THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and ISSUES:
AVELINA JAURIGUEC.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946Ponencia, De
Joya FACTS:
• Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted for the
crime of murder for which Nicolas wasacquitted while Avelina was found guilty
of homicide. She appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon onJune
10, 1944 to completely absolve her of all criminal responsibility for having
acted in defense of her honor, to find inher favour additional mitigating
circumstances and omit aggravating circumstance.
• At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased victim,
went to the chapel of Seventh DayAdventists to attend religious services and
sat at the front bench facing the altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the
chapelshortly after the arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the
bench next to the last one nearest the door.Upon seeing Avelina, Amado went
and sat by Avelina’s right side from his seat on the other side of the chapel,
and without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
• Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which
she had in a pocket of her dress with theintention of punishing Amado’s
offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife
on herleft hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the
neck inflicting upon him a wound about 4 ½ inchesdeep, which is mortal.
• Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon
seeing his daughter approached her andasked her the reason for her action to
which Avelina replied, “Father, I could not endure anymore”.
• Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada
was there and Avelina surrenderedherself. Lozada advised the Jaurigues to
go home immediately for fear of retaliation of Capina’s relatives.EVENTS
PRIOR:
• One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelina’s
handkerchief bearing her nickname while it was washed by her cousin,
Josefa Tapay.
• 7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her and
professed his love for her which wasrefused, and thereupon suddenly
embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts. She then slapped
him, gave himfist blows and kicked him. She informed her matter about it and
since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever she went out.
• 2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of Avelina
and entered the room where she wassleeping. She felt her forehead and she
immediately screamed for help which awakened her parents and brought
themto her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden and kissed the
hand of Avelina’s father, Nicolas.
•Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on the day
of the incident (September 20, 1942) thatAmado had been falsely boasting in
the neighbourhood of having taken liberties with her person. In the
evening,Amado had been courting the latter in vain.
•Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility because she is justified inhaving acted in the legitimate defense
of her honor.
•Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender, presence ofprovocation and absence of intent in her
favour
•Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an aggravating
circumstance in this case
HELD:
•Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared completely
exempt from criminal liability. To be entitled toa complete self-defense of
chastity, there must be an attempt to rape. To provide for a
justifying circumstance of self- defense, there must be a) Unlawful aggression,
b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it,c) Lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Attempt
to rape is an unlawful aggression.However, under the circumstances of the
offense, there was no possibility of the defendant to be raped as they
wereinside the chapel lighted with electric lights and contained several people.
Thrusting at the base of Capino’s neck asher means to repel aggression is not
reasonable but is instead, excessive.
•Mitigating circumstances are considered in her favour. Circumstances
include her voluntary and unconditionalsurrender to the barrio lieutenant,
provocation from the deceased which produced temporary loss of reason and
self-control of the defendant and lack of intent to kill the deceased evidenced
by infliction of only one single wound.
•Aggravating circumstance of having committed offense in a sacred place is
not sustained as there is no evidence thatthe defendant had intended to
murder the deceased when she entered the chapel that night. She killed
under greatprovocation.
•Penalty: For homicide, penalty is reclusion temporal. However, with 3
mitigating circumstances and no aggravatingcircumstance, it is reduced
by two degrees, in this case, prision correccional. Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides thepenalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree to prision
correccional in its medium degree.
•Avelina is sentenced to 2mos and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 2
years, 4 months, and 1 day of prisioncorreccional as maximum; to indemnify
heirs of Capina in the sum of 2,000; with corresponding
subsidiaryimprisonment not to exceed 1/3 of principal penalty and to pay costs.
She is given the benefit of ½ of her preventiveimprisonment
•SEPARATE OPINION: Hilado questions the validity or nullity of judicial
proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts
 came toher residence 30 mins. after the aforementioned crime has been committed.
CASE DIGEST ON U.S. v. AMPAR [37 Phil. 201 (1917)]
She further declaredthat appellant took out a handgun from his jacket, removed the
empty shells from the chamber,and told the former to throw the empty cartridges
Facts: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age asked the deceased,
Patobo, for some roast pig. In the presence of many guests, the deceased out of the window. And out of nervousness,she complied. Barredo also said that
insulted the old man, saying: “There is no more. Come here and I will make appellant disclosed to her that he shot his wife’s paramour.Later on, Police
roast pig of you.” A little later, while the deceased was squatting down, the old investigators recovered the spent gun shells from Barredo’s sweet potato
man came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax. garden.Two more witnesses, Bayacsan and Pauline Gumpic, testified that appellant
disclosed tothem that he indeed killed Nemesio. And, SPO4 Arthur Bomagao of the
Held: While it may be mere trifle to an average person, it evidently was a La Trinidad Police whoinvestigated the fatal shooting of Nemesio, declared that
serious matter to an old man, to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of appellant voluntarily admitted to himthat he shot the victim with .38 caliber
so many guests. The accused was given the benefit of the mitigating
handgun, and that appellant surrendered to him the lettersof Wilma Grace where it
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. In this case, the age of the
was admitted by the latter that she was having an affair with Nemesio.Appellant, on
accused and the place were considered in determining the gravity of the
the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that he wasbaking bread
offense.
with Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio was killed. Under oath, appellant saidhe
never left Kayapa since his arrival there. He further testified that he and Anoma
wereengrossed in baking bread, until the Policemen brought him back to Benguet for
questioning.Defense witness Ben Anoma Corroborated Appellant’s alibi. ISSUES:1.
