the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
- Villafuerte v CA
Spouses Reynaldo C. Villafuerte and Perlita Tan-Villafuerte
operated a gasoline station known as Peewees Petron
Powerhouse Service Station and General Merchandise on the
premises of three (3) adjoining lots at the corner of Gomez
Street and Quezon Avenue in Lucena City. One of these lots,
is owned by several persons namely, Edilberto de Mesa,
Gonzalo Daleon and his brother Federico A. Daleon and Mrs.
Anicia Yap-Tan, mother of appellee Perlita Tan-Villafuerte.
Appellants Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon acquired
their respective lots subject to the lease by Petrophil
Corporation which had built thereon the gasoline station
being managed by the Villafuerte couple. When the lease of
Petrophil Corporation expired on December 31, 1988, the
Villafuertes obtained a new lease on the lot of Edilberto de
Mesa for a period expiring on December 31, 1989.
As regards the lot of Daleon brothers, the Villafuertes were
not as lucky. For, instead of obtaining a lease renewal, what
they received were demand letters from the brothers counsel
ordering them to vacate the premises. Instead of complying
therewith, the Villafuertes simply ignored the demand and
continued operating the gas station.
Gonzalo Daleon filed a complaint against the Villafuertes in
the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tres, Lucena
City. No settlement was reached.
Villafuertes, upon expiration of lease contract with Edilberto
de Mesa, the same was not renewed. The spouses continued
to operate their gasoline station and other businesses on the
lot of de Mesa despite the latters demand to vacate.
Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo Daleon, with the aid of
several persons and without the knowledge of the
Villafuertes, caused the closure of the latters gasoline station
by constructing fences around it. Villafuertes countered with
a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory
injunction against both Edilberto de Mesa and Gonzalo
Daleon. The complaint seeks vindication for the alleged
malicious and unlawful fencing of the plaintiffs’ business
premises.
Issue:
2. Whether or not it was improper for private
respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to
remove petitioners from the premises.
Ruling:
2. No.
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
deliver the thing.
Having disregarded the plain requirement of the law, private
respondents were held accountable to petitioners for the
various damages prayed for by petitioners in their amended
complaint.
- Delfin v Billones
Facts:
Spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414
and subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. The
spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414
and subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots.[6] Lot
No. 1, covered by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto
Delfin on 21 October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-
19619 to Recio Daos on 25 April 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by
TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot
No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley Tamayo on 11
August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the spouses Delfin,
while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road.
On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the
heirs of the former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed
an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of
ownership and possession and damages. According to them,
it was only in 1989[9] when they discovered that Teresa Daos,
sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage
the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses
Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965.[10] Taking advantage of
her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document
purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an
extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot
No. 213, respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering
the property was fictitious and the signatures and thumb
marks contained therein were all forged because three (3) of
the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960,
namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza
Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946.[11] As
proof thereof, respondents presented certifications[12] on
the deaths of Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the
Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz.
To counter respondents arguments, petitioners alleged that
respondents action was already barred by prescription and
laches. Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well
as the subsequent owners of the subject properties, are
innocent purchasers for value and in good faith, whose titles
to the lots at the time of the purchase were all clean and free
from liens and encumbrances.[13] The documents
evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally
and unilaterally executed by the vendors-signatories therein
without any intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly
acknowledged before a notary public, petitioners
averred.[14]
Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court
ruled that respondents claim of ownership over the subject
properties was not established by a preponderance of
evidence. Compared to respondents verbal claims of
ownership, the spouses Delfin were able to prove that they
bought the properties from the original owners, the trial
court added. The trial court held that the deeds of sale being
duly executed notarial and public documents, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity which can only be contradicted by
clear and convincing evidence
Ruling:
When ones property is registered in anothers name without
the formers consent, an implied trust is created by law in
favor of the true owner. Implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of
the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,
independently of the particular intention of the parties.
