“That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
CITIZENSHIP
G.R. No. L-7011 October 30, 1912
TRANQUILINO ROA, petitioner-appellant, vs.
INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee.
Facts:
Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine
Islands, on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of
China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His
parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth.
The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died
there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the
appellant was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying
(and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine
Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1,
1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At
this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.
Issue:
Whether or not Tranquilino Roa was a citizen of the Philippine Islands by
birth?
Ruling:
The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was
therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never
having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. The
United States follow the principle of Jus Soli or citizenship by place of birth.
Basis:
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States reads: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides:
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.”
The cession of the Philippine Islands definitely transferred the allegiance of
the native inhabitants from Spain to the United States (articles 3 and 9 of
Treaty of Paris). Filipinos remaining in this country who were not natives of
the Peninsula could not, according to the terms of the treaty, elect to retain
their allegiance to Spain. By the cession their allegiance became due to the
United States and they became entitled to its protection. The nationality of
the Islands American instead of Spanish.
The appellant was, as we have stated, born in the Philippine Islands in 1889.
His father was a domiciled alien and his mother a native of this country. His
father died in China about the year 1900 while he was still a minor. His
mother sent him to China for the sole purpose of studying and on reaching
his majority he returned to the country of his birth and sought admission.
From the date of his birth to the time he returned to this country he had
never in a legal sense changed his domicile. A minor cannot change his own
domicile. As minors have the domicile. As minors have the domicile of their
father he may change their domicile by changing his own, and after his
death the mother, while she remains a widow, may likewise by changing her
domicile change the domicile of the minor. The domicile of the children in
either case as follows the domicile of their parent. (Lamar vs. Miccu, 112
U.S., 452.) After the death of the father the widowed mother became the
natural guardian of the appellant. The mother before she married was a
Spanish subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities
pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her husband, which occurred after the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, she, under the rule
prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the
Philippine Islands, being that of her native country. When she reacquired the
nationality of the country of her birth the appellant was a minor and neither
he nor his mother had ever left this country.

