G.R. No.
130003 October 20, 2004 public concern so as to expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the
Jonas Añonuevo, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Jerome Villagracia, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Facts: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his bicycle, while Añonuevo,traversing the
opposite lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo was in the course of making a leftturn towards Libertad Street
when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted
an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also
filed a criminal complaint against Añonuevobefore the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
but the latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the criminal charge.
Añonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his
bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by
analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a persondriving
a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Issues:
A. Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply to non-motorized
vehicles, making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
B. Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations.
C. Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of contributory negligence
Held: No to all.
A. Application of Article 2185
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by
analogy. The provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles[23]. He
points out that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even
suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that
only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet
today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has inescapably become matter of
times.[24]
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles
ranging from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-
drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more
prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New
Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with
the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of
Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such
argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized
vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be
certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed
by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between
motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is pertinent basis for segregating between motorized and non-motorized vehicles. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of greater
speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the sam etime, motorized vehicles
are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision.
This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as the greater speed,
its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustibility due to the use of fuel.
B. Negligience on the part of Villagracia
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the
actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or
negligent. Añonuevo asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had transgressed traffic
regulations. However, Añonuevo was speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own
admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been
decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity
to avoid hitting Villagracia, such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the driver of
his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
C. Contributory Negligience
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to
health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal
link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In
a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and
not simply a condition for its occurrence.[61]
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Añonuevo assolely
responsible for the accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be
reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if
Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.