Consti 2 Finals Reviewer

Right to Information
Art. 2, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Art. 3, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Art. 16, Sec. 10. The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of
the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.
Two aspects of the right to information:

1. Right - an individual has the right to access to information; a right that one can assert against the State because it is limited to information that is critical to the individual making a decision in
relation to accountability of the government
2. Duty - it is the duty of the State to provide the information sought. The right to access information is not enough so there needs to be a correlative duty on the part of the State.
Matter Demand to Access What is asserted Notes
Policy of Full Public All transactions involving Duty to disclose of the

Disclosure public interest; government, pursuant to
(Art. 2, Sec. 28) Broad scope, embraces the policy of full public
any matter contained in disclosure
official communications
and public documents of
the government agency
Right to Information on Matters of public Demand or request Right to access Public concern: no exact
Matters of Public concern required to gain access information definition and
Concern adjudicated by the
(Art. 3, Sec. 7) courts on a case-by-
case basis; but
examples abound in
jurisprudence
Limitations on the right to information:

1. Based on kinds of information:
a. Privileged information rooted in separation of powers AS DISCUSSED IN CLASS
b. Information of military and diplomatic secrets The only exception to this right is privileged information which
c. Information affecting national security include the following:
d. Information on investigations of crimes by law enforcers before prosecution Matters involving national security
e. Offers exchanged during diplomatic negotiations Informer’s privilege
2. Based on access: Executive privilege
a. Opportunity to inspect and copy records at his expense Diplomatic negotiations
b. Not the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, summaries and the like Criminal investigations
3. Based on reasonable regulation for the convenience of and for order in the office that has custody of the
documents.
- Discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying.
4. Based on availability:
- The right is available to all citizens. However, this is without prejudice to the right of aliens to have access to records of cases where they are involved.
Case Title Summary Notes
Legaspi v. CSC Facts: The right to access information (1) must be of public concern
Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain sanitarians in the Health and (2) not included in those exempted by law; there is a duty to
Department of Cebu City who claim to be civil service eligible who passed the civil service examinations for disclose unless exempted.
SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 1

sanitarians was denied. He invokes the fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public The right to information is a public right because the information
concern. is of public concern or of public interest – because it is a public
right, you do not have to establish a direct injury. There is
flexibility and any citizen can assert that right.
Held:
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be The Court recognizes the right to access information without
provided by law." The law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those needing to know why the person is interested in the information
affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public because the qualifications of public officers need to be disclosed.
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e. (a) being of public concern or
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional This information could not be exempted because the
guarantee. The threshold question is whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public qualifications of public officers, their offices being a public trust,
need to be published because of the transparency required
concern. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
While refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in
the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
eligibles. The names of those who pass the civil service examinations are released to the public. Hence,
there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Valmonte v. Belmonte Facts: The court looked into the substance rather than the form
This case involves a request by petitioners from the General Manager of the Government Service because if it looked at the form, mandamus would not lie.
Insurance System to furnish them a list of names of legislators who were able to secure loans upon the GSIS is a GOCC. Officers of GSIS are public officers. They have
a limited right to privacy. Right to privacy belongs to the
guaranty of then First Lady Imelda Marcos, as well as certified true copies of documents evidencing the
individual and not the corporation. Also, the public funds were
loans. loaned to public officials. Whatever the function is of GSIS
doesn’t matter.
Held: May GSIS provide for conditions in accessing the information?
The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers Yes
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, the right to access 1. Time – office hours
such records does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, 2. Place – GSIS office
3. Manner – the person requesting access has to do it
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. It is
himself. He cannot direct employees to do it for him
essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right Mandamus does not lie to compel GSIS to give a list but only to
to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The give access.
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific. The request of
the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested.
Chavez v. PCGG Facts: The public is allowed to access information even if it’s not final
Petitioner instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements yet because access to information includes information on how
pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the the government arrives at a decision.
action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the
negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Held:
The petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records,
documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Constitution. The petitioner, a
former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid
down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing (enforcement of a legal right and espoused by a
Filipino citizen), the petition is allowed.

Akbayan v. Aquino Facts: Diplomacy has a confidential nature. While the full text of JPEPA
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership may not be kept, perpetually confidential, it is in line with the
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process public interest that the offers exchanged during negotiations
continue to be privileged information. Furthermore, the
and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. The JPEPA covers a broad range of topics which
information sought includes documents and produced and
includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, communicated by a party external to the Philippine government.
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the Negotiation is privileged because the disclosure of the
business environment, and general and final provisions. information erodes trust between or among the countries
involved. Other states may not want to negotiate with the
Held: Philippines. High degree of confidence is necessary.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
Respondents claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
The Court held that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific
“showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a
matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to
overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its
curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic
decision-making.
The constitutional right to information includes official information on ongoing negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.
Province of North Facts: MOA-AD was invalidated by the SC because it promised that the
Cotabato v. On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Constitution will be amended to accommodate the provisions of
Government Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the the MOA-AD.
MOA-AD violated the right to information because the required
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Invoking the right to
consultation process in peace negotiations was not followed.
information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and Plebiscite does not cure the defect because the people affected
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA- are given the limited choice of a yes or a no.
AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. But with regards to the agreement, the people will not have a
chance to air their views.
Held: Creation of a new juridical entity is a matter if public concern.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information (Art. 3, Sec. 7), while Art. The Court enlarged the right to information not only to content
but also as to the process.
2, Sec. 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and
for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Freedom of Religion
Art. 3, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Art. 6, Sec. 29 (2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher minister, or dignitary is assigned to the Armed
Forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority.

The two-fold aspect of right to religious worship is: 1) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought and 2) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to
external acts.
It is left to the individual to define what religion is.
The freedom of belief is so important because freedom of belief is a function of liberty.
When action is taken pursuant to a belief, the State can come in to protect those who may be injured in the process.
The Philippines follows the benevolent neutrality doctrine. The doctrine gives room for accommodating religion, holding that the wall is instead meant to protect the church from the state. It allows
interaction between the church and state, but is strict re: state action, which would threaten the integrity of religious commitment. The breach in the wall between church and state is allowed in order to
uphold religious liberty, which is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The purpose of accommodation is to remove the burden on a person’s exercise of his religion. Although morality
contemplated in laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The state cannot be entirely neutral. Its actions may have incidental benefits to some religion, but these benefits are not necessarily violative.
The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
Q. What is the meaning of the non-establishment clause?

A. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State.
Board of Education v. Everson
Q. If, as jurisprudence indicates, the non-establishment clause does not prohibit all government aid that might redound to the benefit of religion, how does one distinguish allowable from
non-allowable aid?
A. To be allowable, government aid (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; (3) must not require excessive entanglement
with recipient institutions.
Lemon v. Kurtzman
Q. What is the meaning of free exercise of religion?

A. The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts— freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot
be.
Cantwell v. Connecticut
Q. How does one tell whether a case is a free exercise case or a non-establishment case?
A. One simple guide is this: every violation of the free exercise clause involves compulsion whereas a violation of the non-establishment clause need not involve compulsion.
Ebralinag v. Division Facts: As opposed to Gerona, the Court changed its mind because
Superintendent of Respondents ordered the expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, instead of a policy of exclusion, they want to bring the minorities
Schools Taburan and Asturias in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the in. There is greater danger in excluding minorities (they might
“Panatang Makabayan” required by RA 1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these revolt).
is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel
transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The
respondents relied on the Gerona doctrine which provides that we are a system of separation of the church
and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The
freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-
discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts school

discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Held:
The 30-year-old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse
to obey RA 1265 violates the exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship.
Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them
the right to disrupt such ceremonies.
The students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly,
it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by
reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right to free education. The non-observance
of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for
country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the
school curricula.
Estrada v. Escritor Facts: The controversy tarted when Escritor asked for exemption from
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a participating in the flag ceremony. She had to pass necessary
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty-five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s documents in order to avail of the exemption. Then enter the
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another declaration of pledging faithfulness which made it appear that he
woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to was not married to the man she was currently living with and had
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court a son with.
allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Framework by Puno re the limitation on the freedom of religion:
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a 1. Sincerity in the belief
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is 2. Compelling state interest
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. 3. Least restrictive means
Held:
Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the
law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Islamic Da’wah Facts:

Council v. Office of IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
the Executive services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries
Secretary out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified
products and manufacturers. Respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued Executive Order (EO)
46, creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities.
Petitioner contends that the subject EO violated the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State abd that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal
certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organization, entity or scholars can
lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
Held:
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by abrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal
food.
There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations of their religious

right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be
effectively protected. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos’ right to health are already
provided for in the existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, probably labeled and safe.
Aglipay v. Ruiz Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz,
the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance
and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church.
Held:
The issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor upon
a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’
and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not
violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court
stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people
‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’
Re Letter of Facts:
Valenciano The controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to Chief Justice
Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property
for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the
holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic litigants;
that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions
are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon.
Held:
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these
two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through
the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their
religion.
The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment but merely accommodation wherein the government recognize the reality that some
measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not
impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.
The constitution provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of
a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of public property for
religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which
is available indiscriminately to the public in general.

Imbong v. Ochoa Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors
of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law
Held:
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5
of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program
through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
Liberty of Abode and the Right to Travel

Art. 3, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
A watch list order can be issued against:

The accused in criminal cases (irrespective of nationality in the RTC or below)
1. Any person with a pending case in the DOJ
A hold-departure order can be issued against:

1. The accused in criminal cases (irrespective of nationality in courts below the RTC)
2. Aliens (whether as defendant, respondent, or witness in a pending civil or labor case)
3. Any person motu proprio by the Sec. of Justice or upon the request of the heads of departments, Constitutional Commissions, Congress, or the Supreme Court.
The right to return to one’s country, a distinct right under international law, is independent from although related to the right to travel. The President has the residual/implied power to impair the right
to return when such return poses threats to the government. [Marcos v. Manglapus. 1989]
Limitations
Liberty of Abode Right to Travel
Who may impair Courts upon lawful order Courts upon lawful order or by the appropriate
executive officer
When can it be impaired Within the limits prescribed by law In the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health
Villavicencio v. Facts:
Lukban One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police
and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night
to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by
the respondents.

Held:
Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of
discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly
authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by
law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as
citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other
citizen. Thei rchoice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from
the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished
Silverio v. CA Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to
cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to
cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was
evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the
court.
Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason
that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed
that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing
criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return.
So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates
of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
Marcos v. Manglapus Facts: Although there is a right to return, there was no showing of
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his arbitrariness on the part of then President Aquino.
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of
abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Held:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the
horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country bolsters
the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed
against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats
to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
Philippine Association Facts:

of Service Exporters Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
v. Drilon male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females.
The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills,
and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power.
Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing
for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
Held:
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Freedom of Association
Art. 3, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Art. 9-B, Sec. 2(5). SECTION 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
Art. 13, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth.

Association is of several kinds (e.g. organizations and labor unions)
Organizations are social, cultural, and scientific. These are in relation to speech.
Association is the vehicle where speech is more potently exercised.
The right to associate is just a little lower than speech and expression but a little higher than freedom of assembly
Labor unions are for property rights. Its an economic weapon to ensure compliance with labor standards.
The test used is the clear and present danger test.
What is the scope of the right?

The right is recognized as belonging to people whether employed or unemployed, and whether employed in the government or in the private sector.
The State does not infringe on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it leaves to citizens the power and liberty to affiliate or not affiliate with labor unions. [Victoriano v. Elizalde, 1974]
Every group has a right to join the democratic process, association itself being an act of expression of the member’s belief, even if the group offends the sensibilities of the majority. Any rejection to
such requires a compelling state interest to be proven by the State. [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 2010]
The freedom of association presupposes a freedom not to associate. An organization may remove a member if: (1) it is engaged in some form of expression, whether public or private; and (2) the
forced inclusion of a member would significantly affect the organization’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. [Boy Scouts America v. Dale, 2000]
What is not included in the right?

It does not include the right to compel others to form an association. But there may be situations in which, by entering into a contract, one may also be agreeing to join an association. [Bernas]
The right to association and the right to unionize of government employees does not include the right to strike. [SSS Employees Association v. CA, 1989]
Q. Do all societies and associations enjoy the same constitutional protection?

