REM Batch1 Cases

1. G.R. No.
198356, April 20, 2015
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND
SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER
THEM
DECISION
BRION, J.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de
Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City,
described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand
nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made sure
to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses
were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while
Macario occupied the other one.
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the
dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS
and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each
accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises. SO
ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic
Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of
the criminal case. On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final. Notwithstanding the dismissal,
the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal
of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration. The respondents
thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders
dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-
45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or
implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996. SO ORDERED.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana. After filing their Answer,21 the respondents
moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending
between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses
Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC Ruling
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments
advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC
likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration. From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls
REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has
jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate
was made. Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated October 24, 2008
and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. he Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil
Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the court's jurisdiction over an action
involving title to or possession of land is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive
jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the subject lot falls within MeTC's
jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based
on the assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already prescribed, the action having
been filed beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the
actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been
filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file action was issued on November
25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the
RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009
are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED
The Spouses Supapo moved but failed to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to us through the
present petition.
The Petition
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
The Respondents' Case
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription;
and (3) barred by res judicata.
Issues
Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Ruling
MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue
of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.36
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property
is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by
its assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in
Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration. Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold
that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
The cause of action has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more
than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the
Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the
period provided by law.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
The action is not barred by prior judgment

The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order
must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on the merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case. While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no
identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law
and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo,
was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand,
was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo. Second, there is no identity of subject matter.
The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion
publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property. And third, there is no identity of
causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve
governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed
the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its
possession.
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has
a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such,
this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
111674. SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 164560, July 22, 2009
ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO and ALEJO DOPEÑO vs. HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity
as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL
TARO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint against herein petitioners and Wood Crest
Residents Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an
assessed value of ₱32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with
malice and evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject
property. Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property. It was
further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property was spurious. Private
respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be
ordered to surrender possession of subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered
to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss said complaint on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The MeTC then
issued an Order dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property of small
value. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was denied.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in its Decision5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in
accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real property located in Quezon
City, with an assessed value not exceeding ₱50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration6of the Decision was filed by
petitioners, but was denied in an Order7 dated July 3, 2003.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the MeTC and RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint
for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. In the assailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003,
the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have availed
themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal was denied per
Resolution dated June 1, 2004.
ISSUE
Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses
Lumocso,12 to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real
property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein."
xxxx
x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of
which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to property under Section
19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994,
which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title
to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and
second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was
introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for Accion
Reivindicatoria.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, dated September 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005

CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and
PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, respondent.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Factual Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They
alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
1. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated
as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary
share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by
the plaintiffs[]fathers co-heirs;
2. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs
father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
3. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have
(sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
4. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang,
to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
5. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame,
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
6. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.[3]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor,
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant
to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691. He averred that (1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute; (2) the complaint does not
sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action; both of which are
essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed
value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for
which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed
value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC.
The petitioners opposed the motion. They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court
can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering
that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to
the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced
evidence that the land is of such value.
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim.[9] Traversing
the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the
property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-
Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention[10] making common cause with
the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.[11]
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had
an assessed value of P5,950.00.[12]
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and Dismissing
defendants counterclaim. SO ORDERED.[13]

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the CA,
which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its
refilling in the proper court. SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A. No. 7691.
ISSUE
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs
in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The Ruling of the Court

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls
within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made
mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners
maintain that their action is also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.

It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.[18] The
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon
the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC
was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for
the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its
object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based
on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess.
It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property.
They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who
was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property
despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession
thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section
33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined
by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed
value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of
the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.[20] The fair market value is the price
at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy. Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of
the property subject of the complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of
lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether
the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the
assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the
tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that
the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over
the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00.[23]
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the
property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and
the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration
secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth
3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is
an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as
appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.[24]
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[25]
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages
exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting
the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8)
and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining
the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action involving title to, or possession of real
property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are
merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
4. [G.R. No. 140973. November 11, 2004]

