Civil Law Review I: Effect and Application of Laws

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I 1
Atty. Crisostomo Uribe
I. INTRODUCTION
II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS (NCC 1-18) and HUMAN RELATIONS (NNC 19-36)
A. When law takes effect
NCC Art. 2
Revised Administrative Code (RAC), Secs. 18 to 24
Executive Order No. 200, Sec. 2
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292),
Book VII, Chapter 2, Sec. 3
NCC Art. 2
● Publication in the Official Gazette
● Shall take effect 15 days after
RAC 18-24
● Publication in the Official Gazette or Newspaper of General Circulation unless otherwise provided. (18)
● Prospective in effect, unless the contrary is expressly provided
● The English text shall control in the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance unless specifically provided. (20)
● When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly provided. (21)
● When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise. (22)
● Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (23; NCC Art. 3)
● All legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature shall be published. (24)
(a) Executive and administrative issuances of general application
(b) Decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank of sufficient importance
to be so published
(c) Documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law
(d) Documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published
(e) The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.
E.O. 200 (2)
● Publication of laws in Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as a requirement of effectivity.
● The "Civil Code of the Philippines" and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), Book VII, Chapter 2, Sec. 3
● Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center 3 certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
● Those which are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
● The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements under pain of disciplinary action.
● A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Process on how the law takes effect:

1.) Republic Acts/Presidential Decree- Publication in the Official Gazette, shall take effect after fifteen days. (NCC Art 2)
2.) Admin Issuances- Filing with the UP Law Center and publication in the Official Gazette or newspapers of general circulation, shall take effect after 15 days. (RAC 18-24)
3.) Ordinances- public hearing and posting (Local Government Code)
Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984

People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Petitioners contend that in order
for these laws to be effective it must be published in the Official Gazette.
Doctrine: Laws should be published to give the general public adequate notice of various laws. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
“ignorantia legis non excusat”. Publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or general applicability is mandated by law. Presidential decrees providing
for fines, forfeitures or penalties fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
MRCA v. CA, 180 SCRA 591, December 19, 1989

Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591, December 1989
Commission of Customs v. Hypermix

Petitioner issued CMO 27-2003, classifying wheat as food or feed grade. Respondent challenged it contending that it did not follow the mandate of the Admin Code
on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. Petitioner defensed that it was an admin rule,
not a legislative rule so the mandate is not needed.
Held: It is clear that Respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of the subject regulation as it would be made to pay 7% tariff, instead of
3%. Thus, Petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Admin Code (the required publication).
Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, GR. 187587, June 5, 2013
PASEI v. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 101279, August 06, 1992

PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation on the ground that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office
of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
SC: For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
Acaac v. Azcuna Jr., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013

Facts: Petitioner is a non-governmental organization engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects which built some cottages rented out to the
public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries. Respondents issued Notices of Illegal Construction against petitioner for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop all illegal building activities. A municipal ordinance was adopted which prohibited (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government.
Held: Sec. 56(d) of the Local Government Code provides: If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or
resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, "action." This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory
construction that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each other. Laws
are given a reasonable construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute.
B. Ignorance of the law

NCC Art. 3 Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Kasilag v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 46623, December 7, 1939

Facts: Kasilag and Rodriguez entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the
improvements on a piece of land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that
there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands, petitioner, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the petitioner has no
knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
Held: NCC. Art. 3 provides, “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.” In the case at bar, Kasilag was found by the SC as a possessor of the
land in good faith. Sec. 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, “"Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition,
by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad
faith".
Elegado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-68385, May 12, 1989

Facts: Warren Taylor Graham, formerly resident in the Philippines, died in Orgen, USA. His son Ward filed an estate tax return. The CIR assessed the descedant’s estate, but the assessment
was protested by a law firm which was denied. Elegado as an ancillary administrator filed a second estate tax return. The petitioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of
P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final and executory. Petitioner was denied contending that the first assessment is not
binding on him because it was based on a return filed for by lawyers.
The Supreme Court held that Elegado’s contention is flimsy. Elegado cannot be serious when he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return
on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim similar preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by laws in our country.
Doctrine: Ignorance of the law is not an excuse (ignorantia legis non excusat).
C. Retroactivity of laws
NCC Art. 4, cf. NCC Arts. 2252 – 2269; Revised Penal Code (RPC) Art. 22; Family Code (FC) Art. 256
Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (NCC Art 4)
RULES ON RETROACTIVITY:
1. No retroactive effect with the changes made and new provisions and rules which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
old legislation.
2. The Old Code/laws shall govern rights from acts done or events which took place under their regime even though this Code may regulate them in a
different manner or may not recognize them.
NOTE: If a right is declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once even though the act or event may have been done or may
have occurred under prior legislation, provided that it is not prejudicial.
3. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.
4. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even
though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect.
5. Acts and contracts that are valid under the regime of the old laws shall continue to be fully operative subject to certain limitations. But the revocation or
modification of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws.
6. Provisions with civil sanctions or penalties which were not penalized by former laws, are not applicable to those executed which are condemned by this
Code. Less severe sanction shall be applied, if also punished by the Old Code. In a continuous or repeated act or omission before the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code and subsists after this Code becomes operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the
previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor.
7. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old
legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the
right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that
established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue.
8. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws.
9. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws.
10. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction illegitimate children shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code.
11. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's
possession before said date.
12. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code shall be suspended. The court may determine if possible, a
reconciliation.
Laws that have Prospective and Retroactive effect:

1. Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants
2. Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage
3. Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;
4. Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;
5. Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments
6. Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
7. Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromises.
Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect:

1. favor the persons guilty of a felony
2. not a habitual criminal
3. Although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530
Puzon v. Abellara, 169 SCRA 789, January 31, 1989
Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591, January 30 1989
MRCA v. CA, supra
Sps. Dacudao v. Gonzales, GR No. 188056
Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915- 00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a
vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases.
Francisco vs CA
Teresita Francisco, the petitioner, is the legal wife of Eusebio Francisco by second marriage (1962). Francisco claims that d uring their marriage, she and Eusebio have acquired properties.
And upon the invalidation of Eusebio because of tuberculosis, heart disease, and cancer, he signed a general power of attorney to authorize Conchita (child of Eusebio in the first marriage)
to administer the properties. Francisco filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney; and to be declared as administratrix of the properties in dispute. The
contention is the applicability of Art. 160 and 158 of the NCC, because it has been repealed by Art. 254 of the FC.
Held: Although it is true that Art. 254 of the FC repeals Art 160 and 158 of the NCC; SC cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights. Art. 160 of the NCC
provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife”.
CF: Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

Facts: Lorna and Zosimo got married in 1975, their union brought up 4 children, only during their marriage did Zosimo show signs of his irresponsibility and habitual drinking. Often beating
Lorna and their children up and once even tried to threaten to kill her with a loaded shotgun. In 1992 Lorna took her children to her sister’s place and stayed there for 2 months when she
forgave her husband, which only made things worse when her husband assaulted her in front of their children. She filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity of Zosimo, the RTC ruled against Zosimo who brought it up to the appellate court which overturned the lower court’s decision.
Held: It is in Santos v. Court of Appeals and Molina when the Court has given life to the term psychological incapacity and Molina provided procedural Guidelines to assist the courts. The wife
argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application as the guidelines are merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis
ordained in Art. 8 of the Civil Code applies in the case at bar. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court held that the
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent. It is only when a different view is adopted that the new doctrine may be applied
prospectively in favor of the parties who relied on the old doctrine.
David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

Facts: In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner returned to the Philippines and purchased a property. In
2004, petitioner found out that the purchased property is a public land and part of salvage zone. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application over the subject land with DENR and
indicated that he is Filipino. Private respondent opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. Meanwhile, petitioner reacquired his
Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto). Petitioner then claimed that, by legal fiction, he was already deemed not to
have lost his Philippine Citizenship upon reacquisition of the same under R.A. 9225.
Doctrine: R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of the said act. Only those who acquire foreign
citizenship after R.A. 9225 took effect are considered to have retained their natural-born status.
D. Acts Executed Against Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

NCC Art. 5 with NCC Art. 17 (3)
NCC 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
NCC 17 (3): Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
BPI v. IAC, 164 SCRA 630, August 19, 1988
Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

RA 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any TRO, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the
Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Government’s direction.
SC: The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under RA 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative
Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of
the Government.
E. Waiver of rights
NCC Arts. 6, 301 (& 2035)
NCC 6: Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a person with a right
recognized by law.
NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes
the obligor.
NCC 2035: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

 The civil status of persons;
 The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
 Any ground for legal separation;
 Future support;
 The jurisdiction of courts;
 Future legitime. (1814a)
Requirements of Waiver
a. Person must actually have the right which he renounces thus one cannot renounce liability arising from future fraud, or a future inheritance, or the action
to revoke a donation on the ground of the donee’s ingratitude.
b. He must have the capacity to make the renunciation.
c. The renunciation must be made in clear and unequivocal manner
De Borja v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577
Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation v. Sps. Cesario Gravador and Norma de Vera, et. al., GR 186550, July 5, 2010
DMCI vs. CA
Jose Juego, construction worker of DMC, fell 14 floors from the Renaissance tower to his death. Maria, widow of the deceased, filed for benefits from the ECC and thereafter filed a civil case.
RTC ruled in favor of Maria and ordered DMC to pay damages, decision was appealed to CA, CA affirmed the decision.
Held: Sec. 5 of Labor Code: once an employee, or his representatives, descendants or nearest of kin has claimed for compensation by reason of injury, he/she/they may not claim for
damages through a civil suit. Said exemption is that if the claiming party is ignorant of the facts he/she may file for damages again even after claiming compensation under Section 5. The
Court reiterated the exemption for Sec. 5 that since Maria claimed compensation before being aware of the actual facts may also file the said civil case against DMC.
Aujero v. Philcomsat
Facts: Hypte R. Aujero, petitioner, applied for early retirement after working for 34 years for PHILCOMSAT. His application was granted, he then executed of a Deed of Release and Quitclaim
in PHILCOMSAT’s favor and was granted P9,439,327.91. After three years, he filed a complaint claiming that the actual amount of his retirement was P14,015,055. The Court honored the
Deed of Release and Quitclaim as a valid and binding release and waiver; denying the petitioner’s claim.
Held: Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with
full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
Dona Adela v. Tidcorp

Facts: Petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. Atty. Gonzales was a ppointed as receiver in which she filed a Motion for Parties to enter into
Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of compromise. The creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement which contained some
terms and conditions for their benefit. The RTC rendered the assailed decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.
Held:It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of
contracts. The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x." The sound reason for the
exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an obligation. Consistent with this principle, a
judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the
compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement
binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.
F. Repeal of laws
NCC Art. 7, 8, 10; cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3; FC Arts. 254, 255
NCC 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
NCC 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
NCC 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
FC 254: Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, April 22, 1991
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004:

The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless irreconcilable conflict and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws. There is no provision in RA 8369 that revoked the trial court‗s jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors although it conferred upon the family courts
the jurisdiction to do so. (No implied repeal)
Facts: Senator Tamano married his second wife, petitioner Estrellita Tamano, on May 18, 1994 in civil rights in Lanao del Sur. Soon after his death, his fi rst wife (Zorayda Tamano) and his son
(Adib Tamano) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Sen. and Estrellita Tamano. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Estrellita filed a motion to
dismiss at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Then, the petitioner filed a case to the Court questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case, as the parties were Muslims, and therefore,
the case must be tried in a shari’a court.
The SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil
wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
Doctrine: Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
Kida vs Senate
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of several laws enacted by Congress, particularly RA 10153, on ground that theyinterfere with the autonomy of ARMM.
SC: The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Yinlu vs Bicol
Yinlu’s mining patents were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and subsisted prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Held: Yinlu’s mining patents were issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and subsisted prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. This gave Yinlu and its predecessors vested
rights in the disputed mineral lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with registration requirements and annual work obligation.
Presidential Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree) provides that its provisions would not apply if it will impair vested rights under other mining laws.
Judicial Decisions
NCC Art. 8
ART. 8
● Applying/interpreting the laws/Conti
● Shall form part of the PH legal system
● Doctrine of Stare Decisis - once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
○ Such doctrine shall not apply when there is conflict between the law and the precedent. The duty of the Court is to abandon any doctrine or role found to be in violation of the
law in force.
ART. 8
● Applying/interpreting the laws/Conti
● Shall form part of the PH legal system
● Doctrine of Stare Decisis - once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
○ Such doctrine shall not apply when there is conflict between the law and the precedent. The duty of the Court is to abandon any doctrine or role found to be in violation of the
law in force.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

Facts: Lorna and Zosimo got married in 1975, their union brought up 4 children, only during their marriage did Zosimo show signs of his irresponsibility and habitual drinking. Often beating
Lorna and their children up and once even tried to threaten to kill her with a loaded shotgun. In 1992 Lorna took her children to her sister’s place and stayed there for 2 months when she
forgave her husband, which only made things worse when her husband assaulted her in front of their children. She filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity of Zosimo, the RTC ruled against Zosimo who brought it up to the appellate court which overturned the lower court’s decision.
Held: It is in Santos v. Court of Appeals and Molina when the Court has given life to the term psychological incapacity and Molina provided procedural Guidelines to assist the courts. The wife
argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application as the guidelines are merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. The Court held that the doctrine of stare decisis
ordained in Art. 8 of the Civil Code applies in the case at bar. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The Court held that the
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent. It is only when a different view is adopted that the new doctrine may be applied
prospectively in favor of the parties who relied on the old doctrine.
De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010

Facts: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue that the disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) –
are clear and speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banning appointments during the election period. One even posits that there is no conflict because both provisions can
be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favor of a deferment for the
incoming President’s action. Still others, repeating their original arguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point. Most of the movants contend
that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling,
Held: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members o f the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
The Court cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.
Doctrine: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Ty v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012

The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case
and those of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 are the same. Clearly, in light of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201
and 166608, which the Court follows as precedents, the present action for reconveyance cannot prosper. It is the Court’s duty to apply the previous rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and in G.R.
Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 to the present case. Once a case has been decided o ne way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present
case, should be decided in the same manner.
Virtucio vs Alegarbes
Alegarbes filed a homestead application (acquisitive prescription). Virtucio argued that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted when Alegarbes filed a protest before the
Director of Lands. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the
"extrajudicial demand", thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.
Held: It is only through natural and civil interruption that would effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the
possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run. While petitioner
claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his homestead application interrupted the th (30)-year period of acquisitive prescription, the law however, dictates that only a judicial
summons can effectively toll the said period.
Republic v. Remman Enterprises, G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

Facts: Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of Lot Nos 3068 and 3077. The RTC granted the respondent’s application for registration of title to the
subject properties and the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. They found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject properties are part of the aliena ble and
disposable lands of the public domain and that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. Respondents were also able to present certifications issued by DENR which was not disputed
by the petitioner. It also ruled that the respondent was able to prove through the testimonies of its witnesses that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
properties prior June 12, 1945.
Held: Respondent contends that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 2008 must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of the Court form a part
of the law of the land and pursuant to Art. 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for registration of title to the subject
properties was filed and was granted by the RTC prior the Court’s ruling in T.A.N Properties. The Court does not agree and averred that the pronouncements made in the case may be applied
to the case at bar and is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Art. 4 of the Civil Code. In interpreting the law, the Court constitutes part of the law of the land
from the date it was originally passed and does not amount to a passage of a new law but a construction of pre-existing ones.
G. Duty to render judgment

NCC Arts. 9 & 10; RPC Art. 5
ART. 9
Judge or Court can not decline to render judgment by reason of:
1. Silence
2. Obscurity, or
3. Insufficiency of law
● Shall not be applicable to criminal prosecutions where the case will be dismissed when there is no law punishing it.
● Ignorance/ lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable - not reasons to decline
● If the law is vague - court should clarify it in the light of the rules of StatCon, or if it is silent/insufficient - court should fill the deficiency by resorting to customs
or general principles of law
● When there is no express rules/law that may be applied - customs and jurisprudence are always considered as suppletory
○ Customs - results from a constant and continued uniform practice by the members of a social community, with respect to a particular state of facts,
and observed with a conviction that it is juridically obligatory. It must not be contrary to law, morals, or pubilc order
ART. 10
In case of doubt in the interpretation/application of law
● Presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail
ART. 11
● Customs, which are contrary to law, public order or public policy - shall not be recognized
RPC 5
Duty of the Court in case - act should be repressed but is not covered by the law:
1. Render proper decision
2. Report to the Chief Executive, through DOJ, the he reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation
3. Without suspending the execution of the sentence
People v. Ritter, G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991

Facts: Ritter challenged his conviction involving a rape of a 12 year old girl who died because of a foreign object inside her vaginal canal. He was charged with the crime of rape with homicide
but pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she
received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her
death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a
Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt the accused for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil
liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. He was, however, deported.
Doctrine: No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws (Art. 9, NCC). In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail (Art. 10, NCC).
Alonzo v. Padua, G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987

Facts: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents. Two lands were bought by Carlos and Casmira Alonzo
from Celistino and Estaquia Padua. In 1976 and 1977, coheirs Mariano Padua and Tecla Padua respectively filed their own complaint invoking their right of redemption. The trial court
dismissed this complaint on the grounds of the right had lapsed not having been exercised within 30 days. However, there was no written notice, but actual knowledge by other co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of law. In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not
suffice as a substitute.
The instant case presents that the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made. The Court, thus, held that the co-heirs in this case were undeniably
informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. Though there was no notice in writing, this case provides justifications for the exception.
Doctrine: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right justice to prevail.
Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011

The petitioner argues that the only purpose behind Art. 1623 of the NCC is to ensure that the owner of the adjoining land is actually notified of the intention of the owner to sell his property.
SC: Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Baas.
H. Applicability of Custom
NCC Arts. 11 – 12; cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XII Sec. 5; Rules of Court (ROC), Rule 129, Secs. 2 & 3
ART. 11
Customs, which are contrary to law, public order or public policy - shall not be recognized
ART 12
Customs must be proved as a fact - according to the rules of evidence.
CONSTI Art. XII, Sec. 5

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
ROC Rule 129, Sec. 2 & 3

● A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
● During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties
to be heard thereon.
Martinez vs Buskirk
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant came from the opposite direction, while their
carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied
by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s head. Defendant claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage
at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered.
Held: The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent.
Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010

Facts: The original case was filed by the now private respondents, who are sisters claiming to be the absolute owners of the property in question being the legal heirs of their late father who
have been in continuous possession of the property prior to his death. Petitioner Tomawis assumed ownership to the said property on the claim that he bought the same from another
Mangoda Radia, who claims to have inherited the property from his late father. He reportedly utilized the said land he claimed to have bought for the construction of small houses bringing
forth the said original action before the Sharia District Court in Marawi.
Held: Generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. BP 129 and PD
1083 must be read and construed together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws. This is so since the legislature has not made any express
repeal or modification of PD 1083, and it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. Implied repeals will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, and it follows that the legislature did not intend to interfere
with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter.
I. Legal periods
NCC Art. 13 cf. ROC Rule 18, 22; RAC Sec. 31
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that:
o Year (12 months) = 365 days
o Month = 30 days
o Day = 24 hours
o Night = from sunset to sunrise
If months are designated by their name: They shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have.
-Example: If January is used, then it is understood that it is composed of 31 days.
In computing a period:
-EXCLUDE: the first day
-INCLUDE: the last day
ROC Rule 28: (Physical and Mental Examination of Persons) – typo??
ROC Rule 22: Computation of Time
Section 1. How to compute time.

In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute:
 EXCLUDE: the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run
 INCLUDE: the date of performance
If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a:

 Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday (in the place where the court sits): The time shall not run until the next working day.
Section 2. Effect of interruption.

Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period:
 The allowable period after such interruption shall start to run is: On the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof
 EXCLUDE: The day of the act that caused the interruption in the computation of the period
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. (Same as NCC Art. 13)
Armigos v. CA, 179 SCRA 1, November 6, 1989
Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70, August 27, 1969
CIR v. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007

Facts: On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax the respondent paid in 1997. He stated in his
letter to the revenue district officer of BIR Makati that the increase in the cost of labor and materials, and the difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused
the real estate industry to slowdown. The consequence of that was that the respondents suffered losses despite the boom of the business. Although there were losses, Yap still managed to
pay the quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR which entitles the respondent to tax refund or tax credit.
Held: Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to
be equivalent to 365 days. However, EO 292, a subsequent law, was enacted. It provides in Section 31 thereof that a year shall be understood to be “twelve calendar months.”
Doctrine: The court defines a calendar month as a “month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.”
Montajes v. People, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012

AM No. 00-2-14-SC:
In the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday
 The filing of the said pleaning on the next working days is deemed on time
When a motion for extensiion of time is filed
 Any extension of time to file the required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday.
J. Binding effect – NCC 14-18

NCC Art. 15 cf. FC Art. 26, par. 2
Art. 14: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in PH territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
Art. 15. Laws relating to: (a) family rights and duties, or (b) the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are:
 Binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad
FC Art. 26, par. 2 (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Foreign Marriages of Filipinos
 Requisites:
(1) A marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;

(2) Such marriage is validly celebrated; and
(3) A divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry
 EFFECT: The Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
 NOTE:
o The rule of lex loci celebrationis: Marriages solemnized abroad, if valid in the country where celebrated, are also valid in the Philippines.
o Exception to lex loci celebrationis: A foreign marriage although validly celebrated in another country, will STILL BE VOID in the Philippines if:
(1) Either or both parties did not have the legal capacity to get married (Art. 35 (1));
(2) Bigamous or polygamous marriage (Art. 35 (4));
(3) Mistake as to the identity of the other – consent of one part is lacking (Art. 35 (5));
(4) Psychological incapacity (Art. 36);
(5) Incestuous marriage (Art. 37); or
(6) Marriage void by reason of public policy (Art. 38).
o Reason for the Amendment by EO 227: To avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his/her alien spouse although the latter is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had already obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law
o This provision (Art. 26 par. 2) does not apply to a divorce OBTAINED BY A FILIPINO abroad from his/her FILIPINO SPOUSE; such divorce (even if obtained
abroad) is void because divorce is not allowed in the Philippines, and a Filipino is governed by his/her national law wherever he/she goes (Art. 15, Civil Code).
o This provision does not also apply to divorces OBTAINED BY FILIPINO CITIZENS after they have become NATURALIZED in foreign countries. Allowing this
would open the door to wealthy Filipino to obtain naturalization abroad to divorce their Filipino spouses.
NCC Art.16
Rule governing real property and personal property:
 The law of the country where it is stipulated
Rule governing intestate and testamentary successions:

 Both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions: National law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, regardless of (a) the nature of the property and (b) the country wherein said property may be
found
NCC Art. 17
Rule governing the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments:
 The laws of the country in which they are executed
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country:
 The solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs:
 Shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country
NCC Art. 18
Deficiency in matters governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws:
 Supplied by the provisions of the Civil Code
Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67, March 7, 1933
Tenchavez vs Escano
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño exchanged marriage vows before a Catholic Chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil register. The couple
became estranged after a few months. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed
a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
Held: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139, October 8, 1985
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989
Board of Commissioners v. de la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991

Facts: On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has 5 children. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the
board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was
allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known
as the Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage
then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen. Where it held that, considering that in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family and every intendment of the law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, “he who asserts that the marrage is not valid under the law bears the burden of proof
to present the foreign law.” In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there
being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same as Philippine Law.
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014

Facts: Atty. Juan Luna’s first marriage was to Eugenia Luna (September 1948), with whom he had seven children. He and Eugenia opted to separate (February 1966) and had a written
agreement for separation and property settlement (November1975). Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree abroad from the CFI of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic (January 1976) and on
the same day married Soledad Lavadia. They both returned to the Philippines as husband and wife until 1987. Atty. Juan died on July 1997. After his death, his son from his first marriage,
Gregorio Luna, took over his father’s belongings and leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium to Atty. De la Cruz, his late father’s law firm partner.
Lavadia was not able to prove that she participated in contributing financially to Atty. Luna’s condominium and the purchase of law books. Also, her marriage with Atty. Luna is considered
void as it was a bigamous marriage (illegal marriage as the first marriage was not legally dissolved). Therefore the true owners are the heirs of Atty. Luna through his first marriage with
Eugenia.
Doctrine: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad (NCC
Art 15).
Testate Estate of Amos Bellis, Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national la w. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his
will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
SC held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
Del Soccoro vs Van Wilsem

Del Socorro and Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990, wherein such union resulted to a son named Rodrigo Norjo Van Wilsem. However, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by an appropriate Court of Holland. Del Soccoro contends that Wilselm promised to provide monthly support to their son, which however, was
never fulfilled.
Held: Wilsem is a citizen of Holland and he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of
his failure to do so. In this case, while he pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he neve r proved the same. It is incumbent
upon him to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Raytheon v. Rouzie, G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008

Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie,
Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts sometime in 1990. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. During the existence of the contract, Rouzie filed a case against BMSI and Rust International Inc., (RUST) before the
Arbitration Branch of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination, and breach of employment contract. The complaint also
averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
Held: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As regard to the jurisdiction over the parties,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Rouzie(as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complain while jurisdiction over the person was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. Under
the doctrine of FORUM NON CONVENIENS, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are
not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Tamano v. Judge Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

Facts: Senator Tamano married his second wife, petitioner Estrellita Tamano, on May 18, 1994 in civil rights in Lanao del Sur. Soon after his death, his first wife (Zorayda Tamano) and his son
(Adib Tamano) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Sen. and Estrellita Tamano. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Estrellita filed a motion to
dismiss at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Then, the petitioner filed a case to the Court questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case, as the parties were Muslims, and therefore,
the case must be tried in a shari’a court.
The SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil
wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
Doctrine: Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

Tamano married twice. First with Zorayda under civil and Muslim rites, and second with Estrellita under the Islamic laws and tradition, and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony. In his
marriage with Estreliita, he declared himself as divorced.
SC: Civil Code governs Tamano's marriage with Zorayda. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.In
view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zamoranos vs People
Zamoranos contracted two marriages, both in two ceremonies (Muslim rite and Civil rite). In the first marriage, Zamoranos contracted a Divorce by talaq from which the Sharia courts issued
a decree. The second marriage also did not succeed so a declaration of nullity of marriage (RTC Branch 2) and a bigamy case (RTC Branch 6) was filed against Zamoranos. RTC Branch 2
dismissed the petition because of lack of jurisdiction (Sharia Courts has a jurisdiction, Muslim Code) while the Bigamy case pursued.
Held: Zomaranos is a Muslim and the first marriage is under Muslim rite therefore, the Sharia Courts has the jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of marriage. Since the first validating rite is a
Muslim rite, the Muslim Code and not the Civil Code will apply. Moreover, the Sharia Court already issued a Divorce decree with regard to the first marriage hence, the bigamy case is
dismissed.
Villagracia v. Sharia, GR 188832, April 23, 2014

Facts: Roldan Mala purchased a 300 square meter parcel of land in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Cañete. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name and at the time of the purchase, Vivencio B.Villagracia occupied the parcel of the land. Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg.
P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority which allegedly covering the same parcel of land. Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed and found out through the Geodetic Engineer
that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title. Roldan initiated barangay conciliation to settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio but failed and instead filed
an action to recover possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court.
Held: The SC ruled that in determining whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, it is important to examine the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The law
conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of the Shari’a District
Courts over real actions “is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims”. In real actions not arising from contracts cus tomary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to
apply Muslim. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code, regardless of the court taking cognizance of
the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
Applicability of Penal Laws

NCC Art. 14, 17(3); RPC Art. 2
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety:
OBLIGATORY upon all who
(a) live in the Philippines; or
(b) sojourn in the Philippine territory
Subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations
Art. 17.
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments:
 Shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country:
 The solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs:
 Shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country
RPC Art. 2. Application of its provisions.

