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act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
I. Sources of obligations under Philippine Law
a. The nature of an action as in contract or in tort is
determined from the essential elements of the complaint,
taken as a whole, in the case of doubt a construction to
sustain the action being given to it.
b. After a careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the
term "quasi-delict" for those obligations which do not
arise from law, contracts quasi-contracts or criminal
offenses. They are known in Spanish legal treatises as
"culpa aquiliana", "culpa-extra-contractual" or "cuasi-
delitos". The phrase "culpa-extra-contractual" or its
translation "extra-contractual fault" was eliminated because it
did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations.
"Aquilian fault" might have been selected, but it was thought
inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as the "Lex Aquilia".
So "quasi-delicts" was chosen, which more nearly
corresponds to the Roman Law classification of
obligations, and is in harmony with the nature of this
kind of liability. (Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co, Inc.)
II. Quasi-Delict distinguished from other sources of obligations;
QD v. Breach of Contract
a. The true explanation of such cases is to be found by
directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual
and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non-
contractual obligation is much more broader than that of
contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole
extent of juridical human relations. The mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve
him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
(Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.)
b. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort.” (Air France
v. Carrascoso)
c. The existence of a contract between the parties does
not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. (Singson
v. BPI)
d. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana,
Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had
no contract existed between the parties, the contract
can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply. (LRTA v. Navidad)
e. QD and BoC distinguished by the Source of the
Obligation and the availability of the Defense of Diligence in
Selection and Supervision. In QD, the breach itself furnishes
the vinculum juris.
III. Quasi-Delict v. Delicts
a. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for

cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. (Barredo v. Garcia)
b. Some of the differences between crimes under the
Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under
the Civil Code are:
i. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-
delitos are only of private concern.
ii. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
iii. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts,
IV. Quasi-Delict; Elements
because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce
civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention
of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction
of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (Barredo v.
Garcia)
iv. Plus – Quantum of Proof required; and the nature of
the Employer’s liability.
c. In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (Elcano v. Hill)
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
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d. There has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a
crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. (Barredo v. Garcia)
e. The acquittal of an accused in the criminal case
does not extinguish his liability for quasi-delict. (Elcano
v. Hill) Unless it is held that the act did not exist.
a. The complaint must state the elements, i.e. (1)
Damages suffered, (2) Fault or Negligence of the defendant
or some other person for whose acts he must respond, and
(3) Proximate Causation between the two. (Andamo v. IAC)
i. Proximate Causation – that cause, which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result woul not have occurred.
b. Separate civil actions based on Quasi-Delict may
lie irrespective of the criminal act. It may proceed
independently.
c. In Medical Negligence, the elements are (1) Duty,
(2) Breach, (3) Injury, and (4) Proximate Causation.
i. Physicians represent that they have the needed skill
and that they will exercise that degree of care, skill,
and diligence which physicians in the same
neighborhood and line of practice ordinarily possess
and exercise.

ii. Proof on the failure to meet the standard of care
generally rests upon expert witnesses as. They
possess unusual technical skills. (They are
indispensable – Lucas v. Tuano)
VI. Quasi Delict; Persons Liable, Nature of Liability
iii. Proximate Causation likewise rests on expert
witnesses.
iv. The onus probandi is generally on the patient.
d. In Quasi-Delict, there is generally no presumption of
negligence. In breach of contract, negligence is presumed so
long as it can be proved that there was breach. (Huang v.
Phil. Hoteliers)
V. Quasi-Delict; Double Recovery
a. A recovery under one remedy necessarily bars
recovery under the other under unjust enrichment. Payment
by the tortfeasor’s insurer to the victim prevents the
continuance of the damage claim against the former. (Joseph
v. Bautista)
b. Double recovery prohibits the same against the same
act or omission. Where two claims rest on two different
transgressions, there is no prohibition. (Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Company of Manila v. CA)
c. In negligence cases, the victim has the option to
enforce liability under Art. 100 of the RPC and an action
based on Quasi-Delict. Simultaneous remedies may be
availed of. What is prohibited is actual double recovery.
(Padua v. Robles)
d. The failure to recover in actions ex delicto do not bar
actions ex quasi delicto, being distinct and independent.
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
Page |3
(Equitable Leasing v. Suyom) There is no forum shopping or
litis pendentia between the two. (Lim v. Ping)
a. Common carriers must provide safety to its
passengers so long as they are within its premises and where
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
They are liable for negligent or willful acts of its employees,
as well as of others if it could have prevented them with due
diligence. Injury to a passenger presumes fault or negligence
on the part of the common carrier.
b. The liability of a common carrier and an independent
contractor is solidary. Both are liable under different causes
of action. When an act which breaches a contract would have
itself constituted a quasi-delict, the contract is breached by
tort, along the rules on tort to apply. (LRTA v. Navidad)
c. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. Negligence in
order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of
an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring
with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's,
is the proximate cause of the injury. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not
have resulted from his negligence alone. Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an

efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the
case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the
same. (PNCC v. CA) The MOA re: liability for damages does
not absolve, the victim not being a party thereto.
d. Cooperation in committing the tort gives rise to
solidary liability. (Chan v. INC)
e. One can join as many parties liable for alternative
causes of action, so long as there is no double recovery.
What is clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff to
recover from both the carrier and the driver, justifying the
holding that they were solidarily liable – their separate and
distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury. (Fabre v.
CA)
f. An action against the employer under Art. 2180 does
not require jurisdiction over the negligent employee, the
liability of the employer being solidary, direct, and primary,
based on his own negligence. The employee is not
indispensable nor necessary. The rule is different in
actions based on delict.
VII. Negligence; Concept
a. A train driver has no obligation to stop or slow down
upon seeing an adult pedestrian near the track unless there
is something sketchy indicating the possibility that he would
not step aside. All that is ordinarily required is that he blow his
whistle to attract attention. He may assume all persons
near the track, other than those of tender years, are
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
Page |4
aware of the danger and would take precautions. (US v.
Bonifacio)
b. Violation of a regulation gives rise to a presumption
of negligence. The burden is on the accused to show that the
fault could not have been a contributory cause. (US v.
Bonifacio)
c. There is an appreciable risk that an animal would get
excited and react unexpectedly. The test for determining
whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
admonition born of this prevision is the constitutive fact of
negligence. (Picart v. Smith)
d. Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation
of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is
great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
Every case must be dependent on its facts. (Corliss v. Manila
Railroad Co.)
e. Railroad tracks are in themselves warnings of
danger. It is incumbent on those passing to use all available
faculties and do everything that a prudent man would do

before crossing, that is, stop upon hearing/seeing warnings.
(Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co.)
f. The public has a right to rely on warning devices at
railroad crossings. Where there is no danger apparent, a full
stop is not necessary. (Cusi v. PNR)
g. Mere intoxication is not negligence. It is but a
circumstance tending to prove it. If one’s conduct is attended
by care and prudence, intoxication is immaterial, particularly
when injury could not have been avoided thereby. (Wright v.
Manila Electric)
h. Reckless imprudence under the RPC takes into
account (1) employment or occupation, (2) intelligence, (3)
physical condition, and (4) circumstances of persons, time,
and place. (People v. De Los Santos)
i. Accident is an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches. It is fortuitous, with no human agency,
or if there were, it is unusual or unexpected. It is incompatible
with negligence. The failure to remedy a risk after being
informed thereof constitutes negligence. (Jarco Marketing
Co. v. CA)
j. Negligence is the omission of the diligence required
by the nature of the obligation, corresponding to the
circumstances of the persons, time, and place. Using pliers,
contrary to the established trade standard of a miniature saw,
constitutes negligence. (Sarmiento v. Cabrido)
k. Doctrine of Informed Consent - a physician has a
duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the
medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury
might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare,
and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
Page |5
treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may
intelligently exercise his judgment. He physician is not
expected to give the patient a short medical education, the
disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable explanation,
which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical
terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives open to
him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks
i. For liability of the physician for failure to inform
patient, there must be causal relationship between
physician’s failure to inform and the injury to patient
and such connection arises only if it is established
that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment
would not have been given.
ii. (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise
would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was
injured by the proposed treatment.
iii. Expert testimony is required to prove duty and
breach. (Li v. Soliman) The standard is an evolving
one.
iv. Exceptions – Emergency, viz. an unconscious
person; and the therapeutic privilege, viz. when
informing the patient would adversely affect his
health.
l. Attorneys need only exercise reasonable diligence.
He is not liable for default when he is not the actual counsel.
(Adarne v. Aldaba)
m. Principles re: common carriers - (1) the liability of a
carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation.
 Page |6