PEOPLE vs. IGNASG.R. 140514-15SEPTEMBER 20, 2003(Mitigating & Aggravating
Whether or not the Trial Court committed reversible error when it appreciated the
Circumstance
allegeduse of an unlicensed .38 calibre firearm as an aggravating
FACTS OF THE CASE:Sometime in September 1995, Wilma Grace Ignas confided to circumstance in thecommission of the crime of murder without any factual and
her close friend namedRomenda Foyagao that the former is having an affair with legal basis.
Nemesio Lopate. And when Romendawent back to Taiwan, she received four letters
2. Whether or not the Trial Court committed reversible error when it did not
from Wilma Ignas, two of which are writteninstructions of Wilma for Romenda to
appreciate infavour of the Accused-Appellant the Mitigating Circumstances of
reveal to her husband, herein Appellant, her affair withNemesio. But it was only
(a) immediatevindication of a grave offense, (b) passion and obfuscation and (c)
sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda followed the instructionof her friend
voluntary surrender.RULING OF SC:1. In the first issue raised, the Supreme Court
Wilma, and informed Appellant about the aforementioned extramarital
ruled that:“We find merit in the appellants contentions. It is not enough that
affairbetween Wilma and Nemesio. Upon hearing the information confided by
the specialaggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the
Romenda, Appellantbecame furious, he then declared that he is going to kill
information,the matter must be proven with the same quantum of proof as the killing
Nemesio. Consequently, on March 10, 1996 at around 10 P.M., according to Annie
itself... Therecords do not show that the prosecution presented any evidence to
Bayanes, whenshe was at the unloading area at the Trading Post of La Trinidad,
prove thatappellant is not a duly licensed holder of a calibre .38 firearm… Absent the
Benguet, she heard twogunshots. After which, Bayanes turned towards the place
properevidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special
where the sound of the gunshots camefrom, she then saw a person falling to the
aggravatingcircumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily
ground and another person who was standing behindthe fallen individual. Bayanes
established by theProsecution. Hence, such special circumstance cannot be
said that she recognized the man standing as the appellant JuneIgnas. And another
considered for purposes ofimposing the penalty in its maximum period.”2. As for the
person present at the unloading area that night, named Marlon Manis, had thesame
second issue, however, the Supreme Court ruled that:a. “The Solicitor General
testimony as that of Bayanes, and he then further testified that the fallen victim he
counters that there was literally no immediate vindicationto speak of in this case.
saw wasNemesio Lopate whom he had known since Grade 2 in elementary school.
Appellant had sufficient time to recover his serenityfollowing the discovery of his
Then, another prosecution witness named Mona Barredo declared that appellant
wife’s infidelity.…We agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks
between hisdiscovery of his wife’s infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour
couldno longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more
thansufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged
theease of his mind. The established rule is that there can be no
immediatevindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to
recover hisserenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of
immediatevindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in appellants favor.”b.
“We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscationinexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of
a graveoffense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if
theyarise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked
hisvictim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim inthe
same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him.”c. “On this point, the
following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender hasnot actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person inauthority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. Records show, however, thatleaflets and posters were
circulated for information to bring the killer of Nemesioto justice. A team of police
investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went toKayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite
appellant for questioning. Only then did hereturn to Benguet. But he denied the
charge of killing the victim. Clearly,appellants claimed surrender was neither
spontaneous nor voluntary.”And so, there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, June Ignas was foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
HOMICIDE.
People of the Philippines vs. Benito
December 17, 1976 | Aquino, J.
Mitigating Circumstances: Vindication of a Wrong
JEAF
DOCTRINE: Grave offense must be directed to the accused.
CASE SUMMARY: When the victim remarked “Nagiistambay pala dito and
magnanakaw," the accused got offended. In the afternoon of the same day, he
shot the victim to death. He claims that there’s mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a wrong. The OSG, however, said that it wasn’t specifically directed
to him. The SC also said that the 6-hour interval should have been sufficient for
him to regain his serenity.
FACTS:
Benito was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission at its main office and
was assigned as Clerk 2 in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up
to Nov. 1965 when he was suspended for "DISHONESTY"
After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED
THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION
OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY"
culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.
October 21, 1965 the victim Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the
Commissioner of Civil Service that Benito admitted having malversed an amount between
P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales of examination fee stamps.
At eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 Moncayo, allegedly made upon
seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen:
"Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw."; or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi
ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw."
At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect shot the victim eight
(8) times on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which consequently
caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car.