A. As already seen, under Section 1, the Constitution recognizes a hierarchy of values. Hence, the degree of protection an association enjoys depends on the position which the association's objective
or activity occupies in the constitutional hierarchy of values. Thus, for instance, where the object of an association is the advancement of a common political belief such as racial equality, any law that
either has the effect of limiting membership in such association or blunting its effectivity must satisfy the more stringent standards for allowable limitation of expression and belief.
NAACP v. Alabama
Gonzales v. Facts: Three rights were raised. The court first discussed the lowest
COMELEC The Revised Election Code under RA 4880 was amended to include two new sections which prohibits the right – association. If it was the right to association alone that
too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. was involved, no problem (unconstitutional) because it is not a
Petitioners alleges that RA 4880 is unconstitutional because its enforcement would prejudice basic rights, preferred right. But the right to expression was also invoked so it
such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly and the right to form associations or societies for became unconstitutional. But since the 1937 Constitution
purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under the Constitution. required 2/3 vote to invalidate a statute, it was not invalidated.
Only one vote lacking.
Held:
As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the
'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The
danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present
danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative
body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty

and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan
political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the
case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly,
or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.
In re Edillon Facts: IBP is not an organization. It is a regulatory mechanism of the

Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 1975, the Supreme Court for the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP
notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him.
Held:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom
to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
SSS Employees Facts: Public office is public trust so public service cannot be disrupted.
Association v. CA The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the Allowing govt employees to strike disrupts public service. But
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of govt employees can strike during lunch break or break hours so
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. Petitioners contend that the court as not to disrupt public service
made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or
the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one
hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
striking.
Held:
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) (also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil
service are denominated as "government employees")] and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Boy Scouts of Facts: QUESTIONS ON LETTING TRANS WOMEN JOIN

America v. Dale The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult SORORITIES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR GENDER NEUTRAL
membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. Dale BATHROOMS IN THE FINAL EXAM!!!

filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy
Scouts asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in
young people.
Held:
The Court held that applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit
Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association. While the petitioner’s laws
and oaths do not mention sexuality, the purpose of the organization to foster “morally straight” and “clean”
membership would be disregarded if the petitioner was forced to accept the respondent. Further, the First
Amendment Rights of the association would be violated if it were forced, under the guise of law, to send a
message that it accepted homosexual conduct when, on its own assertions, it did not.
Non-impairment of Contracts
Art. 3, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new
conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is a law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is null and void.
[Clemons v. Nolting]
The requisites for impairment are:

1. Substantial impairment
a. Change the terms of legal contract either in time or mode of performance
b. Impose new conditions
c. Dispenses with expressed conditions
d. Authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in the terms
2. Affects rights of parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non parties
The non-impairment clause is a limit on legislative power, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties.
Contemporary Application of the Contract Clause

When non-impairment clause prevails:
1. Against power of taxation
2. Regulation on loans
When non-impairment clause yields:

1. Valid exercise of police power (e.g. zoning regulation, premature campaign ban)
2. Statutes that exempt a party from any one class of taxes
3. Against freedom of religion
4. Judicial or quasi-judicial order
Oposa v. Factoran Facts: License agreements are not contracts. Even if they were,
The petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The petitioners contracts are still subject to the police power of the state.
alleged that respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the
country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are

so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he
holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
Held:
The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had
done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever
bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein .
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Ortigas & Co. v. CA Facts: There was no impairment because the owner can still maintain a
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with residence there. Reclassification (zoning ordinance) was
several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes, among permissive, not restrictive.
others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying The zoning ordinance only allowed what was once prohibited
the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and
built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a
petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso
as it violated the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.
Held:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could
be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.
Access to Courts
Art. 3, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Rule 141, Sec. 18, ROC. Indigent-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. -- Indigent-litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00)
pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value of more than
fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the indigent litigant, unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, nor they own any real property with
the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
Rule 3, Sec. 21, ROC. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party
is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the
docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is
in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
RA 9999 - Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010
Sec. 3. As provided for in this Act, the term legal services to be performed by a lawyer refers to any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experiences
which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and quasi-judicial offices, bodies and
tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as may be defined by the Supreme Court.
Sec. 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the Public

Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services defined by the
Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be provided by the private counsel.
For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly accredited by the
Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services were actually undertaken.
The certification issued by, among others, the PAO, the DOJ and other accredited association by the Supreme Court shall be submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for purposes of availing
the tax deductions as provided for in this Act and to the DOJ for purposes of monitoring.
Sec. 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an allowable
deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from the actual
performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory legal aid services
rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under BAR Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court.
The significance of having an explicit “free access” provision in the Constitution may be gathered from the rocky road which “free access” seems to have traveled in American jurisprudence. The
American constitution does not have an explicit free access provision and, hence, its free access doctrine has been developed as implicit from both the equal protection clause and the due process
clause. [Bernas]
This right is granted to natural persons only. The Constitution has explicitly premised the free exercise clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only natural persons can suffer.
Acar v. Rosal Facts: At the time of the institution of the case, the Philippines did not
A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten persons for provide support for the poor.
their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar cane plantations at the Improper interpretation of the word “pauper.” In the Philippine
Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Central context, they should be considered as indigents, not paupers.
Azucarera de Bais, Compañia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Indigents, are persons who have no property or source of
Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor,
of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions of though self-supporting when able to work and in employment.
Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952). Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate P14,500 divided by 10 was a really big amount during the 60s.
motion, that the aforementioned court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of The 9,000 laborers are not compelled to divide among
the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance issued an order on May 27, 1963, denying the same upon themselves the P14,500 because it is a class suit.
the ground that the plaintiffs have regular employment and sources of income and, thus, can not be
classified as poor or paupers.
Held:
As applied to statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning.
It has thus been recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the
fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he has
not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs." It suffices that plaintiff is indigent,
though not a public charge. And the difference between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the latter
are "persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own
labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913,
"Indigent", citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of
being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in
fact defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor
who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without being chargeable with costs"
Custodial Investigation
Art. 3, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Criminal procedure in the philippines:

1. person is arrested without warrant
2. custodial investigation

- purpose of the police is to elicit an extrajudicial confession
- in extrajudicial confession, the chances of a plea of guilt is higher
- when the Constitution provides for rights in 2 stages (Art. 3, Sec. 12), the Constitution is explicit on custodial investigation and arraignment; to protect the rights of the accused because it is at
that point that he is most vulnerable.
3. inquest/preliminary investigation
- right to be delivered to the courts may also be waived (Art. 125). Authorities can make the accused sign a waiver (in the presence of counsel) so that he may be detained longer. So that
instead of an inquest, he can demand a preliminary investigation
4. file an information
- needs to clearly state the elements of the crime
5. warrant of arrest (if not arrested); if arrested, the clerk of court issues a commitment order
6. posting of bail
- upon filing of an information, prosecutor already states the amount of bail
7. arraignment
- means formal reading of the charges and the accused is supposed to answer if he is guilty or not
- improvident plea of guilt is when the accused pleads guilty and does not understand the charges against him and the consequences of his plea
8. pre-trial
9. trial
- entitled to an impartial court
10. judgment
Miranda Rights
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warning, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement.
Q. Is a urine sample obtained in violation of Sec. 12 admissible as evidence?

A. Yes, a urine sample is admissible. What the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,
when it may be material. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing
things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion.
Gutang v. People
Q. Is it sufficient compliance with this provision for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution?
A. The right of a person under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been 'informed' of his rights.
People v. Nicandro

Q. What are the fundamental requisites for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence?
A. 1) the confession must be voluntary;
2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3) the confession must be express;
4) the confession must be in writing; and
5) Signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write, thumb-marked by him.
People v. Deniega
Q. Is investigation by an administrative body covered by Section 12?

A. No. Such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
Sebastian, Jr. v. Garchitorena
Q. When does the protection of Section 12(1) end?

A. The criminal process includes (1) the investigation prior to the filing of charges, (2) the preliminary examination and investigation after charges are filed, and (3) the period of trial. The Miranda rights
or the Section 12(1) rights were conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the enquiry is under the control of police officers. It is in this situation that the psychological if not physical
atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Outside of this situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into play.
People v. Mahinay Facts: Rights of the suspect under custodial investigation:

Appellant was charged with rape with homicide for the sexual assault and death of Maria Victoria Chan, 12 1. to be informed why he has been arrested in a
years old. Evidence disclosed that Maria, on that fateful afternoon, went to the second floor of the house language understood to him
where appellant was staying. Appellant pulled her hand and her head hit the table causing her to become 2. he must be warned that he has a right to remain silent
unconscious. At this stage, appellant, who was then drunk, had sexual intercourse with her. He then 3. right to be assisted by counsel
dumped the still unconscious victim inside the septic tank and thereafter took flight. The body of the victim 4. no custodial investigation if he is not with counsel,
was retrieved the following day wearing only a blouse without underwear. Recovered in the unfinished unless he has waived this right in writing and with the
house where accused slept on the night of the incident was the victim’s pair of shorts, brown belt and assistance of counsel
yellow hair ribbon. Weight was given to appellant’s extrajudicial confession containing details consistent - right to be delivered to the courts may also be
with the post mortem findings on the victim that she was raped. The trial court, notwithstanding the waived (Art. 125). Authorities can make the
absence of direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime, rendered judgment of conviction. It accused sign a waiver (in the presence of
based its judgment on circumstantial evidence. counsel) so that he may be detained longer. So
that instead of an inquest, he can demand a
Held: preliminary investigation
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant’s proffered excuse are sufficient to 5. to communicate with counsel, any immediate family
sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence member, a medical doctor, a priest or minister
relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not 6. although he has waived certain rights, he can still
necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled invoke it at any time
jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites 7. no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
concur: other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
1. there is more than one circumstance; against the accused. Secret detention places, solitary,
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable prohibited. (Art. 3, Sec. 12)
doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence
which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough
review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
People v. Del Rosario Facts: Alibis are weak because they are self-serving so the only
Emelita Paragua left their house to go to her stall in the public market. Raquel Lopez, the 11-year old niece defense the suspect has is not given much merit.
of Paragua, was left behind as she had no classes that day. Notified of the news that their house was on Del Rosario did not present evidence to prove that he was

fire, Paragua went home. Paragua saw that the sala set, their merchandise and the cassette were burned. coerced into confessing
When she entered the kitchen, she saw her niece lying on her stomach with a raincoat covering her head
and her neck and arms tied with CATV wire. Parts of her hand and her thigh were burned. Raquel Lopez
was already dead when her aunt discovered her. She likewise discovered that six pieces of her jewelries
were missing. It was also found that the sala was set on fire and he found the items therein burned.
Likewise, the two bedrooms. Police located the body of Raquel Lopez in the kitchen. Her head was
covered with a pink raincoat and around her neck was a CATV wire. She was lying face down, her hands
behind her back.
The Olongapo City police received a call from the Subic police that a certain Donato del Rosario
surrendered to police officer Fernando Morales, the brother-in-law of his common-law wife, Ruby Tan. Del
Rosario, even without being asked, told them that he really surrendered to Morales because he was being
bothered by his conscience and that he was very willing to accompany them to recover the stolen items. He
also volunteered the information as to where he sold the jewelries that he took from the house of Paragua.
Thereafter the policemen from Olongapo and Donato del Rosario proceeded to the places mentioned by
the latte. Del Rosario was not even handcuffed at the time. At the Lovely Kahael pawnshop del Rosario
pointed out the jewelry that he had pawned. He also signed the pawnshop ticket in order that a wedding
band and a diamond ring with the letter "E" could be redeemed. At the pawnshop he was identified by the
OIC/appraiser therein. Afterwards they proceeded to the shop of Rogelio Adriano. They were not able to
immediately recover a bracelet and a 7-day ring that were sold to Adriano, a watch repairer and a
buyer/seller of second hand jewelry, as he had given them to his son for safekeeping. However, his son,
Rogelio Adriano, Jr., returned the jewelry to the police some days later. Both Adrianos identified del
Rosario as the person who sold them the jewelry. After the jewelry was recovered, the police called Emelita
Paragua who positively identified the jewels as hers.
Del Rosario was then brought to the Olongapo police station. A lawyer, Atty. Norberto dela Cruz, was
called in to assist del Rosario. During the custodial investigation, Atty. dela Cruz was present the whole
time. He informed del Rosario what was stated in the waiver/confession. It was only when del Rosario said
that he fully understood its contents that Atty. dela Cruz signed it as counsel. Police brought the accused
and Atty. dela Cruz to Assistant City Prosecutor Martinez for subscription.
As to be expected, Donato del Rosario’s account of the day in question, September 26, 1992, was
different. Accused-appellant relied on alibi as a defense to belie the accusation against him. However,
nobody was presented to corroborate his statements as to his whereabouts on the day when the robbery,
homicide, and arson took place. The trial court then decided to convict the accused of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
Del Rosario contends that it is essential to prove the intent to rob and that the intent to rob must come first
before the killing transpired. He is of the impression that not all the essential requisites of the crime of
robbery with homicide were proven. Hence, this appeal.
Held:
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against
persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c)
the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that there
was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.
In this case, it was apparent that the reason why accused-appellant stole the jewelry of Emelita Paragua
was because he intended to gain by them. He had already admitted that he needed money to marry his
common-law wife.
If gaining through unlawful means was farthest from the mind of the accused, why then did he pawn and
sell the jewelry he had taken from Emelita Paragua? The accused vehemently denies having robbed the
house of Emelita Paragua. But the testimonies of Gamboa and the Adrianos that it was the accused who
pawned and sold, respectively, the jewelry to them shows that the accused had in his possession the
stolen jewelry. His failure to refute this must be taken against him. It is a rule established by an abundance
of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, without a
satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed to be the thief. This rule is in accordance
with the disputable presumption "that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent

wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act."
The court concluded that accused-appellant went to the house of Emelita Paragua because he intended to
rob her. Lamentably, Paragua’s niece, Raquel Lopez, was in the way and she had to be dealt with in the
direct manner possible. And the means resorted to by the accused-appellant was to strangle her until her
very last breath. Raquel Lopez was killed on the occasion of the robbery because she was the only one in
the house at that time and the only witness to the crime that accused-appellant committed. Her autopsy
report revealed that she was already dead before the fire started, thus eliminating any inference that arson
was committed to finish her off. The arson was but a ruse to cover up the theft.
It is immaterial whether the killing transpired before or after the robbery. In the crime of robbery with
homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is essential is that there is a
nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or subsequent to
the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
Right to Bail
Art. 3, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required. [Rule 14, Sec.
1, ROC]
It acts as a security that the accused would appear in court on appointed dates. Its basis is the presumption of innocence.
Bail can be in the form of a sum of money, security bond, or property bond (annotated on the title of the property so when you abscond the State can go after the property).
Can you be released on bail without putting up a bond? Yes. You can be released by recognizance, especially by a respectable member of the community.
The right to bail is not suspended even when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Who are entitled to bail?

All persons under the custody of law.
Exceptions:
1. Those charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong.
2. Military men
Military men who participated in a failed coup d’etat because of their threat to national security [Comendador v. De Villa]
When is bail available?

From the very moment of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgment (which means after appeal).
No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail so long as one is under arrest.
Arraignment of the accused is not essential to the approval of the bail bond. When bail is authorized, it should be granted before arraignment. Otherwise, the accused may be precluded from filing a
motion to quash. Also, the court will be assured of the presence of the accused at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceeding.
If the information states that it is a bailable offense, the accused can immediately pay the bail at the court.
Q. Why is bail awarded to the accused?

A. 1) to honor the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
2) to enable him to prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction.
Cortes v. Catral
Q. What are the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed by an accused charged with a capital offense?
A. (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
Basco v. Rapatalo
Q. What is a recognizance?
A. It is an obligation of record entered into before a court guaranteeing the appearance of the accused for trial. It is in the nature of a contract between the surety and the state.
People v. Abner

People v. Donato Facts: After the case was filed, there was an amendment of the law to
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed bring back the old penalty for rebellion from reclusion perpetua
before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts to prision mayor.
alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the The crime charged was bailable because of subsequent law
Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been even if at the time of the commission of the offense it was not
extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that bailable. (favorable to the accused)
the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942
and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two
months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of
his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Held:
Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore
prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes
discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without
hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made
therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of
the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose
waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Paderanga v. CA Facts: This case was the origin of hospital arrest.

Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple Since they cannot post bail, they go to the hospital so that they
murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in won’t go to the BJMP.
Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The trial of the base was all set to start with the Acute costochondritis is not serious but since the doctor called it
issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner’s apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner acute the court understood it to mean as serious.
through counsel, a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing. SC said that Pedaranga put himself in constructive custody by
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital, his counsel manifested voluntary submitting himself by saying that he was in the
that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the hospital, he will not go anywhere without order of the court with
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered IBP as his guarantor.
being in the custody of the law. The prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for Case of Enrile – non-bailable offense but since he is old kebs
bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge Upon further inquiries lang. Humanitarian reasons.
from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence.
On that note and in a resolution, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00

Held:
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail
before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual
ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody.
Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for
purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the
custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to
the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called “house
arrest” or, in case of military offenders, by being “confined to quarters” or restricted to the military camp
area
The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances
where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same
after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6
(now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion
on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should
be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court is required with the participation of both the defense
and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution
to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
Rights of the Accused

Art. 3, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rights of the accused from the time the information is filed:

1. right to be presumed innocent
2. right to be informed of the charges against him
3. right to present his own evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party
4. right to counsel
5. right against self-incrimination
6. right against improvident plea of guilt
Q. When does the presumption of innocence end?

A. Moreover, where the conviction by a lower court is still on appeal, it has not yet reached finality and the accused still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must be remembered that
the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
Re: Judge Angeles
Q. What is the equipoise rule?

A. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
There is no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.
Malana v. People
Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?

A. The accused is entitled to dismissal of the case, and, if he is under detention, to release by habeas corpus. Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.

People v. Calma Facts: Proof beyond reasonable doubt means that there are no
Accused-appellant Rodrigo Calma was charged with two (2) counts of Rape on his two daughters, namely, inconsistencies. Moral certainty is not absolute certainty because
Annalyn and Roselyn, ages 15 years old and 11 years old respectively, and one (1) count of Acts of that is not possible. There will always be inconsistencies, but are
Lasciviousness on his youngest daughter, Irene, age 5 years old. they material?
All three witnesses testified on the repeated loathsome acts done by their own father to them in details as There is moral certainty when considering all those things that
examined and cross-examined by both prosecution and defense. The testimony of the three victims, need to be established, there is certainty that the accused did it.
withstood the test of cross-examination. They spontaneously, clearly and credibly spoke of the details of If there are doubts, there is no moral certainty
their defilement. Their testimonies were also corroborated by the medico-legal report conducted by Dr. The judge in a criminal case needs to establish two things:
Jesusa Vergara, the medico-legal officer who examined them. The defense did not dispute the time, the 1. identity of the perpetrator
place, the manner and the frequency of the sexual abuses. Neither did the defense show that their hymenal 2. elements of the offense
lacerations were the results of other causes. The Court said that inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
On defense, the accused-appellant denied his daughters' accusations. He charged that Myrna Ignacio, his which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds
common law wife and mother of his children, coached his daughters to lie. He claimed that he had for acquittal.
seriously hurt her in the past, twice by electrocution on suspicion of infidelity. Also, seeking to help
accused-appellant, his mother, Catalina Calma, and their neighbors, testified that accused-appellant's
daughters, especially Annalyn, showed much affection towards their father.
Held:
A reasonable doubt is not such doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a
doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it is possible always to question
any conclusion derived from testimony, but such questioning is not what reasonable doubt is. Rather, it is
that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the
mind of the judge in that condition that he cannot say that he feels an abiding conviction to a moral certainly
of the truth of the charge. Absolute certainty is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge
but moral certainty is required, and this certainty must attend every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense. Absolute, mathematical, or metaphysical certainty is not essential, and besides, in
judicial investigation, it is wholly unattainable. Moral certainty is all that can be required. The arguments of
accused-appellant are premised on the misconception that reasonable doubt is anything and everything
that removes a statement from the matrix of certitude. It bears repeating that even inconsistencies and
discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, unless treating of the elements of the crime, would not
necessarily bring about a judgment of acquittal. In this case, there is not even any inconsistency or
discrepancy to speak of. All things considered, the evidence against the accused-appellant established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all three (3) charges. The appeal is denied. Death penalty is accordingly
imposed.
People v. Flores Facts: The issue is about the information

For automatic review is the trial court's decision finding accused guilty of two counts of rape of his then 11- You can be held liable for the lesser crime if you committed a
year old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. greater crime. But the elements of rape cannot include the
elements of sexual abuse
Held: Flores has to be acquitted because of double jeopardy
The Supreme Court, on appeal, dismissed the criminal cases against the accused, declaring null and void If the information is defective, then no valid judgment can arise
the informations filed against him, for being violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. What characterizes the charge is the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. The allegation in the criminal complaints that accused "sexually abused" the
private complainant cannot be read to mean that accused had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with
the complainant. The recital of facts in the complaints does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not
being an essential element or ingredient thereof.
People v. Murillo Facts: A trial judge must do the following to make sure that there is no
Freddie Murillo was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder against his aunt Paz Abiera improvident plea of guilt:
and was sentenced to the penalty of Death. 1. ask the accused how he was put under the custody of
Murillo confessed that he stabbed his aunt and dismembered her body and hid the parts inside the septic the law
tank and the head was placed on a red and white striped plastic bad and was disposed at a canal near the 2. whether he was assisted by counsel during the
service road of the South Super Highway. custodial investigation
Appellant argues: His plea of guilt was improvident since there was no indication that he fully understood 3. ask the conditions of his detainment

that the qualifying circumstances charged in the information would result to the penalty of death. He only 4. ask if he was informed of what he has been charged
admitted the killing but not the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. There could be no with
evident premeditation since he stabbed Paz only after losing his senses. There could also be no treachery 5. ask if he was informed of the penalty
since it cannot be determined with certainty whether or not the wounds inflicted on the victim were made 6. ask whether or not the accused has the capacity to
before or after her death. The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse comprehend; ask the educational attainment
cannot be appreciated in this case since it was not alleged in the Information. 7. inform the accused of the nature of the penalty
Issue: Whether or not the death penalty was violative of his rights, considering his plea of guilt. 8. inform them of the elements of the crime charged
9. ensure that the language used is one that can be
Held: understood by the accused (directly dapat and not
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.--- When the accused pleads guilty to a through a translator)
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of 10. why he is entering a plea of guilt.
the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. It is only when the penalty is divisible that a plea of guilt and
The Court explained that while there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a voluntary submission is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
searching inquiry, the following guidelines should nevertheless be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and
the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in
the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
Clearly, the proceedings taken by the trial court was short of being satisfactory. Appellant was never asked
about the circumstances of his arrest and detention, not even when SPO2 Nieves himself in his testimony
mentioned that he ordered that the two brothers be brought to Block 6 for questioning without the presence
of counsel. Where or what kind of place Block 6 is, was not even explained by the witness neither did the
court nor the defense counsel ask the witness to clarify said point. The Court also did not ask appellant
about the circumstances of his arraignment as well as his age and educational attainment. He was also
neither apprised of the consequences of his plea nor was it explained to him that the penalty imposable for
the crime attended by its qualifying circumstances as alleged in the Information is death regardless of the
presence of mitigating circumstances.
The failure of the defense counsel to faithfully protect the rights of appellant also cannot go unnoticed.
Records show that defense counsel Atty. Dante O. Garin, never cross-examined three of the four
witnesses of the prosecution, namely Sancho Fereras, Ramon Saraos, and Dr. Ludivino Lagat. The only
prosecution witness he cross-examined was SPO2 Nieves to whom he asked four questions pertaining
only as to how the police came to the conclusion that the body parts belong to Paz Abiera. Apart from
these, no other questions were ever offered.