There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence physically. While the injury would not have occurred without
according to all the circumstances of each case; (2) a carrier the negligence of the owner, the proximate cause was the
is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of a child’s stupidity. (Taylor v. Manila Electric)
very cautious person, having due regard for all the
c. Where a speeding bus with bald tires overturned,
circumstances; (3) a carrier is presumed to be at fault or to
resulting in the leakage of fuel, the same is the proximate
have acted negligently in case of death of, or injury to,
cause of injuries resulting from a fire caused by good
passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
Samaritans coming to assist with lit torches. It is a natural
extraordinary diligence; and (4) the carrier is not an insurer
consequence of having an accident in a rural area at night.
against all risks of travel. Proving extraordinary diligence
(Bataclan v. Medina)
relieves liability from quasi-delict. And breach of
contract; see (3). d. Even when the city was negligent in maintaining a
septic tank, it is not liable for the death of one who enters it
n. One is a common carrier regardless of whether
when the tanks are sealed with warning signs; the proximate
it is a principal business or a sideline with only select
cause of death is the victim’s own conduct in opening the
clients. They are presumed negligent when the stuff is
seals without authority from the city, the danger being
damaged in their possession.
apparent. (Fernando v. CA)
o. When the defect is apparent, the failure to discover
e. Tetanus can be an intervening cause to a hacking
and remedy it constitutes negligence. (Ridjo Tape and
incident. When medical facts show a likelihood that the
Chemical Co. v. CA)
wound was infected far after the incident, reasonable doubt
demands an acquittal. The hacking becomes a remote cause.
(Urbano v. IAC)
VIII. Negligence; Proximate Cause
i. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
a. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that
basis of an action if such remote cause did
produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
nothing more than furnish the condition or give
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the
rise to the occasion by which the injury was
result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
made possible, if there intervened between such
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
(Quezon City Government v. Dacarra)
injury, even though such injury would not have
b. Proximate causation must be proved for liability to happened but for such condition or occasion. If
attach. Where the child recovers blasting caps from a no danger existed in the condition except because of
negligently secured facility, the owner incurs no liability for the the independent cause, such condition was not the
injury resulting from the child’s detonating it by use of a proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act
match, particularly when he was mature both mentally and
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages

or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause.
f. When one evades an automobile by running to a
ditch, the owner of a facility dumping hot water thereto,
causing death, is liable, as the victim had a perfect right to be
on the street. It is easily foreseeable that injury would result if
hot water was allowed to course through public streets, it
being a logical consequence. (Bernal v. House and Tacloban
Electric)
g. The mere fact that one stops a carromata/kalesa
does not make one liable for the subsequent behavior of the
horse; the stopping is too remote to be the proximate cause
thereof. It is the driver who is charged with control of the
horse. (Gabeto v. Araneta)
h. One’s negligence is not the proximate cause of a
collision if there is an intervening event which is the actual
cause of the injury. Hence, when upon seeing a vehicle
approaching head-on, the truck driver did nothing, it is his
negligence which is the proximate cause of the accident, the
last clear chance being his. (McKee v. IAC)
i. When one parks a truck askew with no warning
devices whatsoever, he is liable for the resulting collision,
even though the injured party is negligent. The latter party’s
negligence is only contributory. If the intervening cause is one
which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant
may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason. (Phoenix v. IAC) Most likely distinction – Justice
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
Page |7
Feliciano’s refusal to apply the Last Clear Chance rule.
Sobrang pa-uso lang.
i. However, when the injured party first hit a stone,
causing him to lose control and collide with the truck,
the driver of the truck is not liable. That the injured
party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his
own making. (Austria v. CA)
j. When an electric company, knowing of the threat
posed by tall plants and a storm against its electric lines, fails
to act to prevent the damage and cordon off the damaged
lines, it is liable for the death of a child that touches the fallen
live wire. He would be alive were it not for the live wire. (Umali
v. Bacani)
k. In medical malpractice, proximate causation is
generally one for expert knowledge beyond the ken of the
average layperson. The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualified physicians or surgeons stems from the
former’s realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating; hence, the indispensability of expert
testimonies. (Lucas v. Tuano)
l. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
(Calalas v. CA)
IX. Negligence; Proof of Negligence
a. The person claiming damages generally has the
burden of proving that the damage is caused by the fault or

negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed,
or of one of his employees. (Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District)
d.
X. Presumption of Negligence; Res Ipsa Loquitur
a. It is also a recognized principle that ‘where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
e.
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he
having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury
arose from defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of
evidence is shifted to him to establish that he has observed
due care and diligence. (Africa v. Caltex)
b. When a fire occurs on a ship sent to dry dock for
repairs, the repair company exercising exclusive control over
the ship is liable under res ipsa loquitur. (Cebu Shipyard v.
William Lines)
c. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption
or inference that the incident was a result of negligence. It is
established without direct proof. Its basis is necessity, since
it is the negligent party that has the best opportunity of
ascertaining the cause. Evidence is accessible to the
negligent party, but not to the victim.
f.
i. Elements: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent, (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence, (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to ay voluntary action or
g.
contribution on the part of the person injured, (4)
there is no direct evidence.
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
Page |8
ii. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its
defense to prevent the presumption/inference
from arising. Defenses come only after the doctrine
is established. (DM Consunji v. CA)
Flooding caused by a dam, in the absence of
explanation, gives rise to res ipsa loquitur. (National Power
Corporation v. CA)
The doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the
supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct
evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory
that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff,
having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff
relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence. It provides a means by which a
plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent,
should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the
incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s
responsibility to show that there was no negligence on
his part.
i. Re: presumption or inference – debatable point.
When a school is sued for a child’s jumping out of a
bathroom window, it is presumed negligent even though no
direct evidence of the defective doorknob was presented.
The fact that the student had to go through the window shows
that something was wrong with the door. (Child Learning
Center v. Tagario)
The principal of a school is liable for the death of a
student caused by the felling of a dead tree branch. The

danger of a dead and rotting tree is a clearly foreseeable
danger. She is expected to oversee the safety of the school;
the failure to see the danger and seasonably act shows
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur applies. (Capili v. Spouses
Cardana)
h. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with
the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of
plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. (Batiquin v. CA)
i. When a rubber glove is left inside a patient after a
caesarian section, the presumption arises, since the
same would not occur absent the intervention of
negligence.
i. In malpractice or negligence cases involving the
administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of expert
testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur
to the plaintiff, have been applied in actions against
anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death
or injury of a patient under excessive or improper
anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence:
evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical
community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that
the physician in question negligently departed from this
standard in his treatment. (Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio)
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Page |9
j. When the qualifications of a physician are admitted,
as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that
in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and
employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This
presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion, which is sadly
lacking in the case at bench. (Cruz v. CA)
k. Medical malpractice cases do not escape the
application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has
been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the
harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an
inference of negligence as the cause of that harm.
i. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res
ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does
not automatically apply to all cases of medical
negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of
proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of
the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a
rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but
a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted
to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional
care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised, viz., when
the removal of a kidney stone results in a vegetative
state. (Ramos v. CA) The Fund of Common
Knowledge.
ii. In such cases, all that is required is proof of a causal
nexus to establish proximate causation. Expert
testimony will not be required.

l. Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable when the issue is
beyond common knowledge, as when whether or not a
particular set of symptoms warrants a diagnosis of typhoid
fever. When expert witnesses testify as to similar courses of
action, a doctor is not liable, although his diagnosis may have
been erroneous, causing injury or death. (Reyes v. Sisters of
Mercy Hospital)
m. Ipsa Loquitur does not always arise even if all
the elements are satisfied. The inference may be
rebutted by a disputable presumption, such as that of
due care or innocence. (D.M. Consunji) (May nadali sa recit
dito);
XI. Respondeat Superior
a. In the use of an employer’s motor vehicle, whether in
going to and from meals, work, or even outside of working
hours, an employer is generally not liable for injuries caused,
unless the employer was deriving some special benefit
thereby. (Castilex Industrial Co. v. Vasquez)
i. When there is no showing that the employee was
acting for the employer, the employer need not
present evidence of its diligence in his selection and
supervision.
b. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast
with the American doctrine of respondent superior,
where the negligence of the employee is conclusively
presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is
clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility
therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 10
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. (Jose v. CA)
i. Therefore, before the presumption of the
employer’s negligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees can arise, the
negligence of the employee must first be
established.
ii. While the allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation
in the complaint are enough to make out a case of
quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the
failure to prove the employee’s negligence during the
trial is fatal to proving the employer’s vicarious
liability.
iii. An allegation that one is an “authorized driver” is not
equivalent to an allegation that he is a n employee. It
will not give rise to liability under Article 2180.
c. The surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must
not only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of
the passengers of the vessel. The head surgeon is made
responsible for everything that goes wrong within the four
corners of the operating room. It enunciates the liability of the
surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are under
his physical control but also those wherein he has extension
of control. (Ramos v. CA)
d. The prevailing doctrine is that doctors are not
employees; they are independent contractors.
Nevertheless, hospitals may still be liable for their negligence
under:
i. Apparent Authority.

