IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)

FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide
in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the
university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were consequently
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at
two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was
allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be
admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is
noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the
practice of law

HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the
bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short,
he must show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice. The practice of law is a privilege
granted only to those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL QUALIFICATIONS
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character of all Bar members,
keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by the court to
produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible
member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that
he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal profession.
A.C. No. 10681, February 03, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION AND BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELMER
A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.

The Facts

omplainant alleges that from 1997 until August 2008, respondent served as their retained lawyer
and counsel. Complainants wanted to open their pawnshop business but did not materialize and
Atty. Dela Rosa, as their counsel, knew of the fact that complainants had money intact form their
failed venture, and borrowed money from them in the amount of P2.5M. The checks were issued
and Atty. Dela Rosa photocopied them and verified he received the original checks and that he
promises to pay them within 5 days with an interest of 5%. The checks were personally encased
by him. Atty. Dela Rosa failed to pay and despite numerous demands from the Complainant, did
not return the money. Hence an administrative complaint was filed against him by Sps.
Concepcion. Respondent denied borrowing the P2.5M insisting that Nault was the real debtor.
He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he was
engaged for that specific purpose

ISSUE:
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.

RULING:
Respondent�s receipt of the P2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by
substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to P2,500,000.00, with respondent as the
payee.41 With respondent�s direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he
derived therefrom, absent too any credible indication to the contrary, the Court is thus
convinced that respondent was indeed the one who borrowed the amount of P2,500,000.00
from complainants, which amount he had failed to return, despite their insistent pleas.

Respondent�s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault�s acknowledgment of his debt to the
complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the
complainants and incurring the same obligation.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a
P2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On
the other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondent�s receipt
of the checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the P2,500,000.00 plus
interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former
to wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently
imbued in such relationship.

Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the client�s interests are fully protected:

CANON 16 � A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.04 � A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client�s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.�

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this �trust
and confidence� is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his
client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer�s ability to use all
the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court
categorically declared that a lawyer�s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein
respondent did, is unethical, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client�s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case and by independent advice.
JUDGE MARIBETH MANAHAN vs. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 297

FACTS: Atty. Flores was the counsel for the defendant in a civil case before the sala of Judge
Manahan. During the preliminary conference, Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was
given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief.

Later, Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was
expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing
the required MCLE compliance, however, Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was set several times and Atty. Flores was given several occasions
to submit the brief with the proper MCLE compliance.

On the final instance, instead of submitting the promised proof of MCLE compliance, Atty.
Flores filed a letter stating that he was no longer representing the defendant. Such was stated
in what was deemed as intemperate language.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Flores is guilty of disrespect to court orders.

HELD: YES. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government.

Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance
notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Furthermore, he used intemperate
language in his pleadings and dealing with the court.

As an officer of the court, he must be circumspect in his language and should have abstained
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court.
Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006

Facts:
Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against others (Duane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for
estafa thru falsification of public document. A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May
20, 2003 against respondent Atty. Emmanual O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arose when
respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-charge of perjury against Donton. Atty. Tansingco in
his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement at the request of
Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time resident of a real property located at Cubao, Quezon City. Since
Mr. Stier is a U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name, he agreed
that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code. Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred. Atty. Tansingco claimed
that complainant Donton filed disbarment case against him upon the instigation of
complainant ’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Aletajan, because he refused to act witness in the
criminal case against Stier and Manggay. In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred
the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation and for which the latter,
through Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the IBP Commission of Discipline recommended
suspension from the practice of law for two years and cancellation of his commission as Notary
Public. The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months. The report was
then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?

Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. The Court ruled
that a lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance
of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against
the lawyer. Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and
the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against
foreign ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful
end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. As
such, respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.
[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, VS
ATTY. YOLANDO F.BUSMENTE respondent

FACTS:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente
was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's
deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted
in the ling of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed
as Civil Case No. 9284,where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was
led against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso incourt,
projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-
Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders andnotices speci ed Dela Rosa as Busmente's
collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamanaalleged that upon veri cation with this Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was
able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana
was forged.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in
her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law

It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar misrepresented herself as
respondent’s collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent
allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give legal assistance to
respondent’s client. This is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that “[a] lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice
of law.” The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. Holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such
as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.
A.M. No. 94-9-297-RTC December 22, 1994

IN RE: REPORT ON THE AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE CASHBOOKS OF THEN CLERK OR COURT
PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ OF THE RTC, TANGUB CITY, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, NOW PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE MCTC OF JIMENEZ-SINACABAN, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL.

FACTS:
Last June 1993, the City Auditor of Tangub City conducted an audit of the cash and accounts of
Atty. Hernandez covering the period from October 23, 1992 to June 15, 1993. The audit showed
shortages totalling to P8,637.00. However, it was found out that the shortages were not directly
incurred by her but by her designated Collecting Officer, Mr. Macutob, a Staff Assistant III.
Although Mr. Macutob immediately restituted the whole amount, the Supreme Court, in its
resolution dated March 11, 1994, dismissed Mr. Macutob from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and the Clerk of Court was not, in any way, made responsible for the irregularity.
When Clerk of Court Priscilla Hernandez was promoted as Judge last December, 1993, she was
required by our Office to submit all her Judicial cashbooks together with other pertinent
documents for audit purposes. Unfortunately, she was not able to comply with all the
requirements. We were able to reconcile her cashbooks for Judiciary Development Fund and our
audit shows a zero accountability. However, for Clerk of Court General Fund, there appears a
shortage amounting to P412.00.

As Clerk of Court, Atty. Hernandez has general administrative supervision over all personnel of
said court. Even if Mr. Macutob was the designated collecting officer, still the Clerk of Court
remains to be the Accountable Officer and, as such, must closely supervise the proper handling
of collections and deposits to avoid any mishandling of government funds. As can be gleaned
from the explanation given by Mr. Macutob on the En Banc Resolution dated March 11, 1994, it
is always the practice to bring home daily collections and official receipts, an [sic] accountable
forms, and nobody seems to mind that practice which is beyond the normal procedure. Added
to this, how come Mr. Macutob was allowed to handle collections from June to November, 1993,
inspite of the discovery of same irregularities last June 15, 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Priscilla Hernandez is liable.

RULING:
From the records of this instant administrative matter, it was culled that the shortages in the
Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Tangub City per audit conducted by the City Auditor of Tangub
City were not directly incurred by then Clerk of Court Priscilla T. Hernandez but by her designated
Collecting Officer, Mr. Nemesio Macutob, a Staff Assistant III. In the Resolution of this Court dated
March 11, 1994, issued in A.M. No.

P-94-1014, Mr. Macutob was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and then
Clerk of Court Priscilla Hernandez was not, in any way, made responsible for the irregularity.
Per audit findings of Mrs. Antonina A. Soria, Director III, Fiscal Audit Division, this Court, the Office
of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Tangub City has a balance of unremitted collection for the Sheriff
General Fund in the amount of P480.78 based on the documents submitted by then Clerk of
Court Priscilla Hernandez.

While she (Hernandez) was not held responsible for the irregularities committed by Mr. Nemesio
Macutob, sanction may be imposed upon her for negligence in not exercising strict supervision
over her subordinates as then Clerk of Court and Accountable Officer of the RTC of Tangub City.

In her letter of 16 November 1994, the respondent admitted the shortage but claimed,
nevertheless, that she had already remitted on 7 June 1994 the amount of P312.00 and had asked
the OIC of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 16, Tangub City "to remit the under
remittance of P100.00 to the Land Bank of the Philippines [at] Ozamis City." However, she opted
not to deny her negligence by not showing cause, as required in the resolution, why she should
not be administratively disciplined for such negligence, if not dishonesty.

We do not, however, find any dishonesty on the respondent's part. Nevertheless, we find the
respondent's tacit admission of negligence to be a mitigating circumstance and considering that
this is her first administrative offense, the fine recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator may be reduced to P500.00.