Meanwhile, constructive trusts are created in order to satisfy
the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the
registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title,
registration being constructive notice to all persons.
However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the
property subject of the acts.
In essence, petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove
that fraud attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414.
The Court agrees.
A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be
treated as such until it is shown to be otherwise by either
positive or circumstantial evidence. A duly executed contract
carries with it the presumption of validity. The party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation. A notarized document is executed to lend truth to
the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of
the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption
of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and
convincing evidence.
As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents
have the burden to establish their case by a preponderance
of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.
Hence, parties who have the burden of proof must produce
such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on
the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of
the defendants.
As regards Lot No. 3414, respondents specifically alleged that
the spouses Delfin tricked the plaintiffs and their late mother
into signing a fictitious and simulated document, and that TCT
No. T-16805 was the product of a fictitious and simulated
transaction [that] was obtained through fraud, the same
should be declared null and void. They claimed that the
original owners of Lot No. 3414 did not intend to execute a
deed of extra-judicial partition and absolute sale but only a
mortgage instrument. However, all that respondents came
out with were bare allegations that the said owners were
either old and sickly or illiterate; that the purported selling
price of P300.00 was unconscionable; and that petitioners
failed to eject respondents from the subject land, as
respondents were unable to present any evidence to
substantiate their claims, much less the charge of fraud.
Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the
execution of the deed, nor on the condition of the signatories
thereto. At best, their witnesses merely testified as to the
identity of the previous owners of the property. Worse,
petitioners Presentacion Degala Billones and Rosario Degala
Demonarca, both signatories to the subject deed, were not
presented to testify on the real circumstances surrounding
the assailed transaction. As for the selling price of P300.00,
suffice it to say that respondents did not even present a
witness to testify as to its alleged unconscionability vis-a-vis
the prevailing market value of the property at the time of the
sale. Meanwhile, the belated registration of the document
with the Register of Deeds can be explained by the fact that
the original of OCT No. 4650 covering Lot No. 3414 was either
lost or destroyed and was reconstituted only in 1971, while
the original copy of the deed of sale was lost by Felipa Delfin.
Even respondents claim of possession of the subject
properties has not been sufficiently proved. This Court has
uniformly held that the one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. Actual
possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would
naturally exercise over his own property.
Contrary to the appellate courts illation, respondents have
not established possession of the subject properties. Save for
the lone testimony of Orlando Buday, a neighbor, that
Rosario Degala Daradar was the only one still residing in the
properties in dispute, no other evidence was presented to
show that respondents are in actual occupation and
possession thereof. Not even Rosario herself testified. Doubts
also arise as to the veracity of respondents claim of
possession since respondents themselves averred in their
complaint that the spouses Delfin had immediately taken
possession of the subject properties in the same year that the
sale was made, and appropriated the produce found in the
subject lots from then on. Admissions made in the complaint
are judicial admissions which are binding on the party who
made them and cannot be contradicted absent any showing
that it was made through palpable mistake. No amount of
rationalization can offset such admission. By their very own
admissions, it can be inferred that respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest did not exercise actual occupancy, as
they had ceased to perform acts of dominion over the
property upon the sale thereof.
Spouses Lumbres v Sps Tablada
FACTS: on January 9, 1995 Spring Homes, former owner of
the parcel of land in dispute, entered into a pro forma
Contract to Sell with the respondent spouses Tablada. The
prepared typewritten contract, with the blank spaces therein
merely filled up, contains the designation of the parcel sold,
the price per square meter and the stipulation as to payment.
After having been paid the sum total of P179,500.00, which
the respondents claim to be the full purchase price of the
subject lot, Spring Homes executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the respondents. In the deed the subject lot was
already made to appear as covered by a TCT. Because the
anticipated Pag-Ibig loan failed to materialize,
the P230,000.00, which, under the Contract to Sell, was
supposed to be paid upon release of the loan, was left
unpaid.