JUSTINO LARESMA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO P. ABELLANA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Factual Antecedents
On May 24, 1994, respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo,
Cebu, Branch 29, against petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E of subdivision plan
psd. 271428, a parcel of agricultural land located in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu. The lot had an area of 21,223 square
meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47171. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the petitioner had
been a lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that sometime in 1985, the
petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took possession of his property and deprived him of its
possession.[1] The respondent prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the petitioner
to vacate the property and pay him actual damages, attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation.[2] Appended to the complaint
was a contract of lease[3] executed by the petitioners wife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma, on March 1, 1977, over a parcel
of land owned by Socorro Chiong covered by Tax Declaration No. 05561.
To support his complaint, the respondent presented his father, Teotimo Abellana, as witness. Teotimo testified that
the petitioner married his maid, Praxedes Seguisabal, after which the couple resided in the property of Socorro
Chiong,[4] which abutted the property of the petitioner and a portion of the property of the Spouses Vicente and Susana
Paras. The petitioner thus became a tenant of Socorro Chiong. Teotimo further narrated that sometime in 1989 and 1990,
the petitioner transferred his house to the property of his son, the respondent, in the process destroying coconut trees
planted on the property to pave the way for the construction of the barangay hall. According to the witness, he reported the
incident to the office of the chief of police and the barangay captain. However, the matter was not acted upon.[5]
Teotimo also testified that his son, the respondent, purchased the property from his uncle, Mariano Paras, who, in
turn, bought the same from his parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras.[6] Based on the said sale, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. 47171 over the property under the name of the respondent on April 2, 1980.[7] The respondent had
since then declared the property for taxation purposes,[8] and paid the realty taxes therefor.[9] Teotimo declared that he
requested Geodetic Engineer Lordeck Abella to relocate the property, and the engineer prepared a sketch plan showing
that the said lot abutted the property of Socorro Chiong on the northeast and that of Agnes Abellana on the north.[10] He
admitted that he and the respondent were informed that the property had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT), and that they refused to acknowledge the information.[11]
The respondents aunt, Socorro Chiong, testified that on October 14, 1972, she and Felicidad Paras Montecillo
purchased from her parents, the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras, a 19-hectare land in Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu,
Lot 4-C of Psd. 271428 Lot 4-E, covered by Tax Declaration No. 009088.[12] Chiongs parents died in 1977. In an Order
dated November 8, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) affirmed the July 11, 1988 Ruling of the DAR Regional
Director that the deed of sale over the property executed by her parents in her favor was valid; that the tenants therein,
including Justino Laresma and his wife, were bound by the said sale; and that the tenanted portion of the property, including
that portion leased to Praxedes Laresma, was outside the scope of the OLT.[13] She confirmed that the property of the
respondent abutted her property on the north.[14]
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner averred that the dispute between him and the respondent was agrarian
in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession covered by Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-031817 issued to his wife Praxedes. He alleged that the property titled in the name of the
respondent consisted of a portion of that property owned by the Spouses Vicente and Susana Paras covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 780 which was placed under OLT under Presidential Decree No. 27. Being a beneficiary of the
agrarian reform program of the government, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 on July 13, 1982 over a portion of the
property, Lot No. 00013, with an area of 0.1700 hectares. Since then, he and his wife became owners of the property and,
as such, were entitled to the possession thereof.
The parties agreed to defer further proceedings for the conduct of an ocular inspection of the property to determine
whether Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817 was, indeed, a part of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. On January
13, 1995, the trial court issued an Order allowing the said inspection with Socorro Chiong in attendance.[15] The parties
were advised to make a report on the same. The court designated its process server, Felix Navarro, as its representative
during the inspection.[16] The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, for its part, designated Municipal Agrarian Reform
Technologist Alberto Epan as its representative.
On February 16, 1995, Epan inspected the property in the presence of the petitioner. The petitioner pointed to Epan
eight of the ten OLT muniments. Epan also noticed that there were coconuts scattered on the property, that corn was planted
in the plan area, and that the house of the respondent was in the property titled to the petitioner. On February 17, 1995, the
parties respective counsels, including Navarro and Epan, inspected the property. Epan, thereafter, submitted his Report
dated February 22, 1995,[17] with a sketch at the dorsal portion showing the respective locations of the property cultivated
by the respondent, his house and the OLT muniments.[18] Navarro submitted a separate report on March 7,
1995,[19] where it was indicated that the parties had agreed that the house of the petitioner was located at the respondents
property.
The petitioner denied being the tenant of the respondent. He testified and adduced evidence that he and his wife
were married on September 23, 1953,[20] and, thereafter, resided in the property of the Spouses Paras[21] where he was
a tenant.[22] He delivered one-half of the produce from the land to Susana Paras and kept the rest as his share. Shortly
thereafter, the Spouses Paras sold a portion of the property to the respondent. Sometime in 1976 or 1977, the subject
property was placed under the OLT.[23] The respondent and Roque Paras protested the inclusion of the property, which
was, however, rejected.[24] The petitioner also testified that after the death of the Spouses Paras, he gave the share of the
produce to the spouses daughter, Socorro Chiong.[25]
The petitioner further testified that on July 13, 1982, his wife was issued CLT No. 0-031817 over Lot No. 00013, the
property he was cultivating. The lot had an area of 0.1700 hectares and was located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu.
Because of lack of funds, his wife was able to make only partial payments of her amortizations for the property to the Land
Bank of the Philippines for which she was issued receipts.[26] After CLT No. 0-031817 was issued to his wife, he kept all
the produce from the land.
The petitioner also presented Felix Navarro and Alberto Epan who affirmed their respective reports on the conduct
of the inspection on the property.
On October 30, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant
declaring:
1 - That plaintiff as the lawful owner in fee simple of the entire real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47171 [Exhibit D]; and, declaring further that plaintiff is entitled to recover possession thereof from defendant;
2 - That the occupation, use, and possession of defendant under the latters claim as bona fide tenant of plaintiff
over the latters property is null and void ab initio in violation of aforecited provision of the Code of Agrarian Reform,
R.A. 3884;
3 - That defendant, his wife, Praxedes Laresma and their children and his agents or representative are hereby
ordered to vacate and to surrender the entire possession, use, and occupation of said real property covered by TCT
No. 47171 to and in favor of plaintiff;
4 - That defendant is hereby declared liable and ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00 as actual damages,
the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P5,000.00 as costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The court ruled that, as evidenced by the contract of lease executed by Praxedes Laresma and Socorro Chiong, the
petitioner was the tenant of Chiong and not of the respondent. Thus, the court had jurisdiction over the case. The court
rejected the reports of Epan and Navarro, and considered the same as barren of probative weight, considering that the said
reports failed to take into account the technical descriptions of Lot 4-C owned by Chiong, Lot 4-E covered by TCT No.
47171, and Lot 00013 covered by CLT No. 0-031817.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING
NO.
We agree with the respondent that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the petitioner. The bone
of contention of the parties and the decisive issue in the trial court was whether or not Lot No. 00013 covered by CLT No.
0-031817 is a portion of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 under the name of the respondent. This is the reason why the
parties agreed to have Lot No. 00013 resurveyed in relation to Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and to Lot 4-E titled in the
name of the respondent. After a calibration of the evidence on record and the reports of Epan and Navarro, the trial court
ruled that Lot No. 00013 formed part of Lot 4-C owned by Socorro Chiong and not of Lot 4-E titled in the name of the
respondent
We agree with the ruling of the RTC that, as gleaned from the material averments of his complaint, the action of the
respondent against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-
entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.[32] In Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation,[33] we
ruled that the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant.[34] Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. We also
held in Arcelona v. Court of Appeals[35] that, in American jurisprudence, the nullity of a decision arising from lack of
jurisdiction may be determined from the record of the case, not necessarily from the face of the judgment only.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court that based on the material allegations of the respondents complaint and
even on the admission of the petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the respondent. In fact, the
respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As
such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the respondent, as plaintiff, and the
petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jurepossession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not an agrarian
dispute. Decisive of the issue is our ruling in Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals:[41]
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, by Republic
Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Italics supplied)
Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, stewardship
or, otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject
property. In the case of Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, et al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order
for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements
to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure-related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought
this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition for injunction in the first place.[42]
However, we find and so hold that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent. In this case, the respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner on May 24,
1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court over the nature of this action is governed by
Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3 thereof amended Section
33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, and reads:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
On the other hand, Section 1 of the Rule amending Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdictions:
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) .
The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria. To determine
which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. In this case, the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner
for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana) reads:
3. That plaintiff is the owner and possessor of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. T-47171 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu located at Tampa-an, Aloguinsan, Cebu;
4. That defendant is the tenant of the land of Socorro P. Chiong, which adjoins the parcel of land owned by the
plaintiff as shown by a leasehold contract hereto attached as Annex A and made an integral part hereof;
5. That sometime in 1985, by means of threats, strategy, and stealth, the herein defendant took possession of the
parcel of land owned by herein plaintiff, thus effectively depriving plaintiff of the possession thereof;
6. That the defendants, while illegally occupying the land of herein plaintiff, cut trees, and harvested the fruits of
said land causing damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P50,000.00;
7. That despite demand, defendant has refused to vacate said land and return the possession thereof to herein
plaintiff, thus compelling the plaintiff to file the present action;

8. In filing the present action, the plaintiff engaged the services of counsel for P10,000.00 and expects to incur
expenses of litigation in the amount of P5,000.00.[43]
The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E covered
by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt
of realty tax payments issued to the respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993
was P8,300.00.[44] Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent.[45] Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null and void.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions of the court, there is no longer a need to still resolve the third issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo, Cebu City, Branch
29, in Civil Case No. T-466 is NULLIFIED for lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the action of the respondent against
the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
5. Cabrera vs. Clarin, G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016 
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The instant petition originated from a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed before the RTC by
Cabrera against respondents Arnel Clarin (Clarin) and wife, Milagros Barrios (Barrios) and husband, Aurora Serafin
(Serafin) and husband, and Bonifacio Moreno (Moreno) and wife. Cabrera alleged that he is the lawful and registered owner
of a parcel of agricultural land located at Barangay Maysulao, Calumpit, Bulacan, with a total area of 60,000 square meters
(sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4439. He was in actual and physical possession of the land
until he discovered the encroachment of respondents sometime in December 2005. By means of fraud, strategy and stealth,
respondents usurped and occupied portions of the said property, viz.: Clarin with 63 sq. m. thereof, Barrios with 41 sq. m.
thereof, Serafin with 30 sq. m. thereof, and Moreno with 11 sq. m. thereof. He made numerous oral and written demands to
vacate the premises but the respondents refused to heed. They also tailed to settle amicably when the case was brought
before the barangay for conciliation.
In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents claimed that the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the property
which is needed in determining the correct amount of docket fees to be paid. Also, Cabrera did not fulfill an essential
condition prior to the filing of the complaint which was submission of a government approved technical survey plan to prove
the alleged encroachment. Cabrera anchors his claim of ownership in the certificate of title registered in his and his father
Ciriaco Cabrera's name. Cabrera did not aver that it was his portion of property that respondents have intruded as there
was no proof of partition of the property since his father who was an American citizen died in the United States of America.
In an Order dated June 19, 2007, the RTC denied respondents' motion, and directed them to file their Answer. The
RTC cited the case of Aguilon v. Bohol10 in ruling that based on the allegations in the complaint, the case is the plenary
action of accion publiciana which clearly falls within its jurisdiction. The trial court, in an Order dated October 19, 2007,
declared respondents in default upon tailing to file their Answer, and allowed Cabrera to present his evidence ex parte. On
February 5, 2009, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the order of default, to admit Answer, and to set the
hearing for the presentation of their evidence.
In a Decision dated May 30, 2012, the RTC ruled in favor of Cabrera. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner]:
1. ORDERING the [respondents] and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the subject portions of
[the] land and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. ORDERING the [respondents] to pay attorney's fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]50,000.00) and
Ten Thousand Pesos ([P]10,000.00) litigation expenses. SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case before the CA which then reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC in a Decision dated July 25, 2014. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Malolos, Bulacan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the complaint for accion publiciana with
damages filed by [petitioner] Nestor Cabrera is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED
Finding no cogent reason to deviate from its previous ruling, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Cabrera.