Benito contends that there’s mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense
since Moncayo insulted him when he remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises
of the Civil Service Commission.
NOTE: Benito was later on acquitted of the crime that Moncayo alleged he had
committed.
ISSUE/RULING:
1. W/N the defamatory remark by the victim may give rise to the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a wrong? NO.
OSG said that the defamatory remark was not specifically directed at Benito.
SC said that even assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, Benito "had
more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent
it.” The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo
against Benito and the assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to
recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he evolved
the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo
just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with treachery and evident
premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
Also, SC said that the facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito
to assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory remark but the refusal
of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act primarily
to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having
exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately
refusing to change his report.
Because according also to Benito’s testimony, he saw Moncayo three hours later after the
remark or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and
Moncayo said that he had already submitted his report and he could not do anything more
about Benito's case
DISPOSITION:
SC denied his petition.
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909 Ponente: TORRES, J. THE UNITED STATES vs. with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as
AUGUSTUS HICKS Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet
striking Augustina.
FACTS: CFI- Moro Province convicted Augustus Hicks of murder and sentenced him
to the penalty of death, to be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs ISSUE: Whether or not judgment of should be affirmed (?) HELD: Yes.
of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to SC for review. From September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Re: Passion or Obfuscation
Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived
RATIO: The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case,
together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province. Trouble arose
constitute the crime of murder, with two aggravating circumstances: treachery and
between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907. Agustina left Hick's house and
premeditation (plus the fact that srime was committed in the home of the deceased).
went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted
Treachery. Augustina was suddenly and roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired
new relations with another negro (LOL) named Corporal Wallace Current.
upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured
December 21, 1907 at about 7:30 p. m., - Augustus Hicks together with a soldier
woman was unarmed and unprepared. It is logically inferred that means, manners,
named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old
and forms were employed in the attack directly and specially insured the
mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her
consummation of the crime without such risk to Hicks as might have been offered by
in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of said room;
the Augustina who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to
in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short
flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him
Premeditation. 1. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R.
the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent from the canteen where he
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you
was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his
any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The
mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. 2. It is also shown by the
accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current
fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's invitation,
saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket,
and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the
he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said:
crime, was lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the
"Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the
accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding
partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by
that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man. 3. On the day
in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to
after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house several loaded
the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later. Upon hearing the shot
cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the
Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and wrested
revolver. No mitigating circumstances present, not even loss of reason and self-
the weapon from the hand of the accused. Hicks immediately fled from the house
control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes
and gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock
which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as
him up in jail; and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and
reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks
immoral passions. Judgment affirmed. with costs, provided, however, that the death
to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of
penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event of a
the window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and
pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of
delivered the cartridges to his chief. HICKS’ VERSION: When he (Hicks) withdrew his
the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon.
hand from that of Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed to
support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again Current threatened him
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SANICO NUEVO @
SANY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11, finding accused Sanico Nuevo @ Sany guilty of
rape and sentencing him to death.
His conviction stemmed from the following information:[2]
That, in the evening, on or about the 4th day of December, 1994, in the municipality
of Godod, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, moved by lewd and unchaste design and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
sexual intercourse with one ROBERTA CIDO, a 20 year old married woman, against
her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 335, Revised Penal Code).
A plea of not guilty was entered upon arraignment.
During trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) complainant
Roberta Cido; (2) Anselmo Cido, Jr., the complainants husband; and (3) Dr. Esmeralda
Nadela, a resident physician of the Sindangan District Hospital, Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte. They testified as follows:
ROBERTA CIDO[3] recalled that at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of
December 4, 1994, Sanico Nuevo passed by their house and invited her husband
Anselmo Cido, Jr., to a drinking spree at the house of Anselmo, Sr., her father-in-
law.[4] She was left at home with her 10-month-old daughter and her nine-year-old
niece Gemma Atis. They slept in the living room, cum bedroom, the only room in the
house.[5] At around 11:00 P.M., appellant surreptitiously returned and entered their
room. She was awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and
took off her clothing. While Sanico was removing her panties, she struggled to
extricate herself but to no avail. She was unable to shout because appellant was
covering her mouth. While she was lying on her back, appellant laid on top of her and
proceeded to forcibly have sexual intercourse with her, at the same time pinning her
down with a bolo. As this was happening her niece Gemma, who was present,
witnessed what was being done to her.Appellant even warned Gemma not to reveal
what she saw and at the same time threatened Roberta not to tell her husband about
the incident or else he would kill her.[6] He thereafter left the house.
Roberta further testified that her husband Anselmo, Jr., returned home only the
morning after. She immediately told her husband about the previous nights
incident. The latter hastened to the house of Sanico but did not find him. Appellant
was arrested that same afternoon.[7]
Although Roberta testified on cross-examination, that she did not see him
because it was very dark that night, she identified him through his voice. [8] She was
certain it was he because she was very familiar with appellants voice. Not only have
they been neighbors since childhood, she also heard the appellant when he invited her
husband earlier that evening, and when he warned her and her niece not to tell anyone
what happened.
