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G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903 1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as “the institution
U.S. v. Dorr or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out those rules…xxx…the government is the aggregation of authorities
which rule a society (administration)”.[1]
FACTS: 2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term ‘government’ is used in
1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of writing, an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the existing political
publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the Government of the U.S. system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that it is in this sense that
and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under consideration.
Act 292 of the Commission. 3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of “Insular of the Government of the Phil.
2. The alleged libel was published in “Manila Freedom” issue dated 06 April 1902 Islands” is the government as a system, however, the article in questions
as an editorial issue. attacks the ‘government’ as the aggregate of public officials who run it.
3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to 4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon the
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for brevity). governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S. is
The following are part of the article: enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of men who
are entrusted with the administration of the government which the writer
“…the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity, and private
over a set of men who should be in jail or deported…xxx…this kind of foolish work morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does not constitute any
that the Commission is doing all over the Island, reinstating insurgents and rogues seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation of Art. 292.
and turning down the men who have during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided Respondents are acquitted.
the Americans.”
[1] ADMINISTRATION – the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of
“The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos who are government are for the time being.
alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no personal character”.

“it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil
Commission are rotten and corrupt…xxx”.

4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense against
it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the policy of the CC,
the complaint in question cannot be regarded as having a tendency to
produce anything like what may be called disaffection or a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.
5. There is a question as how the term “the Insular Government of the Phil.
Islands”, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as “the existing law and
institutions of the Islands” or “the aggregate of the individuals by whom the
government of the Islands is administered”?

ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the Art.
292 for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular Government of the
Phil. Island?

2. Bacani vs Nacoco 2. The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
100 Phil. 468 – Political Law – Two-fold Function of the Government – Constituent vs
Ministrant Functions 3. The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court
in Manila. During the pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of 4. The determination of contract rights between individuals.
the parties, National Coconut Corporation or NACOCO, requested said stenographers
5. The definition and punishment of crime.
for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter 6. The administration of justice in civil cases.
submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The National
7. The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said
transcripts at the rate of P1 per page. 8. Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from
external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse
said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was On the other hand, ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way
expressed that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. The most
of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a government entity important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of principles to consider whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
HELD: No. Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire

the status of being part of the government because they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the NACOCO.
While it was organized with the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a

position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing
“Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut
by-products“, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote

the coconut industry, it was, however, given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are

concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518 – the law creating
NACOCO). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
The Supreme Court also noted the constituent functions of the government.

Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature. According to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, they are as
1. The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.

5. Aratuc vs Comelec

G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of respondent
Comelec.A supervening panel headed by Comelec had conducted hearings of the
complaints of the petitioner therein alleged irregularities in the election records. In
order for the Commission to decide properly. It will have to go deep into the
examination of the voting records and registration records and it will have to
interview and getstatements from persons under oath from the area to determine
whether actual voting took place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being
assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.


Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction?


No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 “ the commission on
elections shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers”. In

administrative law, a superior body or office having supervision or control over

another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
The petition is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit.

6. ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued
September 30, 1969CASTRO, J. Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to
how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy
Facts: to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine
centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the
bags. In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs duties and subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of
special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax "judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the Bureau of
bond, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide
date of importation. a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially
known its policy to consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
only 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second
shipment. In other words, of the total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is
were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by
were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years from administrative or executive departments of the state.
their importation.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re- or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged
exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest
citing reasons for its failure to export the remaining jute bags within the period of respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining
one year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner. the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long
continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute,
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
86,353 jute bags within one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required
to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing
tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on demanded the and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed
refund of the amount it had paid. by it thereon should be given controlling weight.