ISSUES:
The issue presented before this Court is whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691
provides
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein docs not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That
in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value
of the adjacent lots.
Before the amendments, the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the RTC regardless of the value
of the property. With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been
expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, P50,000.00
where the action is filed in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.16
A perusal of the complaint readily shows that Cabrera failed to state the assessed value of the
disputed land, thus:
In the case at bench, the complaint for accion publiciana filed by [Cabrera] failed to allege the assessed value of
the real property subject of the complaint or the interest therein. Not even a tax declaration was presented before the court a
quo that would show the valuation of the subject property. As such, there is no way to determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action or whether the court a quo has exclusive jurisdiction over the same. Verily, the court a quo erred in denying
the motion to dismiss filed by [respondents] and in taking cognizance of the instant case.
Indeed, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. On its face, there
is no showing that the RTC has jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at
bar. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
Anent the issue of the CA's failure to consider the tax declaration annexed in the Appellee's Brief, Cabrera insists
that its attachment in his Brief without objection from the other party sealed the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction, and cured
the defect of failure to allege the assessed value of the property in the complaint as provided in Section 5,32 Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. Such averments lack merit. The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know
the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. Conversely, this allows opposing parties to
examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required
to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.34 We relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not
formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated
in the records of the case. Based on the petitioner's admission, he presented the Tax Declaration 2006-07016-
0039436 dated November 13, 2006 purporting to prove the assessed value of the property for the first time on appeal before
the CA in his Brief.37 There was no proof or allegation that he presented the same during the trial or that the court examined
such document.38 Since the tax declaration was never duly identified by testimony during the trial albeit incorporated in the
Appellee's Brief, the CA will not be required to review such document that was not previously scrutinized by the RTC. As

the assessed value is a jurisdictional requirement, the belated presentation of document proving such value before the
appellate court will not cure the glaring defect in the complaint. Thus, jurisdiction was not acquired.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for not reviewing
the document belatedly filed. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void. Indeed, a void judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all, and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
WHEREFORE, petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Nestor Cabrera is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated July 25, 2014 and Resolution dated November 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100950
are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
6. Ungria vs. CA, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011 
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS
Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint[3] for ownership,
possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for
recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria.
The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon
dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit
of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion
to DismissPetitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss[5] raising the following additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee
in full. On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[6] denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,[8] which the RTC denied in an Order[9] dated February 4, 2000. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[10]
asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1) whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records
pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings contained in the Order dated February 4,
2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the submission of the answer to the complaint. In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC
again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner sought the nullification
of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petitionPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA
denied in a Resolution dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of acquisitive prescription
and laches were likewise unavailing. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE
WON APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF
THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES
HELD
we find it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents' complaint
was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. It would appear that the first cause of
action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action.
Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00 based on Tax Declaration No. 15272.
Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of
the MTC as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction
that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing
fees.[23] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Since we find that the case
involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their
memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached
to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as
assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated
SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] where
we held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted
or admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee
However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[30] we laid down the following guidelines in the payment of docket fees,
to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[33] Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner
but also against his hereditary successors.[34] In this case, the parcel of land subject of this case is a titled property, i.e.,
titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor, married to Rosario Dideles.
7. RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS REALTY CORPORATION V. FORMARAN
FACTS:
Ruby Shelter obtained a loan from Tan and   Obiedo secured by a REM consisting of 5   parcels of land in the
name of the former.  
Despite an extension granted by Tan and Obiedo and several negotiations, Ruby was not   able to pay.  
Hence, Tan and Obiedo, by virtue of a MOA,   executed Deeds of Absolute sale in their favor covering the 5 parcels
of land. The MOA provided that if Ruby fails to pay the loan, 5 deeds of absolute sale would be executed in favor of Tan
and Obiedo.  
So Ruby Shelter filed complaint for declaration of nullity of the deeds. Believing that their action was one which was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, they paid docket fees amounting to about 13K. It said that it only wanted to annul the
deeds so no issue of title or recovery of possession is present to classify it as a real action.  
Tan and Obiedo moved to dismiss the complaint and ask for damages (also pursuant to the MOA – there was a
provision that if Ruby Shelter brought suit against them, it would be liable for P 10M) contending that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because the case involved recovery of real property making it a real action which requires payment
of docket fees equivalent to a percentage of the fair market value of the land (P 700K).  
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Tan and Obiedo ordering Ruby Shelter to pay additional docket fees. Hence, this
petition.  
ISSUE
W/N Ruby Shelter should pay additional docket fees.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. For the court to acquire jurisdiction, docket fees must be paid first. Payment is mandatory and jurisdictional.
To determine whether an action is real, it must affect title to or recovery of possession of real property. In this case,
Ruby Shelter did not disclose certain facts which would classify the complaint it filed as a real action (like the execution of
deeds of sale pursuant to a MOA). The action was really one for recovery of possession of the parcels of land. Hence, it is
a real action.
The docket fees for cases involving real property depend on the fair market value (or the stated value) of the same:
the higher the value, the higher the fees due. For those incapable of pecuniary estimation, a fixed or flat rate is imposed.
8. Concha vs. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007 
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195
(Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos.
6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No.
5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent
holders and registered owners of the subject lots.
The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.[7] and his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon,
Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance
and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya."They sought to annul
Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of
"Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as
Civil Case No. 5188.
On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners, [9] this
time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso
and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to
Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434,
respectively.
The three complaints[12] commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr.
and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since
1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares
"untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted
of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A)
"continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d)
that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23,
1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees standing in [the
subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for
Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and]
stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees
(for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was
part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195
(Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber
dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots
despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey
over the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that
respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and
misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same
grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action
for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel. [13] On the issue of jurisdiction,
respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa

Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less
than P20,000.00.
Petitioners opposed,[14] contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable
of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery
of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed,
allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.[15] The respondents filed a Joint
Motion for Reconsideration,[16] to no avail.[17]
Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for
Issuance of Restraining Order Ex Parte[18] with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,[19] the CA
reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of
action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on
fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least
twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases;
RULING OF THE COURT

Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question,
we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction. [22]
In their Supplemental Memorandum,[23] petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated
therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages.
The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of
title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties
were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC
has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners
cited: a) Raymundo v. CA[24] which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation; b) Swan v. CA[25] where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC;
c) Santos v. CA[26] where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC; and d) Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA[27] where it was held that "[w]here
the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend
that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural
grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax
declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.[28] It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
parties.[29] To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the
nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.[30]
The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance. [31] An action for reconveyance
respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better
right.[32] There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim
on the property superior to that of the registered owner [33] and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.[34]
The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also
the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:
(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have
painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four
hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly
married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession; [35]
(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees
standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from
1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and
5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut,
collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil
Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes; [36]
(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of
the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,]
otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];[37]
(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously
filed[38] [their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original
certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners]; [39]
(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were
issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;[40] and
(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser. [41]
These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the
cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the
enjoyment of their alleged title.[42]
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to
determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x.
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in
Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less than P20,000.00
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.
Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance[44] of or for cancellation of title[45] to or to quiet
title[46]
over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein."
The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, [47] as amended,
gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the
old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction
between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691[48] in 1994 which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second
level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to
"unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice." [49]
Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the subject properties constitutes "any interest therein (in
the subject properties)" that should be computed in addition to the respective assessed values of the subject properties is
unavailing. Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that the RTC shall exercise jurisdiction "in all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the
subject properties may be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is emphatic that in determining
which court has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that should be computed. [54] In this case,
there is no dispute that the assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax declarations are less
than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED that the RTC of Dipolog City,
Branch 9, has no jurisdiction in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9. Jimenez vs. Jordana, G.R. No. 152526 

