Van Dorn v.

Romillo

FACTS:

Alice Reyes, a Filipino, married Richard Upton, a US citizen, in Hong Kong in 1972 and
resided in the Philippines afterwards. In 1982, however, they got divorced in Nevada, USA.
Reyes then contracted a marriage with Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada. Upton subsequently
filed a case against Reyes stating that Reyes’ business is a conjugal property between the
two of them, hence he has the right to manage the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce between Reyes and Upton in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines.

HELD:

Yes. The Philippines recognizes divorces of aliens provided that the same are valid
according to their national law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of Reyes, hence he does not have standing to sue in the case as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by
his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German, before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. However, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an
action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983. Their divorce decree was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner. Subsequently, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery, alleging that
Imelda had an affair with two men while she was still married to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent can sue Imelda for alleged adultery considering
that they are already divorced.

HELD:

No. The law specifically provided that in cases of adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse alone. In the case at bar,
private respondent and petitioner obtained a valid divorce decree which was recognized
in the Philippines. Respondent, therefore, is no longer considered as the husband of
petitioner, hence does not have a legal standing to file an action for adultery.

Quita v. Quita

FACTS:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married. Eventually they got
divorced in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Thereafter, Quita got married twice. Arturo
then died intestate. Respondent Blandina Dandan – who alleged that she is Arturo’s
surviving spouse – and six of her alleged children with the deceased claimed for Arturo’s
estate. They then submitted certified copies of the final judgment of divorce between Quita
and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

Quita, with the trial court invoking that the divorce between her and Arturo as not
recognized in the Philippines, Ruperto, and five of the Padlan children were declared the
intestate heirs of Arturo. Blandina was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to Quita.

ISSUE:

1. WON the case should be remanded to the lower court to determine if Quita is the
legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo;
2. WON Blandina is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.

HELD:

1. Yes. Quita stated that she is American citizen since 1954 and it was shown that
their divorce decree was obtained in the same year. She however did not file a
reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of
their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.

2. No. Blandina and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting, hence it is a bigamous and void marriage.
Therefore, she may not be considered as Arturo’s surviving spouse.

Roher v. Rodriguez

FACTS:

Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, and Carmen Rodriguez got married on December 11,
1980 in Germany. However, Carmen petitioned for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage before the Makati RTC. Wolfgang subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, but it
was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Included in the said decree is that the parental custody of their
children should be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had
already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Judge Salonga. Carmen filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer for the case to proceed in order to
determine and settle the custody of children and the distribution of their properties. Judge
Salonga partially set aside her previous order.

ISSUE:

W/N Judge Salonga erred when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child
custody and support.

HELD:

No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But its legal effects, such as on custody of the children,
must still be determined by our courts. It must first be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48).

In the case at bar, Carmen was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the
German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard
to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. Without any
finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody.

Garcia v. Recio

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio was married to Editha Samson, a naturalized Australian Citizen. They
subsequently lived in Australia. However, they got divorced in Australia on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace Garcia. Since October 22, 1995, they lived
separately without any judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while
they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy
on March 3, 1998, claiming that she only found out about Rederick’s marriage with Editha
in November 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree presented by Redrick is sufficient to prove his legal
capacity to marry Grace.
HELD:

No. The divorce decree of Redrick and Editha was valid in the Philippines since the
respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, such is not a sufficient evidence of
Redrick’s legal capacity to marry Grace since, the said decree, being a foreign document
was inadmissible as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul or
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Republic v. Dayot

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married on November 24, 1986. Instead of acquiring a valid
marriage license, however, they executed a sworn affidavit that they cohabitated for at
least 5years. On August 1990, Jose married Rufina Pascual, prompting Felisa to file an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Jose then filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Felisa on the ground of lack of marriage license and that his
consent was acquired through fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid.

HELD:

No. Jose and Felisa’s marriage is considered void ab initio as it was established that they
lived together just barely five months before they contracted marriage, contrary to what
was stated in their sworn affidavit. Moreover, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required
to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”.

Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA

FACTS:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their
wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. In order to celebrate their
honeymoon, they opted to go to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. During the
course of their marriage from May 1988 until March 1989, no sexual intercourse between
the two transpired. Chi Ming Tsoi allegedly avoided being intimate with his wife. They
consequently had themselves medically examined. The result of Gina’s examination was
disclosed, but Chi Ming Tsoi’s was kept confidential.

Allegedly, the only reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina was to maintain his residency
status in the Philippines. Gina then petitioned for the declaration of their marriage as void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently submitted himself
to another medical examination, wherein the results show that he is not impotent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi is psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations.

HELD:

Yes. It was held that Chi Ming Tsoi’s abnormal reluctance to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder, thereby qualifying him to the
psychological incapacity provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code. It was further stated
that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is procreation, thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.