For his part, ANSELMO CIDO, JR., corroborated part of his wifes story. He
narrated that at around 9:00 P.M., December 4, 1994, Sanico with companions dropped
by their house and invited him to a drinking spree in his fathers (Anselmo, Sr.) house,
about 50 meters away from theirs. While there, they drank until dawn. Sanico left his
fathers place at around 11:00 P.M., purportedly to answer the call of nature, and
returned only at around 1:00 A.M. of December 5, 1994. At the time Sanico left,
Anselmo, Jr., observed that he was carrying an 18-inch bolo. When Anselmo, Jr.,
arrived home early in the morning, his wife told him of her ordeal. [9]
DR. ESMERALDA NADELA testified on her medical findings contained in her
Medico-Legal Certificate dated December 6, 1994, which document[10] she brought
along and read in open court. She said Roberta told her that the latter was submitting
herself for medical examination because she was raped, and that her last sexual contact
with her husband was a week before the incident. Nadela testified further that based
on her examination conducted two days after the alleged incident, no fresh injuries
were actually found on the victim; that only old lacerations were present; that such
absence was possible due to the victims previous child birth; and that no spermatozoa
was found on the victim, which was likely because the examination was conducted
only two days after the alleged rape.[11]
For the defense, two witnesses were presented. First was the appellant himself,
SANICO NUEVO. He declared that he knew Roberta since they were schoolmates in
grade school and she was a former neighbor. He lived about 100 meters from her
house. Moreover, her husband Anselmo, Jr., was his barkada. He recounted that at
about 6:30 P.M., December 4, 1994, his father and he went to the house of Anselmo,
Sr., to buy Tanduay Rum and drank with their friends Rudy and Ami Tinambakan. On
the way, they had to pass by the house of Anselmo, Jr. He denied he invited the
younger Anselmo to go drinking as the latters house was already close by. It was
Anselmo, Jr., who later followed and joined them until around 10:30 P.M. Appellant
said he stayed in the house of Anselmo, Sr., where he slept at around 12:00 oclock
midnight. It was already 6:30 A.M. the following day when he woke up. He denied
raping Roberta. He added that the house of Anselmo, Sr., was only about 35 meters
from the house of Roberta.[12]
The second witness for the defense was EMELIO[13] NUEVO, brother of
appellant. He claimed that he was with his brother Sanico and two neighbors the night
of the incident. He corroborated his brothers story that they were drinking at the house
of Anselmo, Sr., and he noticed his brother asleep on the upper floor of Anselmo Sr.s
house, when he left at around 5:00 A.M. early in the morning while the others were
still dancing downstairs. He admitted, however, that he told no one of seeing his
brother sleep in the house of Anselmo Sr., even when he found out that his brother was
to be arrested, and even when he saw him tied up and already in the custody of the
police. He did not disclose this fact, even when he was already alone with his other
brother who was a councilor of their place. It was only in his testimony during trial
that he chose to reveal these facts in Sanicos defense. He also said he was not aware
of any misunderstanding between his brother and the spouses Roberta and Anselmo,
Jr.[14]
The trial court found the prosecutions version of events credible and disbelieved
that of the defense. It rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused SANICO NUEVO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the above-quoted information
with aggravating circumstances of dwelling (Article 14, (3) of the Revised Penal Code;
People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 629) and committed in full view of the relative within
the third degree of consanguinity (Sec. 11 R.A. 7659), but since no mitigating
circumstances (sic) to offset the above aggravating circumstances, the Court hereby
sentences the accused Sanico Nuevo to suffer the maximum penalty provided by law
which is DEATH and to pay the private offended party in the sum of P50,000.00.
COSTS de officio.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In his brief, appellant assigns one error only:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SANICO NUEVO OF COMMITTING RAPE AGAINST ALLEGED VICTIM
ROBERTA CIDO DESPITE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF HIS POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION.[16]
In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more
difficult for the appellant, although innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense (People vs. Quijada, 321 SCRA
426 [1999]); and (d) the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of
witnesses deserves utmost respect on the ground that they are in the best position to
observe the demeanor, act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in court while
testifying (People vs. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 [1999]).
In our view, the first issue for our resolution here is whether appellant was
sufficiently identified by the offended party based only on her recognition of the sound
of his voice. The second issue is whether the prosecutions evidence suffices for the
conviction of rape and the imposition of the death penalty on him.
Appellant denies he raped Roberta Cido. He questions the certainty of his
identification as the offender. He avers that the night of the rape, there was no moon
and it was very dark. Nor was there any showing of illumination from any source in
and out of the house of the victim. Further, she averred that she identified her rapist
only because she recognized his voice. According to appellant, such voice
identification is insufficient to prove he was the rapist.
