Tupas vs CA

Topic: AUHTORITY TO APPEAR, AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS, COMPENSATION, ATTY’S

LIEN

FACTS:

Petitioners received a copy of the RTC and then they filed their respective motion for reconsideration 14
days later. The motion was denied, instead, of filling the petition for review with the court of appeals
with the remainder of the 15 day reglementary period , that is, a day after they received the order,
petitioner filed the said petition 14 days after. The petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on
grounds of tardiness.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. They allege that they should not be prejudiced by the
mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration be granted.

DECISION:

The motion was denied with finality by the Court. The Court found that the petitioners have not shown
that their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the facts.
There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their
counsel, including his mistakes

The Court stated, “Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize his
earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept. There
would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject
of challenge by his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be
disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on.”
Ynot vs. IAC

Topic: Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

FACT:

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen
the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to
promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not
mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and
explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan

Doctrine: The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him

ER: 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, Executive Assistant of the Department of Public Information, filed a
report with the Legal Panel- Presidential Security Demand, charging Tatad, the Secretary of the
Department, with violations of the Anti Graft Law. No action was taken on the report. Five years later,
de los Reyes filed a complaint with Tanodbayan, alleging the same things. On the same year, Tatad
resigned. It was only after Tatad’s resignation was accepted by Marcos when the Tanodbayan referred
the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact finding investigation. In June 1980, the
CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corruption against Tatad. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with
the Tanodbayan and the case was already for disposition. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 (three
years delay in the preliminary investigation) that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the fiing of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco
Tatad. Thereafter, Five (5) criminal informations were later filed with the Sandiganbayan. Tatad filed a
motion to quash the information based on the alleged violation of due process and his right to a speedy
disposition of cases. This was denied by the SB. Hence Certiorari (65) with the SC.

ISSUE: Was Tatad deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition"
of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? (YES)

Held: The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant
case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA) vs TEVES
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional
infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners directly filed the present
petition before this Court against respondents.

BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse
effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified.
BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing
their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their
constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families prejudice.

Respondents countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to
security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure
under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the
purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be
separated from the service upon compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG
added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.

In Abakada, the Court declared Section 12of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the principle of separation of powers.
However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld pursuant to
Section 13of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335
is presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to: (a) equal
protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process?

HELD: Ruling in Abakada is adopted.

REMEDIAL LAW: actions; parties

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA
impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file
employees of the BOC, are actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEAs members have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative agencies

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means "what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only
a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and
not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits
of numerous exceptions, one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Board in this case.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection clause

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a
similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely
on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side. BOCEAs apprehension of
deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335. The concerned BIR
or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection and capriciously left without
any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all relevant factors that may affect
the level of collection.

As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these
anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this
law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court
has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.
Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

Sequestration is a procedure by which across-the-board spending cuts go into effect if

Congress fails to agree on a deficit-reducing budget before a specified date.

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two
lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda
Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos
filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules
and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her
acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had
conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the
two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to
delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it
was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

HELD:

No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued
upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies
an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The
Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2
PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that
would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired
the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the
doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of
the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot
Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.
PHILRECA vs DILG GR 143076 10 June 2003

Facts:

Under Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as amended, or the National Electrification Administration Decree, it
is the declared policy of the State to provide “the total electrification of the Philippines on an area
coverage basis” the same “being vital to the people and the sound development of the nation.”

Pursuant to this policy, PD 269 aims to “promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged
in supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives” by “giving every tenable support and
assistance” to the electric cooperatives coming within the purview of the law.

From 1971 to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended,
the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic Council (now National Economic
Development Authority) and the NEA (National Electrification Administration), entered into 6 loan
agreements with the government of the United States of America through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives, including Agusan Del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO); Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I); and Isabela I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (ISELCO I), as beneficiaries.

The 6 loan agreements involved a total amount of approximately US$86,000,000.00. These loan
agreements are existing until today.

The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.

On 23 May 2000, a class suit was filed by the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc.
(PHILRECA); ANECO, ILECO I and ISELCO I; in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives
organized and existing under PD 269, against the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and the Secretary of the Department of Finance, through a petition for prohibition,
contending that pursuant to the provisions of PD 269, as amended, and the provision in the loan
agreements, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including payment of real property tax.

With the passage of the Local Government Code, however, they allege that their tax exemptions have
been invalidly withdrawn, in violation of the equal protection clause and impairing the obligation of
contracts between the Philippine Government and the United States Government.

Issue:

Whether or not the Local Government Code unduly discriminated against electric cooperatives organized
and existing under PD 269 on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause.

Decision:

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.” Thus, the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by
a law based on reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the
same class.

There is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines).

First, nowhere in PD 269, as amended, does it require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to
capital. Under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of
the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has
been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up
share capital be less than P2,000.00.

Second, another principle adhered to by the Cooperative Code is the principle of subsidiarity. Pursuant
to this principle, the government may only engage in development activities where cooperatives do not
possess the capability nor the resources to do so and only upon the request of such cooperatives. In
contrast, PD 269, as amended by PD 1645, is replete with provisions which grant the NEA, upon the
happening of certain events, the power to control and take over the management and operations of
cooperatives registered under it. The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by
PD 269, as amended, is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these
electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the
development and operations of the electric cooperatives.

Consequently, amendments to PD 269 were primarily geared to expand the powers of the NEA over the
electric cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In
contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations
with minimal government intervention or regulation.

Lastly, the transitory provisions of RA 6938 are indicative of the recognition by Congress of the
fundamental distinctions between electric cooperatives organized under PD 269, as amended, and
cooperatives under the new Cooperative Code.

Article 128 of the Cooperative Code provides that all cooperatives registered under previous laws shall
be deemed registered with the CDA upon submission of certain requirements within one year. However,
cooperatives created under PD 269, as amended, are given three years within which to qualify and
register with the CDA, after which, provisions of PD 1645 which expand the powers of the NEA over
electric cooperatives, would no longer apply.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

G.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made
revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the
gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by
Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented
the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is explicit
that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section
provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the
accused is not exempted.