Antonio v. Reyes

FACTS:

Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes were married. Leonilo then alleged that Marie
Ivonne was a persistent liar as she often lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income and educational attainment amongst others. She even claimed that her
illegitimate child, was an adopted child. Leonilo subsequently filed a petition to have his
marriage with Marie Ivonne declared null and void on the ground of psychological
capacity. In support of his petition, Antonio presented a psychiatrist and a clinical
psychologist, who both concluded that Reyes’ behavior was abnormal and pathological.
Reyes, on the other hand, denied the allegations of Antonio. She, likewise, presented Dr.
Antonio Reyes to refute said allegations. Dr. Lopez, the psychologist presented by Antonio
however rebutted that Dr. Reyes’ evaluation was flawed since the latter was not the one
who administered and interpreted Reyes’ psychological evaluation and the only
instrument he used was unreliable because a good liar can fake its results.

The lower court ruled in favor of Antonio. Shortly before the lower court rendered its
decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of Antonio and Reyes on the ground of lack of discretion on the part of the
parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marie Ivonne’s persistent lying constitutes psychological incapacity.

HELD:

Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of

marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. Marie Ivonne’s tendency to
persistently invent and fabricate stories made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. Furthermore,
her apparent psychological incapacity was sufficiently proven by experts. It was held that
it would be difficult for a pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Choa vs. Choa

FACTS:

Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment of
his marriage to Leni. He subsequently filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on psychological incapacity, claiming that Leni is psychologically
incapacitated on the ground of lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an
intention of procreative sexuality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Leni is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:

No. The court held that documents presented by Alfonso is insufficient to establish
psychological incapacity on the part of Leni as it shows grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity. It was held that none of his allegations constitutes psychological
incapacity because pychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect
in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Dedel vs. CA

FACTS:

David and Sharon got married in 1966. However, David alleged that Sharon is
psychologically incapacitated as, during the course of their marriage, Sharon had various
extra-marital affairs, particularly with a certain Mustafa Ibrahim with whom she had 2
children. She even contracted marriage with Ibrahim. David supported his claim with the
findings of Dr. Dayan, declaring that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and abandonment of her family.

ISSUE:

Whether or not psychological incapacity on the part of Sharon has been sufficiently
proven.

HELD:

No. It was held that PI pertains to the most serious cases of personality disorders which
make one incapable of performing his/her essential marital obligations. In the case at bar,
Sharon’s sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of
psychoses which, if existing prior to the marriage, renders the marriage contract voidable
as provided in Article 46 of Family Code.

Siayngco vs. Siayngco

Republic vs. Hamano

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, started a common-law

relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in Cavite. Toshio returned to Japan
after a month. After two months of providing financial support to his family, Toshio
eventually stopped. In 1991, Lolita found out that Toshio came back to the Philippines but
did not bother to see her nor their child. Lolita then alleged that Toshio’s act of
abandonment constitutes his psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:

No. Toshio’s abandonment was not proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as a general rule, actual medical examinations are not necessary to prove PI, it
would have greatly helped Lolita if she presented an expert witness to substantiate
Toshio’s alleged psychological illness. It must also be noted that in order to qualify a
marriage to be void on the ground of PI under the Family Code, it is essential that one of
the parties is incapable of performing his/her marital obligations due to some serious
psychological and not physical illness.

Republic vs. CA (Molina)

FACTS:

Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina got married in 1985. Reynaldo eventually manifested
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father after a year as he
continually spent more time with friends, squandered money, depended on his parents for
and persistently lied about their finances. In 1986, Roridel and Reynaldo had an intense
quarrel, prompting Roridel to live with her parents in Baguio City. A few weeks later,
Reynaldo abandoned her and their child.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roridel and Reynaldo’s marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

HELD:

No. It was held that psychological incapacity does not constitute mere irreconcilable
differences. At least one of the parties must manifest some serious psychological illness
rendering him or her incapable of performing his or her essential marital obligations. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with
each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor
its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed merely
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

Moreover, the grounds of psychological incapacity were likewise presented in this case, to
wit:

 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the
essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must
be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on
behalf of the state.

Paz vs. Paz

FACTS:

Jordan Paz and Jeanice Pavon got married in 1997. In 1999, Jeanice filed a petition to have
their marriage be declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. She supported
her calim by presenting Dr. Cristina Gates as expert witness. According to the testimony of
Dr. Gates, based on her interview with Jeanice, Jordan has “Borderline Personality
Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability;” hence,
psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Gates further stated that Jordan’s psychological illness
are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication of reformation,
Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incurable based on Jeanice’s
description of Jordan as being dependent on his mother for support; by his uncontrollable
tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his tendency to be violent
and abusive whenever thing don’t go his way; by his apparent resentment of his own child;
and by his failure to provide any financial support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jordan Paz is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:

No. While personal examination by a physician or a psychologist is not necessary for the
declaration of PI, there is still a need to prove the same through independent evidence
adduced by the person alleging said disorder. In the present case, the only basis upon
which Dr. Gates made her conclusion were the information provided to her by Jeanice. She
had no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on; hence could be
considered as unscientific and unreliable.