Respondents later declared the subject lot for taxation
purposes and paid the corresponding real property taxes
thereon. Using their own funds, they caused the construction
thereon of a residential house, which they presently occupy.
A Certificate of Occupancy was issued to them and the house
was declared in their names.
With the execution of the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale,
the respondent spouses sent a demand letter to Spring
Homes for the transfer and release to them of the original or
owner’s copy of the TCT, who promised to deliver the said
title and even apologized for the delay. However, to their
great dismay, the spouses subsequently learned that the TCT
was canceled and a new one issued to the petitioners. On
account thereof, the respondent spouses filed with the RTC a
civil suit against the petitioners, Spring Homes and the RD of
Calamba City for nullification of title, reconveyance and
damages.
It appears, however, that after the filing of the Civil Case the
spouses Lumbres filed a civil case before the RTC of Calamba
City, against Spring Homes. The petitioners filed with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba City a Notice of Lis
Pendens over all the properties registered in the name of the
said corporation, including the subject lot. The RTC issued an
order attaching all of Spring Homes properties, subject lot.
Premiere Development Bank subsequently intervened
because all said properties had been mortgaged to it.
The petitioner spouses entered into a Compromise
Agreement in the Civil Case with Spring Homes and Premiere
Development Bank, which was approved by the RTC. In that
Compromise Agreement, both Spring Homes and Premiere
Development Bank recognized the rights and interests of the
petitioner spouses over the parcels of land The subject
property (Lot 8, Block 3) was among the properties covered
by the aforementioned compromise agreement that were
judicially assigned, transferred and conveyed to the
petitioners.
Meanwhile, due to the respondents’ alleged failure to pay
the P230,000.00 unpaid balance as per the Contract to Sell
earlier adverted to despite demands, the subject lot was sold
by Spring Homes to the petitioners, again by way of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed on December 22, 2000 for and in
consideration of the sum of P157,500.00. The mortgage on
the lot was released by Premiere Development Bank.
Subsequently a TCT covering the subject lot was issued in
petitioners’ favor.
The instant case cropped up when, asserting their ownership
of the subject lot on the basis of the TCT the petitioners
demanded of the respondents to vacate said lot and to pay
them the rentals due thereon. Their demands having come to
naught, the petitioner spouses then filed in the MTCC for
ejectment against respondent Tabladas and all persons
claiming rights under them. The MTCC dismissed the
petitioners’ ejectment complaint and ruled for the
respondents.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the RTC. In The RTC
reversed and set aside the MTCC decision and ordered the
respondent spouses to vacate subject lot to surrender the
possession thereof to the petitioners. In holding that the
petitioners have superior right on the subject lot over the
respondents, the RTC, applying the provisions of Articles
1350, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code, deemed the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the respondents void ab initio for
want of valid consideration. With their MR having been
denied by the RTC in the respondent spouses then went to
the CA on a petition for review.
The CA granted the respondents’ petition, thereby reversing
the assailed Orders of the RTC and reinstating the earlier
decision of the MTCC. Their MR having been denied by the
CA,petitioners are now before us via the instant recourse
raising the following issues:
ISSUE: Who, as between the petitioners and the respondents,
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of their respective claims of
ownership thereof
HELD:
petition denied.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues laid out
above, it must be stressed that the present case is one
forejectment. As such, our judgment hereon is effective only
with respect to possession. It does not bind the title or affect
the ownership of the lot in question.
Upon scrutiny, however, the CA astutely observed that
despite there being no question that the total land area of
the subject lot is 105 square meters, the Contract to Sell
executed and entered into by Spring Homes and the
respondent spouses states, however, that while there is only
one parcel of land being sold, the Contract to Sell speaks of
two (2) land areas, namely, “105 sqm” and “42 sqm,” and two
(2) prices per square meter differ.
The CA could only think of one possible explanation: the
Contract to Sell refers only to a single lot with a total land
area of 105 square meters. The 42 square meters mentioned
in the same contract and therein computed at the rate
ofP6,000 per square meter refer to the cost of the house
which would be constructed by the respondents on the
subject lot through a Pag-Ibig loan.
