DAY THREE
3.2. DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL LIABILITY FROM
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND TORT FROM CONTRACT
CANGCO vs MANILA RAILROAD
FACTS:
 Cangco, a clerk of the defendant, was on his way home via train. As the train
was about to stop in the station where Cangco usually deboards, Cangco,
alighted from the train as he and other passengers always did. Unfortunately,
due to the fact that it was nighttime and that the station was dimly lighted,
Cangco was not able to see that there was a sack of watermelons on the
platform. Thus, he landed on said melons and slipped. He was drawn under
the train and his arm was injured so severely that it had to be amputated.
 Cangco sued defendant for damages due to negligence of servants &
employees in placing the sack of melons which obstructed the passenger‘s
egress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Railroad is liable
HELD:
Yes.
It is implied from the contract of carriage of the defendant the duty to carry him
safely and provide him with a safe means to come in and out of the train. Being
contractual, that duty was direct and immediate. Its non-performance cannot be
excused due to the fault of defandant‘s employees.
It cannot be doubted that the employees of defendant were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks of watermelon on the platform in the manner stated. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s own contributory negligence.
It is to be noted that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of carriage.
However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as
the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that
proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter’s act. The fundamental distinction between
obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact
that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations
the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by
the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
When the source of obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of action depends is a
negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove
negligence. On the other hand, in contractual undertaking, proof of the contract
and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery.
The negligence of employee cannot be invoked to relieve the employer from
liability as it will make juridical persons completely immune from damages arising
from breach of their contracts. Defendant was therefore liable for the injury
suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual. As Manresa discussed, whether
negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. The
contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty
to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains.
Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked by defendant is
untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
such act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly- age,
sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting
the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. It is to be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily routine. Our conclusion is
there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence and therefore was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
AIR FRANCE vs CARRASCOSO
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class",
but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
DAY THREE
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto
G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when
they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to
give his seat to the white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in
the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the
availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to damages
HELD:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
The judgment of the lower courts did not suffer reversible error.
SINGSON vs BPI
FACTS:
 It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906
of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants. Singson and Lobregat
had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co.,
as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory.
In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the
Bank of the Philippine Islands — in which the Singsons had a current
account — insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were
concerned.
 Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, the clerk of the bank,
without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing
himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of
defendant Villa-Abrille & Co et al, prepared a letter for the signature of
the President of the Bank informing plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the
garnishment of his deposits. Another letter was also prepared and signed
by the said President of the Bank for the Special Sheriff.
 Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in
favor of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation,
were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson
DAY THREE

that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had
SO PING BUN vs CA
already been garnished and that they are now constrained to close his
credit account with them. FACTS:
 Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
president, Santiago Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal agreements with DCCSI. Lease is for one year. It was not renewed but Tek Hua
freezing of plaintiffs' account. Trading continued to occupy the property. Tek Hua was later dissolved and one of
its original partner Manual Tiong formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. When So Pek
Giok died, his grandson petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the leased property as his
CFI of Manila held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or
warehouse for Trendsetter Marketing. DCCSI later sent a letter to Tek Hua
quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature.
Enterprise, increasing the rent by 30%. The letter was not answered by Tek Hua,
but nevertheless the lease contract was not rescinded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not contractual relation between the parties precludes an action for
Tek Hua sent a separate letter to So Ping Bun demanding the latter to vacate the
torts
premises he was occupying since Tek Hua needs it for his textile business. So Ping
refused and instead negotiated with DCCSI that a contract of lease between him
HELD:
and DCCSI be. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek
No. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his
Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease contracts in favor of
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
Trendsetter were executed.
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for,
although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in
Tek Hua thus instituted the case against So Ping Bun for Turtuous Interference of
origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".
Contract.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
ISSUE:
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
Whether or not So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous Interference of Contract
as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages —
HELD:
the amount of which need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
YES.
attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)
sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said
interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the
costs.
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to
lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation.
DAY THREE
Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and
benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice
on him.
Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party." Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows
that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to
intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the
conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory
award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to
make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability
for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent
appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of
the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding
damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury
caused by petitioner's interference.
LRTA vs NAVIDAD
FACTS:
 October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m.: Drunk Nicanor Navidad (Nicanor) entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token”.
 While Nicanor was standing at the platform near the LRT tracks, the
guard Junelito Escartin approached him.