Patalinhug vs. CA

https://lexforiphilippines.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/ligeralde-v-patalinhug.pdf

Marable vs. Marable

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent based on his
psychological incapacity. The marriage between petitioner and respondent was at first
smooth, but turned sour shortly after they got married. They fought frequently, which got
worse when their business ventures were failing and had financial trouble. Another factor
that lead to the escalation of their bickering was that their children were spoiled by
petitioner, and that such made the children unsociable. Petitioner eventually had a short-
lived affair with another woman, which lead to even more fighting. Petitioner eventually
left respondent, and filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity. In court, petitioner presented the findings of a specialist, who declared
petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marriage obligations. The
specialist said that petitioner exhibited "antisocial behavior disorder" which made
petitioner seek too much attention to himself, and thus making him incapable of complying
with his marriage obligations. It was stated that petitioner had a father who was a
womanizer, which lead petitioner to develop feelings of insecurity and need for attention.

The trial court found such sufficient to declare the marriage of petitioner void. The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed said decision. It ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate
his incapacity, to show that the problem is incurable, and that it is rooted in a
psychological problem present upon the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marriage

obligations.

HELD: Petition is without merit.

Civil Law: It is the burden of the party asserting the incapacity to show that said disorder
is rooted in a psychological problem and existed during the celebration of the marriage. In
the case at bar, petitioner failed to establish such. All the specialist did is to make general
assumptions that petitioner indeed has antisocial personality disorder. There are no
factual bases to support such a conclusion. In fact, the events leading to the filing of the
suit says otherwise. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent did have good
moments. The petitioner is also a doting father to his children, to the point of spoiling
them even. This shows that petitioner is not the self-centered attention seeker he is
claiming to be. Even his history with his womanizing father does not completely
substantiate his claim. It can be seen that it was the general dissatisfaction with his
marriage that made him seek comfort elsewhere. Hence, the petition to declare the
marriage void for psychological incapacity must be denied.

Domingo vs. CA
FACTS:

Roberto Domingo was married with Emerlina dela Paz. He subsequently married Delia
Soledad in 1976 while his marriage with Emerlina was still subsisting. Delia only found out
about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983. In 1989, she found
out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and that he was disposing her
properties without her knowledge and consent. Subsequently, Delia filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their, as well as separation of property. (INCOMPLETE?)

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary for the
purpose of remarriage.

RULING:

Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for the said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. A person can conceive of other instances other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and
the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is required
by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Antone vs. Beronilla

G.R. No. 183824, [December 8, 2010]

FACTS:

Myrna Antone and Leo Beronilla were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second
marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991; hence information on the crime of Bigamy was
filed. Pending arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared
null and void in 2007. Leo argues that since the marriage had been declared void ab initio,
there was actually no first marriage to speak of, which is the requisite for bigamy to
prosper.
ISSUE:

WON Leo is guilty of committing the crime of bigamy.

HELD:

Yes. Pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage for purposes of remarriage is required. Therefore, a person who contracts a
subsequent marriage without such judicial declaration shall be held guilty of bigamy. In
the case at bar, even if Leo’s marriage with Myrna was declared void ab initio, the fact that
he contracted a second marriage prior to such declaration makes him guilty of committing
bigamy.

Republic vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived
with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her
to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province.
In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave
birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in
November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote
several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He
claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988,
Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife Janet.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA,
contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because
Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA
affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:

No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the
Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already
dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4
years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the
spouse present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before
declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's
whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she
was already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities
or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to
give any information about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate
her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he
asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom he inquired from.
When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters, he said he had lost them.
Moreover, while he was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to
find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

Villanueva vs. CA

Republic vs. Iyoy

In 1961, Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy got married and had 5 children. In 1984, Fely
went to the US and in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely remarried and had a child.

Crasus subsequently filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely was
psychologically incapacitated. Crasus adduced pieces of evidence such as his own
testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her new husband’s last name.

Issue:

Is the evidence adduced by Crasus sufficient to establish Fely’s alleged psychological

incapacitaty.

