On March 3, 1995, President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No.
7942 to
Tuason v. Register of Deeds
FACTS:
Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in
Caloocan City by virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and
they took possession of their property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising
martial law powers, issued
PD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the
lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the
Malacañang Association Inc.
ISSUE:
W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titles
HELD:
The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial
function. Since he was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as
everyone knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be
established by law -- the judicial acts done by him were under the
circumstances alien to his office as chief executive.
La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent.
“govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all
mineral resources.”
On April 9, 1995, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. But shortly before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7942, (March 30th), the President entered into an Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMC Philippines, Inc.
(WMCP) covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. Subsequently, DENR Secretary
Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s.
1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 7942 which was also later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in signing and promulgating DENR Administrative Order No. 96-
40 implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the latter being unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are present to raise the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942.
HELD:
When an issue of constitutionality is raised, this Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only if the following requisites are present:
(1) The existence of an actual and appropriate case;
(2) A personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question;
(3) The exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) The constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Respondents claim that the first three requisites are not present. Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that “judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.” The power of judicial review,
therefore, is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does
not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing.
Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal
B’laan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous people’s
cooperative organized under Philippine laws representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of WMCP, members of said
cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining
activities of WMCP. These petitioners have standing to raise the
constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and
substantial injury. They claim that they would suffer “irremediable
displacement” as a result of the implementation of the FTAA allowing WMCP
to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. They thus meet the
appropriate case requirement as they assert an interest adverse to that of
respondents who, on the other hand, insist on the FTAA’s validity.
In view of the alleged impending injury, petitioners also have standing to
assail the validity of E.O. No. 279, by authority of which the FTAA was
executed.
Public respondents maintain that petitioners, being strangers to the FTAA,
cannot sue either or both contracting parties to annul it. In other words, they
contend that petitioners are not real parties in interest in an action for the
annulment of contract.
Public respondents’ contention fails. The present action is not merely one
for annulment of contract but for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioners
allege that public respondents acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the FTAA, which they submit is unconstitutional. As the case
involves constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with whether
petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal
standing.
Misconstruing the application of the third requisite for judicial review – that
the exercise of the review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity – WMCP
points out that the petition was filed only almost two years after the
execution of the FTAA, hence, not raised at the earliest opportunity.
The third requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of
constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state
action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been
raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A
contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse
into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a
case to challenge the same.
JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a
government owned and controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869
issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument
denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” which granted Sports and Games and
Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain
Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the
satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September
1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia LI. Reyes, and
SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its ISSUE:
President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to
operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, another entity such as SAGE.
making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various
Bingo Bonanza outlets. RULING:

Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate No.
and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports,
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
filed the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at
favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave
will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that
such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in
PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to
the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree
which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling
business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the
activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the
duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost
internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily
always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to
SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation of While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or
PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish
“Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity
or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal
Republic of the Philippines. x x x.” principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any
In Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from
of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license
Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the “right, privilege and
or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.” By
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not
recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial
“ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet
gambling.
gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted
definition of “gambling casinos,” “clubs” or “other recreation or amusement Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
places” as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where
people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized FACTS:
by law.
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No.
438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products
imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty
to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5%
duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478
are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue
bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within
the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may
impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or
imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
Antonio Araneta vs Judge Rafael Dinglasan
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order
62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed
seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case.
He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an
appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which
controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to
him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing
funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was
appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A
STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING
THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative
and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD:
Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became
inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May
25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress
instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of
the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.”
Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to
rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue
the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL - ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare
War and Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:\ On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017
declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I;
and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt
to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and
BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On
March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging
that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related
to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The
absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is
only partly unconstitutional.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of
Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He
filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were
denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-
Unjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the
court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended
denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for
hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu
Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it
has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative
power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper
and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and
is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to
the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not
at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline
to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of
the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent
entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than
those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the
various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces
— and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without the probation system.
195 Conference v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666 (1995) G.R. Nos. L-170236
August 31,2006.