In People vs. Reyes,[17] we held that once a person has gained familiarity with
another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable
distance. In a number of cases, we ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an
acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the
accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. [18] Appellant
did not deny that he and Roberta had known each other since childhood [19] and that
appellant and Robertas husband were barkada.[20] It is not impossible then that
complainant could immediately recognize appellant through his voice alone. In
addition, appellants face was very near the victim[21] such that the victim could not
have misidentified him, even only by voice recognition.
According to appellant, Roberta claims she smelled marijuana on the rapist but
she patently made a mistake since he should have smelled of Tanduay Rum instead,
because that was what he drank. In addition, he argues that since no physical injury
was found on Roberta to show that there was force or intimidation inflicted on her,
therefore, no rape had happened.
As testified to by Dr. Nadela, however, lacerations or signs of injury may not be
present in this case due to the fact that the victim had already given birth to a
child.[22] Moreover, according to the victim,[23] appellants penis was relatively small in
size, about two and a half inches long. This is consistent with Dr. Nadelas testimony
that in some cases of women who have already given birth, it would take an extra-
large male organ to cause lacerations. According to her, healed lacerations or the
absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal canal do not negate rape. [24] We are, thus,
constrained to say that appellants bland conclusion that no rape happened for lack of
physical injuries on the person of the victim is clearly a non-sequitur.
Appellants claim that Roberta should have smelled him reeking of liquor instead
of marijuana is beside the point and deserves scant consideration. Note that appellant
and his five other companions shared only four bottles of pocket-sized Tanduay mixed
with softdrinks.[25] Thus, it was not unlikely that he did not smell strongly of
liquor. Further, note that the drinking spree started at 8:30 P.M., and it was barely two
hours thereafter when appellant left the group, according to prosecution
witnesses. Besides, that Roberta said she detected the smell of marijuana on her abuser
does not change the fact that she identified him positively and without any reservation
as the perpetrator of the offense.
 Considering the circumstances in this case, in the light of the testimony by the
victim and her witnesses as well as of those for the defense, we agree with the trial
court that Roberta had sufficiently identified appellant as the person who raped her, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, against her will and without her
consent. Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
We are, however, constrained to disagree concerning the penalty imposed on
him. An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide open for review and it is
the duty of the appellate court to correct errors, as may be found in the appealed
judgment, even if unassigned.[26] This salutary principle governs our automatic review
of death penalty cases as well.
Although not assigned as an error, it is our view that the trial court erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance under par. 3, Section 11, R.A.
7659,[27] concerning the presence of a relative, to justify the imposition of the death
penalty.
In People vs. Amadore, we held that the attendance of any of the circumstances
under the provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandating the death
penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of proper
averment thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme
penalty.[28] The information in this case did not allege the qualifying circumstance, that
the rape was committed in full view of a niece (a relative within the third degree of
consanguinity). Because of this deficiency, appellant was not properly apprised of the
extent of the punishment which the charges against him entailed. Thus, it was an error
to consider the foregoing circumstance in the imposition of the proper penalty on
appellant.
Further, while the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use of a
deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, we find that these were not averred
in the information. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1,
2000, provides that every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying
but also the aggravating circumstances with specificity.[29] This requirement of
procedure has retroactive effect and is applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage insofar as it is favorable to the appellant. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[30] Here, it was error to appreciate
dwelling and the use of a deadly weapon as aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the offense. In sum, we find that no aggravating as well as qualifying
circumstances have been properly pleaded and proved by the prosecution in this
case. The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, the law
prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished only with reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, on the civil aspect, modification is also in order. Private complainant
is entitled not only to P50,000 as civil indemnity, but following current jurisprudence,
also to P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED. The appellant is
declared GUILTY of the crime of simple rape beyond reasonable doubt, and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua. Conformably with
prevailing jurisprudence, appellant is also ordered to pay the offended party P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
US vs Dela Cruz
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he
was convicted in the court below is conclusively established by the evidenced
of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to
fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium
degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been
taken into consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have been
imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed
the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon
discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled
to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under
the provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as
set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69,
in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for
having caught her in her underclothes with another party and
afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible
for that crime with the extenuating circumstance of having acted with
violent passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba
 did not so hold and its judgment was reversed by the supreme court
for the improper disregard of article 9, number 8, of the Penal Code
for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial court,
and which were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in the
accused strong emotion which impelled him to the criminal act and
even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient impulse in the natural
and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation
which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as the
judgment did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of article
9 of the code, the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this
legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that
the "causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control
are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from
vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of
the provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the
alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate from legitimate
feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,
deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman
who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his
perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was
already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried
other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he
entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with
his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his
intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility,
doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design,
behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the
aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations
with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being
merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and
live with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which
defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was
not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in
the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited
decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of
things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to be
one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the
court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the
reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day
ofreclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the
judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-46530 April 10, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. CATALINO RABAO,Defendant-Appellant.