1. The hospital or its agent acted in a manner
that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that the person alleged to be
negligent was an employee or agent;
2. Where the acts of the agent created the
appearance of authority, the hospital must
XII. Violation of Rules and Statutes; Traffic Rules
have acquiesced;
3. The plaintiff acted in reliance upon it,
consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
ii. Corporate Negligence
1. Reasonable care in maintaining facilities and
equipment;
2. Selection and retention of competent
physicians;
3. Supervision of persons practicing medicine;
4. Formulation and enforcement of rules and
policies ensuring quality care.
e. When the employee of a common carrier, in the
course of his duties, i.e. driving a cab, stabs and kills a
passenger, the carrier is liable for breach of contract.
Liability is not based on respondeat superior, but on the
carrier’s duty to transport the passenger safely. Also, they are
liable for death or injuries through the negligence or willful
acts of their employees, even though they acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of orders.
i. They are charged with a high degree of care;
ii. They confided the duty to their employees;
iii. The carrier bears the risk, since it has the power to
remove its employees.
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f. The defense of exercising the required diligence
in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa
aquiliana. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. v. CA)
a. Proximate causation must still be proven, unless the
injury is that which the statute seeks to prevent. See:
Anonuevo below.
b. The operator of an automobile is bound to exercise
care in proportion to the varying danger and risks of the
highway and commensurate with the dangers naturally
incident to the use of such vehicle. He is obliged to take
notice of the conditions before him, and if it is apparent that
by any particular method of proceeding he is liable to work an
injury, it is his duty to adopt some other or safer method if
within reasonable care and prudence he can do so. In
determining the degree of care an operator of an automobile
should use, when on the highway, it is proper to take into
consideration the place, presence or absence of other
travelers, the speed of the automobile, its size, appearance,
manner of movement, and the amount of noise it makes, and
anything that indicates unusual or peculiar danger. (US v.
Juanillo)
i. Great care was due from him by reason of the
deadliness of the machine he was propelling along
the highway. When one comes through the highways
with a machine of such power as an automobile, it is
incumbent upon the driver to use great care not to
drive against or over pedestrians. An automobile is
much more dangerous than a street car or even a
railway car.

c. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation
of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and
to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes
himself responsible for such acts. (Chapman v.
Underwood)
i. The owner of an automobile who permits his
chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a
speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop
him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to
do so, becomes himself responsible, both
criminally and civilly, for the results produced by
the acts of his chauffeur
ii. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its
continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal
law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.
iii. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's
act his own. It does not appear from the record that,
from the time the automobile took the wrong side of
the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient
time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity
to correct the act of his driver
d. While it is true that the law does not draw an
inference of negligence from the mere showing that there was
a collision between a man and an automobile on a public
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street but that negligence must be proved x x x where, in the
an action to recover damages for having been run down
by defendant's automobile, it appeared that the
automobile, at the time the injury was produced, was
being driven on the wrong side of the street, the burden
of proof was on defendant to establish that the accident
occurred through other causes than his negligence.
According to the law of the road and the custom of the
country he should have been on the left-hand side of
the street (US v. Crame)
e. Article 2184 only applies to owners of vehicles who
are not included in the terms of Article 2180 as owners of an
establishment or enterprise. (De Leon Brokerage Co. v. CA)
(J. Lo says that this is not really followed by the courts.)
f. Re: the negligent act of the driver: the act complained
of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a
length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his
driver's act his own. There must be a reasonable opportunity
to assess the risk and warn the driver. (Caedo v. Yu Khe
Thai) Facts such as 10 years of experience can be taken into
account.
i. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondeat superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his
own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
ii. The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. The law does not require that a person
must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency

either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a
motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the
meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that
which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident.
g. The negligence of the lessee of a vehicle does not
give rise to liability on the part of the lessor, there being no
fault or negligence on the part of the latter. The rent-a-car
company has no vinculum juris with him as employer and
employee. Liability, however, may arise if the true nature of
the alleged lease is a disguise to relieve itself of the burdens
of an employer. (FGU Insurance v. CA)
h. PCI Leasing v. UCPG General Insurance conversely
posits that the registered owner of a motor vehicle is liable for
the quasi-delicts of the lessee if the lease is not registered. It
is based on the Motor Vehicle Registration Law. In
contemplation of law, the registered owner is the employer of
its driver, with the actual employer being its agent. (J. Lo – no
material difference between cases. Better rule is probably
FGU Insurance. Joketime naman eh, leased nga eh. No
vinculum juris.)
i. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is
proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation. A driver abandoning
his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it
that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do
so in safety. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of
Sec. 41, pars, (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise
known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
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i. This liability of the common carrier does not cease
upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of its employees by
the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by
Mallari, Sr. assumed the express obligation to
transport the passengers to their destination safely
and to observe extraordinary diligence with due
regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or
death that might be suffered by its passengers is right
away attributable to the fault or negligence of the
carrier. (Mallari v. CA) See, extraordinary diligence is
required.
j. Selection and Supervision of employees are different
things. (Pleyto v. Lomboy)
i. Indeed, the testimony of the said two witnesses of the
PRBL would impress one to believe that the PRBL
has always exercised the strictest standard of
selecting its employees and of maintaining its
vehicles to avoid injury or damage to the life and limb
of people on the road whether of its own passengers
or pedestrians or occupants or other vehicles. It has
not however, shown to the satisfaction of the Court
that it has maintained proper supervision of its
employees, especially drivers while in the actual
operation of its buses.
ii. While it has a list of procedures and testing when it
comes to recruitment and another list of what should
be done with its buses before they are allowed to run
on the road, it has no list of procedures and duties to
be followed by a driver while he is operating a vehicle
to prevent injury to persons and damage to property.
Neither has it proved to the Court that there are
people employed by it to supervise its drivers so that

it can be seen to it that all the safety procedures to
prevent accident or damage to property or injury to
people on the road have been in place.
k. The presumption of negligence arising when one
figures in a mishap while violating any traffic regulation
applies only as regards motor vehicles. Substantial
differences underlie the differing treatment, i.e. speed,
acceleration, control. More diligence is required. (Anonuevo
v. CA)
i. But the existence of an ordinance changes the
situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding
the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire
whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited.
Violation of an ordinance intended to promote
safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard
which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings
about the harm which the ordinance was intended to
prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. If by creating
the hazard which the ordinance was intended to
avoid it brings about the harm which the
ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal
cause of the harm.
ii. The general principle is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of
another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened,
was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
iii. Nevertheless, the bare fact that Villagracia was
violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the
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P a g e | 14
accident may have sufficiently established some
degree of negligence on his part, but such
negligence is without legal consequence unless
it is shown that it was a contributing cause of
the injury.
iv. It is but indicative of Villagracia’s failure in fulfilling his
obligation to the municipal government, which would
then be the proper party to initiate corrective action
as a result. Such failure alone is not
determinative of Villagracia’s negligence in
relation to the accident. To determine if Villagracia
was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative
to examine Villagracia’s behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
v. The rule on negligence per se must admit
qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that
matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability
arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as
to deny relief when in fact there is no causal
relation between the statutory violation and the
injury sustained.
vi. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

l. Drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another
vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence”.
(Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon)
i. Here, the rear-bumper is not the cause, since the
vehicle in front suddenly turned without establishing
right of way. The latter vehicle’s behavior is the
proximate cause.
ii. The rear-bumper has contributory negligence by
virtue of high speed, tailgaiting, beer drinking, and
lack of helmet.
XIII. Statutes and Ordinances; Administrative Rules
a. The violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission
or Board is not negligence per se, but may be evidence of
negligence. This is as opposed to those rules imposed by
public authorities. (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc., v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission)
b. Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.
i. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we
held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which
started in his establishment in view of his failure to
comply with an ordinance which required the
construction of a firewall. The spreading of the fire,
whatever the cause may be, is the injury that the
ordinance sought to prevent.
ii. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that where the
very injury which was intended to be prevented by
the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with
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P a g e | 15
the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but
also the proximate cause of the death.
iii. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to
private respondent was due to a fortuitous event,
since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring
against the risk which was the proximate cause of the
loss
c. The failure to obey a city ordinance mandating the
construction of a firewall constitutes negligence, rendering
one liable for damages caused by a fire of unknown cause.
(F.F. Cruz v. CA)
d. “Driving an overloaded vehicle with only one
functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the
risk of accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one
headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact
that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded “decreased [its] maneuverability.” Mere
allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its
burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was
the contributing cause of the injury. (Sanitary Steam Laundry
v. CA) No proximate causation or even contribution was
proven between the violations and the accident.
XIV. Dangerous Weapons and Substances
a. “It is also the hope of the Court that the award in the
present case will remind licensed possessors of firearms of
their peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such
dangerous weapons at all times, and to take all requisite
measures to prevent minors and other unauthorized parties
from having access thereto. Competent observers have
recently called attention to the fact that the growing teenage
hooliganism in our society is principally due to parent's

complacency in and neglect of their progeny.” (Araneta v.
Arreglado)
XV. Defenses
A. Plaintiff’s Negligence is the proximate cause of injury
- Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence is only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages.
a. The omission to perform a duty constitutes the
proximate cause only when the doing of the said act would
have prevented the injury. An aggrieved party cannot claim
damages for their injuries where their own failure to exercise
due care was the cause thereof. (PLDT v. CA)
b. When sheer common sense dictates that the injured
party should have known the consequences of his actions
(i.e. moving towards a moving propeller), the same alone
should suffer the damage resulting therefrom. (Kim v. Phil.
Aerial Taxi)
c. A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes
himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting
injury. (i.e. does not show up in scheduled follow-up check-
up, fails to give proper identification upon request of credit
card company, and those in a tour group pero nag-pastar).
B. Contributory Negligence
- Contributory Negligence, under common law, completely bars
recovery. Contributory Negligence in Philippine jurisdiction is
akin to the doctrine of Comparative Negligence, where the said
negligence only mitigates the damages to be awarded.
Comparative negligence, broadly, involves apportionment of
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damages depending on the relative degrees of negligence.
(Aquino)
- Under this rule, contributory negligence is defined as conduct on
the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he
is required to conform for his own protection. (Rakes v AG&P)
- Damages may be mitigated if the claimant “in conjunction with the
occurrence, contributes only to his injury.” (Rakes v. AG&P)
- Where the plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence, as one
of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, the plaintiff contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. (Rakes v.
AG&P)
- The test of negligence is the foreseeability test, which states
that there is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed
lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him
harm or put his life in danger. (Aquino)
a. Distinction must be made between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident (proximate cause), and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt (contributory negligence).
b. Violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the
violation was the proximate cause of the injury (not always
contributory), unless the very injury that happened was
precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute.
c. The theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the
rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the (proximate)
cause of the accident, unless there is proof to the contrary.
(Lambert v. Heirs of Castillion)
d. No contributory negligence can be imputed to a child
of tender years.