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Madeliene S. Bunye was the owner of a parcel of residential land, located in Adelfa Street, Ayala Alabang Village,
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17133 issued by the Register of Deeds. On
December 27, 1993, [Respondent] Juan Jose Jordana wrote a letter to x x x Bunye offering to purchase the said property
for the price of P12,300,000.00 payable in cash, on January 31, 1994, and to remit to her, by way of earnest money, the
amount of P500,000.00 within five (5) days from his receipt of her acceptance of said offer. On December 28, 1993, x x x
Bunye wrote a letter to [respondent] informing the latter that she accepted his offer and requesting him to remit the earnest
money within five (5) days from his receipt of said letter. [Respondent] received the letter, on December 29, 1993, and had
until January 3, 1994 within which to remit the earnest money. [Respondent] did remit the P500,000.00 earnest money but
x x x Bunye refused to receive the money. On January 3, 1994, x x x Bunye wrote a letter to [respondent] confirming her
rejection of the earnest money and that she can no longer accept his offer of P12,300,000.00 as her property was worth
much more. She apologized for any inconvenience caused to him. However, she added that she would be willing to sell
her property to him for P16,000,000.00.
Unknown to [respondent], x x x Bunye executed a Special Power of Attorney on December 29, 1993, or a day after
[she] accepted [his] offer to purchase the property, authorizing Lourdes Cuerva to sell the said property and to execute the
appropriate contract therefor. The latter did offer to sell the said property to the [petitioners,] Spouses Ramon R. Jimenez,
Jr. and Annabelle L. Jimenez, for the price of P14,350,000.00, and the couple agreed. On August 5, 1994, x x x Bunye,
through her attorney-in-fact, Lourdes Cuerva, as Seller, and [petitioner-]spouses x x x as Buyers, executed a Contract to
Sell over the said property for said price, of which P4,500,000.00 was payable, upon the execution of said deed, and the
balance payable on or before March 30, 1995 and with the understanding of the Seller that:
Upon completion of payment, the SELLER agrees to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over subject property
in favor of the BUYERS free from all liens and encumbrances, and in connection therewith, the SELLER
agrees to submit/surrender to the BUYERS all documents and papers evidencing their right of ownership
over the property subject of this Contract necessary to formalize BUYERS title over the same, and
undertake to sign all documents that may be necessary for the purpose.
Conformably with the said deed, [petitioner-spouses] remitted to x x x Cuerva, on August 5, 1994, the amount
of P4,500,000.00 as downpayment for the property for which x x x Cuerva issued a Receipt. To protect their rights over the
property, the spouses x x x executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property and had the same annotated, on
August 15, 1994, at the dorsal portion of Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 171333.
On March 1, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a letter to x x x Cuerva informing her that they will be paying the balance of
the purchase price of the property earlier, on March 3, 199[5], at 8:00 oclock in the morning, x x x.
On March 7, 1995, [petitioners] received a letter from x x x Cuerva informing [them] that she was no longer the
attorney-in-fact of Bunye, who was then in the United States of America and suggested that [petitioners] communicate with
her at her address in the United States stated in the letter.

On March 10, 1995, the Register of Deeds cancelled the Adverse Claim of [petitioners] annotated at the dorsal
portion of [TCT] No. 171333.
On March 14, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a letter to Bunye, in the United States of America, informing her that they had already
deposited the balance of the purchase price of the property, in her account, with the Asian Bank, Greenbelt Branch,
under Savings Account No. 2006-13-00558-4. [They then] requested Bunye to execute the appropriate Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in their favor and deliver to them the owners duplicate of the title to the property under their names,
within five (5) days from her receipt thereof.
On March 15, 1995, or more than one (1) year from the rejection by Bunye of his proferred earnest money,
[Respondent] Jordana filed a complaint against Bunye, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, entitled and docketed
as Juan Jose Jordana, Plaintiff versus Madeliene S. Bunye, Defendant, Civil Case No. 95-443, for Specific Performance
and Damages praying that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor x x x.
[Respondent] alleged, inter alia, in his complaint, that he and x x x Bunye had already entered into a perfected contract over
the property but that, despite his demand, she refused to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property despite his
offer to remit the earnest money and his readiness to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property.
On March 15, 1995, [respondent] filed a Notice of Lis Pendens with the Register of Deeds, for annotation at the
dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 171333. However, the Register of Deeds refused claiming that the action of [respondent] was
personal and that no formal deed of sale has been executed between [respondent] and Bunye over the property.
On the same day, Bunye wrote a letter to [petitioners] informing them that she will be in the Philippines on March
23, 1995. [Bunye] requested the spouses to have the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property prepared for her signature
when she arrived in Manila.
On March 17, 1995, [respondent], through counsel, wrote a letter to x x x Bunye in the United States informing her
of the filing, by [respondent] of his complaint against her, with the Regional Trial Court, for Specific Performance.
In the meantime, on March 19, 1995, [petitioners] wrote a letter to Madeliene S. Bunye suggesting that she execute a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing Lourdes Cuerva to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in their favor even
before her arrival in the Philippines. Bunye agreed to the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, in the person of Ernesto del
Rosario.
When Bunye received the letter of the counsel of [respondent], she wrote a letter to [petitioners], dated March 23,
1995, informing them of the claim of [respondent] in his complaint and that, as soon as she received the Special Power of
Attorney from the Secretary of the State of Washington, she will return to the Philippines.
In the meantime, [respondent] filed, on March 24, 1995, in Civil Case No. 95-443, a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, praying
that an x x x an Order [be] immediately issued directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to immediately annotate the [Notice
of] Lis Pendens on TCT No. 171333.
The summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 95-443 were served on Bunye through her security guard, Joseph
Ytac, on March 23, 1995, as she was still in the United States of America.
On March 28, 1995, [petitioners] filed, in Civil Case No. 95-443, a Motion for Leave to Intervene x x x. However,
[respondent] opposed the motion x x x.
[Petitioners, on the other hand,] opposed the motion of [respondent] to compel the Register of Deeds to
annotate the Notice of Lis Pendens at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 171333.
On March 30, 1995, [respondent] executed a Notice of Adverse Claim and had the same annotated on
March 31, 1995 at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 171333.
On April 5, 1995, [TCT] No. 171333 was cancelled on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
March 30, 1995 by Bunye, pendente lite, in favor of [petitioners] and, on the same day, the Register of
Deeds issued [TCT] No. 200308 over the property to and under the name of the said spouses. The Adverse
Claim of [respondent] was carried over in said title, x x x, as Entry No. 18053.
On June 13, 1995, [petitioners] secured a loan from the Urban Bank in the amount of P12,000,000.00 and executed
a Real Estate Mortgage over the said property, as security therefor which deed was annotated, on June 14, 1995, at the
dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 200308.
On September 12, 1995, [respondent] filed an Amended Complaint impleading the [petitioners] as Parties-Defendants x x
x.
[Petitioner] spouses x x x filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on the grounds that the Amended
Complaint did not state a cause of action against them and [for] laches. [Respondent] filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss of [the] spouses.
In the meantime, the Register of Deeds caused the annotation, on October 24, 1995, of the Notice of Lis
Pendens filed by [respondent] at the dorsal portion of [TCT] No. 200308.
Before the Court could resolve the Motion to Dismiss of the [petitioners], [respondent] filed a Motion for Leave to
File Supplement to Amended Complaint, impleading the Urban Bank, as [p]arty-[d]efendant x x x.
On February 7, 1996, [respondent] filed his Supplement to Amended Complaint x x x.
[Petitioners] filed an Opposition to [respondents] motion. On July 2, 1996, the Court issued an Order granting the motion
of [respondent] and admitting [his] Supplement to Amended Complaint. [Petitioners] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid Order of the Court. [Urban] Bank likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss the Supplement to Amended Complaint
on the ground that it stated no cause of action against it. [Respondent] filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
of [petitioners] and the Motion to Dismiss of the x x x bank. On February 1, 2000, the Court issued an Order granting the
Motion to Dismiss of [Urban] Bank and the Motion for Reconsideration of [petitioners] on the ground that the
Amended Complaint and the Supplement to Amended Complaint did not state causes of action against
[them].[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the trial court had erred in dismissing the Supplement to Amended Complaint. The appellate court held
that respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action against petitioners for the recovery of the Adelfa property. The CA said
that such action was real, not personal.
Moreover, the appellate court held that respondent and Bunye had entered into a Contract of Sale -- not a Contract to Sell
-- which was perfected by their mere consent thereto. Thus, Bunye was deemed to have relinquished ownership of the
property to respondent.
Regarding the double sale of the property, the CA said that the spouses could not have registered the second sale in good
faith because they had prior knowledge of respondents claim. It noted that even the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
petitioners had been executed during the pendency of the Complaint.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a Cause of ACTION
Ruling of the Court