The provisions of this Code (RPC):
 ENFORCEABLE: not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
2. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number;
3. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
4. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
 EXCEPTION: If otherwise provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application
K. Human Relations
NCC 19-35
Every person must (exercise of rights and performance duties)

a.) act with justice (19)
b.) give everyone his due (19)
c.) observe honesty and good faith. (19)
● If he willfully or negligently causes damage to another; he shall indemnify (20)
● If he willfully causes loss or injury to another (contrary to morals, good customs or public policy); he shall compensate of the damage (21)
● If a person acquires or comes into possession of something through an act of performance and at the expense of another without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him. (22; UNJUST ENRICHMENT)
● Causes damage to another’s property was not due to the fault/negligence – still liable to indemnify if through the act/event, he was benefited. (23)
● Courts must be vigilant for the protection of the ff in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at disadvantage on account of his:
○ Moral dependence
○ Ignorance
○ Indigence
○ Mental weakness
○ Tender age, or
○ Handicap (24)
● Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the
instance of any government or private charitable institution. (25)
● Every person shall respect his neighbors and other persons’:
○ Dignity
○ Personality
○ Privacy
○ Peace of mind (26)
● Not criminal offense but shall produce a cause of action for damages:
○ Prying into the privacy of another’s residence
○ Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another
○ Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
○ Vexing/humiliating another of his:
■ Religious beliefs
■ Lowly station in life
■ Place of birth
■ Physical defect
■ Other personal condition
● Suffering material or moral loss because a public servant/ee refuses to neglects, without just cause, to perform is duty
○ May file an action for damages + other reliefs against such official
○ Without prejudice to any disciplinary admin action (27)
● Unfair competition (agri, industrial, labor) through use of force, intimidation, deceit machination, or any other unjust, oppressive, or high-handed method
○ Gives rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damages (28)
● Criminal Prosecution: Acquitted + guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt = civil action for damages may be instituted
○ Requires only preponderance of evidence (29)
○ Upon motion of the defendant, court may require plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages incase the complaint should be found malicious
● Criminal Prosecution: Acquitted + reasonable doubt = court shall declare. In the absence of any declaration, it may be inferred from the decision w/n the
acquittal is due to that ground. (29)
● Separate civil action arising from criminal offense + no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case = preponderance of evidence
shall be sufficient to prove the act complained of. (30)
● Civil action based on obli not arising from act/omission complained of as a felony – such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings,
and regardless of the result of the latter. (31)
● Public officer/ee or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes/impairs the rights under Art. 31
shall be liable to damages. (32)
● Defamation/fraud/physical injuries – civil action for damages may be brought separately and distinctively from the criminal action. It shall proceed
independently of the crim procecution + require only preponderance of evidence. (33)
● Member of a city/municipal police force refuses/fails to render aid/protection to any person in case of danger to life/property
○ Primarily liable for damages
○ City/municipal – subsidiarily responsible
○ Civil action shall be independent of any criminal proceedings – preponderance of evidence shall suffice (34)
● Charges a person with criminal offense, for which no independent civil action is granted in the Code or special law BUT the justice of peace finds no reasonable
ground to believe that the crime has been committed/prosecuting atty refuses/fails to institute crim proceedings = complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender + preponderance of evidence + upon defendant’s motion, court may require plaintiff to pay bond
○ If during the pendency of civil action, Information was presented = civil action shall be suspended until termination of the criminal proceedings. (35)
● Prejudicial questions shall be decided before any criminal prosecution – to be governed by ROC, which shall not be in conflict with the Code. (36)
People v. Ritter, G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991

Facts: Heinrich S. Ritter employed the sexual services of one Jessie Ramirez and one Rosario Baluyot on the night of October 10, 1986. Ritter paid a total of P500.00 to
Ramirez and Rosario the morning after the act was performed. Later, Baluyot was found with a foreign object inserted into her vagina, which caused bleeding and an
infection. Baluyot claimed to the attending physician that it was black man who inserted said object into her vaginal cavity yet she had also divulged to Ramirez that it
was Ritter. Baluyot later died due to the infection and Ritter was held liable for the rape and murder of Rosario Baluyot.
Held: Heinrich S. Ritter was found “not guilty” due to reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove that Baluyot was 12 years old at the time of the incident and
that she had prostituted herself even at a tender age. A medical expert testified that the object Ritter had inserted was different from what caused the infection and
that she had told Ramirez that the object Ritter had inserted had already been removed. While having been acquitted, Ritter is not exempt from civil liability and was
ordered to pay damages to the victim’s heirs. Ritter was later deported.
Ardiente v. Sps. Pastorfide, GR No. 161921, July 17, 2013
Carpio v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866, septembre 09, 2004

Upon Valmonte's return, she noticed that everyone’s staring at her and Soledad Carpio said that she lost her jewelry placed i nside the comfort room in a paper bag and uttered these words
“Ikaw lang lumabas sa kwarto, nasaan and dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang lumabas ng kawrto, ikaw ang kumuha”, was was bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by the
security guard throughout the evening.
SC: Valmonte may claim damages. Incorporated in our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate cer tain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct.
Even if Carpio had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign Valmonte without proof that she stole the jewelry is an act by standard or principle of law is
impermissible.
Nikko Hotel vs Reyes

Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was
helping himself at the buffet table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to leave the party for it was intended for a number of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was humiliated by the
manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other guests.
Held: Any damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
Since Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Amay Bisaya to leave the party for being a gate-crasher, neither she nor her employer be held liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.
Pacis v. Morales, G.R. No. 169467, February 25, 2010

Facts: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis (petitioners) filed a petition for review assailing the May 11, 2005 decision and the August 19, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals regarding a
civil complaint for damages against respondent Morales for the death of the petitioners’ son due to an accidental gunshot of a defective gun inside the respondent’s gun store. Jerome
Jovanne Morales contended that he was out of town during the incident, he left the keys of the store with the caretakers, and claims that he is not guilty of negligence and lack of due care. It
appears that carertakers, Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis
got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head
which caused his death.
Held: The SC held that Art. 2176 held that the owner ‘s liability is primary and direct based on a person’s own negligence which states: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.” As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a
loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of causing harm or injury to others. Moreover, respondent should have exercised due diligence in making sure that the guns are not
loaded especially those that are accepted for repairs. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed
to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.
III. PERSONS & PERSONALITY
A. The concept of a ‘person’ and ‘personality’

NCC Arts. 37 - 39
Classes of persons and their distinctions

Elements of civil capacity
Juridical capacity v. capacity to act
JURIDICAL CAPACITY
 Fitness to be the subject of legal relations
 Passive
 Inherent in every natural person
 Lost only through death
 Can exist without capacity to act
 Cannot be limited or restricted
CAPACITY TO ACT
 Power to do acts with legal effect is acquired and may be lost. (37)
 Active
 Must be acquired
 Lost through death and other causes

 Must exist with juridical capacity
 May be restricted or limited
Restrictions on capacity to act:

 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction.
 Do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations. (38)
Modify/limit capacity to act:

 Age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.
 Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
 A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.
B. Commencement and termination of personality
1. Natural Persons
(a) Birth
NCC Arts. 40 – 41; 1987 Constitution, Art. II Sec. 12; P.D. No. 603 [Child and Youth Welfare Code], Art. 5; FC Art. 164; RPC Arts. 256 – 259
NCC 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
*Personality from Birth: existence of personality of natural persons depends upon birth. Birth means the removal of the
fetus from the mother’s womb and may take place either naturally or artificially by surgical means.
*Fetus is considered merely a part of the internal organs of the mother before birth.
*The expectancy that the fetus may be born, the law protects it and reserves its rights, making its legal existence, if it
should be born alive, retroact to the moment of its conception.
Conceived child’s personality has two distinguishing characteristics:
a.) it is essentially limited, because it is only for purposes favorable to the child and
b.) it is provisional or conditional as it depends upon the child being born alive later, such that if it is not born
alive, its personality disappears as if it had never existed.
Rights of Conceived Child:

 right of inheritance or property rights
 also embraces both personal and property rights which include the right to compensation for personal injuries
wrongfully inflicted
*An unborn child is entitled even to support from his father, who may be compelled to give it if the mother cannot.
NCC 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
*Fetus aged more than 7 months born alive is considered alive.

*Fetus aged less than 7 months born alive must live 24 hours before being considered alive.
1987 Constitution, Art. II Sec 12 Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
P.D. 603 – Child and Youth Welfare Code

P.D. 603, Art. 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of
his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
FC 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate
RPC 256 – 259: Abortion

Art. 256. Intentional Abortion.- Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman shall have consented.
Art. 257. Unintentional Abortion.- The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents.- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that
any other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they act with the consent of
said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. –The penalties provided in Art. 256
shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973
Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961

Nita Villanueva sought 3 abortions from Antonio Geluz, and her husband sued Geluz for damages on behalf of his unborn child. The Court ruled
that a fetus had no civil personality (because Art. 40 relies on the express condition of being born) and therefore had no right of action to seek
damages for injuries or death that could be transmitted to its parents. (Fetus may have civil personality but if it dies, the civil personality is
extinguished.)
Quimiging v. Icao, G.R. No. 26795, July 31, 1970: Quimiging claimed support & damages for her unborn child, conceived after being repeatedly
raped by Icao. The Court ruled that the unborn child has right to support even if it is still unborn, and Article 40 grants provisional personality for
all purposes favorable to the child. Mother can already receive donations even when the baby is just in the womb (NCC 742). For all purposes
favorable to the child, he is already considered born. (NCC 40 cf. NCC 41)
- A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
- It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article” is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child. If
it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective
Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13, july 13, 1970
Syquia vs De Jesus
Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a
baby boy. He was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in
her hands a note directed to the padre who was expected to christen the baby. While he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to
Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that
might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. Antonia gave birth and lived with the Syquia. In course of time, the show signs of a
second pregnancy, the he decamped, and he is now married to another woman.
Held: A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet
unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of an unborn child is really not different
from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources
of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name
used. Acknowledgment of paternity required in No. 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code is satisfied by the production of more than one document
of indubitable authenticity, containing, all together, the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the admissions
of one writing being supplemented by those of another.
Continental Steel v. Montano

Facts: Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions
in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant
to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. Hortillano’s claims were based on the premature delivery of his wife
which resulted to the death of his unborn child. This was supported by a death certificate which states that the female fetus died during labor due to fetal anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Continental Steel granted Hortillano’s claims for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other
death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Held: The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. The abovementioned articles do not
provide any definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not sy nonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death. Furthermore, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general
definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
(b) Death
NCC Art. 42
Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract
and by will.
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948
Fragrante invested in an ice plant but died while his application for a certificate to construct it was being processed. The application was
approved because the intestate estate of Fragrante was considered capable of operating the ice plant and maintaining it. By legal fiction, the
estate of a deceased person is considered to have a legal personality independent of his legal heirs.
Facts: The Public Service Commission (PSC) ruled on the application of Fragrante for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal having found that Fragrante fulfilled the requirements at the time of his death. Said certificate was issued
to the Intestate Estate of Fragrante, and the said intestate was authorized to maintain and operate an ice plant. Petitioners, in present petition,
contended that PSC erred in allowing the legal representative of the estate of Pedro Fragrante to substitute in the application and in granting
said estate the certificate and authority to operate an ice plant.
Doctrine: The Court held that the estates of a deceased person would have legal personality and is accorded the rights of the deceased owner at
the time of his existence. In this case, the application, nationality, and investments attached to the application for a public convenience of
Fragrante is accorded to his estate. As the Court stated, ‘we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Fragrante should
be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, G.R. No. L-27956, April 30, 1976

The late Pedro Oria, along with others, was served a summons to pay QPI a certain amount of money for a bond. Oria was already long dead by
the time the summons was served. The Court ruled that there could be no legal jurisdiction over Oria, as he had already lost his juridical
capacity through death.
It turned out that Oria died long before when the action was filed. Oria's heirs were aware of the suit and his sureties and that the said heirs
were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
SC: The lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not
have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, was lost through death.
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court: Defendant’s counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no
application to this case.
Eugenio vs Velez
The full blood brothers and sisters of Vitaliana Vargas filed a petition for habeas corpus. They contended that she was forcibly taken from her
residence and confined by Eugenio (live-in partner). Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. Vitaliana died
and her family wanted to have the custody of her body.
Held: Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. Right to bury a dead person does not include a common law husband who is
still married. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
“Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial.—The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the
ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
“(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary
expenses.”
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211. Oct. 27, 1989:

Can Ferdinand Marcos be buried in the Philippines after his death? The Court ruled ―no because the circumstances which barred Marcos’ return to the Philippines
when he was alive still exist. It is absurd to place rights on a dead person since its civil personality is extinguished by death. The dissent stated that a dead man does
not cease to have rights merely because he is dead; Marcos has the right to be buried in his own country.
Facts: Former President Marcos was deposed from the presidency through people power revolution which resulted to his and his family’s forced exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, sought to return to the Philippines to die, after spending three years of exile in Hawaii, USA. However, President Corazon Aquino averred that allowing
the return of Marcos and his family might result to dire consequences to the nation as the government’s stability had been threatened from various events that
transpired one of which is the failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos’ staunch leaders. Marcos filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition to grant them
their travel documents and questioned President Cory Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country.
Held: Article 42 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that: “Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.” The Court ruled against Marcos’ return in the Philippines because the circumstances which barred his
return to the Philippines when he was alive still exist. It is absurd to place rights on a dead person since its civil personality is extinguished by death. The dissent
stated that a dead man does not cease to have rights merely because he is dead; Marcos has the right to be buried in his own country.
NCC Art. 43
ROC, Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj)-(kk) (1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)
NCC 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them
died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Rules of Court Rule 131 Sec 3. (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, survivorship is determined according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the
sex be the same, the older
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have
survived.
Rules of Court Rule 131 Sec 3. (kk). That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in
the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
*In doubt, whoever alleges shall prove the death and in absence of proof, it will be considered that both have
died at the same time.
Joaquin v. Navarro: Japanese troops massacred civilians, among them Angela Joaquin (Mother) and Joaquin Navarro Jr. (Son). The question is
who died first, which would determine the right to succession. The Court ruled that Angela outlived her son, so the successor should be her
natural son. Though the rules of court provide the assumptions to be made when deaths appear to be simultaneous, they only apply when
there is not enough evidence to determine who died first.
During the time of the liberation of Japanese to Manila, spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr, and relatives was raging inside the building. As they came
out, Joaquin Jr.(son) was hit and fell on the floor, after which German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin
(wife).
The court ruled that there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another since there’s no clear evidence about who died first between
the mother and son. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another.
2. Juridical Persons
NCC Arts. 44-47
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, Secs. 2, 4, 17
NCC Art. 1767-1768
NCC. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations,
partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member.
Concept of Juridical Persons: an abstract being, formed for the realization of collective purposes, to which the law has granted capacity for
rights and obligations.
*The state must recognize in it a separate personality, distinct from and independent of individuals composing or managing it.
*The entity must be recognized as having its own rights and obligations which are not the rights and obligations of its competent members.
*It has no family and personal rights
Kinds of Juridical Persons:

a. The state and political subdivisions such as provinces, cities, and municipalities
b. Juridical persons for public interest or purpose
c. Juridical persons for private interest or purpose
NCC. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private
corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.
 State- governed by the provisions of the Constitution
 Provinces and municipalities- Local Government Code and the Revised Administrative Code
 Chartered cities- respective charters
 Corporations- created by special charter are governed by such charter and those created by general law are governed by the
Corporation Law
NCC 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization.
Capacity of Juridical Persons:

1. It can have nationality, domicile, a name, a right to reputation, and the capacity for relations which do not require ties of blood, such
a guardianship.
2. It can own and possess property, dispose of such property, enter into contracts, and inherit by will
3. It can incur obligations, and is liable for the acts of its managers and employees for contractual as well as extra-contractual fault or
negligence
NCC 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44,
their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point,
the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the
existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corporation Code), Sec. 2, 4, 17

Section 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and
properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.
Section 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the
special law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable.
*Corporations created by special laws will be governed by provisions of the special law or charter that created them, supplemented by Corp. Code.
Section 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or disapproved. - Grounds for such rejection or disapproval:
1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not substantially in accordance with the form prescribed herein;
2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or contrary to government rules and regulations;
4. That the Treasurer's Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock subscribed and/or paid is false;
5. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or
the Constitution.
New Civil Code 1767-1768

NCC 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of
dividing the profits among themselves. Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession.
NCC 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 1772, first paragraph.
Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919
Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41, November 24, 1906
III. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
A. GENERAL RULE: Presumption of Capacity
Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911
Juridical Capacity
● Inherent in every natural person
● Lost only through death
● Capacity to act (with legal effect) - acquired and may be lost (37)
Catalan vs Basa
Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to
his “schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparse and pointless
speech.” A document was executed, titled “Absolute Deed of Donation,” wherein Catalan allegedly donated to his sister Mercedesone-half of the real property. Mercedes sold
the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa. Also, Catalan executed other contracts.
Held:
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties
is essential. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. From the scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite
his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
2. Restrictions on Capacity to Act

NCC 38-39 cf. NCC 1327
ART. 38
Capacity to Act: MERE Restrictions - NOT EXEMPTED from certain obligations
1. Minority
2. Insanity or imbecility
3. Deaf-mute
4. Prodigality
5. Civil interdiction
ART. 39
Circumstances that Modify or Limit Capacity to Act:
1. Age
2. Insanity
3. Imbecility
4. Deaf-mute
5. Penalty
6. Prodigality
7. Family relations
8. Alienage
9. Absence
10. Insolvency
11. Trusteeship
● Religious belief or political opinion - does not limit capacity to act

● Married woman, 21 years or over - qualified for all acts of civil life, except those specified by law.
ART. 1327
Persons who CANNOT GIVE CONSENT:
1. Unemancipated persons
2. Insane or demented persons
3. Deaf-mute, who do not know how to write
1. Minority
1. Age of majority R.A. No. 6809
2. A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship
3. Suffrage Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution [cf. Sangguniang Kabataan]

4. Marriage FC Art. 5, 45 (1); cf. R.A. No. 6809
5. Contracts NCC Arts. 1327, 1390 (par. 1), 1397-1399, 1403 (par. 3), 1489; 1426 – 1427
6. Criminal Liability RPC Art. 12 (2) - (3), 13 (2); P.D. No. 603 Secs. 189 – 204; Also see: ROC Rule 3, Section 5; R.A. No. 9344, Secs. 6 & 7
RA 6809
Age of Majority - 18 years
AM No. 03-02-05-SC
Rules on Guardianship
1. Father & Mother
● Joint legal guardianship
● Over the person & property of the minor
● Without necessity of a court appointment
2. Who may petition for appointment of guardian?

● Any relative
● Other person on behalf of a minor
● Minor himself, if 14 years or over
3. Where to file the petition?
● Family Court - city/province where the minor resides
● If living abroad, Family Court - where the property is situated
4. Grounds of Petition
● Death, continued absence, incapacity of parents
● Suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority
● Remarriage of surviving parent - if the latter is found unsuitable
● When the best interests of the minor so requires
5. Qualifications of Guardians
● Moral character
● Physical, mental and psychological condition
● Financial status
● Relationship of trust with the minor
● Availability to exercise the powers and duties
● Lack of conflict of interest with the minor
● Ability to manage the property of the minor
6. Who may be Appointed Guardian? (in default of parents or a court-appointed guardian) the following order of
preference:
a. Surviving grandparent - in case of several, the Court shall select any of them
b. Oldest brother/sister over 21 years of age - unless unfit or disqualified
c. Actual custodian of the minor over 21 years of age - unless unfit or disqualified
d. Any other person, who in sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of the minor
Suffrage
Constitution - at least 18 years of age
SK
● Candidate -15 to 24 yrs old
● Voter - 15 to 30 yrs old
Marriage
FC 5 - 18 years and above may contract marriage
FC 45 (1) - if FC 5 is not followed, it will be a ground for annulment
RA 6809 - age of majority is 18 years
Contracts
1327 - unemancipated minors - CANNOT GIVE CONSENT
1390 (1) - contract entered into by a minor (one of the parties) is VOIDABLE
1397 - action for annulment of contract may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally/subsidiarily.
However, persons who are capable cannot alleged the incapacity of those with whom they contracted.
1398 - If the contract/obli is annulled, subject matter + fruits + interest shall be restored
1399 - incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except when he has benefited by the thing/price
received
1403 (3) - BOTH parties are incapable to enter into contract - ENFORCEABLE, unless ratified.
1489 - When necessaries are sold & delivered to a minor - HE MUST PAY a reasonable price
1426 - after the annulment of the contract entered into without the consent of the parent, & voluntarily returned the
thing/price received - there is no right to demand the thing/price returned
1427 - after the annulment of the contract entered into without the consent of the parent, & voluntarily pays a money or
delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of an obli - no right to recover the same if already consumed by the obligee in good
faith
Criminal Liability
RPC
12: EXEMPTED from criminal liability:
● (2): under 9 years old
● (3): over 9 years and under 15, unless acted w/ discernment
13: MITIGATING circumstance - under 18 or over 70
PD 603
● Youthful offenders - over 9 but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense
● If found guilty - instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings
and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the DSWD/any training institution, until he shall have
reached 21 years old, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the DSWD, etc.
● If it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the youthful offender has behaved properly, even before
reaching the age of majority, upon recommendation of the DSWD, it shall dismiss the case and order his final
discharge
● But if not, he shall be returned to the committing court for the pronouncement of judgment.
● If he has reached 21 years while in commitment - court shall determine whether to dismiss the case or to
pronounce the judgment of conviction.
ROC Rule 3, Sec. 5

A minor or a person alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of his father, mother, guardian, or
if he has none, a guardian ad litem.
RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice & Welfare)

● 15 years and under - exempted from crim liability but shall undergo intervention program
● Above 15 years but below 18 years - exempted from crim liability but shall undergo intervention program,
unless he has acted w/ discernment
● Exemption from crim liability does not include exemption from civil liability
Mercado v. Espiritu, G.R. No. L-11872, December 1, 1917

Facts: Mercado alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita
Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu. Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares
in Bulacan which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado,
husband of Margarita Espiritu. Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and
Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400. The plaintiffs alleged that at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale, the plaintiffs were still minors, 18 and 19 years of age rendering the notarized agreement void.
Held: The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted
to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of
law. Art. 38 provides that , “Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.” In the case at bar, no proof was adduced of the fact that Luis Espiritu caused to change the real
age of Mercado in the notarial instrument. No certified copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any
supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document.
Young v. Tecson, 39, O.G. 953
Bambalan v. Maramba, G.R. No. L-27710, January 30, 1928

Facts: Isidro Bambalan, being the sole and universal heir of the deceased father, claimed that he was the owner of the land in question. He
alleged that, although he did sign a document selling the land to German Maramba and Genoveva Muerong, he only did so on account of
intimidation exerted by respondents upon his mother. Although there was no evidence that supported Bambalan’s allegations, the consent in
the signing of the document was vitiated to the point of being void because at the time the document was signed, Bambalan was still a minor.
Doctrine: As provided for in Art. 38 of the New Civil Code, minority (among others) is a mere restriction on capacity to act, and do not exempt
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. Reliance
of the defendants on the case of Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu, wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract,
cannot be applied in the case at bar because in this case, minority was well known to the purchasers/defendants.
Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-1720, March 4, 1950
Ramon circumstance that, about 1 month after the date of the conveyance, he informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment,
because his previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the appellants in fact did not know that he was a minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes his bad faith,
when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the appellants the
sum of P500.
As held in Mercado v. Espiritu, “The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in factthey are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of law; and the judgment that holds
such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser. To bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee
to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration.
De Braganza v. De Villa-Abrille
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo (both are minors) received from Villa Abrille Japanese war notes in exchange of a
promissory note payable two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the
Philippines. No payment has been made so Villa sued them.
Held: There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her consignors does not release her
from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such
minors may be responsible. It is rule in contract that failure of the minor to disclose his minority when making a contract does not per se,
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In order to hold the minor liable, the fraud must be actual and not
constructive. However the boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they have profited
from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the
extent that they may have profited by the money received.
Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010