Looking at that portion of the Contract to Sell, the CA found
merit in the respondents’ contention that the total selling
price of P409,500 includes not only the price of the lot
but also the cost of the house that would be constructed
thereon. We are inclined to agree. The CA went on to say:
It could be argued that the contract to sell never mentions
the construction of any house or building on the subject
property. Had it been the intention of the parties that the
total selling price would include the amount of the house that
would be taken from a loan to be obtained from Pag-Ibig,
they could have specified so. However, one should not lose
sight of the fact that the contract to sell is an accomplished
form. [Respondents,] trusting Spring Homes, could not be
expected to demand that another contract duly reflective of
their agreements be utilized instead of the accomplished
form. The terms and conditions of the contract may not
contemplate the inclusion of the cost of the house in the total
selling price, but the entries typewritten thereon sufficiently
reveal the intentions of the parties.
The position of the [respondents] finds support in the
documents and subsequent actuations of Bertha Pasic, the
representative of Spring Homes. [Respondents] undeniably
proved that they spent their own hard-earned money to
construct a house thereon after their Pag-Ibig loan did not
materialize. It is highly unjust for the [respondents] to pay for
the amount of the house when the loan did not materialize
due to the failure of Spring Homes to deliver the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT.
If the total selling price was indeed P409,500.00, as
[petitioners] would like to poster, said amount should have
appeared as the consideration in the deed of absolute sale
dated January 15, 1996. However, only P157,500.00 was
stated. The amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 15, 1996 was not only a portion of the selling price,
because the Deed of Sale dated December 22, 2000 also
reflected P157,500.00 as consideration. It is not shown that
[petitioners] likewise applied for a loan with Pag-Ibig. The
reasonable inference is that the consistent amount stated in
the two Deeds of Absolute Sale was the true selling price as
it perfectly jibed with the computation in the Contract to
Sell.
We find the CA’s reasoning to be sound. At any rate, the
execution of the January 16, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of the respondents effectively rendered the previous
Contract to Sell ineffective and canceled. Furthermore, we
find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the first sale to
the respondents was void for want of consideration. As the
CA pointed out in its assailed decision:
Other than the [petitioners'] self-serving assertion that the
Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed solely for the purpose
of obtaining a Pag-Ibig loan, no other concrete evidence was
tendered to justify the execution of the deed of absolute sale.
They failed to overcome the clear and convincing evidence of
the [respondents] that as early as July 5, 1995 the latter had
already paid the total amount of P179,500.00, much bigger
than the actual purchase price for the subject land.
Having stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
favor of the respondent spouses is valid and with sufficient
consideration, the MTCC correctly applied the provisions of
Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Article 1544 reads:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it
in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession, and,
in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners, as the second
buyer, registered their Deed of Absolute Sale, in contrast to
the Deed of Sale of the respondents which was not registered
at all precisely because of Spring Homes’ failure to deliver the
owner’s copy of the TCT, the respondents’ right could not be
deemed defeated as the petitioners are in bad faith.
Petitioners cannot claim good faith since at the time of the
execution of the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case, they
were indisputably and reasonably informed that the subject
lot was previously sold to the respondents. In fact, they
were already aware that the respondents had constructed a
house thereon and are presently in possession of the same.
Knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is the first to register the second
sale because such knowledge taints his prior registration with
bad faith. For the second buyer to displace the first, he must
show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance
of the first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) from the time
of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by
registration.
Hence, there was nothing to cede or transfer to the
petitioners when the Compromise Agreement was entered
into insofar as the subject lot is concerned as it was already
sold to and fully paid for by the respondents as early as
January 16, 1996 when the Absolute Deed of Sale was
executed in their favor by Spring Homes. More so that Spring
Homes has no more to sell to the petitioners when it
executed in the latter’s favor the second deed of absolute
sale on December 22, 2000.