 Due to misunderstanding, they had a fist fight Nicanor fell on the tracks
and killed instantaneously upon being hit by a moving train operated by
Rodolfo RomanDecember 8, 1994:
 The widow of Nicanor, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit Org. Inc. and
Prudent (agency of security guards) for the death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim against Nicanor and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent
 Prudent: denied liability – averred that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection and surpervision of its security guards LRTA and Roman:
presented evidence Prudent and Escartin: demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned
task
 RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent and Escartin, complaint
against LRT and Roman were dismissed for lack of merit
 CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held LRTA and Roman liable
ISSUE:
Whether or not LRTA and Roman should be liable according to the contract of
carriage
HELD:
 NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal damages is DELETED
(CANNOT co-exist w/ compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.
 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with
the duty off exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers Civil Code:
 Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
 Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755
 Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope
of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers
 This liability of the common carriers does NOT cease upon proof that
they Exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees
 Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
 Carriers presumed to be at fault or been negligent and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieaved of the duty to still establish the fault
or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or
to force majeure
DAY THREE
 Where it hires its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task, the common
carrier is NOT relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage
 General Rule: Prudent can be liable only for tort under Art. 2176 and
related provisions in conjunction with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort
may arise even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict liability] is that
which breaches the contract)
 EX: if employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee, employer can be made liable on the basis of the presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 EX to the EX: Upon showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
 Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent and the death of Nicanor
for the reason that the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven NO
showing that Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he
must also be absolved from liability Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor
is NOT itself a juridical relation bet. Nicanor and Roman. Roman can be
liable only for his own fault or negligence
CONSOLIDATED BANK vs CA
FACTS:
L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya (“Macaraya”), filled up a savings
(cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50. Macaraya
instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre (“Calapre”), to deposit the
money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and
the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to
Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the
deposit slips with the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD
OFFICE.”
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis
C. Diaz (“Diaz”), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same
passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. On the same day, Diaz formally
wrote Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same day that L.C.
Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before.
L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano Ilagan (“Ilagan”) and one Roscon
Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. L.C. Diaz
through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank
refused.
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings account written
on the passbook. The rules state that “possession of this book shall raise the
presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon
the production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the
same effect as if made to the depositor personally.” The Court of Appeals ruled
that Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies to Solid bank
HELD:
NO. We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or
culpa contractual. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking. The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of
integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract of
simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under a similar contract of
simple loan. Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that “responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable.” For
breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor. Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of
diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a
presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.
In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative
of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller
was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on
Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its employees.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
DAY THREE
precedent. We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of
its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where
neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid
the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability.
CRISOSTOMO vs CA
FACTS:
 Petitioner Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan
Travel and Tours Intl. to arrange and facilitate a tour dubbed as Jewel of
Europe.
 Menor who was the respondent's ticketing manager and the niece of the
petitioner delivered to the petitioner her travel document and plane
ticket and told her to be on NAIA on Saturday. In turn petitioner gave
menor the full payment for the package.
 Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on
Saturday to take the flight but she discovered that the flight she was
suppose to take had already departed the previous day and that her
plane ticket was for the flight schedule on June 14, 1991 and not June 15,
1991.
 Petitioner called Menor. Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take
another tour called the British Pageant. Petitioner made partial payment
and commence with the trip.
 Upon return she demanded the respondent the reimbursement of the
difference between the amount she paid to the respondent and the
amount she owned to the respondent.
 Respondent refused to reimburse the amount contending that the same
was non-refundable.
 Respondent filed a complaint against respondent for breach of contract
of carriage and damages. That her failure to join the Jewel of Europe was
due to the respondent's fault since it did not clearly indicate the
departure date on the plane ticket. Respondent was also negligent on
informing her of a wrong flight schedule and insist that the British
Pageant tour was merely a substitute for the Jewel of Europe tour such
that the cost must be set-off.
 Trial court favored the Petitioner
 CA reverse and set aside the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Crisostomo is entitled to refund for she was more negligent than
the private respondent
HELD:
Yes Petitioner was more negligent and not entitled to refund.
This is not a contract of carriage contract but an ordinary contract since private
respondent is not on the business of transporting either passengers or goods thus
neither private nor a common carrier. Respondent’s service is travel agency which
includes ticketing and facilitating travel permits or visa as well as booking
customers for tours.
The standard of care required of respondent is that of a goof father of a family
under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.
Menor’s negligence was not sufficiently proved considering that he only evidence
presented on this score was petitioner’s uncorroborated narration.
The evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in
performing its obligations under the contract ad followed standard procedure in
rendering its service to petitioner.