C. Assumption of Risk
- Three elements: 1.) the plaintiff must know that the risk is
present, 2.) he must further understand its nature, and 3.) his
choice to incur it is free and voluntary. (Aquino) It may be
implied or express.
- In relation to the last requisite of the Doctrine of Assumption of
Risk, it has been held that the plaintiff is excused from the
force of the rule if an emergency is found to exist or if the
life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property.
a. An animal in the custody and under the control of a
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such, has the
responsibility to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being
injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of
the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
and for which he must take the consequences. (Afialda v.
Hisole)
D. Last Clear Chance
- The law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party. (Aquino)
- Absent preceding negligence on the part of the other party, the
doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. (PNRC v.
Vizcara)
a. When a traveller has reached a point where he
cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert
the injury, his negligence in reaching that position
becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of
the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Picart v. Smith)
b. The doctrine does NOT apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
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cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered. (Achevara
v. Ramos)
c. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
(Lapanday v. Angala)
d. Last Clear Chance is not applicable to Breach of
Contract.
E. Prescription
- Art. 1146. The following must be instituted within four (4) years:
1.) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff
2.) Upon a quasi-delict
- The 4-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is
committed or the date of the accident.
a. The defense of prescription, even if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived
UNLESS such defense raises issues of fact not appearing
upon the preceding pleading. (Ferrer v. Ericta)
b. The aggrieved party need not wait for a
determination by an administrative body like a Board of
Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or
negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages. Filling with an administrative body DOES NOT toll
the prescriptive period. (Kramer v. CA)
c. Under the Civil Code, an action on an implied
warranty must be brought within six months from the sale. If
the sale falls under R.A. 7394 (The Consumer Act of the
Philippines), the prescriptive period is one year. (De Guzman
v. Toyota Cubao)
F. Fortuitous Event

- Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by aw, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
- Elements: 1.) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the obligor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of human will; 2.) it must be
impossible to foresee, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; 3.) the occurrence must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal
manner; and 4.) the obligor must be free from any participation in
the aggravation of the injury. (Aquino)
- Fortuitous event is an affirmative defense that must be proven.
- It includes both Acts of God and Man. What is required is that it
be independent of the obligor’s will.
G. Mistake and Waiver
- For a valid waiver of rights, the document must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. In ascertaining this, the Court looks upon the
other circumstances surrounding the case such as the condition
of the person who signed the waiver during the act of signing.
(Gatchalian v. Delim)
- The waiver must not be offensive to public policy. Waivers of
gross negligence are prohibited.
- The concept of error must include BOTH ignorance and mistake,
which is a wrong conception about the said thing, or a belief in the
existence of some fact or circumstance, which in reality does not
exist. (Theis v. CA)
H. Emergency Rule
- Doctrine: One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
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negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency he finds himself in is brought about by his own
negligence. (Gan v. CA)
I. Damnum absque injuria
- Damage or loss without injury. This doctrine contemplates a
situation wherein a person causes damage or loss to another, but
does not injure them. Thus leaving the latter with no legal remedy.
(ie. The exercise of one’s rights does no actionable injury to
another and cannot be held liable for damages)
- The injury contemplated in this doctrine is an actionable wrong.
- But, when one abusively exercises his rights, damnum absque
injuria will not apply. (Dole Phil. v. Rodriguez)
- The doctrine includes the good faith performance of a public duty,
even if tainted with mistake.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm arising from injury.
- Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right.
XVI. Vicarious Liability re: Parents
a. The liability of the parents is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes the “duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them
in proportion to their means,” and it gives them the “right to
correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way they
can relieve themselves of liability is to prove the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Exconde v. Capuno)
b. The principle is designated as vicarious liability, or
the doctrine of “imputed negligence” under Anglo-American
tort law, where a person is liable also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsible;

i. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortuous act,
the parents were negligent in the performance of their
legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child. It
is anchored upon presumed parental dereliction;
ii. The retroactive effect of a decree of adoption will not
relieve the biological parents of their liability if the
child was under their supervision at the time
(Tamargo v. CA)
c. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their
minor children is primary, and not subsidiary. The liability of
parents for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary, not subsidiary (Libi v. IAC).
XVII. Vicarious Liability
A. Owners and Managers of Enterprises/Employers
a. The liability of the employer is based ultimately on his
own negligence, and not that of his employee. This is in
contrast to the American doctrine that the negligence of the
servant is conclusively the negligence of the employer;
i. The employer is not liable even if he did not formulate
rules and regulations, if the failure to do so was
unrelated to the injury in question (Bahia v. Litonjua);
b. The term “owners and managers” is used in the
sense of “employer” (director) in Spanish; hence, a
corporation’s manager cannot be held liable for the
negligence of an employee, for the manager himself is a co-
employee (Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil-American
Forwarders);
c. A school cannot be held liable for the stupidity of its
teachers, when committed outside of school and without any
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permit or sanction therefrom, i.e. a picnic. Mere knowledge is
not acquiescence (St. Francis High School v. CA);
d. The mere fact that an employee was using a
company vehicle at the time of a tortuous act does not suffice
to hold the employer liable unless it appears that the
operation of the vehicle was within the course or scope of his
employment;
i. The use of the vehicle going to or from meals is not
within the ordinary scope of employment, in the
absence of some special business benefit to the
employer. An example would be the reduction of an
employee’s off-time so that he can devote more time
to his duties;
ii. The use of the vehicle going to or from work is
ordinarily a personal problem, in the absence of
some special business benefit to the employer.
An example would be having the special benefit of
the employee arriving earlier at work to devote more
time to his duties;
1. The “special errand” or “roving commission”
rule deems an employee to be acting within
his duties until he reaches home where his
duties require him to circulate in a general
area with no fixed place or time of work, or
where he is furnished a vehicle to go to and
from various places of work;
iii. The loan of an employer’s vehicle for personal use
outside of regular work hours does not give rise to
vicarious liability during the period of permissive use
(Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez);
e. The diligence in the selection of employees consists
in an examination as to qualifications, experience, and
service records. The diligence in supervision consists in the
formulation of standard operating procedures,

monitoring their implementation, and imposing
disciplinary measures for their breach (Mercury Drug
Corp. v. Huang);
f. In the selection of drivers, employers must not be
satisfied with the mere possession of a license. They must go
beyond the minimum requirements of the law (Sanitary
Steam Laundry v. CA);
g. An employer cannot be held liable for the damages
caused by its striking employees. In staging a strike, the
employees act on their own, beyond the range of their
employment (Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Q.C. Human
Resources Management Corp.);
h. Working scholars, for the purposes of Labor laws, are
not covered by an employer-employee relationship. However,
for the purposes of tort liability, an employer-employee
relationship is deemed to exist (Cadiz, Filamer Christian
Institute v. CA)
i. Oral evidence alone of due diligence does not
suffice. It must be buttressed by any other evidence, object or
documentary. Merely detailing the company’s policies and
procedure does not suffice. The employer must show that
they were all followed (Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. CA);
j. The negligence of a driver of a municipality assigned
to a mayor cannot be imputed to the latter, since both are
employees of the municipality. A public official is not liable
for the wrong ful acts of his subordinates on a vicarious basis
XIX. Teachers and Heads of Establishments
since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation.
The only exception is when they cooperate in the act
complained of, or direct or encourage it. (Joint tortfeasor,
bale) After all, negligence is imputed to the master, and not to
a superior employee. (Jayme v. Apostol).
XVIII. The State
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 20
a. A legislative enactment authorizing a suit against the
state only waives its immunity from suit, and does not in any
way amount to an admission of liability;
i. The state is liable when it acts through a special
agent, that is, one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office, so that in representation of the
state and being beound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him (Merritt v.
Government of the Philippine Islands);
b. The mere fact that a corporation is a government
agency does not make it immune from suit. It must be
determined whether it exercises government/constituent or
proprietary/ministrant functions to properly determine its
vicarious liability;
i. A water improvement district is not generally public in
nature, but only incidentally so. Its purpose is purely
local. The NIA, like the NAWASA, performs
proprietary functions, and is thus vicariously liable as
an employer (Fontanilla v. Maliaman).
c. For a pretty set of equations, see the Torts Omnibus
Reviewer.
a. For a pretty delineation of liabilities, see the Torts
Omnibus Reviewer. Flippyfloppy yung cases eh;
b. The rationale of their liability is that they stand, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child.” It is thus their duty to properly supervise student
 P a g e | 21