The trial court and the CA differed in characterizing the suit of respondent. The RTC opined that he failed to allege
against petitioners a cause of action for specific performance. On the other hand, the appellate court held that the action
was actually for recovery of real property. Clearly then, the crux of the present controversy is the nature and the sufficiency
of respondents cause of action against petitioner-spouses.
In resolving this issue, we shall begin with some basic rules and guiding principles regarding cause of action,
dismissal of suit, and the law on sales.
Cause of Action
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[7] It has the following
elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and 3) an
act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.[8]
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,[9] not
by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.[10] Thus, the complaint must contain a concise statement of
the ultimate or essential facts[11] constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.[12]
In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiffs complaint. This
hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the
complaint.[13] Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action,
the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer?[14]
To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the plaintiffs claim for relief does not exist at all. On the
contrary, the complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be
vague or indefinite, in which event, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of
particulars.[15]
Generally, the court takes into account only the material allegations of the complaint, without considering extraneous facts
and circumstances. In some cases, however, the court may also consider -- in addition to the complaint -- annexes or
documents appended to it, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the record.[16] It must then bear in mind that the
facts proving the existence of a cause of action do not have to be established or alleged by the complaint and/or the other
pleadings at the outset but, under exceptional circumstances, even during the trial on the merits of the case.[17]
Contracts of Sale
The elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are the following: (1) the parties consent or
meeting of minds, (2) a determinate subject matter, and (3) a price certain in money or its equivalent. Being consensual, a
contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the buyer and the seller as to the object of the sale and the
cause or consideration.[18] From that moment on, the parties may reciprocally demand performance; that is, the vendee
may compel the transfer of the ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the price
of the thing sold.
We shall now apply the foregoing discussion to the issues at hand.
In the present case, the cause of action of respondent against petitioners was premised on the material
averments in the Complaint as follows:
1. He offered to buy,[19] and Bunye agreed to sell[20] to him, the Adelfa property for P12,300,000.
2. As agreed, he tendered to her the sum of P500,000 on January 3, 1994, but she refused to accept it.[21]

3. She informed him by letter, which he received on January 4, 1994, that she could no longer accept the
offer of P12,300,000, but that she was willing to sell it for P16,000,000; thus, she was declining to receive
the P500,000 earnest money he had sent.[22]
4. There was a perfected contract of sale, which Bunye breached by her unreasonable refusal to complete
the sale.[23]
5. She unreasonably refused to heed his demand for compliance with the contract, which she should be
compelled to specifically perform.[24]
6. On or about March 30, 1995, she sold the same property to petitioners, pursuant to which TCT No.
171333 was cancelled and TCT No. 200308 issued to the latter on April 3, 1995.[25]
7. Bunye and [the] Jimenezes should be compelled to execute a contract or deed of sale over the subject
property in [his] favor x x x which complies with the requirements of Article 1358 of the Civil Code[26] that
a contract involving real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.[27]
8. As a result of Bunyes and the spouses unreasonable breach and circumvention of the contract, he
suffered actual damages.[28]
9. Having acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, Bunye and petitioners
should be ordered to pay exemplary damages.[29]
10. Their acts or omissions have compelled him to litigate, for which they must be ordered to reimburse
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.[30]
What appears from all these contentions is that the action rests upon the basic hypothesis that, prior to the
second sale and delivery to petitioners, there was already a perfected sale of the Adelfa property to
respondent. Hence, Bunye was duty-bound to execute a deed of sale; and petitioners, to reconvey the property to
him. From this hypothesis sprang the CAs conclusion that the suit against petitioners was for recovery of property.
We agree with the appellate court. Indeed, what respondent instituted against petitioners was a real action for the
recovery of property. It has been held that where a party makes a claim contrary to ownership, and the relief prayed for
cannot be granted without the court deciding on who has a better right to the property, the suit is a real action.[34]
The correctness of the ruling as to the nature of the case, however, answers only half of the issue. The other half is whether
respondent has alleged a sufficient cause of action for recovery of property against petitioners. Like the CA, we find that
he indeed has. There are at least three reasons for this conclusion.
First, it is readily apparent that respondent has stated a demandable right over the subject
property. Assaying the allegations of the Supplement to Amended Complaint -- allegations that were
hypothetically admitted to be correct for the purpose of the Motion to Dismiss -- he averred that through an
exchange of letters,[35] a definite offer and an unqualified acceptance as to the object of the sale and the
cause or consideration therefor transpired between him and Bunye. Upon these allegations, a contract of
sale was deemed perfected as of December 29, 1993, the day he received Bunyes letter of unqualified
acceptance.[36] From that moment, respondent acquired the legal right to compel the transfer of ownership
of the property to him.
Second, respondent has the right to compel petitioners to respect, not violate, his rights as a prior
buyer. His reference to the second sale to petitioners -- in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Supplement to
Amended Complaint, in which he had alleged that they did not have any rightful or valid title to the subject
property[37] -- was only for the purpose of underscoring that fact.
Third, despite the discrepancies and the linguistic lapses in the material averments of the Supplement, the
acts and/or the omissions that violated respondents rights are fairly discernible from the records and the
pleadings of the plaintiff. They more than compensate for such shortcomings.
Taken together, the allegations in the Complaint, the pleadings of the plaintiff and the record of the case sufficiently
support a cause of action for recovery of property against petitioners. It is generally accepted that when property belonging
to a person is unlawfully or fraudulently taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery
of the property.[45]
Respondent himself recognizes that his causes of action against Bunye and petitioners, which are subject to joinder
under Section 5 of Rule 2[46] of the Rules of Court, are entirely different. Notably, he stated in his Opposition[47] to Urban
Banks Motion to Dismiss that his case was one for specific performance by Bunye and reconveyance by the Jimenezes.
Certainly, as he seeks the consummation of the Contract of Sale by Bunye, so also must he ensure the recovery of the
property, which was allegedly wrongfully registered in petitioners name.
His averments as to Bunye are inclined to support the conclusion that there was a breach of contract. Such breach
gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance, the remedy he has chosen as against rescission.[48] To this effect,
he contends that Bunye must be compelled to complete the sale, to execute the Deed of Sale in accordance with the
requirements of Article 1358 of the Civil Code, and to pay him actual damages for the breach and the circumvention of the
contract. Article 1475 of the Civil Code gives the parties to a perfected contract of sale the right to reciprocally demand
performance and to observe a particular form, if warranted.
On the other hand, respondent is not suing petitioners for contractual breach but for a recovery of property. It is not
relevant, therefore, even to argue that the parties have no privity of contract. We stress that participation in a contract is
not necessarily an element that determines the existence of a cause of action.[49]
Having decided that the CA correctly ruled that respondent had a cause of action against petitioners, we deem it no longer
necessary to take up the other issues. These questions deal with evidentiary facts that need to be finally resolved by the
trial court after trial on the merits.
The Court must, however, emphasize the provisional nature of any ruling herein on the nature of the contract
between respondent and Bunye, as we have premised such ruling only on the hypothetical admissions of petitioners
averments. Additionally, in determining that a cause of action exists against petitioners, the Court has necessarily inquired
only into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.[50] The truth of those allegations, as well as petitioners
defenses, can be determined only after the parties have adduced their respective sets of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO
ORDERED.
10.Sebe vs. Heirs of Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed
with the RTC of Dipolog City[5] a complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood Resources
Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed
value of P9,910.00, plus damages.[6] On November 25, 1999 they amended their complaint[7] to address a deed of
confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevillas Answer[8] to the complaint. The Sebes claimed that they owned the
subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his
Answer[9] Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.
While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so his wife and children substituted
him.[10] Parenthetically, with defendant Veronico Sevillas death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this
case.[11]
On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the
ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total assessed
value of less than P20,000.00. Under the law,[12] said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed
value of the property exceeds P20,000.00,[13] otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.[14] The RTC
concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.
On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration.[15] They pointed out that the RTC mistakenly
classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment
of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebess motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the Copioso ruling
had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.[20] Before the Huguete, cancellation of titles,
declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however,
the jurisdiction over actions of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC
had jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did not exceed P20,000.00.
ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether or not the Sebess action involving the two lots valued at less than P20,000.00 falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Courts Ruling

Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs allegations in
the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.[21]
The gist of the Sebess complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40 years of two unregistered lots[22] in
Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered by Tax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value of P9,910.00.[23] On
June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.[24] Being illiterate, they
relied on Sevillas explanation that what they signed were deeds of real estate mortgage covering a loan that they got from
him.[25] And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership over the two lots to Sevilla
for P10,000.00[26] were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary public.[27] Using the affidavits of quitclaim,
defendant Sevilla applied for[28] and obtained free patent titles covering the two lots on September 23,
1991.[29]Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to defendant Technology
and Livelihood Resource Center for P869,555.00.[30]
On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale covering the two lots.[31] Upon closer examination,
however, their signatures had apparently been forged.[32] The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making them sign
such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla already got titles to them as early as
September.[33] At any rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his name.[34] Then, using
force and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants[35] and harvested that planting seasons
yield[36] of coconut and palay worth P20,000.00.[37]
Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them to hire a lawyer[38] and incur
expenses of litigation.[39] Further the Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the years.[40] They were also entitled to
moral[41] and exemplary damages.[42] They thus asked the RTC a) to declare void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds
of confirmation of sale in the case; b) to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to
them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay them P140,000.00 in lost produce from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing
of the complaint, P30,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in attorneys fee, P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and such
amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix.[43]
Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law that applies to the action is Batas
Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its
predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a real action would have ended the
controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.
Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside Metro Manila involved in the
suit is P20,000.00 and below, as in this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. Thus
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -
- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
But was the Sebess action one involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it or one the subject of
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the documents of conveyance that defendant Sevilla
tricked them into signing and, second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded
in getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action involving title to real property means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such
property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.[47] Title
is the legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself.[48]
Title is different from a certificate of title which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued
by the government through the Register of Deeds.[49] While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate
of title is the evidence of such claim.
Another way of looking at it is that, while title gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a certificate of title, the holder
of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate of title does
not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in law.[50] Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation or nullification
of a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendants lack of title to real property. Further, although
the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains
unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.[51]
Nestled between what distinguishes a title from a certificate of title is the present controversy between the Sebes and
defendant Sevilla. Which of them has valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificates of title
covering them?
The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred ownership of the same to anyone. Such
title, they insist, has remained with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they constituted a real
estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevillas favor. The Sebes alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership
by tricking them into signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan that they
got from him.
Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of ownership over the two lots, they would then
be entitled, first, to secure evidence of ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second, to possess and
enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of
the Torrens titles issued to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and their corresponding Torrens titles
to them as true owners.[52]
The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes
of the certificates of title covering the two lots.These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the
issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also entitled to their
possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their
property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to
him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction
over which is determined by the assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not exceed the
jurisdictional threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely incidental to
their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order dated August 8, 2006, of
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
11.Russell, et al. vs. Vestil, et al., G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION
OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN 2275. The complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in
Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was previously owned by the
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal
heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a
public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents

were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the
heirs.[1]
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[2] the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33
(3)[3] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,[4] falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.[5]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[6] saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P.
129, as amended.[7]
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.[8] A Motion for
Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because
their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null
and void,[9] hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. MAN-2275.
ISSUE
WON RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
RULING
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a
document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL
PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value
of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12] we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional
Trial Courts).[13]
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment;[14] also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage,[15] annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid[16] and for rescession,
which is a counterpart of specific performance.[17]
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates
that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does
exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00
as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).[18]
However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided
his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the
property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is
the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.[19]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-
2275, as well as the Order denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.
12.Spouses Huguete vs. Spouses Embudo, G.R. No. 149554, July 1, 2003
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Teofredo
Amarillo Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493,
and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter
portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a
consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed of
sale,[3] after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite demands, Teofredo
refused to partition the lot between them.
On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, arguing that the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3)[5] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.[6]
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[7] alleging that the subject matter of the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129,
as amended. [8]
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which
was denied on July 26, 2001.
ISSUE
WON RTC is correct in dismissing the complaint for Lack of Jurisdiction
RULING
Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of deed of sale and
partition, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for
annulment of title and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v.
Isabela Sawmill,[13] we ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure
title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they purchased from respondents.
Petitioners cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from
respondents. They pray that they be declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property
or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction
of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well
as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary before the lot may be partitioned and
the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for
annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what
is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in this

case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Order dated June 27, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-24925, and its Order dated July 26, 2001
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
13.Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005 

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan
T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated
as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary
share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by
the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs
father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have
(sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang,
to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame,
humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.[3]
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant
to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691.[5] He averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of
this action; both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed.
In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint
and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as
provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed
value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. [6]
The petitioners opposed the motion.[7] They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court
can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering
that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to
the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced
evidence that the land is of such value.
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended.
Aggrieved, the private respondent, appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003
reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its
refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had
exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 33[15] of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.[16] Hence,
they filed the instant petition
ISSUE
WON RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS
The Ruling of the Court

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls
within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss, they made
mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners
maintain that their action is also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same
is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.[18] The
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon
the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in
the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or
one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has
for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession
based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to
possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.[19]
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property.
They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who
was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property
despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession
thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the
law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of
land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed
value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of
the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.[20] The fair market value is the price
at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value
of the property subject of the complaint.[21] The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of
lands.[22] Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether
the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the
property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and
the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality
where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration
secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth
3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is
an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as
appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.[24]
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[25]
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages
exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs. This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting
the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or
a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action,
or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or,
in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to all other cases other than an action involving title to, or possession of real
property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are
merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.[26]
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the
decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
14.Salvador vs. Patrica, G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016 

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the

complaint of the assessed value of the property involved. The silence of the
complaint on such value is ground to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction
because the trial court is not given the basis for making the determination.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property occupied by the plaintiffs
and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.
Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective improvements
along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the
merits.
The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Manila. A Complaint-
in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-
Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.
A preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants.
Based on the allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the improvements of the plaintiffs
stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title?
All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of the following documents:
(1) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44247 in the name of the City of Manila;
(2) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35727 in the name of Patricia Inc.;
(3) Approved Plan PSD-38540; and
(4) Approved Subdivision Plan PCS-3290 for Ricardo Manotok.

