the Office of the
Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s actions constitute a breach of
the standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent
was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer
a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a
client before the office he was previously connected with.
Ruling:
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may
be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only
when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer. After a careful evaluation of the pleadings
filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
In Huyssen vs. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private
interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or
her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her
office. In Ali vs. Bubong, we recognized that private interest
is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing
the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest
interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the
office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law
to benefit relatives. In Vitriolo vs. Dasig, we found the act of
the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office to be a
serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We reached the same conclusion in
Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based
on the evidence showing that he demanded money from
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
the complainant who had a pending application for visas
before his office. Similarly, in Igoy vs. Soriano we found the
respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that
he demanded and received money from the complainant
who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we
find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent
abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales
application was ever brought before the Committee on
Awards. Complainant filed a sales application in March
1990 before LMB. By 1996, the complainant’s sales
application was pending before the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2,
2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the
DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the
respondent’s elective public office and membership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.These
circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any
way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. Since the sales application
was not brought before the Committee on Awards when
the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of
the complainant’s sales application over the subject land
was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel
and the document entitled Assurance where the
respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of
evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a
violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in
the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private practice is
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or
her official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a
one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with. Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent
must have accepted engagement or employment in a
matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had
previously exercised power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was
still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one’s self to the public as a lawyer. In any event, even
granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of
practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was
made before the Committee on Awards, or that the
Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These
are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot
consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondents favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion,
we already struck down the complainants allegation that
respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards. We
find that a similar treatment should be given to the
complainants claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1) of Memorandum No. 119 when he
encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not
a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application
over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been
resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in
the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due
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course to his sales application over the subject land. We
are, at this point, bound by this finding. As pointed out by
the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the
Office of the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally,
the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11,
2006, in G.R. No. 173453.
All told, considering the serious consequences of the
penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is under
no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden
shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has
proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven,
nothing has to be rebutted in defense.
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
case against the respondent for the complainant’s failure
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former
committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of
the Courts disciplinary power.
36. A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006
GISELA HUYSSEN vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation officer, received US$20,000 from complainant
Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was
needed in complainant’s application for visa and failing to
return the same, respondent denied misappropriating the
said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty.
Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their
application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such
denial.
Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could
not immediately be returned to the complainant, and
promised her several times that he would repay her out of
his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated
checks on this, but which later bounced.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and merits the penalty of
disbarment.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not
convincing. It is settled that denial, which is inherently a
weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a
strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence,
respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he
made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited
with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is
true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said
sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by
the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his
personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited
with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use.
Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private
practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the
fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of
Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is
submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties."
Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral
turpitude. Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not
only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the
letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his
misdeeds.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law
is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in
his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent
miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross
misconduct in office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he
received from the complainant with legal interest from his
receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be
referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal
prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action.
37. A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. ATTY. TELESFORO S.
CEDO
Facts:
PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of
Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter which he had intervened with
in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of
the Asset management Group of PNB.
During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2
transactions:
1. Arrange the sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong and;
2. Intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses
Almeda.
When a civil action arose because of 1st transaction, Cedo,
after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of
Ms. Ong. Also, when the second transaction was involved
in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law
firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was
a Senior Partner.
Cedo claims that he did not participate in the
litigationbefore the court of Ms. Ong’s case He also claims
that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case,
the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.
IBP made its report and recommendation for suspension
for having deliberate intent to devise ways and means to
attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
since he was in the best position to see the legal
weaknesses of his former employer.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Cedo violated Rule 6.02.
Ruling:
Cedo violated Rule 6.02. Atty. Cedo was suspended.
According to Canon 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.” Having been an executive of
complainant bank, respondent sought to litigate as counsel
for the opposite side, a case against his former employer
involving a transaction which he formerly handled while
still an employee of complainant, violated said Canon.
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between the atty. and the client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the
atty. utilized against his former client information given to
him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their
previous relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all the parties concerned after
the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him
to oppose.
II. The Lawyer and The Legal Profession
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
38. A.C. No. 4921, August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO
Facts:
This is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I.
Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of
Gross Immoral Conduct. Complainant and respondent met
sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
NBI. Respondent courted complainant and promised to
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
marry her while representing himself to be single. They
had an intimate relationship that started sometime in
1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent
was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed.
On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar. It was only around the first week of May
1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was
already married when his wife went to her office and
confronted her about her relationship with respondent. On
September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was
carrying as his. On December 9, 1997, complainant gave
birth to a baby girl. By this time however, respondent had
started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any
form of support. After due haring, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross
immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of gross
immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty
of indefinite suspension.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as: "x x x that conduct
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it
must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency."
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to
renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part
which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a
noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.
This Court has repeatedly held: "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member
of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards."
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital
affair with complainant he seeks understanding from the
Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous,"
and that what happened between them was "nothing but
mutual lust and desire." The Court is not convinced. In fact,
it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the
respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to
win her affection. Granting arguendo that complainant
entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his
marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross
immorality for what is in question in a case like this is
respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other
party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with
him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is
not feasible. The Court held in Mortel vs. Aspiras: "In a
disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the
complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a
proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to
purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect
the public and the courts."
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while
respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations.
Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an
applicant for admission to membership in the bar must
show that he is possessed of good moral character, a
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission
to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's
good standing in the profession; it is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore
admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent
judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely
creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a
woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and
support a child whom he previously recognized and
promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent
violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given. Records show that from the time he took
his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant
and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of
now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication
of respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he
recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble
profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more
appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite
suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is
able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he
has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member
of the profession.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. The Court finds
respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the
practice of law.
In a Resolution of the Court issued on August 3, 2005, the
Court found that respondent Castillo’s show of repentance
and active service to the community is a just and
reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of
indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of two years.
Furthermore, the Court noted that complainant Zaguirre’s
further claim for the support of her child should be
addressed to the proper court in a proper case.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
39. A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009
CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.
Facts:
In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant)
accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) of committing
the following violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:
(1) respondent’s abuse of court remedies and
processes;
(2) respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by
filing the subject cases in order to impede,
obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration
of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat
the right of the complainant;
(3) respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards
his adversary and the courts by resorting to
falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice;
(4) respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that
unjustly maligned and defamed the good name
and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico, the
previous counsel of the respondent’s clients;
(5) respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court in the petition
for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three
of whom are already deceased; and
(6) respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in
the second petition for annulment of title as
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without
being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of
representing fifty-two (52) litigants in a civil case when no
such authority was ever given to him.
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on
behalf of 52 litigants in a civil case, Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan found all the charges against the
respondent meritorious. The Board of Governors of the
IBP-CBD, through its Resolution, adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years. On reconsideration, the Board of Governors
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
reduced the respondent’s suspension from the practice of
law to one (1) year.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional
misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should
carry.
Ruling:
Yes. Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.
Abuse of court procedures and processes
Respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing
court procedures and processes to shield his clients from
the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC
in the unlawful detainer case against these clients. The
persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive
relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts –
the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of
judgment, the second petition for annulment of
complainant’s title and the petition for declaratory relief –
reveal the respondent’s persistence in preventing and
avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC
and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.
Respondent’s repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending
the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for
measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of
the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent
violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to
"observe the rules of procedure and. . . not to misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct
the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting
in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which
are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain
the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of
court processes; they tend to degrade the administration
of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; and
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of
the courts.
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the
lower courts’ jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate
(but substantively erroneous) move, the respondent’s
subsequent petitions involving the same property and the
same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure
favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious
objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC
and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his
clients.
Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the
courts
Respondent also committed willful, intentional and
deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the
lower courts. For these acts, we find the respondent liable
under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe
candor and fairness in his dealings with the court.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney
and his oath as a lawyer "never to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law." The respondent failed to remember that his duty as
an officer of the court makes him an indispensable
participant in the administration of justice, and that he is
expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.
His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth
from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no
matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be. In
case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to
deal candidly with the court.
In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed
to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Said Canon obligates a lawyer,
in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor. He should not prosecute
patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions. The recital of what the respondent did
to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients
shows that he actually committed what the above rule
expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for
annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked the name
and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of
deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with
the counsel for the adverse party. Respondent failed to
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against
Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only
participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty.
Catolico after the latter died.
We believe that the respondent has been less than fair in
his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus
liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues." He was unfair because he
imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any
factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty.
Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan’s finding
that the respondent twice represented parties without
proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for
annulment of title.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the
unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a
lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from
the latter or from the latter’s representative or, in the
absence thereof, without leave of court. The willful
unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given
case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants
disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for
professional misconduct.
Conclusion
We conclude that the respondent committed various acts
of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to
the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the
Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-
year suspension from the practice of law should be
imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the
originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2)
years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record,
and the nature of these violations which shows the
readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we
believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this
Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from
the law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in
defending the interests of his client can save him. Such
traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the
integrity of the profession and the orderly administration
of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the
illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We
cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear
that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility.