The plane ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and time
contrary to petitioner’s contention. The travel document consist of the itinerary,
voucher, instructions which was likewise delivered to petitioner 2 days prior to the
trip. Respondent properly booked petitioner for the tour, prepared the necessary
documents and procured the plane tickets. It arranged the petitioner’s hotel
accommodation as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing excursions in
accordance with its avowed undertaking.
Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of her affairs, there would
have been no reason for her to miss the flight. Respondent company performed its
duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach hence petitioner cannot
recover and must bear her own damage.
DAY THREE
PAL vs SAVILLO
FACTS:
 Grino was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf
Tournament held in Jakarta, Indonesia.
 In 1993, He and several companions decided to purchase their respective
passenger tickets from PAL with the following points of passage: MANILA-
SINGAPORE-JAKARTA-SINGAPORE-MANILA. Grino and his companions
were made to understand by PAL that its plane would take them from
Manila to Singapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from
Singapore to Jakarta.
 Upon landing in SG, Singapore Airlines refused to accept their tickets
since it was not indorsed by PAL. They contend that without
indorsement, PAL wouldn’t pay them for the passage. Grino tried calling
PAL’s office but it was closed.
 Stranded at the airport in SG and left with no recourse, Grino was
subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, fear and distress. Eventually, he and his companions were forced
to purchase tickets from Garuda Airlines and board its last flight bound
for Jakarta. When they arrived in Jakarta at about 12:00 o’clock midnight,
the party who was supposed to fetch them from the airport had already
left and they had to arrange for their transportation to the hotel at a very
late hour. After the series of nerve-wracking experiences, private
respondent became ill and was unable to participate in the tournament.
 Grino, upon his return, sent a demand letter to PAL and Singapore
Airlines in 1993 and 1994 respectively, but both denied liability and
pointed fingers at the other.
 In 1997, Grino thus filed with the RTC a complaint for damages.
o PAL filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the 2-yr prescriptive
period has lapsed, pursuant to the Warsaw Convention for
international contracts of carriage.
o Grino argues that the NCC should apply.
o RTC denied the Motion.
o CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Warsaw Convention governs this situation, and if Grino can
recover damages
HELD:
NO. Grino’s action is covered by torts under the NCC, which prescribes in 4 years.
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier
for "damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
baggage or goods." Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that
"(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention.". A claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be
recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already
lapsed. Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the
United States also recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not "exclusively
regulate" the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight.
In United Airlines v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the
passenger’s baggage and (2) humiliation he suffered at the hands of the airline’s
employees. The first cause of action was covered by the Warsaw Convention which
prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the provisions of the Civil
Code on torts, which prescribes in four years. In Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, the
court pronounced that actions for damages for the "bumping off" itself, rather
than the incidental damages due to the delay, fall outside the Warsaw Convention
and do not prescribe in two years.
Grino’s complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross
negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to "humiliation, embarrassment,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress." The emotional harm suffered by
the private respondent as a result of having been unreasonably and unjustly
prevented from boarding the plane should be distinguished from the actual
damages which resulted from the same incident. Under the Civil Code provisions
on tort, such emotional harm gives rise to compensation where gross negligence or
malice is proven.
Singapore Airlines barred private respondent from boarding the Singapore Airlines
flight because PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and
his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to respondent that Singapore Airlines
had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still needs to be heard and
established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations
will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the
part of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but
days before the scheduled flight. Had the present case merely consisted of claims
incidental to the airlines’ delay in transporting their passengers, the private
respondent’s Complaint would have been time-barred under Article 29 of the
Warsaw Convention. However, the present case involves a special species of injury
resulting from the failure of PAL and/or Singapore Airlines to transport private
DAY THREE

respondent from Singapore to Jakarta – the profound distress, fear, anxiety and necessary that he committed no negligence or misconduct that may have
humiliation that private respondent experienced when, despite PAL’s earlier occasioned the loss.
assurance that Singapore Airlines confirmed his passage, he was prevented from
boarding the plane and he faced the daunting possibility that he would be stranded ISSUE:
in Singapore Airport because the PAL office was already closed. Whether or not G&S Transport is liable for the death of Marcial.

HELD:
YES.
HEIRS OF OCHOA vs G&S TRANSPORT
In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is
FACTS:
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the
Jose Marcial boarded Avis Coupon Taxi owned by G&S Transport Corporation from
court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
Manila Domestic Airport to Teachers Village, Diliman Quezon City. The cab was
carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the
driven by Babinia Padilla Jr. As the taxi was cruising along EDSA, the driver Padilla,
carrier exercised extraordinary diligence." Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to
while going up the (Santolan) fly-over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo
overcome this presumption.
Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the
narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and the ten-wheeler
The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for
truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla)
breach of contract. This case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the
was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel
recovery of damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly
to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and
committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action arising from contract
fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the vehicle on the
which is separate and distinct from the criminal action for reckless imprudence
floor of the road broke and split it into two parts. Jose Marcial dies because of the
resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against Padilla by reason of the same
said accident. A complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide was filed
incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case,
against Padilla but he was acquitted.
same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case.
The heirs of Jose Marcial sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter indemnify
them for Jose Marcial's death. The demands were ignored by the defendant hence
they filed a complaint for damages with the RTC Pasig. The heirs alleged that G &
S, as a common carrier, is under legal obligation to observe and exercise
extraordinary diligence in transporting its passengers to their destination safely and
securely. They averred that G & S is liable to them for having breached the contract
of common carriage. As an alternative cause of action, they asserted that G & S is
likewise liable for damages based on quasi-delict pursuant to Article 21806 in
relation to Article 21767 of the Civil Code.
The defendant then alleged that the e Avis taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing
delivery van at the right portion causing the taxicab to veer to the left, ram through
the left side of the railings of the fly-over and fall to the center of the island below.
They contended that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial's death is a fortuitous
event and/or the fault or negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the
taxicab. It likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence required of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including Padilla.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs Jose Marcial. The appellate court gave weight to
their argument that in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is
DAY THREE
QUASI-DELICTS
1.1. CONCEPT – NCC 1173
PICART vs SMITH
FACTS:
 On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of
his approach.
 He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two
more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the
automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right
side of the bridge instead of going to the left.
 He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of
the road for the machine.
 In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to
the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.
 When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his
car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and
the limb was broken.
 The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result
of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has
appealed.
ISSUE:
Is Smith liable for negligence.
HELD:
YES.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations
cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable
men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known
to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence
they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper
criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road.
But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances
the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
DAY THREE
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING vs BORJA
FACTS:
Petitioner’s vessel was carrying a chemical cargo – alkyl benzene and methyl
methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous
inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary
precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was therefore negligent.
Smith Bell (petitioner) filed a written request with the Bureau of Customs for the
attendance of the Latter’s inspection team on vessel M/T king family which was
due to arrive at the port of manila. Said vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl
benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. On the same day, supervising customs
Inspector Manuel Nalgan instructed respondent Catalino Borja to board said vessel
and perform his duties as inspector upon the vessel’s arrival until its departure.
While M/T king family was unloading chemical unto 2 barges, a sudden explosion
occurred setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing this, Borja who was inside the
cabin preparing reports, ran outside to check. Another explosion was again heard.
Fearing for his life, Borja jumped overboard to save himself. The water howver was
likewise on fire because of the chemicals. Despite this he mange to swam his wasy
for an hour until he was rescued and sent to the hospital. He was diagnosed to be
permanently disabled due to the incident.
ISSUE:
WON Smith bell is not liable as it claims that the explosion occurred outside of its
vessel
HELD:
No. Smith Bell is liable. The lower court and CA ruled that the fire and explosion
had originated from the petitioner’s vessel. Knowing fully well that it was carrying
dangerous chemicals, petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary
precautions in transporting the cargo. Respondent Borja suffered the following
damage and injuries: (1) chemical burns of the face and arm; (2) inhalation of
fumes from burning chemicals; (3) exposure to the elements while floating in sea
water for about three hours; (4) homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right
eye; and (5) cerebral infract with neo-vascularization, left occipital region with right
sided headache and the blurring of the vision of right eye. The owner or the person
in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and
proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of negligent
navigation or management.
DELSAN TRANSPORT vs C&A CONSTRUCTION
FACTS:
C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation Area in
Tondo,
Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority though it was
completed in 1994. On 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T.
Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report that that a typhoon was going to hit
Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35AM he tried to seek shelter but it was already
congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth,
the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was dragged by the wind
toward the Napocor power barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to
avoid the collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the
incident. C & A Construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt. Jusep
but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous
event. The trial court ruled that Jusep was not guilty of negligence in applying the
“emergency rule: because it had taken necessary precautions to avoid accident. CA
reversed & set aside the decision. Captain Jusep was found guilty of negligence in
transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21,1994 and held liable for
damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transfering the vessel to sought shelter.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code for Quasi-Delict.