TOPIC: Tests for Valid Delegation
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the
particular fields assigned to them. This reasons for the delegation of
legislative powers is particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., urge the SC to
annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, alleging inter alia that it is
prohibited by the principle of non-delegation of powers. The SC ruled that it
is not. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. Therefore, in some instances, the Congress can indeed delegate
its powers, which is what took place in this case
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all
licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in
behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us[the SC] to
annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that:
(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated
the standards for its exercise.
(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional
because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation
of contracts clauses of the Constitution.
(4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the
Governing Board because the private sector representative mandated by
law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA.
In their, comment. the public respondents contend that the petition is without
merit and should de dismissed because
(1) the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular
was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of
subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA
(2) the "non-appointment" of the third member of the Governing Board
bees not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been
functioning "under the advisement of t the Tripartite Technical Working
Group which group is incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e.,
seafarer employers and/or associations of manning agencies including
herein petitioner," for which reason "the third member complement . . .
has been substantially represented by said technical working group";
and
(3) the consensus on the increase in the rates of compensation and other
benefits was arrived at after appropriate consultations with the
shipowners and the private sector; the Board therefore soundly
exercised its discretion
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing
Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994,
are valid exercise of delegated power of the Congress
RULING:
Yes, It s, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making
of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should
be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be
not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law.This is the principle of subordinate legislation. In
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA,
the SC had already discussed that POEA is exercising delegated power
from the legislative department. This was the conclusion when it held that
Memorandum Circular No. 02, is a valid delegation of legislative power :
“xxx The
principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major
powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the
legislative power because of the many instances when delegation is
permitted. Xxx The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to
say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned
to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.”
In this case, the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which
merely further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly
conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be
disputed.
PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825 15 SCRA 569
December 24, 1965
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121,
124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in
the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a
writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to
restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the
ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No.
2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370,
reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of
Congress.”
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged
power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily
connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control
which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to
comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact
opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations
than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved
Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in
regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta
of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount
was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was
charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as
charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine.
He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative,
which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to
the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner
power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use
as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and
without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch
of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation
of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that
proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what
was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and
what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and
under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be
sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation
should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be
suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,”
or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither
did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything
about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged
with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
 Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
Facts:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP
22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is
unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus
elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General,
commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme
Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme
Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a
motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police
power of the State.
Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt.
Held:
1.Yes. The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not
malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
2.No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter
of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed
public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
Chiongbian vs. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CHIONGBIAN, et.al. v. ORBOS et.al.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to
create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such
region were later on known as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734
which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX,
Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no
standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted
is not expressed in the title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of
E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the
President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire
administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to
guide the President’s discretion.
HELD:
No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative
determination the existing regions following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the
pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is
logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the
direction of executive departments which the law requires should have
regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC)
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on
the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which
has been described as "administrative in nature.” (Pelaez v. Auditor
General)Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more
than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions
for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of
essential services.
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796
FACTS:
On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Act of 2001. Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity
of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law for being an undue delegation of the power
of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of a “Universal Charge” to
all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively of
the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as
payment for government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of
taxes and royalties applied to renewable energy and imported energy,
environmental charge and for a charge to account for all forms of cross
subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall
be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then
be managed by the PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust
fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part
of the ERC
HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an
exaction of the regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal
charge under section 34 is incidental to the regulatory duties of the ERC,
hence the provision assailed is not for generation of revenue and therefore it
cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police power
thru regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the
legislative parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore
cannot be understood as a rule solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in
this case is only a specialized administrative agency which is tasked of
executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before
execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of
standard test. The court in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety
finds the said law and the assailed portions free from any constitutional
defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004
A mere license is always revocable
FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in
order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a
violation of his right to property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must
be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence
is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that
“a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held
in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by
the due process clause of the Constitution.”
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance
of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions
as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside
of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that
a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated
fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but
only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and
such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license
subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of
the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the
selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The
US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative
power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the
main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”
PEOPLE v. ERNESTO LARIN Y BONDAD
GR No. 128777, October 07, 1998
FACTS:
On April 17, 1996, at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, after a practice
swim at the university pool in Baker’s Hall, U.P. Los Baños, Carla
Calumpang (Complainant) proceeded to the bathhouse to shower and dress
up.