We hereby AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Board of
Governors of the IBP-CBD insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8;
Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the
IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
In a Resolution of the Court issued on November 11, 2014,
the Court denied the Profound Appeal for Judicial
Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., who seeks
to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar. The
Court was not fully convinced that the passage of more
than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to
reflect and to realize his professional transgressions. Court
emphasized that this is the second time that the
respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct. Considering the respondent’s earlier
disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment
case against him still pending review by the Court, we are
not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has
already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise
not considerably long considering the nature and
perversity of the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it
is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
40. A.C. No. 4807, March 22, 2000
MANUEL N. CAMACHO vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C.
PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V.
LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES
Facts:
Nine students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC),
all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly
published certain objectionable features. The Student
Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students
were expelled.
The 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC
President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with
Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates
representing the defendant, AMACC.
While the case was pending, letters of apology and re-
admission agreements were separately executed by
and/or in behalf of the students by their parents.
Following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a
Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of the
students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to
terminate all proceedings.
Apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-
admission agreements through negotiations with said
students and their parents without communicating with
Camacho.
Issue:
Whether or not Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding
professional ethics.
Ruling:
Yes, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Ethics which states:
“A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon
the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to
negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake
to advise him as to law.”
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a
duty owing to his colleague.
The Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution
suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the
case against the other respondents since they took no part
in it. The court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced
the suspension to 3 months.
41. A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES
TOLENTINO
Facts:
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that
Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
“pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later
executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s
calling card. In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing
Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such
calling cards.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached
upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper
calling card of Labiano.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients,
Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical predatory overstep
into another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03 and 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty.
Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he
actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear
that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through
Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty.
Tolentino could produce a more favorable result.
Page 45
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
42. G.R. No. 89591-96, January 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. BONIFACIO
SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional
Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving
custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the
Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355. The trial court's order specifically provided for
private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty. del
Rosario and not to be allowed liberty to roam around.
However, the order was not strictly complied with because
Javellana was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a
free man, including engaging in the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not Avelino Javellana can practice law under
detention.
Ruling:
As a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary
consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial
court's order was clear that private respondent "is not to
be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a
detention prisoner As a matter of law, when a person
indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on
bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
43. A.M. No. P-220, December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Felicisimo
Malinao, a court interpreter of the CFI of Catbalogan,
Samar.
These are the charges against him:
l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — Mr. Malinao has
been appearing in the municipal court of this town for
parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the
municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even
Sta. Rita. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects
fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but does
not pay anything.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed
in the CFI he would instigate persons, especially in his
barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the
municipal court in this town involving himself and his
men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
court employee and has influence over the judges.
3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that
he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even he
has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes
he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary
for those absent days. This can be checked with time
record he has submitted and if he has any application for
leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for
leave but this should not be allowed as he has already
committed crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL
SERVICE LAW. — It is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession or
business without permission from the Department Head.
Mr. Malinao has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney.
After due hearing and investigation, Judge Segundo Zosa
(CFI Catbalogan) submitted a report stating:
*Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the court to
subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a
resident of Zumarraga, Samar, the same had failed because
the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person;
*Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the
investigation in his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao,
Page 46
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
the court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case
against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita,
Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge
Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
*Judge Duran declared that according to his docket books
Mr. Malinao appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in
criminal case No. 1247 for grave threats and in criminal
case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia
for illegal possession of firearm;
*Judge Avestruz declared that the respondent appeared as
counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of
Daram, Samar, for forcible entry case;
*Judge Reyes declared that Mr. Malinao appeared as
counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the
Municipal Court of Zumarraga for a forcible entry case;
Comparing the dates when he appeared before the
aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily time
record entries, Mr. Malinao made it appear that he was on
a regular duty. He did not offer any plausible explanation
for this irregularity.
Issue:
What should be done to a person like Mr. Malinao?
Ruling:
The SC carefully reviewed the record and found the
conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply
supported by the evidence, particularly the documents
consisting of public records and the declarations of the
judges before whom respondent had appeared.
Apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal
courts without prior permission of his superiors in
violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his
time record of service by making it appear therein that he
was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was
in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without
being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes
illegal practice of law.
The defense of Mr. Malinao that "his participation (sic) for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage
the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the
absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry
the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in
court, he did so without permission from his superiors
and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to
conceal his absence from his office on the dates in
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent
acted as counsel under the above circumstances would
indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of
justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense
committed by Mr. Malinao is grave, hence it warrants a
more drastic sanction than that of reprimand
recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than
to separate him from the service, with the admonition that
he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body
wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby
ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the
CFI of Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to re-
employment in the judicial branch of the government.
44. G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO
PAGAYOKAN vs. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
Facts:
This is an original petition for contempt filed by
petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao
Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
On May 8, 2005, Mr. Balajadia filed a criminal case against
the petitioners with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of
Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and
violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal
collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent.
In the complaint-affidavit, Mr. Balajadia asserted that he is
a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City. However, certifications issued by the Office of
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
showed that Mr. Balajadia has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that Mr. Balajadia
is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself
as a lawyer.
In his Comment, Mr. Balajadia contends that the allegation
in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is a
practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that
the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino
had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against
petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Page 47
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Mr. Balajadia claims that two complaint-affidavits were
drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005
parking incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and
another for the parking incident on the same date but
which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Mr.
Balajadia insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the
1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged that he is a
businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F
Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, the
complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking
incident, which is the subject of the instant petition,
erroneously referred to him as a practicing lawyer because
Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was
inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing
lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-
207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City, which
statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his
law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an
affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation of the
complaint-affidavit. Mr. Balajadia alleged that he did not
read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the
two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations
with respect to his occupation and office address. Mr.
Balajadia also claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
Whether Mr. Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
No, Mr. Balajadia is not guilty of indirect contempt. He is
reprimanded though to be more careful in the future.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after
charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
x x x x.
In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized
practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as
such without authority constitutes indirect contempt
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The
liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of
criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they
are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and
obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is
the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can
be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports Mr.
Balajadia’s claim that he never intended to project himself
as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the
part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza
Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to
the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit
conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken
together, these circumstances show that the allegation in
paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was,
indeed, the result of inadvertence.
Mr. Balajadia has satisfactorily shown that the allegation
that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to
make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases where
we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of
law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing
court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing before
court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before the court
that he will practice law
despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or
deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out
himself as an attorney through circulars with full
knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that
Mr. Balajadia acted as an attorney or that he intended to
practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for
indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally
practice law.
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove
respondents deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as
an attorney and act as such without authority, Mr.
Balajadia is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.
Page 48
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
45. B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA
Facts:
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those
who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-
taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
(complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a
member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could
not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without
the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before
the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The
OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC
proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath on 22
May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct
casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member
of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his
admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be admitted to practice
law.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agrees with the findings and
conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus do not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, the Court
elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law, incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably
strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the
Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court.
Page 49
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations
and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing in the
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath
to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys.
46. A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006
LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P.
TERRADO
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by complainant
Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a
legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment
representing attorney’s fees.
She engaged the services of respondent sometime in
January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati
branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of
her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear
before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the
Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the
Compromise Agreement which she subsequently entered
into to end the case in RTC-Laguna.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He
averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant
was payment for legal services for the recovery of the
deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not
include the case pending before the RTC of Bian, Laguna.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the
Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It is recommended
that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern
warning that similar acts in the future will be severely
dealt with.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Rules 1.01
and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
We agree with the findings of the IBP.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who
show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated
to serve their clients with competence and diligence. They
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them, and this
negligence in connection therewith shall render them
liable.
Respondent’s admission that he divided the legal fees with
two other people as a referral fee does not release him
from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except in certain cases.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the
following grounds:
1) deceit;
2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office;
3) grossly immoral conduct;
4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5) violation of the lawyers oath;
6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court; and
7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.
47. A.C. No. 7056, September 13, 2006
PLUS BUILDERS, INC. and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.
Facts:
The respondent herein is the counsel of the tenants/
farmers in cases regarding the properties owned by the
petitioners Plus Builders, Inc. The respondent allegedly
Page 50
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
resorted to unlawful strategies and machinations after the
Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite rendered adecision
against the tenants regarding ownership of the subject
properties. Among these machinations and strategies
include his involvement in the unauthorized practice of
law by allowing a group of non-lawyers to submit a
pleading collectively representing themselves as law
partners in KDC Legal Services, Law Officers, and
Associates and solicited fees for such. The respondent
contends that he only did such in good faith to exert
utmost efforts to defend his clients, no matter how guilty
he may appear to be. This prompted the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline to review
the matter and eventually found the respondent guilt of
unlawful practice of law because he was not able to deny
that the allegations were true, violation the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Canon 9.
Ruling:
Yes. He indeed violated Canon 9. The Canon states that "—
A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.” 'Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall
not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.' In the present case,
respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his
clients. The records show, however, that his course of legal
action was obviously a stratagem to delay unduly the
execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision. the
silence or failure of respondent to challenge the allegation
that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law may be deemed an admission of the truth of
the accusation.
The significance of this professional norm was emphasized
in Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio, which we quote:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public
policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon
a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name
to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line
with jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct
and is suspended from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found
guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for two
years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
III. The Lawyer and The Courts
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.
48. A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA vs. ATTY. ANTONIO G.
DORONILLA, JR.