Jose F. Oreta for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Paredes, Jr. for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide and
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of from eight years and
one day of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay
the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information filed by the acting provincial fiscal of said province
charged the defendant with parricide for having killed his wife
Salvacion Agawa on December 15, 1937, in the municipality of Naga,
Province of Camarines Sur, which crime was committed with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior
strength.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant and the deceased Salvacion Agawa were married
before the justice of the peace of Naga on January 15, 1936 and had
since been born to the marriage. Since their marriage they had made
their home in the house of Urbano Rellora, who lived maritally with
the mother of the accused. On the morning of December 15, 1937,
when the defendant was hardly awake after staying up late the
previous night on account of the elections held in the municipality of
Naga, he noticed that his wife was preparing water with which to
give the child a bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child because
it had a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose in the heat of
which the accused punched his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated
on a sack of rice nearby and immediately suffered an attack of which
she died in spite of the aid rendered her by the accused himself and
other persons who had arrived. The following morning Dr. Vicente
Roxas performed an autopsy and found that the spleen of the
deceased had been hypertrophied due to an acute and chronic
malaria from which she had been suffering, and that death was
caused by the hemorrhage of the spleen when it was ruptured as a
consequence of an external blow on the abdomen which might have
been that delivered by the
accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense alleges that the lower court erred in declaring that the
accused hit the deceased on the abdomen, which caused her death,
instead of finding him, at most, guilty of parricide through reckless
imprudence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After an examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the
lower court did not err in finding that the accused hit the deceased
on the abdomen which directly caused the rupture of her spleen
producing thereby an internal hemorrhage that caused her almost
instant death. Urbano Rellora who, as stated before, was the owner
of the house where the defendant and the deceased lived and who
maintained marital relations with the mother of the accused, testified
positively that he saw the accused punched his wife on the abdomen,
as a result of which she fell seated on a sack of rice and that very
moment she had an attack, became unconscious and expired. This
testimony is corroborated by Dr. Roxas who performed the autopsy,
when he declared that the death was caused by the hemorrhage
produced by the rupture of the spleen which rupture was caused by
an external blow on the abdomen of the deceased. The defendant
himself, in his sworn declaration (Exhibit C) subscribed before the
justice of the peace of Naga, voluntarily admitted having hit his wife
on the abdomen with his fist when she said things that offended and
made him nervous. The aggression was likewise corroborated by
another eye-witness, Raymundo Hilano, who declared that he was
at that time passing in front of the defendant's house when he heard
and saw him quarrelling with his wife and that the defendant was
delivering blows on his wife. The testimony of this witness however,
seems incredible and deserves no merit for he testified having seen
the aggression through a window which was three and a half meters
high from the ground where he stood. Considering the height of the
window and the location of the witness, it is clear that he could not
have seen what was happening inside the
house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant's act is not mere reckless imprudence, as the defense
contends, since under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code the acts
that go to make up reckless imprudence must be lawful in
themselves, and the attack consisting in the blow the defendant
dealt his wife is certainly not lawful, since it transgresses the Revised
Penal Code itself, which expressly prohibits it under pain of
punishment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts proven constitute the crime of parricide defined by article
246 of the Revised Penal Code, and in its commission there were
present the following mitigating circumstances considered by the
lower court in favor of the defendant: lack of intention to commit so
grave a crime (article 13 [3], Revised Penal Code); having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
or obfuscation (article 13 [6]); having surrendered himself to the
authorities immediately after the commission of the crime (article 13
[7]); with no aggravating circumstance. As to the penalty imposed,
we find that it is not in accordance with that prescribed by the law.
Under article 246 of the Revised Penal Code the crime of parricide is
punished with reclusion perpetua to death. These penalties are
indivisible and the Revised Penal Code provides, in article 63, rule 3,
that whenever there is present some mitigating circumstance with
no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In
conformity with this legal provision, the penalty that should be
imposed on the accused is that of reclusion
perpetua.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After reviewing the facts, we are convinced that the defendant did
not really have the intention of committing so grave a crime as
parricide. The quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from
the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a father, to
prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a bath. If,
under the circumstances, he transgressed the law by an unjust
attack on his wife, he is, nevertheless, deserving of the mitigating
circumstances allowed in his favor. We invoke, for this reason, article
5, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and recommended to his
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, the commutation of the
penalty imposed on the defendant in this
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Modifying the appealed judgment, we declare the defendant Catalino
Rabao guilty of the crime of parricide and hereby sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua, and to the accessory penalties provided in
article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs in both
instances. So ordered.
People vs. Dawaton
GR No. 1446247. September 17, 2002.
I. Facts:
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on September 20, 1998. His
brother-inlaw Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon.
Domingo Reyes arrived shortly thereafter. The group, all of which are residents of
Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora, started drinking. Came 3:00 pm, they
decided to transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle Amado after the group has
finished four bottles of gin. Upon arriving at the elder Dawaton's house, they
proceeded at the balcony and continued their drinking spree there. The elder Dawaton
was not home at the time of their session. Leonides, due to his drunkenness, opted to
sleep on the papag or wooden bench on the balcony area, as the three continued
drinking until they finished another bottle of gin.
