VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs.

JUICO

FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all
his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. Doña Fausta, the widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted
a project of partition. The probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding
closed. Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she
received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and referred to in
Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition, however, expressly provided that
approval thereof was without prejudice in the clause of the will for Nicalas Villaflor.

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words
"uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership)

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in the Interpretation of the will.
Held:

The trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .

SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.".

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words,
which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime. The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following:
 ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain

BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ

64 SCRA 452

Art .792
the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made
Doctrine
Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of the probate court. Unless the nullity of the will is patent on its
face, the probate court should first pass upon the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its
substantive validity. Balanay further holds that there is no such thing as preterition of the surviving
spouse.

Facts
Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her husband, Felix Balanay Sr., and by their six legitimate
children as heirs.

Felix Jr.(child) filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will.

In that will Leodegaria Julian declared

(a) that she was the owner of the "southern half" of nine conjugal lots;

(b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father, and

(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties.
In par. V of the will she stated that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the
manner set forth in that part of her will.

She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in
the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.

Felix Balanay Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio(child) opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of
lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper
partition of the conjugal estate.

Felix Balanay Sr. wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he
was interested in its probate. he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and
renounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he
confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay Sr. were
void.

The lower court declared the will void and converted into intestate proceedings.

Issue
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the will void.

Ratio
Yes

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

But the probate court erred in declaring in its order that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which
presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
"Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if
they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering
with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is contrary to
law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso (Art.
143, Civil Code); Madrigal and Paterno v Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil 414). But that illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the lower court's are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the
petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special
Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion.

Solla v. Ascuenta
G.R. No. 24955; September 4, 1926

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor are the surviving legatees of the testratrix Maria
Solla; that the plaintiff Julian Solla and Lucia Solla are heirs of Sergio Solla; Ambrosio Lagmay is the
heir of the deceased Cayetana Solla; Francisco Serna, 2. and Juana Baclig of the deceased Josefa
Solla; Pedro Serna and Agapita Serna of the deceased Jacinto Serna, and that Pedro Garcia is
nephew and heir of the deceased Matias Seveda.

Defendant Ursula is the widow of the deceased Leandro Serrano; that the other defendants Simeon,
Cesario, Santiago, Primitiva and Maxima, surnamed Serrano, are the children and heirs of the said
Leandro Serrano, who died on August 5, 1921; that Simeon Serrano is the executor of Leandro
Serrano and possesses the property claimed by the plaintiffs.

1. Dña. Maria Solla died in June, 1883, leaving a will executed and recorded in accordance
with the laws then in force, but which had not been probated in accordance with the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2. There were named in said will, as legatees, Sergio Soll, Cayetano Solla, Josefa Solla,
Jacinto Serna, Rosenda Lagmay, Silvestra Sajor and Matias Seveda, and Leandro
Serrano, as universal heir, with their shares given them by the will above-mentioned.
3. Said legatees or their descendants or heirs did not judicially claim their legacies during the
life-time of Leandro Serrano, of which he had taken possession, neither was any
testamentary proceeding instituted for the settlement of the estate left by Maria Solla and
that Leandro Serrano did not deliver the legacies in question, which he possessed in his
name until his death, having declared the property for taxation as his own and collected the
income therefrom for himself.
4. That the plaintiffs Julian Solla, Lucia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Rosenda Lagmay,
Francisco Serna, Juana Baclig, Pedro Serna, Agapita Serna and Pedro Garcia are the
descendants or heirs of some of the original legatees, two of whom are the plaintiffs
Silvestra Sajor and Rosenda Lagmay; and the defendants are heirs of Leandro Serrano.
5. That the property of the legacy situated in Cabugao passed into possession of Simeon
Serrano by virtue of Leandro Serrano's will as executor thereof, and that said legacies
have been and are mixed with other property of the estate of Leandro Serrano.
 6. The fifth and sixth assignments of error of defendants raise the question of the true
interpretation of the provisions of the last will of the testratix Maria Solla in regard to the
obligation imposed upon the universal heir named by her, Leandro Serrano, and of the
provisions of the last will of the latter in regard to the obligation imposed by him upon his
heir, and executor Simeon Serrano, one of the herein defendants-appellants.
a. Defendant contended that the trial court erred in interpreting and holding that
paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will, Exhibit C, ordered the delivery of the legacies
left by Maria Solla in her will Exhibit B, to the plaintiffs, and that said paragraph
affects each and everyone of the parcels of land in the property deeds of Leandro
Serano, Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and in holding that the said paragraph 3 of
Leandro Serrano's will cancels all of the rights acquired by him, and is the immediate
cause of the action brought by the plaintiffs;

7. The following are the pertinent parts of Maria Solla's will:

- I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson, as my universal heir who is a
legitimate son of my son Modesto Solosa, and is single;
- and I desire him to comply with the obligation to give or deliver to the parish priest of this
town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena for an ordinary require
mass for the first eight days thereof and on the ninth, or last day, a solemn requiem
mass, with vigil and a large bier, for these masses and for the repose of my soul and
those of my parents, husband, children and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my
heir shall execute and comply with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death
he will insist that his heirs comply with all that I have here ordered.