Facts:
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed
by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired
colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against
several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as
counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002
hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing
in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed
before against the same defendants. We had an
agreement that if we withdraw the case against
him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with
that understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension. (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding
Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory
questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his
statements in writing and file the appropriate pleading.
Page 51
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such
pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty.
Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline. The complaint, which
charged Atty. Doronilla with misleading the court through
misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of
justice, was referred to a commissioner for investigation.
Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner
that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw
his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of
two hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such
agreement. Later he explained in his memorandum that his
main concern was to settle the case amicably among
comrades in arms without going to trial and insisted that
there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath. He
pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he
put it, his alleged acts of falsity) had no effect on the
continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual
prejudice to complainant.
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty.
Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending that he be
suspended from the government military service as legal
officer for a period of three months. This was adopted and
approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August
30, 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Canon 10.
Ruling:
Yes. There is a strong public interest involved in requiring
lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the
dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. The common caricature
that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak
the truth and to act honestly should not become a common
reality. To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS,
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had
agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached
these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that,
he violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every
lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law.
Atty. Doronillas unethical conduct was compounded,
moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the
impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning
of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the
untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing
so even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing,
spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather
than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty.
Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been
meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as a
sort of question to complainant regarding a pending
proposal to settle the case.
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable
only for its speciousness, cannot absolve him. If anything,
it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to
obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping
his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith which keeps us from treating
the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only
aim was to settle the case amicably among comrades in
arms without going to trial, perhaps it is not unreasonable
to assume that what he really meant to say was that he had
intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the
proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if
that had been so, it would have been no justification for
speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a
lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way,
makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to
state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyers duty to the
court to employ only such means as are consistent with
truth and honor forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus,
even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and
accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties
Page 52
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for
resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronillas offense is within the ambit of Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x
x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision
means only suspension from the practice of law. For this
reason, we disagree with the IBPs recommendation for
Atty. Doronillas suspension from the government military
service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative
case is to determine Atty. Doronillas liability as a member
of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in
the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to
order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the
lawyers oath, his suspension from employment in the
Judge Advocate Generals Service. Of course, suspension
from employment as a military legal officer may well
follow as a consequence of his suspension from the
practice of law but that should not be reason for us to
impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We
would be going beyond the purpose of this proceeding
were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBPs
recommendation as one for suspension from the practice
of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBPs
recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronillas
suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that
mitigate his liability somewhat. First, we give him credit
for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the
investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in
Judge Daways courtroom. Second, the absence of material
damage to complainant may also be considered as a
mitigating circumstance. And finally, since this is Atty.
Doronillas first offense, he is entitled to some measure of
forbearance.
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the
conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap
on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it
seems, needs time away from the practice of law to
recognize his error and to purge himself of the
misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies
the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
49. A.C. No. 3731, September 7, 2007
MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN vs. ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR
Facts:
Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
who represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in
numerous cases. Tanlioco is an agricultural lessee of a land
owned by Manuel Sebastian’s (complainant) spouse and
sister-in-law. The landowners filed an Ejectment case
against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the
land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s
ejectment subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation. The RTC’s judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
However, Atty. Emily Bajar (respondent), as Tanlioco’s
counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to
produce the conversion order. The RTC dismissed the
complaint due to res judicata and lack of cause of action.
Respondent filed another case for Maintenance of
Possession with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of
conversion and disturbance compensation.
Hence, on 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily A. Bajar for
"obstructing, disobeying, resisting, rebelling, and impeding
final decisions of Regional Trial Courts, the Court of
Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court, and also for
submitting those final decisions for the review and
reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for
contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics."
Issue:
Whether or not respondent obstructed, disobeyed, and
resisted the decisions of the Court which may cause her
disbarment.
Ruling:
After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the
evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP’s findings
that [1.] Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay
which amounted to an obstruction of justice; and [2.]
Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The
duplication or multiplication of suits should be avoided
and respondent’s acts were tantamount to forum-shopping
Page 53
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes
and proceedings.
It must be noted that officers of the court shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the
public may repose confidence "Lawyers must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts, and to their clients. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct
showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor — or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court."
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Hence,
respondent was ordered suspended for three years.
50. A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003
WALTER T. YOUNG vs. CEASAR G. BATUEGAS,
MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q.
SUSA
Facts:
YOUNG is the private prosecutor in People of the Phil v
Arana. BATUEGAS, et al are the counsels for the accused in
the said criminal case. On Dec 13, 2000, BATUEGAS filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Bail alleging that the
accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority and, as such, is now under detention. Upon
verification with the NBI, YOUNG discovered that the
accused surrendered on Dec 14,2000 (not 13). BATUEGAS,
et al in their defense alleged that on Dec 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their
client, they filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail. They
immediately fetched accused from Cavite and brought him
to NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy
traffic, they arrived at NBI at 2am the next day. That was
why the Certificate of Detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 and not 13. As to lack of
notice, YOUNG being a private prosecutor, is not entitled to
such as only the State and City prosecutors should be given
notices. Investigating Commissioner recommended
suspension of 6 months. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
in a resolution approved said recommendation.
Issue:
Whether or not Batuegas, et al. are guilty of falsehood and
should be suspended.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon
his admission that he will do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in court. As officer of the court, his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and
facts of the case to aid it in arriving at the correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. A lawyer’s solemn duty is to defend
his client. A lawyer’s conduct must never be at the expense
of truth. In the case at bar, BATUEGAS, et al feel short of
the duties and responsibilities expected of them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail
will be denied by the Court found that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily
concealed the truth alleging that the accused had
voluntarily surrendered. To knowingly allege an untrue
statement in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that
the Court strongly condemns. BATUEGAS, et al violated
their oath when they resorted to deception. Hence,
BATUEGAS, et al should be suspended for 6 months.
51. G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP
WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU
INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Facts:
This is a case appealed by certiorari to review a decision
and a resolution en banc of the CIR regarding ULP.
The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for
contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez of the CIR and the counsels for the private
respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the
following in his decision subject of the instant petition for
certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91
of the respondents' brief:
... Says the Supreme Court in the following
decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving
a determination as to whether or not the acts of
the employees concerned justified the adoption of
the employer of disciplinary measures against
them, the mere fact that the employees may be
able to put up a valid defense in a criminal
Page 54
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or
neutralize the employer's right to impose
discipline on said employees. For it is settled that
not even the acquittal of an employee of the
criminal charge against him is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its
employees, should the act upon which the
criminal charged was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest... The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct
which is a just cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et
al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et
al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.)
(emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision *
which contained the underscored portions of the above
citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando
Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to
uphold the action taken by the employer as proper
disciplinary measure. A reading of the article
which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that
it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the
supposed exertion of political pressure by the
Manila Chronicle management upon the City
Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the
case against the employer. In rejecting the
employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente
and Aquino was justified, the lower court
considered the article as "a report of some acts
and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the
exercise of his official functions" and, therefore,
does away with the presumption of malice. This
being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the
matter should not have been viewed or gauged in
the light of the doctrine on a publisher's
culpability under the Penal Code. We are not here
to determine whether the employees' act could
stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out
whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by
the employer of disciplinary measure against
them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the
publication in question is qualified privileged, but
even on the assumption that this is so, the
exempting character thereof under the Penal Code
does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect
on the employer's interest which may warrant
employment of disciplinary measure. For it must
be remembered that not even the acquittal of an
employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a
bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
its employees, should the act upon which the
criminal charges was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an
employee to publish his "suspicion," which
actually amounts to a public accusation, that his
employer is exerting political pressure on a public
official to thwart some legitimate activities on the
employees, which charge, in the least, would sully
the employer's reputation, can be nothing but an
act inimical to the said employer's interest. And
the fact that the same was made in the union
newspaper does not alter its deleterious character
nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the
ground that it is a union activity, because such end
can be achieved without resort to improper
conduct or behavior. The act of the employees
now under consideration may be considered as a
misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal.**
(Emphasis ours)
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge and respondents’
counsels are guilty of contempt for the misquotation.
Ruling:
No. It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored
words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do
not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's
decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored
sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is
settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered
...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and last
underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the
respondent Judge's decision, appears not in the same
paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an
indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge and
the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that
the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude
than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent
Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many
pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not
difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their
varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape
their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents'
counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation
as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the
import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in
the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same
as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this
Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an
employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to
the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charges were
based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in
citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy
the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary
reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers
and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which
reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of
last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al.
vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions
of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or
doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the
danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the
decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper
and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts,
lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if
inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously
discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of
authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but
from other sources and make certain that they are
verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from
acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious
time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
52. A.M. No. 10-9-9-SC
Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman Referring
the complaint of Attys. OLIVER O. LOZANO and
EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO Against Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno [ret.].
Resolution:
We resolve the separate successive letter-petitions of Atty.
Oliver O. Lozano, addressed to the Supreme Court en banc,
for the lifting of the indefinite suspension from the practice
of law imposed by the Court in its Resolution of June 15,
2010.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano
and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano guilty of grave
professional misconduct when they misquoted or misused
constitutional provisions in their pleadings in order to
impute unjust acts to members of this Court. Subsequently,
we have reinstated Atty. Lozano-Endriano in our August
23, 2011 Resolution, because of circumstances indicating
lesser culpability on her part.