At around 3:30 pm, Edgar stood up and left for his house. He went back with a stainless
knife ranging 2-3 inches in length, and used it to stab the sleeping Leonides near the
base of his neck. Awakened by the sudden attack, Leonides was distraught of his
companion's deed against him. Edgar gave him another stab on the upper part of his
neck, spilling blood on the arm of Leonides. Leonides tried to escape for his life, but
the bigger Edgar grabbed him from the collar of his shirt and stabbed him multiple
times. Leonides still managed to move 20 meters away from the elder Dawaton's
house, but he dropped in front of the Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar
continuously stabbed him until Leonides expired. After the incident, he fled to the
house of his uncle Carlito Baras, where he was arrested by the authorities, who found
him when people surrounding the body of Leonides pointed them to Edgar's
whereabouts. Domingo and Esmeraldo was shocked by the incident. Both failed to
convince Edgar to stop stabbing Leonides, yet they were not able to help the poor
victim.
II. Issues
1. Whether or not the sentence of the trial court charging Dawaton guilty of murder
qualified by
treachery is valid.
2. Whether or not the account of Dawaton on his provocation by the victim, leading to
the
commission of the murder, is valid.
III. Holding
1. Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court, with a few
modifications on the
penalty
2. No. There was no evidence to prove that account, as said by Domingo and
Esmeraldo
themselves.
IV. Rationale
1. The Supreme Court (SC) has specified the errors of the trial court in the imposition
of the death penalty sentence, to wit:
a.) The presence of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication was not taken into
account by the trial court. The accused was drunk at the time of his commission of the
crime, and there was no indication of his frequency of alcohol intake.
b.) The presence of the said mitigating circumstance should entail the imposition of
the lesser penalty, the crime being punishable by two indivisible penalties, namely
reclusion perpetua and death. Under Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the
lesser penalty must be the one imposed in the presence of a mitigating circumstance.
Hence the modification of the sentence of the trial court by the SC, from death to
reclusion perpetua.
2. Treachery is involved in the commission of the crime. There is no question to that,
since it is proven by the prosecution witnesses that at the time of the commission, the
victim was drunk and fast asleep, and that Edgar unexpectedly started to attack the
victim in his sleep. Hence the victim lacked the opportunity to defend himself from
the attack.
a.) The guilty pleading of Edgar to the lesser offense is of no merit. Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code does not present any attenuating circumstance referring to a
scenario wherein the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense (in this case, homicide).
Furthermore, the accused did not secure the consent of the prosecution to allow him to
plead guilty to a lesser offense (Sec. 2, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). The prosecution has consistently maintained its stand that murder,
accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, must be imposed against
Edgar.
b.) The presence of a grenade being threatened to be used by the victim, as mentioned
in another version of the facts prepared by Edgar, is not merited. The prosecution
witnesses belied it and maintained that the victim was fast asleep and not in a
belligerent manner against the accused. In fact, they claim that the attack was so
unexpected, the two having been in good terms to each other prior to their drunkenness.
PEOPLE V VIERNES
G.R. Nos. 136733-35 / DEC 31, 2001 / PANGANIBAN, J. / CRIMPRO –
Modification of
Judgment
Nature Appeal from Decision of RTC
Petitioners People of the Philippines (appellee)
Respondents Eladio Viernes y Ildefonso (appellant)
Case Brief.
Eladio Viernes raped his daughter 3 times and was convicted by the RTC of
Lipa on May 1998.
In a Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution asked that the that the
imposed penalties be increased pursuant to RA No. 7659. The RTC granted
the Motion via the assailed Order. The SC held that the RTC erred in
increasing the penalties and that a judgment of conviction may be modified
only upon motion of the accused.
Case Doctrine.
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution may be modified only upon
motion of the accused. As a rule, the prosecution is prohibited from seeking,
and the trial court from granting, a more severe penalty than that imposed in
the original decision. This is especially true in a case in which the new and
amended penalty imposed is death.
Facts.
Catherine Linatoc (12 years old) was raped 3 times by her stepfather, Eladio
Viernes. (mej irrelevant pero just in case kailangan details)
o 1st time (Sept. 29, 1996): Catherine Linatoc was on the ground floor of the
house when appellant sprung from wherever he was, grabbed and carried her
to the second floor. He caressed her breasts and started inserting his penis
into her vagina. Appellant dressed up, and before walking away, apologized to
her. It would be the first and last rape, he said.
o 2nd time: From nowhere, appellant appeared. He dragged her to the second
floor where he undressed her and himself. This time, however his penis landed
on the thighs of the victim as insertion, because of her struggle and vaginas
virginal qualities, became frustratingly difficult. Between her thighs appellant
thrusted his penis. He satisfied himself just the same.
o 3rd time: Appellant instructed Catherine Linatoc to fetch water for the house
toilet. She deposited them by the door of the toilet. Turning about, Catherine
Linatoc was surprised to find appellant behind her. Grasping her hands tightly
with one hand, appellant began inserting his penis into her vagina. After
appellant spurted out, he backed off and left saying nothing.