Facts: Petitioners Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal were accused of killing Rogelio Llonaon on April 1994. Mirandilla, c ommon-law wife of Rogelio Llonaon
narrated that at about 8 in the evening of that date, they went to the house of Manuel Desder in Brgy. Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon, the petitioners barged in the
house of Desder and suddenly shot Llonaon with their guns. After the shooting, they fled. In their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were at their family
residence and drinking gin. The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the
court affirmed the conviction in 2005. Salvador Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime.
Held: The court affirmed the conviction subject to the modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil liability.
The witness’ positive identification of the petitioners as killers and her declaration on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their deadly assault
against Llonaon left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery. Under Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua although it is not the correct penalty for Monreal due to the fact that he is a minor, being over 15 years of age and under 18 years of age. The
RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the
trial but it cannot be doubted that Monreal was below 18 years of age when the crime was committed. Monreal, being a minor, was sufficiently established through
evidences presented.
2. Insanity
1. Effect on Marriage FC 45 (2)

2. Effect on Contracts NCC 1237 (1), 1328
3. Criminal Liability RPC 12 (1) & ROC 101
Marriage
45 (2): ground for annulment - either party was of unsound mind
● Unless after coming to reason, freely cohabited w/ the other as husband/wife
Contracts
1327 (1): insane/demented person - cannot give consent
(1328): contract entered into during:
● Lucid interval - valid
● In state of drunkenness/ hypnotic spell - voidable
Criminal Liability
● Exempted
ROC - Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons
● Filed in CFI
● Shall be filed by DOH in case it is for the public welfare
● There will be a hearing
US v. Vaquilar, G.R. Nos. L-9471-72, March 13, 1914

Facts: The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate information with parricide--- one for the killing of his wife, and another for
the killing of his daughter with a bolo. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the
payment of the costs in each case. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that the
defendant appeared to them to be insane during and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been
complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
Held: evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant’s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person
with an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes.
Doctrine: The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of “crazy” is not synonymous with the legal
term “insane”. The mere mental depravity, or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of
the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the
defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he
was in a normal state of mind.
Standard Oil vs Arenas

The Standard Oil Company of New York sued Juan Codina Arenas etc. due to the default of their obligation. The defendants were summoned,
the record showing that summons was served on Vicente Sixto. CFI Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally. Pending
execution, the wife of Vicente Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged Villanueva was declared to be insane by CFI Manila and that as a guardian
she is to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband while in a state of insanity.
Held: Villanueva’s mental condition appeared to the witness to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary
and that was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving cause for any suspicion that there was anything abnormal. There
is no proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, or if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several
bonds, among them that he was influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not. There must be proof that in
the performance of that act, he did not give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent.
People v. Rafanan, G.R. No. L -54135, November 21, 1991

ln previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance, it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these
cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to
deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity, Here,
appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on
Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the act is committed.
People v. Bugalao, G.R. 184757, October 05, 2011

Facts: On June 29, 2000, in Bocaue Bulacan, accused, armed with a knife had carnal knowledge with the use of force and intimidation with AAA, 14 years old against
will and consent. Only AAA took the witness stand for prosecution. AAA’s birth certificate shows that BBB (mother) and CCC (f ather) are her parents but testified
that they are not his biological parents and was adopted at a very young age by BBB and CCC. CCC died on 1999 and on April, 2000, AAA and BBB stayed at the house
of AAA’s brother DDD with two of her brothers, EEE and accused appellant Aniceto Bulagao and one of her younger sister FFF, all children of BBB and CCC. On June
17, 2000 in her brother’s house, Bulagao raped AAA threatening her with the use of a knife. On June 29, 2000, AAA was rape again inside their sister’s house
threatening her again with a knife. AAA recanted her testimony and alleged that what happened was consensual and invoked that her brother has a little defect in
mind which another witness Yolanda Palma, a psychologist said that Bulagao is suffering a mental retardation because of his IQ level of below 50.
Held: Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that he was suffering from mental retardation. The court agrees with the
finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by Yolanda Palma was
already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. The Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete
deprivation of intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
the commission of the crime. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting
circumstance of insanity be considered.
Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. 184528, April 25, 2012

Facts: Petitioner claimed that the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years and was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgement. Due to respondent’s condition, he cannot manage his property wisely without the help of others and has become an easy prey for deceit
from his girlfriend, Luisa Agamata.
On January 23, 2004, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for him and his companion to be appointed as guardians over the
respondent’s property. RTC dismissed the petition due to lack of evidence, and later on the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
Held: The respondent is not incompetent and should not be placed under guardianship, and therefore, the petition was denied. The Court noted the absence of any
testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the
contrary, the respondent pointed out in the petitioner’s evidence which includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report stating that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation.
Doctrine: The word “incompetent” includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation.
Crewlink v. Teringtering, G.R. No. 166803, October 14, 2012

Jacinto, an OFW, died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was denied by Crewlink. Petitioner asserted that Editha was not entitled to the
benefits being claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar
Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual death.
SC: No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided,
however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.
3. Deaf-Mutism
NCC 1327 (2); 807 & 820
1327 (2): deaf-mute, who do not know how to write - Cannot give consent
807:
● Testator is deaf/deaf-mute - he must personally read the will
○ Otherwise, he shall designate 2 persons to read it & communicate to him the contents
820: deaf - may be a witness to the execution of a will
4. Prodigality
ROC 92, Sec. 2
Incompetent - persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read
and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
5. Civil Interdiction
RPC 31, 34, 41
34: Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any
act or any conveyance inter vivos.
41: The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life
6. Family Relations
FC Arts. 150-151; cf. FC Arts. 87, 37, 38; NCC Art. 1490 & 2035 cf. NCC Arts. 963-967
FC 150-151
Family Home
● The dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated
● Constituted jointly by the husband & wife, or by an unmarried head of a family
● Occupied as a family residence
● From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such
● exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law
FC 87
● Donation, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage is VOID
○ EXCEPT - moderate gifts which may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing
● The prohibition is also applicable those living together without a valid marriage
FC 37-38
INCESTOUS VOID by reasons of

(VOID from the beginning-parties are legit or illegit) PUBLIC POLICY
Between: Between:
1. Ascendants & descendants - of any degress 1. Collateral blood relatives - legit or illegit, up to 4th civil
2. Brothers & sisters - whether full or half degree
2. Step-parents & step-children
3. Parents-in-law & children-in-law
4. Adopting parent & adopted child
5. Surviving spouse of the adopting parent & adopted
child
6. Surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter
7. Adopted child & legit child of the adopter
8. Adopted children of the same adopter
9. Parties where one, with the intention to marry the
other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her
own spouse
ART 1490
Husband and wife CANNOT SELL PROPERTY TO EACH OTHER
● Except:
○ Separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlement
○ When there has been a judicial separation under Art. 191
ART. 2035
NO COMPROMISE SHALL BE VALID:
1. Civil status of a person
2. Validity of a marriage or a legal separation
3. Any ground for legal separation
4. Future support
5. Jurisdiction of courts
6. Future legitime
ART. 963-967
● Proximity of relationship - determined by the number of generations
○ Each generation forms a degree
● Series of degrees - forms a line
1. Direct Line - constituted by series of degrees among ascendants & descendants
2. Collateral Line - constituted by series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants,
but who come from a common ancestor
● Full blood relationship - have the same father and the same mother
● Half-blood relationship - have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.
7. Alienage
cf. Art. IV, Secs. 1-5, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 1
Citizens of the PH
1. Citizens at the time of the adoption of this Consti
2. Fathers OR mothers are PH citizens
3. Born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who ELECT Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority
4. Naturalized in the accordance w/ law
Sec. 2
Natural-born citizens
1. Citizens of PH from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship
2. elect PH citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
Sec. 3
PH Citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law
Sec. 4
PH citizens who marry aliens shall RETAIN their citizenship
● Unless their act/omission, they are, under the law, deemed to have renounced it
Sec. 5
Dual Allegiance - inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law
Cordora vs COMELEC
Cordora filed a complaint against Tambunting stating that he made false assertions that he is a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen, resident and eligible to run for public
office for lack of the required citizenship and residency requirements.
Held: Dual citizenship-as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. (Tambunting is) Dual allegiance- a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Article IV on citizenship, the concern
of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of
taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship. (Which Tambunting did)
Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Facts: Respondent Joseph Socorro Tan Liled before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the COC of petitioner on the ground that it
contained material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Mandanas of Batangas; (2) that she is a resident of
Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas; (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American
citizen. Petitioner Reyes countered that while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Mandanas there is no valid and binding marriage between them.
As to Petitioner Reyes’ date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the NSO shows that it was on July 3, 1964. She also notes that the allegation that she is a
permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.
Held: COMELEC retains jurisdiction of the case because the petitioner is not yet considered a member of the HOR as stated in Sec.17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution
hence HRET cannot take cognizance of the case. For one to be considered a member of the HOR, it is imperative that there are concurrent of the following
requisites: valid proclamation, proper oath, and assumption of office. With that, the petitioner cannot be considered a membe r of the HOR yet as she has not
assumed office yet. She has not met the qualifications to become a Member of the House of Representatives. It is held that the petitioner must have taken an oath
first before the Speaker of the HOR and in an open session and no indication was made that she has validly complied with the requirements hence, her proclamation
and oath of office is without merit.
David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Renato David was a Canadian citizen, who reacquired his Philippine citizenship, as issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Toronto
(Oct. 11, 2007). However, petitioner is being sued by private respondent Editha Agbay on the ground that he was not yet a Filipino citizen when he filed for MLA
(Miscellaneous Lease Application) which was six months prior (April 2007) to him reacquiring his Filipino citizenship. Agbay then filed a criminal complaint against
him under Art. 172 of the RPC for falsification of public documents. The MTC and RTC denied his petitions for certiorari for lack of merit.
Held: The petitioner belongs to the first paragraph of R.A. 9225, where he became a naturalized citizen of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the Act. At the
time of his filing his MLA (April 2007), petitioner is deemed to have “lost” his Philippine citizenship as provided by R.A. 9225, and he had yet to reacquire it on
October of 2007. He was correctly charged with falsification of public documents, as he had claimed in his MLA that he was a Filipino, despite the contrary.
Doctrine: Under R.A. No. 9255 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003), natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Those who
became citizens of a foreign country after this Act took effect shall have also retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
8. Absence
NCC Arts. 381 – 396, FC Art. 41
WHEN absence may be declared?

1. 2 years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news
2. 5 years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property
WHO may ask for the declaration of absence?

1. SPOUSE present
2. HEIRS instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
3. RELATIVES who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
4. Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death.
Judicial Declaration of Absence

● shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation
Administrator of the absentee’s property - appointed in accord w/ Art. 383

● Wife (appointed) cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without
judicial authority
● Administration shall cease in the ff cases:
○ absentee appears personally or by means of an agent
○ death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear
○ third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's property by
purchase or other title
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH: after absence of 7 YEARS, unknown whether or not the absentee still lives
● NOT PRESUMED DEAD - for the purpose of OPENING HIS SUCCESSION until after an absence of 10 YEARS
● IF disappeared AFTER THE AGE OF 75 YEARS - absence of 5 YEARS is sufficient in order that his succession may be opened
● Presumed dead for all purposes + Division of the estate among the heirs
a. on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for 4
years since the loss
b. person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for 4 years
c. has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for 4 years
● IF THE ABSENTEE APPEARS - shall recover:
a. his property in the condition in which it may be found
b. price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith
■ BUT HE CANNOT CLAIM EITHER THE FRUITS OR RENTS
Olaguer v. Purugganan, G.R. No. 158907, February 12, 2007

Petitioner executed an SPA appointing his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofilena for the purpose of selling or transferring his shares of stocks with
Businessday. When he was released from prison 6 years later, he was surprised as to why he is no longer listed as a stock holder of the corporation, and immediately
demanded to restore his full ownership which the respondents refused.
SC: Defining the terms “absence” and “incapacity” by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, “the state of not being present” and the
“inability to act,” given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend stockholders’ meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner, to sell the shares of stock,
and other related acts. This construction covers the situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained.
Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave powers to the respondents to actually dispose of his share, he cannot therefore assail such now. And even if the said
contract is assailable, it was already ratified by the reception of the amount 600,000 by Olaguer‘s wife and in-laws from 1980-1982.
9. Insolvency and Trusteeship

NCC Arts. 1381, 1491, 2236
ART. 1381
Rescissible Contracts
1. Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by
more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;
2. Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding
number;
3. Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims
due them;
4. Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the
knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;
5. All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
ART. 1491
Persons CANNOT ACQUIRE by purchase, even at a public/judicial auction, either in person or through the
meditation of another:
1. Guardian
2. Agents, unless consent of the principal is given
3. Executors and administrators
4. Public officers and employees, the property of the State
5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice
ART. 2236: debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, subject to
the exemptions provided by law
Umale vs ASB Realty

ASB Realty commenced an action in the MTC for unlawful detainer against Leonardo S. Umale. Umale averred that he has the right to remain in the property and
cited the oral lease contract with Amethyst Pearl (ASB’s lessee) and cited that the lease period was in fact for a long perio d of time. Umale challenged ASB Realty’s
personality to recover the subject premises and contended that ASB Realty had been placed under receivership by SEC and a rehabilitation receiver had been duly
appointed.
Held: Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of
operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the pla n more if the corporation
continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. While corporate rehabilitation imposes certain restrictions, none of which pertain to a
debtor corporation's’ right to sue which implies that the concept of rehabilitation does not restrict this particular power. Additionally, the Court claimed that
while ASB Realty and its corporate officers retain their power to sue to recover property and the back rentals from Umale, it is necessary that the receiver is
kept abreast of the proceedings and be notified of the developments in the case to ascertain that the assets will be managed in accordance with the approved
rehabilitation plan.
Gender
Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution; cf. NCC Art. 403; See also: ROC, Rule 3 Section 4
Daughter 21-23 years of Age

● cannot leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives,
● except to become a wife, or when she exercises a profession or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent
marriage.
Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law
Physical Incapacity/Disease
FC Arts. 45(5), 45(6), 46; NCC Art. 820
Ground for annulment

● if incapacity continues and appears to be incurable
● Either party was afflicted w/ STD found to be serious & incurable
Sound mind + 18 yrs old or more + not blind/deaf/dumb + able to read and write = may be a witness to the execution of a will.
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. 185922, Jan. 15, 2014
Facts: Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven children. When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales as his common-law wife
with whom he had one child, Mariano G. Favis. When Dr. Favis and Juana got married, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate
children. Dr. Favis beset with various illnesses, died intestate. He allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana. Claiming that said donation prejudiced their legitime, Dr. Favis’ children with Capitolina, filed an action for annulment of the Deed of
Donation, inventory, liquidation and partition of property before the RTC against Juana, Spouses Mariano and Larcelita and their grandchildren.
Held: The mental and physical condition of the donor in executing a Deed of Donation is a primordial consideration in determining the validity of his consent when
the donation is made. As to the validity of the Deed of Donation executed by Dr. Favis, the SC totally agreed with the facts presented by the RTC. In the said decision
of the trial court, it ruled that at the time Dr. Favis executed the Deed of Donation, he was already at an advanced age of 92, afflicted with different illnesses like
Hiatal hernia, Parkinson’s, and pneumonia, which had the effects of impairing his brain or mental faculties and at the time he executed the Deed of Donation was
not in full control of his mental faculties.
V. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
1. Juridical Persons
NCC 51
When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the
place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
2. Natural Persons
NCC Art. 50 ; FC Arts. 68-69; cf. NCC Art. 110; cf. FC Arts. 55, 101, 149, 152, 101
NCC Art. 50; FC Arts. 68-69

Domicile of Natural Persons:
-For purposes of the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations: Domicile is at the place of their habitual residence.
Personal Obligations of the spouses to each other:

(1) To live together;
(2) To observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and
(3) To render mutual help and support.
Duty to Live Together:

This duty includes cohabitation or consortium and sexual intercourse except:
(a) For abnormal or perverse practices;
(b) If the wife is ill, or it would endanger her health, or the husband is suffering from some venereal diseases; or
(c) If the husband forces the wife against her will (he may be charged with coercion).
The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible’
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels
(Del Rosario v. Del Rosario);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated his wife roughly and
without consideration (Dadivas v. Villanueza);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting
his wife and laying hands on her (Panuncio v. Sula);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329); and
(g) When the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby).
If the wife abandons the conjugal home without justifiable cause: The husband, under pain of contempt of court, cannot compel her to return
because cohabitation is purely a personal obligation. To compel her would be to violate her personal liberty which is guaranteed by the
Constitution (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo).
Remedies of the husband:

(a) To refuse support to his wife (Arts. 100 (1) and 127 (1));
(b) To recover moral damages from the wife (Tenchavez v. Escano); and
(c) To ask the Court to counsel his wife (Art. 72).
Fixing of Family Domicile

 The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
 In case of disagreement: The court shall decide.
 The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Note:
 Under Art. 110 of the Civil Code [OLD BASIS]: The husband (as the head of the family) as the right (not exactly duty) to fix the family
residence. The court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad, unless he does so in the service of the
Republic, in which case the wife should also join him abroad.
 Under the Family Code [NEW BASIS]: It must be a JOINT DECISION of the spouses, and in case they disagree, the court shall decide.
o Once the spouses or the court has fixed the matter: The duty of the spouses is TO LIVE TOGETHER. The court may, however,
exempt one from living with the other:
(a) If one of the spouses live abroad; or
(b) If there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
The exemption shall not apply if the same will not be compatible with the solidarity of the family.
 It is no longer required for a spouse to live abroad with the other spouse for purposes of “service to the Republic”. There may be
reasons why the wife would justifiably remain in the Philippines like he children studying here or the weather is too cold abroad for her
health.
 The court may like wife exempt the wife from living with the husband even if the latter is just in the Philippines, but assigned to a place
far from the family home.
 This article uses the term “family domicile” instead of family residence as he spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may
elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits.
cf. NCC Art. 110 [OLD BASIS] – Already discussed above/previously.
cf. FC Arts. 55, 101, 149, 152, 101

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Abandonment of One Spouse by the Other for More Than 1 Year:

 Abandonment is not mere separation but when one spouse leaves the family and the conjugal dwelling with NO INTENTION OF
RETURNING (Art. 101, FC). Hence, there is a complete cessation of material relations between the husband and the wife, both
personal and property, as well as parental relations with the children.
 The abandonment must be WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE.
 The abandonment must be for MORE THAN 1 year.
 If there is only physical separation between the spouses, but they still support each other and also support and maintain the
children, there is no abandonment.
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family:
The aggrieved spouse may petition the court:
(a) For receivership;
(b) For judicial separation of property; or
(c) For authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may
impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to:
(a) Marital,
(b) Parental; or
(c) Property relations.
Presumption of Abandonment:
-The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for (a) a period of three months or (b) has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts: Shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling
Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.
The policy of the law on “Family” is as follows:

(1) The family is the foundation of the nation.
(2) The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
(3) Family relations are governed by law.
(4) No custom, practice, or agreement destructive of the amily shall be recognized or given effect.
Art. 152. The Family Home
Definition of family home:

(1) constituted jointly by the husband and the wife, or by an unmarried head of the family; and
(2) the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Who may constitute a family home?

(1) Husband and wife jointly;
(2) An unmarried head of the family (which includes a widow or a widower).
Can the beneficiaries constitute a family home?

No, otherwise they can migrate from one place to another and have separate family homes to the prejudice of creditors (Minutes of Committee
Meeting of April 9, 1987).
Can the family home be constituted on a house constructed on a land belonging to another?
No, based from the definition in the Family Code, a family home is:
(a) erected on a land, which is an integral part of the home; and
(b) of a permanent character.
 A house constructed on rented land or by tolerance of the owner of the land is not a permanent improvement of the land, and the
home will thus be temporary (Jurado, id., p. 232).
Limitations on constitution of family home:

(1) Each family can only have one home. After a family home is constituted, no other family can be established without first dissolving the
existing one.
(2) The family home can be constituted only on the dwelling place, and therefore, in the locality where the family has its domicile
(Tolentino, id., p. 524).
(3) The value of the family home exempt from seizure of creditors cannot exceed the limits fixed by law.
Family home must actually be used as residence of the family:

(1) There must be actual occupancy with the intention of dedicating the premises for such purpose. Merely going through the forms of
establishing a home is not sufficient.
(2) Where a dwelling consists of a double house with 2 separate entrances and the family occupies only one unit thereof, the family home
is deemed constituted on that one unit alone.
(3) No valid family home can be constituted on premises used primarily for business purposes (like a store or hotel), although the family
resides thereat.
(4) If a portion of a building is really the bona fide residence of the family, that portion and the land on which it stands can be constituted
as a family home (Tolentino, id., p. 524-525).
Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253, September 3, 1991
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, pri vate respondent Cirilio
Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, the petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in
said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and
residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s petition for disqualification meritorious.
The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the
following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b)
domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establish ing a new one, and acts
which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife
does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Doctrine: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012

Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election—for purposes
of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support
such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular
place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
Poe vs. COMELEC

The other issue confronting Senator Poe is her possession of the ten-year residence qualification for President. The sense that the term "residence" is used here is "permanent
residence" or "domicile." One's domicile is one's place of habitual residence, or that place that one has established as his or her permanent home and to which one intends to
return when, for one reason or another, one has to stay for some time in another place.
In this regard, the point that Senator Poe has been having difficulty dealing with, among others, is the rule that a foreigne r who has not obtained the appropriate visa from
Philippine immigration authorities cannot be allowed to establish permanent residence or domicile in the Philippines. Counting back from the May 2016 elections, the required
ten-year period of residence would include months during which Senator Poe was still an American citizen who had not obtained a visa allowing her to be a permanent resident
of the Philippines.
During those months at the beginning of the required ten-year period, Senator Poe was not even a dual citizen, that is – one who is a Filipino and an American citizen at the
same time. The argument against her is that she cannot satisfy the required ten-year residence in the Philippines if she could not have been allowed to establish permanent
residence here as a foreigner during the earliest months or stages of the required period. (GMA)
SC: Poe is correct in claiming in her COC that she will have been a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months on the day before the 2016 elections. The SC considered
the "voluminous evidence" presented by Poe's camp that she had abandoned her United States domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These include:
 Her arrival on May 24, 2005, and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad
 E-mail correspondence starting in March 2005 until September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for shipment of household items from the US to the
Philippines
 School records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools
 Tax declarations
 Other evidence, which taken together show proof that she had intended to change domicile from the US to the Philippines.
"The Comelec refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005.... It was grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to treat the 2012
COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner," the SC said.
For the High Court, Poe's declaration in her 2012 COC that she had been a resident for 6 years and 6 months is "an honest mistake."
"The Comelec, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on May 24, 2005 not because it was false, but only because
Comelec took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under RA 9225 in July 2006," the court said.
According to the SC, Poe did not attempt to hide the "erroneous statement" in her 2012 COC when she accomplished her COC for president in October 2015 since all her
answers were on record and were established facts. (Rappler)
V. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAMILY CODE

A. Effect and Retroactivity
E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227; R.A. No. 6809, R.A. No. 7610; FC Art. 256, cf. FC Art. 36 in rel. to 39 FC Arts. 105, 162 & 257
E.O. No. 227

Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209
 Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209
 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209
 Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before
the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall have taken effect."
R.A. No. 6809

 Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years.
 Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
 Article 236 of the same Code
 Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
 Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
 Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions
favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
R.A. No. 7610

Children- below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
FC Art. 256
Family Code can be applied retroactively provided that no vested rights or acquired rights in the Civil Code shall be impaired/prejudiced.
FC Arts. 105, 162 & 257

 Supplementary application: If future spouses agree that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage.
 Applies to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. (105)
 Also governs existing family residences(162)
 Effectivity: One year after publication July 6, 1987 (257)
Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts: Complainant Atienza alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that
respondent was married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom the respondent had 5 children.
The respondent alleged that his marriage with Ongkiko was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of Ongkiko, the
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. The respondent claimed that when he
married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.
Held: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired
by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Doctrine: Art. 40 is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
Bernabe v. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, January 21, 2002

Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with this secretary, Carolina Alejo. Bernabe and his legit wife died, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of
Adrian filed a complaint, praying that her son be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Bernabe and be given his share in the estate. Ernestina defensed that
Carolina is barred from filing an action for recognition.
SC: CA was correct when it ruled that Adrian was born in 1981, Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after
the child has attained the age of majority, governs his rights. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right. According to jurisprudence,
Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore,
the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or
taken away. The minors have up
Fuentes vs Roca
Petitioners bought the land from Tarciano. Before the perfection of the sale, there were conditions that need to be done such as the consent from his estranged wife.
The sale was perfected. Years after the death of Tarciano and the wife, their children brought an action for the nullification of the deed of sale alleging that the wife’s
signature was forged. The contention was the retroactivity of the Family Code because the sale happened a few months of its effectivity.
Held: The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code applies because:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256
B. Repeal/Amendment
FC Arts. 254, 255
Article 254, 255

Repealed:
 Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV (Civil Code)
 Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 (Child and Youth Welfare Code)
 all other laws inconsistent with the Family Code. (254)
Other provisions not affected shall remain valid. (255)
VI. MARRIAGE AND PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES
A. The Concept of “Marriage”

FC Art. 1 cf. NCC Art. 52, FC Art. 149; Art II Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution; XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
MARRIAGE
● Special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
● In accordance with law
● To establish conjugal and family life.
● Inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. (Also in Art. XV Sec. 2, 1987
Constitution)
● Marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Also in NCC 52)
FAMILY
● basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
● governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (FC 149)
ROLE OF THE STATE