Issues: In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical
construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend bases of the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling
the period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909. weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors
are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they
statute by the Executive Department or other Administrative Agencies be given frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
consideration? In the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs. which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique
Held: opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.
a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of
the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the
containers therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said
7. PEREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN preference to the seller of the subject computer” and “submit your recommendation
It is clear that the recommendation must be submitted to one who has authority to
PETITIONER: Salvador Perez and Juanita Apostol implement such recommendation. The Ombudsman has the power to file
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Sandiganbayan (2 Div), and the People of the Philippines, informations,
represented by Office as well as the power to delegate his powers. Office Order No. 40-05 delegates the
of the Special Prosecutor disposition
of administrative and criminal cases (filing informations) to the Deputy Ombudsman,
SUMMARY: Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, but
Pangasinan, respectively. They “willfully, unlawfully, and criminally caused the NOT the Special Prosecutor (which is included in the Office of the Ombudsman). All
purchase of 1 computer unit costing P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass,” that is
violating Sec. 362 and 367 of the LGC. No public bidding occurred and no Committee delegated to the Special Prosecutor is the discretional authority to review and modify
of Awards was constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and Juanita gave the
Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or preference through Deputy Ombudsman-authorized information, but without departing from the basic
manifest partiality, showing evident bad faith and gross, inexcusable negligence, but resolution.
this was not included in the original information, so it was recommended by the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor are given the same rank and salary (RA
Special Prosecutor that the information be amended to show the manner of the 6770), but they do NOT have the same functions.
commission of the offense, based on the Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original
information. The amended information was admitted. The petitioners challenge this, Since there is no express delegation, the Court looked into whether or not there was
saying that the Sandiganbayan committed GAD in accepting the amended an
information, which had no approval from the Ombudsman, amounting to denial of implied delegation. RA 6770 provides that the powers of the OSP include: conducting
due process. The SC granted the petition. preliminary investigations and prosecute criminal cases w/in jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining agreements, and perform other duties
DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman may delegate powers to the Office of the Special assigned
Prosecutor, but such delegation must be shown by clear intent. The Ombudsman’s by Ombudsman. Respondents argue the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, saying
power of control would be seriously hampered if the former were authorized to file that since the amended information has not been disapproved by the Ombudsman,
informations in the first instance. This is because while the Ombudsman has full it has his tacit
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the approval. The SC said no. This doctrine does not apply to the Office of the
Sandiganbayan. Once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, Ombudsman, which is an apolitical agency. Granted, this is a procedural defect and
and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the the OSP’s Memorandum (amended info) may later be approved by the Ombudsman.
informations may not be dismissed, without the approval of the said court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED.

Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the power to file information
without delegation from the Ombudsman.


NO. The Ombudsman’s margin notes order was to "study whether the accused,
assuming arguendo that there was no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or

8. UNIVERSITY OF NUEVA CANCERES VS. MARTINEZ of commissioners by the courts under Rule 34 does not make the procedure
administrative or less judicial. Indeed, under the provision aforementioned, the
investigation could very well be assigned to one of the judges of the CIR, and in that
On June 17, 1969, respondent University of Nueva Caceres Guardians Union filed event, how can it be maintained that the function is administrative? Withal, it is
with the Bicol branch of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an unfair implicit in this procedure that the work of the "agency or agent designated by
labor practice charge against petitioners accompanied by the joint affidavit of Court" is as much the responsibility of the court as if it were the court itself that
Benito de la Paz and George Offemaria. At the hearing of said charge before the were acting directly.
prosecutor of the CIR, petitioners moved to dismiss the same on the grounds: (1) it
is not verified; (2) it does not specify the particular provisions of Section 4 (a) of the The contention of respondent Judge that the function of overseering the
Industrial Peace Act, RA 875, as amended, supposed to have been violated, and (3) Prosecution Division of the CIR in its work of filing and dismissing charges of unfair
the supporting joint affidavit contains "falsities, misstatements and improbabilities labor practice is purely administrative in nature and falls within his exclusive
on points otherwise material to the charge." Instead of dismissing the charge, the competence is without merit. It is true that reference to the court in the law must
prosecutor, although finding the grounds of the dismissal motion to be more or less be construed to mean the Presiding Judge and not the court en banc when the
plausible, granted respondent Union five (5) days "to file an amended charge and action contemplated is purely administrative in character, but, precisely, the point
amended affidavit," which said Union did on July 8, 1969. On July 14, 1969, missed is that, as already explained, the Industrial Peace Act does not consider the
petitioners moved to reconsider the ruling of the prosecutor, but on July 30, 1969, investigation by the CIR, either by itself or thru an agent, as an administrative
respondent Presiding Judge denied the same, admitted the amended charge and matter but a judicial one like the preliminary investigations in election and anti-
directed the Court Prosecutor to set the said amended charge for preliminary subversion cases.
investigation. On August 16, 1969, petitioners moved again for reconsideration of
the order of July 30, 1969. Apparently, petitioners assumed their motion for Maybe the development in the United States recounted by respondent Judge
reconsideration would be acted upon by the court en banc, for when on October 6, whereby the Taft-Hartley Law transferred from the National Labor Relations Board
1969, respondent Judge issued an order, signed by him alone, denying it, the to its General Counsel the exclusive function and power to determine with finality
present petition was filed charging said respondent with having acted in excess of whether or not an unfair labor practice charge should be filed with the Board is
jurisdiction in acting on a matter addressed to and within the jurisdiction of the good, in the sense of avoiding that the Board be the accuser, investigator and judge
CIR en banc and of grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the dismissal of the all rolled into one, but there is nothing in either Commonwealth Act 103 or the
charge upon the grounds invoked by them. Industrial Peace Act indicating that the American experience has influenced the
enactment and phraseology of the pertinent provisions of our laws. Quite on the
The assertion by respondent Judge, implicit in his order of October 6, 1969, of contrary, as already pointed out, Section 5(b) of RA 875 very explicitly confers the
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the court en banc, over the matter herein involved function of investigating unfair labor charges upon the CIR itself, albeit it allows the
cannot be sustained. It is Our considered view that unlike the preliminary court to designate any other agency or agent for the purpose.
investigation of criminal cases by fiscals which are under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, the peculiar procedure prescribed by law in As regards the other impugned order of July 30, 1969, the result of the foregoing
unfair labor practices partakes of the nature of judicial investigations, since they are discussion and ruling is that the same should first be submitted to the CIR en
conducted, to quote the language of the law, by "the Court or any agency or agent banc for appropriate action. Much as the writer of this opinion feels that the
designated by the Court", (Section 5 (b), Rep. Act 875) similarly to the preliminary objections thereto raised by petitioners are rather strained and are not very
investigations undertaken by courts of first instance in election cases and charges consistent with the interests of justice, which would not permit the throwing out of
of violation of the Anti-Subversion Act. Surely, no one can pretend that in such an unfair labor practice charge merely because of non-jurisdictional defects which
preliminary investigations, the courts of first instance are performing administrative can anyway be corrected, the Court would not pre-empt the power of the CIR en
or non-judicial functions. In such cases, the courts act in the same judicial capacity banc to make the corresponding ruling relative thereto in the first instance.
as they do in trying the cases on the merits and cannot, in any respect or measure,
be controlled by the Secretary of Justice. The fact that the law authorizes the CIR to Before closing, it might be stated that, to be sure, the creation of the National Labor
delegate the investigation to "any agency or agent designated by the Court" does Relations Commission, may have altered the procedure in cases involving alleged
not alter the nature of the court's function in the premises, just as the appointment
unfair labor practices, but that point is not and cannot be raised anymore in this
proceeding and We do not consider it necessary to pass on it now.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition insofar as the assailed order
of July 30, 1969 is concerned is denied, without prejudice to the appropriate action
on petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof by the CIR en banc, but the
petition for certiorari and mandamus relative to the impugned order of respondent
Presiding Judge of October 6, 1969 is granted, the said order is hereby declared null
and void and set aside, as in excess of jurisdiction, and respondent Presiding Judge