activity during the whole time that they are in attendance, i. However, it is still possible to hold schools liable
including recess time; therefor by virtue of the contractual relation between
the school and its students, imposing upon the
i. The teachers, and not the parents, are the ones
former the duty to maintain an atmosphere that
answerable for torts committed while under the
promotes or assists the undertaking of imparting
formers’ custody, since parents are not supposed to
knowledge (PSBA v. CA);
interfere with the discipline of the school;
f. When a school’s contracted security guard shoots
ii. There is no requirement that students must live and
one of the former’s students, the school is liable for damages
board at the school (Palisoc v. Brillantes);
not under Article 2180, but for breach of contract (Saludaga
c. Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic and v. FEU).
non-academic, the distinction becoming material only in
determining whether it is the teacher or the head that should
be held liable. The distinction is based on the historically XX. Right to Reimbursement
closer relationship between heads of establishments of arts
a. The driver of a common carrier cannot be held
and trades and their apprentices;
solidarily liable with the latter, where the latter is sued on the
i. The student is in the custody of the school as ground of breach of contract;
long as he is under its control and influence and
i. The driver is a stranger to the contract of carriage.
within its premises, whether or not the semester
The carrier is exclusively responsible therefor, and it
has begun;
cannot shift its liability to the driver;
ii. A legitimate student objective, right, or privilege
ii. To make them solidarily liable would be to make the
involves continued school responsibility. Even when
carrier personally, and not vicariously, liable for the
he is chilling, he is still within the school’s custody;
driver’s negligence, which means that it would only
iii. The defense of due diligence that is available to be allowed to recover the share which corresponds
teachers is less than that of parents. After all, the to the driver. This cannot be done, for it would be
student may be of age, and the parent can expect contrary to Article 2181 – whoever pays for the
more obedience from the child. Reasonable damage caused by his dependents or employees
diligence suffices (Amadora v. CA); may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Article 2181
d. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal
provides for total recovery (Philippine Rabbit Bus
(Salvosa v. IAC);
Lines v. IAC).
e. The liability imposed by Article 2180 envisages
damages caused by pupils, students, or apprentices of the
schools, and not those caused by third persons;
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages

XXI. Distinguished from Subsidiary Liability under the Revised
Penal Code
a. It is not necessary that a separation action be
instituted in order that an employer can be held subsidiarily
liable. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the
employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to
the criminal case;
i. His subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same
criminal case as part of the execution
proceedings against the employee (Carpio v.
Doroja);
b. In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily
liable, it is not necessary that the employee be insolvent.
Remember Crim Pro? An employer can be determined to be
subsidiarily liable by showing the three elements –
i. Employer-employee relationship;
ii. The employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
iii. The employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
done in the discharge of his duties (Bantoto v. Bobis);
c. The requisite of insolvency only comes in when
one moves for the issuance of a subsidiary writ of
execution against the employer;
i. The returning of an unsatisfied writ of execution
against the employee does not imply his insolvency;
ii. A hearing is required in order that the employer be
heard, and so that the court may convince itself of the
three elements above, in addition to the employee’s
insolvency (Yonaha v. CA).
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 22
XXII. Primary Liability – Articles 2183 to 2193
a. Possessors/Users of Animals (Article 2183)
i. The controlling query is the possession of the animal,
regardless of the actual ownership. Hence, an heir
who possesses a dog of the decedent, even though
the estate is yet to be partitioned, can be held liable
under Article 2183. By the way, a death certificate is
conclusive only as to the fact of death, and not the
cause. (Vestil v. IAC);
b. Owners of Motor Vehicles (Articles 2184, 2185) –
see far far far above;
c. Manufacturers and Processors (Article 2187)
i. The requisites thereof are that –
1. The defendant is a manufacturer or
processor;
2. The defendant manufactures or processes
foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles, or similar
goods;
3. The defendant used noxious or harmful
substances;
4. Death or injury results thereby;
5. The victim is a consumer, user, or purchaser;
ii. The remedies of a buyer or consumer is not limited to
this article;
1. One may sue for breach of warranty against
hidden defects under Article 1567;
2. One may ask for annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud;
 P a g e | 23

3. One may claim damages for a quasi-delict i. Where a building collapses due to an earthquake,
under Article 2176 (Coca-Cola Bottlers v. and such collapse has been proven to have been
CA); partly caused by defects in the construction, a
proprietor cannot interpose the defense of force
d. Municipal Corporations (Article 2189)
majeure;
i. Always keep in mind Section 24 of Republic Act
ii. Under Article 1723, engineers and architects are
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
liable if within fifteen years from completion, the
Code of 1991 – “Local government units and their
structure collapses by reason of defects in the plans;
officials are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property.” iii. Likewise, contractors are liable in like manner if it
was due to the use of inferior materials. If the
ii. An exemption from damages contained in a city’s
engineer or architect supervises the construction,
charter will not suffice to exonerate it from the liability
they shall be solidarily liable with the contractor
imposed by Article 2189. Such charters impose only
(Nakpil & Sons v. CA);
a general rule as to liability, whereas Article 2189
particularly governs damages concerning roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
XXIII. Special Torts (Human Relations)
works (City of Manila v. Teotico, Jimenez v. City of
Manila, Municipality of San Juan v. CA, Guilatco v. a. Article 19
City of Dagupan); i. Unscrupulously assigning one’s credit to a sister
iii. Ownership of the road, street, etc. is not corporation, in order to get ahead of other creditors,
controlling. The controlling attribute is control or gives rise to a cause of action under abuse of right
supervision. (Municipality of San Juan v. CA); (Velayo v. Shell);

e. Building Proprietors (Article 2190) ii. The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are-

i. Where a firewall of a building collapses upon 1. The existence of a legal right or duty;
another’s structure, the proprietor of the former is 2. The exercise thereof in bad faith;
liable, even if he had warned the latter. The doctrine
of last clear chance, which has been applied to 3. The sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable (really?) (De Roy another (Far East Bank and Trust Company
v. CA); v. Pacilan);

f. Engineers/Architects/Contractors (Articles 2192, iii. Simple negligence in the exercise of a legal right of
1723) duty is not constitutive of bad faith. Such a situation is

“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages


damnum absque injuria (Far East Bank and Trust
Company v. Pacilan);
iv. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
under a constitution, statute, or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of
a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another;
1. The premature carrying out of an order of
demolition prior to its finality gives rise to a
claim for damages, even though the order
may be later affirmed (Rellosa v. Pellosis);
v. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with Article 19, resulting in damage, a legal
b.
wrong is thereby committed. Damnum absque injuria
cannot apply when there is abuse of right (Cebu
Country Club v. Elizagaque);
vi. Even when one is a gatecrasher, volenti non fit injuria
does not apply, as one is still entitled to be treated
fairly so as not to be exposed to unnecessary ridicule
and shame (Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes);
vii. The elements of acts contra bonus mores under
Article 21 are –
1. A legal act;
2. Such act is contrary to moral, good customs,
or public policy;
3. It is done with intent to injure (Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden v. Reyes);
viii. “Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of
torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 24
for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law. In civilized society, men must be a be to assume
that others will do them no intended injury; that others
will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that
their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so
with due care… The ultimate thing in the theory of
liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of
civilized society.”
1. The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the persons who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a
claim for damages (University of the East v.
Jader);
Articles 20/21
i. While the Spanish Civil Code permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise of marry, these
articles were never in force in the Philippines. No
action lies for the breach thereof, apart from the right
to recover money or property advanced upon the
faith of such promise;
1. The elimination was premised on its
susceptibility to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men, in relation to “Balm
suits” (Hermosisima v. CA);
ii. While a breach of promise to marry is not in itself
actionable, coexisting actions may characterize the
case as one that is contra bonus mores, as when one
ditches a wedding after the license was procured,
invitations printed, and wedding paraphernalia and
accessories had already been purchased (Wassmer
v. Velez);

iii. When a fraudulent promise to marry is the proximate
cause of a lady’s giving of herself into sexual
congress, a cause of action exists under Article 21
not because of the breach of the promise, but
because of the fraud and deceit which caused injury
to her honor and reputation (Baksh v. CA);
iv. An action under Article 19, 20, and 21 only give
rise to an action for damages. Other reliefs, i.e.
annulment or specific performance, are not
encompassed;
c. Unjust Enrichment (Articles 22, 23)
i. A stipulation whereby payment for increased costs
would depend on mutual agreement of both parties is
in reality a potestative condition, which would give
rise to unjust enrichment. This cannot be
countenanced, especially when the construction had
already been completed, and the bank had enjoyed
the same (Security Bank & Trust Co. v. CA);
ii. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who
will benefit has a valid claim to the same. Thus, the
owner is entitled to rentals as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of his
property by another; the elements thereof are –
1. That a person is benefited without a valid
basis or justification;
2. Such benefit is derived at another’s expense
or damage;
3. The injured party has no other remedy under
contract, delict, quasi-delict, or any other
provision of law (Car Cool Philippines v.
Ushio Realty and Development Corp.);
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 25
iii. When the contract expressly states that approval is
required before additional costs should be incurred,
the party which voluntarily undertakes the risk of
incurring such costs without approval cannot invoke
unjust enrichment; it took the risk, since approval was
required by the contract (Uy v. Public Estates
Authority);
iv. When a pilot undertakes training for a particular
aircraft at the expense of the employer, only to ditch
said employer immediately after completion of the
same, unjust enrichment behooves the pilot to pay
back the training expenses (Almario v. Philippine
Airlines);
1. The injury need not be the cause of the
enrichment. It is enough that there be
some relation such that the enrichment
would not have occurred had it not been
for the fact from which the injury was
derived;
v. Enrichment consists in every patrimonial, physical, or
moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may consist of –
1. The enjoyment of a thing belonging to the
plaintiff;
2. The benefits from service rendered by the
plaintiff to the defendant;
3. The acquisition of a right, real or personal;
4. The increase of value of property of the
defendant;
5. The improvement of a right of the defendant;
 P a g e | 26