Professional misconduct involving the misuse of
constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting
Members of this Court is a serious breach of the rigid
standards that a member of good standing of the legal
profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty
of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the
past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been
suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his willingness to
admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the
practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should
be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not
been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty.
Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable
to a member of the bar.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring
officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been
shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been
served. From Atty. Lozanos letters-petitions, we discern
that his suspension had already impressed upon him the
need for care and caution in his representations as an
officer of this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant
Atty. Lozanos letters-petitions with the expectation that he
shall now avoid going to the extreme of employing
contortions of and misusing legal provisions and principles
to justify his positions, and instead focus his energies and
talents towards a lawyers primary aim of promoting the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby LIFT the
indefinite suspension from the practice of law of Atty.
Oliver Lozano and REINSTATE him to the status of a
member in good standing in so far as the suspension
imposed him by this Court is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Page 56
Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 Canon 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
53 & 56. G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-
27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender
the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a
sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal
“peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for
justice…” He also expressed strong words as against the
judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.” The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the
absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court.
His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by
reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute
resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this
sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender
his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title
again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary
actions for his acts.
Ruling:
Yes. Indefinite suspension imposed. It has been pointed
out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but
Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if
the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking
of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn
the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough
damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular
case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and
local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and
suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen
may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the
practice of law.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
54. G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*AND CESAR GOCO vs.
CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C.
DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A.
ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA
Facts:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for annulment of
contracts with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction and temporary restraining order filed by
respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as
taxpayer, against respondents City of Urdaneta and
Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA
Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP)
represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific Planners
Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC)
represented by Cesar D. Goco.
In their Answer, respondent asserted that the contracts
were properly executed by then Mayor Parayno with prior
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Also, they
contended that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and
that the complaint states no cause of action.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its
appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an
Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1) withdraw Urdaneta
City's Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be
joined as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta City's complaint;
and (4) conduct a new pre-trial. Urdaneta City allegedly
wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate
legal representation caused its inability to file the
necessary pleadings in representation of its interests.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the
City Prosecutor. It also granted the prayer to drop the city
as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation
with Del Castillo's complaint, and directed the defendants
to answer the city's complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in
(a) entertaining the taxpayers' suits; (b) allowing a private
law firm to represent Urdaneta City; (c) allowing
respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
being defendants to becoming complainants; and (d)
allowing Capalad's change of attorneys?
2. Whether or not offensive language used by Attys. Oscar
C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings
before the court unfairly calling the Court of Appeals a
"court of technicalities" for validly dismissing their
defectively prepared petition.
Ruling:
1. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers' suits. In the
case of taxpayers' suits, the party suing as a taxpayer must
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. Here, the
allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and
Maguisa that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had
already been paid for minimal work is sufficient allegation
of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them
with personality to sue.
The Lazaro Law Firm’s appearance as Urdaneta City's
counsel was also held as against the law as it provides
expressly who should represent it. The City Prosecutor
should continue to represent the city. The LGC provides
that the city legal officer is supposed to represent the city
in all civil actions, as in this case, and special proceedings
wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In the case
of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal officer
is still vacant, the City Prosecutor's appearance as counsel
of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as
the city's legal adviser and officer for civil cases, a function
that could not yet be transferred to the city legal officer.
Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed
the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the
City Prosecutor.
As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint
and dropping him as defendant, we find the same in order.
Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no authority to
represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note,
however, that Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who
claim that the contracts are valid. On the other hand,
Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts.
Certainly, Atty. Sahagun cannot represent totally
conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
2. Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language
used by Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante
in their pleadings before us and the Court of Appeals. They
unfairly called the Court of Appeals a "court of
technicalities" for validly dismissing their defectively
prepared petition. They also accused the Court of Appeals
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
of protecting, in their view, "an incompetent judge." In
explaining the "concededly strong language," Atty.
Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the Court of
Appeals' dismissal of the case shows its "impatience and
readiness to punish petitioners for a perceived slight on its
dignity" and such dismissal "smacks of retaliation and does
not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality
demanded of the appellate court."
Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and
Antonio B. Escalante a fine of P2,000 each payable to this
Court within ten days from notice and we remind them
that they should observe and maintain the respect due to
the Court of Appeals and judicial officers; abstain from
offensive language before the courts; and not attribute to a
Judge motives not supported by the record. Similar acts in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
55. A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and
Pairing Judge, Branch 30 vs. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA
and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
Facts:
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed by
Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom against respondent-spouses
Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba -
Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules
11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lacurom issued a Resolution reversing the
earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.
Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an
ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of
factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY
in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (HOW
HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very
patent and glaring!
The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
and after a very questionable SHORT period of
time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN
REVERSAL. Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT
to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the
Judicial Process. Need we say more? THIS ERROR
IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the
Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x
x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE Another
HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student
knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the
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Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the
averments in the answer!
In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba
claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually
prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively
participate in this case." Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any
"conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and
integrity of the Honorable Court. Judge Lacurom found
Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
imprisonment for five days. Velasco-Jacoba moved for
reconsideration order. She recounted that on her way out
of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba
("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito
kasi last day na, baka mahuli.” She signed the pleading
handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith"
on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her
whole life and future. Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge
Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without
conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of
harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of
the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a
grandmother many times over." Judge Lacurom issued
another order this time directing Jacoba to explain why he
should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing
an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he
denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion.
IBP Commissioner recommended the suspension.
IBP Board of Governors adopted Recommendation, except
for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced
to three months.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is liable under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no dispute that the genuine signature of
Velasco-Jacoba appears by signing the 30 July 2001
motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read
it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the
purpose of delaying the case. Velasco-Jacoba insists,
however, that she signed the motion only because of her
husband’s request but she did not know its contents
beforehand. By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore,
she violated Sec 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of
falsehood before the courts, which is a ground for
subjecting her to disciplinary action.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name
does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the
inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to
him as the author of the motion. The Court cannot easily
let Jacoba off the hook. His Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account.
Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the
motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the
errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental." we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts
more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the
events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s
defense which was raised only after a considerable time
had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; (2)
Jacoba filed a Manifestation praying that Judge Lacurom
await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before
deciding the contempt charge against him. This petition for
certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise
that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by
saying that every remark motion was warranted.
We disagree. Resolution presented the facts correctly and
decided the case according to supporting law and
jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful
and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote
high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration. Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001
motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client
in instituting two administrative cases against Judge
Lacurom Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the
timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very
well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as
leverage against Judge Lacurom. Respondent spouses have
both been the subject of administrative cases before this
Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended
Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the
practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of
this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
 Canon 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
57. A.M. No. AC 4762, June 28, 2004
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO vs. ATTY. PEPITO C.
PRESQUITO
Facts:
Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the
Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo for "having
employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing
to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when
he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00" against Atty
Pepito C.Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the
respondent entered into an agreement for a purchase of
land by the latter from the former. The price of the land
was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by
installments. Respondent issues post-dated checks as
payment. Respondent then entered into a joint venture or
partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the
subdivision of the landinto home-size lots and its
development, with a portion of the land retained by
respondent for his own use. The land was eventually titled
in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided
into 35 to 36 lots. The 8 post-dated checks issued by
respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino made
repeated demands for payment from respondent but the
latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His
widow, complainant, then tried to collect from respondent
the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s
numerous pleas remained unheeded, she filed the
complaint in June 1997.Respondent denied any
wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had
employed "fraud, trickery and dishonest means" with the
late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless.
Respondents claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr
Espino will not encash the checks until the right of way
problem has been resolved. In addition, respondent claims
that the balance would be offset with the cost he incurred
when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent failed to act with candor
and fairness towards the complainant.
Ruling:
Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly
established that: (1) there was an agreement between
respondent and complainant’s late husband for the sale of
the latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
checks in connection with said agreement; (3) these
checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the
land sold had an existing road-right-of- way. The
responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse
payment, or that he was entitled to legal compensation.
Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of
Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8
dishonored checks, respondent’s indifference to
complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the
court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful
conduct towards complainant and her late husband, first
by allowing the 8 checks he issued to bounce, then by
ignoring the repeated demands for payment until
complainant was forced to file this complaint, and finally
by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with
dilatory tactics.
58. G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES vs. HON. MA.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Ombudsman; HON.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman;
HON. SYLVIA A. SEVERO, Graft Investigator and
Prosecution Officer I; HON. MARILOU B. ANCHETA-
MEJICA, Acting Director, PIAB-D; HON. JOSE T. DE
JESUS, JR., Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO; All of the
Ombudsman; and SSP EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was
filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent
Velasco was a senior state prosecutor at the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 20 February 2007, petitioner Judge Angeles filed a
criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the
Ombudsman and sought his indictment before the
Sandiganbayan for the following acts allegedly committed
in his capacity as a prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to the accused in a criminal case for
smuggling by failing to present a material witness;
2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the
reopening of child abuse cases against petitioner;
3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear
that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse
Complaint was conducted.
In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed
the charges against respondent Velasco. It found that after
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by
complainant, there was no cause to conduct a preliminary
investigation or an administrative adjudication with
regard to the charges.