The issue as to whether TCT 35727 should be cancelled as prayed for by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares is
laid to rest by agreement of the parties that this particular document is genuine and duly executed. Nonetheless, the
cancellation of a Transfer Certificate of Title should be in a separate action before another forum.
Since the Transfer Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine, the
question now is: Where are the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles?4
To resolve the question about the boundaries of the properties of the City of Manila and respondent Patricia, Inc.,
the RTC appointed, with the concurrence of the parties, three geodetic engineers as commissioners, namely: Engr. Rosario
Mercado, Engr. Ernesto Pamular and Engr. Delfin Bumanlag.5These commissioners ultimately submitted their reports.
On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc., permanently
enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict the former from their respective premises, and from collecting any
rentals from them. The RTC deemed it more sound to side with two of the commissioners who had found that the land
belonged to the City of Manila, and disposed:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED:
Defendant Patricia Inc. and other person/s claiming under it, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED to REFRAIN and
DESIST from any act of EVICTION OR EJECTMENT of the PLAINTIFFS in the premises they occupy;
Defendant Patricia Inc. STOP COLLECTING any rentals from the plaintiffs who may seek reimbursement of previous
payments in a separate action subject to the ownership of the City of Manila and;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Attorney's fees of P10,000.00 to each plaintiff and intervenor, Ciriano Mijares; P20,000.00 to the City of Manila. (emphasis
ours)
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 86735, reversed the RTC's judgment,7 and dismissed the complaint. The CA
declared that the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting
of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a mere rubber stamp of the majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC
should have conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper the adjudication of the
boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title; and decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated May 30, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32. Civil Case No. 96-81167 is hereby DISMISSED for utter want of merit.
Accordingly, the questioned order enjoining Patricia and all other person/s acting on its stead (sic) to refrain and desist from
evicting or ejecting plaintiffs/appellees in Patricia's own land and from collecting rentals is LIFTED effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA denied the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and intervenor Mijares through the assailed resolution of
February 16, 2011.9
Issue
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
RULING
Jurisdiction over a real action depends on the assessed value of the property involved as alleged in the
complaint The complaint was ostensibly for the separate causes of action for injunction and for quieting of title.
As such, the allegations that would support both causes of action must be properly stated in the complaint. One
of the important allegations would be those vesting jurisdiction in the trial court.
The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction, which includes the power to determine
whether or not it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not
the statement of facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters that arise in the case legitimately before the
court. Jurisdiction imports the power and authority to declare the law, to expound or to apply the laws exclusive of the idea
of the power to make the laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce
judgment on the issues before the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce the
judgment.12
But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot exist without the latter and must
of necessity be exercised within the scope of the latter, not beyond it.13
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as distinguished from venue, which is a purely
procedural matter. The conferring law may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the special
or general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal, but it must be in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.14 Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear clearly from the law or it will
not be held to exist,15 but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal by necessary implication as well as by express
terms.16 It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the parties;17 or by the court's acquiescence;18 or by the erroneous
belief of the court that it had jurisdiction;19 or by the waiver of objections;20 or by the silence of the parties.21
The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: one, that the court must have cognizance of the class of cases to which the
one to be adjudged belongs; two, that the proper parties must be present; and, three, that the point decided must be, in
substance and effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is ordinarily the nature of the case as made by
the complaint and the relief sought; and the primary and essential nature of the suit, not its incidental character, determines
the jurisdiction of the court relative to it.22
Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the power to take judicial cognizance of
a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority of a
court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court that tried the case elevated for judicial review.
Considering that the two classes of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly conferred by law. One
does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.23
Jurisdiction is to be distinguished from its exercise.24 When there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter,
the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.25 Considering that jurisdiction
over the subject matter determines the power of a court or tribunal to hear and determine a particular case, its existence
does not depend upon the regularity of its exercise by the court or tribunal.26 The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the
court or tribunal had the power to enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions in the course thereof were correct,
for the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrongly as well as rightly. In a manner of speaking,
the lack of the power to act at all results in a judgment that is void; while the lack of the power to render an erroneous
decision results in a judgment that is valid until set aside.27 That the decision is erroneous does not divest the court or
tribunal that rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case.28 Hence, if the court or tribunal has jurisdiction
over the civil action, whatever error may be attributed to it is simply one of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari,
lies to correct the error.29
The exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases is conferred and provided for in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in controversy,
amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the
averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.30 Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had
jurisdiction over the cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of
pecuniary estimation. But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the
nature of a real action that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest
in real property31 in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which
amended Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994,32 to now pertinently provide as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
-
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x
As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the
assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of
Rule 63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court,"33 the specification does not override the statutory
provision on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa,34 to wit:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title
be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may"- that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the]
Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action
in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely
permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and
explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession
of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
xxxx
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.35
The complaint of the petitioners did not contain any averment of the assessed value of the property. Such failure left the
trial court bereft of any basis to determine which court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of
title. Thus, the RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Although neither the parties
nor the lower courts raised jurisdiction of the trial court in the proceedings, the issue did not simply vanish because the
Court can hereby motu proprio consider and resolve it now by virtue of jurisdiction being conferred only by law, and could
not be vested by any act or omission of any party.36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86735; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
15.Estate of Manantan vs. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 10 March 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch 1,
a Complaint for ejectment and damages against respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain Presentacion Tavera
(Tavera),[4] docketed as Civil Case No. 10467.
Manantan alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a 214- square meter parcel of land located in Fairview
Subdivision, Baguio City (subject property), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54672, issued in her name by
the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City. After causing a relocation survey of the subject property, she discovered that
respondent and Tavera occupied certain portions thereof [disputed portions]. Manantan advised respondent and Tavera to
vacate the disputed portions as soon as she would decide to sell the subject property to an interested buyer. Later, a
prospective buyer approached Manantan about the subject property. However, upon learning that respondent and Tavera
occupied some portions of the subject property, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after
respondent and Tavera vacated the same. Manantan repeatedly requested respondent and Tavera to abandon the disputed
portions of the subject property, but the two refused. Hence, Manantan hired the services of a lawyer who immediately sent
a formal letter of demand to respondent and Tavera requesting them to leave the disputed portions. Respondent and
Tavera, however, ignored the demand letter. Manantan submitted the matter before the barangay justice system of Fairview
Subdivision, Baguio City, but the parties failed to reach a settlement. Upon issuance by the barangay secretary of a
Certificate to File Action, Manantan instituted Civil Case No. 10467.
In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467, Manantan prayed that respondent, Tavera, and all persons claiming rights
under them, be ordered to vacate the portions of the subject property they were occupying; that respondent and Tavera be
directed to pay her P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, every month, as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the disputed portions of the subject property, computed from the filing of the Complaint until possession of
the said portions has been restored to her; that respondent and Tavera be instructed to pay her P30,000.00 as actual
damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.[5]
Respondent and Tavera filed a Joint Answer to Manantans Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. In their Joint Answer,
respondent and Tavera averred that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10467, because it was neither an
action for forcible entry nor for unlawful detainer. The Complaint did not allege that Manantan was deprived of possession
of the disputed portions by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for forcible entry. It also
did not state that respondent and Tavera withheld possession of the disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession of the same by virtue of an express or implied contract, which would build a case
for unlawful detainer. Respondent and Tavera argued that even if there was dispossession, it was evident from the face of
the Complaint that it was not committed through any of the means enumerated under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and,
thus, forcible entry or unlawful detainer could not be the proper remedy for Manantan.[6]