● Protect and strengthen the family.
● Protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
● The government supports duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character. (Art II Sec. 12/ 1987
Constitution)
Obergefell et. al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department Of Health, et. al. Supreme Court Of The United States, Nos. 14–556, 14-562,14-571 and 14–57, 200 U. S. 321
Facts: The petitioners with same sex partners brought cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right to marry or the right to have
their marriage performed elsewhere recognized in their own state. Petitioners Obergefell and partner wanted to get married cause of sickness, while other
petitioners wanted to be married to have a right to adopt children, etc. In the state of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee which defines marriage as between a
woman and man were the cases heard. In each case, the DC ruled in favor of petitioners. Each of the respondents, who were state officials responsible for enforcing
the relevant laws, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the respondents’ appeals and reversed the decisions, finding in favor of the
respondents. Thus, petition for certiorari.
Held: The right to same-sex marriage is also guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. In interpreting this Clause, the Court has “recognized that new insights and
societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged”. The marriage laws
challenged by the petitioners are “in essence unequal”. They denied same-sex couples all the benefits granted to opposite-sex couples and work as a “grave and
continuing harm”, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. The Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified
infringement of the fundamental right to marry. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of
the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them.
B. Nature of Marriage in Philippine Law

FC Art. 1 cf. ROC, Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa); NCC Art. 220; P.D. No. 1083, Sec. 14
Family Code Art. 1

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Characteristics of Marriage:
1. It is civil in character because it is established by the state independently of its religious aspect
2. An institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by rules established by law cannot be made
inoperative by the stipulation of the parties
3. It is an institution of natural character because one of its objects is the satisfaction of the intimate sentiments and needs of human beings for the organic
perpetuation of man.
Difference Between Marriage and Ordinary Contract:

1. Ordinary contracts may be entered into by any number of persons whether of same or different sex, while marriage can only be entered into by one man
and one woman.
2. The agreement of the parties has the force of law in ordinary contracts while in marriage the law fixes the duties and rights of the parties.
4. Ordinary contracts can be terminated by mutual agreement of the parties while marriage cannot be so terminated, neither can it be terminated even
though one of the parties subsequently becomes incapable of performing his part.
5. Breach of ordinary contracts gives rise to action for damages while breach of the obligations of a husband or a wife does not give rise to such an action, the
law provides the penal and civil sanctions, such as prosecution for adultery or concubinage, and proceedings for legal separation.
Principal Effects of marriage:

(1) personal and economic relations between the spouses
(2) legitimacy of sexual union and of the family
(3) personal and economic relations between parents and children
(4) emancipation of spouses from parental authority
(5) incapacity of the the spouses to make donation to each other
(6) disqualification of the spouses to testify against each other
(7) modification of criminal liability
Damages for Breach of Promise to Marry

The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise”
Rules of Court, Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa)

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
NCC, Art. 220

In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility
of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense
for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916: (A wife can claim support if forced to leave the domicile)
Facts: In January 1915, Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila and thereafter lived together in Calle San Marcelino for about a month.
Petitioner went back to her parents because of the following reasons:
 Defendant demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on her genitals
 Defendant made other lewd demands
 Defendant maltreated petitioner by word and by deed on the ground that the latter refused to do any of defendant’s demands other than legal and valid
cohabitation
Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support outside their conjugal domicile.
Held: Campos Rueda was liable to support his wife. Campos Rueda cannot, by his wrongful acts, be relieved of the duty to support Goitia as imposed by law. Where a
husband, through is wrongful, illegal and unbearable conduct drives his wife away from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to sever
the law concerning marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.
Doctrine: The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or
implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband--- an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the
state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.
Sermonia v. Republic, G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994: (Marriage is different from other civil law contracts)
Sermonia was charged with bigamy for contracting marriage with Unson while his prior marriage to Nievera remained valid and substing.
Sermonia contended that Since the 2nd marriage contract contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it
a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world, therefore the offended party is considered to have had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975. Prescription ommenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered, the corresponding information for bigamy should
have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
SC: To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability
therefor. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered
by the offended party, the authorities or their agency.
Perido vs Perido
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong with whom he begot 3 children and his second wife was Marcelina
Baliguat with whom he had 5 children. The Children and Grandchildren of the first and second marriages filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio
Perido. However, the first family had second thoughts and filed an annulment of said declaration on the grounds that the children of the second family were
illegitimate.
Held: Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil procedure is ‘that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In this case, no sufficient evidence that Lucio had legal impediments when he married Marcelina.
Silverio v. Republic:
A person‘s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person‘s legal capacity and civil status. Only a man and a woman can marry under
Philippine Laws.
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.187683, February 11, 2010:

The key element in Parricide ― other than the fact of killing ― is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of
the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the
victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest.
Facts: Victoriano was charged with a crime of Parricide in an Information dated January 2, 2003 which reads: That on or about the 18th day of August 2002, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, with intent to kill his wife Anna
Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence, and
stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries
which directly caused her death.
Held: It defined parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code, “Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.” It is committed when a
person is killed, the deceased is killed by the accused, and the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide, other than the fact of killing, is the relationship of the offender
to the victim. Additionally, in cases of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
In the case at bar, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim is an ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an
admission again penal interest.
Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

Adriano and Winifreda Tambuyat were married. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several properties, including a land in Bulacan. One day, Adriano sold the
said land alone as a vendee and one of the signing witnesses was Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat. All this time, Rosario remained married to Eduardo Nolasco, who is still
alive, and their marriage is never annulled. Winifreda filed a petition for cancellation of TCT, however it was opposed by Rosario contending that she and Adriano
were married and that she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds.
SC: Winifreda has a better right over the property. The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Banguis
cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
Heirs of Calimag vs Macapaz

Virginia D. Calimag co-owned property with Silvestra N. Macapaz. Silvestra allegedly sold her portion to the petitioner. The heirs of Macapaz instituted the action for
Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT. Petitioner averred that there is no record of marriage between Anastacio Sr. (child of Macapaz’s brother) and
Fidela (parents ofrespondents), hence, no capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children. However, their marriage was
evidenced by a Certificate of Canonical Marriage and live births of the children.
Held: Even though the Court said that a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document and therefore inadmissible evidence, the Court honored the
marriage of Anastacio Sr and Fidela based on the respondent’s certificates of live births, Art 220 of the Civil Code. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
C. Agreements Prior to Marriage
1. Stipulations in Marriage
FC 1 cf. NCC 221
FC 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
*Once a marriage has been properly solemnized and the obligations of married life undertaken, its validity cannot be affected by an antenuptial
agreement not to live together, nor by an agreement previously entered into that the marriage should not be valid and binding, nor because one or both
parties did not intend it to be permanent relation.
NCC Art. 221:

The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property
between husband and wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;
(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.
2. Breach of Promise to Marry

NCC 19-21; NCC 2176; NCC 1403 2(c); FC 22
NCC 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
NCC 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
NCC 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
NCC 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
NCC 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
xxx
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.
Hermosisima v. CA:
Seduction is untenable when the consent for carnal knowledge was voluntarily given and the ages of the consenting parties do not fall within the
requisites as defined by the RPC. Breach of promise to marry cannot be claimed from such voluntary action.
Facts: In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a regular intimate and
sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl.
The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez. Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the
latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad and for damages due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad.
Doctrine: Mere breach of promise to marry is not by itself a ground for recovery of moral damages, unless there have been actual damages suffered by the
complaining party (Wassmer vs Velez).
Wassmer v. Velez:
One cannot sue for breach of promise to marry but can claim for damages for actual expenses already incurred in preparation for the marriage.
Velez and Wassmer decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954. Velez left a note for Wassmer, saying that they have to postpone the wedding as his
mother opposed it, and that he was leaving on the Convair that same day. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
SC: Velez is liable on the ground of "breach of promise to marry Wassmer". Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promissor must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of ,the said Code. Exemplary
damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive
manner.
Tanjanco vs CA
Tanjanco started courting Santos from December 1957 and already professed a promise of marriage sometime July 1958 which lead Santos to have a
consent of carnal knowledge with the defendant. Santos informed Tanjanco about her pregnancy on July 1959 and upon knowing Santos’ pregnancy,
Tanjanco stopped and refrained from seeing her. Since then, Tanjanco has not visited Santos to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and
his promises. Santos left work from social humiliation and was not able to support herself and her child.
Held: No case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion: for had the appellant been deceived she
would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she would have
cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.
Baksh v. CA:
Although breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong but if it was done in deceit and as adevice to lure a woman into sexual congress
with a man who had no intention whatsoever to fulfill such promise,then the award for damages is justified not because of the promise but because of the
fraud and deceit and the willful injury to her honor and reputation.
Facts: Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, Gasheem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen who allegedly violated their
agreement to get married. Respondent alleged that she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community while the petitioner is an Iranian exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City. According to the respondent, both she and the petitioner agreed to marry after the end of the school semester, after the latter
courted and proposed to marry her. The petitioner forced her to live with him; she was a virgin before she began living with him. Moreover, a week before
the respondent filed the complaint; the petitioner’s attitude changed towards her, has maltreated her and even threatened to kill her.
Held: The Court averred that the existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. In light of Art. 21, the Court
maintained that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential; however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Petitioner in this case used fraud and deception to satisfy his lustful desire.
D. Requisites for a Valid Marriage
Mariategui v. CA, G.R. No. L-57062, January 24, 1992

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor.
Jacinto (son from the 3rd wife) testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and
wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa
Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed
for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father
SC: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage (3rd marriage), no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed
and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
With regard to the rights of the child of the 3rd marriage, Art. 172 of the Family Code provides that filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the
legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence, which tends to disprove
facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in
evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother
Jacinto.
1. Kinds of Requisites & Effects of Non-Compliance

FC Arts. 2-5; 35; 45 cf. NCC Art. 53; RPC Arts. 350-351
Sec. 2: ESSENTIAL Requisites Sec. 3: FORMAL Requisites
1. Legal capacities of the contracting parties 1. Authority of the solemnizing oofficer

2. Consent freely given in the presence of the 2. Valid marriage license
solemnizing officer 3. Marriage ceremony, takes place w/:
a. the appearance of the contracting parties
b. Before solemnizing officer
c. Personal declaration that they take each
other as husband & wife
d. In the presence of not less than 2 witnesses
of legal age
Effects:
● ABSENCE of essential or formal- render the marriage VOID AB INITIO (except as stated in Art. 35(2)
● DEFECT in essential - NOT AFFECT the validity, but the party/ies responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable
● 18 years or upwards not under any of the impediments in Art. 37 & 38 - may contract marriage
FC 35 FC 45
VOID (from the beginning) VOIDABLE (annullable)
1. Below 18 years old even w/ parents’/guardian consent 1. Without parents/guardian consent

2. Solemnized by any person not legally authorized to ● Unless after attaining 21, such freely
perform marriages (except if either or both parties cohabited w/ the other and lived together
believed in good faith that the officer had legal as H & W
authority) 2. Either party was of unsound mind
3. Without license ● Unless after coming to reason, freely
4. bigamous/polygamous marriages cohabited w/ the other as H & W
5. Contracted through mistake of one as to the identity 3. Consent of either party was obtained by fraud
of the other ● Unless such afterwards, w/ full knowledge
6. Subsequent marriages that are void under Art. 53 of the facts constituting fraud, freely
cohabited w/ the other as H & W
4. Consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence
● Unless the same having
disappeared/ceased, such party freely
5. Either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage & such incapacity continues and appears
to be incurable
6. Either was afflicted w/ STD found to be serious &
appears to be incurable
ART. 53
● After compliance w/ the requirements, either of the former spouses may marry again
RPC 350-351
● Prision Correccional (med & max periods) - imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding
article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment
○ If consent is obtained by means of violence, intimidation or fraud - max period of the penalty
● arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if:

○ Any widow who shall marry within 301 days from the date of the death of her husband, or
○ before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death
De Mijares v. Villaluz
Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares got married to Justice Onofre Villaluz in a civil wedding. On the day of their honeymoon, De Mijares got a call from a
woman who was offending her with insulting remarks. De Mijares confronted Villaluz about this which led to a heated argument; since then, the couple
has been living separately. Several months after, she found out that Vullaluz got married to another woman which prompted her to file a disbarment case
against Villaluz.
Held:
All the requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2-3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied with.
Essential Requisites: (a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be male and female; (b) Consent freely given in the presence of solemnizing
officer
Formal Requisites: (a) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (b) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this title; (c)
marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
2. Essential Requisites
(a) Legal Capacity
(i) Gender
FC 2 (1) cf. FC 148
● Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female
● (I think 148 is a wrong provision)
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 and the impleaded civil registrar of Manila as respondent. He alleged that he was born in the
city of Manila to the spouses, Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962 and his name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate) with sex registered as “male”. Additionally, he
alleged that he is a male transsexual that is "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Petitioner underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation and his first attempt to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery.
Held: The Court held that the petitioner is not entitled to the civil registry changes sought despite acquiring physical features of a
female. The Court claimed that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and must look to
the statutes. Sec. 2 of RA 9048 provides expressly that no correction must involve change of nationality, age, status, or sex of the
petitioner To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The Court averred that the birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct thus, no correction is necessary.
(ii) Age
FC Arts. 5; 35 (1); R.A. No. 6809 cf. FC Art. 21; NCC Arts. 54 & 80 (1); RPC Art. 344 cf. DOJ Opinion 145 S.1991 (Oct. 1991)
● 18 or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage
● Below 18 years, even with consent - VOID
ART. 21
Either or both of the contracting parties - Citizens of a foreign country
● Must submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials
before a marriage license can be obtained
Stateless/Refugees
● in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity, they shall submit an an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to
contract marriage
ART. 54
The ff may contract marriage (under NCC)
● Male - 16 yrs or upwards
● Female - 14 yrs or upwards
ART. 80 (1)
● VOID - contracted under the ages of 16 and 14 years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the
parents
RPC 344
● seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian
(iii) Absence of Impediment

FC Arts. 5 & 35
FC 5
Any male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage
FC 35
Void Marriages:
1. Below 18 years old even w/ parents’/guardian consent
2. Solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages (except if either or both parties believed in good faith
that the officer had legal authority)
3. Without license
4. bigamous/polygamous marriages
5. Contracted through mistake of one as to the identity of the other
6. Subsequent marriages that are void under Art. 53
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001

Facts: In 1987, Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen. In 1989, a decree of divorce dissolving
the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered
into marriage with Grace Garcia, a Filipina in the year 1994. Sometime in 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. In 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Recio contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia; thus he was legally
capacitated to marry Garcia.
Held: The divorce obtained by Recio in Australia DID NOT ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. The said decree, being a foreign
document, was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country
where it will be used.
Doctrine: Art. 15 of the Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Also, Art. 17 of the same Code provides that the
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Te v. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000

Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did not live together, they would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana
gave birth to their daughter. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still married
to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the revocation of his and his mistress’ engineering
license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage. RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was
pending.
SC: Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Te’s guilt in the bigamy case. The ground cited by Te for the annulment was for
voidable marriage. Hence, he was still validly married when he committed bigamy.
Nollora vs. People

Nollora, when she was still in Saudi Arabia, heard rumors that her husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the
Philippines and learned that indeed a second marriage was. A case of bigamy was filed. His husband admitted having contracted 2
marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge
of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992.
Held: The marriage is bigamous because the elements of the crime of bigamy are all present. Indeed he is a Muslim but both
marriages were not conducted in accordance with Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of the Philippines shall
apply. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

Facts: Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido
(Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido. Tecla alleged that her marriage was
solemnized in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town and the fact of their their marriage is evidenced
by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar although records were destroyed due to World War II.
Peregrina averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio and presented a marriage contract and an affidavit by
Eustaquiao declaring himself single. Tecla, on the other hand, presented testimonial evidence from various people supporting her
claim and documentary evidences from civil registry supporting her claim of marriage with Eustaquiao.
Held: a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
The Court also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in
the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are
usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost” which in the case at bar, Tecla was
able to establish through the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony.
3. Parental Consent
FC 14 & 45 (1)
FC 14
● Between 18 to 21
● consent to their marriage of their: (IN ORDER)
○ Father
○ Mother
○ surviving parent or guardian, or
○ persons having legal charge of them
● manifested in:
1. Writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, OR
2. in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths
● recorded in both applications for marriage license
FC 45(1): absence of such - ground for annulment
4. Consent freely given by both spouses
(a) Mistake as to Identity

FC 35(5); NCC 86 (1)
● mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other - VOID

● Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties – FRAUD
(b) Effect of Insanity

FC 45 (2)
● Ground for annulment - unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife
(c) Effect of Fraud

FC 45 (3) & 46
● Ground for annulment - unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife
● Circumstances that constitute fraud:
○ Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude
○ Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
○ Concealment of STD, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage
○ Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage
● through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without
them, he would not have agreed to - fraud
● Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them - fraud
● usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the facts - not fraud
● mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud - not fraud
○ Unless made by expert and the other party relied on it
● misrepresentation has created substantial mistake - fraud
● Misrepresentation made in good faith - constitutes only error, not fraud
● In order that fraud may make a contract voidable
○ it should be serious and
○ should not have been employed by both contracting parties
● Incidental fraud - only obliges the person employing it to pay damages
Anaya v. Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, Nov. 26, 1970

Facts: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan married on December 4, 1953, and a month after that, Fernando filed an action for annulment
of the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and Aurora filed
for counterclaim saying that Fernando divulged to her that prior to their wedding, he was involved in a pre-marital relationship with his
close relative and such non-divulgement to her constituted fraud.
It was held that the non-disclosure of pre-marital relationship is not a ground for annulment of marriage. The law does not assuage her
grief after her consent was solemnly given for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested.
Doctrine: Fraud shall constitute the following:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; and
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage.
(d) Effect of Force, Intimidation and Undue Influence

FC 45 (4); NCC 1335-1337
● Ground for annulment - unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife
● Violence - when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed
● Intimidation - when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent
● To determine the degree of intimidation
○ age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind
● May annul obligation even if employed by a 3rd person who did not take part in the contract
● Undue Influence - when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable
freedom of choice
○ Circumstances to be considered:
■ confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or
■ the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was
ignorant or in financial distress
Villanueva v. CA, 505 SCRA 564

In 1988, Orlando and Lilia got married. In 1992, Orlando filed a petition for annulment alleging threats of violence and duress forced him into
marrying Lilia who is now pregnant. He said that he never cohabited with her after marriage.
SC: Marriage may not be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent.

1. On its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case
[filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.
3. appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of
cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence.
(e) Effect of Physical Incapacity/Impotency

FC 45 (5)
● Ground for annulment

● such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable
Jimenez vs Canizares
Petitioner and respondent were married in 1950. In 1955, Joel filed for annulment on grounds that his wife, Remedios, is impotent because her
genitals were too small for copulation and such was already existing at the time of the marriage. She was ordered to have herself be checked by
an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation. Remedios again refused.
Held: Impotency of Remedios cannot be deemed established. Her refusal to submit herself for examination was natural for women in this
country are shy and bashful. The presumption is in favor of potency.
Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, Oct. 13, 2009

Facts: Veronica and Rey got married on October 11, 2000 by Rev. Augusto Pabustan at the latter’s residence. After the wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived for 5 days in hometown of respondent’s parents. The newlyweds went back in Manila although the respondent did not live
with the petitioner’s abode in Tondo, Manila. The respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a
furniture shop. A year and a half later, petitioner was informed that respondent came home to the Philippines and that he proceeded to his
parents’ house in Mindoro and started living there.
Held: Petitioner originally filed for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads, “A marriage may
be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable;”. The Court maintained that Article
45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the
spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. Petitioner admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had
sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s
part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent hence, petitioner’s complaint was rightfully dismissed.
(f) Effect of Affliction with STD

FC 45 (6); 46 (3)
● Ground for annulment

● serious and appears to be incurable
● Constitutes fraud - if concealed
Note: Please bring a sample marriage contract and an application for a marriage license.
5. Formal Requisites
(a) Marriage License
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994

Facts: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and
it was only when Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US, and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter, she wanted to put in order her marital status before
leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
Held: Although the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses, such testimony is not a ground to deny her petition because of
the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
Doctrine: The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently proves that his
office did not issue a particular marriage license. Based on this certification, the Court held that the absence of such license would render the
marriage void ab initio.
Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000

The marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The pieces of evidence on
record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
Alcantara vs Alcantara
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita Alcantara. He alleged that on both occasions when they
appeared before a minister, the marriage was celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. They just went to the Manila City Hall
and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham as there was a discrepancy between it and the marriage contract and neither party was a resident of Carmona.
Held:
The marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued
by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar versus that in the marriage contract appears to be a mere a typographical error which does not detract from the finding of validity.
De Castro v. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

Facts: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married thus applied for a marriage license with
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. The couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar and learned that the marriage license had already expired.
To push through with the marriage plan, the couple executed an affidavit attesting that they had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years and got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, the couple went back to their respective homes and
ceased living together as husband and wife.
Held: The Court held that under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the case at bar, it is clear from the presented
evidence that the petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when their marriage was contracted and instead executed an
affidavit attesting to the fact that they had been living together for more than five years. The law requires that a man and a woman should have
lived together for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage in dispense of a marriage license. This provision is
aimed to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame, and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Facts: Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the
ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9,
1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also was Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and
Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage. In the
marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being
issued to other couple.
Held: The marriage between Syed and Gloria is NOT valid. No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. The Marriage
License No 9969967 was proven not theirs.
Doctrine: Art. 4 of the Family Code states that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).
Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Parents of the petitioner called a clerk of in the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for the
intended marriage of their son and Veronica.
Petitioner filed a petition to the RTC to consider ab initio or to nullify the marriage from the very start for lack of marriage license from the civil
registry. He showed a certification from the civil registry that there's in fact no marriage license issued in their favor for the marriage to happen.
SC: CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidence of the lack of a marriage licence and giving weight to unsupported
presumptions in favor of the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former Civil
Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil registrar. In
addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
1. Where to Apply
FC 9-10
● Issued by the local civil registrar - where either contracting party habitually resides
● Abroad
○ consul-general, consul or vice-consul
2. Requirements for Issuance
a. Application FC 11
FC 11:
Marriage License - each party shall file separately a sworn application for such license w/ the proper local civil registrar
and specify the ff:
1. Full name
2. Place of birth
3. Age & date of birth
4. Civil status
5. If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled
6. Present residence and citizenship
7. Degree of relationship of the contracting practice
8. Full name residence & citizenship of the father
9. Full name residence & citizenship of the mother
10. Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party
has neither father nor mother and is under the age of 21 years
** Not required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage
license
b. Proof of Capacity
FC Arts. 12-14, 21 cf. NCC Art. 84 cf. DOJ Opinion 50 S. 1991 (April 30, 1991); DOJ Opinion 146 S. 1991 (Oct. 17, 1991)
FC 12 – birth/baptismal certificate
FC 13 – previous marriage (death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage)
FC 14 – parental consent for parties 18-21 yrs old
FC 21 - certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials
(foreigners)
 Affidavit (Stateless persons or refugees)
c. Parental Advice FC 15
Parental Advice - 21-25 yrs old

● If no advice or if its unfavorable - marriage license shall not be issued till after 3 months following the
completion of the publication of the application
● Sworn statement to the effect that advice has been sought
● If the parent/guardian refuse to give - such fact shall be stated in the sworn statement
d. Marriage Counseling FC 16
● In cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed

● Parties shall attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage or a
marriage counsellor duly accredited by the proper government agency - that the contracting parties have
undergone marriage counselling
● Failure to attach such - shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of 3 months from the
completion of the publication of the application
● Issuance of marriage license within the prohibited period - subject the officer to admin sanction but shall not
affect the validity of the marriage
e. Publication FC 17
● Notice - Prepared by local civil registrar
○ Containing the - full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given
○ To be posted on:
■ bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicous place within
the building and accessible to the general public
○ Posted for 10 consecutive days
○ Contain a Request - all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar
● marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication
f. Investigation of Impediments FC 18
● In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention
● He shall note it down in the application for marriage license
● But shall nonetheless issue the license after the completion of the period of publication - unless ordered
otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party
● No filing fee shall be charged for the petition
g. Payment of Fees FC 19
● before the issuance of the marriage license
● Free for indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for
their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar
h. Family Planning Certificate

● he Office of Family planning shall give instructions and information on family and responsible parenthood to
applicants for marriage licens
● in the form of personal instruction and/or handbook, pamphlets or brochures
● No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar unless the applicants present a certificate, issued
at no cost to the applicants, by an Office of Family Planning that they had received instructions and information
on family planning and responsible parenthood.
3. Places where valid FC 20

In any part of the PH
4. Period of validity FC
 120 days from the date of issue
 Deemed automatically cancelled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it
5. Duties of the Civil Registrar FC 24-25

1. to prepare the documents required by this Title
2. administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases
3. enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received
4. record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as
may be necessary
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994

Facts: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live
together and it was only when Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said
cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the
consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US, and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter, she wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there
was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig.
Held: Although the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses, such testimony is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
Doctrine: The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and sufficiently
proves that his office did not issue a particular marriage license. Based on this certification, the Court held that the absence of such
license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Alcantara vs Alcantara
Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita Alcantara. He alleged that on both occasions
when they appeared before a minister, the marriage was celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. They just went
to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham as there was a discrepancy between it and the marriage contract and
neither party was a resident of Carmona.
Held:
The marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption is always
in favor of the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The discrepancy between the
marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar versus that in the marriage contract appears to be a mere
a typographical error which does not detract from the finding of validity.

: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the
ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on
August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by
Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also was Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of
Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until
Gloria told him that it was a marriage. In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.
Held: The marriage between Syed and Gloria is NOT valid. No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license.
The Marriage License No 9969967 was proven not theirs.
Doctrine: Art. 4 of the Family Code states that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
Kho v. Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Parents of the petitioner called a clerk of in the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for
the intended marriage of their son and Veronica. Petitioner filed a petition to the RTC to consider ab initio or to nullify the marriage
from the very start for lack of marriage license from the civil registry. He showed a certification from the civil registry that there's in
fact no marriage license issued in their favor for the marriage to happen.
SC: CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidence of the lack of a marriage licence and giving weight to
unsupported presumptions in favor of the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the
testimony of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil
registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
6. Marriage EXEMPT from marriage license FC 27-34 cf. NCC 76; PD 1083
Exempted from license requirement

1. either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death (articulo mortis), even if the ailing party subsequently
survives
2. residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally
before the local civil registrar
3. marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members (solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not
only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers)
4. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities (provided they are solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites or practices)
5. have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other
Who may solemnize without license requirement?