People v. Rivera Facts: On the right to cross-examine
Accused-appellant Rolando Rivera was convicted of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga of his - defense: right was violated because the lawyer was
13-year old daughter and was sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. In his appeal before the not able to ask substantive questions
Court, appellant invoked his right to due process of law. He claimed that he was denied the same because - SC: that’s the lawyer’s fault because the lawyer kept
the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining the complainant Erlanie Rivera concerning the on asking for postponement.
latter's sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality. Appellant also imputed partiality - new counsel was not able to ask substantial questions
on the part of the presiding judge when the latter propounded numerous questions to appellant during his because he is not the original one. No time to study
cross-examination by the prosecutor. the case
On the right to counsel
Held: - not violated because the counsel was provided as
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant of rape. Appellant's right to counsel de oficio
due process was not violated. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him. The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not
without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. In the present case,
appellant's counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly
committed by appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility. There was, however, no
showing on his parthow these questions had any bearing on complainant's credibility or on the truth of her
claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant into
committing mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that accused-appellant's counsel could later
use to possibly put complainant's credibility, not to mention her character, in question. The Court also
rejected appellant's claim of partiality. The Court ruled that it is a judge's prerogative to ask questions to
ferret out the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain truths
which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.
The Court, however, reduced the penalty of death imposed by the trial court to reclusion perpetua because
the minority of the victim was not established. Although complainant's minority has been alleged in the
information, no independent and competent evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the same.
Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the rape during direct examination; it was only during
her cross-examination when she stated that she was 12 years old at the time she was raped by her father.
The Court stressed that to justify the imposition of the death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and
her age must be alleged and proved.
In re: Request for Facts: Coverage should not be allowed because it will violate the right
Coverage of the Trial On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting this to a free trial. Sandiganbayan may feel pressured by the
in the Sandiganbayan Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed publicity.
of the Plunder Case against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than Publicizing the trial would violate the right to an impartial tribunal
Against Former Pres. the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern
Joseph Estrada which could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the
court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the
dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon
C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in
view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Held:
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that
is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in
open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes
in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may
have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be

said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract
the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.
Writ of Habeas Corpus

Art. 3, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
Art. 7, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
It is used to question the legality of the deprivation of liberty.
The petitioner in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not the detained person but his representative or relative.
The shortcoming of the remedy is that the detainers can just file an information, or the court can just make the person disappear. A writ cannot be issued when the body cannot be found.
When is the writ available?

1. Involuntary restraint of liberty
2. Voluntary restraint of liberty (e.g. right of parents to regain custody of a minor child even if the child is in the custody of a third person of his or her own free will)
3. Illegal arrest with a supervening event when the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information
4. The issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
5. The filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is detained [Sec. 4, Rule 102]
6. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess.
What is restraint of liberty?

Not only physical restraint, but any restraint on the freedom of action.
Conditions for the valid suspension of the writ:

1. Presence of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion
2. When public safety requires it.
Ilusorio v. Bildner Facts: The wife wanted custody of husband so she can get his
A wife tried to secure a Writ of Habeas Corpus to compel her husband to live with her since her husband property.
refused to let her visit him. This was not a guardianship case but a habeas corpus case
because the husband was of sound mind so a guardianship case
Held: would not have prospered.
A WHC extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of a person Habeas corpus will not be proper because there must be

is withheld from the one entitled thereto. deprivation of liberty.
To justify the grant of WHC, the restraint (actual, physical) must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of The Court said that there is no deprivation of liberty because
freedom of action even if the person is married, he is not obligated to live with the
Evidence presented by the wife, of her husband being 86 and implying that his old age warrants that he wife. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
needs guardianship, she failed to prove any actual or effective detention of her husband’s liberty. husband to live with his wife.
As such, having full mental capacity. the visitation rights granted by the Trial Court to the wife is against his The second reason is that it wasn’t proved that the wife and the
free choice and deprives him of liberty. other children were not deprived access to the husband
In re: Writ of Habeas Facts: There unlawful conviction when:

Corpus for Reynaldo Reynaldo was found guilty of raping his niece and is currently serving his sentence in Bilibid prison. His son 1. there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
de Villa alleges that during the trial he was unaware of a new scientific test that could determine the paternity of the resulting in the restraint of a person
child borne by his niece. A DNA lab test confirmed that Reynaldo could not be the father of his niece’s child 2. the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence
and thus filed an action for a writ of habeas corpus to (1) for the director of prisons justify the basis for his (defective information)
imprisonment and (2) Reynaldo be granted a new trial 3. an excessive penalty has been imposed
Held: If conviction is unlawful, habeas corpus may be a remedy
If the liberty of a person is restrained via some legal process, the writ is unavailing. WHC cannot be used because:
to DIRECTLY ASSAIL A JUDGEMENT rendered 1. there has been deprivation of a constitutional right
In Feria v. CA, Court ruled that review of judgement of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of resulting in the restraint of the person
the WHC only in very specific instances: 2. the court had no jurisdiction
1. There has been a deprivation of a consti right resulting in the restraint of a person 3. the penalty being excessive, is voided
2. The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence An erroneous judgment doesn’t mean the judgment is illegal.
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such extent Pregnancy is not an essential element in rape
None of these is alleged here The modality for getting the evidence is not new. DNA testing
Velasco v. CA: HC petition reaches the BODY, but not the RECORD of the case was available before. That you did not choose DNA testing
- Corrected by certiorari or on appeal before does not entitle you to a new trial.
On re-litigation
- Issue of paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner’s guilt or innocence. It is entirely
different.Pregnancy is not an element of rape.
- DNA evidence does not fall within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of “newly-
discovered evidence” A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met
- Evidence was a discovered after trial
- It could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence
- That it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching
- That the evidence is of such weight that if admitted, it would probably change the
judgement
The DNA evidence could have been discovered and produced at the trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Writ of Amparo
Sec. 1, The Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The problem sought to be addressed by the writ of amparo are extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The writ is not for the dead. It is to protect people from being killed or disappeared (has now become a verb).
The principal reliefs are:
1. temporary protection order
2. inspection order
3. production order (real evidence—records of detention, medical records, photos, etc.)
4. witness protection

Various permutations of the right to security of person:
1. right to security of person is freedom from fear
2. guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security
3. guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government
Time is of the essence in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo because of the danger that the disappeared person is or may be subjected to.
Secretary of National Facts: Should the writ still be available even after they escaped? Yes.
Defense v. Manalo Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the - as to inspection: find out what happened to them
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the - as to production: records to find out who actually took
brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. custody of them and to find out what was done to them
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining while under custody
Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic - issue the writ to protect them in order to ensure that
rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. they will not be killed by the persons they implicated
The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as - as to witness protection: they are material witnesses in
amparo petition. the case of the missing UP students
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered
the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court
with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of
official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the
Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Held:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos
right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape,
the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.
Lozada v. Macapagal- Lozada was issued a subpoena by the Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal. He did not appear The writ is not available because there was no substantial
Arroyo during the hearing and instead flew to London on “official business.” Upon his return, he was escorted by evidence of a threat to life, liberty, or security.
several men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to ES and Ma’am, whom Lozada - no continuing threat
assumed to be ES Recto and the President. Lozada was brought to La Salle Green Hills where he was - no impediment to his going to La Salle Green Hills
purportedly harassed and threatened by the police. His brother filed for a writ of amparo. The Court held - since the case was already publicized, the possibility
that the writ was properly denied by the CA because the petitioners failed to meet threshold of substantial of agents of the state killing him became remote
evidence and that they failed to prove the existence of a continuing threat.
Navia v. Pardico Facts: The writ not available because there is a need to show
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The government involvement.
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were - but the rules of the SC state that writ also applies to
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards private persons and entities
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. - but private entities should be acting pursuant to an
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the order of the state
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and - the Court narrowed the meaning of private persons
lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security and entities to agents of the state
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo
before the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners.
The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is

available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state
with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a
violation of or a threat to Ben’s right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the
evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance.
On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent
proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the
trial court erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Ben’s disappearance.
Held:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing
are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government participation.
In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that
such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does
not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the
government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or
employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had
a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his
case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable
persons.
Under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But
even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual
or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Caram v. Segui Facts: The proper action would have been a petition to annul the
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano decree of adoption. But they resorted to a petition for the writ of
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of amparo because it is difficult to annul a decree of adoption.
marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for There was no enforced disappearance because the DSWD
Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing never concealed the baby.
situation for having a second illegitimate son. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at
Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and
medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
Held:
Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter
up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over
the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is
the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate
the quality of life.

Speedy DIsposition of Cases
Art. 3, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
A delay is also a violation of due process so there is no need for an express provision in the Constitution.
If the accused is detained for a long period of time, he is seen as a criminal even if he is innocent, thus, violating the right to presumption of innocence.
The rationale of the right is (1) to prevent an oppressive pre-trial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
When is the right available?

1. When the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
2. When unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured.
3. When without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Unreasonable delay is weighed by the following factors:

1. Length of delay
2. Reason for delay
3. Assertion/failure to assert the right by the accused (failure to assert means a waiver of the right)
4. Prejudice caused by the delay
When is the right not available?

The right is not available when to sustain it would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution.
Mendoza-Ong v, Facts: Three years was not inordinately long because (1) they filed the
Sandiganbayan Petitioner seeks a reversal of the SC’s Resolution dismissing her petition for certiorari and upholding the case with the Ombudsman where they handle a lot of cases; (2)
Sandiganbayan’s denial of her motion to quash and contends that the SC erred in failing to resolve the petitioner is at fault because he kept asking for extensions to file
fundamental issue of whether the excessive or inordinate delay in the conduct of the preliminary a counter-affidavit.
investigation and filing of the informations after three years had deprived her of her Constitutional and - if the delay is attributable to the accused, it is not a
statutory right to due process and speedy determinations and disposition of the cases against her violation of the right to a speedy trial
warranting dismissal thereof. - delay was not attributable to the State
A classic example of violation attributable to the State is when
Held: the prosecution is not ready with witnesses.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings The prosecution always asks for extension to get ready or to find
are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of whether said right has a witness so the SC made a rule limiting the allowable
been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The extensions to three.
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the
factors to consider and balance. A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.
Considering the number of times that the case had to be reviewed, the levels of review that the case had to
undergo, and petitioner’s own motions for additional time, the period that lapsed -- roughly two years and
five months (from the time petitioner and her co-accused submitted their counter-affidavits on March 29,
1995, to the time the informations were filed on August 1, 1997) to terminate the proceedings against
petitioner -- could not be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. They were necessitated
by exigency of the actions taken on the case. The period to terminate the proceedings, in our view, had not
violated petitioner’s constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.
Neither could the delay be said to have been prejudicial to her considering that she herself is guilty of
delay. The Court has held that if the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation was not
solely the prosecution’s fault, but was also due to incidents attributable to the accused and his counsel, the
right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases is not violated. Petitioner cannot now seek the
protection of the law to benefit from what she now considers the adverse effects of her own conduct in this
case.
Cervantes v. Facts: More than six years of delay is a violation because there is
Sandiganbayan On March 6, 1986, private respondent Pedro Almendras filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the neglect on the part of the State.
Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) against a certain Alejandro Tapang for falsification of
complainant's "salaysay" alleging that Alejandro Tapang made him sign a piece of paper in blank on which
paper a "salaysay" was later inscribed stating that complainant had been paid his claim in the amount of

P17,594.00, which was not true. Almendras mentioned in the complaint that he sought the help of petitioner
Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as analyst in the office of the labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. Tapang in a
counter-affidavit denied the accusation of Almendras. Petitioner Cervantes also denied the accusation
against him. On May 18, 1992, more than six (6) years after the filing of the initiatory complaint, the
Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging petitioner, together with Teodorico L.
Ruiz and Alejandro Tapang, with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act 3019. On October 2, 1992,
petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of arrest on the ground, among others, that
the case against him had already prescribed due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary
investigation. The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dated December 24, 1992 denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
Held:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and annulled the minute resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner's motion to quash. The Court ruled that petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case, a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court did not accept the Special
Prosecutor's ratiocination that herein petitioner was insensitive to the implications and contingencies
thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. The Court
emphasized that it is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his
acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to him.
Remulla v. Facts:
Sandiganbayan - Aug 2005: Remulla filed a crim complaint in the omb v. Maliksi for violation of Sec. 3 RA 3019
o Alleged that Maliksi, as gov of Cavite, caused the purchase of med supplies w/o public
bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or presence to it.
- Aug 2014 (AFTER 9 YEARS), the Omb (reso) found probable cause
- Nov 2014: omb filed an information
- Maliksi filed motion to dismiss on the grd that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was
violated.
- SB favored Maliksi
- Remulla’s argument:
o Maliksi did not promptly assert his right to a speedy disposition
▪ Citing Tilendo v. Omb, there must be an active assertion
▪ Cited also Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello
▪ Coscolluela is not controlling since it is only applicable when the resp is
completely unaware of the prelim inv against him
- Maliksi’s comment:
o Cited Tatad and People v. SB where even shorter delays were considered violations
- SC: On the right to a speedy disposition of cases
o It is a relative concept
▪ Violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays
▪ When unjustified postponements are asked for and secured
▪ Balancing test: conduct of both the prosec and the defendant are weighed
● Four fold factors:
o Length of the delay
o Reason for the delay
o Def’s assertion/non-assertion of his right
o Prejudice to def resulting from the delay
▪ None of these is a necessary/sufficient
condition
▪ Courts must still engage in a difficult
balancing process