6. The recognition of the existence of a right in 3. Right to family relations;

the defendant; and
4. Right to social intercourse
7. The improvement of the conditions of life of
5. Right to privacy; and
the defendant (Almario v. Philippine Airlines)
6. Right to peace of mind (Gregorio v. CA);
d. Judicial Vigilance (Article 24)
iii. The failure of a telecommunications company to
i. Judicial vigilance arises only when the parties are on
promptly send a message, as well as its failure to
unequal footing, as when one is disadvantaged by
even inform the sender of the failure, renders it liable
virtue of moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
for the disruption of “filial tranquility” between family
mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap. It
members (Radio Communications v. Verchez);
is intended to shield the unwary from deceptive
schemes contained in ready-made covenants; g. Dereliction of Duty (Article 27)

1. However, when one is extensively engaged i. The action of a city treasure in accordance with his
in business, it cannot be said to be bona fide interpretation of a tax ordinance is one
disadvantaged or ignorant (Everett which is within the scope of his authority; the fact that
Steamship Corp. v. CA); his action was not completely sustained by the courts
does not render him liable for damages;
e. Thoughtless Extravagance (Article 25)
1. Article 27 presupposes that the refusal
f. Disrespect of Persons (Article 26)
or omission of a public official is
i. The publication of the plaintiff’s photograph without attributable to malice or inexcusable
his consent and purely for commercial purposes has negligence (Philippine Match, Co. v. City of
been held to be a ground for damages… A picture is Cebu);
not necessarily a photograph of the living person, but
ii. Public officers who act in accordance with a
includes any representation of such person (St. Louis
resolution are not liable for damages, as it is not for
Realty Corp v. CA);
them to rule on its validity; it is presumed valid;
ii. The failure to exercise diligence in ascertaining the
1. One purpose of this article is to end the
identity of an accused, causing an innocent person to
bribery system, where the official, for some
be arrested in the presence of his family, gives rise to
flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
an action for damages. The rights protected by this
performance of his duty until he gets some
Article are as follows –
kind of pabagsak” (Tuzon v. CA);
1. Right to personal dignity;
iii. A public officer may be liable for moral damages so
2. Right to personal security; long as they are the proximate result of his wrongful
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages

act or omission, i.e. the refusal to perform an
official duty or neglect in the performance
thereof;
ii. The liability attaches to all persons, whether private
1. Article 27 contemplates only nonfeasance,
but public officers are nevertheless liable for
negligence, misfeasance or malfeasance in
relation to Article 19 or 2176 (Torio v.
Fontanilla, Vital-Gozon v. CA);
h. Unfair Competition (Article 28)
i. Including an illegally dismissed worker in a “watchlist”
or “watch out list” in order to malign his good name
and ultimately deprive him of his livelihood
constitutes unper lebor practis within the purview of
Article 28.
i. Violation of Civil/Political Rights (Article 32)
i. The defense of good faith is unavailing against the
liability imposed by this article; it is enough that there
iii. In libel as well as in group libel, it is essential that the
was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs, and it is not required that defendants
should have acted with malice or bad faith;
1. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong
maybe civil or criminal. To make bad faith a
requisite would be to defeat the purpose of
the article which is to effectively protect
individual rights;
2. Public officials in the past have justified
abuses on the pretext of good faith. This
article puts and end to that;
3. It is a fundamental article introduced to
implement democracy. There is no real
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 27
democracy if a public official is abusing (Lim
v. De Leon);
individuals or public officers, and whether they are
directly or indirectly responsible; thus, it is not the
actor alone who must answer for damages (Silahis
International Hotel v. Soluta);
1. Hence, a private person who instigates a raid
and keeps the goods illegally seized for
safekeeping renders him indirectly
responsible under this article (MHP
Garments, Inc. v. CA);
2. Likewise, a private person who orchestrates
an illegal search into a union office is
solidarily liable due to his indirect
participation therein (Silahis International
Hotel v. Soluta);
victim be identifiable, although not named.
Otherwise, there is no cause of action. A lack of an
individual cause of action cannot be cured by the
filing of a class suit;
1. Defamatory remarks against a group or
class, in order to be actionable, must either
be so sweeping as to apply to every
individual therein, or sufficiently specific so
that each individual can bring the action
separately;
2. Even when the statements are sweeping, no
action would lie where common sense would
tell the ordinary person that it would be
unreasonable and absurd to condemn all
 P a g e | 28

because of the actions of a part (Newsweek c. There was a causal connection

v. IAC); between the defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff’s distress; and
iv. Defamation is made of up the twin torts of libel and
slander, and as the size of the defamed group d. The plaintiff’s mental distress was
increases, the chances for its members to recover extreme and severe;
damages on tortuous libel becomes elusive;
i. it is severe and disabling,
1. Defamation protects the interest in generally recognized and
reputation; the mere fact that the plaintiff’s diagnosed by professionals,
feelings and sensibilities have been offended that no reasonable person
is not enough to create a cause of action for could be expected to endure
defamation; the requisites thereof are - it;

a. The defendant published a 4. A toughening of the mental hide seems to be

statement that was the more appropriate remedy. “Taking it all
in” is also recommended (MVRS
b. Defamatory
Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’Wah Council
c. Of and concerning the plaintiff; of the Philippines, Agas);
2. Relational Harm includes harm to social
relationships in the form of defamation;
XXIV. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
3. Reactive Harm includes injuries to individual
a. Malice on the part of the interferer is not necessary in
emotional tranquility in the form of an
order that an injunction may issue; of courts, all the elements
infliction of emotional distress; the requisites
thereof must first be proven;
thereof are –
i. It is likewise unnecessary that the tortfeasor must
a. The conduct of the defendant was
know the identity of the person to whom he causes
intentional or in reckless disregard of
damage (Gilchrist v. Cuddy);
the plain;
b. The tortfeasor cannot be more extensively liable in
b. The conduct was extreme and
damages than the party in whose behalf he intervenes
outrageous;
(Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos);
i. It must be regarded as
c. The requisites of tortuous interference are –
atrocious and utterly
intolerable in civilized i. The existence of a valid contract;
society;
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages

ii. Knowledge by the third person of the existence of the
contract; and
iii. Interference by the third person in the contractual
relation without legal justification (Tayag v. Lacson,
So Ping Bun);
d. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler (Tayag v. Lacson);
b. A single act or omission may give rise to two separate civil
i. Justification for interfering exists where the actor’s
motive is to benefit himself, as when he seeks to
advance his financial or economic interests. This is
not the case where the actor’s motive is to cause
harm to the other;
ii. It is not necessary that his interest outweigh that
of the other party’s, nor that his economic
interest be substantial (Lagon v. CA);
e. In sum, proving the three elements without malice
can give rise to an injunction; malice is only necessary in
order that damages may be recovered (Fu, Agas).
XXV. Civil Liability Arising from Crimes
a. When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities,
namely (1) the society which lives or the political entity called
the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual
member of that society whose person right, honor, chastity, or
property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the
same punishable act or omission;
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 29
i. Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the
same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof;
ii. Regardless of whether or not a special law so
provides, indemnification of the offended party may
be had on account of the damage, loss, or injury
directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful
act of another (Banal v. Tadeo);
liabilities on the part of the offender –
i. Civil liability ex delicto that is, civil liability arising from
the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and
ii. Independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may
be pursued independently of the criminal
proceedings;
1. It may be based on “an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a
felony,” provided in Article 31; or
2. An act or omission constituting a felony, but
is nevertheless treated independently from
the criminal action by specific provision of
Article 33 (“in cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries”);
iii. Because of their distinct and independent
natures, an offended party may pursue the two
simultaneously or cumulatively, without
offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata (Lim v. Ping);

c. There can be no independent or separate civil action to
recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of B.P. 22, as provided by Rule 111, Sec. 1(b)
of the Rules of Court. The filing of such an action constitutes
forum shopping (Simon v. Chan);
d. An adjudication on the merits dismissing an Estafa case does
not bar an independent civil action based on breach of
contract, even where no reservation of a separate civil action
had been made (Cancio v. Isip);
e. Only separate civil actions to recover civil liability ex delicto
are deemed suspended by the filing of the criminal action; as
a general rule, they are also deemed instituted therewith.
Independent civil actions based on Article 31, 32, 33, 34, and
2176 proceed independently of the criminal action, and are
not deemed instituted therewith. In no case, however, can the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission;
i. An accused must file a separate action to litigate his
counterclaim based on quasi-delict, as the Rules
prohibit him from setting up any counterclaim in the
criminal case (Casupanan v. Laroya);
f. The single act of issuing a bouncing check gives rise to two
distinct offenses – Estafa and violation of B.P. 22. The Rules
allow the offended party to intervene in both proceedings;
however, the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
single act of issuing a bouncing check in either case
bars the recovery of the same in the other. While the law
allows two simultaneous civil remedies, it authorizes recovery
in only one. While two crimes arise from a single set of facts,
only one civil liability attaches (Rodriguez v. Ponferrada);
g. Civil actions ex delicto are deemed instituted with the criminal
complaint, unless the same is waived, reserved, or instituted
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 30
prior. The separate civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment in the criminal action. Independent civil actions
such as those in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176, however, need
no reservation; they are totally independent and may be filed
even without reservation (DMPI Employees Credit
Cooperative v. Velez);
h. Where the accused Is acquitted based on reasonable doubt,
a separate civil action based on Article 29 may be instituted
to recover damages. However, there is nothing contrary to
the said article in the rendition a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action; the
two can stand side by side;
i. An exception wherein a separate civil action would
be warranted is where additional facts have to be
established, or more evidence must be adduced, or
where the criminal case had already been fully
terminated and a separate complaint would be more
expedient;
ii. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil
might arise did not exist, thus –
1. Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt;
2. Where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal, but
only civil in nature, and;
3. Where the civil liability does not arise from or
is not based on the crime of which the
accused was acquitted (Padilla v. CA,
Fishbowl);

