Aldrin L.

Lim

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh

Case Digest in Political Law

Facts:
Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated duringthe time of the
Japanese occupation. After the liberation of ManilaJudge Arsenio Dizon refused to
continue hearings on his case sayingthat the proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur
has invalidatedand nullified all judicial proceedings and judgements of the courts of the
Philippines and without the enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of proceedings pending in the courtsof the defunct Republic of the
Philippines under the Japanese.

Issues:
1. Whether or Not judicial proceedings and decisions duringthe Japanese Occupation
were valid and remained valid.

2. Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthurdeclared that all laws,

regulations and processes of anyother Government other than that of the
commonwealthare null and void, invalidated and all judgements and judicial acts
proceeding from the courts

3. Whether or not of they were invalidated (reference to No.2), the courts can
continue hearing the cases pendingbefore them

Held:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that allacts and proceedings and
non-political judgements of a defacto government are good and valid. The
governments bythe Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupationbeing de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice
of those governments, which are not of a politicalcomplexion, were good and valid,
and, by virtue of thewell-known principle of postliminy (postliminium)
ininternational law, remained good and valid after theliberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by theAmerican and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.

2. it should be presumed that it was not, and could not havebeen, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, inusing the phrase "processes of any other
government" insaid proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, inviolation of said
 principles of international law. The onlyreasonable construction of the said phrase is
that it refersto governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings.

Bacani vs. NACOCO

Issue:

Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During
the pendency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs.
NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Nat’l Coconut Corporation) , requested the
said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them
during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala
the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills
for the payment of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and
P150 to Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.

Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by
virtue of a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was
exempt from the payment of the fees in question.

Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that
the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 hence, exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the NACOCO is a government entity.

Discussion:

1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the
 purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of
copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our
government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to
the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers
that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense it is an entity different from our government.
2. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its
objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people.

3. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

Held:

No, it is not.
Lawyers' League for Better Phils vs. Aquino

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1

announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed througha direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New ArmedForces of the Philippines."

Issue:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Ruling:
 Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

Free Telephone WOrkers Union vs. Minister of Labor

FACTS:

On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor forunfair
labor practices stating the following grounds " 1) Unilateral and
arbitraryimplementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment of the interest of
ourmembers; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as aresult of the
implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation of callsick leaves and its
automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with
corresponding suspensions, in violation of our CollectiveBargaining Agreement."Several
conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitionermanifesting its
willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair toall concerned but
with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct beingimposed be suspended a
position that failed to meet the approval of privaterespondent.Subsequently,
respondent Ministry, certified the labor dispute to the National LaborRelations
Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at theprivate
 respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was set for hearing byrespondent
National Labor Relations Commission. Private respondent, following thelead of
petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding theCode of
Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh,resulting in
what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently theprincipal cause of the
labor dispute.It is now the submission of petitioner labor union Free Telephone Workers
Unionthat "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor
Codedelegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power
anddiscretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration
tothe National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law
onfree collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers. There
islikewise the assertion that such conferment of authority "may also ran contrary tothe
assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-organization and
collectivebargaining.

ISSUE:

Whether BP 130 amending Art. 264 of the Labor Code is an undue delegation
of legislative powers?

Discussion:

The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test
of scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue of such
principle is for petitioner labor union within the competence of the President, who in its
opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such
admission is qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law," an
assertion which need not be passed upon in this petition. What possesses significance
for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who "shall have control of the
ministries." It may happen, therefore, that a single person may occupy a dual position of
Minister and Assemblyman. To the extent, however, that what is involved is the
execution or enforcement of legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive
branch of the government. The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in
the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII
on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state
and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an even more
emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government.

Held:
 No. The Delegation to the MOLE of the power to assume jurisdiction in the labor dispute
was likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for
arbitration does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers.

Government of the Philippines vs. Monte De Piedad

Facts:

Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those
damaged by an earthquake. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under
the control of the church, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give
$80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4) installments. As a result, various petitions were
 filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to
bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest. The
Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry
loans.

Issue:
Whether or not the government is the proper authority to the cause of action.

Ruling:

Yes. The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the
action since there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the
parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The
Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its
sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed
upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan
was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities.

Magallona, et al vs. Ermita

Facts:
The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk thePhilippines because an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with theterms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortenedone baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippinea r c h i p e l a g o a n d
c l a s s i f i e d a d j a c e n t t e r r i t o r i e s s u c h a s t h e K a l a y a a n I s l a n d Ground (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islandsgenerate their own
applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their capacities as “citizens, taxpayers or
legislators” assailthe constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments
contending thatthe law unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters into archipelagic
waters,thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passageunder UNCLOS III, including overfligh t. Petitioners have contended
that thesepassage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine
internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic waters

Discussion:

The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippine’s national
interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding thecountry’s maritime zones,
the law also allows an internationally-recognizeddelimitation of the breadth
of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court also finds that
the conversion of internal waters intoarchipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as
affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power
that extends to thew a t e r s e n c l o s e d b y t h e a r c h i p e l a g i c b a s e l i n e s ,
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r d e p t h o r distance from the coast. It is further stated that the
regime of archipelagic sealanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic
waters or the exerciseof sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resourcestherein.

Ruling:

The Petition was dismissed.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence

by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity
provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of
our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

Discussion:
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,
the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained
by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of
industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the
policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to
the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of
its sovereign duty and power. The Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review.
That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation
should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers.

THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate
of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]