▪ Analyzing Tilendo, Guerrero, Bernat, and Tello
● Tilendo: pet invoked his right because the prelim inv lasted for 3
years (denied, Tilendo did not do anything to accelerate)
● Guerrero: Transcript of Stenographic Notes was incomplete. A
decision cannot be rendered without it. Court observed that the
case could have been different had the pet made some over act to
assert his right
● Bernat: TSN, reiterated Guerrero
● Tello: Echoed Bernat
▪ Analyzing Coscolluela: it was not the pet’s duty to follow up on the prosec of
their case
▪ Cervantes: it is the duty of the prosec to speedily resolve the complaint,
regarless of whether the pet did not object to the delay (also reiterated in
People)
▪ Inocenctes: reiterated Coscollueta
o Harmonizing the two sets of cases
▪ First set: criminal cases were not dismissed bec of the non-assertion or the
right. Other factors in the balancing test (reason and prejudice cause) were
considered.
▪ Second (Cervantes, people, inocentes, coscolluela): the lengthy delay was
not satisfactorily explained.
▪ Due to the manifest prejudice, Court no longer gave weighty consideration to
their lack of objection. It was emphasized that it was the duty of the prosec
to expedite the prosec regardless.
▪ Ad hoc basis approach
o Delay is a two edged sword
▪ Govt bears the burden of proving its case
▪ Passage of time may make it difficult
o Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by
the state
o COnsti does not make it mandatory for the accused to follow up
o The omb was failed to justify the delay
▪ Their explanation: delay in the approval of the complaints, the memo for
consolidation of the Remulla and PCSO cases was received only on 2009, it
was only forwarded to the Chief Admin officer in 2010, took 4 years to find
probable cause, impeachment complaint v. omb Gutierrez
▪ Computation of delay
● Started from fact-finding invest of the omb, dec 2005, until
completion of the PCSO case, Oct 2008 (3 YEARS)
● Prelim invest began at that point, terminated on Aug 2014 (6
YEARS)
● 9 year delay
▪ Not acceptable explanation: omb did not ensure that the investigation would
be resolved in a timely manner.
o Final note: An undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation cannot be
corrected for now, until man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
Right Against Self-incrimination

Art. 3, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Three aspects of the right against self-incrimination:
1. right to remain silent before trial
2. right to refuse to testify before questions are asked
3. right to refuse to answer after the question is asked
The privilege is available in any proceedings, even outside the court, for they may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution.
Exclusionary Rule under Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 12: When the privilege against self-incrimination is violated outside of the court (e.g. police), then the testimony, as already noted, is not admissible.
Ousted of jurisdiction: When the privilege is violated by the court itself, the court is ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings, and even judgment, are null and void.
People v. Ayson Facts: The right against self-incrimination was not violated because
Felipe Ramos, a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), was charged with estafa for even though he did not know that the statement he made would
irregularities in the sale of plane tickets. Respondent judge admitted all evidentiary and testamentary be used in trial and even though he wasn’t informed of his right
evidence offered against Ramos except for the latter’s handwritten note expressing his willingness to settle to remain silent, there was no custodial investigation
the irregularities alleged against him as well as his statement during an administrative investigation where The statement may be used against him because it was not
he admitted to the offense. made during the custodial investigation. Investigation was done
within the context of the employer-employee relationship
Held: (administrative and not for law enforcement).
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the administrative The first sentence of Sec. 20, Art. 3 is right to remain silent in
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The custodial investigation.
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Components of right against self-incrimination:
Constitution did not therefore come into play. He had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the 1. Right to refuse/refusal to testify – incriminatory if he
first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded. The note testified because he might be liable for perjury but
that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and more importantly, he might be cross-examined. If he
even spontaneous act on his part. refuses to testify, it won’t be taken against him
2. If he testifies, he will have to undergo cross-
examination - the purpose of cross-examination is to
destroy the credibility of the person who testified.
3. If he testifies, he may refuse to answer those
questions in relation to other crimes → he may refuse
only when the question is asked, not before.
Chavez v. CA Facts: Chavez will be the only one who will be arrested because a
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). famous actor and a mayor-to-be will not be arrested.
An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to Chavez did not want to testify
gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead - you can’t make the accused a hostile witness because
not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. the accused has the right not to testify
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an - there were no other witnesses against him, so the
ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But prosecutor compelled him to be a witness
the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted. - he did not object as the questions were asked. If you
do not object, under the law, you waive your right
Held: against self-incrimination. But at the start he already
Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain refused to testify.
silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his Chavez invoked right no. 1 (see Ayson)
own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness. - he can’t be convicted because his statements were
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It inadmissible no evidence
cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For
the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty.
Villaflor v. Summers Facts: The judge had her undergo physical examination to determine
In a criminal case pending before the CFI of Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR and FLORENTINO whether she had sex with another man (pregnancy as proof).
SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro - there was no self-incrimination because the protection
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court extended only to testimonial evidence
ordered the defendant Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or two - testimonial vs mechanical evidence (all that is done is
competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the to just take a look. Nothing is required of the accused)
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self- - examination was purely external

incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid - semen sample a violation as it requires an active
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. participation on the part of the accused
Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the constitutional provision; - urine, blood, hair not a violation as these can be
the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of the constitutional provision. obtained without active participation from the accused
The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that a judge of the
same court has held on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the accused and
petitioner.
Held:
It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care
will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary.
Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the
person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be
understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal.
Beltran v. Samson Facts: A handwriting sample a testimonial evidence because it is

Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as already existent. All that is needed is a verification.
ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a But giving a handwriting sample in open court is a violation
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the because it was not yet existing before it was given or before it
prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that was requested (producing something not existing is not
such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. mechanical).
Held:
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever
from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the
latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing
is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe
the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for
the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a
difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is
impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some
cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.
Non-imprisonment for Beliefs and Involuntary Servitude

Art. 3, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary peonage, all denote a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another. [Hodges v. US in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
1919]

Caunca v. Salazar Facts: - habeas corpus will lie even against the mistress of the house
Estelita Flores is a 21 year old illiterate who was recruited from Cavite to work as a maid in Manila. Her because there is no valid basis for detaining her
cousin would visit her but her employers would prevent her from leaving with her cousin even when she - violation of due process of the house maid
wanted to saying that Flores owed her employers Php 83.85 which they spent in transporting her to Manila.
Her cousin filed for Habeas Corpus but her employers failed to bring her to court.
Held:
Physical restraint is not an essential requirement in involuntary servitude.
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of movement of said employee.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief
in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
Human dignity is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental
freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.
Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishment

Art. 3, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.
What is prohibited?
Cruel and unusual punishment. Unusual punishment is not prohibited especially if it makes the penalty less evere.
What is a cruel punishment?

1. Torture or lingering death.
2. Not only severe, harsh, or excessive but flagrantly and plainly oppressive.
3. Wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
The constitutional limit must be reckoned on the basis of the nature and mode of punishment in terms of physical pain.
For a death penalty to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty [is not
required in Sec. 19(1)]. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. [People
v. Echegaray, 1997]
Sec. 19(2) as worded, already embodies the constitutional authorization for the Commission on Human Rights to take action in accordance with Art. 13, Sec. 18. There is a command addressed to
Congress to pass whatever civil or penal legislation might be required for the subject. [Bernas]
Atkins v. Virginia Facts: - Court: we take notice of this movement (revisiting the
Atkins Daryl was sentenced to death for shooting a patron of an automated teller machine and for robbery, imposition of penalties for those who are mentally retarded
after he was found guilty of abduction, capital murder and armed robbery. A verdict of “mildly mentally because States, one by one, were changing the rules on the
retarded” pertaining to the health of Atkins, was given by a forensic psychologist. This verdict of the theory that in retarded persons, there is a diminution of malice
psychologist was based on the interview he had with Atkins and with others who knew him, review of because of their mental disability)
school and court records of other crimes and a standard intelligence test which showed that Atkins had a - in the PH, mentally retarded persons cannot be held criminally
full scale IQ of 59. Atkins however appealed against the ruling of the trial court on the ground that liable → mental health facility
sentencing a mentally retarded criminal to death was a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Held:
Under the Eighth Amendment, the capital punishment of a mentally retarded convict is cruel and unusual.
Mentally retarded persons should be tried and punished when they commit crimes once they meet the

law’s requirement. Mentally retarded persons do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes
the most serious adult criminal conduct because of their disabilities in the areas of reasoning, control of
impulses and judgment. Hence, the enactment of the federal government which exempts the mentally
retarded from execution has provided a strong evidence in which the society view the mentally retarded
offenders as less culpable than the average criminal. The mentally retarded person’s disposition often
portrays that they lack remorse for their crimes and they are also poor witnesses because they are not
capable of assisting their counsel. Reversed and remanded.
Lim v. People Facts: - severity of the penalty alone does not make it cruel. It is the
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal modality
Code, by increasing the penalties for estafa, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail - not good for the court to be the arbiter of moral standards
and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution. because they evolve
Held:
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that settled is the rule that a penalty of fine or
imprisonment, when authorized by a statute, is not cruel or degrading unless it is flagrantly oppressive and
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Thus,
while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. The
increase in the penalty, however, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable
purpose,
namely, to avert the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks which
undermines the country's commercial and economic growth.
Lito Corpuz v. People Facts: - if the SC itself did the assessment, it would be usurpation of
An information was filed against Lito Corpuz for the crime of estafa, wherein said Danilo Tangcoy is legislative function
engaged in the business of lending money to casino players, that on May 2, 1991 petitioner Lito Corpuz - what happened here is that there has been no change in the
approached him and offered to sell his jewelry pieces in a commission basis in which Danilo Tangcoy threshold for the crime of estafa. Without an adjustment in the
agreed. He then gave Lito Corpuz several jewelries that has an aggregate value of P98,000 as evidence by threshold amount, the accused can suffer the penalty of
a receipt. Both agreed that within sixty days Lito Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale or if unsold reclusion perpetua for half the price of a laptop
shall return the same. Lito Corpuz then promised to pay the value of the said items. - but not cruel and inhuman. Only harsh. If it’s harshness we’re
On the information filed by Danilo Tangcoy it was said that Lito corpuz with an intent to defraud said talking about, it’s a matter of wisdom congress decides
Tangcoy misappropriated, misapply and convert such jewelries into his personal used. Herein, Lito Corpuz - purpose of imprisonment under the ISL is rehabilitation so
filed a not guilty plea but the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Tangcoy and sentenced Corpuz guilty of imprisonment cannot be considered inhuman. Length of
the crime of estafa and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment under the indeterminate sentence law of 4yrs imprisonment is a matter of wisdom
and 2mons to 14yrs and 8mons. - RA 10951 revising the penalties and fines
Lito Corpuz appealed to the Court of Appeals where it denied the appeal and ruled the same, Corpuz then
appealed to the Supreme Court by way of Certiorari.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that indeed the petitioner Lito Corpuz was guilty of the crime of estafa. In its
decision about the punishment the Supreme Court stated that there seems to be a perceived injustice
brought by the range of penalties, but the high court said that they modify the penalties for that would
constitute judicial legislation and that such duty does not belong to the court but to the legislature. Other
Justices has their own opinion as to the punishment, some concurs with the ponente, others invoked the art
5 of the RPC that in cases of excessive penalties the court shall render the proper decision and shall report
to the chief executive the reasons that such said act should be made subject of legislation and without
suspending the sentence. Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion said that the first paragraph of article 315
should be held unconstitutional as it is against article 19(1) of the Constitution and that according to the
universal declaration of human rights "torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment should be ban",
the Philippines was one of the approving State/community during the UDHR and although is a non binding
instrument, such UDHR forms part of the Philippine law for it is a generally accepted principle of
international law.