iii. An acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission closes the door to civil
liability ex delicto. An acquittal based on reasonable
doubt may still give rise to civil liability, as this is the
situation contemplated by Article 29 (Sanchez v. Far
East Bank and Trust Co.);
i. The death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes criminal liability, as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon; death prior to final
judgment extinguishes both criminal and civil liability arising
from the offense committed;
i. The claim for civil liability may survive, if it may be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict;
ii. In such cases, an action may be pursued only by
way of a separate civil action, which may be
enforced against either the executor/administrator or
the Estate (People v. Bayotas);
j. The civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused;
i. The distinction between acquittals based on
reasonable ground and those stating that the act or
omission did not exist applies only as regards the
civil liability ex delicto;
ii. The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. Acquittal or conviction in the criminal case
is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict;
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iii. Hence, an accused acquitted in a criminal case for
reckless imprudence on the ground that he was not
negligent may still be held liable for negligence for
quasi-delict (Manliclic v. Calaunan);
iv. Really? Wtf?
XXVI. Damages
a. In General
i. There is a distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage
is the loss, hurt, or harm which results therefrom, and
damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered;
1. There must be both wrong and damage in
order that recovery may be in order
(Custodio v. CA);
b. Actual Damages/Attorney’s Fees
i. The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages
is to repair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injury inflicted, and not to
impose a penalty. They are not dependent on the
intent with which the wrongful act was done; they
proceed from a sense of natural justice;
1. The party claiming them must establish the
same by competent evidence, and the courts
cannot give judgment for a greater amount
than those actually proven;
2. They include not only loss already suffered,
but also loss of profits which may not have
been realized; while certainty is an essential

element of an award of damages, it need
not be a mathematical certainty;
a. The elements to be considered are
the plaintiff’s business, its nature and
extent, the importance of his
oversight and superintendence, and
the loss arising from his inability to
prosecute it;
3. When it is shown that his business was a
going concern with a fairly steady average
profit, it may be assumed that had the
interruption not occurred, it would have
continued producing this average income
(Algarra v. Sandejas);
ii. The sole design of the courts in awarding damages
for tortuous injury is to provide adequate
compensation by putting the plaintiff in the same
financial position he was in prior to the tort. The
law will not put him in a better position than where he
should be in had not the wrong happened (Lim v.
CA);
iii. It is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with
a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable. A list of expenses cannot replace
receipts when the latter should have been issued as
a matter of course in business transactions (People
v. Mamaruncas); “Credence can be given only to
claims which are duly supported by receipts” (OMC
Carriers v. Spouses Nabua);
iv. Plaintiffs are not mandated to prove damages in any
specific or certain amount; when the existence of a
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
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loss is established, absolute certainty as to amount is
not required;
1. Actual damages are not presumed; the
plaintiff must point out specific facts
premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable; it cannot be based on
mere testimony in the absence of receipts or
other documentary proofs (GQ Garments v.
Miranda);
v. Loss of earning capacity is based on two factors
- (1) the number of years by which damages should
be computed, and (2) the rate at which the losses
sustained should be fixed; the formula is thus -
1. 2/3[80-(age at time of death)] x (gross
yearly income – living expenses) (People
v. Arellano);
2. The amount recoverable is not loss of the
entire earning, but rather, the loss of that
portion of the earnings which the
beneficiary would have received. In other
words, only net earnings, not gross earnings,
are to be considered (Villa Rey Transit v.
CA);
3. When there is no showing that the living
expenses constituted the smaller
percentage of the gross income, the
living expenses are fixed at half of the
gross income. Hence, 50% is a maximum
of sorts (Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Tamayo v.
Senora, Me);

4. The use of 80 as the base age prevails as
regards any retirement age (Tamayo v.
Senora);
x. When a contract for services is breached, the plaintiff
vi. As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for loss of
earning capacity. There are two exceptions –
1. The deceased is self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage;
2. The deceased is a daily-wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage;
xi. The measure of damages for the wrongful detention
3. The exceptions are based on the courts’
taking judicial notice of the fact that in such
lines of work, no documentary evidence is
available (Philippine Hawk Co. v. Lee);
vii. Pension is in the nature of sure income that may be
recovered, but only for one year. I don’t know why
one year lang (De Caliston v. CA);
viii. The extent of the liability for the breach of a contract
must be determined in the light of the situation in
existence at the time the contract is made, and
the damages ordinarily recoverable are in all events
limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in
the light of the facts then known to the contracting
parties (De Guia v. The Manila Electric Railroad &
Light Company);
1. In other words, indemnification for damages
is not limited to damnum emergens (actual
loss), but extends to lucrum cessans (profit
lost) (Lim v. CA);
ix. The court may award damages according to the
evidence presented and issues discussed, even if
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 33
the pleadings have not been amended to conform
thereto (Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. Gonzales);
is entitled to recover not only the compensation for
services rendered prior to breach, but the full amount
that he might have earned under the contract, less
the compensation he actually obtained in some other
employment during the term of the contract which
had not yet expired at the date of the breach
(Coleman v. Hotel de France Company);
of real property is the value of the use and
occupation of the land;
1. Ordinary Damages are found in all
breaches of contract, and they result
according to the usual course of things; no
discussion is ever indulged as to whether it
was contemplated or not, as it is conclusively
presumed;
2. Special Damages result from some external
condition, apart from the actual terms of the
contract; before such damages may be
recovered, the plaintiff must show that the
particular condition which made the damage
a possible and likely consequence was
known to the defendant at the time the
contract was made;
3. Compare with Article 2201. Ordinary
Damages refer to “natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the
obligation”, whereas Special Damages refer
to “those which the parties have foreseen or

could have reasonably foreseen at the time
the obligation was constituted;”
a. It is possible that lost profits may be
characterized as Ordinary Damages
when the contract contemplated
precisely that (Daywalt v.
Corporacion de PP Agustinos
Recoletos, Nav);
b. Notice of any special circumstances
which will show that the damages to
be anticipated from a breach would
be enhanced has been held
sufficient, and the absence thereof
obviates any liability for special
damages. Hence, an airline is not
liable for the loss of profits suffered
by a cinema owner for the failure to
show a film on time, where the airline
was not informed of the nature and
purpose of the cargo (Mendoza v.
PAL);
xii. The income that a student would have earned, had
he finished his course, may be considered in
computing loss of earning capacity; it is deemed to
have been reasonably foreseen by the parties.
However, evidence must be presented that the
victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was
reasonably certain to complete training for a
specific profession;
1. Mere enrolment is not sufficient. Evidence as
to scholastic performance, though not stellar,
is necessary to support the claim. Extra-
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 34
curricular activities and varied interests may
also support it (Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabaus
Bus Company, OMC Cariers Inc. v. Spouses
Nabua, Metro Manila Transit Co. v. CA);
xiii. Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty
clause takes the place of indemnity for damages
in case of non-compliance with the obligation,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
1. Also, the fact that the thing repaired was a
spare obviates any foreseeability of
production losses on the part of the obligor
(Continental Cement Corp. v. ASEA Brown
Boveri, Inc.);
xiv. While injury to a corporation’s business standing or
commercial credit is a ground to recover actual
damages, such damages are baseless where
multifarious complaints or charges have been levied
against it, contradicting any pretense of probity and
integrity (National Power Corp. v. CA);
xv. Generally, attorney’s fees are not a proper element of
damages, for it is not sound policy to set a premium
on the right to litigate;
1. Hence, no right thereto accrues merely
because of an adverse decision.
Nonetheless, various exceptions exist under
the law under Article 2208 (Justiva v.
Gustilo);
2. The exercise of judicial discretion under
Article 2208(11) demands a factual,
legal, or equitable justification; it is
necessary to make express findings of fact
and law that would bring the case within the

exception (Noelle Buan v. Camaganacan,
Villanueva v. Salvador);
3. Where the claimants refused to accept a
perfectly reasonable amicable settlement,
they are not entitled to attorney’s fees at the
expense of the other party (Villanueva v.
Salvador);
xvi. The standards to be followed in fixing attorney’s fees
are –
1. The amount and character of the services
rendered;
2. Labor, time, and trouble involved;
3. Nature and importance of the litigation and
businesses in which the services are
rendered;
4. The responsibility imposed;
5. The amount of money and the value of the
property affected by the controversy
involved;
6. The skill and experience called for;
7. The professional character and social
standing of the attorney; and
8. The results secured (Tanay Recreation
Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto);
xvii. Attorney’s fees under Article 2208 are awarded in the
extraordinary sense. Hence, they may be awarded,
notwithstanding the fact that the claimant had availed
of the pro bono services of the U.P. Office of Legal
Aid;
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 35
1. Ordinarily, the fees represent reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client;
2. Extraordinarily, they are awarded by the
court as indemnity to the prevailing party,
not counsel (Padilla Machine Shop v.
Javilgas);
3. They are awarded only in the instances
specified in Article 2208. Moreover, in the
absence of stipulation, a winning party may
be awarded attorney’s fees only in case
plaintiff’s action or defendant’s stand is so
untenable as to amount to gross and evident
bad faith. (David v. Misamis Occideental II
Electric Cooperative, Inc.);
4. Even a clearly untenable defense does not
justify an award unless it amounts to gross
and evident bad faith (Petron Corporation v.
National College of Business and Arts);
xviii. An attorney who is concurrently an executor of a will
is barred from recovering attorney’s fees from the
estate. It is the heirs who must pay therefor. He is not
entitled to a lot if he did not exactly achieve anything
out of the ordinary (Lacson v. Reyes);
xix. The most recent amounts of damages provided
in People v. Aleman are –
1. Homicide – 50,000;
2. Murder – 75,000;
3. Robbery with Homicide – 75,000;