On the first charge of suppression of testimonial evidence
in connection with the smuggling case, the Ombudsman
dismissed the charge on the ground that petitioner had no
sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance. The Ombudsman explained that petitioner was
neither one of the parties nor the presiding judge in the
said criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest
in it.
Moreover, granting that the personal interest of petitioner
was not in issue, respondent Velasco acted based on his
discretion as prosecutor and his appreciation of the
evidence in the case, and any lapse in his judgment cannot
be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman said that
it had no authority to investigate the prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion, unless there was sufficient evidence that the
exercise was tainted with malice and bad faith.
The Ombudsman likewise dismissed the second charge of
private practice of profession on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. It pointed out that
petitioner should have first elevated her concern to the
DOJ, which had primary jurisdiction over respondent’s
actions and conduct as public prosecutor. Moreover, the
Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not
engaged in private practice when he filed the two Petitions
for the reopening of the child abuse cases against
petitioner, since he was the investigating prosecutor of the
said cases.
Finally, on the falsification of a public document, which
was also dismissed, the Ombudsman said that the issue
should have been raised earlier, when petitioner Judge
Angeles filed her Petition for Review of the Resolution of
respondent Velasco. Moreover, petitioner should have
substantiated the allegation of falsification, because the
mere presentation of the alleged falsified document did
not in itself establish falsification. The Ombudsman also
ruled that with the belated filing of the charge and the
reversal by the DOJ of respondent Velasco’s Resolution
indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged falsified
document is no longer in issue.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
questioned Joint Order, which was denied by the
Ombudsman for lack of merit.
Hence, the present Rule 65 Petition.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.
Ruling:
No.
Power of the Court over the Ombudsman’s Exercise of its
Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and
prosecutorial powers without good and compelling
reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the instant
Petition.
At the outset, we emphasize that certiorari is an
extraordinary prerogative writ that is never demandable
as a matter of right. Also, it is meant to correct only errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment committed in
the exercise of the discretion of a tribunal or an officer.
This is especially true in the case of the exercise by the
Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated powers. That
is why this Court has consistently maintained its well-
entrenched policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman’s
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
General Rule of Non-Interference with the Plenary Powers
of the Ombudsman
The general rule has always been non-interference by the
courts in the exercise by the office of the prosecutor or the
Ombudsman of its plenary investigative and prosecutorial
powers.
The Discretionary Nature of Preliminary Investigation
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause
or of whether there exists a reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary
investigation is by no means mandatory.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Ombudsman’s
Evaluation of Evidence
This Court acknowledges exceptional cases calling for a
review of the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge
and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of discretion.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility. The abuse must be in a manner so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The determination of grave abuse of discretion as the
exception to the general rule of non-interference in the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its powers is precisely the
province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. However,
we highlight the exceptional nature of that determination.
In this Petition, we do not find any grave abuse of
discretion that calls for the Court’s exceptional divergence
from the general rule. Notably, the burden of proof to show
grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has
failed to discharge this burden. She merely states why she
does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman,
instead of demonstrating and proving grave abuse of
discretion. In her arguments, petitioner would also have us
pass upon the factual findings of the Ombudsman. That we
cannot do, for this Court is not a trier of facts.
Even if we were to extend liberally the exception to the
general rule against the review of the findings of the
Ombudsman, an examination of the records would show
that no grave abuse of discretion was demonstrated to
warrant a reversal of the Joint Order dismissing the
Complaint against respondent Velasco.
Final Note
Finally, the Court notes with strong disapproval both
parties’ resort to abuse of the judicial processes of this
Court. This is the third case we know of that the parties
have filed against each other, and that has reached the
Supreme Court.
This fact is especially regrettable, considering that
petitioner as judge and respondent as prosecutor should
have been well-cognizant of our clogged court dockets and
should have thus exercised more restraint in filing cases
against each other. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from filing multiple actions
arising from the same cause and from misusing court
process. Judging from the number of cases and the
vengeful tone of the charges that the parties have hurled
against each other in their pleadings, they seem more bent
on settling what has become a personal score between
them, rather than on achieving the ends of justice.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
The parties are warned against trifling with court process.
This case shall, hopefully, serve as a reminder of their
ethical and professional duties and put an immediate end
to their recriminations.
59. A.C. No. 6273, March 15, 2010
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA vs. ATTY.
OSCAR PAGUINTO
Facts:
An Information for Estafa was filed on June 21, 2001
against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant)
along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint
which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and
notarized, which did not indicate the involvement of
complainant. A Motion to Quash the Information was
granted. Respondent’s MR of the quashal of the
Information was denied. Respondent also filed six other
criminal complaints against complainant for violation of
Article 31 of RA 6938 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines) but eventually withdrew them.
Complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano
Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a
Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on
October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members
of the Board of Directors which was signed by respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly
presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L.
Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then
current Board, Gerango, complainant’s predecessor, as
Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair,
appointed others to replace the removed directors, and
appointed respondent as Board Secretary. Thus,
respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office
and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and
operations.
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a
complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during
Special General Assembly. The CDA Acting Regional
Director (RD), declared the questioned general assembly
null and void for having been conducted in violation of
GEMASCO’s By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines, but was later vacated on February 21, 2002
for lack of jurisdiction of CDA.
In her present complainant against respondent for
disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent
promoted or sued a groundless, false or unlawful suit, and
gave aid and consent to the same, disobeyed laws of the
land, promoted disrespect for law and the legal profession,
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Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleague and engaged in
harassing tactics against opposing counsel, violated Canon
19, and ruined and damaged the GEMASCO and the entire
water-consuming community.
Despite the Court’s grant on respondent’s motion of
extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed
any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause,
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with but just the
same he failed to comply. The Court thus referred the
complaint to IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon 1, – A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal [processes], Canon 8 – A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel, Canon 10 – A
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court,
Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law, Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute
violations of his lawyer’s oath.
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent]
complained of are grounds for disbarment or suspension
of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking
over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities,
respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He
also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which provides that a
lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer’s
Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
or consent to the same."
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment
on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored
this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule
12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions
of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian vs. Bajar
teaches: x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively".
The Court notes that respondent had previously been
suspended from the practice of law for six months for
violation of the CPR. It appears, however, that respondent
has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this
time is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for
violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath.
60. G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL
BUILDERS, INC. vs. HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite
Facts:
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a
hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case NO. 1266-
96 entitled "Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale
and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent
judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
The trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to
annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice
of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant
Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel
lis pendens. The newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis
pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a MR,
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which was opposed by the defendants. Petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed
a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of
Court.
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court
held on December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner
in direct contempt of court which sentenced him to 3 days
imprisonment and a fine of P3,000.00.
While serving the first day of his sentence, petitioner filed
a MR of the Order of contempt. The next day, petitioner
filed another motion praying for the resolution of his MR.
Both motions were never resolved until release.
To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public,
petitioner filed a petition before the CA praying for the
annulment of the Order citing him in direct contempt of
court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on
grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no
factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of
court, and that said Order was null and void for being in
violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.
The Court of Appeals found that the petitioner was indeed
arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the
extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic
towards the court. It affirmed the order of the respondent
judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the
limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, and
ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner.
The petition was however dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible
error in affirming the assailed order of the trial court
which the petitioner’s submissions smacks of oppression
and abuse of authority, hence it committed a grave error of
law in its questioned decision.
Ruling:
We disagree. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person
guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court or judge, offensive personalities
toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer
as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be
summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or
judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten
(10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a
judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two
hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in
consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your
Honor please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his
behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari
against the trial court is contrary to Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the CPR which mandates that "a
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the
Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the
respondent judge was partial in favor of the other
party is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the CPR
which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge
"motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's
order to maintain order in the proceedings in
utter disregard to Canon 1 of the CPE which
makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the
courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain
its importance in the administration of justice, and
Canon 11 of the CPR which mandates lawyers to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the
Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his
fellow counsel who at the time he was making
representations in behalf of the other party, was
rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not
allowed to further put a word in edgewise is
violative of Canon 8 of the CPE which obliges a
lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar
of Deeds, through counsel, to exercise his right to
be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article 3,
1997 Constitution on the right to due process of
law, Canon 18 of the CPE which mandates a
lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with
fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of
CPR which insists on a lawyer to "exert every
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 effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in
the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For,
after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to
the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this
behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should
not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed
and maintained during court proceedings.
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked to the extent of
interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed
disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the
court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed
the administration of justice. Petitioner argued that while
it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in
espousing the case of his client – by persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked despite the respondent
judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that
he was bound to protect the interest of his client to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in
espousing his client's cause". He should not forget
that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert
every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. He
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule
10.03. Canon 10 of the CPR, or unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary
duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede
or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyer's duty."
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of
Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed
decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
61. G.R. No. L-27662, October 29, 1968
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC. vs. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO,
as Chief Hearing Officer of Regional Officer of the
Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and
MARIO ABITRIA
Facts:
On February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission (WCC), through its referee,
considered a complaint filed against it by the other
respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for
decision after he and a physician had testified, petitioner's
counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February
24, 1967. A MR by petitioner praying that he be allowed to
present evidence on his behalf was denied as a decision
had already been rendered against petitioner, as employer,
awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability
compensation benefit. It was also pointed out in such
order that there was no plea in such MR for such decision
being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses. It could not be granted as
the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic." It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a
MR of the aforesaid order was filed with the averment that
petitioner was not aware of any decision rendered in the
case as no copy of the same had theretofore been
furnished to its counsel. After a denial of MR and a plea for
execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was
granted the City Sheriff of Manila, likewise made a
respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14,
1967, by virtue of the above writ of execution.