Non-imprisonment for Non-payment of Debt or Poll Tax
Art. 3, Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
WHat is the scope of the right?

1. Debt - nay civil obligation arising from a contract. It includes even debts obtained through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution.
2. Poll tax - a specific sum levied upon any person belonging to a certain class without regard to property or occupation.
A tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Hence, its non-payment may be validly punished with imprisonment.
Lozano v. Martinez Facts: - bouncing checks a crime against public order

The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing - concern is the damage to the banking system (economic
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for damage to the public)
decision. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The - what is punished is the issuance with the knowledge that the
defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts account has insufficient funds
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the - penalty does not depend upon the amount because the
respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court damage considered is the damage to the banking system and
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. not to the person who received the check
- no double jeopardy because there were different acts (different
Held: elements → no estafa because there was no damage
BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. While a debtor
cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he
contracted his debt through fraud. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
Double Jeopardy
Art. 3, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Termination of jeopardy:
1. By acquittal
2. By final conviction
3. By dismissal without express consent of the accused
4. By dismissal on the merits
Requisites:
1. A court of competent jurisdiction
2. A complaint/information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
3. Arraignment and plea by the accused
4. Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the case without the express consent of the accused
When is subsequent prosecution barred?

1. Same offense
2. Attempt of the same offense
3. Frustration of the same offense
4. Offense necessarily included in the first offense (all the elements of the second constitute some of the elements the first)
5. Offense that necessarily includes the first offense (all the elements of the first constitute some of the elements of the second)
Exceptions
1. The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
2. The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information.

3. Accused is discharged to be a state witness
When is the defense of double jeopardy available?

1. Dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence
2. Dismissal because of denial of the right to a speedy trial
3. The accused is discharged to be a state witness
The accused cannot be prosecuted a second time for the same offense and the prosecution cannot appeal a judgment of acquittal. [Kepner v. US, 1904]
When an accused appeals his conviction, he waives his right to the plea of double jeopardy. If the accused had been prosecuted for a higher offense but was convicted for a lower offense, he has
technically been acquitted of the higher offense. His appeal would give the court the right to impose a penalty higher than that of the original conviction imposed on him. [Trono v. US, 1905]
Double jeopardy provides three related projections:

1. Against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal
2. Against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction
3. Against multiple punishments for the same offense. [People v. Dela Torre, 2002]
People v. Relova Facts: - unauthorized installation was the means for taking so double
People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an jeopardy. Both crimes arose from the same act
information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the - Sir: alleging a different period of time would have allowed the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of prosecution to file another case
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to
search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and
architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or
decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed
on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be
2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov
24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a
violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy
because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices
without the approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an
ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity
which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st
complaint against Mr.Opulencia.
Held:
Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously
explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The
first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the
second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal
shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges
filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are
not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was
a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act
of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus
making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first
offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense
charged against Mr.Opulencia.
People v. Dela Torre Facts: - after conviction by the trial court, the State wanted to impose a

Appellee Wilfredo Dela Torre was convicted of two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness and four (4) counts higher penalty
of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. The court a quo, however, refused to impose the - double jeopardy because the accused would have to defend
supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the himself again
gravity of the offenses. Hence, the present appeal. Appellant People of the Philippines represented by the - the rule in double jeopardy is that the accused only has to
Solicitor General, contended that the trial court erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each defend himself once
of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. - since the burden is on the state, the accused does not have to
7659. defend himself again. He may be found liable again because a
higher penalty could make him liable for a higher crime
Held: - 3 examples of double jeopardy:
The Supreme Court denied the appeal. According to the Court, the prosecution cannot appeal on the 1. when he is acquitted, and he is tried again
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty even assuming that the penalties 2. when he is convicted, and he is tried again
imposed by the trial court were erroneous because it runs afoul of the right of the accused against double 3. punished several times for the same act
jeopardy. The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for
certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. The error cannot be corrected by the Court on an appeal by
the prosecution.
Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

Art. 3, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
Ex Post Facto Laws

1. Makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal and punishes such action
2. Aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimonies than the law required at the time of the commission the offense in order to convict the defendant.
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
The prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused.
Bills of Attainder
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the
Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.
In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present:
1. The statute specifies persons, groups.
2. The statute is applied retroactively and reaches past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In re: Kay Villegas Facts:

Kami Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., is a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation. It is praying
for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and
duties and whether or not it is an ex post facto law.
Held:
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132, the penalty is imposed
only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. Therefore, it is
not an ex post facto law. The penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law.
People v. Ferrer Facts: - the Anti-Subversion law was not declared as a bill of attainder
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act because the prohibition applies to conduct and not mere
of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against Feliciano Co (an knowledge or intent. The reach of the law was limited to conduct.
officer/leader of the CPP) and Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA. - 3 operative words as determined by the court:
1. knowingly
Held: 2. willfully
This is not a bill of attainder. the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the 3 by overt acts – most important, not knowledge

overthrow of the Government. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having - overt act is the act of the organization which can be attributed
the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not the person. Furthermore, to its members (overt act is rising publicly by taking arms)
membership to these organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, must be attended by an intent to further the goals
of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable.
Academic Freedom
Art. XIV, Sec. 5(2). Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in institutions of higher learning
Q. Do faculty members have Academic Freedom?

YES, faculty members have the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty. It is defined as:
1. A right claimed by the accredited educator, as a teacher and investigator
2. To interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions
3. Without being subjected to interference, molestation or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution
In the same way that students do not lose their rights upon entering the school gates, so too do the faculty retain their rights upon entering the school. This includes one’s right to express one’s self. As
worded, the constitution has no express provision for academic freedom for faculty members
Q. What’s the difference between this and the Academic Freedom of the Learning Institution?
Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objects and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference, save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
(Camacho v Coresis)
COMPONENTS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM:

It encompasses the freedom to determine on academic grounds:
1. Who may teach
2. What may be taught (what the institution wants its teachers to teach)
3. How it shall be taught
4. Who may be admitted to study (allowed as long as there is due process)
Miriam College v. CA Facts: Was this is a case of a right of speech? No. Although the
The members of the editorial board, as well as the writers of Miriam College’s school paper (Chi-Rho) and students want to invoke it, the context of the rights is the
magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) received letters of complaint against them from the institution. These are not standalone rights but since you are in
Miriam community for producing literary pieces that the College has found to be obscene, vulgar, indecent the institution, it should be in the context of what the court
etc. The Chair of MC’s discipline committee, Dr. Aleli Sevilla, required the students to submit a written considers the greater right of the institution.
response but none of the students did.
They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), which they contested, that had jurisdiction over the case. Dr. Sevilla again required the students to
file their answers, but the students reiteration their positions that MC”s Discipline Committee had no
jurisdiction over them. The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte and the following
sanctions were imposed: the students were suspended, expelled, dismissed, and one was not allowed to
attend her graduation.
RTC: Student’s petition for prohibition and certiorari with TRO against jurisdiction of MC discipline board
DENIED. MR GRANTED.
CA: TRO on enforcing dismissal/suspension, RTC & Suspension by MC is VOID.
Held
SC rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against students.
YES, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act (investing jurisdiction on DECS) should be read in a manner
as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we
should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent

with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that the school cannot
suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written,except when
such articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others.
The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a
necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
Morales v. UP Board Facts: - issue was w/n the courts can intervene
of Regents Nadine Morales is a graduating student from UP who shifted from majoring in German to majoring in - not within the province of the courts to intervene in the exercise
French. This shift in majorse caused her to be removed from the list of those graduating with honors. This of academic freedom
is because UP has a rule wherein for language majors, only those subjects which form part of the - (1) no factual basis for the court (UP Code and the
prescribed curriculum will be included in the computation for the final weighted average, which will circumstances were very clear) and (2) no legal basis for the
determine whether or not a student will be granted honors. Since her shift from German to French, some of court (how to teach includes determining both the curriculum and
her German electives were not included in the computation of her grades. Morales attempted to appeal to who can be given recognition).
UP multiple times to no avail. So she attempted to get the courts to intervene to compel UP to include her - as long as there is no violation of due process and equal
electives in the computation of her grades. protection, the courts cannot do anything
Held:
It’s not within the province of the courts to intervene w/in the exercise of academic freedom unless
there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its judgement.
There was no legal basis for the Courts to compel UP to include the German electives in the
computation for her grade.
The wide sphere of autonomy given to universities in the exercise of academic freedom extends to the right
to confer academic honors. The University has exclusive discretion to determine to whom among its
graduates it shall confer academic recognition based on its established standards.
The discretion of schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. (University of San Carlos v CA)
Well-settled is the principle that by reason of special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgement thereon; thus,
their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the university. (UP v Ayson)
Garcia v. Loyola Facts: - no basis because they only kicked her out because she’s a
School of Theology Epicharis Garcia, a woman, was admitted by the Loyola School of Studies leading to an MA in Theology for woman and she can’t become a priest
a summer class. She wanted to enroll again when the term began but the school’s director informed her - in the first place, she wasn’t enrolled. She was only allowed to
that she would not be accepted for readmission because her “frequent questions in class had the effect of edit.
slowing down the progress of the class.” and suggested she study at the UST Graduate school. Garcia - she wanted to enroll but the school refused because of the
inquired in UST and found out that it would take her around an extra 4 or 5 years of study whereas in the effect on her male classmates because they will question the
Loyola school where she was “unlawfully” being refused admission, it would only take an extra 2 years. doctrines (theology school so di encouraged ang pag question
She prayed the Court issue a mandamus against the Loyola School to let her enroll in the semester. ng doctrine)
- under the Catholic church only males can become a priest
Held: - court cannot compel because it goes into the very doctrine that
The faculty admissions committee of the Loyola school had authority and discretion in allowing or barring the school teaches
her admission.
Being a particular educational institution (SEMINARY), mandamus would not lie as Loyola Schools had no
clear duty to admit Garcia, being that she’s a woman, it was a seminary and she was asking questions that
concerned dogma, an exercise more appropriate for graduate school rather than a seminary.

Court considered factors such as academic standards, personality traits, character orientation and nature
of Loyola School as a seminary.
De La Salle University Facts: - clear that although this was outside, it still reflected on the
v. CA Members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity were expelled by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board because of values that the school teaches
their involvement in a rambol between their fraternity and that of Domino Lux, specifically fratman James - right to admit includes the right to exclude
Yap, who sustained injuries because of the incident. Yap filed a complaint for Direct Assault with the DLSU- - rule of proportionality should be applied. Slight physical injury
CSB Joint Discipline Board which resulted in the expulsion of some of the students. Respondents argued lang so hindi dapat expulsion
lack of due process for there was no hearing conducted and they were not allowed to cross-examine the - the values should be used in determining the proportionality of
witnesses against them. the penalty
Held:
There was due process. A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times essential to due process.
In administrative cases, it is mostly an opportunity to be heard. Such as investigations of students found

violating school discipline, there are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are:
a. that the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired;
c. that they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. that they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. that the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges
against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses against them.
Human Rights
Characteristics of Human Rights:

1. Inherent
2. Inalienable
3. Indivisible
4. Interdependent
1 Commission on Human Rights

Art. 13, Sec, 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office
and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and regularly released.
Art. 13, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government’s compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Art. 13, Sec. 19. The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendations.
The CHR is an independent body.
The 2 Main Powers of the CHR are:

1. to investigate
2. to monitor compliance of the Philippines to international human rights obligations
Carino v. CHR Facts: - CHR does not have prosecutorial powers

Members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers - CHR cannot be given prosecutorial powers because these
(ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged powers are already performed by the DOJ and Ombudsman
failure of the public authorities to act upon their grievances. The teachers participating in the mass actions (these are executive functions)
were served with an order of the Secretary of Education (Hon. Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours
or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Respondents were
preventively suspended for 90 days and temporarily replaced.
The teachers submitted sworn statements to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The CHR sent a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance in a dialogue. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
Held:
The CHR does not have the power to adjudicate the case. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
Simon v. CHR Facts:

A Demolition Notice, signed by Carlos Quimpo, was sent to the officers and members of the North EDSA
Vendors Association, Incorporated where they were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate
the premises of North EDSA. The group filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners and
the CHR issued an order directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North Edsa pending resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission and ordered
said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
Held:
The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and from implementing the
penalty for contempt. The CHR’s focus must be on violations of human rights such as (1) protection of
rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoner and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials,
(4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious.