The lower court held that the testimony of Catherine Linatoc was clear,
positive and steadfast while the appellant’s denial and alibi were
unsubstantiated.
In a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 18, 1998, Prosecutor Sandoval
asked that the imposed penalties be increased pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 76591. The RTC granted the Motion via the assailed Order.
In the assailed Order, the trial court noted that the prosecutions Motion was
unopposed. It ruled that the increase in penalty did not place appellant in
double jeopardy.
Issue.
1. Whether the trial court erred in increasing the penalties via the assailed
Order.–YES
Ratio.
1. Whether the trial court erred in increasing the penalties via the assailed
Order..–YES
The trial court was correct in convicting appellant in accordance with the
challenged Decision, BUT was wrong in imposing the new penalties through
the assailed Order.
People v. Ang Cho Kio: the Court, citing Article 2 of Rule 118 of the pre-1964
Rules of Court, held that the prosecution cannot move to increase the penalty
imposed in a promulgated judgment. Reopening the case for the purpose of
increasing the penalty as sought by the government would place the accused
in double jeopardy.
1964 amendment of the Rules: allowed the fiscal to move for the modification
or the setting aside of the judgment before it became final or an appeal was
perfected. Under this amendment, a judgment acquired finality and the trial
court lost jurisdiction only in the following cases:
o (1) after the 15-day period to appeal lapsed,
o (2) when the defendant voluntarily submitted to the execution of judgment,
o (3) when the defendant perfected the appeal
o (4) when the accused withdrew the appeal
o (5) when the accused expressly waived in writing the right to appeal
o (6) when the accused filed a petition for probation.
In 1985, Section 7 of Rule 1202 was amended to include the phrase “upon
motion of the accused” effectively resurrecting the Ang Cho Kio ruling
prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of
conviction.
It aims to protect the accused from being put anew to defend himself from
more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may
have overlooked in the original trial. It does not however bar him from seeking
or receiving more favorable modifications.
the present Rules(2000)3, retained the phrase “upon motion of the accused”.
Therefore, the assailed Order is erroneous and reversible. The trial court
cannot increase the penalties without the consent of the accused.
Decision.
the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Order is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, while the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
PEOPLE VS VIERNESG.R. Nos. 136733-35. December 13, 2001
FACTS: Catherine Linatoc, a minor who is 12 years old was raped by her stepfather,
Eladio Viernes, three times The young girl confided the incident to her grandmother
who reported it to the police The courts said that the testimony of the victim was
clear, positive and steadfast while the accused’s denial and alibi were
unsubstantiated
issue: whether or not Viernes is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
held: NO. Viernes is not entitled to the mitigating circumstances of $voluntary
surrender The courts held that for the act of surrender to be voluntary, it must be
spontaneous it must show !unconditional surrender to authorities because of the
acknowledgment of guilt, or the intention of saying the authorities the trouble and
the expense that search and capture would require going to the police station to
clear his name does not show any intent of the accused to surrender !unconditionally trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary
the authorities surrender presupposes repentance.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE ABOLIDOR, CLAUDIO BARCIMO, JR. and
had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of
FRANCISCO COMODA
the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor
G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004
intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending
Facts:
warrant of arrest against him.[24] Hence, he should not be credited with the
Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her deceased husband, Primo
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Subosa. Subsequently, she cohabited with her common-law husband Warlito Huesca
Thus, appellant is guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of Thelma
and lived together with some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena,
Sobusa. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the penalty of
Ilo-ilo. Thereafter, Warlito Huesca also died.
reclusion perpetua to death for Murder.
In morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried, the victim, Thelma and
her children namely, Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and
Milagros Huesca, the younger sister of Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the
forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered the house and declared
a hold up. Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her. Then
Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing her instantaneous death.
Witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn testified that they knew Ronnie Abolidor because he was
their neighbor for several years, and Claudio Barcimo, Jr. because he was a friend of
their deceased stepfather. Francisco Comoda was later identified by the witnesses at
the police station.
Claudio Barcimo, Jr. denied any participation in the killing of Thelma Subosa and
claimed that he could not have done it because he was a good friend of Warlito
Huesca; that on June 13, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was with Brgy. Capt. Buol in a
celebration at the house of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo Paniza at Brgy. Dawis. He had dinner
and watched game of mahjong; that at around 10:00 p.m., he went to sleep on the
sofa near the mahjong table; that the mahjong game lasted until 4:00 a.m. the
following day; that he and Capt. Buol went back to New Lucena at about 6:00 a.m. of
June 14, 1993; and on the next day, he left for Manila for treatment of
tuberculosis.[8]
After trial, the trial court convicted the three accused of the offense of murder on
January 31, 2000.
Only Claudio Barcimo, Jr. appealed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Held:
To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (3)
the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous,
showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the