Unknown to her, accused Ernesto Larin followed and then instructed her to
remove the towel wrapped around her; clad in her swimsuit, accused again
ordered her to undress to allow him to shave her pubic hair which he
allegedly noticed was visible.
Larin then went outside while she undressed and wrapped a towel around
her body; when the accused came back, he asked her to sit down while he
took a squatting position in front of her holding on to a shaving instrument.
But instead of shaving her pubic hair as he committed to do, accused
performed the act of cunnilingus.
Calumpang backed away saying “Nandidiri ako” but accused kept on saying
“Huwag mong lagyan ng malisya”; accused then asked her to stand up and
told her to simply pretend that he was her boyfriend and thereupon accused
removed the right cap of her brassiere and licked her right breast while
touching her vagina at the same time.
Calumpang was then told to lie down but she sat down instead and again
accused performed the act of cunnilingus on her as she repeatedly said
“Nandidiri ako.”.
Larin then told her to stand up as he pulled down his shorts and forced her
to hold and squeeze his penis saying “if your boyfriend will do this, just tell
him, ‘huwag mo itong ipapasok sa katawan ko’“.
Thereafter, accused left after instructing her to shave her public hair.
The next day, Calumpang went to see the accused to return a book and
there she told him that she was confused with what happened and accused
replied “Ako rin. Hindi ako nakatulog kagabi at para mawala ang kaba mo,
halik lang ang kailangan.”
Larin forced her to kiss him on the right cheek and on the lips.
On the night after the incident, Calumpang experienced a nightmare about
rape and she then decided to quit swimming. She told her mother about her
decision as she narrated what the accused actually did to her.
Calumpang was then brought to Dr. Nectarina Rabor-Fellizar and thereafter
in [the] company of her parents, went to the National Bureau of Investigation
where she filed her complaint.
RTC’s decision:
Larin is guilty of violating Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua with all its attendant accessory penalty. He
must indemnify Carla Lenore Calumpang the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.
ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of a
violation of Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
SC’s RULING:
THUS; Larin’s Appeal is unmeritorious and is denied. RTC’s decision is
affirmed. However, damages have been reduced from Php 100,000 to Php
50,000 only.
The Lower court did not err in finding Larin guilty of violating Sec. 5 (b) of RA
7610.
The elements of the offense penalized under this provision are as follows
The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is
abused for profit; but also one in which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing
provision penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is profit,
but also other forms of sexual abuse of children.
The defense argues that there is no proof or allegation that complainant
indulged in lascivious conduct with the accused-appellant for money, profit
or any other consideration; or that she was coerced or influenced by
accused-appellant to indulge in lascivious conduct. The argument is
untenable. That appellant sexually abused Carla Lenore Calumpang, in
violation of RA 7610, was duly alleged in the Information and proven during
the trial.
 PT&T Co. v. NLRC, GR No. 118978, May 23, 1997
FACTS:
Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for
C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement
signed by Grace, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon
expiration of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and
from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged the services of
Grace as reliever for Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both
periods. On September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner company
as a probationary employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace,
she indicated in the civil status that she was single although she had in fact
contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This meant she was not single, as
she had represented herself, when she signed the reliever agreements on
June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the
company after learning about Grace’s real civil status and being
unconvinced of Grace’s explanation for the discrepancy. Grace immediately
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of
cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. At the
preliminary conference, Grace volunteered the information that she had
failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections, and executed a
promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter
handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already
gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner
and ordered her reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back
wages and COLA. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but
modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision with the qualification that Grace de
Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months due to the dishonest
nature of her acts which should not be condoned.
ISSUE:
Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the
services of an employee?
HELD:
No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the
disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social
and political life. Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that
“The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” Corollary to
this is Article XIII Section 3 which states that “The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all”
and Article XIII Section 14 which states that “The State shall protect working
women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974,
corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with
more frequency in the years. Two of these are Republic Act No. 6727 which
explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and
conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities; and
Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building
Act which, among others, affords women equal opportunities with men to act
and to enter into contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136 explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. The
private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from
PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she
was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically
forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil
status for fear of being disqualified from work.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they
are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus,
right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and