2 Civil Liability for Violation of Rights
Lim v. Ponce De Leon Facts: To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough
A complaint was filed against Jikil Taha alleging that a year after he sold his motor launch, he forcibly took that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
the same. After the preliminary investigation, Fiscal Ponce de Leon filed an information for robbery with plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted
force and intimidation filed an information for robbery with force and intimidation upon person and directed with malice or bad faith.
the Provincial Commander of Palawan to impound the motor launch subject of the criminal offense. The
Provincial Commander in turn directed Detachment Commander Orlando Maddela to seize the motor The Constitutional Right violated was the RIGHT AGAINST
launch from Delfin Lim, a subsequent vendee, Jikil Taha and Delfin Lim filed a complaint for damages ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. Because there was no
against Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela alleging, among others, that the motor launch was search warrant and the order came from the prosecutor who
seized without a search warrant. The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure and ordered plaintiffs to does not have the power to issue a search warrant, this power is
pay jointly and severally actual and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees. Hence, this appeal. vested with the judge. THERE WAS NO LAWFUL ORDER.
Held:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling holding that the seizure without a warrant was illegal and violative
of the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizure even if the thing seized was the
corpus delicti of a crime; and ordered fiscal Ponce de Leon to pay Delfin Lim actual and moral damages
plus attorney's fees.
Aberca v. Ver Facts: The concept of Respondeat Superior is not applicable in this
Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against case. It presupposes a superior and a subordinate. The liability
Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases in this case is not under this doctrine but instead is borne out of
defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and causality. Also, Art. 32 is clear; DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY.
interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating
that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus
was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was
no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs
to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR
for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and
MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.
Held:
Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. These
rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else
liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them
to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official
duties”. Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional
rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the
illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the
writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of
obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as people
who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior officers are the ones who
gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were
the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted
all the facts stated in the complaint.
MHP Garments v. CA Facts:

In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In
their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." Sometime in

October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman (“Larry”), an employee of MHP, was then tasked to
undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other constabulary
men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
WITHOUT any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts
were issued for the seized items and the items were then turned over to MHP for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but during its
pendency, Larry exacted from respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped from the complaint.
However, after the preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against
all the private respondents and ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of
business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the seized items were returned and the other items
returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against MHP and Larry (note: the
PC officers were not sued for damages). The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents which was later
on affirmed by CA.
Held:
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for
violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to
violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the
search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure.
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger
to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he
was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.
The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly
involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure:
● FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.
● SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a
warrant.
● THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents'
claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
3 UN Treaty Bodies
Wilson v. Executive Facts:

Secretary Wilson was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the RTC of Valenzuela and was
imposed the death penalty. The SC reversed the RTC because there was not enough evidence to support
the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by Wilson. Wilson was released from
detention the day after and immediately left for the UK. Wilson sought compensation from the Board of
Claims (BoC) of the DOJ which granted him P14,000 but was subsequently raised to 40,000. Wilson filed
with the UNHRC a case against the RP for violations of the ICCPR. The UNHCR issued a View that the
allegations were inadmissible and that the compensation provided by the State was not directed at these
violations, and that compensation due to the author should take due account both of the seriousness of the
violations and the damage to the author caused. Wilson also asked the Executive Secretary to increase the
reparation due him. Wilson filed a petition for mandamus because the RP is in breach of an international
obligation since any View issued by the Committee constitutes part of international law and that the RP is

obligated to enforce the same.
Held:
Mandamus does not lie because it is not a purely ministerial duty. Wilson also has no clear legal right
because any View only displays "important characteristics of a judicial decision" and are not per se
decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views, therefore, are mere recommendations to guide the
State it is issued against. The recommendations are matters which are best taken up by the Legislative and
the Executive branches of government as can be seen by the formation of the Presidential Human Rights
Committee.
Citizenship
Art. 4, Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Art. 4, Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Art. 4, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Art. 4, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Art. 4, Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Citizens on May 14, 1935 - the date of the adoption of the 1935 Constitution
1. Persons born in the Philippine Islands who resided therein on April 11, 1899 and were Spanish subjects on that date, unless they had lost their Philippine citizenship on or before May 14,
1935.
2. Natives of the Spanish Peninsula who resided in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and who did not declare their intention of preserving their Spanish nationality between that date and
October 11, 1900, unless they had lost their Philippine citizenship on or before May 14, 1935.
3. Naturalized citizens of Spain who resided in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and did not declare their intention to preserve their Spanish nationality within the prescribed period (up to
October 11, 1900).
4. Children born of (1), (2) and (3) subsequent to April 11, 1899, unless they lost their Philippine citizenship on or before May 14, 1935.
5. Persons who became naturalized citizens of the Philippines in accordance of naturalization law since its enactment on March 26, 1920.
Citizens Under the 1935 Constitution

1. Those who are citizens at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands
3. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of 1935
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law

1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
3. Those who elected to be citizens. This is available only to:
a. those born before January 17, 1973
b. to Filipino mothers and
c. elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
4. Those naturalized in accordance with law.
Art. 4, Sec. 1(3), 1987 Constitution is also applicable to those who are born to Filipino mothers and elected Philippine citizenship before February 2, 1987. This is to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect

Philippine citizenship.
Modes of Acquiring Citizenship

1. By birth
a. Jus Soli - “right of soil;” person’s nationality is based on place of birth; formerly effective in the Philippines
b. Jus Sanguinis – “right of blood;” person’s nationality follows that of his natural parents. The Philippines currently adheres to this principle.
2. By naturalization - judicial process by which a foreigner is adopted by the country and clothed with the privileges of a native-born citizen. The applicant must prove that he has all of the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for citizenship
Dual Citizenship
Allows a person who acquires foreign citizenship to simultaneously enjoy the rights he previously held as a Filipino citizen.
Dual Allegiance
1. Aliens who are naturalized as Filipinos but remain loyal to their country of origin
2. Public officers who, while serving the government, seek citizenship in another country
“Dual citizens” are disqualified from running for any elective local position. (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, sec. 40[d]); this should be read as referring to “dual allegiance” (see
below)
Once a candidate files his candidacy, he is deemed to have renounced his foreign citizenship in case of dual citizenship. [Mercado v. Manzano (1999)]
Clearly, in including sec. 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, sec. 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, sec. 20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
Expatriation
Expatriation is a constitutional right. No one can be compelled to remain a Filipino if he does not want to.
How May Citizenship be Reacquired?

1. Naturalization
2. Repatriation - results in the recovery of the original nationality. Therefore, if he is a natural-born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino. Repatriation requires an express and equivocal act. In the absence of any official action or approval by proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation does not, and cannot,
amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.
3. Legislative Act
Tecson v. COMELEC Facts: - citizenship under the Jones Law was based on continued
Victorina X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ, claiming he is not a natural-born residence
Filipino citizen. - illegitimacy was not a relevant issue because FPJ was an
She alleged that FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, is an American and FPJ’s father, Allan Poe, is a acknowledged child
Spanish national because he is son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Even if Allan Poe was a Filipino - under American law, FPJ would not be American because he
citizen, FPJ is an illegitimate child since Poe had a previous marriage with Paulita Gomez. Even if he was was born here
not married to Gomes, Kelley and Poe married a year after FPJ was born, which still makes him - what saved him was the acknowledgement
illegitimate.
Held:
Lorenzo Poe, FPJ’s parental grandfather was born sometime in 1870, is presumed to have lived in
Pangasinan, his place of death, If so, he would have benefitted from the “en masse” Filipinization from the
Philippine Bill in 1902. This citizenship, if acquired, was passed on to Allan Poe, who also passed it to FPJ.
The 1935 constitution confers citizenship to all whose fathers are Filipinos, regardless of legitimacy.
FPJ’s father was Filipino and his mother was American. Even if FPJ was illegitimate, his father’s citizenship
is transferred to him.
In the absence of contrary evidence, it should be sound to conclude/presume that the place of residence of

a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Thus, if he died after the mass
naturalization happened, he is considered to have died as a Filipino. à Lorenzo pou died in Phils.
Contested whether he is in Phils during 1898-1902.
An illegitimate child should follow the citizenship of mother only because we are sure that she is his mother.
The 1987 Constitution equalizes the right to citizenship of children born to Filipino mothers OR fathers
(follow the blood).
There were no “Filipinos” prior to the Philippine Bill of 1902. The term “natural born citizen” was coined by
the Americans. Natural born as a legal concept seems to assume that you have special loyalty to the
country or that one has special qualifications.
Republic v. Lim Facts: - if parents were married, Lim would be stateless (something that
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother, who the court wanted to prevent)
never got married due to a prior subsisting marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there - would have only been a Filipino if she elected it.
were few mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit: - court scrutinized the documents to find out → mother did not
1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu” in all of her school lose citizenship because there was no valid marriage → Lim was
records and in her marriage certificate. an illegitimate child so she followed her mother’s citizenship →
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co Tian)” when it should even if on the assumption that they were validly married, Lim
have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).” would be a Filipino because of constructive election of
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that citizenship as she registered as a voter (when you register you
her father and mother got married. register under oath)
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in fact, it should have
been illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s petition.
Held:
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The Supreme Court held that the two above
provisions only apply to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of the respondent who was an
illegitimate child considering that her parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no more need for
her to validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered as a voter
inside the country when she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
The Republic’s submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her
father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she has
been using ever since she can remember. The court held that prohibiting the respondent to use her father’s
surname would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates the use of
aliases as well as the jurisprudence state that it is allowed for a person to use a name “by which he has
been known since childhood”. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father
from using his surname. While judicial authority is required for a chance of name or surname, there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since
childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship
remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause
prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced
or be the object of future mischief.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC Facts: - you can lose your citizenship

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. - repatriation also a judicial proceeding
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the - when one reacquires, he has to go under the same procedure
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. as a foreigner, because under the law he is indeed a foreigner
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized - repatriation applies retroactively to the date of application (court
as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era. said you can retroact because it is more favorable); it will revert
to his original citizenship

Held:
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of
the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the
US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Bengson v. HRET Respondent Cruz was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Filipino citizenship by reason of his enlistment - when he filed the CoC, it was under oath (constructive
with the US Marine Corps and subsequent naturalization. He reacquired his citizenship thru repatriation repatriation)
and was able to run for public office. Petitioner Bengson filed a quo warranto case claiming that R’s
repatriation meant that he was no longer a natural-born citizen. The Court held that if one acquires Filipino
citizenship by means other than naturalization, he or she is considered a natural-born citizen. Cruz’s
Filipino citizenship was only restored, meaning he reverted back to his previous state of citizenship (i.e.,
that of being natural born). In repatriation, the original nationality of a person is recovered.
Cordora v. Facts: - dual citizenship allowed by law; not a disqualification from

Tambunting Tambunting ran for a public local office which was opposed by Cordora. The latter alleged that Tambunting running for office
was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and - dual citizenship different from dual allegiance
residency requirements. In lieu with this, Cordora seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making - he would have to renounce his other citizenship so that there
untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he would be no dual allegiance and that he can be allowed to run
did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. Tambunting further denied that he was - never lost his filipino citizenship because he never renounced it
naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after
Tambunting's father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting's citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting's possession of an American passport did
not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18
November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth.
Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been educated in
Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown
by his service as councilor of Parañaque.
The COMELEC En Banc was convinced and affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC
Law Department that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and
convincing evidence.
Held:
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting
acquired at birth. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states.
Suffice it to say, that the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 (Oath of Allegiance and an execution of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship) do not apply to Tambunting for the reason that he is natural-born

Filipino. The twin requirements apply only when a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's
foreign citizenship.
David v. Agbay Facts: - reacquisition vs retention