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above
alleged infringement of procedural due process was the
basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from
proceeding with the sale at public auction of petitioner's
properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ
of execution. The Court issued a resolution to file, within
10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to
dismiss) to the petition for prohibition; let temporary
restraining order issue, effective immediately and until
further orders from this Court.
The answer of respondent WCC revealed quite a different
story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the
offended party suffering from a legitimate grievance, it’s
right to due process having been summarily disregarded.
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
should be, as it is hereby, denied.
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Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient or substantial evidence
in support of the claim for disability compensation benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Ruling:
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be
heard appeared to have been disregarded. No further
attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If
it did not introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to
blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent WCC.
There must be such a realization on the part of petitioner
for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral
argument did not bother to discuss such a matter at all.
Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us further
as it ought never to have been raised in the first place.
Petitioner would make much however of the allegation
that, as shown in the answer of respondent WCC, the
decision was sent to a certain Attorney Manuel Camacho
but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz.
Petitioner would emphasize that the one "officially
furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel,
who was without any connection with the aforesaid
Attorney Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it had
not received a copy of a decision which could not
thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of
execution.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question
arose. What was done satisfied such a constitutional
requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a
copy of the decision; that such effort failed was
attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there
was a denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted.
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be
required to pay forthwith the sum due respondent Abitria.
The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances
disclosed, of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A.
Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect
the interest of one's client. It is quite another thing, and
this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any
unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if
not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee
is a necessitous and poverty-stricken man suffering from a
dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our
countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an
outlay far beyond the means of our poverty stricken
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
masses. The ancient and learned profession of the law
stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be kept in
mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who
expects to remain a member in good standing. This
Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious
responsibility of seeing to it that no deviation from such a
norm should be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction is denied. With treble costs
against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney
Manuel A. Corpuz.
62. A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004
JULIAN MALONSO vs. ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a
proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that
lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one,
not even the Court can deny them that right; there is no law
that authorizes them to do so.
Facts:
In a Complaint for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Julian
Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any
authority entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in
the expropriation proceedings initiated by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he
complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally representing
him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling
price of his land to the NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees
and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-
owner of Malonsos property.
In his Answer, respondent replied that the services of his
law office, Principe Villano Villacorta and Clemente Law
Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its
President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of Legal
Services executed on 01 April 1997.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a
member of SANDAMA and that said member executed a
special power of attorney in favor of Elfa, which served as
the latters authority to act in behalf of Malonso.
In his Reply, Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize
Elfa to act in his behalf, considering that while the Contract
of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa
was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of attorney he
executed bore a much later date, 27 November 1997.
Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a
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lawyer in his behalf since he already had his own lawyer in
the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that
the agreement entered into by SANDAMA and his law firm
is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the
coverage of the contract even if he executed the special
power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a member of
SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations
commitments.
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is
between SANDAMA, a corporate being, and respondents
law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the
expropriation proceedings instituted by NAPOCOR, neither
does it claim co-ownership of the properties being
expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney was
executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and not SANDAMA,
and that said power of attorney was executed after
SANDAMA entered into the Contract of Legal Services.
Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership
could not be derived from the said documents
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal
representation could not be derived from the above-
mentioned documents. A contract for legal services
between a lawyer and his client is personal in nature and
cannot be performed through intermediaries. Even Elfa,
the attorney-in-fact of Malonso, was never authorized to
engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a
party litigant in the expropriation proceedings and thus
Atty. Principe has no basis to interfere in the court
proceeding involving its members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the
evidence presented by both parties, Atty. Principe was
guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to
have violated Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and
Rule 12.04. In representing himself as Malonsos and the
other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters
opposition, Atty. Principe was found to be guilty of gross or
serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to
be the co-owner of properties being expropriated and his
filing of several actions to frustrate the implementation of
the decision approving the compromise agreement make
his conduct constitutive of malpractice. The Report
recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension
from the practice of law.
In its Resolution dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors ordained that Atty. Principe violated Rule 3.01
of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum respondent claims that the
Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 has no factual and legal
basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure
selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for
having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. According to the respondent, the Investigating
Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case
despite the lapse of three months provided under Section
8 of Rule 139-B, without any extension granted by the
Supreme Court. Moreover, in the subsequent review made
by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place
but a mere consensus, and the required number of votes
provided by the Rules was not secured considering that
there were only five (5) governors present. Respondent
opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at
preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run
for IBP National President.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Principe is valid
and done in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
2. Whether or not Atty. Principe and his law firm is entitled
to be compensated for the legal services it has rendered.
Ruling:
We find for the respondent (Atty. Principe).
1. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a
lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his
client, his peers in the profession and the public. However,
the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those
guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation
of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully
found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation
of the standards of the law profession, the improvement of
the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt
from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the
very rules formulated for their observance.
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The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure
that the innocents are spared from the wrongful
condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their
just due. These rules cannot be taken lightly.
This Court underscores the procedural transgression
incurred by the IBP Board when it issued Resolution No.
XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere
consensus, and not through a formal voting, with the
required number of votes not secured. As to the issue of
the protracted investigation without the requisite
permission from the Supreme Court to extend the
investigation period, we agree with respondent that no
such request was made to this Court.
2. The Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable
conduct or practice justifying the penalty recommended.
While filing the claim for attorney’s fees against the
individual members may not be the proper remedy for
respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the same
out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect
his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firms
services and was led to believe that he would be paid for
the same. There is evidence which tend to show that
respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-
legal services in order to assist the landowners get a
favorable valuation of their properties. They facilitated the
incorporation of the landowners to expedite the
negotiations between the owners, the appraisers, and
NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political
personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with
NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after concluding the compromise
price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the
compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA
disengaged the services of respondent’s law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its
authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for
years without having received anything in return, and with
the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the
services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect
their interests. They may have been mistaken in the
remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good
faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business
venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered. It is but
natural that he protect his interest, most especially when
his fee is on a contingent basis.
Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a
compromise agreement was entered into by the lot owners
and NAPOCOR. Its motions for separate legal fees as well
as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Prescinding from the ultimate outcome of an independent
action to recover attorney’s fees, the Court does not see
any obstacle to respondent filing such action against
SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of
his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services.
Such independent action may be the proper venue to show
entitlement to the attorney’s fees he is claiming, and for his
client to refute the same. If respondent could resort to
such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome
and portends to be more protracted, there is similarly no
rhyme or reason to preclude him from filing mere motions
such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of
providing what he perceives to be his legitimate claim. The
bottom line is that respondent is not proscribed from
seeking recovery of attorney’s fees for the services he and
his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. As to
whether he would succeed in the quest, that is another
story which obviously does not have to be resolved in this
case.
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty
percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract
illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se
prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure,
upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent
fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless,
when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was
obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney
upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the
compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will
protect the aggrieved party.
63. A.C. No. 7062, September 26, 2006
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, CRISANTO
CONOS, and FREDILYN BACULBAS vs. ATTY. JOSE A.
SUING
Facts:
The practice of law does requires only ordinary diligence
or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias.
Sambajon, et al. are parties to a previous labor case in
which the Atty. Jose Suing is the counsel of their employer
Microplast, Inc. A judgment in favor of them was rendered
by the Labor Arbiter and a writ of execution was issued
against Microplast, Inc.
In the meantime, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case
insofar as the seven complainants are concerned on the
basis of individual Release Waiver and Quitclaims
purportedly signed and sworn to by them.
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Four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release
Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to
before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having
received the considerations therefor. They subsequently
filed an administrative complaint alleging that respondent,
acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel
Rodil, ―frustrated the implementation of the Writ of
Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the
spurious documents. A Complaint seeking the disbarment
of Atty. Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice,
violation of Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility was also filed.
During the administrative hearings before the IBP
Commissioner, it was apparent that Atty. Suing was
coaching his client to prevent himself from being
incriminated. It was also revealed that the Release Waiver
and Quitclaims allegedly signed were not the same
documents originally presented to the employees to be
signed.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Respondent Atty. Suing is an act
arguably violative of the Lawyers’ Code of Ethics.
Ruling:
Diligence is ―the attention and care required of a person
in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence. A
lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that
norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He
thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him,
save by the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in
the practice of law that the price of success is eternal
diligence to the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary
diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that ―extreme
measure of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection use for securing and
preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary
diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected
of a bonus pater familias.
In the case at bar, not only did Atty. Suing try to coach his
client or influence him to answer questions in an apparent
attempt not to incriminate him. His client contradicted
Atty. Suing’s claim that the Release Waiver and Quitclaim
which he prepared was not the one presented at the
Arbiter’s Office, as well as his implied claim that he was not
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
involved in releasing to the complainants the money for
and in consideration of the execution of the documents.
As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist
in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to
advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to
obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar
Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are
nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into
the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his
character.