Respondent claimed in the Joint Answer that he and his family had been using one of the disputed portions of the
subject property as driveway since the latter part of 1970. The said portion was the only means by which he and his family
could gain access to their residence. He even caused the improvement and cementing of the same a long time ago. Tavera
also explained in the Joint Answer that she had been utilizing the other disputed portion of the subject property as an access
road to her residence. Her tenement, which consisted of concrete and permanent structures, bore witness to the fact that
her occupancy of the portion in dispute was continuous and uninterrupted.[7]
Respondent and Tavera additionally asseverated in their Joint Answer that it would be unjust to prohibit them from
using the disputed portions which serve as their only means of ingress or egress to or from their respective residences from
or to the main road. Their use of said portions had been recognized by the Bayot family, Manantans predecessors-in-
interest. It was only in 1997, after Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, that Manantan started to
claim ownership even of the portions they had been using. Respondent and Tavera contended that they could not just
relinquish their right to the disputed portions and yield to Manantans demand, considering that the latters claim was based
merely on a relocation survey. [J]ust to buy peace of mind and maintain cordial relations with Mananatan, respondent and
Tavera alleged that they walked the proverbial mile and show[ed] their interest to pay Manantan the equivalent amount of
the disputed portions, but Manantan ignored their proposal and insisted that they buy the whole of the subject property.
Respondent and Tavera alternatively argued in their Joint Answer that in case Manantan would be declared as the
lawful owner of the subject property, the MTCC should not disregard the fact that they were builders in good faith. As
builders in good faith, they should be allowed to pay a reasonable price for the portions of the subject property on which
their driveway/access road, and other improvements were situated.
At the end of their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera asked the MTCC to dismiss Manantans Complaint; or in
case their driveway/access road and other improvements were found to be encroaching on Manantans property, to declare
them builders in good faith who should be allowed to purchase the portions on which their driveway/access road and other
improvements were located and to award them their counterclaims for moral damages and P35,000.00 attorneys fees.[8]
After submission of the parties respective position papers and other pleadings, the MTCC rendered a Decision[9] in
Civil Case No. 10467 on 21 May 1999, favoring Manantan. The MTCC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and that
respondent and Tavera were not builders in good faith. It ordered respondent and Tavera to pay Manantan the amount
of P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, per month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the disputed
portions of the subject property, counted from the date of the filing of the Complaint up to the time respondent and Tavera
would actually vacate the same. It further ordered respondent and Tavera to jointly and severally pay Manantan the amount
of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Respondent and Tavera appealed the MTCC Decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch
5. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 4435-R. On 29 October 1999, the RTC promulgated its
Decision[10] affirming in toto the appealed MTCC Decision. Only respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
since Tavera opted not to appeal anymore.
Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55891. During its pendency,
Manantan died on 20 January 2000.[11]Almost four months later, on 10 May 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision setting aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTCC and dismissing Manantans Complaint in Civil Case
No. 10467. The appellate court held that Manantans Complaint before the MTCC failed to allege facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. The allegations in the Complaint merely presented a controversy arising from a boundary dispute,
in which case, the appropriate remedy available to Manantan should have been the plenary action for recovery of
possession within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467.[12]
The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing disquisition, the petition for review is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
assailed Decision dated October 29, 1999 which was rendered by Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
in Civil Case No. 4435-R, affirming in toto the other assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 rendered by the First Branch of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 10467, entitled SOLEDAD MANANTAN v. ANICETO
SOMERA and PRESENTACION TAVERA, and all persons claiming rights under them, are hereby both REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING said Civil Case No. 10467.
Accordingly, let a writ of injunction issue permanently enjoining public respondent Judge Antonio M. Esteves and all persons
acting in his behalf or orders to cease and desist from further enforcing the assailed decisions.
Manantans counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] of the afore-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals but it
was denied by the same court in the Resolution dated 18 October 2000.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 1, HAD THE JURISDICTION
OVER THE ACTION - EJECTMENT AND DAMAGES ENTITLED SOLEDAD MANANTAN, PLAINTIFF, V. ANICETA
SOMERA AND PRESENTACION TAVERA, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, DEFENDANTS;
In the main, petitioner argues that the Complaint is in the nature of an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC
had jurisdiction.[15]
An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.[16] This action may be filed by a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.[17]
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the
plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendants possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess
under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.[18]
A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court within one
year from unlawful withholding of possession. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last
demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.[19]
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations
in the complaint.[20] To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action
for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes
of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature.[21] The complaint must show on its face enough
ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.[22]
Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer,
it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer.[23] The jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for
unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction
over the case.[24]
Noticeably, the Complaint does not allege facts showing compliance with the prescribed one year period to file an action for
unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates that would have established that it was filed within one year from the
date of Manantans last demand upon respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional
and crucial, because if the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed one year period, then it cannot properly qualify as an
action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC can exercise jurisdiction. It may be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession, which should be brought before the proper regional
trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one
year has lapsed since defendant unlawfully withheld possession from plaintiff, the action will not be for illegal detainer, but
an accion publiciana. Accion reivindicatoria, meanwhile, is an action to recover ownership, as well as possession, which
should also be brought before the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.[26]
Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already in possession of the disputed
portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a
relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin
asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent. Clearly, respondents possession of
the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondents
right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that
respondents possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from
Manantan.[27]
Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action
for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said
Complaint and should have dismissed the same. There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of
MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55891 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No cost. SO ORDERED.
16.Barrido vs. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014 

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V.
Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting
of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership
over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a
Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already been sold to their children,
Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision dated September 17, 2003, applying Article 129 of the Family Code. It
ruled in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the conjugal property of the former
Spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361 located at Eroreco, Bacolod City,
which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. On July 21, 2004, the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of
the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a
reversible error in adjudicating the subject property to Barrido. Its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated September 17, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering the parties:
(1) to equitably partition the house and lot covered by TCT No. T-140361;
(2) to reimburse Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them in payment of the debts and
obligation of TCT No. T-140361 with Philippine National Bank;
(3) to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family
Code. SO ORDERED.5
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision on November 16, 2006. It held that since the property’s assessed
value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the RTC erred in relying on Article
129 of the FamilyCode, instead of Article 147, the dispositive portion of its decision still correctly ordered the equitable
partition of the property. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review. She assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:
The petition lacks merit.
Contrary to Barrido’s contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those affecting title
to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on
real property.7 Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 1298 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.–
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
therein where the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)9
Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required
limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court
correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
ISSUE
WON MTCC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
RULING
YES, Here, the subject property’s assessed value was merely ₱8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the
required limit of ₱20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the
lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant case.
The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under
Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.17
Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their
marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned
by them in equal shares. Barrido, however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on
their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the
former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary public. It must be noted that without the
notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible
in evidence unless properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity. In
fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November
16, 2006, as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
17.Malana vs. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages[2] against
respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the
owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937[3] situated in Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died
intestate.[4] During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin
Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter
would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.[5]
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members,[6] continued to occupy the subject property even
after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded
that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.[7]
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West
for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and
presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters
claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property. Thus,
petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.[8] Petitioners additionally
sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from
the latters baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil

Code on Human Relations.[9] Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the
amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over
the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the
latters refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer.[10]
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,[11] amending Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real
actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a
value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007Order that:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed
value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.[12]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. They
argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable
them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court[13] states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.[14]
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action
to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed
value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside
the jurisdiction of the RTC.[15]
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4
May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also
contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a
single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.[16] And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners
maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.[17]
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was
dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed
value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.[19]
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.[20]
RULING
Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that their
Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition,
however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court rules in the negative.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought
under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.[21]
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction
between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a
person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be
brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the
reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized
by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil
Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they
also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment
into effect.[22]
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for quieting of title may be brought
under [the] Rule on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may
x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the
provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.[23]
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and
explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession
of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of rights arising thereunder.[24]Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement
of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof,
or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained
only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and
supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.[25]
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can
no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory
relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.[26]
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents
refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of
ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the
proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.[27]
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would
depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the
MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said
to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.[29] No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31
October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868,
without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal
Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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1. G.R. No.

198356, April 20, 2015

The MeTC Ruling

The RTC Ruling

The Respondents' Case

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:

Section 3 of the same law provides:

Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

The action is not barred by prior judgment

2. G.R. No. 164560, July 22, 2009

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

3. G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

4. [G.R. No. 140973. November 11, 2004]

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

5. Cabrera vs. Clarin, G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

6. Ungria vs. CA, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011

7. RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS REALTY CORPORATION V. FORMARAN

8. Concha vs. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

RULING OF THE COURT

9. Jimenez vs. Jordana, G.R. No. 152526

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

Ruling of the Court

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

The Courts Ruling

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

13.Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

The Ruling of the Court

14.Salvador vs. Patrica, G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016

Jurisdiction over a real action is determined based on the allegations in the

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

15.Estate of Manantan vs. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

16.Barrido vs. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014

17.Malana vs. Tappa, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009.

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

The Court rules in the negative.

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

REM 1 – JUDGE BATHAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION

Вам также может понравиться

5. Cabrera vs. Clarin, G.R. No. 215640, November 28, 2016 

6. Ungria vs. CA, G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011 

8. Concha vs. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007 

9. Jimenez vs. Jordana, G.R. No. 152526 

13.Hilario vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005 

14.Salvador vs. Patrica, G.R. No. 195834, November 09, 2016 

16.Barrido vs. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014 