● For 1 & 2 - solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party is so
located that there is no means of transportation, and that he took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and
relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage
○ original of the affidavit together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person
solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar within 30 days after the performance of the marriage
● For 3 - ship captain or by an airplane pilot
● military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer
Ninal vs Bayadog
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie,
petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Held: At the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife
for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even if they cohabited, it should be in the nature of a perfect union that
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when the cohabitation started. The five-year common-law cohabitation period which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years.
De Castro v. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008

Facts: Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married thus applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. The couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar and learned
that the marriage license had already expired. To push through with the marriage plan, the couple executed an affidavit attesting
that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years and got married on the same date. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, the couple went back to their respective homes and ceased living together as husband and wife.
Held: The Court held that under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the case at bar, it is clear
from the presented evidence that the petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when their marriage was
contracted and instead executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that they had been living together for more than five years. The
law requires that a man and a woman should have lived together for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage in dispense of a marriage license. This provision is aimed to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame,
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581/179474, March 28, 2008

Facts: Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986 and executed a sworn affidavit attesting both of them
had attained the age of maturity and being unmarried, had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On August
30, 1990, Jose contracted a marriage with Rufina Pascual while his marriage with Felisa was still subsisting, resulting to Felisa filing
an action for bigamy against Jose and subsequently filed an administrative complaint against Jose and Rufina before the
Ombudsman as they are both government employees.
Held: Art. 53 provides, “No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: xx (4) A marriage license,
except in a marriage of exceptional character.” Furthermore, Art. 76 states “No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of maturity and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths.” The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
b) Authority of Solemnizing Officer
1. Who are authorized?

FC Arts. 7, 10, 31 & 32; NCC Arts. 56, 74, 76; R.A. No. 7160, Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii)
Under the FC
1. Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
2. Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious
sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
3. Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;
4. Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
5. Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10
FC 10: As to (5)
● Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad
● issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar - shall be performed by said consular official
FC 31: Articulo mortis between passengers or crew members

FC 32: Articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians
Under the NCC

1. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
2. The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
3. Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
4. Mayors of cities and municipalities;
5. Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
6. Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in article
92; and
7. Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in articles 74 and
75
ART. 74: During voyage (ship captain/ airplane chief), or war (commanding officer - military unit)
ART. 76: Marriages between Filipino citizens.
● duties of the local civil registrar - shall be performed by said consular official
R.A. No. 7160: Municipal Mayor - may solemnize marriages
Beso v. Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 (2000)

Facts: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with neglect of duty and abuse of authority for solemnizing her marriage
with Bernardito Yman even though it was outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar. The Court held that the judge solemnized a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction.
Doctrine: Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, “Any incumbent member of the judiciary with
the court’s jurisdiction”. In relation thereto, according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a
judge may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
(1) when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; and
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Note: ART. 23 of the same Code provides that it shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the
contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized.
Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and,
in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those
mentioned in Article 8.
Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen, on their wedding day, was refused by their supposed officiating priest to conduct said wedding
due to the couple’s failure to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, they proceeded to an Aglipayan Church and requested the
petitioner, an Agplipayan priest, to perform their wedding ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the
couple’s lack of marriage license. After the ceremony, an information was filed against the petitioner for allegedly performing an
illegal marriage. Court held the petitioner guilty because despite his knowledge of the couple’s lacking requirement, he still
conducted the wedding ceremony.
Art. 352, RPC - Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. - Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law.
2. How authorized?
FC 7(2) cf. NCC 92-96
● Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious
sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect
● Freedom of religion shall be observed by public officials
○ no public official shall attempt to inquire into the truth or validity of any religious doctrine held by the applicant or by
his church
● The public official in charge of registration of priests and ministers shall cancel the authorization issued upon showing that
the church, sect or religion whose ministers have been authorized to solemnize marriage is no longer in operation
○ Cancellation may also be ordered upon the request of the bishop, head, etc, to which he belongs
Villar vs. Paraiso

In the 1951 elections, Paraiso defeated Villar and was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Villar filed a quo warranto
proceeding against Paraiso contending that the latter was ineligible to hold office because he was disqualified under Sec. 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Villar instituted a quo warranto proceeding praying that Paraiso’s proclamation as mayor-elect be
declared null and void, and that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal. Paraiso denied ineligibility and claimed that he resigned
as minister and that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church.
Held: An ecclesiastic is ineligible to hold a municipal office under section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code. An Ordained
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines registered as such in the Bureau of Public Libraries with authority to
solemnize marriages, is an ecclesiastic and ineligible to hold the office of the Municipal Mayor. If a candidate to a municipal office is a
minister of a church with license to solemnize marriages, it is his duty (and not of his church) to secure from the Bureau of Public
Libraries the cancellation of his resignation as minister and to attach to his certificate of candidacy a copy of such resignation.  
3. Effect of Absence of Authority

FC Arts. 4, 35 (2); RPC Art. 352 cf. Tenchavez v. Escaño,15 SCRA 355 at page 360
Effect - absence of authority - VOID AB INITIO

● unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority
Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law
Tenchavez vs. Escano: The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved. It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing
priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the
very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
4. Duties of Solemnizing Officer FC 23-24
1. to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
2. to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than 15 days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized
3. shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage
5. Effect of Irregularity FC 4
● absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2)
○ FC 53 (2) - unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority
c) Marriage Ceremony
1. Form of Ceremony FC Arts. 3 (3); 6 cf. FC Arts. 33; 8
Formal requisite: takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses of legal age
● No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required
○ shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife
● In case of articulo mortis - when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be
sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer.
● Muslim marriages - solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices (no need for marriage license)
● publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul
Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731

Facts: Plaintiff filed a complaint with regard to the marriage claimed by the defendant to be valid. An evidence was received in trial
which is called an expediente de matrimonio civil, written in Spanish and consists of a petition directed to the justice of the peace,
dated September 25, 1907, signed by both the plaintiff and the defendant which states that they have mutually agreed to enter into
a contract of marriage before the justice of peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Another document dated on
same day, September 25, 1907, signed by the justice of peace.
Held: The Court held that the petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually
agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced. A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by
both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the
parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife.
COMPARE TO: Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, Feb. 06, 2004
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while, but after receiving a card from
Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. He was then
charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he
contracted second marriage in good faith.
Held: Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of
the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
Doctrine: Art. 3 of the Family Code provides that the formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A
valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
2. Place of Ceremony FC Arts. 8; 28-29; 32-33
1. chambers of the judge or in open court,

2. in the church, chapel or temple, or
3. in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul
4. on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
5. both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement
6. within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians
7. while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, also during stopovers at ports of call
3. Issuance of Marriage Certificate FC 6; 22-23
● contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than 2
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife
● In case of articulo mortis - when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be
sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the
solemnizing officer.
● Duty of Solemnizing Officer
● to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
i. to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
ii. to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than 15 days after the marriage, to the
local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized
iii. shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate,
the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage
Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez had a child named Melecio Madridejo. On July 8,
1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, got married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis,
by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her first marriage, and Melecio
Madridejo, her son in her second husband. The parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary.
SC: The marriage is valid. The failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of their
marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law
for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.
People vs Borromeo
The four year-old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing
her. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana’s hut. The windows and
door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall and saw her sister, Susana, lying down,
motionless, and apparently dead. Elias was convicted in the lower court for a crime of parricide and upon appeal he raised that he
and Susana were not legally married and that the execution of a marriage contract is absent. Therefore the crime committed is not
parricide, but homicide.
Held: The Court held that there is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
Elias Borromeo, admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife and was in fact married by a priest in a chapel near the
RCPI Station in Babag. The Court maintained that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the
strongest known in law. Despite his contention that there was non-execution of marriage contract, the mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites
for its validity are present.
E. Law Governing Validity of Marriages Abroad
1. General Rule in Contracts
(a) As to Form NCC 17 (1) & (2)

(b) As to Substantive Requirements NCC 15 & 17 (3)
Check discussions in “K” and “L” of Chapter II: Effect and Application of Laws
2. Special Rule in Marriage
(a) Lex Loci Celebrationis FC 26, 21, 10
FC 26 – Check discussion in “L”
Art. 21.
When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country:
 Before a marriage license can be obtained: They need to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their
respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries:
 In lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required: They need to submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such
capacity to contract marriage.
Art. 10.
Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by:
(a) a consul-general;
(b) a consul; or
(c) a vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines.
Duties of the consular official in relation to the solemnization of marriage abroad:

(1) The issuance of the marriage license; and
(2) The duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 786

Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines woth P300,000 more or less.
Subsequently, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased and that they were
married in China. Additionally, Yao Kee claimed that her child, Sze Sook Wah should be made administrator of the deceased
Held; The Court held that it is well-settled rule in jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. It
is imperative that they must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a
question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. It is not sufficient to establish that marriage is valid
in accordance with Chinese law and custom. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present competent evidence relative to the law in China
regarding marriages. The absence of the proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it is presumed to be similar with the Philippines. The SC affirmed
the decision of CA.
Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. In 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Stanley.
Held: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted
to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Doctrine: A Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a foreign citizenship and remarried is also allowed to remarry
under the Philippine law.
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Marinay in the PH. He was not able to bring Marinay in Japan and eventually lost contact with her. Marinay
met another Japanese, Maekara. They got married in the PH. She suffered physical abuse from Maekara when he brought her to Japan so she
left him adn started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan, which declared Marinay's marriage
with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiko then filed in the RTC (PH) a petition called a Judicial of Foreign Recognition of Judgement, to
(1)Validate the declaration of nullity on ground of bigamy the marriage of Miranay and Shinichi (2)declare the marriage of Shinichi and Miranay
void ab initio (3) to annotate the judgement of the Japanese court on the certificate of marriage.
SC: Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese FC judgment nullfying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. Under Art. 35(4) of FC, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Sec.
2(a) of AM No. 02-11-10-SC.
(b) Exceptions
FC Art. 26 in relation to FC Arts. 35(1), 35(4), 35(5-6), 36 to 38 cf. NCC 71; DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)
FC provisions – check discussion in “L”
cf. NCC 71
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and
valid there as such:
 General Rule: Also valid in the Philippines
 Exception: Those marriages which are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law
DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)

This Opinion is in relation to the request for clarification/opinion on the status of the daughter of one Consuelo Mamangon Haarnagel.
The facts presented are as follows: that a certain Consuelo Haarnagel, nee Mamangon, who is a Filipino citizen, was married to a German
national; that they were divorced on April 2, 1987 before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988; that on August 12, 1988 Mrs.
Haarnagel gave birth to a daughter; and that on September 5, 1988, the child was recognized by her biological father, one Charles Scauzzo, an
American national.
In relation to the above presented facts, you pose the following queries:
"1. Considering that Mrs. CONSUELO MAMANGON HAARNAGEL is a divorcee, is her child a natural child or an illegitimate child other (than)
natural?
"2. What surname will the child carry? Considering that the child was born when the Family Code has already taken effect, and Article 176 of
said Code provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother, what is now the considered surname of the mother —
MAMANGON which is her surname or HAARNAGEL which is the surname of her former husband?"
The pertinent provisions of the law are as follows:
Family Code —
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (71a)
"Where a marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (n) (as amended by
E.O. No. 227, dated July 17, 1987)"
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws. (n)"
"Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
"Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n)."
"Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate of a legitimate child. (278a):
As regards the first query:
It is believed that the daughter of Mrs. Haarnagel is an illegitimate child.
-At the outset, it should be mentioned that the Civil Code provisions on filiation have been superseded by the provisions of the Family Code
which limits the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate thereby eliminating acknowledged natural children and natural children
by legal fiction (Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 228). -Considering that the subject child was conceived and born
outside a valid marriage, regardless of the validity or invalidity of the divorce secured prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the daughter of
Mrs. Haarnagel is an illegitimate child pursuant to the express provision of the aforequoted Section 165 of the Family Code, the law in force at
the time of the child's birth. ---The fact that the child was recognized by her biological father, one Charles Scauzzo, an American national, would
not affect her status since under the Family Code, legitimation can only take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.
As regards the second query:
It is our opinion that the child will carry the name presently being used by the mother.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of the mother.
-We have had occasion to rule that a Filipino woman who was validity divorced abroad by her alien husband is allowed to use her former family
name (i.e. the name she employed prior to her marriage).
-The right or privilege of the wife to use the husband's surname springs from the fact of marriage and when the marriage is dissolved, the basis
for the continued use by the wife of her husband's surname ceases (Sec. of Justice Op. No. 10, s. 1989).
-In the case under consideration, the child should carry the name prior to the marriage of her mother, i.e. Mamangon.
F. Common-Law Marriages/ ‘Live-in’ Relationships

FC Art. 147 & 148 cf. RPC Art. 350
ROC, Rule 131, Sec. 3(aa)–(cc)
FC Art. 26, par. 1
NCC Book II, Title III (Arts. 484-501)
FC 147
Requisites:
(a) A man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other; and
(b) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
Effect:
(a) Their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares;
 applies even if only one party earned the wages and salaries and the other did not contribute thereto
(b) The property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 If the property was acquired by either party through donation or succession or in exchange for such exclusive properties, this Article does not apply
 The fruits and income of the above mentioned exclusive properties are also not covered by this Article
 In the rules of co-ownership: The share of the parties are based on their proportionate efforts in acquiring the properties
 GR: based on their proportionate share
o EX: In the absence of proof: Obtained through equal efforts so they own the properties in equal share
Living exclusively without the benefit of marriage shall mean:

(a) The parties must be capacitated to marry each other, which means that they have no legal impediment to get married and consequently, their living
together does not prejudice anyone.
(b) The cohabitation of the parties must be exclusive. Multiple alliances, like a man living with several women at the same time, are thus excluded.
(c) There must be a real cohabitation or “living together as husband and wife”. A mere transient relationship or the case of a man mere “visiting” the
woman from time to time even for a long period is not included.
(d) Idea behind the provision: To encourage the parties, who have no legal impediment to marry each other, to eventually legalize their union
A man and a women living together under a void marriage:

(a) This applies to void marriage where the parties or either of them does not have an existing valid marriage with anyone else.
(b) On the other hand, if the parties do not have existing marriages with other persons but their marriage is void for other reasons (like an incestuous
marriage or a marriage against public policy), it is believed that this Article will apply.
This Article does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between a man and his lawful wife (Tumulos v. Fernandez, GR 137650, April 12, 2000).
Presumption on the properties acquired while they live together (in the absence of proof):
 Obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry
 Shall be owned by them in equal shares
 For purposes of this Article: A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof.
Properties of the common-law wife cannot be bound in a suit against the man withourt making her a party to the case (Stasa, Inc. v. Liwasan)
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith

 the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children.
o In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
o In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
FC 148
This article applies to:

(a) Bigamous marriages;
(b) Adulterous relationships (where a woman is married to another while the man is single);
(c) Relationships in a state of concubinage (where a man is married to another while the woman is single);
(d) Relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons; and
(e) Multiple alliances of the same married man.
Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
 In the absence of proof to the contrary: Their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another: His or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another: His or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
 The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The rule that if both parties are in bad faith, they will be considered as if they were in good faith, cannot apply here because the rule in pari delicto does not apply in
family law.
ROC, Rule 131, Sec. 3(aa)–(cc)

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman, who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry; and
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman, who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to
submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Art. 484.
-Requisites: There is co-ownership whenever:
(a) The ownership of an undivided thing or right (b) belongs to different persons.
-In default of contracts, or of special provisions: Co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title (Civil Code).
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges:
-Shall be proportional to their respective interests
-Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
-Presumption unless otherwise proved: The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership are equal.
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided:
(a) He does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended; and
(b) In such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.
The purpose of the co-ownership:

-May be changed by agreement, express or implied
Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute:
(a) To the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common; and
(b) To the taxes.
Exemption of one/more of the co-owners in paying the expenses and taxes:

-General Rule: Happens by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes
-Exception: No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
Art. 489.
Necessary expenses or repairs for preservation

-may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but if practicable, there must be notification to the other co-owners of the necessity of such expenses or repairs
Expenses for improvement or embellishment

-Shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners:
-If the titles of ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on the subject, the
following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all the owners in proportion to the value of the
story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the exception of the owner of the ground floor;
the stairs from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and so on
successively.
Art. 491.
Alteration to the thing owned in common:
-General Rule: None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would
result therefrom.
-Exception: If the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Art. 492.
When there’s majority
-For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners shall be binding.
-There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co-ownership.
-Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property owned in common: The court, at the
instance of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the appointment of an administrator.
-Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common: The preceding provision shall apply only to the
part owned in common.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore:
(a) alienate;
(b) assign;
(c) mortgage; or
(d) substitute another person in its enjoyment.
-Exception: when personal rights are involved
-The effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners: Limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership
Art. 494.
-No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
-Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
-Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
-A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
-Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
-No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing owned in common, when:
-To do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended
-However, the co-ownership may be terminated in accordance with Article 498.
Art. 496. Partition

-May be made:
(a) By agreement between the parties; or
(b) By judicial proceedings.
-Shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code (Civil Code)
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners

-may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence
-However, they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to
prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others:
It shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
Art. 499.
-The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights belonging to
them before the division was made.
-Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the partition.
Art. 500. Upon partition:

-There shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made.
-Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud.
Art. 501. After partition:

Every co-owner shall be liable for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other co-owners.
Lesaca vs. Lesaca

Garcia sold the land for P2,500 to Lesaca before the latter's marriage to Juana Felix [2nd wife] and repurchased it to for the same amount [a retrovendendo] after said
marriage  
ISSUE: W/n money received after marriage, as purchase price of land sold a retrovendendo before such marriage to 1 of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property
or not.  
SC: it was not, since the husband obtained the property prior to meeting w/ the Juana and she did not invest/contribute in anything in the property, she had no
interest or rights over it  
 If the money paid by Lesaca was his own exclusively, surely the mere fact that it was returned or repaid after marriage cannot convert it to conjugal
property
 No evid that Juana actually contributed in the acquisition of the land. In the absence of such proof the sum must be deemed to have been the property of
the deceased to whom the land for w/c it was given in payment was sold by Garcia
Yapitinchay vs. Torres

 The property is not co-owned by spouses of common-law relationships. No evid that the woman actually contributed in the acquisition of the land  
 There must be proof that the property claimed was acquired by the labor, industry, or efforts of both parties in an amorous relationship  
Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

Facts: Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases, for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. They alleged that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987
and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental and despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. Respondent court issued the writ of habeas corpus but was returned unsatisfied as petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliano
and reasoned that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings.
Held: Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence,
in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana’s body. Vitaliana’s brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
“married” in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Facts: Soledad Escritor was a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of
Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr., a man not her husband and had begotten a son with
her. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Escritor claims that she had been living with Quilapio without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. However, she
claimed that as a member of a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity
with her religious beliefs. The Court found that Escrior should not be penalized for she is exercising her right to religious freedom.
Doctrine: Common-law marriages may be allowed by virtue of benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
G. Void Marriages
General Rule FC 4
Absence of any of the essential or formal requisites - render the marriage void ab initio
 EXCEPT FC 35 (2) – marriages solemnized by any person not legally authorized, unless either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had authority to do so
Defect in any of the essential requisites – render the marriage voidable
Irregularity in any of the formal requisites

 Shall not affect the validity of the marriage
 Party/ies responsible for the said irregularity shall be administratively, civil, or criminally liable
1. Kinds of Void Marriages
(a) Absence of Requisites

cf. VII (D) of the Outline; FC 35 cf. FC 234, RA No. 6809
1. Absence of legal capacity: contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents/guardian.
Emancipation: (attainment of the age of majority)

● By the marriage of the minor
● By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and
the minor at least eighteen years of age. (Irrevocable)
2. Absence of authority of the solemnizing officer; unless there is good faith on both parties that there is a legal authority
3. Absence of marriage license; EXCEPT:

● At the point of death
● No means to appear personally before the local registrar
● Marriage in articulo mortis (passengers and crew members; persons in the zone of military operation)
● Marriages among muslims
● Lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and without any legal impediment
Other marriages that are VOID AB INITIO

4. Bigamous or polygamous marriages (except Art 41)
5. Mistake of identity
6. Subsequent marriages under Art. 53
7. Marriages contracted by any party, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage, was psychologically incapacitated
8. Incentuous Marriages (Art. 37, FC)
9. Marriages declared void because they are contrary to Public policy (Art. 38, FC)
So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009

Reyes So (P) and Lorna Valera (R) met at a party in 1973, where they immediately became close. Said meeting resulted in a courtship and soon eloped only
two months after. Petitioner was aged 21 and respondent was aged 17 at the time. The parties lived together for 19 years as a common-law couple until
they formally exchanged vows in a wedding ceremony that occurred in 1990. The petitioner alleges that, for years, the respondent has been acting
erratically, mentioning drug-use, dropping out of school, abandoning her profession and the mere fact that she does not even take care of her own
children. Petitioner filed to declare their marriage null and void on the grounds of psychological incapacity and the absence of essential and formal
requisites of marriage.
SC:Petitioner failed to prove both psychological incapacity and absence of requisites.

Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In the case of Molina, the Court ruled that
“mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should be a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.”
De Castro vs De Castro
Petitioner and Respondents did not claim the marriage license on time which led to its expiration. With the expiration of the said license and their
intention to carry out their plan of getting married, they executed an Affidavit stating that they had been together as husband and wife for at least five
years even though such fact was not true since they it was only in 1994 that they had their first sexual relation.
Held:
The Court ruled that the false affidavit executed by the two parties has no value at all for there was no continuous cohabitation that took place. In effect,
since the affidavit was considered as a mere scrap of paper, the parties were not from the marriage license requirement. Failure to obtain and present a
marriage license constitutes an absence of formal requisite of marriage. Hence, their marriage is VOID AB INITIO.
Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Facts: Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986 and executed a sworn affidavit attesting both of them had attained the age of
maturity and being unmarried, had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. On August 30, 1990, Jose contracted a marriage with Rufina
Pascual while his marriage with Felisa was still subsisting, resulting to Felisa filing an action for bigamy against Jose and subsequently filed an
administrative complaint against Jose and Rufina before the Ombudsman as they are both government employees.
Held: Art. 53 provides, “No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with: xx (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.” Furthermore, Art. 76 states “No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
maturity and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.” The exception of a marriage license under Article
76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code in no ambiguous
terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage.

Facts: Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of
absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived
in the Philippines on December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez
and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also was Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he
did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage. In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage
License No 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.
Held: The marriage between Syed and Gloria is NOT valid. No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied
on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. The Marriage License No 9969967 was proven
not theirs.
Doctrine: Art. 4 of the Family Code states that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2).
Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Parents of the petitioner called a clerk of in the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange the necessary papers for the intended marriage
of their son and Veronica.
Petitioner filed a petition to the RTC to consider ab initio or to nullify the marriage from the very start for lack of marriage license from the civil registry. He
showed a certification from the civil registry that there's in fact no marriage license issued in their favor for the marriage to happen.
SC: CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s documentary evidence of the lack of a marriage licence and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in
favor of the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar at the time of the
wedding is sufficient to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article
80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without a marriage license is void.
(b) Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

FC Art. 35(4), 39, 40, 41, 44; RPC Arts. 344, 349
● Action for declaration of absolute nullity shall not prescribe. (Art. 39)
○ Except: In case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36; ten years after the effectivity of the Code
● Remarriage: a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (Art. 40)
Subsequent marriage is not void if:

1. The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead.
2. Disappearance (due to Article 391): An absence of only two years shall be sufficient. (Art 41)
What happens to the donation?

