The Significance of

September 2
ROK-China Summit
and Prospective Tasks
2015. 9. 10. | CO 15-23

Lee Ki-hyun
(Research Fellow, International and Strategic Studies Division)

1. Details of September 2 ROK-China Summit

On September 2, ROK-China summit was held. This was a venue for ROK
President Park Geun-hye and PRC President Xi Jinping to ascertain
deepened bilateral trust as they met for the sixth time. This summit
attracted the media’s attention as it was followed by the commemoration
of the 70th anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War
(hereinafter, China’s V-day celebrations). The summit mainly dealt with
the state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula, the development of ROK-China
relations, and the issue of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

Regarding the state of affairs in the Korean Peninsula, both leaders agreed
on the following terms: objection to the escalation of tensions on the
Korean Peninsula; mutual understanding on the commitment to
denuclearization, September 19 Joint Statement, and UN Security Council

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Resolutions; and positive reception of the August 25 Inter-Korean Agreement. And

as for the ROK-China relations: mutual understanding of the achievements in the
development of bilateral relations ; linkage between ROK’s Eurasian Initiative and
China’s Belt and Road Initiative; and broadening cooperation in each sector such
as bilateral humanities ties. Finally, for peace and stability in Northeast Asia:
proposal of ROK-China-Japan trilateral summit; and development and maintenance
of cooperation framework for peace, stability, and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

Since China’s V-day celebrations were an event to commemorate the victory 70

years ago, this summit was brief and it was an occasion of sharing the understanding
of the recent political circumstances in the region and certifying the development
in ROK-China ties rather than coordinating and negotiating major agendas between
the two countries. This explains why the contents did not differ from those of the
previous five summits. While some media were at sixes and sevens over the
discrepancy between the press releases from the two governments, there is no
need to accentuate this, considering that diplomatic events are conventionally
interpreted based on a country’s own stance and interests.

2. Significance of the Summit

More important than the contents of the summit is the change of stature in the
ROK-China relations revealed in the process. Beijing received President Park as
the most important guest. It has generously shown consideration and hospitality
to President Park through occasions such as an exclusive luncheon after the bilateral
summit, consecutive talks with Premier Li Keqiang, protocol at the V-day
celebrations, etc. As the adage “protocol is vital in diplomacy” suggests, this
behavior denotes that South Korea’s strategic values for China have increased in
the current circumstances. Actually, there were concerns from the West including
the U.S. on China’s V-day celebrations. However much the V-day celebrations may
be shrouded under the name of world peace, the event cannot conceal China’s

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intentions of military rise by the very nature of a political event that includes a
military parade. Moreover, with the countries including the U.S. striving to hold
China’s rise in check, many countries’ leaders did not attend the event. In such
circumstances, President Park’s decision to attend the event, the sole U.S. ally in
the event, must have been a very special gift for China and the summit content
must have entailed a greater meaning than ever before in terms of its weight and
symbolism.

First, the summit had the effect of upgrading the ROK-China political ties. The
bilateral relations were often referred to as “cold in politics, hot in economics”
meaning that the trust in politics and security was at a low level compared to the
economic relations. This is deeply related to the structural environment of the
Korean Peninsula where South Korea has to value the security alliance with the
U.S. and economic cooperation with China as important. However, as the two leaders
re-evaluated, both countries have bolstered political mutual trust to a considerable
level since the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye administration through six
summits, eight foreign ministers’ meetings, and four strategic dialogue channels.
Also, even though South Korea was under difficult situations in international politics,
the decision to visit China, per se, illustrated the resolve to sustain the accumulated
political communications and trust in bilateral relations. This event has laid the
foundation to consolidate political relations as well as economic relations between
the two countries.

Second, the summit increased the expectations of China’s constructive role to solve
the North Korean nuclear issue. Immediately before the summit, the inter-Korean
tensions were escalated by North Korea’s provocations. In China’s view, its only
ally rained on China's parade ahead of its house party. The idea of North Korea
as a liability has reignited among China’s strategic group, and there are rumors
that China made efforts below the surface to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Meanwhile, Seoul was able to demonstrate to Beijing its active and principled crisis

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management ability against North Korea’s provocations while simultaneously

vaunting the might and cause of ROK-U.S. alliance to deter North Korea’s
provocations. Although China is discontent with ROK-U.S. alliance being
strengthened, it had to support South Korea in this crisis-solving game on the
Korean Peninsula. Simply put, South Korea’s principled approach to crisis
management has increased its leverage on China. Given the situation, President
Park’s request made to President Xi for China to play a more constructive role
in solving the North Korea issue clearly has more bearing than in the past.