64. G.R. No. L-35252, October 21, 1932
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. UY TENG PIAO
Facts:
Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for
non-payment of obligations at the CFI of Manila and said
court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9,
1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven
percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered
the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the
clerk of the court within three months from the date of
judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage properties
should be sold at auction in accordance with law and the
proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.
The defendant failed to comply with the payment order
and the properties were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila
for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.
On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a
waiver of the latter’s right to redeem one of the properties
described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to
one Mariano Santos for P8,600.
The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and
the proceeds were credited to the account of Uy. The total
amount generated with the resale of the lots amounted to
P 11, 300.
On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for
the recovery of the balance of the judgment amounting to
P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent per annum.
The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of
his right to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the
bank would not collect from him the balance of the
judgment.
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The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by
the bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not PNB condoned the balance of the
judgment.
2. Whether or not a lawyer can appear as both counsel and
witness in the same case.
Ruling:
1. No. There was no evidence presented except the
uncertain testimony of the defendant, that the bank did in
fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr.
Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is no evidence
presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank
through its board of directors or persons authorized by the
said board to bind the bank to the agreement.
2. Yes (No). The SC qualified.
The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both
counsel and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The
SC however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer
in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other
words, if they are to testify as required by the case, they
should withdraw from the active management of the case.
This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics.
Disposition: The decision of the CFI is reversed and the
defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38
with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per
annum to be reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the
defendant.
Canon 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits
of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
65. G.R. No. 75209, September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. AUGUSTO S.
SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES
Facts:
Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent
Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-
Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been
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Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme
Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the
pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises
and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set
up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers
and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and
sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards
with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day
long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been
received by the Chairmen of the Divisions where their
cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the
Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that
the pickets might be informed that the demonstration
must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct
contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained.
The Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said
unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and
requiring the union leaders of respondent Union of Filipro
Employees and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C.
Espinas; and the union leaders of petitioner Kimberly
Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia to appear before the Court and to
SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of
court.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders
concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-
described acts, together with an assurance that they will
not be repeated. He manifested to the Court that he had
explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong
and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such
penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances.
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the
picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is
usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that
the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its
role as the guardian of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the picketers should be held in contempt.
Ruling:
No. We accept the apologies offered by the respondents
and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction
warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier.
The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases should
not, however, be considered in any other light than an
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acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting
from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The
Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply
the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who
attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the
other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any,
must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e.,
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings
in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and
tending to embarrass the administration of justice."
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of
the citizen under all free governments. However, such
right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never
been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety
entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that
courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court;
and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies."
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen
has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from
outside coercion or interference." The aforecited acts of
the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the above-
stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at
large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-
lawyers are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of
substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that
even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are
protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or
influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the
ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that
any such efforts to influence the course of justice
constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility
of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily
upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did
his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of
their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as
a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is
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their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their
clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward
courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of
a continuing educational program for their members.
The contempt charges against herein respondents are
dismissed. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets
intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into
acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be
allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any
and all courts.
66. G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-
27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs. VIRGINIA Y.
YAPTINCHAY
Facts:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender
the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a
sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal
“peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for
justice…” He also expressed strong words as against the
judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb.” The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the
absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court.
His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by
reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute
resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this
sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender
his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title
again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary
actions for his acts.
Ruling:
Yes. Indefinite suspension imposed. It has been pointed
out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but
Atty. Almacen himself because of his negligence. Even if
the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking
of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn
the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough
damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular
case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and
local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and
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suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen
may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the
practice of law.
67. A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C., June 29, 2001
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF
IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP)
requested this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases
filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case
in our history."
Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally
filed the instant petition, submitting the following:
“The criminal cases involve the previous acts of
the former highest official of the land, members of
his family, his cohorts and, therefore, the
prosecution thereof definitely involves a matter of
public concern and interest.
The constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern can best be
recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the
live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings.
Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of
the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose
of ensuring the desired transparency in the
administration of justice in order to disabuse the
minds of the supporters of the past regime of any
and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived
attempts on the part of the present dispensation,
to railroad the instant criminal cases against the
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada.”
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be
evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
Issue:
Whether or not media coverage of the trial should be
allowed.
Ruling:
No. The propriety of granting or denying the instant
petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights
of the accused, on the other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings
in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to win. With the possibility of losing not only the
precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused
receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and
dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only
after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by
unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of
histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed
by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of
innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial. Witnesses
and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude,
able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to
presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it
must also be conceded that "television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on." Even
while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or
pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and
through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact,
nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in
varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that
such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and
the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can
likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
innocence to yield to it.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that
belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the
court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in
the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
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courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable
number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too
large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied
freedom of the press and the right to public information. It
also approves of media's exalted power to provide the
most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process which must
never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying
out the important function of informing the public in a
democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject
to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process."
The IBP also expressed its own concern on the live
television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr.
Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage
can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the
hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the
criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused
but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice
system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial
could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto
themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused,
such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if
popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial
will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to
the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the
popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are
tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the
basis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not
a free trade of ideas, nor is a competing market of thoughts
the known test of truth in a courtroom. The petition is
denied.
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Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
68. A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009
FOODSPHERE, INC. vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO,
JR.
Facts:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in
the business of meat processing and manufacture and
distribution of canned goods and grocery products under
the brand name "CDO," filed a complaint for disbarment
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP) against Atty. Melanio L.
Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas Mauricio"
(respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids and a host of
television and radio programs, for (1) grossly immoral
conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3) disrespect
to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
Alberto Cordero purportedly bought from a grocery
canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO
Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon
discovered a colony of worms inside the can. Cordero’s
wife filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug
Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination
confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing during which the
spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from
complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand as
being in contravention of company policy and, in any
event, "outrageous." Complainant instead offered to return
actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but
the offer was turned down.
Respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front
page of the would-be issue of a tabloid, which complainant
found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and
imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless
complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the
Corderos. Respondent later proposed to settle the matter
for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos
and P35,000 to his foundation.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD
thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in
one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared
the document. Respondent sent complainant an
Advertising Contract asking complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program. As
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a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-
page advertisements in the tabloid and three spots of 30-
second TVC in the television program. Acting on
complainant’s offer, respondent relayed to it that he was
disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed
with the publication of the articles/columns.
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against
respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to
Publish Libel. The complaints were pending at the time of
the filing of the present administrative complaint. The
pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo
order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish
articles against complainant and to malign complainant
through his television shows. The IBP recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two
years.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP
well-taken. The Court emphasized the necessity for every
lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession, which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he
engaged in deceitful conduct by taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest – to obtain
funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and
advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates: “A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and
the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining
further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any
matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent
continued with his attacks against complainant and its
products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1
also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to "uphold the Constitution, obey the
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laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." For he defied said status quo order, despite his
(respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to
"obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate:
“CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 – A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper, by using intemperate
language.”
The adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of
their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the
Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the
exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to "at all times
uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession." The power of the media to form or influence
public opinion cannot be underestimated. On reading the
articles respondent published, not to mention listening to
him over the radio and watching him on television, it
cannot be denied that the same could, to a certain extent,
have affected the sales of complainant.
Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyer’s oath
and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three years effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
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69. G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO
(San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental
Facts:
Khalyxto Maglasang was convicted in the court in San
Carlos, Negros Occidental. His counsel, Atty. Castellano,
filed for a petition for certiorari through registered mail.
Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the court
dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the
President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd
division, with biases and ignorance of the law or
knowingly rendering unjust judgments. He accused the
court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being
Marcos appointees, and robbing the Filipino people
genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is
doing this to protect the judge who was impleaded in the
petition and for money reasons. He alleges further that the
court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The
court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and
meticulous. When asked to show cause why he should not
be cited in contempt, Castellano said that the complaint
was constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith
the erroneous and very strict practices of the justices
concerned. He also said that the justices have no
jurisdiction over his act and that they should just answer
the complaint. The SC found him guilty of contempt and
improper conduct and ordered to pay P1, 000 or
imprisonment of 15 days, and to suffer six months
suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Atty. Castellano’s acts constitute a
violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. The court found his comments scurrilous and
contumacious. He went beyond the bounds of constructive
criticism. What he said are not relevant to the cause of his
client. They cast aspersion on the Court’s integrity as a
neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies
before it.
The explanation of Castellano in his negligence in the filing
of the petition for certiorari did not render his negligence
excusable. It is clear that the case was lost not by the
alleged injustices Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the
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members of the Court, but his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence.
As an officer of the court, he should have known better
than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court just to
keep the confidence of his client.
Also, with the complaint he filed, the most basic tenet of
the system of government – separation of power - has been
lost. He should know that not even the President of the
Philippines can pass judgment on any of the Court’s acts.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite
interference by another branch or agency of the
government in the normal course of judicial
proceedings.
IV. The Lawyer and The Client
Canon 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services
to the needy.
70. A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and
CARLOS M. JOAQUIN vs. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P.
PORTUGAL
Facts:
Three police officers were involved in a shooting incident,
resulting in the death of two people and the serious injury
of another. They were tried and convicted of two counts of
homicide and one count of attempted homicide by the
Sandiganbayan.
The police officers then engaged the services of a lawyer.
After filing two Motions for Reconsideration before the
Sandiganbayan and a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Supreme Court (SC), the lawyer disappeared.
