G.R. No.

130003 October 20, 2004

JONAS AÑONUEVO, Petitioner.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, Respondent.

FACTS:
On 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, Jerome Villagracia was traveling along Boni
Avenue on his bicycle, while Jonas Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car
with plate number PJJ 359, which was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad
Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated
his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

Villagracia filed an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo
before the RTC; and also filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. Trial on the civil action
ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble
and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia for actual damages, moral damages, attorney’s fees and
legal costs.

CA Ruling: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto, stating that, it was Añonuevo’s vehicle which
had struck Villagracia; that Añonuevo’s vehicle had actually hit Villagracia’s left mid-thigh, thus causing a
comminuted fracture; that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Añonuevo
was "umaarangkada," or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad; that considering Añonuevo’s
claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path as he made the turn. Añonuevo had enough
warning to control his speed; and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and
diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided.

Respondent’s Contention: Añonuevo does not dispute the findings of tortious conduct on his part made
by the lower courts, but hinges his appeal instead on the negligence of Villagracia, alleging that
Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a
1948 municipal ordinance. Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to
register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code
applies by analogy, pointing out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was
enacted, the number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then and that the
interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has "inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to
expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the times.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.
2. Whether Villagracia’s own fault and negligence absolves Anonuevo of any liability for damages.

RULING:
1. NO. At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized
vehicles ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and
animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more
prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New
Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the
use of the term "motorized vehicles." The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is
the difference in type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine
unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of
burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical
exertion is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same
time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an
accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as
the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass and greater combustibility due to the fuels that
 they use. The Court emphasized that a driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is
required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the reason that the machine
is capable of greater destruction, and furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of
the driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some extent aid in averting an
accident.

Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations.
If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the
Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter,
pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities
attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long
existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the
special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under
Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards
applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

2. NO. The Court cited with approval American authorities elucidating on the rule, that “the generally
accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter
of law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason that non-
observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain
acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a
breach of duty with respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise
expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal
excuse…Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the
hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance
was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.”

However, the general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance
was intended to prevent.

In this case, at face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded
against by the ordinance he violated. However, the fact that Añonuevo was speeding as he made
the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless
behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it
turned into the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. Even
assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow
down as he proceeded to make the left turn.

The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may
have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is
without legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If
anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal
government, which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But
such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in relation to the accident.
Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree
of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances reasonably require. To determine if
Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal
ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the contemporaneous
circumstances of the accident.
 The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed
by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection
is established between such failure and the injury sustained.

G.R. No. L-10073 December 24, 1915

BUTARO YAMADA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., defendant-
appellant.

G.R. No. L-10074 December 24, 1915

KENJIRO KARABAYASHI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-10075 December 24, 1915
TAKUTARU UYEHARA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., defendant-
appellant.

FACTS:
On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an automobile from the
defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at a certain price hour
and was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company. The journey to Cavite
Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip, while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad
company in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and
the plaintiffs injured.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad Company and held
the defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs in various amounts, stating that the
driver of the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the precautions
which ordinary care and prudence would require, without reducing speed and without taking any
precaution looking to determining whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. The trial court
accordingly found that the driver was guilty of gross negligence and that said negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the driver had been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab
company to approach and pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the
occasion in question, and that, for that reason, the taxicab company was liable for the damages caused.

Defendant’s (Taxicab Co.) Contention:

1. The appellant contended that on approaching the railroad crossing from the direction in which the
automobile was travelling at the time, the view of the railroad tracks in both directions was
obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was impossible for a
person approaching the crossing even though on guard, to detect by sight the approach of a train.
2. Mr. Bachrach, the president of the company, contended that that all of his drivers, including the
one in charge of the car on the night of the accident, operated cars in that manner and that it was
the custom among automobile drivers generally. The defendant further contends that "When a
person does what is usual and customary, i. e., proceeds as he and others engaged in a like
occupation have been accustomed to proceed, the action cannot be characterized as reckless,
nor, strictly speaking as negligent."
3. The appellant contends that Manila Railroad Co. is negligent as the railroad company did not
maintain either a flagman or protecting gates at the grade crossing where the accident occurred,
while the sign "Railroad Crossing" was broken on the side toward the road; that trees and
undergrowth had been permitted to grow on and adjoining the right of way and houses were
constructed thereon, in such manner as to obstruct the view of persons approaching the railroad
 track until within a few meters thereof; and that the approach to the crossing is twisting, and on
either side thereof are ditches about two meters deep.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether defendant Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. is liable for damages
2. Whether defendant Manila Railroad Co. is liable for damages

RULING:

1. YES. It was the duty of a person or corporation operating automobiles for hire to exercise
ordinary care and diligence in the selection of the drivers of his or its automobiles and in
supervision over them while in his or its employ, including the promulgation of proper rules and
regulations and the formulation and due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in
cases where such rules, regulations and the formulation and due publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules, regulations and instruction are
necessary. Discussion article 1903 of the Civil Code, which, as we have seen, not only
established liability in case of negligence but also provides when that liability ceases, the court in
that case said:

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the selection of the servant or employee
or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course,
in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the
servant is conclusively the negligence of the master.

The Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to comply with one of the essential
requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction,
including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of
proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and instructions
are necessary. To repeat, it was found by the trial court, and that finding is fully sustained by the
record, that it was the custom of the driver who operated the machine on the night of the
accident, to approach and pass over railroad crossings without adequate precautions, and that
such custom was known to and had been sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab company, the
president of the company testifying that none of its drivers, especially the one who operated the
car on the night of the accident, were accustomed to stop or even reduce speed or take any other
precaution in approaching and passing over railroad crossings, no matter of what nature, unless
they heard "the signal of a car." He testified that he himself had ridden behind several of his
drivers, among them the one who handled the automobile on the night of the accident, and that it
was settled practice, to which he made no objection and as to which he gave no instructions, to
approach and pass over railroad crossings without any effort to ascertain the proximity of a train.

2. NO. The trial court found that the employees of the railroad company fully performed their duty as
the train approached the crossing on the night in question and that, therefore, the railroad
company in nowise contributed to the accident. That the bell was rung and the whistle was blown
on nearing the crossing, giving due and timely warning to all persons approaching, was testified
to not only by servants of the corporation but by passengers on the train. The Court find nothing
 in the record which materially impairs the credibility of these witnesses or to show that their
evidence is improbable or unreasonable; and we would be going far under such circumstances in
discarding it and reversing a judgment based thereon. Further, the Supreme Court stated that it is
not negligence on the part of the railroad company to maintain grade crossing, even in populous
district; nor is it negligence not to maintain a flagman at such crossing. It is true that a railroad
company is held to greater caution in the more thronged streets of the densely populated portions
of the city than in the less frequented streets in suburban parts or in towns; but this does not
mean that it is negligence to maintain grade crossing in such densely populated portions or that it
is negligence not to maintain a flagman at crossings located in such districts. It simply means that
the company in operating its trains over such crossings must exercise care commensurate with
the use of crossings in any given locality.

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910

S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On September 11, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on
Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for
the purpose of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses,
came along the street in the opposite direction to that in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that
thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant
was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of the street and stopped,
in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the
defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and
overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring
the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
The defendant contended that the cochero driving the delivery wagon as the defendant’s
employee, tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside of the wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the
forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a
whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they
ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into
collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. The defendant
himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable
driver is liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team

RULING:
NO. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them
in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that
time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist
in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all
cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of
the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or
inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues.

EXTRA: The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable
or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be
held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted
by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries
result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that,
because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not
in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates aprima
facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of
was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the
conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur disappears.