Third, the summit conveys messages to North Korea. The close ROK-China tie
in a series of political events itself lends huge pressure on North Korea. Taking
into consideration the stalled DPRK-China relations and China’s aggravated
perception of North Korea caused by Pyongyang throwing a wet blanket before
the celebrations, it is difficult to foresee a momentum coming for the time being
which could restore relations between Pyongyang and Beijing. Particularly, in the
situation where Kim Jong-un did not attend the event, the fact that President Xi
specially welcomed President Park and watched the military parade together is likely
to engender despair to North Korea. Besides, as President Park and Xi reiterated
that both countries will adhere to September 19 Joint Statement and relevant UN
Security Council resolutions and oppose any related behaviors that heighten
tensions, North Korea faces limits and pressure in its prospective military
provocations.

Finally, South Korea’s initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia was
manifested in the summit. In this summit, President Park proposed to China to hold
ROK-China-Japan trilateral summit between late October and early November in
South Korea. This is meaningful in itself as the proposal displayed South Korea’s
determination and proactive role to actively alleviate regional disputes in Northeast
Asia.

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3. Limits to ROK-China Cooperation to Solve North Korean Issue and

Prospective Tasks

This summit boosted expectations for ROK-China cooperation to solve the North
Korea issue since the summit was held immediately after August 25 Inter-Korean
Agreement. In fact, this summit reinforced the strategic cooperative partnership
and paved the way to further build political trust between the two countries. In
light of China’s frame of interests in Northeast Asia, it might be too early to discuss
fundamental changes in China’s North Korea policy.

First and foremost, due to the structural nature of Northeast Asian order where
China’s military rise and U.S. Rebalance to Asia policy coexist, it is difficult to see
the fundamental nature of China’s North Korea policy changing. Viewing a series
of recent events, despite the fact that China has felt burden mounting from North
Korea, North Korea is still a strategic asset of high geopolitical value to China.
In spite of North Korea’s apparent military provocations, continually using
ambiguous terms when referring to North Korea in ROK-China talks reflects China’s
interests in international politics.

The perception gap between Seoul and Beijing on the North Korea (nuclear) issue
still remains the same. Whereas the South Korean administration emphasizes
bilateral cooperation in solving the North Korea (nuclear) issue, the Chinese
leadership focuses more on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula than
denuclearization or the North Korea issue. Thus, China is more interested in bilateral
cooperation in resolving structural issues in Northeast Asia.

As aforementioned, there are limits to ROK-China cooperation for the North Korea
issue. As much as Seoul continuously requests to Beijing to take a constructive
role in solving the issue, it should present precise and specific methods that
encourage China to assume the role that meets South Korea’s expectations.

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First, in an effort to boost already close ROK-China relations, South Korea has
the task to invigorate existing strategic communication mechanisms and seek the
expansion of bilateral cooperation to respond to North Korea-driven crisis. The
two countries could initiate “Strategic Dialogue for Korean Peninsula Crisis
Management (tentative name).”

Second, using the momentum of improving inter-Korean relations, South Korea

should actively draw China into expanding ROK-DPRK-China trilateral cooperation
projects. Though the currently improving inter-Korean climate cannot reach the
level of lifting the May 24 measures in the short run, feasible trilateral cooperation
projects presented after the Dresden Initiative can be expanded with the efforts
from both Seoul and Beijing. Especially, as both leaders emphasized the importance
of linkage between ROK’s Eurasian Initiative and China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
it is crucial to develop and substantially implement projects for trilateral cooperation
that could draw synergy of benefits for all while managing North Korea risk.

Third, Seoul has to relieve the U.S. concerns and mistrust. Stronger political bond
with China inevitably begets concern and alert from the U.S. For the harmonious
development of ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership,
the South Korean government should elucidate the meaning of this visit to China
and its strategic stance at the ROK-U.S. summit scheduled to be held this October.

Above all, Seoul should capitalize on this opportunity of improving inter-Korean

relations and achieve success in holding trilateral dialogue with China and Japan.
This connotes South Korea’s enhanced role and function as a mediator in Northeast
Asian peace and cooperation. Consequently, President Park’s visit to China is likely
to render a strategic asset rather than a strategic liability. ⓒKINU 2015
※ The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and are not to be construed
as representing those of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

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