In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his - reacquisition will apply to those who lost their PH citizenship by
wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, virtue of Commonwealth Act 63
Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built - retention of PH citizenship applies to future instances
their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, on October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07
issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto).
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and authorityto convey the same. The dispute had
in fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.
On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to
indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.
Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country re-
acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization.
Held:
David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his MLA. He made an untruthful statement
in his MLA that he was a Filipino citizen at the time he filed the document but he was in fact at that time a
Canadian Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
that has no retroactive effect in as so far as his false misrepresentation.
Poe-Llamanzares v. In her COC for presidency, Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Ph - pag qualification, jurisdiction is on HRET → qualification can
COMELEC up to the day before the election would be 10 years and 11 months. Petitions were filed to deny or cancel only be questioned if the candidate won
her candidacy on the ground that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot - COMELEC gravely abused discretion because it assumed
prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos, as she was a foundling. The Court held jurisdiction and also applied the law incorrectly (in not saying that
that Poe is considerably a natural-born Filipino for three reasons. First, there is a high probability that her Poe is not a natural-born citizen because it put the burden on
parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos and she was abandoned as an infant in a her. The burden should be on the one alleging.
municipality where the population is overwhelmingly Filipino. Second, the Court pronounced that foundlings - foundling are persons whose parentage are unknown
are, as a class, natural-born Filipinos. Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born - two categories of persons under the 1935 Consti. Convention:
citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international law. 1. Legitimate
2. Parentage is unknown
- only reason why foundlings were not included in the
enumeration was because there were so few of them that they’re
not worthy of a provision

- they will be stateless if not recognized, if naturalized, presumed
na they weren’t citizens before and had to undergo a process to
acquire citizenship
- SC looked at intl law. customary intl law on statelessness. In
many intl law, the right to nationality is recognized because it is
the key to enjoyment of rights. One of the most impt rights of a
person is citizenship.
- most rights spring from the right to nationality
- no distinction in intl law between enjoyment of rights of citizens
and non-citizens. Distinctions lie on privileges.
- going back to the foundling, customary intl law does not favor
statelessness. It puts the burden on the state to give citizenship
to persons
- presumption is that the child who is a citizen is a natural-born
citizen
- naturalization presumes that the person is not a filipino to begin
with
- adoption laws provide for the adoption of filipino children
(exercise of parens patriae). Already a presumption that all
children who are foundlings are filipino because otherwise
adoption cannot be had. Presumption became conclusive
because dswd has to confirm that she is filipino before being
adopted
David v. SET Facts: - burden of David to show that Grace Poe is not a natural-born
Arguments of petitioner: citizen by virtue of the previous decision in Poe v Comelec
Poe is not qualified to be a member of the Senate on account of her not being a natural-born citizen. - Bengson: when one is repatriated it reverts to the citizenship
1. Poe does not fall under any of the classes of natural-born citizens enumerated in Sec. 1, Art. IV, status of the person prior to his naturalization as a citizen of
1987 Constitution. To be a natural-born citizen, one’s parents must be Filipino citizens. Poe another country
cannot claim natural-born status as her parents are not known and cannot be presumed as - Poe’s repatriation would revert back to her being filipino citizen
Filipino citizens. (natural-born as per poe v Comelec)
2. The provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of - in the case of frivaldo, he was required to naturalize because of
Nationality Laws and the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are not the law on dual nationality
applicable because the Philippines has yet to accede to both Conventions.
3. Poe’s adoption did not confer upon her the status of natural-born citizen. The effect of the
adoption is to confer unto her legitimate status.
Arguments of respondents:
Poe asserts that she is a natural-born citizen and is eligible to sit as a Senator
1. As early as the 1935 Constitution, it was always the intention of the framers to consider
foundlings found in the Philippines as Filipino citizens.
2. Poe invokes Art. 7 of the UNCRC and Art. 24 of the ICCPR. Both treaties are ratified by the
Philippines. These treaties create an obligation on the part of the Philippines to recognize a
foundling as its citizen from the time of the foundling’s birth. Although neither the ICCPR nor the
UNCRC was in force when she was born in 1968, each may apply retroactively to the date of her
birth. To rule otherwise would be to discriminate against foundlings born before the ratification of
these treaties.
3. Poe invokes Art. 15 of the UDHR which recognizes the right of everyone to a nationality.
4. Poe invokes Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws. The
presumption that a foundling is a citizen of the State in which she is found is a generally
accepted principle of international law.
5. Poe invokes Art. 2 of the UN Convention on Statelessness which expresses a rebuttable
presumption of descent from a citizen, consistent with jus sanguinis.
6. Finally, Poe argues that she validly reacquired her natural-born status pursuant to R.A. No. 9225.
Held:

1. From the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention on citizenship, it was never the
intention of the framers to exclude foundlings from natural-born citizenship status.
● “Children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens of this nation”
and the only reason that there was no specific reference to foundlings in the 1935
provision was that these cases “are few and far in between.”
● Evident intent was to adopt the concept found in the Spanish Code “wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards,
because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard.”
2. Under Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930 (on Conflict of Nationality Laws), a foundling is
presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found until the contrary is
proved.
● Although the Philippines is not a signatory to said convention, its provisions are binding
as they form part of the law of the land pursuant to the incorporation clause.
● Sr. Roxas in the 1934 Constitutional Convention remarked “By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in
this nation is recognized…” By referring to this rule in international law (which was no
other than Art. 14 of the Hague Convention of 1930), what was effectively created in
the Constitution itself, was an exception to the general rule of natural-born citizenship
based on blood descent.
3. Hence, foundlings (children born in the Philippines with unknown parentage) were, by birth,
accorded natural-born citizenship by the Constitution.
● “natural-born citizens by legal fiction”
● The framers of the Constitution were sufficiently empowered to create a class of
natural-born citizens by legal fiction, as an exception to the jus sanguinis rule. This is
evident from Art. 1 (State to determine who are its nationals) and Art. 2 (questions on
nationality to be determined by the law of that State) of the 1930 Hague Convention
4. Poe validly reacquired her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic, as required under Section 3, R.A. No. 9225
● Before assuming her position as MTRCB Chairman, Poe executed an affidavit of
renunciation of foreign citizenship. This was sufficient to qualify her for her appointive
position, and later, her elective office as R.A. No. 9225 did not require that her
Certificate of Loss of Nationality filed before the U.S. Embassy be first approved in
order that she may qualify for office.
● Records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Poe still used her U.S. passport after
having taken her Oath of Allegiance but not after she has renounced her U.S.
Citizenship.
Suffrage
Art. 5, Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Art. 5, Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such
rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
What is suffrage?
The right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in determination of questions submitted to the people.
Kinds of election:
1. Regular - one provided by law for the election of officers either nation-wide or in certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the full term of the former officers
2. Special - one held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected.
3. Plebiscite - election at which any proposed amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution is submitted to the people for their ratification. It is also the means by which the voter in affected
areas consent or object to the change in the form of local government.
4. Referendum - submission of a law passed by the national or local legislative body to the registered voters at an election called for the purpose for their ratification or rejection.

5. Initiative - the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
6. Recall - the termination of official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.
Three systems of initiative:

1. Initiative on the Constitution
2. Initiatives on statutes
3. Initiatives on local legislation
Election Period
Unless otherwiaw fixed by the COMELEC in special cases, the election period shall commence 90 days before the day of the election and shall end 30 days thereafter.
Qualifications:
1. Citizenship - Filipino citizen by birth or naturalization. Any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
2. Age - at least 18 at the time of the election
3. Residency - it is not necessary that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a municipality. It is enough that he should live there, provided that his stay
is accompanied by his intention to reside therein permanently.
4. Not otherwise disqualified by law
Grounds for Disqualification Under RA 8189:

1. Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1 year (unless granted a plenary pardon or an amnesty) shall automatically reacquire right to vote upon the expiration of
5 years after the service of sentence.
2. Adjudged by final judgment for having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government (e.g. rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms law) or any crime against
national security (unless restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with law) shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon the expiration of 5 years after the service of
sentence
3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority
In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election, plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the Permanent List of Voters for the city or municipality in which he resides.
No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Registration is not a qualification. It is only a pre-requisite to make sure that those registered are actually qualified to vote.
Akbayan v. Facts: - SC cannot compel COMELEC to provide extension for

COMELEC Around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the registration or other registration dates
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. A request to conduct a two-day additional - SC: up to the Comelec to set the date but it cannot go beyond
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. the prohibitive period as it is an absolute prohibition
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the - example of exceptions to the 120-day period: natural calamity
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no or armed conflict
more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. - it was not shown that they could not have actually registered
during the period. They were informed but they did not register.
Held: Negligence on their part. You cannot go to court with unclean
The Supreme Court cannot compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of new voters. The right to hands.
suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. - they wanted to register during the period kung kalian hindi na
Petitioners failed to register, thus missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that sila pwede mag register
the President issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of special
registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend Republic Act No. 8189.
Kabataan v. Facts: - why did the court say that the Comelec can be compelled to
COMELEC In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks to extend the voters registration for the May provide additional registration days?
10, 2010 national and local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8514, - SC: clear violation of the right to suffrage because they weren’t
to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the 120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010. asking for an extension but Comelec issued a deadline that was
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A. 8189 which reads: "The personal way before the start of the 90 or 120-day period
filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer - pwede pa sana sila mag register pero di na pinayagan ng
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one Comelec
hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election." - no need to prove a compelling state interest dahil na violate na
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code confer upon right nila

it the power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections; that
Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it to fix other dates for pre-election acts
which include voters registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by operational and
pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
Held:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and
participate to the fullest extent in every national or local election is so zealously guarded by Article V of the
1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during
office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a
special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of Congress that the 120 day or 90 day
period, as the case may be, was enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter's registration under R.A.
8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-election
activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within the period provided by law. However, this grant
of power, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the common
underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that continuing voter's registration cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The court explained that if the petitioners
had only filed their petition, and sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer would
have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution fixing voters registration for the May 10,
2010 national and local elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
Kabataan v. Facts: - biometrics can be a requirement for registration as a voter

COMELEC RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new because it is an exercise of police power; reasonable to require
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometrics because the lawful purpose is honest and clean
biometric technology. election; means is requiring biometrics; reasonable connection
because it is a way of weeding out those registered multiple
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit times
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of - but this affects the right to privacy; compelling state interest test
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated x x x.” – interest is to eliminate the multiple registrants; no violation of
rights
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to
submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Held:
Biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the
registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The
process of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Although one is deemed to be a
“qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution, the same cannot be struck
down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental

interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the burden befalls
upon the State to prove the same.
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and
credible elections by containing the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and
multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest
Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter
is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent
evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.
Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves to
validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation process
one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter.
Failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding
elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.
The 120-and 90-day periods refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer
be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such
time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the
administrative necessities and other exigencies.

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Right to Information

Two aspects of the right to information:

Matter Demand to Access What is asserted Notes

Policy of Full Public All transactions involving Duty to disclose of the

Limitations on the right to information:

Case Title Summary Notes

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 1

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 2

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 3

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority.

Q. What is the meaning of the non-establishment clause?

Q. What is the meaning of free exercise of religion?

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 4

Islamic Da’wah Facts:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 5

Aglipay v. Ruiz Facts:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 6

Liberty of Abode and the Right to Travel

A watch list order can be issued against:

A hold-departure order can be issued against:

Liberty of Abode Right to Travel

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 7

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 8

Philippine Association Facts:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 9

What is the scope of the right?

What is not included in the right?

Q. Do all societies and associations enjoy the same constitutional protection?

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 10

In re Edillon Facts: IBP is not an organization. It is a regulatory mechanism of the

Boy Scouts of Facts: QUESTIONS ON LETTING TRANS WOMEN JOIN

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 11

The requisites for impairment are:

Contemporary Application of the Contract Clause

When non-impairment clause yields:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 12

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 13

Criminal procedure in the philippines:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 14

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement.

Q. Is a urine sample obtained in violation of Sec. 12 admissible as evidence?

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 15

Q. Is investigation by an administrative body covered by Section 12?

Q. When does the protection of Section 12(1) end?

People v. Mahinay Facts: Rights of the suspect under custodial investigation:

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 16

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 17

Who are entitled to bail?

When is bail available?

Q. Why is bail awarded to the accused?

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 18

Paderanga v. CA Facts: This case was the origin of hospital arrest.

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 19

Rights of the Accused

Rights of the accused from the time the information is filed:

Q. When does the presumption of innocence end?

Q. What is the equipoise rule?

Q. What is the remedy for violation of the right to speedy trial?

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 20

People v. Flores Facts: The issue is about the information

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 21

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 22

SICAD, DE LEON, DIAZ, & ARQUERO | UP LAW | A2021 23

Writ of Habeas Corpus