Both spouses in the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith: all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the
other are revoked. (Art 44)
Bigamy as a criminal offense:

1. Not prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. (Art. 344)
2. Offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution:
● Not include both the guilty parties (if both alive)
● If he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders
● Prision mayor (RPC; Article 349)
Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy

Lilia was married to Eduardo A. Maxion on June 25 1972. Lilia however married Karl on July 1978. Lilia claimed that her marriage with Eduardo was forced
and that Eduardo was still married at the time they were married.
Held: The court held that there is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she was still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.
Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6

Facts: Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a
second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting. Complainant
alleged that after getting her pregnant, respondent abandoned them and contracted another marriage with Helina Malicden. According to the
Complainant, Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their
marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote “single” as her status.
Held: Before a person can legally contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage is null and void is essential. The Court ruled that
the respondent’s marriage with Dorothy is deemed valid and that the second marriage he contracted is bigamous in nature. A subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity.
Domingo v. CA 226 SCRA 572

Facts: Roberto Domingo (petitioner) married Delia Soledad (private respondent) in 1976 while being married to Emerlina dela Paz. Delia came to know only
of the previous marriage when Emerlina filed a case for bigamy against them. Domingo had been unemployed and was completely dependent upon Delia
who had been working in Saudi Arabia. In 1989, Delia found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman, and he was spending and disposing
some of her properties without her knowledge and consent. Hence, in May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Roberto and a prayer for the separation of property.
Doctrine: A petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary and should be filed not only for purposes of remarriage but also for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married
Note: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Cariño vs. Cariño 351 SCRA 127

Santiago married Susan Nicdao in 1969. Santiago ocntracted a 2nd marraige w/ Susan Yee. They were cohabiting since 1982.Cariño died in 1992, which
prompted the spouses to claim death benefits. Yee files a case for the collection of the return of 1⁄2 of the sum P146,000 “death benefits” against Nicdao.
To strengthen her claim on half of the death benefits, Yee claimed that Nicdao and Cariño’s marriage was void ab initio as there was 1) no marriage license
number on the marriage certificate, and 2) the Civil Registrar issued a certificate stating no such marriage license was issued to Nicdao and Cariño.
SC: As the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the FC on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Art. 148 - refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man. In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Art. 147 - applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party
earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
Mercado vs Tan
Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims
she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The
decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
Held: In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime
had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 139509, July 31, 2000

Facts: Isagani Bobis contracted a second marriage in 1996 without annulling, terminating, or nullifying the first marriage in 1985. He allegedly contracted a
third marriage. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani by his second wife, Imelda Marbella-Bobis. Thereafter, Isagani Bobis initiated a civil
action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Isagani Bobis then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question.
Held: The Court held that the subsequent filing for a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is not a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Art. 40 of the Family Code which was the governing law at the time of the celebration of marriage requires that a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage is essential before a person can remarry. In the case at bar, Isagani Bobis, failed to obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage hence, his marriage with the petitioner is deemed not valid. It is clear that respondent wanted to suspend the criminal case proceeding
to secure first a judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage to avoid being prosecuted for bigamy.
Ty v. CA, G.R. No.127406, Nov. 27, 2000

FACTS: Edgardo Reyes and Anna Villanueva were married twice, in civil rites and in church, in 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio
for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes contracted marriage with Ofelia
Ty (petitioner) in April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati in April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed
with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. RTC ruled that his marriage to Ofelia null and void ab initio. CA
affirmed trial court‘s decision. CA ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage with Villanueva must first be secured before a subsequent
marriage could be validly contracted.
Held: The first and second marriage were contracted in 1977 and 1979 respectively, so their marriage is governed by Civil Code which do not provide for
any provisions requiring judicial declaration of nullity before contracting a second marriage; however, the jurisprudence provides otherwise (thus,
conflicting):
o Gomez v Lipana: There is a need for judicial declaration of nullity.
o Odayat v Amante (1977): There is NO NEED for judicial declaration of nullity.
o Wiegel v Sempio- Dy (1986): There is a NEED for judicial declaration of nullity.
o Yap v CA (1986): There is NO NEED for judicial declaration of nullity.
o Terre v Terre (1992): There is a NEED for judicial declaration of nullity.
o Domingo v CA (1993): There is a need for judicial declaration of nullity.
In this case, the Court applied the case of Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon since the case was entered into in 1976. With this, it ruled that there was NO
NEED for judicial declaration of nullity before Reyes could contract a second marriage with Ty.
Doctrine: In determining whether or not judicial declaration of nullity is required before contracting a second marriage, it is important to consider the
DATE OF MARRIAGE and the JURISPRUDENCE AT THAT TIME.
Morigo v. Morigo, 422 SCRA

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of
letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario
Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that
there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
SC: Morigo cannot be guilty of bigamy. His first marriage is declared null and void ab initio (no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer; they merely signed a marriage contract on their own). Thus, he cannot be guilty of bigamy. The first element of bigamy as a
crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null.
This argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
Tenebro vs CA
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 1990, lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes. He contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Tenebro countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there
being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence
he cannot be charged for bigamy.
Held:
The Court averred that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
(read concurring opinion of Justice Vitug and dissent of Justice Carpio)

Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011
Facts: A marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves and Thelma Jaime-Teves at MTC Muntinlupa. Thelma left to work abroad and would only come
home to the Philippines for vacations. While on vacation, Thelma was informed that her husband contracted another marriage with Edita Calderon. Danilo
Bongalon filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos a complaint of bigamy against Cenon Teves. Pending the case, RTC Caloocan
rendered a decision declaring Thelma’s marriage with Cenon null and void as Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held: Cenon was legally married to Thelma, their marriage legally subsisting, when he contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita. His marriage
with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity which validates the crime of bigamy. Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code proves the elements of
bigamy, all of which are present in Cenon’s marriage with Edita.
Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Nollora v. People, G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011

Facts: Petitioner was married to Jesusa Nollora. Their marriage was still subsisting when he contracted a 2nd marriage with Rowena Geraldino, who was
herself aware of his marriage with Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him. Petitioner contended that as a Muslim convert, he was
entitled to marry 4 wives under the Muslim belief. However, the Supreme Court ruled against him. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous,
and pursuant to Art. 35 of the Family Code, it is void ab initio. Petitioner’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his marriages were
solemnized under the Muslim Law. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be used as a defense.
Doctrine: Regardless of the professed religion, a person can not claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy when both marriages were not
conducted under the Muslim Laws.
Montanez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012

Lourdes married Socrates. During the susbsitence of the said marriage, Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a petition for annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered its decision declaring the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and
void.
Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy against Lourdes alleging that Lourdes failed to reveal to
Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her first marriage to Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio
SC: At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the
above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the
second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements
of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Capili vs People
Petitioner James Capili was married to Karla Medina. James Capili submitted himself to a second marriage with Shirley Tismo. Karla filed in the RTC of
Antipolo for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage, and in the RTC of Pasig for the crime of bigamy against James Capili. The RTC of Antipolo
rendered the second marriage null and void. The RTC of Pasig considered the decision of RTC of Antipolo, and thus absolving James Capili for the crime of
Bigamy. James Capili argued that he cannot be charged bigamy since the second marriage was already null and void.
Held: All the essential requisites for validity were present in the actions of James Capili. It also ruled in previous jurisprudence that nullity of the second
marriage does not invalidate the crime of bigamy. As long as the second marriage took place while the first marriage is still binding and legal, it is
bigamous.
See: Abbas vs. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Facts: On January 24, 2004, Fujiki, a japanese national married Miranay, a Filipina in the Philippines. They eventually lost contact as he was not able to
bring her to Japan. On May 15, 2008 Miranay got married to Shinichi in Quezon City. But apparently suffered abuse from Shinichi, making her leave him,
and look for Fujiki. Fujiki then filed a petition called Judicial Foreign Recognition of Judgment to validate the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Miranay and Shinichi on ground of bigamy and declare the marriage void ab initio and annotate the judgment of the Japanese court on the certificate of
marriage.
Held: The Court held that the Philippines does not have Divorce Laws, the Japanese Family Court is fully consistent with the public policies of the
Philippines. The Court further states that Fujiki has the legal interest to file this petition. He has met the certifications of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
being the aggrieved party as he is married to Mirana, he can petition the court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify marriage. It is an action for the Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule lex nationalii
expressed in the Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

Facts: On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor Alagon. He later filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage
with Modina and thus filed a complaint-affidavit charging respondent with bigamy. Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that
the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
Held: A declaration of nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases
that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted, or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
Doctrine: He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Iwasawa v. Gangan, G.R. No. 204169, Sept, 11, 2013

"Private respondent introduced herself to Petitioner as single and has never been married before. However, petitioner discovered that she was actually
married before to a Raymond Arambulo. Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity against private respondent on the ground that their marriage is a
bigamous one.
SC: This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what
transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the
marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts:
1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila;
2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City;
3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner;
3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been
dissolved; and
4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when
the second marriage was contracted."
SSS vs Azote
Upon the death of Edgardo, his second wife tried to claim his death benefits. It appears from the SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form
where his former wife Rosemarie and their child were designated as beneficiaries. Edna did not know that Edgardo was previously married to another
woman.
Held: The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) thereof, only the legal spouse of the deceased-member is
qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another
individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edna, pursuant to Art 41 of the Family Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that
the impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier
marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before her marriage to
Edgardo.
(c) Subsequent Marriage:, Upon Reappearance Of Absent Spouse

Except: (Refer to subsequent marriage is not void if)
● Summary proceeding by the spouse re the presumptive death of the absentee; without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
● Subsequent marriage (SM) shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (unless
there is a judgment that the previous marriage is annulled or void)
·
Requirements of Reappearance:
1. Sworn statement of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry (residence of parties to the SM)
2. At the instance of any interested person
3. Notice to the spouses of the SM
4. Without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
Effects of Termination of the SM:
1. Children conceived prior to termination: legitimate
2. ACP/CPG shall be dissolved and liquidated
If bad faith: his or her share of the net profits of the ACP/CGP shall be forfeited in favor of the common children/the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children/the innocent spouse
3. Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid
4. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if irrevocable
Except: if the done contracted the marriage in bad faith; revoked (Also in Art 44)
5. The spouse of the SM in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (Art 43)
Presumption of Death (for succession purposes)

1. For all purposes if unknown w/n the absentee lives or not (after 7 years) except for succession purposes
2. Not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years.
3. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened. (Art 390)
Shall be considered DEAD:

1. A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane
2. A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years.
3. A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. (Art 391)
Note: If there is an attempt by the spouse against the life of the other spouse; legal separation.
What constitutes abandonment?
1. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family (marital,
parental and property)
The aggrieved spouse may:
● File a petition the court for receivership
● Judicial separation of property
● For authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community.
2. Has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning.
Period of 3 months and failed to give information of his whereabouts prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (Art 101)
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179

Facts: Marciana Escaño married Arthur W. Jones and had a daughter named Angelita Jones. Few years later, Jones left the country and thereafter nothing
was ever heard of him. Escaño instituted a proceeding to have Jones judicially declared absent and was later on granted by the court. She then contracted
a second marriage with the respondent, Felix Hortiguela. On the death of Escaño, Hortiguela was appointed as judicial administrator of the estates of her
wife. Both Angelita Jones and Hortiguela were declared the only heirs of Escaño. Upon adjudication of the estates of Escaño by Hortiguela, Angelita filed a
motion, alleging that she was the only heir of her mother; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela since the
declaration of absence failed to meet the 7 consecutive years that the former spouse has been absent at the time of the second marriage.
Held: In the case at bar, the Court ruled that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the
former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
Republic v. Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20, March 17, 1993

Facts: Nolasco married Monica Parker, but while he was on duty as a seaman, he received a letter telling him that his wife has given birth. However, Parker
has left his hometown of Antique. He sought to have his wife declared as presumptively dead but was opposed by the Solicitor-General on the ground that
Nolasco failed to establish that he had a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead and that he was merely trying to circumvent the marriage laws
of the Philippines. The Supreme Court denied Nolasco’s petition on the ground that he did not really diligently searched for his wife and that he was not
able to establish a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead.
Doctrine: In seeking a petition to declare an absentee spouse as presumptively dead, the present spouse must be able to show that has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead and that he really conducted a diligent search for the absentee spouse.
Bienvenido v. CA, 237 SCRA 676, October 24, 1994

Aurelio married Consejo in 1942. Without their marriage being dissolved, Aurelio married Luisita in the light of the absence of Consejo.In 1967, He courted
and lived with Nenita until his death. During Aurelio and Nenita's time, the former bought the house and the lot, and the deed of sale of the said property
was consequently executed by Aurelio in favor of Nenita. After Aurelio's death, Luisita came to know that the deed of sale of the said land was in favor of
Nenita, so she instituted a case before the RTC to annul the sale of the land to Nenita and for damages.
SC: The Court ruled in favor of Nenita, and stated that indeed a spouse may contract another marriage in light of the absence of his/her spouse for 7 years
or in the belief that his/her spouse is deceased, however, the Court stated that this rule only applies to the abandoned spouse and not the deserting
spouse. In the present case, it was found that it was Aurelio that left his first wife, Consejo therefore the rule of absence of spouse may not apply to him. It
was also pointed out in the case that Consejo was not dead and was living, albeit in Australia. Having established this, the Court then found that the
subsequent marriage of Aurelio to Luisita is not valid and therefore she may not claim that the property in question is part of her conjugal property.
SSS vs Jarque
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. Bailon filed before the CFI of Sorsogon a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead which was
granted. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque. She was designated as
SSS beneficiary of Bailon. Alice subsequently emerged, thereafter SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death
benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of
Bailon’s marriage with Alice.
Held:
Article 42 provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee‘s mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since the second
marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical
reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify Bailon & Jargue’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon
Republic v. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, Dec. 10, 2013

Facts: Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor (petitioner) after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or hearing from the
former, the latter filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent search for her
husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC granted her petition. However, the OSG filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Held: The Court ruled that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Art. 41 enumerates the four essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death and these are: 1) the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years or two consecutive
years if disappearance occurred where there is danger of death; 2) the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3) the spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and 4) present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of spouse. The respondent’s well-founded
belief was anchored on her alleged earnest efforts to locate her husband and fell short of stringent standard and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence.
Republic v. Hon. Estrada, G.R. No. 214792, March 18, 2015

Facts: Teresita Olemberio filed a Petition for Declaration of Absence and Presumption of Death of her husband Diego, the latter having been absent for the
past 32 years and having made no contact with the former. The RTC ruled in her favor. However, the Office of the Solicitor General intervened and alleged
that the lower court erred in the appreciation of the facts and ircumstances surrounding Diego’s death as well as the alleged insufficiency in exerting effort
to locate her husband. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Teresita; the Court found no compelling reason to rule in favor of the OSG due to the fact that
32 years have already elapsed, which exceeds the 4-year period by a longshot and the fact that Malaybalay is plagued with New People’s Army rebels.
Doctrine: If a spouse has been absent for 4 years (2 years where there is danger of death), the surviving spouse may file a Petition for Declaration of
Absence and Presumption of Death for all legal intents and purposes.
Note: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Republic v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015

Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in Bukidnon.In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that
Romeo had left their conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts. Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the
country to look for Romeo. In 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. During
the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness.
SC: Article 41 of FC provides that before a judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna failed.
The well-founded belief in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news
that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-founded
belief” which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from
whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone witness. Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the
allegation that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already.
Republic vs Tampus
Respondent Nilda Tampus files a petition to declare his husband, Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage. Dante is a member of AFP
who was assigned to a mission to Jolo ,Sulu and has been missing of 33 years. She testified that she tried locating him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, who unfortunately did not know where to find him as well, but didn’t make inquiries to AFP Headquarters.
Held: The "well-founded belief' in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief' which can only be discharged upon showing of proper and honest-to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already dead.
Procedure
Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

Facts: Yolanda and Cyrus Granada met in Sumida Electric Philippines (SEP) on May 1991, the two subsequently got married on March 3 1993. Their son,
Cyborg was born out of this union. Sometime in May 1994, SEP closed and Cyrus went abroad to look for work and after 9 years of searching and waiting
for Cyrus, Yolanda filed for Cyrus to be presumptively dead. RTC declared Cyrus to be presumptively dead. Republic of the Philippines then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, stating that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus. Failing to prove that she had well-found belief he is dead. RTC
denied the petition. The Republic filed an appeal in CA while Yolanda filed a motion to dismiss the petition due to lack of jurisdiction which was approved
hence, this petition for certiorari.
Held: The Court averred that the Appelate Court did not err in dismissing the Republic’s appeal on declaring that the RTC’s judgment final and executory as
based on Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. It is noted that the arguments of the Republic are well taken by the court.
However, as in the first issue, judgment is final and they are forced to deny the Petition.
(d) Bad Faith of Both Spouses FC 44

● Marriage – void ab initio
● All donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other – revoked by operation of law
(e) Psychological Incapacity FC 36, 39, 68-73, RA 8533
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Art. 39. Action for declaration of absolute nullity shall not prescribe.
FC 68-73: Marital Rights and Duties

● Live together, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity, render mutual help & support
● Fix family domicile
○ In case of disagreement, court shall decide
○ Except: (shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family
■ Spouse is living abroad
■ Other valid & compelling reasons
● Jointly responsible for the support of the family
○ Family expenses shall be paid from: (in order)
■ Community property
■ Income or fruits of their separate properties
■ Separate properties
● Management of the household
● Aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief (neglect of duty)
● The exercise of legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity
○ Objection may only be made on valid, serious or moral grounds
○ In case of disagreement, the Court shall decide
○ These provisions shall not prejudice the rights of the creditors
Note: What are the reasons why some cases are granted while some are not granted?
Not Granted
Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20

Facts: Leouel Santos was married to Julia Bedia in 1986. The couple usually quarrelled about Julia’s parents among other things. In 1988, Julia left for the
US to work as a nurse and did not return home. Leouel searched for Julia, but she was not found. He then filed a petition to nullify their marriage due to
Julia’s alleged psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort
constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an opposition; she said that it was Leouel who was incompetent. The Court held that the Family Code
Revision Committee intended psychological incapacity to be interpreted on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Republic vs Molina
A year after marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as husband and father spending more time with his friends and
squandering money. Financially dependent on his parents, dishonest to his wife in financially resulting to frequent quarrels. Reynaldo abandoned them
and thus shown psychologically incapable in complying the essential marital obligations, highly immature and habitually quarrelsome who thought of
himself as a king to be always served.
Held: Reynaldo merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other with no showing of the gravity of the problem neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. In
the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. Reynaldo’s failure to fulfill impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" is not an indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Hernandez vs. CA
Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000

Facts: Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982; they had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the
family and had resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA. Although SC was convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts did not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
were incurable.
Doctrine: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Psychological
incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
Republic v. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425

Erlinda and Avelino got married. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. He left
again, and Erlinda learned that that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. Erlinda a petition
for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
SC: Petition must fail. In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda
failed to comply with guideline number 2, which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.
Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Lolita and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed
there for half of 1987. Lolita and Toshio got married and after a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. She learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Lolita
Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Held: Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation
due to some psychological, not physical illness.
Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 517 SCRA 123, Feb. 6, 2007

Facts: Laila and Manolito were married when she was 19 years old and Manolito was 20 years old. They had 2 children, a girl and a boy. For nine years, the
couple stayed with Manolito’s parents and Manolito was jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. On August 20, 1998, Laila left their home and
stayed with her parents. Manolito left as well and he never came back. Laila filed for declaration on nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Held: Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity was thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and
his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude had not been shown, however, to be
a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.
Doctrine: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners and got married. Leonida sought to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform marital obligations. Leonida testified that Mauel is a harsh disciplinarian towards their children and would be the
cause of their frequent fights; Manuel was unreasonable when it comes to disciplining his children but is gentle towards his mom which made Leonida
wonder. Leonida also testified that Manuel is homosexual. She noticed his unusual closeness to his male companions, caught Manuel talking to a man
affectionately over the phone, found Manuel's pornographic homosexual materials and saw Manuel kissed another man.
SC: Marriage can not be annulled. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear—a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of
his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration
by fabricated evidence. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
Najera vs. Najera

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment, claiming that at the time of their marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated. She alleged that the
respondent, while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient financial support and she had to rely on her own efforts and the
help of her parents in order to live. And when he went home, he started to quarrel with petitioner and falsely accused her of having an affair with another
man. He took to smoking marijuana and tried to force petitioner into it. When she refused, he insulted her and uttered unprintable words against her. He
would go out of the house and when he arrived home, he was always drunk. One time, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her
with a bolo. She was able to parry his attack with her left arm, yet she sustained physical injuries on different parts of her body. He also abandoned her
and lived with his mother.
SC: Petition must fail. Santos v. Santos cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to
provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the
Code of Canon Law, which reads: Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage: 1. those who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. those who
suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted; 3. those
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It must be pointed out that in this case, the
basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions
causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted. x x x
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts
established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by
the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist
Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal.
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012

Anabelle and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. After a month of courtship, they became
intimate and their intimacy led to her pregnancy. They got married 8 months after.. Being one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the family’s
expenses. Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit affair with his
co-employee and they started to sleep in separate rooms affecting their sexual relationship. Dominic eventually got fired from his employment and was
criminally charged with the violation of B.P. 22 and estafa.
SC:We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We
have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity
as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and
comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the
time of marriage, and must be incurable.
It is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive
but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Vinas v. Parel-Vinas, G.R. No. 208790, Jan. 21, 2015

Facts: Glenn filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace, alleging that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing
and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even
when she was pregnant. Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai.
Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, and found her to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits.
Held: In the case of Mary Grace, however, the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity, incurability of Mary Grace’s
condition and that it existed at the inception of marriage. Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions
and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Malilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, Feb. 18, 2015

Facts: Robert Mallilin filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. He alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz
Jamesolamin was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent. Luz
filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
While the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal). The Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground
of grave lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she
failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Held: Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced.

Doctrine: As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great
respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
Granted
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, G.R. No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997
Gina Lao Tsoi married Chi Ming Tsoi. After the celebration of marriage, they proceeded to the latter’s mother’s house; no sexual intercourse took place for
several nights. Instead, Chi Ming Tsoi just turned his back and slept. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went up to Baguio;
however, Chi Ming Tsoi invited their relatives. No coitus took place. Gina filed a petition to have their marriage annulled on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
SC:“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar. 10, 2005

Facts: Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila CIty Hall and later on in church. A child was born four months after the second marriage, April 1991
but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying, insecurities, and jealousy so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
reconciliation but Reyes’ behavior remained the same which prompted him to leave her for good in November. He later learned that she had a child with
another man. Antonio then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Held: The petitioner presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that Reyes’ constant lying and extreme jealousy is abnormal and
pathological which amounts to psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that the respondent has consistently lied about many material aspects of her
character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The Court held that the case sufficiently
satisfies the Molina case and has the essential elements that constitute psychological incapacity. Despite petitioner’s effort of reconciling with respondent,
respondent’s behavior remains the same. Hence,marriage is declared null and void.
Te vs Te
Edward and Rowena got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was
threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to
stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. She said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they
then parted ways. Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
Held: Given that both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Edward being extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition and Rowena being extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere
and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic
and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both dubbed to be emotionally immature and
recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. The precipitous marriage which
they contracted is declared null and void.
Azcueta v. Republic, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009

Facts: In 1993, Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met. They got married in July 1993, less than two months after their First meeting. They
had no child. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. On March 2002, petitioner Ailed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage. Petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Moreover, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. She constantly encouraged her husband
to find employment but never bothered to look for one. She also complained that Rodolfo became physically violent every time he gets drunk. Their sexual
relationship was also unsatisfactory.
Held: The Court held that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Disorder. His
marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio. The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness. Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the
marriage being rooted in his early development of his upbringing and family life. A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume
the essential marital obligations and such has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable as it is deeply ingrained in his system since his early
years.
Halili v. Halili, G.R. No. 165424, June 9, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Lester Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Held: In Te v. Yu-Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others' comments. It has been sufficiently
established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Thus, the petitioner was indeed
suffering from psychological incapacity.
Doctrine: In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on
psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Camacho Reyes vs Reyes

By the time that petitioner and respondent married each other, all living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, and they were living with the
respondent’s parents. Petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. The couple became so estranged from each other. Upon recommendation of one of the psychiatrists that the psychological incapacity is curable
because Reyes is referred for “psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning”.
Held: A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists,
or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. The doctor’s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding
that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, during the testimony, it was categorically declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011

Facts: Kalaw and Fernandez got married in 4 November 1976 in Hong Kong. Their marriage begot 4 children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son,
Kalaw had an extramarital affair with Quejano. In 1985, Fernandez left the conjugal home and her four children with Kalaw. From then on, Kalaw started
living with Quejano who bore him 4 children. In 1990, Kalaw went to US with Quejano and their children. He left his four children from his first marriage in
a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. Fernandez would only stay with her children on weekends as provided in their custody
agreement. It was only in 1994 that Fernandez knew that Kalaw brought the children to the US and decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Held: Kalaw failed to prove that Fernandez suffers from psychological incapacity. The testimonies of two experts presented by Kalaw were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez which had not been sufficiently proven. The Court considered Fernandez’ frequent engagement in mahjong but such
habit was not proven to have any adverse effect on her relationship with her children. As to the alleged extramarital affair of Fernandez, the Court ruled
that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. The Court averred that Sexual infidelity is a
ground for legal separation but not necessarily constitutes psychological incapacity. In the end, the Court pointed out that what transpired between the
parties is just ACRIMONY, and perhaps INFIDELITY which led to estranged relationship. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
Kalaw v. Fernanez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

Facts: Valerio Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent Elena Fernandez was psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
Held: In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.
Doctrine: Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
Note: SEXUAL INFIDELITY per se is a ground for legal separation, BUT IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
Republic vs. De Gracia

Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations. Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage
however proved futile because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable. Dr. Zalsos (psychiatrist) stated that both Rodolfo and
Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from “utter emotional
immaturity”.
Held: Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
(f) Incestuous Marriages FC 37 cf. NCC 963-967
INCESTOUS
(VOID from the beginning-parties are legit or illegit)
Between:
1. Ascendants & descendants - of any degress
2. Brothers & sisters - whether full or half
ART. 963-967
● Proximity of relationship - determined by the number of generations
○ Each generation forms a degree
● Series of degrees - forms a line
3. Direct Line - constituted by series of degrees among ascendants & descendants
4. Collateral Line - constituted by series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor
● Full blood relationship - have the same father and the same mother
● Half-blood relationship - have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the same father.
(g) Marriages against Public Policy

FC Art. 38, compare FC Art. 38(6) with NCC Art. 80(6)
RPC Art. 246; NCC Arts. 80(7), 82; NCC Arts. 963-967
VOID by reasons of
PUBLIC POLICY
Between:
1. Collateral blood relatives - legit or illegit, up to 4th civil degree
2. Step-parents & step-children
3. Parents-in-law & children-in-law
4. Adopting parent & adopted child
5. Surviving spouse of the adopting parent & adopted child
6. Surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter
7. Adopted child & legit child of the adopter
8. Adopted children of the same adopter
9. Parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse
FC 38 (6) vs. NCC 80 (6)

● FC 38 (6) - Surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter
● NCC 80 (6) - Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them
RPC 246: “Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.”
NCC 80 (7), 82
• Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in article 82.
• Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between
the former and the surviving spouse of the latter;
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted.
ART. 963-967 (see above)
(h) Non-compliance under FC 53, 52

Sec. 21, 22 and 23, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
FC 52
The following shall be recorded in the appropriate Civil Registry and Registries of Property – if not recorded, it will not bind 3rd persons
1. Judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage
2. Partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses
3. Delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes
FC 53
After compliance w/ the requirements, either of the former spouses may marry again
Sec. 21, 22 and 23, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legltimes. - Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court,
on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings.
Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage."