The respondents are the current occupants of the subject lot.
They had constructed their residential house thereon and are
living there at present. The action for ejectment was
fashioned to provide a speedy, albeit temporary, remedy to
the dispossessed party while the issue of lawful possession
or de jure possession is pending or about to be filed. The
remedy of ejectment ought to maintain the status quo and
prevent the party-litigants from further aggravating the
situation and causing further damage.
NOTES:
1. When acting as an ejectment court, the Metropolitan,
Municipal and Circuit Trial Courts’ jurisdiction is limited to the
determination of the issue on possession de facto and not
possession de jure.11 By way of exception, however, if the
issue of possession depends on the resolution of the issue of
ownership, which is sufficiently alleged in the complaint, as
here, the MTCC may resolve the issue of ownership although
the resulting judgment would be conclusive only with respect
to possession but not to the ownership of the property.
2. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceful, quiet possession thereof shall
not be ejected therefrom. Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Whatever may be the character of the
defendant’s prior possession, whether it be legal or illegal,
since he had in his favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected therefrom by a person having a better right by accion
publciana or accion reivindicatoria
Rosa Sales v Barro
Facts:
This case originated from the ejectment complaint filed by
the petitioners against the respondent, his wife. In their
complaint, the petitioners alleged among others that (1) they
are owners of the lot; the respondent constructed a shanty
thereon without their consent; (3) the respondent and his co-
defendants have not been paying any rent to the petitioners
for their occupation thereof; (4) the respondent and his co-
defendants refused the formal demand made by the
petitioners for them to vacate the subject lot.
the respondent denied the allegations of the complaint, and
essentially claimed that (1) his construction of the temporary
makeshift house on the lot was tolerated by the petitioners,
considering that he acted as the caretaker thereof; and (2) he
does not remember receiving any demand letter and
summons from the barangay and so he was surprised to
know that an ejectment complaint was filed against him.
he MeTC found in favor of the petitioners. The respondent
appealed to the RTC.
Ruling:
After carefully examining the averments of the petitioners
complaint and the character of the reliefs sought therein, we
hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the
complaint was for forcible entry, and that the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed it.
There are two reasons why we could not subscribe to the
petitioners submission that their complaint was for unlawful
detainer. Firstly, the petitioners own averment in the
complaint that the defendant constructed a shanty in the lot
of the plaintiffs without their consent, and the relief asked for
by the petitioners that the respondent and his wife pay the
amount of P10,000 a month beginning January 2004 as for
reasonable rent of the subject premises,[15] clearly
contradict their claim. It must be highlighted that as admitted
by the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration[16]
before the appellate court, and as evidenced by the TCT No.
262237 annexed to the complaint, the petitioners became
owners of the property only on January 6, 2004. By averring
that the respondent constructed his shanty on the lot without
their consent and then praying that the MeTC direct the
respondent to pay them rent from January 2004, or from the
inception of the respondents occupation of the lot, no other
conclusion can be made except that the petitioners had
always considered respondents occupation of the same to be
unlawful from the very beginning. Hence, the complaint can
never support a case for unlawful detainer. It is a settled rule
that in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer, the
owners permission or tolerance must be present at the
beginning of the possession.
Secondly, the nature of the complaint is neither changed nor
dependent upon the allegations and/or defenses made in the
answer. As we had previously stated in Caiza v. Court of
Appeals, it is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, what the

petitioners actually filed was a fatally defective complaint for
forcible entry, considering that there was no allegation
therein regarding the petitioners prior physical possession of
the lot. In v. Alejo, we held that in actions for forcible entry,
two allegations are mandatory for the municipal trial court to
acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege his prior
physical possession of the property; and second, he must also
allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the
means provided for in Section 1,[20] Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and
stealth.

The petitioners allegation that they are the registered owners

of the lot miserably falls short of satisfying the required
averment of prior physical possession. As we had clarified and
stressed in Tirona, the word possession as used in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than
physical possession, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law