4. This is in contrast to Mamaruncas. Which set
a straight 75,000 award for both murder and
homicide (Lecture niya);
xx. When death occurs due to a crime, the following
may be recovered –
1. Civil indemnity ex delicto;
2. Actual or compensatory damages;
3. Moral damages;
4. Exemplary damages;
5. Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;
6. Interest, in proper cases (People v. Rarugal);
7. Loss of earning capacity. Kulang daw yung
enumeration (Lecture);
xxi. Interest sucks and is a total joke kasi 6% na
lahat (Eastern Shipping v. CA ,,I,,)
c. Moral Damages
i. Moral damages cannot be awarded for the loss of a
boyfriend, since the reasons for the break-up of a
courtship are too many and too complicated ;
1. Moral damages are emphatically not
intended to enrich a complainant at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain the
means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant’s
culpable action;
2. The amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive so as to indicate
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 36
that it was the result of prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court; they
are awarded to achieve a “spiritual status
quo” (Mayo v. People, Samson v. BPI);
ii. The conditions required are –
1. There must be an injury, whether physical,
mental, or psychological, clearly sustained
by the claimant;
2. There must be a culpable act or omission
factually established;
3. The wrongful act or omission of the
defendant must be the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and
4. The award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219
(Villanueva v. Salvador);
iii. There must be pleading and clear proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright, and the like. The
claimant should take the witness stand and testify to
the same, as no other person could have proven
such personal damages. Absent this, moral damages
cannot be awarded (Mahinay v. Velasquez);
iv. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The
amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender (Mercury
Drug Co. v. Huang); the actual rule, however, is that
social and financial standing may be considered
only if he was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offender’s knowledge of his
social and financial standing (Kierulf v. CA);

v. There are cases where moral damages are
automaticall granted without need of further
proof other than the fact of its commission –
1. Rape (Peple v. Iroy, People v. Pareja);
2. Murder (People v. Rarugal);
3. Libel per se, subject to mitigation upon
showing of honest mistake, etc. (Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. AGO Medical
and Educational Center);
vi. Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in
breaches of contract. The exception is where there is
fraud or bad faith (Article 2220);
1. In cases of common carriers, an injured
passenger cannot recover moral damages
unless he proves malice or bad faith;
2. Moral damages may be recovered from
common carriers, however, for the death of
a passenger, applying article 1764 in relation
to Article 2206;
3. The rationale arises from the advantageous
position of a party suing the common carrier,
for the latter is already presumed negligent
(Fores v. Miranda);
4. In such cases, only the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendants, and
ascendants of the deceased may claim
moral damages, as provided in Article
2206(3). The brothers of the deceased who
died in the course of a voyage cannot
recover moral damages, even if they
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 37
succeeded to the entire estate (Sulpicio
Lines v. Curso);
vii. What we call moral damages are treated in American
jurisprudence as compensatory damages. Mental
suffering means distress or serious pain as
distinguished from annoyance, regret, or vexation.
Mental anguish is intense mental suffering;
1. Where the act is wanton or willful, there may
be a recovery for humiliation and mental
suffering without any physical injury. In
negligence cases, absent willful or wanton
wrong, physical injury must be present
before damages for mental suffering may be
recovered (Bagumabayan v. IAC);
viii. The elements of malicious prosecution are as follows
–
1. The fact of prosecution;
2. That the defendant was himself the
prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement;
3. That it finally terminated in his acquittal
(which must be based on innocence, and not
simply due to the erroneous designation of
the offense);
4. That in bringing it the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
5. That he was actuated by legal malice, that is,
by improper and sinister motives (Lagman v.
IAC);
 P a g e | 38

ix. When a city levies taxes and auctions properties 2. Where a house is burned down, but its value
outside its territorial jurisdiction, it is extremely stupid is not competently established, temperate
and it amounts to bad faith, calling for moral damages are proper (People v. Murcia);
damages (City of Tagaytay v. Guerrero);
3. Temperate and actual damages are mutually
d. Nominal Damages exclusive (People v. Gutierrez);

i. The award of nominal damages precludes the a. Unless the injury is chronic and
recovery of temperate or moderate damages continuing (Ramos v. CA);
(Ventanilla v. Centeno);
f. Liquidated Damages
ii. When the plaintiff suffers some species of injury not
i. A party that enters into a contract which provides a
enough to warrant an award of actual damages, the
stipulation for liquidated damages and thereafter
court may award nominal damages (China Airlines v.
finds himself liable for the same cannot evade the
CA);
same with a plea that what was imposed upon him
iii. The dismissal of an employee for just cause without was a penalty shocking to the conscience and
observing procedural due process entitles him to an impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought
award of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000 on the part of a judicial tribunal. (Azcuna v. CA)
(Sang-An v. Equator Knights Detective and Security
g. Exemplary Damages
Agency, Inc.); P50,000, according to De Jesus v.
Aquino; i. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, they need not be proved, although the
e. Temperate Damages
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
i. In the absence of competent proof on the actual temperate or compensatory damages before the
damages suffered, respondent is entitled to court may consider the question of whether or not
temperate damages. The allowance is ultimately a exemplary damages should be awarded;
rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to
1. Exemplary damages are imposed as a way
those definitely injured who are unable to prove how
of example or correction for the public good
definite the injury;
(Makabali v. CA);
1. Thus, where it is apparent that loss has been
ii. In criminal offenses, the attendance of aggravating
suffered by virtue of a temporary halt in
circumstances (whether ordinary or qualifying) in the
business caused by the disconnection of
perpetration of the crime serves to increase the
electricity justifies the award of temperate
penalty as well as to justify an award of exemplary or
damages, where competent evidence is not
corrective damages (the civil liability aspect);
presented (Equitable PCI Bank v. Tan);

“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages


1. Also known as “punitive” or “vindictive”
damages, exemplary or corrective damages
are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct (People v.
Catubig)l
iii. Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, when aggravating
circumstances have been proven but not alleged,
courts awarded exemplary damages. However the
rule now is that aggravating circumstances must
be alleged and proven to justify an award of
exemplary damages (People v. Dalisay);
1. However the courts may still award
exemplary damages even if the aggravating
circumstance has not been alleged, so long
as it has been proven, in criminal cases
prior to the effectivity of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure (People v.
Dalisay);
iv. The rule is therefore as follows, according to me and
Dalisay –
1. Aggravating circumstances must be both
alleged and proved to be taken into
consideration in the determination of the
penalty and in the awarding of damages;
2. Nevertheless, exemplary damages can be
awarded where the circumstances show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender, as in the case of a father
“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages
P a g e | 39
raping his daughter, or an accused sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman (Me,
People v. Dalisay);
v. A principal or master can be held liable for
exemplary or punitive damages based upon the
wrongful act of his agent or servant only where
he participated in the doing of such wrongful act
or has previously authorized or subsequently
ratified it with full knowledge of the facts. The law
does not contemplate a vicarious liability on the
principal’s part: the breach is his as party to the
contract, and so if he is to be held liable at all for
exemplary damages by reason of the wrongful act of
his agent, it must be shown that he had previously
authorized or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in effect
making him a co-participant (Munsayac v. CA)
h. Mitigation of Damages
i. It is well-settled, that the burden of proof rests
upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff
might have reduced the damages from the injury
suffered had he exercised diligence (Cerrano v.
Tan Chuoco);
ii. Article 2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties
suffering from loss or injury to exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question. One
who is injured then by the wrongful or negligent
act of another should exercise reasonable care
and diligence to minimize the resulting damage.
One can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in
reasonable efforts to preserve the property injured
 P a g e | 40

and for injuries incurred in attempting to prevent

damage to it (Lim v.CA);

iii. Weird but sound doctrine - an employee who is

improperly discharged is under an obligation to
use reasonable diligence to obtain other
suitable employment and that in assessing the
damages for the period which is still to run after
the breach, the court may properly take into
account the probability that the discharged
employee will be able to earn money in other
employment. "The law of service is a law of life. The
general rule is that sooner or later men who are
capable of service find employment, and enforced
idleness is the exception. It should not be presumed
in advance that the exceptional will occur. To assume
that the plaintiff must remain idle through the entire
term of the contract merely because he had not
found employment up to the time of trial would put a
premium on idleness and incompetency (in short,
bawal “pa-banjing-banjing” pag nawalan ng trabaho)
(Sotelo v. Behn);

iv. An offshoot to the above doctrine is this: where a

plaintiff/employee is wrongfully discharged by the
defendant/employer and commences an action to
recover damages for breach of contract, and the
employer, during the pendency of the case, offers to
take him back into his employ under terms and
conditions substantially the same as plaintiff’s
previous work but was refused by the plaintiff for no
justifiable reason, would entitle the
defendant/employer to a mitigation of damages.
(Lemoine v. Alkan)

“In MSC, we trust.” CRV : Torts and Damages