(a) The court shall issue the Decree after;
(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;
(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real
properties are located; and
(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.
(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.
Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth
certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.
Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. –
(a) The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the
place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court compliance with this
requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.
(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to
third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their
common children.
2. Who can invoke nullity?

FC Arts. 36, 39-40
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, Mar. 4, 2003
Under FC:
FC 36 – A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Nullity of Marriage:
● Marriage under this article is void from the beginning because a party at the time of the celebration of the marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Juridical Basis for the Declaration of this Marriage Void Ab Initio

● The psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.
● If it were psychological incapacity to understand the marital obligations then this would mean lack of consent to the marriage.
● Art. 45(5) provides that physical incapacity to consummate marriage makes the marriage voidable only.
● While psychological incapacity may be cured, this would not validate the marriage which is legally inexistent.
FC 39 –The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribed in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect. (As amended by
E.O. No. 227)
FC 40 –The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
● Final Judgment- Art. 40 has reference to a void marriage which in law does not exist and whose absolute nullity can be raised at any time and even in a
case where it is attacked collaterally.
● For purposes of remarriage, it is necessary for the party to such void marriage to secure a final judgment declaring it null and void from the beginning.
Without such final judgment, the previous void marriage would constitute an impediment to the remarriage, and a marriage license may be denied.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, March 4, 2003 Cases filed before March 15, 2003, this AM shall not apply
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.
(c) Imprescriptibility of action or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.
(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing the either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 607, February 6, 2007
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, Sept. 28, 2007
Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008
Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010

Since the marriage is under the CC, AM does not apply, but the wife, daugther & brother must prove that he has standing
Determining factor
When is the marriage?
● If under the CC – AM does not apply
● If under the FC – Check when filed?
○ Before March 15, 2003 – AM does not apply
3. When to file action for declaration of nullity

FC Art. 39 in relation to FC Arts. 255, 256; 42, par. 2
FC 39. - The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribed in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect. (As amended by
E.O. No. 227)
FC 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage
at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being
judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
FC 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.
FC 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
FC 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall
revive the parental authority over the minor but shall not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil
Register.
4. Procedure in Actions for Declaration of Nullity
a. Requisite for valid remarriage

b. Safeguards against collusion FC Art. 48
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State:
● to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
● to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Malcampo Sin v. Sin, 355 SCRA 285 – SC remanded the case to the RTC as the prosecutor must participate in the trial
Ancheta v. Ancheta, 424 SCRA 725
Wife was not informed. The summons was given to the child. So, there is improper service of summons.
In cases of nullity of marriage, the Court cannot simply declare the party in default. Instead, the prosecutor shall investigate if there is collusion. If
summons is not served properly, Court shall void the proceedings.
Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 159594, Nov. 12, 2012

ISSUE: Wife received P50K from the husband. Fiscal said that there was a collusion because the 50K, which is supposedly the wife’s share to the property,
is the payment for her to attend trial.
SC: Wife is merely protecting her rights to the property. No collusion.
Yuk Ling Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 206653, Feb. 25, 2015
c. No confession of judgment FC Art. 48; cf. NCC Art. 2035
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
● no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment
d. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
● May be filed solely by the husband or the wife

● Shall be filed in the Family Court
● Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall NOT prescribe
● Shall ALLEGE, under Art. 36, the complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration
Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 - Summary judgment based on stipulation of facts – not allowed. Parties shall have to go through the entire proceedngs.
Tolentino v. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1
e. Participation of the OSG
Mendoza v. Republic, G.R. No. 157649, November 12, 2012
f. No Motion to Dismiss
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011
5. Effects of Pendency of Action for Declaration of Nullity

Art. 49, 198, 50 (2)
ART. 49
● In the absence of written agreement, Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children
● Court shall paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain
ART. 198
● spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
● If the petition (annulment) is GRANTED - obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases
● In case of LEGAL SEPARATION - court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one
ART. 50 (2)
● The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
● Creditors of the spouses - shall be notified of the proceedings
6. Effects of Res Judicata
Mallion v. Alcantara, 506 SCRA 336
7. Effects of Final Judgment Declaring Nullity
(a) In General FC 50-54, 198, 213 but see 147-148
Art. 50. The effects of final judgment to marriages declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
● The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are
declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. Thus in liquidation of properties of absolute community or conjugal
partnership of the annulled marriage, the following rules shall apply:
(d) The share of the party who acted in bad faith in the net profits shall be forfeited in favour of the common children, or if none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage, or in default of such children, the innocent spouse.
(e) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, but donations in favour of the guilty spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(f) The designation of the innocent spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy may be revoked even if such designation is stipulated as
irrevocable.
(g) The spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession.
(h) If both spouses are guilty, donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favour of the other shall be
revoked by operation of law.
● Note that if the marriage is declared void ab initio, the parties would not have an absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, and the
rules in Arts. 147 and 148 on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage” would apply.
○ The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
○ All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
● They should be allowed to intervene to protect their interests.
○ In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102
and 129.
o Said house and lot shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children should choose to remain.
o Children below 7 years of age are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court decides otherwise.
o In case there is no majority (of common children), the court shall decide, taking into account the best interests of the children.
Art. 51. Partition and legitimes

 In the partition of the net profits of the absolute community or conjugal partnership between the sposuses: The value of the presumptive legitimes of
all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
 If the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes is not made although ordered by the court: The children or their guardian or the trustee of their
property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
 The delivery of the presumptive legitimes shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of
both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
Art. 52.
 The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of
the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the (1) appropriate civil registry and (2) registries of property.
-Otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.
Art. 53.
 Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article
 Otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54.
 Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory
shall be considered legitimate.
o This is because voidable or annullable marriages are valid until annulled.
 Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate (although the said subsequent
marriage is null and void).
o The Committee does not want the children to suffer because of the fault of their parents.
Note:
o Children of marriages that are judicially declared null and void or void ab initio are, however, illegitimate (Art. 165), except for children born of the
void marriages under Art. 36 (psychological incapacity) and under the immediately preceding Art. 53 (marriages declared void or are annulled but
the presumptive legitime is not delivered and recorded).
o Note that there are no more natural children by legal fiction under the Family Code, which classifies children only as LEGITIMATE OR ILLEGITIMATE
(Arts. 164 and 165).
Art. 198. Support during proceedings for legal separation, annulment of marriage, or declaration of nullity of marriage:
o During the pendency of proceedings: The spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
o After the final judgment granting the petition:
(a) When marriage is annulled: The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases because they are no longer married to each
other.
(b) When the marriage is declared null and void: Same as (a).
(c) When there is a decree of legal separation:
(4) Ordinarily, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases because their absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership has already been dissolved.
(5) If the innocent spouse has no properties: The court can order the guilty spouse to support the innocent spouse because after all
the parties are still considered married.
(6) The guilty spouse cannot ask for support from the innocent spouse.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents:

o Parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
o The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit.
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in this Chapter.
Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(b) On Remarriage FC 40, 41
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Art. 41. Bigamous Marriages
There are two kinds of bigamous marriages under this Article, namely:
(1) The void bigamous marriage, which is contracted by a person during the subsistence of his or her previous marriage. Here, the good faith of the
party who marries again is immaterial; the second marriage would still be void. On the other hand, the person who marries again in bad faith is
even criminally liable for bigamy; and
(2) The voidable bigamous marriage, which is contracted by a person whose spouse has been absent for 4 consecutive years (in ordinary absence)
or 2 years (in extraordinary absence under Art. 391 of the Civil Code), said person having:
a) a well-founded belief that his or her absent spouse was already dead and after having the latter
b) judicially declared presumptively dead in a summary proceedings as provided by this Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
(c) On Rights & Obligations between the Former Spouses
(d) On the Property Regime of the Marriage FC 147-148
FC 147
Requisites:
(a) A man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other; and
(b) They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
Effect:
(a) Their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares;
o applies even if only one party earned the wages and salaries and the other did not contribute thereto
(b) The property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
o If the property was acquired by either party through donation or succession or in exchange for such exclusive properties, this Article does not
apply
o The fruits and income of the above mentioned exclusive properties are also not covered by this Article
o In the rules of co-ownership: The share of the parties are based on their proportionate efforts in acquiring the properties
o GR: based on their proportionate share
 EX: In the absence of proof: Obtained through equal efforts so they own the properties in equal share
Living exclusively without the benefit of marriage shall mean:

a) The parties must be capacitated to marry each other, which means that they have no legal impediment to get married and consequently, their
living together does not prejudice anyone.
b) The cohabitation of the parties must be exclusive. Multiple alliances, like a man living with several women at the same time, are thus excluded.
c) There must be a real cohabitation or “living together as husband and wife”. A mere transient relationship or the case of a man mere “visiting”
the woman from time to time even for a long period is not included.
d) Idea behind the provision: To encourage the parties, who have no legal impediment to marry each other, to eventually legalize their union
A man and a women living together under a void marriage:

(c) This applies to void marriage where the parties or either of them does not have an existing valid marriage with anyone else.
(d) On the other hand, if the parties do not have existing marriages with other persons but their marriage is void for other reasons (like an
incestuous marriage or a marriage against public policy), it is believed that this Article will apply.
This Article does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between a man and his lawful wife (Tumulos v. Fernandez, GR 137650, April 12, 2000).
Presumption on the properties acquired while they live together (in the absence of proof):
o Obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry
o Shall be owned by them in equal shares
o For purposes of this Article: A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof.
Properties of the common-law wife cannot be bound in a suit against the man withourt making her a party to the case (Stasa, Inc. v. Liwasan)
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith

o the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children.
 In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
 In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
FC 148
This article applies to:
(a) Bigamous marriages;
(b) Adulterous relationships (where a woman is married to another while the man is single);
(c) Relationships in a state of concubinage (where a man is married to another while the woman is single);
(d) Relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons; and
(e) Multiple alliances of the same married man.
Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
o In the absence of proof to the contrary: Their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another: His or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another: His or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
o The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The rule that if both parties are in bad faith, they will be considered as if they were in good faith, cannot apply here because the rule in pari delicto does
not apply in family law.
Valdes v. QC-RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
(e) On ‘Legitimes’ of the Common Children
Arts. 50-53, FC Art. 51 in relation to NCC Arts. 886, 888;

FC Art.176; NCC Arts. 908, 1061
Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003
COMPARE TO: FC Art. 147
Arts. 50-53, FC Art. 51 in relation to NCC Arts. 886, 888
(i) The share of the party who acted in bad faith in the net profits shall be forfeited in favour of the common children, or if none, the children
(j) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, but donations in favour of the guilty spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(k) The designation of the innocent spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy may be revoked even if such designation is stipulated as
irrevocable.
(l) The spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession.
(m) If both spouses are guilty, donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favour of the other shall be
liquidation.
and 129.

Art. 52.
Art. 53.
Otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 886. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
called compulsory heirs.
Art. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
FC Art.176; NCC Arts. 908, 1061

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification,
all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges,
which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Sec. 21, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. March 4, 2003

COMPARE TO: FC Art. 147
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes
o Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition: The Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
FC 47 [see (d) On the Property Regime of the Marriage]
Dino v. Dino, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011

COMPARE TO:
Yu v. Carpio-Reyes, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
(f) On the Status and Custody of Children FC 54, 176
Art. 54.
Note:
(Arts. 164 and 165).
Art. 176
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
(g) On the use of surnames NCC 371
 In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party: She shall resume her maiden name and surname.
 If she is the innocent spouse: She may resume her maiden name and surname.
 However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise; or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Yasin v. Shari'a, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995

Bar Matter No. 1625 – “Petition to Use Maiden Name in Petition to Take the 2006 Bar Examinations, Josephine P. Uy-Timosa”
Remo v. DFA, G.R. No. 169202, March 2010
(h) On hereditary rights FC 43, 50, 54
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
intestate succession.
(n) The share of the party who acted in bad faith in the net profits shall be forfeited in favour of the common children, or if none, the children
(o) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, but donations in favour of the guilty spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(p) The designation of the innocent spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy may be revoked even if such designation is stipulated as
irrevocable.
(q) The spouse in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession.
(r) If both spouses are guilty, donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favour of the other shall be
liquidation.
and 129.

Art. 52.
Art. 53.
 Otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54.
Note:
(Arts. 164 and 165).
(i) Effect of Death FC 103, 130
Art. 103.
Rules in case of termination of marriage by death of one of the spouses:
(1) The community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
(2) If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted: The surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within
six months (check though if this is still really six months now) from the death of the deceased spouse.
 Liquidation may be extra-judicial settlement under Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court or an ordinary action for partition, in both cases if
there are no debts to be paid.
 If there are debts, the surviving spouse has no choice but to file proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, and the
community property would be liquidated in the same proceeding.
Effects if the community property is NOT liquidated as above prescribed:

(1) Any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
(2) Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements: A mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
(3)
 In case one of the spouses dies: The surviving spouse may NOT settle the estate of the deceased spouse and liquidate their absolute
community. It is different when a marriage us annulled because there is always a court of action and the court will order liquidation of the
absolute community.
 If the surviving spouse does not settle the estate of the deceased and liquidate their absolute community property: The heirs of the deceased
spouse may be prejudiced by the subsequent marriage of the surviving spouse because under the Code, the latter would have an absolute
community with his or her second spouse; thus, the community properties of the first marriage might be merged with the absolute community
of the second marriage. Hence, this Code prescribes a COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY in the second marriage so as to protect the heirs
of the deceased first spouse.
Art. 130. (Same with Art. 103 except for the property regime: 103 – Absolute Community; 130 – Conjugal Partnership)
 Upon the termination of the marriage by death: The conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
 If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted: The surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-
judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse.
If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
 Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements: A mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
H. Voidable Marriages
1. Void v. voidable marriages

FC Art. 4 cf. Art. 45
FC 35 FC 45
VOID (from the beginning) VOIDABLE (annullable)
7. Below 18 years old even w/ parents’/guardian consent 7. Without parents/guardian consent

8. Solemnized by any person not legally authorized to ● Unless after attaining 21, such freely
perform marriages (except if either or both parties cohabited w/ the other and lived together
believed in good faith that the officer had legal as H & W
authority) 8. Either party was of unsound mind
9. Without license ● Unless after coming to reason, freely
10. bigamous/polygamous marriages cohabited w/ the other as H & W
11. Contracted through mistake of one as to the identity 9. Consent of either party was obtained by fraud
of the other ● Unless such afterwards, w/ full knowledge
12. Subsequent marriages that are void under Art. 53 of the facts constituting fraud, freely
10. Consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence
● Unless the same having
disappeared/ceased, such party freely
11. Either party was physically incapable of consummating
the marriage & such incapacity continues and appears
to be incurable
12. Either was afflicted w/ STD found to be serious &
appears to be incurable
Ninal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
2. Grounds for annulment
(a) Absence of parental consent

FC Arts. 5(1), 45(1), 47(1),
R.A. No. 6809 cf. FC Art.14
Who may contract marriage?

Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments (Articles 37 and 38) may contract marriage.
Who may file for annulment?

● The party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one
● The parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
For those who are 18-21 years old:

 They shall exhibit to the local civil registrar the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having
legal charge of them, in the order mentioned.
 Consent shall be in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit
made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths.
 The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be
attached to said applications.
Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (1981) 669 F. 2d 67 (1982)
(b) Insanity
FC Arts. 45(2), 47(2), NCC Art. 1149
Who may file annulment?

● The same spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity
● By any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party
● By the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
● Must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
Katipunan v. Tenorio, 38 OG 172, 1937
(c) Fraud
FC Arts. 45(3), 46, 47(3)
What constitutes fraud?

1. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude
2. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
3. Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriag
4. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
5. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
6. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud.
No fraud in:
1. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent.
2. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an expert and the other party has relied on the former's special
knowledge.
3. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is
mutual.
4. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error.
5. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should not have been employed by both contracting parties.
6. Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270
Hernandez v. CA, 320 SCRA 76, December 08, 1999

Facts: Petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner claims that respondent failed to
perform his obligations, has cohabitated with another woman and inflicted petitioner with STD due to his promiscuous activities. The RTC dismissed the
petition. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the CA and held that the petitioner failed to establish respondent was suffering from psychological defect which
deprived him of the ability to assume his duties and respondent’s habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, perversion and abandonment does not constitute
grounds for finding that he is psychologically incapacitated. Private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
NCC Arts. 1338-1344
Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil 49

Aquino v. Delizo, 108 Phil 21
Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97

Almelor v. RTC, G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008
(d) Force, intimidation and undue influence

FC Arts. 45(4), 47(4); NCC 1335-1337; RPC 344, last paragraph
There is violence when:

In order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed.
There is intimidation when:

One of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon
the person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
Factors to determine the degree of intimidation:

● Age
● sex
● Condition of the person
NOTE: Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, although it may have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract.
There is undue influence when: a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of
choice.
The following circumstances shall be considered:
● the confidential,
● Family
● spiritual and other relations between the parties
● that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
Ruiz v. Atienza, 40 O.G. 1903

Villanueva v. CA, 505 SCRA 564
(e) Physical incapacity/impotence

FC Arts. 45(5), 47(5)
Action must be filed by the injured party within 5 years after marriage
Jimenez v. Cañizares, 109 Phil 273

Sarao v. Guevara, 40 OG 11 Supp 263, 1940
Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009
(f) Affliction with STD

FC Art. 45(6), compare with FC Arts. 46(3), 47(5)
● Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage
● Action must be filed by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
(g) Others
Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
3. Who can seek annulment

FC Art. 47
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003, Section 3
Family Code, Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(4) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the
age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-
one;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or
person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining
sanity;
(6) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(7) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence
disappeared or ceased;
(8) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, March 4, 2003

i. Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
ii. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.
iii. Imprescriptibility of action or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.
iv. What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege the complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
4. When to seek annulment

FC Art. 47, NCC Art. 1149
Family Code, Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:
(1) By the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian
or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) By the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) By the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) By the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) By the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
NCC, Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
5. Procedure in actions for annulment

FC Art. 48; A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
Family Code, Art. 48. - In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, March 4, 2003

(a) Who may file. - Be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - Family Court.
(d) What to allege. - Allege the complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
Barcelona v. CA, G. R. No. 130087, Sept. 24, 2003
6. Effects of pendency of action for annulment

FC Arts. 49, 213
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
Family Code, Art. 49.- During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall:
1) Provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children.
2) Give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided
in Title IX.
3) Provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.
Family Code, Art. 213.- In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 2, March 4, 2003

(a) Who may file. - Be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(b) Where to file. - Family Court.
(d) What to allege. - Allege the complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
7. Effects of annulment, FC Arts. 50-54, 43, 102, 129, 213

ART. 43
Effects of Annulment
1) Children conceived prior its termination shall be considered as legitimate
2) Absolute community of property or conjugal partnership shall be dissolved & liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his/her
share of the net profits shall be forfeited in favor of common children, if none, children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children,
the innocent spouse
3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except if donee is in bad faith or if revoked by law
4) Innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy
5) Spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession
ART. 50-54
● Final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
● Creditors of the spouses - shall be notified of the proceedings
● Presumptive legitimes of all common children shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities - unless the parties had already provided for such
matters as approved by the court
● Children (or their guardian/trustee) - may ask for enforcement of judgment
○ Delivery of presumptive legitimes - shall not prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents
○ value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as ADVANCES on their legitime
● Partition and distribution of properties + delivery of presumptive legitimes shall be recorded the civil registry and of property, and shall not affect 3rd
persons
● Former spouse MAY MARRY AGAIN
● Children conceived or born before the judgment - considered legitimate
● Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage - legitimate
(a) In general
Chan-Tan v. Chan, G.R. No. 167139, Feb. 25, 2010
(b) On remarriage
(c) On rights & obligations between the former spouses
(d) On the property regime of the marriage
FC Arts. 50, 43(2)
cf. FC Arts. 102(4), 129
ART. 50
● conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
■ 102: shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain
ART. 43
● Absolute community/conjugal partnership - shall be dissolved and liquidated
○ Either spouse contract marriage in bad faith - his or her share of the net profits shall be forfeited in favor of the:
■ common children or,
■ if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
■ in default of children, the innocent spouse
ART. 102 (4)

● Net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitutes its net assets
○ Shall be divided between husband and wife, UNLESS:
■ different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements
■ there has been a voluntary waiver of such share
○ said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution
ART. 129
PROCEDURE - Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime:
1. Inventory shall be prepared
2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset
3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership
4. debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets (in case of insufficiency, spouses shall be solidarily liable w/
their separate properties)
5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them
6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any
7. net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits - which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different division was agreed upon, or if there is a voluntary waiver
8. presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition
9. conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain
a. Children below 7 - deemed to have chosen their mother, unless the court decided otherwise
b. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children
Buenaventura v CA, G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005

Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
(e) On presumptive legitime/hereditary rights

FC Arts. 50-53, FC Art. 51 in relation to NCC Arts. 886, 888;
FC Art. 176; NCC Arts. 908, 1061
FC Arts.102 (5), 43 (2), 50 (2), 51, 63 (2), 129, 135
FC 50-53 ART. 886

● Presumptive legitimes of all common children shall be Legitime - part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of
delivered in cash, property or sound securities - unless the because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore,
parties had already provided for such matters as approved by called compulsory heirs
the court
● Children (or their guardian/trustee) - may ask for ART. 888
enforcement of judgment
■ Delivery of presumptive legitimes - shall not Legitime of legit children & descendants
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the ● Consists of ½ of the hereditary estate of the father & of
children accruing upon the death of either of both the mother.
of the parents
■ value of the properties already received under the The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the
decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse
considered as ADVANCES on their legitime
● Partition and distribution of properties + delivery of
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded the civil registry and
of property, and shall not affect 3rd persons
● Former spouse MAY MARRY AGAIN
FC 176 ART. 908

The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the To determine the legitime - value of the property left at the death of
legitime of a legitimate child. the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges,
which shall not include those imposed in the will
net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he
made them
FC Arts.102 (5), 43 (2), 50 (2), 51, 63 (2), 129, 13

● presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
● Absolute community/conjugal partnership - shall be dissolved and liquidated
○ Either spouse contract marriage in bad faith - his or her share of the net profits shall be forfeited in favor of the:
■ common children or,
■ if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or
■ in default of children, the innocent spouse
● Presumptive legitimes of all common children shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities - unless the parties had already provided for such
matters as approved by the court
● Children (or their guardian/trustee) - may ask for enforcement of judgment

○ Delivery of presumptive legitimes - shall not prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the
parents
○ value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as ADVANCES on their legitime
● absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
● (FOR ART. 129 - look at the procedure for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership)
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011
(f) On the Status and Custody of Children FC 213

● parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court
● Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit
(g) On Use of Surnames

NCC 371
If the wife is:

● GUILTY - shall resume her maiden name and surname
● INNOCENT - may resume her maiden name and surname, but she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, UNLESS:
○ Court decrees otherwise
○ She or the former husband is married again to another person
Yasin v. Shari'a, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995

Bar Matter No. 1625 – Josephine P. Uy-Timosa
Remo v. DFA, G.R. No. 169202, March 05, 2010
I. Marriage When One Spouse is Absent

FC Arts. 41-44, compare with NCC Arts. 83, 85(2) and 87(2); cf. RPC Art. 349
Bigamy - any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage:

● before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
● before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings
ART. 41-44 ART. 83, 85 (2), 87 (2)
41: Marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous 83: Marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse -
marriage - Null & void illegal and void from its performance
● UNLESS the prior spouse has been absent for 4 ● UNLESS
consecutive years & the spouse has a well-founded a. First marriage - annulled/dissolved
belief that the absent spouse was already dead b. 1st spouse - absent for 7 years at the time
○ 2 years is sufficient if falls under Art. 391 of the 2nd marriage having no news being
● Spouse shall institute a summary proceeding for the alive
declaration of presumptive death without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance 85 (2): former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact
living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was
42: Subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated - by then in force
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse 87(2): action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
● UNLESS there is a judgment annulling the previous the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by
marriage or declaring it void ab initio either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of
● Sworn statement of reappearance shall be recorded in the other
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage w/ due notice to the subsequent
spouses, and w/o prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such
fact is disputed.
43: Effects of the termination of the subsequent marriage:

1. Children conceived prior its termination
shall be considered as legitimate
2. Absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership shall be dissolved &
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his/her share of
the net profits shall be forfeited in favor of
common children, if none, children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse
3. Donations by reason of marriage shall
remain valid, except if donee is in bad faith
or if revoked by law
4. Innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the other spouse who acted
in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance
policy
5. Spouse who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate
and intestate succession
44: BOTH subsequent spouses acted in BAD FAITH - marriage

shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions are revoked by operation of law
SSS v. De Bailon, G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006

Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009
J. Marriages Dissolved by Foreign Judgment

NCC Arts. 15, 17 (3)
FC Art. 26 (2)
Art. 15.- Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
Living abroad.
Art. 17.-The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
xxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered
Ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
FC Art. 26 (2)
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
Arca v. Javier, G.R. No. L-6768, July 31, 1954

Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355
Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139
Somera v. Pilapil, 174 SCRA 663
Quita v. CA, 300 SCRA 406
Llorente v. CA, 345 SCRA 592
Roehr v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 30, 2003.
Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437
Diego v. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67
Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
Amor-Catalan v. CA, G.R. No. 167109, Feb. 6, 2007
Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014
Edelina T. Ando v. DFA, G. R. No. 195432, AUG. 27, 2014
K. Marriages giving rise to criminal liability

FC Arts. 4, 16, 41, 168
NCC Art. 84
RPC Arts. 351-352
FC Arts. 4, 16, 41, 168

Art. 4.
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites:
-Shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
Defect in the absence of essential requisites while irregularity in the absence of formal requisites:
-A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage; it merely renders the marriage voidable.
-But, an irregularity in a formal requisite would not even affect the validity of marriage, but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 16.
In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed:
-The party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to
solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties
have undergone marriage counseling.
Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counselling:

-Shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application
-Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the
marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice:
The other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage,
these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former
marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such
marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
NCC Art. 84
Art. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow:
-Till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child.
RPC Arts. 351-352

Art. 351. Premature marriages
-Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant
at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
-The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the
expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation.
Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony

-Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.
People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010
 R.A. No. 6955, “An Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals”
 R.A. No. 9208, “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003” as amended by R.A. No. 10364
 TRODUCTION
R.A. No. 6955, “An Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals”
AN ACT TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE OF MATCHING FILIPINO WOMEN FOR MARRIAGE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ON A MAIL ORDER BASIS AND OTHER
SIMILAR PRACTICES, INCLUDING THE ADVERTISEMENT, PUBLICATION, PRINTING OR DISTRIBUTION OF BROCHURES, FLIERS AND OTHER PROPAGANDA MATERIALS IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFORE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. It is the policy of the State to ensure and guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a decent standard of living. Towards this end, the State shall take
measures to protect Filipino women from being exploited in utter disregard of human dignity in their pursuit of economic upliftment.
Section 2. Pursuant thereto, it is hereby declared unlawful:
(a) For a person, natural or juridical, association, club or any other entity to commit, directly or indirectly, any of the following acts:
(1) To establish or carry on a business which has for its purpose the matching of Filipino women for marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order
basis or through personal introduction;
(2) To advertise, publish, print or distribute or cause the advertisement, publication, printing or distribution of any brochure, flier, or any propaganda
material calculated to promote the prohibited acts in the preceding subparagraph;
(3) To solicit, enlist or in any manner attract or induce any Filipino woman to become a member in any club or association whose objective is to match
women for marriage to foreign nationals either on a mail-order basis or through personal introduction for a fee;
(4) To use the postal service to promote the prohibited acts in subparagraph 1 hereof.
(b) For the manager or officer-in-charge or advertising manager of any newspaper, magazine, television or radio station, or other media, or of an advertising
agency, printing company or other similar entities, to knowingly allow, or consent to, the acts prohibited in the preceding paragraph.
Section 3. In case of violation of this Act by an association, club, partnership, corporation, or any other entity, the incumbent officers thereof who have knowingly
participated in the violation of this Act shall be held liable.
Section 4. Any person found guilty by the court to have violated any of the acts herein prohibited shall suffer an imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of not less than Eight thousand pesos (P8,000) but not more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000): Provided,
That if the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately deported and barred forever from entering the country after serving his sentence and payment of fine.
Section 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction on the freedom of speech and of association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Section 6. All laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its publication for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
NOTES during discussion.