They repeatedly called his office but their calls were not
returned. They visited his last known address only to
discover that he had moved out without any forwarding
address.
More than a year later, the police officers were forced to
personally verify the status of their Petition. They were
shocked to discover that the SC had already issued a
Resolution denying it for late filing and non-payment of
filing fees. Further, since the Resolution was already final,
warrants for their arrest had been issued.
This prompted them to file an administrative complaint
against their lawyer for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath,
gross misconduct, and gross negligence.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
In his defense, the lawyer claimed that the police officers
did not formally engage his services and, hence, were not
really his clients. He pointed out that he was not their
original counsel and had only met them during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision, when their
original counsel requested his assistance. He had only filed
Motions and Petitions on their behalf out of sincerity and
in the true spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath. He asserted that
because of the “herculean” efforts he exerted for their case,
which were all done without proper and adequate
remuneration, his other professional obligations were
neglected.
The lawyer further claimed that he formally withdrew as
their counsel when he wrote a letter to another police
officer who served as the contact person between him and
the accused officers. He had attached his Notice to
Withdraw with instructions that they sign and file it with
the Court.
Issue:
Was the suspension of the lawyer proper?
Ruling:
Yes. The SC, upon recommendation of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, found the lawyer guilty and suspended
him for three (3) months. Rejecting the allegation that
there was no formal agreement of undertaking between
the parties, the SC held:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a
lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even
if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-
client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it
is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
xxxx
A written contract is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney… To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession.
Even if the lawyer felt inadequately compensated in the
case he undertook to defend, his obligations towards his
clients embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility remain. His zeal in handling
the case should neither diminish nor cease for this reason
alone.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
With respect to his alleged formal withdrawal as counsel,
the SC held that the lawyer should have filed the Notice of
Withdrawal himself, being more adept with court
procedures and practice. He could relieve himself of his
responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written
conformity of the accused and filing it with the court
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime
with or without cause. The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for
sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that
an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to
abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client’s written consent or from a good
cause.
Also, the Court does not appreciate the offensive
appellation respondent called the shooting incident that
the accused was engaged in. He described the incident,
thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted
of [h]omicide for the ‘salvage’ of Froilan G. Cabiling and
Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C.
Macato." Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate
clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic
that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own
clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims.
Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even
the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
71 & 74. G.R. No. L-26868, February 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO
Member of the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. REMIGIO ESTEBIA
Facts:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of
First Instance of Samar, and sentenced to suffer the capital
punishment. His case came up before this Court on review.
On December 14, 1966, Lope E. Adriano, a member of the
Bar, was appointed by this Court as Estebia's counsel de
oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was
required to prepare and file his brief within thirty days
from notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine
the case, the record would be at his disposal. Adriano
received this notice on December 20, 1966. On January 19,
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1967, Adriano sought for a 30-day extension to file
appellant's brief in mimeographed form. On February 18,
Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension (his second).
This was followed by a third filed on March 8, for fifteen
days. And a fourth on March 27, also for fifteen days. He
moved for a "last" extension of ten days on April 11. On
April 21, he even sought a special extension of five days. All
these motions for extension were granted. The brief was
due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show
cause within ten days from notice thereof why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for failure to file
appellant's brief despite the lapse of the time therefor.
Adriano did not bother to give any explanation.
Issue:
Does Atty. Adriano deserve a disciplinary action?
Ruling:
Yes. It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we
do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty
to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant
himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must
exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf
of the person assigned to his care. His is to render effective
assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not
accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the
defended party is poor. It has been said that courts should
"have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of
attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons charged
with crime." For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the
bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest. Because of this,
a lawyer should remain ever conscious of his duties to the
indigent he defends.
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct, it would
seem to us, reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to
benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio
and of the courtesy and respect that should be accorded
this Court. For the reasons given, we vote to suspend
Attorney Lope E. Adriano from the practice of law
throughout the Philippines for a period of one year.
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
72. A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006
NESTOR PEREZ vs. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE
Facts:
On 30 July 2003, complainant Nestor Perez charged
respondent Atty. Danilo Dela Torre with misconduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting
interests.
Atty. Dela Torre, while being retained by the family of
murder victim Resurreccion Barrios assisted in the
drafting of an extrajudicial confession of Sonny Boy Ilo and
Diego Avila, two suspects in the kidnapping for ransom
and murder of Mr. Barrios. The IBP recommended the
suspension of Atty. Dela Torre for two (2) years violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Dela Torre committed misconduct
unbecoming of a lawyer.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC ruled that the respondent clearly violated Rule
15.03 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from
representing conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the
facts.
Atty. Dela Torre is suspended from practice for three
years.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In
the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client’s case,
including the weak and strong points of the case. The
nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
What is unsettling is that Atty. Dela Torre assisted in the
execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby
they admitted their participation in various serious
criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained
previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Atty. Dela
Torre, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law,
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
should have exercised his better judgment before
conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross
his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and
instead, he even assisted them in executing the
extrajudicial confession.
73. A.C. No. 5485, March 16, 2005
ELMER CANOY vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ
Facts:
Atty. Jose Max Ortiz's services were engaged by Elmer
Canoy, who was illegally dismissed by his employer, Coca
Cola Bottlers Philippines. The latter submitted all
important files necessary for the establishment of the case.
After the filing thereof, Mr. Canoy made several trips to
Atty Ortiz's office to no avail. His last trip prompted him to
follow the case up with the NLRC by himself. He was
aghast to discover that the case was already dismissed two
years before.
Mr. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never communicated
to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that
he failed to submit the position paper.
In his defense, Atty. Ortiz commented that he had the
intention of filing a motion to enter a compromise
agreement. Unfortunately, he was not able to do so
because of his tight schedule, being a newly-elected
Councilor of Bacolod City.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Ortiz is negligent in his duty or counsel or
should he be excused for his negligence.
Ruling:
Atty. Ortiz should be suspended from the practice of law.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He is
expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him. Moreover, he is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Here, Atty. Ortiz already took up the cause of his client. In
doing so, he impliedly imposed upon himself the legal
obligation to champion said cause until its termination
with competence and diligence. Such competence requires
that he no neglect any legal matter entrusted in him.
Being elected to a public office is not enough cause to leave
one's client in the dark. Such act does not only erode the
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr.
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4
public's confidence in the lawyer, in particular, but also in
the judiciary, in general. Hence, Atty. Ortiz must be held
liable.
Lawyers who devote their professional practice in
representing litigants who could ill afford legal services
deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public
service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-
meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not
enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of
legal representation. They deserve quality representation
as well.
Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
75. A.C. No. 5303, June 15, 2006
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in behalf of PENTA RESORTS
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A.
JALANDONI vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA
Facts:
Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis
Jalbuena (married to her daughter Carmen Jalbuena) and
Humberto Lim, Jr. (herein complainant; married to her
daughter Cristina Lim). Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni owned 97%
of Penta Resorts Corp (PRC). The only property of the
corporation is the Alhambra Hotel constructed solely thru
the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on the parcel of land now
claimed by the Cabiles family.
PRC had a case wherein Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was its
counsel. Later on, complainant had a case against spouses
Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and
the latter spouses were represented by Atty. Villarosa as
their retained counsel.
After Atty. Villarosa had allegedly withdrawn as counsel
for the complainants which Atty. Villarosa averred in his
answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim to represent
his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra
Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only
her interest but that of the family.
It is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client
relationship with Atty. Villarosa before the latter retained
as counsel by the spouses Jalbuena when the latter were
sued by complainant’s representative. Atty. Villarosa for
having appeared as counsel for the Sps. Jalbuena when
charged by Atty. Villarosa’s former client Jalandoni of PRC
and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in
violation of CPR.
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Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4
Issue:

Whether or not there existed a conflict of interest in the

cases represented and handled by Atty. Villarosa.

Ruling:

The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases

which confidential communication have been confided but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used. The first part of the rule refers to cases in
which the opposing parties are the present clients either in
the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second
part pertains to those in which the adverse party against
whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter
which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present
controversy.

The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients

whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action
or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or
indirectly involved the parties’ connection to PRC. An
attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After
being retained and receiving the confidences of the client
he cannot, w/out the free and intelligent consent of his
client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is
adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same
general matter.

The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by

the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of
circumstances beyond the control of the client or the
lawyer. An attorney may only retire from a case either by
written consent of his client or by permission of the court
after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is
recorded in the case. The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in
fact was not even to substitute for Atty. Villarosa but to act
as additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to
having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean to
Atty. Villarosa’s desire to withdraw as counsel Atty.
Villarosa’s speculations on the professional relationship of
Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the
records of this case. Atty. Villarosa should not have
presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel would
be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs.
Jalandoni’s counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first
hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have
actually granted his motion for withdrawal.

Thus, Atty. Villarosa is found guilty of violating Canon 15

and Canon 22 of CPR and suspended from practice of law
for one year.

UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW Page 79

LLB – 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)

Abing, Patrick Jamero, Jacinto Jr. Maglasang, Laarni Ursal, April Lynn
Gulbin, Lou Ann Magdoza, Bregette Niere, Sherlyn Ysulan, Aura Bern
Franje, Hanelli Jane JD-4 Tabuñag, Vincent Roel JD-4