Held:

No. It was held that Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

Grecio vs. Sunlife

G.R. No. 23703 September 28, 1925

Lessons Applicable:
 Blood relationship (Insurance)
Revocable Designation (Insurance)

FACTS:

January 29, 1910: Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada issued a 20-year endowment
insurance policy on the life of Hilario Gercio
insurance company agreed to insure the life of Gercio for the sum of P2,000, to be paid
him on February 1, 1930, or if the insured should die before said date, then to his wife,
Mrs. Andrea Zialcita, should she survive him; otherwise to the executors, administrators,
or assigns of the insured
policy did not include any provision reserving to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary
End of 1919: she was convicted of the crime of adultery
September 4, 1920: a decree of divorce was issued
March 4, 1922: Gercio formally notified the Sun Life that he had revoked his donation in
favor of Andrea Zialcita, and that he had designated in her stead his present wife, Adela
Garcia de Gercio, as the beneficiary of the policy
Sun Life refused
Gercio filed a petition for mandamus to compel Sun Life
Trial Court: favored Gercio

ISSUE: W/N Gercio has the right to change the beneficiary of the policy

HELD: NO. Dismissed.

The wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband.

The beneficiary has an absolute vested interest in the policy from the date of its issuance
and delivery. So when a policy of life insurance is taken out by the husband in which the
wife is named as beneficiary, she has a subsisting interest in the policy
applies to a policy to which there are attached the incidents of a loan value, cash
surrender value, an automatic extension by premiums paid, and to an endowment policy,
as well as to an ordinary life insurance policy.
If the husband wishes to retain to himself the control and ownership of the policy he
may so provide in the policy.
But if the policy contains no provision authorizing a change of beneficiary without the
beneficiary's consent, the insured cannot make such change.
Accordingly, it is held that a life insurance policy of a husband made payable to the wife
as beneficiary, is the separate property of the beneficiary and beyond the control of the
husband.
effect produced by the divorce, the Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, merely
provides in section 9 that the decree of divorce shall dissolve the community property as
soon as such decree becomes final
absence of a statute to the contrary, that if a policy is taken out upon a husband's life
the wife is named as beneficiary therein, a subsequent divorce does not destroy her rights
under the policy
Neither the husband, nor the wife, nor both together had power to destroy the vested
interest of the children in the policy.
Uy vs. CA

GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property
and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge
his functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses
that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such
necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article
124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions
on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings
in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for
notice and a hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes
under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a
situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not
be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular
accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with
improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife
who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such
incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on
the ground of lack of due process.

Abella vs. Galinger

Del Val vs. Del Val

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
dismissing the complaint with costs.
The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio del Val,
who passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased,
and, after a partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he
took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val
as sole beneficiary. After his death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy.
He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold
to third persons with a right to repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by
the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the
deceased vendor. Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of most of his
personal property and that he has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to
P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the
deceased and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not
only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The
complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased,
and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally
among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of deceased.
The defendant’s claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made
in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his
knowledge or consent. He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of
the insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and
is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property
The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the
argument that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec.
183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which
partition is demanded.'

Issue: Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his
individual and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong
exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured,
and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not
of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. The doctrine
is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:
“The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of
the contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate
heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor
of the former.”
The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:
“An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must
bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the
deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration,
in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.”
They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are
not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
The court didn’t agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the
destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that
subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-
insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the
Code of Commerce.
The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to
the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasn’t agreed upon by the court
unless the facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other
heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate.

Munoz vs. Ramirez

FACTS:

Respondent-spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to
secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter, they used the money loaned to construct a
residential house on said lot.

It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the
debt to GSIS. The balance of the loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOS upon surrender
of the title over the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over the property) to be
executed by the husband. While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit
was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to give the 400k balance of the
loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to
GSIS), MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a
new one in his own name.

The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in
favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that the property was the wife’s exclusive paraphernal
property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid even without
the husband’s consent.

The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal
property of the wife, it became conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a
housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is void.

ISSUE (1): Is the property paraphernal or conjugal?

RULING: PARAPHERNAL. As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In this case, clear evidence that the
wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of
conjugal ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wife’s exclusive paraphernal
property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).

It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas.
True, respondents were married during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions
should govern their property relations. With the enactment of the FC however, the
provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the CC. Thus,
it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC
(which supersedes Article 158 of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in the value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement; otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of improvement.

In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the
contribution paid by the husband. Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal
property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the written consent of the
husband was not necessary.

ISSUE (2): Was the transaction a sale or equitable mortgage?

RULING: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. Under Article 1602 of the CC, a contract is presumed an
equitable mortgage when: (a) price of sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate; (b) vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) upon or after the
expiration of the right to repurchase, another instrument extending the period of
redemption is executed; (d) purchase retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e)
vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case it may be
fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is for the transaction to secure the
payment of a debt.

In this case, considering that (a) the spouses remained in possession of the property
(albeit as lessees thereof); (b) MUNOZ retained a portion of the ‘purchase price’ (200k); (c)
it was the spouses who paid real property taxes on the property; and, (d) it was the wife
who secure the payment of the principal debt with the subject property — the parties
clearly intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale.

Ayala Investment vs. CA