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
• NOTE: This is “Annulment”
• VALID marriage, you want to terminate it because of a problem. Unlike void marriages, which are void from the beginning.
• Grounds of FRAUD
• Concealment – drug addiction
* No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds…
LEGAL SEPARATION
- cannot marry another
- does not break marital relations
- Effects: property remains conjugal in nature
- cannot enter into agreements  contract for separation
- Absolute in PH: Absolute Divorce – FC 26, part. 2 and under the Muslim Code
VAWC – skip the 6-month cooling off

Who may ask for LS?  only the innocent spouse
When? Within 5 years from the time of the occurrence of the cause (not discovery)
o Under the CC – period is only 1 year
Capital property – property of husband

Paraphernal property - property of wife
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
By Atty. Vargas
© 2016
Grounds:
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was 18 years of age or over but below 21, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
21, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Who can see annulment? (Art. 47)
GROUNDS WHO CAN FILE? WHEN CAN IT BE FILED?
18 to below 21 y.o. without parental consent The party whose parents did not give consent within five years after attaining the age of 21
By the parent or guardian any time before such party has reached 21
Insanity By sane spouse who had no knowledge of the

insanity Any time before death of either party
By a relative or guardian of insane
By insane spouse During lucid interval or after regaining sanity
Fraud The injured party Within 5 years after discovery of the fraud
Within 5 years from the time F, I or UI disappeared

Force, intimidation or undue influence The injured party of ceased
Physically incapable of consummating the marriage;

incurable The injured party Within 5 years after the marriage
Serious and incurable STD The injured party Within 5 years after the marriage
Absence of Parental Consent
Moe v. Dinkins (1981) - Maria Moe (13 years old) became pregnant by Raou Roel (16 years old). They wanted to get married but Maria’s mother refused to give her
written consent. Maria and Raoul filed a case questioning the constitutionality of the New York marriage statute, burdened their right to marry and deprived Maria of
benefits she might enjoy as Raoul’s wife.
 The State has a legitimate interest in protecting minors from immature decision making.
 The constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with adults for three reasons: a) the peculiar vulnerability of children; (b) the inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature matter; (c) the importance of the parental role in child-rearing.
 The parent consent requirement ensures that at least one mature person will participate in the marriage decision.
NOTES:
 Raoul Roe1 was born on March 9, 1962, and Maria Moe was born on March 2, 1965. In late November 1978, Maria became pregnant by Raoul. He was
sixteen; she was thirteen. Maria's mother, who is a widow, urged Maria to have an abortion; Maria refused. In April 1979, Maria and Raoul moved into an
apartment together, and decided to marry. Raoul's parents gave their permission, but Maria's mother refused. On August 21, 1979, Maria bore a son,
Ricardo Roe.
 Maria, Raoul, and Ricardo filed suit on March 19, 1980, in the federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Their complaint alleged that the New
York statute controlling the marriage of minors, New York Domestic Relations Law § 15, unconstitutionally burdened Maria's and Raoul's right to marry.2
New York law forbids marriage without a license,3 and section 15 provides in part:
o If it shall appear ... that the woman is under the age of eighteen years and is not under fourteen years of age then the town or city clerk before
he shall issue a license shall require the written consent to the marriage from both parents of the minor ... or such as shall then be living ....4
 Beyond the denial of Maria's and Raoul's right to marry, plaintiffs alleged, the New York statute deprived Maria of workmen's compensation benefits,
Social Security benefits, and intestate succession rights she might enjoy as Raoul's wife.5 Further, they claimed that section 15 inflicted all of the social and
economic disabilities of illegitimacy on Ricardo. Therefore, time was of the essence in the prosecution of their suit.
 Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the federal court should abstain from adjudication. Judge Motley, in a careful opinion, found section 15
"unclear in a number of respects," and dismissed the action.6 This appeal followed.
Insanity
KATIPUNAN v. TENORIO (1937) – wife became insane after the marriage. Husband sought an annulment. According to the court, there is a presumption of validity of
marriage. Absent proof of insanity which occurred after the celebration of marriage cannot constitute a cause of nullity.
Fraud
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
HERNANDEZ v. CA (1999) – Lucita and Mario were married in 1981. A petition for annulment was filed on the ground of psychological incapacity of Mario and for
fraud (extramarital affair, STD). Petition was DENIED. Allegations are for legal separation. Annulment was also denied because the STD occurred five years after the
marriage.
Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil 49 (1941) – An annulment was filed because wife concealed her pregnancy. She gave birth 89 days after the wedding. SC said no proof of
concealment. Unlikely that the husband who was a 1st year law student did not suspect anything about the condition of the wife considering she was in advanced
stage of pregnancy (7th month) when they got married.
 Gave birth 3 months after the wedding
Aquino v. Delizo, 108 Phil 21(1960) –Annulment of marriage on the ground of concealment of pregnancy by another man. Wife was 4 months pregnant at time of
marriage, it was not yet apparent cause she was naturally plump, even doctors can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy at 5 months.
 Remanded for new trial
Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97 – premarital sex with another woman prior to marriage is not a ground for annulment of marriage.
Almelor v. RTC, G.R. No. 179620 (2008) – concealment of homosexuality is the ground for annulment of marriage; in the RTC it was not proven that he was a
homosexual.
Force, Intimidation, and Undue Influence

Ruiz v. Atienza, 40 O.G. 1903 (1941) - An uncle of the wife threatened to file a case to prevent his admission to the bar for immorality. Not a ground for annulment of
marriage. There was no violence nor duress that attended the marriage celebration. Threat cannot come from lawful actions. He was not kidnapped, he had
occassion to escape.
Physical Incapacity/Impotence
Jimenez v. Cañizares – problem with the genitalia of the wife, presumed to be potent.
Sarao v. Guevara (1940) – Uterus and ovaries of wife had to be removed. Husband filed for annulment of marriage but this was denied because the incapacity for
copulation was only temporary. Defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment because the test of impotence is not the capacity to reproduce but capacity to
copulate.
Alcazar v. Alcazar (2009) – The husband went to Saudi for a year. When he came home he refused to have sex with the wife. He is not physically incapable because
they had sex after the wedding and before he left for abroad.
Affliction with STD

 FC 45(6) - That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
 FC 46(3) - Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage
 FC, 47(5) - For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
Procedure in Actions for Annulment
Barcelona v. CA (2003) – husband filed for annulment of marriage twice. The first petition was dismissed without prejudice, he withdrew case before an Answer was
filed because he wanted to keep the peace between him and his children. Such dismissal did not amount to res judicata.
Effects of Pendency of Judgment

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of
said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
Effects of Annulment
FC 50-54 – liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties; custody and support of the children and delivery of presumptive legitimes; children conceived or
born before judgment of annulment are considered legitimate.
Use of Surnames
NCC Art. 371 - In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
 Yasin v. Shari'a, G.R. No. 94986, February 23, 1995
 Bar Matter No. 1625 – Josephine P. Uy-Timosa
 Remo v. DFA, G.R. No. 169202, March 05, 2010
MARRIAGES DISSOLVED BY FOREIGN JUDGMENT

By Atty. Vargas
© 2016
NCC 15, 17 (3)

FC 26 (2)
ARCA v. JAVIER (1954) – Divorced secured in the US not valid. Must be domiciled in good faith in the State which granted it. The wife’s answer in divorce case did not
place her in courts jurisdiction.
 Philippine courts grant divorce only on ground of adultery or concubinage. Desertion is not a ground.
TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO (1965) – Divorce from the US after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity.
 The innocent spouse has ground for legal separation.
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO (1985) – American husband file case for accounting of the business and he wants to manage the same. They already divorced in US and stated
that there was no community property.
 The divorce secured in the US is binding upon the American husband. He has no standing to sue here in the Philippines. Alice, the Filipina wife, should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
PILAPIL v. JUDGE IBAY-SOMERA (1989) – After the divorce in Germany, the German husband filed an adultery case against Filipina wife here in the Philippines.
Adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
 Under the national law of German husband, he has no standing to sue for adultery.
QUITA v. CA (1998) – Arturo died without will. Second wife not an heir because their marriage is bigamous. Fe, the 1st wife is also not an heir because she divorced
Arturo when she became a US citizen.
LLORENTE v. CA (2000) – The divorce obtained by Lorenzo was valid, he was already a US citizen then.
GARCIA v. RECIO (2001) – bigamy case was remanded to RTC for reception of evidence that at time of 2nd marriage, Rederick was capacitated by Australian Law to
marry (valid divorce in Australia).
DIEGO v. CASTILLO (2004) – Judge was fined and warned for acquitting accused in bigamy case who secured divorce in the US while he was a Filipino citizen.
RP v. ORBECIDO (2005) – Art. 26, par. 2 applies to Filipinos who later become alien and secures a divorce.
SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS (2007) – Felicisimo’s wife, a US citizen, divorced him in 1973. He married a Filipina in 1974. Art. 26 was applied retroactively to Felicisimo.
AMOR-CATALAN v. CA (2007) – Amor & Orlando became US citizens. Filed for divorce and was granted. Orlando remarried in the Philippines. Amor filed for nullity of
said 2nd marriage. The case was remanded for reception of evidence of naturalization and divorce, to determine if Amor has standing to file the case.
CORPUS v. STO. TOMAS (2010) – Alien spouse filed divorce decree with NSO. He also filed a case for recognition of the divorce. The alien spouse can claim no right
under Art. 26(2) as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. But Art. 26 does not necessarily strip alien spouse of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien spouse.
CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE (2012) - Case is remanded to the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce under US Laws between petitioner and deceased
husband to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY (2013) - Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition
under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
 There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it
refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ (2003) - the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and
education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr despite divorce decree granted in German courts and declaring custody be given to the
father. The mother was not given opportunity to be heard in the divorce proceedings.
 In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in
the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records
remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly,
the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three
years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that
private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare
Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA (2014) - It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did
not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
 This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage
must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
NOVERAS v. NOVERAS (2014) - divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation of their property relations.
 Judicial Separation was granted on the ground that parties were already separated for more than one year.
ANDO v. DFA (2014) - petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.
With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband.
 Edelina wanted to have new passport under name of 2nd husband, also a Japanese national like 1st husband not knowing her first marriage is still
considered subsisting under phil law
MARRIAGES GIVING RISE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

By Atty. Vargas
© 2016
RPC Article 351. Premature marriages. - Any widow who shall marry within 301 days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall
have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the
expiration of the period of 301day after the legal separation.
 Republic Act No. 10655 repealed Art. 351 of the RPC
 Signed into law: March 13, 2015
RPC Article 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. - Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.
People v. De Guzman (2010) – the marriage of the accused with the offended party in a rape case absolved him from liability for two counts of rape.
R.A. No. 6955, “An Act to Declare Unlawful the Practice of Matching Filipino Women for Marriage to Foreign Nationals”
R.A. No. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 as amended by R.A. No. 10364
LEGAL SEPARATION under the Family Code

By Atty. Vargas
© 2016
Concept of Separation & Divorce
BENEDICTO v. DELA RAMA (1903) – the only ground for divorce is adultery; either of the spouses can file but the divorce decree does not dissolve the marriage bond.
1. Separation in Fact
FC Arts. 238-248 – procedure to be followed when the husband and wife are separated in fact and one of them seeks judicial authorization for transaction where the
consent of the other spouse is required but cannot be obtained or is withheld.
VILLANUEVA v. CHIONG (2008) – the separation in fact of the spouses since 1975 neither affected the nature of the lot nor prejudiced the wife’s interest over it. The
lot remains conjugal in nature.
2. Agreements to Separate
FC, Art. 1 – Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
NCC Art. 221 (1) – The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife.
3. Absolute Divorce
(a) Under the Family Code – FC Art. 26 par. 2

(b) Under the Muslim Code – MC 45-55
Concept of Legal Separation
Under the Civil Code:

Art. 97 – A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
Grounds for Legal Separation (FC 55)

• (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
• (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
• (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
• (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
• (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
• (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
• (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
• (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
• (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
• (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Physical Violence under RA 9262

SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The
court shall proceed on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order filed by the petitioner
must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.
Sec. 3 (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Rule on Legal Separation

A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, March 04, 2003
Sexual Infidelity or Perversion

GOTIA v. CAMPOS-RUEDA (1916) – wife was asked to perform unchaste & lascivious acts on genitals of husband
GANDIONCO v. PENARANDA (1987) – legal separation (civil case) can proceed independently of concubinage (criminal case)
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ (2011) – there is ground for legal separation (infidelity) but not for psychological incapacity
 husband sired three kids with mistress, sought art 36 against wife cause she allegedly had an affair, saw her in hotel with another man
REPUBLIC v. QUINTOS (2012) – sexual infidelity not valid ground for Art. 36 considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation
of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism and homosexuality

As a ground for legal separation:
1) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
2) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
Compared with voidable marriage, Art. 46 (4)
Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of marriage.
ALMELOR v. RTC (2008) – “To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a
marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.”
 “Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction.
At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.”
CAMPOS v. CAMPOS (2012) – “With respect to respondent’s alleged homosexuality, such issue is for the determination of the trial court wherein the petition for
declaration of nullity is pending. Thus, we also agree with the investigating judge and the OCA in absolving respondent from the charge of dishonesty. The fact that
respondent got married and had children is not proof against his claim of homosexuality. As pointed out by the investigating judge, it is possible that respondent was
only suppressing or hiding his true sexuality.”
Attempt on the Life of the Other Spouse

• FC Art. 55 (9) - Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner;
• NCC Art. 97 (2) – An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
• RA No. 9262, Sec. 5 – crime of violence against woman and her children
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not
limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or
solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm,
or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
Abandonment
• FC Art. 55 (10) – abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year
• FC Art. 101 (3) – left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning; presumed no intent to return if within 3 months of leaving failed to give
whereabouts
REPUBLIC v. QUINTOS (2012) - in an Art. 36 case, the admission by the wife that she abandoned the husband is not a ground for nullity of marriage but is instead a
ground for legal separation.
 Art. 36 case on collusion where wife received 50k
Other Grounds
GOITIA v. CAMPOS-RUEDA – “The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the
wife in the situation of a feme sole.”
 But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a
divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from
the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.
This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty;
nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base
demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
KALAW v. FERNANDEZ (2011) - “What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.”
 wife plays mahjong, frequent visits to parlor
PRO TANTO – FOR SO MUCH

FEME SOLE – WOMAN ALONE; SEPARATED WOMAN
Who can ask for legal separation?

 Under Article 55, the innocent spouse
When may petition be filed?

• Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)
LAPUZ v. EUFEMIO (1972) – action for legal separation is purely personal; death of one party causes the death of the action itself
MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES (1960) – husband cohabited with another woman and wife came to know about this; she filed legal separation case 15 months later, case was
filed out of time.
PEOPLE v. ZAPANTA (1951) – wife pled guilty to adultery; she was again charged for adultery; court said that each act is adultery
Under the Civil Code it should be filed within one year from date plaintiff became cognizant of the cause (NCC 102).
Courts Procedure in Legal Separation

• Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
• Art 58 is what is called the cooling off period
• Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such
efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable.
• Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
• In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
ARANETA v. CONCEPCION (1956) – determination of custody and support pendente lite during the six-month cooling off period is allowed.
OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO (1960) – husband filed case for legal separation on ground of wife’s adultery; wife admitted to fiscal during collusion hearing that she is
indeed guilty of adultery; not indication of collusion or confession of judgment.
LAPUZ v. EUFEMIO (1972) – husband died before decision on legal separation was resolved, right to dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains also extinguished
(property rights are mere effects of the decree of separation).
SAMOSA v. VAMENTA (1972) – wife filed for legal separation on ground of attempt on her life and for concubinage; court may appoint administrator for her
paraphernal property even during the six-month cooling off period.
PACETE v. CARIAGA (1994) – respondent failed to file an Answer and was declared in default; case should have been referred to the fiscal for determination of
collusion; cannot be based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment (Art. 60).
Effect of Pendency of Petition

(a) cooling off period – FC Art. 58
(b) right of consortium –
 FC Art. 61 (1) – After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
(c) Administration of property
 FC Art. 61 (2) – The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the
absolute community of conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a
guardian under the Rules of Court.
DE LA VINA v. VILLAREAL (1920) – an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the
wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during pendency of
the action.
SABALONES v. CA (1994) – in legal separation cases, while the court has not appointed an administrator of the entire conjugal assets, court is justified in allowing wife
to continue her administration.
Support & Custody Pendente Lite

YANGCO v. RHODE (1902) – where the answer to a complaint alleging marriage and praying for divorce denied the fact of marriage, the court exceeds its jurisdiction
in granting alimony. The right of the wife to support depends upon her status as such and where the existence of the status is put in issue by the pleading it cannot be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.
ARANETA v. CONCEPCION (1956) – determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy
of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and
convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.
RAMOS v. VAMENTA (1972) – The husband, accused of concubinage and attempt against the life of the wife would continue in the management of her paraphernal
property if the judge does not allow the preliminary mandatory injunction during the cooling off period.
LERMA v. CA (1974) – Husband filed adultery case. Wife countered by filing legal separation, custody of children and support pendente lite. A petition in bad faith,
such as that filed by one who is herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as
within the intendment of the law granting separate support.
Defenses in Actions for Legal Separation

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
• (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
• (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
• (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation;
• (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
• (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
• (6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Consent
- MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES (1960) – parties executed an agreement that they will not prosecute for adultery or concubinage; husband cohabited with another
woman and wife came to know about this; she filed legal separation. There is condonation and consent in writing (agreement).
- PEOPLE v. SANSANO (1933) – Husband filed for divorce but was denied because by his actions he consented to his wife’s adulterous relations.
Condonation
• AYONG v. GINEZ (1956) – after learning of wife’s adultery, husband had sexual intercourse with her. Court denied the divorce saying that a single voluntary
act of marital intercourse is sufficient to constitute condonation.
Recrimination
• BROWN v. YAMBAO (1957) – wife was impregnated by another man. They separated and liquidated conjugal partnership. He filed for legal separation but
this was denied because he himself cohabited with another woman and had children with her and because he filed the case 10 years after learning of his
wife’s adultery.
• ONG ENG KIAM v. ONG (2006) – wife was being maltreated by husband so she filed for legal separation (repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct). Husband sought nullification saying wife abandoned her and so she is barred from filing a case for legal separation. Court said that abusive
conduct of husband is justifiable cause for abandonment.
Collusion/Mutual Consent
(a) BROWN v. YAMBAO (1957) – wife was impregnated by another man. They separated and liquidated conjugal partnership. He filed for legal
separation but this was denied because he himself cohabited with another woman and had children with her and because he filed the
case 10 years after learning of his wife’s adultery.
(b) OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO (1960) – wife had illicit relations with different men. Husband filed for legal separation and she agreed as long
as she is not charged with adultery. She did not file an Answer but admitted guilt before the fiscal during collusion hearing. This is not a
confession of judgment because it was not given in court. Husband also presented evidence independent of wife’s testimony to prove the
adultery, legal separation action will prosper.
Effect of Decree of Legal Separation
(a) On Personal Relations

1. Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
1. (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
2. (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the
provisions of Article 43(2);
3. (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
4. (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of
the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
(b) On Property Relations

1. Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending
spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation
of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances
registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in
the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.
2. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final
(c) On the Custody of Children

• Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
• MATUTE v. MACADAEG (1956) – husband is legally separated from wife cause of adultery with husband’s brother. Custody of children was granted to
husband. Wife brought children to Manila with consent of husband but refused to return them saying they prefer to stay with her. Custody of children is
never final and subject to review for the best interest of the children. However, until the decision is modified, the custody is to the father. Besides, wife is
not capable of supporting the children.
Property Relations
QUIAO v. QUIAO (2012) – if the property relations of the spouses is Absolute Community, net profits is divided by:
Market value of properties at time of dissolution

- less debts and obligations of the ACP
_____________________________________
= net remainder or net asset
- less market value at the time of marriage
_____________________________________
= net profits divided into 2 but the share of guilty spouse forfeited in favor of children
 Quiao spouses had no separate properties
• If the property relation is Conjugal Partnership of Gains:

CPG property
- less debts and obligations
____________________________
= net profits/ 2 but share of guilty spouse shall be forfeited in favor of children
Effect on the Use of Surname

• NCC Art. 373 – When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
• LAPERAL v. REPUBLIC (1962) – wife who obtained legal separation cannot revert to using her maiden name. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. Her apprehension that she has extensive business interest was not taken into
consideration because their conjugal partnership had already been dissolved in 1958.
• Elisea l Laperal filed a case for change of name, to resume using her maiden name elisea laperal because of their legal separation
RA No. 8972 – Solo Parents’ Welfare Act

• Solo parent – Sec. 3 (5) – parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at
least one (1) year, as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children.
• Flexible work schedule
• Parental leave of 7 days
Reconciliation
• Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same
proceeding for legal separation. (n)
• Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already
effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
• The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.
• Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify:
1. The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
2. Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
3. The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
• The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both
furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order
shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
• The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient
separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.
Effect of Death of One of the Parties

• LAPUZ v. EUFEMIO (1972) – husband died before decision on legal separation was resolved, right to dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains also
extinguished (property rights are mere effects of the decree of separation).
• MACADANGDANG v. CA (1981) – the decree of legal separation had long been final (Jan. 4, 1973) prior to death of husband in Nov. 30, 1979. The rules on
dissolution of CPG should be applied effective January 04, 1973. Law on intestate succession should take over in disposition of remaining properties
allocated to the husband.
• Prior to death of husband there were motions such as for accounting.

Civil Law Review I: Effect and Application of Laws

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Civil Law Review I: Effect and Application of Laws

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW I 1

Atty. Crisostomo Uribe

Process on how the law takes effect:

Pesigan v. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984

Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

MRCA v. CA, 180 SCRA 591, December 19, 1989

Commission of Customs v. Hypermix

Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, GR. 187587, June 5, 2013

PASEI v. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 101279, August 06, 1992

Acaac v. Azcuna Jr., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013

B. Ignorance of the law

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 46623, December 7, 1939

Elegado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-68385, May 12, 1989

Laws that have Prospective and Retroactive effect:

Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect:

Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530

Puzon v. Abellara, 169 SCRA 789, January 31, 1989

Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591, January 30 1989

MRCA v. CA, supra

Sps. Dacudao v. Gonzales, GR No. 188056

Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

CF: Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015

D. Acts Executed Against Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

BPI v. IAC, 164 SCRA 630, August 19, 1988

Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

NCC 2035: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

De Borja v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577

Dona Adela v. Tidcorp

Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, April 22, 1991

Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004:

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010

Ty v. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 188302, June 27, 2012

Republic v. Remman Enterprises, G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

G. Duty to render judgment

People v. Ritter, G.R. No. 88582, March 5, 1991

Alonzo v. Padua, G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987

Barcellano v. Bañas, G.R. No. 165287, September 14, 2011

CONSTI Art. XII, Sec. 5

ROC Rule 129, Sec. 2 & 3

Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010

ROC Rule 28: (Physical and Mental Examination of Persons) – typo??

ROC Rule 22: Computation of Time

Section 1. How to compute time.

If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a:

Section 2. Effect of interruption.

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. (Same as NCC Art. 13)

Armigos v. CA, 179 SCRA 1, November 6, 1989

Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70, August 27, 1969

CIR v. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007

Montajes v. People, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012

J. Binding effect – NCC 14-18

FC Art. 26, par. 2 (As amended by Executive Order 227)

(1) A marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;

Rule governing intestate and testamentary successions:

Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67, March 7, 1933

Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139, October 8, 1985

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989

Board of Commissioners v. de la Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991

Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014

Del Soccoro vs Van Wilsem