or whoever is acting in his stead is ordered to refer the motion for reconsideration
of petitioners dated August 16, 1969 to the CIR en banc for appropriate action. The
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court on November 24, 1969 is made
permanent, without prejudice to the resolution by the CIR of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration just referred to. The manifestation of Acting Presiding Judge
Ansberto Paredes to the effect that he has desisted and continues to desist from
following the practice of former Presiding Judge Martinez declared illegal in this
decision is noted. Costs against private respondents.

9. VINZON-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages
that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
Liwayway as CIR. consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. In
valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
covered. constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance
of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of plaintiff.
her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one,
case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in
did not act with malice or bad faith. person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the
Hence this appeal. tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant
has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
ISSUES: otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or
• Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not
his/her office precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
• Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book
I, Administrative Code


On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties
and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority


Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the
awarded contractor Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private
respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with other companies like SK
C&C, WeSolv, and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of

Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements.


Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium.


NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a
consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC
without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of the consortium. It
did not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by the other
members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective
behalf and, more important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid

undertakings. The letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated.

11. Beja Sr. v. CA (d) the General Manager shall,

Facts: subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel below the
rank of Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis supplied.) As correctly observed by
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. is an employee of the Manila Port authority as a the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension"
terminal supervisor. Two administrative cases was filed against him by the PPA as a remedial measure with "suspension" as a penalty for administrative dereliction.
General Manager where the first one was dismissed while the second one
prospered. Both where for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged with
office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service an administrative offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service
and for being notoriously undesirable. The second charge consisted of six Law, P.D. No. 807:

(6) different specifications of administrative offenses including fraud against the Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension
PPA in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer
or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
PPA general manager indorsed it to the AAB for "appropriate action." Beja filed a
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Although the
Misamis Oriental.
foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative
Investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring employees on the
Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law
hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency
impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank
of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued
of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During
with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the
such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the
dismissal of the certiorarI case below and proceeded to file before this Court a
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.

Onlyafter gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager impose the
Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive suspension and the
proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which requires the
jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear
approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General

Manager. It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General
Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first
conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable
penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was discretionary
Held: on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then DOTC Secretary
Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him
to a preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of
Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:

12. Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998 control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining
Facts: heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval
from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum
amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of
including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by
financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the
study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, control of executive departments.
then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive
benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity
incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the
refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or
agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.


Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments


The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of
Posted by kaye lee on 12:18 PM
GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982


De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129
which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit
of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of
the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.


Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and
judges as provided for under the Constitution.


What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition
must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.