8. The pertinent parts of the will of Leandro Serrano (Exhibit C) are as follows:
- I command my executor to put all of my property in order, separating first the property of
his deceased grandmother Capitana Maria Solla, because she directed in her will that
her property be distributed strictly in conformity with her wishes and as she earnestly
requested the compliance of her bequests I obligate my heirs to comply with the same;
- On occupation of the fact that all of the property of the deceased Capitana Solla was
given to my son Simeon I order him not to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of
my grandmother and also of nine and to have a mass said on the first and ninth days of
the yearly novena and that he erect a first class bier.
- I insistently order that the property of my deceased grandmother Capitana Maria be
disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine.

9. As may be seen Maria Solla named grandson Leandro Serrano in her will as her universal
heir to her property and ordered him to strictly comply with her orders and requests and
that at the hour of his death to make the same insistence upon his heirs to comply with all
that she has ordered.
a. As may also be seen Leandro Serrano named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor
of his will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate
that which came from his deceased grandmother Maria Solla, which he gives to his
said son Simeon Serrano and orders that same be disposed of exclusively in
conformity with the wishes of his said grandmother, not forgetting the souls of all of
his grandmother's relatives and of his own for whose repose nine masses were to be
said annually during nine days, with a solemn mass on the first and last days.

ISSUE: Interpretation of Solla and Serrano’s wills.

- what are the orders and requests that Maria Solla wanted the universal heir named by
her in her will, Leandro Serrano, to faithfully comply with and to make his heirs comply
with, and what are the orders of Maria Solla which Leandro Serrano ordered his executor
and heir Simeon Serrano to comply with?
RULING:
1) In the first place, there is the distribution of the legacies given in her will to her brothers,
nephew, protegees and servant.
2) In the second place, the delivery of a sufficient sum of money to the parish of Cabugao for
the annual novena, consisting of eight ordinary masses and one solemn requiem mass,
together with vigil and bier on the last day for the repose of the soul of the testratix and her
parents, children, husband and other relatives;
3) and in the third place, the order that Leandro Serrano demand, with the same insistence, that
this heirs comply with all that she had ordered.

 Leandro Serrano have complied with all of these commands and orders during his lifetime,
some wholly and others partially.
 The orders and requests that he could and should have fully complied with during his lifetime
were to distribute the legacies and to order his heirs to comply with all her wishes specified in
her will.
 The order or request that he was able to comply with only partially was to deliver to the
parish priest a sufficient sum of money necessary for the annual masses for the repose of
the soul of Maria Solla and her parents, husband, children and other relatives.
 It is not logical to suppose that Maria Solla in ordering Leandro Serrano to insist in his will
that his heirs after his death comply with all the requests contained in her said will, referred
to the orders and requests that he could and should comply with during his lifetime, because
neither is it logical nor reasonable to suppose that she for a moment doubted that the person
whom she had named as her universal heir — for, according to her, he was the only person
in whom she had any confidence — would comply with her requests.
o If that is so, Maria Solla could not have referred to other than the pious orders and
requests, because, by reason of their nature, they were the only ones which Leandro
Serrano could not wholly comply with during his lifetime, but that his heirs would
continue to do so.
o And Leandro Serrano, in complying with the requests of Maria Solla in his will by
ordering his son Simeon Serrano, to whom he bequeathed all of the property
received from the former, to comply with all of the requests of the same, could not
have meant but those requests which Maria Solla wished complied with by the heirs
of Leandro Serrano which are those relating to the pious bequests.
 She confirms this on the fifth clause of her will quoted above, in which she
says: "On account of the fact that all the property of the deceased Capitana
Solla is bequeathed to my son Simeon I order him not to forget the souls of
my grandmother's relatives."
 From this is evidently appears that Leandro Serrano bequeathed all of the
property of the deceased Maria Solla to his son Simeon Serrano only in order
that he might comply with her pious requests.
 Furthermore if to ease his conscience it had been Leandro Serrano's desire
to deliver the aforesaid legacies to the legatees or to their successors in
interest he would have done so during his lifetime or would have said so
clearly in his will and would not have given all of his said property to his son
Simeon Serrano.

 In order to determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near as possible
in his position, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, should
take into consideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances
surrounding him at the time the will executed.
 Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and surrounding
circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the language
will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as
 possible, the court may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense
different from that which is ordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may mold or
change the language of the will. such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words
or phrases.

 In the present case, it clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla's intention, in ordering her
universal heir Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the
compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious orders and
that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the compliance of which she had
entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the application of the words "all
that I have here ordered" used by the said Maria Solla and the words "all her orders" used by
Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to the pious orders and substituting
the phrase "in regard to the annual masses" after the words used by both testators,
respectively.

 The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro Serrano
mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will relative to the
legacies and not to pious bequests exclusively.