[ G. R. No. L-9602, April 25, 1957 ]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TEOTIMO RODRIGUEZ TIO TIAM
TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TEOTIMO
RODRIGUEZ TIO TIAM, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
SYLLABUS
1. NATURALIZATION; PERSONS BORN IN THE PHILIPPINES OF ALIEN PARENTS WHO
HAD NOT BEEN DECLARED FILIPINO CITIZENS BY JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT
BEFORE OVERRULING OF ROA DOCTRINE CAN NOT INVOKE PRINCIPLE OF Jus Soli. —
While this Court has held in the case of Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., 313,
that persons born in the Philippines of alien parents are deemed Filipino citizens by
virtue of the principle of jus soli, however, petitioner can not invoke the benefit
granted by said decision even if he is similarly situated for the reason that he has not
been declared a Filipino citizen by judicial pronouncement before the overruling of
said decision in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil., 249. This is
clearly inferred from the decision in the Tan Chong case wherein this Court has held
that "this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot divest, of their
Filipino citizenship, those who had been declared to be Filipino citizens, or upon whom
such citizenship had been conferred, by the courts because of the doctrine or principle
of res adjudicata."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN APPLICANT ENTITLED TO PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IS NOT
AFFECTED BY HEARSAY EVIDENCE. — Except the testimony of the Chief of the
National Bureau of Investigation who declared on a supposed investigation conducted
by an agent of his office, where one S. T. gave sworn statement as to an alleged illicit
relation had by petitioner with a woman, which evidence however is hearsay and
incompetent not only because the supposed sworn statement was not presented as
evidence, but also because S. T. never appeared to testify in spite of the opportunity
given her by the Court to do so, the evidence on record shows that petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed in the law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence, petitioner is entitled to become a
Philippine citizen subject, however, to the requirements of Republic Act No. 530
relative to the two year suspension of the period prior to the effectivity of the
decision.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Teotimo Kodriguez Tio Tiam filed this petition for naturalization before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu praying that he be granted Philippine
citizenship. During the hearing, petitioner asked that he be allowed to
present evidence to show that long before the filing of the petition he had
already possessed the status of a Filipino citizen. The court granted this
request and, after the presentation of the evidence, found the same
sufficient to consider petitioner a Filipino citizen and rendered, accordingly, a
decision declaring him Filipino citizen without the need of complying with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 530 relative to the two-year suspension of
the period prior to the effectivity of the decision. From this decision, the
Government has appealed.
The evidence of petitioner shows that he was born in Cebu City of Chinese
parents on January 12, 1904 and has never left the Philippines since then.
He is married to a Chinese woman with whom he has eleven children. He
considers himself Filipino and has voted in the elections held in 1964, 1949,
1951 and 1953. On October 25, 1945, while he was forty-one years old,
he took the oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. His wife and children never registered as
aliens in the Bureau of Immigration. During the occupation, he joined the
Cebu Guerrilla Command with the rank of second lieutenant under General
Macario Peralta, Jr. He finished first year high school while all his children
are presently studying in schools recognized by the Government. He is at
present a businessman by profession with an average annual income of
P20,000 and is a registered owner of several real properties situated in
Cebu City. He has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipino people. He has never
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not
opposed to organized government nor is he affiliated with any person or
association with subversive ideas. He is not a believer in the practice of
polygamy and is not suffering from any mental ailment or any incurable
contagious disease. He believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution and is able to speak and write English and Chinese
languages and the Cebuano dialect. And he was once brought to Camp
Murphy, Philippine Army Headquarters, where he was investigated for the
the charge of rebellion and multiple murder, but subsequently, however, he
was cleared by the army authorities.
The Government did not introduce any evidence except the testimony of
Mauro Magsaysay, Chief of National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu Office,
who declared that Agent No. 64 was assigned by him to cover the case of
petitioner and that said agent obtained a sworn statement of Sonia Tiu to the
effect that petitioner had illicit relations with another woman and begot Sonia
Tiu as a result. However, Sonia Tiu, notwithstanding the opportunity given to
her, failed to appear to substantiate the charge.
The lower court, on the strength of the evidence presented, declared
petitioner as having already acquired Filipino citizenship relying apparently
on the decision rendered in the case of Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23
Phil., 315), which holds that those born in the Philippines of alien parents are
deemed Filipino citizens by virtue of the principle of jus soli. However, we
are of the opinion that petitioner cannot invoke said decision in his favor for
the reason that the same has already been expressly overruled in the case
of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil, 249. Said the Court in said
case:
"Considering that the common law principle or rule of jutf soli obtaining in
England and in the United States, as embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, has never been
extended to this jurisdiction (section 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Act of 29
August 1916); considering that the law in force and applicable to the
petitioner and the applicant in the two cases at the time of their birth is sec. 4
of the Philippine Bill . (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 March
1912, which provides that only those inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the ] Ith day of
April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, we are of the opinion and so hold that the petitioner in the
first case and the applicant in the second case, who were born of alien
parentage, were not and are not, under said section, citizens of the
Philippine Islands."
Neither can petitioner invoke the benefit of the Eoa decision even if he is
similarly situated for the reason that he has not been declared a Filipino
citizen by judicial pronouncement before the overruling of said decision. This
is clearly inferred from our decision in the Tan Chong case wherein we
stated: "this decision is not intended or designed to deprive, as it cannot
divest, of their Filipino citizenship, those who had been declared to be
Filipino citizens, or upon whom such citizenship had been conferred, by the
courts because of the doctrine or principle of res adjudicata. (Italics
supplied).
We believe, however, that petitioner can be given the benefit of our
naturalization law considering that, as his evidence shows, he possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed in the law for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. Indeed, the Government has not
presented any evidence that may serve as basis for his disqualification,
except the testimony of Mauro Magsaysay who declared on a supposed
investigation conducted by an agent of his office, wherein one Sonia Tiu
gave sworn statement as to an alleged illicit relation had by petitioner with a
woman, which evidence however is hearsay and incompetent aot only
because the supposed sworn statement was not presented as evidence, but
also because Sonia Tiu never appeared to testify in spite of the opportunity
given her by the court to do so. The claim of the Government that petitioner
is disqualified to be naturalized because he does not possess good moral
character or has not behaved in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his stay in the Philippines, cannot therefore be sustained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that
petitioner is granted Philippine citizenship subject to the requirements of
Republic Act No. 530.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number
of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate
for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point
of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, Petitioner Vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, Respondents
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a disqualification case against private respondent in 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez (private
respondent) was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. Petitioner contends that in
her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of
residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, therefore it operated to disqualify her to run for elective office. He
also argued that Comelec’s finding of renouncing her Australian citizenship
and had her Australian passport cancelled did not automatically restore the
status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is an Australian citizen
RULING:
No. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth. Private respondent was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country and these were the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law. Under
both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Her father was born on 1879 in Daet,
Camarines Sur. Therefore by virtue of the said laws, Telesforo’s daughter,
herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines. Also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Secondly,
as ruled in Aznar vs Comelec and Mercado vs Manzano and Comelec, the
mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express.
Petition is DISMISSED. COMELEC resolutions AFFIRMED
G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
SCHOOL TEACHEARS AND ALLIED WORKERS) member - HECTOR
GUMANGAN CALILUNG. Petitioner,
VS.
The honorable SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Respondent
QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition and prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No.
63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes" which he avers that Rep. Act No.
9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
R.A. 9225:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it
is not a self-executing provision. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear
out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of
Rep. Act No. 9225. On the other hand, Congress was given a mandate to
draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance
AASJS vs DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary
Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 entitled "An Act Making
the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
which was signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29,
2003. Petitionerargued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.”
Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship.
He avers that Sections 2 and 3 thereof, together, allow dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that Section 2 allows all
Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenshipwithout losing their
foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippinecitizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without
forfeiting their foreign allegiance.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely
declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section
3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the
former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of
his foreigncitizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an
unmistakable and categorical affirmationof his undivided loyalty to the
Republic.
Issues:
1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional
2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance

Held:
1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act
No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No.
635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
personimplicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance
and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there
is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to
the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy
and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on
issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts
and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we mustproceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of
setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the
Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what
acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
CO vs. HRET
Facts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislativedistrict are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The
petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Whether the decision of HRET is appealable;
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose
Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar
in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and
was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong,
Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during
those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He
has established his life here in the Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is
not required that a person should have a house in order to establish
hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality
or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own
property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet
the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements..
Yes. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be
the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. In the case at bar, the Court finds
no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the
HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by
the Supreme Court.
Board of Commissioners, CID v. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino
citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On
June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from
Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with
them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate
in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of
foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as
Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf
of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all
cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino
citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the
board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision
of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order
affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion
ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash
bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but
denied.
Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen
Held:
William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the
assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to
a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the constitution.
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition
(SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed
SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later
consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634,
both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the
offcie of the President of the Philippines.
Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and
jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last
long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in
Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the
only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death
on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and
the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence
by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.
Dy Cuenco vs. Sec. of Justice
L- 18069 May 26, 1962
FACTS:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
counsel for petitioner Alfonso Dy Cuenco wrote to the Commissioner of
Immigration a letter requesting the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration, upon the ground that he had exercised the right to elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4) of the Constitution
and Commonwealth Act No. 625. Said election appears in an affidavit dated
May 15, 1951, stating that petitioner was born in Dapa, Surigao, on February
16, 1923; that his parents are "Benito Dy Cuenco, Chinese (now deceased)"
and "Julita Duyapit, Filipina, a native of Surigao, Philippines"; that he is
"married to Rosalinda Villanueva, a Filipino," by whom he has four (4)
legitimate children; that he renounces all allegiance to the Republic of China;
that he recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that he
will obey, support and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines.
On the same date, petitioner, likewise, took the corresponding oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the Secretary of
Justice who, rendered an opinion (No. 129) holding that the alleged
Philippine citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been sufficiently
established, that said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein
was legally ineffectual and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner sought a rehearing and a reconsideration of said opinion.
Secretary of Justice, who denied the petition for reconsideration. About a
year later, petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila the
present action for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the
Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to recognize as valid said
election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's
certificate of registration. Said court rendered judgment for the petitioner.
Hence, this appeal by respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the election of Philippine Citizenship of the petitioner
is valid.
HELD:
No. Election must be made within a reasonable period after reaching the age
of majority. 3 years is a reasonable period, however, may be extended under
certain circumstances as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. In the case at bar the petitioner reached
the aged of majority 1944, he made his election of citizenship 1951 when he
was 28 years old, 7 years after he reached the age of majority. Petitioner
cited his reasons for the delayed election but the court stated that it was
insufficient excuse for the delay of the said election.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another
one shall be entered dismissing the petition, with costs against petitioner.
Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University
in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he
needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take
his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother
was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a
foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a
certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even
served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate
child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7
years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he
was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing
for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority.
Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed
due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable
time".
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
RULING:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the
election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14
years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not
within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the
nearest civil registry.
2. No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme
Court cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General.
Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the allowable 7 year period.
The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was
extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s
special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in
place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to
elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought
he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure
in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Facts:
The respondent, Chule Y. Lim, is an illegitimate daughter of a Chinese father
and a Filipina mother, who never got married due to a prior subsisting
marriage of her father. The respondent petitioned that there were few
mistakes as to her citizenship and identity, to wit:
1. That her surname “Yu” was misspelled as “Yo”. She has been using “Yu”
in all of her school records and in her marriage certificate.
2. That her father’s name in her birth record was written as “Yo Diu To (Co
Tian)” when it should have been “Yu Dio To (Co Tian).”
3. That her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father and mother got married.
4. That she was entered as a legitimate child on her birth certificate when in
fact, it should have been illegitimate. Both the trial court and Court of
Appeals granted the respondent’s petition.
In 1999, Chuley Lim filed a petition for correction of entries in her birth certificate with
the regional trial court of Lanao del Norte. Her maiden name was Chuley Yu and that’s
how it appears in all her official records except that in her birth certificate where it
appears as “Chuley Yo”. She said that it was misspelled. The Republic of the
Philippines through the local city prosecutor raised the issue of citizenship because it
appears that Lim’s birth certificate shows that she is a Filipino. The prosecutor
contends that Lim’s father was a Chinese; that she acquired her father’s citizenship
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution in place when she was born; that she never elected
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority (she is already 47 years old
at that time); that since she is a Chinese, her birth certificate should be amended to
reflect that she is a Chinese citizen. Lim contends that she is an illegitimate child
hence she is a Filipino.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing
her citizenship
2. Whether the CA erred in allowing Lim to to use her father’s surname
despite its finding that she is illegitimate.
HELD:
1. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes
the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipinomothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.”
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipinocitizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do
not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate
child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother
were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with
said constitutional and statutory requirements to become
a Filipinocitizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondentautomatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipinosince birth without having to
elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent
elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
2. The
Republic’s submission is misleading. The Court
of Appeals did not allowrespondent to use her father’s surname. What
it did allow was the correction of her father’s misspelled surname
which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this
regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to
use her father’s surname.
Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time
from using her father’s surname which she has used for four decades
without any known objection from anybody, would only sow
confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing one’s
name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law
regulating the use of aliases, a person is allowed to use a name “by
which he has been known since childhood.”
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue.
In Pabellar v. Rep. of the Phils., we held: Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a person to use
a name “by which he has been known since childhood” (Lim
Hok Albano v. Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil.
679; Republic v. Tañada, infra). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin
the illegitimate children of their father from using his surname (De
Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname,
there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which
a person has already been using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the
false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the
extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability
cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. In this case, the
Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be
prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondent’s case,
the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and
assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation
on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the
Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election.
Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did
not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in
the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer’s entire tenure.
Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified
from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC 23 July 2008
GR No. 182701
TOPIC: Loss and Re-Acquisition of Citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He
was eventually declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any
public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition
for disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman.
COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez
should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez resorted to
petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of
Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for disqualifying petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed
no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for
Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship
and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by
re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul
of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California; the
same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the
absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to
believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.
LABO vs. COMELEC 176 SCRA 1
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on
his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen.
The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney
on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian
records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.
Issue: the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to
reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation under Presidential Decree
Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. No. 725 are:

Held: (1) filing the application;

The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in
1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant.
There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino
because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his
case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the
Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear
in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship.
Frivaldo v. Comelec and Lee v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727
(2) action by the committee; and
(3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved.
It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso
jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the
oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it
should not have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 132244, 14 September 1999 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No.
8171]

Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, September 14, 1999

FACTS:
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee
questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a
Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a
Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his
Philippine citizen.
Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC
declared him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled
based on his previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship,
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the
and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as
petition should have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.
the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid.
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.
HELD:

RULING:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the
curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the
court's order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act
providing for repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost
the Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA
2630, since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the armed forces of an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual
matter not alleged in his petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the
person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even
required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said oath
with the proper civil registry.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due
course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in
the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in
December 17, 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation.
RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only
after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before
the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in
the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.
Bengzon lllv. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
142840, May 7, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as “An Act Providing For
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States.” He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino
Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a natural-born citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD:
ISSUE:
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally 8171 and therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. RULING:

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which
he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of the
House of Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, thus the petition was dismissed.
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171.
The only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino
woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a
natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act
cannot be applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time of
his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to
children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for
repatriation.

TABASA VS CA

G.R. No. 125 793, 29 August 2006 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; R.A. No.
8171]

FACTS:

When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American

citizenship when his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995,
he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter,
he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the
US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has
been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal
charges against him.