HELD:
(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the knowledge
that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain
Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have observed in the same situation.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the danger where
Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.
(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage to another, it instantly arise a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and diligence of
supervision of his employee. In Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals held that due
diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulation for the guidance and
actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any evidence that its
DAY THREE
rule are strictly implemented and monitored in compliance therewith petitioner is
therefore liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27
due earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the
decision.
PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION vs CA
FACTS:
 PASUDECO and TRB entered into a MOA, where the former was allowed to
enter and pass through NLEX under some specified terms and conditions.
PNCC, NLEX operator was furnished a copy of the MOA and interposed no
objection.
 On January 23, 1993 (2:30 a.m.), NLEX Security staffs saw a pile of sugarcane
in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road. They
placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including
lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the
obstruction.
 The security staffs requested PASUDECO to clear the area.
 At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the
highway of the sugarcane. The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a
few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road.
 As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the
roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As
dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted
cans and lane dividers.
 At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, together with his sister and friend, was
driving his two-door Toyota Corolla along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per
hour. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control
and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen
paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
 On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz and company filed a complaint for damages against
PASUDECO and PNCC. They alleged that the combined gross negligence of
PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
sustained by them.
 RTC – Only PASUDECO is liable
 CA – PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable liable
ISSUE:
Was there gross negligence on the part of PASUDECO and PNCC
HELD:
Yes.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It
also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance
justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176
of the New Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Further, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily
liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes without
proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning
devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate
cause of Latagan's injuries.
Thus, with PASUDECO's and the petitioner's successive negligent acts, they are joint
tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of
the New Civil Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April
29, 2003, is AFFIRMED.
DAY THREE
PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION vs CA
FACTS:
 Amores was traversing the railroad tracks in Manila. Before crossing the
railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded accordingly.
Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the intersection, a Philippine National
Railways (PNR) train turned up and collided with the car.
 At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the
intersection to warn motorists of an approaching train. Aside from the railroad
track, the only visible warning sign at that time was the defective standard
signboard STOP, LOOK and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was lacking while
that of Look was bent. No whistle blow from the train was likewise heard
before it finally bumped the car of Amores. Amores died.
 The heirs of Amores filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioners PNR
and Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNRs locomotive driver at the time of the incident.
 RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, rationalizing that the
proximate cause of the collision was Amores’ fatal misjudgment and the
reckless course of action he took in crossing the railroad track even after
seeing or hearing the oncoming train.
 CA reversed.
ISSUE:
WON CA was correct in ascribing negligence on the part of the petitioners
HELD:
Yes.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code, which states that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this chapter.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Using the
aforementioned philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and
fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent
upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is
that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence
expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances.
We hold that the petitioners were negligent when the collision took place. the train
was running at a fast speed because notwithstanding the application of the
ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still dragged the car some distance away
from the point of impact. Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate precautions
taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the public of the impending danger. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal
devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of
care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties
pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings.
The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even
if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that said
device or equipment be installed.
The petitioners insist that a train has a right-of-way in a railroad crossing under the
existing laws.
However, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in public highways
before traversing any through street only accrues from the time the said through
street or crossing is so designated and sign-posted. From the records of the case, it
can be inferred that Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required of
him as to avoid injury to himself and to others. The witnesses testimonies showed
that Amores slackened his speed, made a full stop, and then proceeded to cross
the tracks when he saw that there was no impending danger to his life. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that Amores did everything, with absolute
care and caution, to avoid the collision.
It is settled that every person or motorist crossing a railroad track should use
ordinary prudence and alertness to determine the proximity of a train before
attempting to cross. We are persuaded that the circumstances were beyond the
control of Amores for no person would sacrifice his precious life if he had the
slightest opportunity to evade the catastrophe.
In view of the foregoing, We will now discuss the liability of petitioner PNR. Article
2180 of the New Civil Code discusses the liability of the employer once negligence
or fault on the part of the employee has been established. The employer is actually
liable on the assumption of juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
DAY THREE
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been
demonstrated. Even the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory employees
cannot be incidentally invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer.
GUILLANG vs BEDANIA
FACTS:
 Genaro Guillang was driving his car along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it
was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned
by Rodolfo de Silva. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor
damage.
 Antero, one of the car passengers, died due to the injuries he sustained from
the collision.
 Petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero instituted a
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and
de Silva.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found
Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a
sudden U-turn in the highway without duer egard to traffic rules and the
safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania.
 On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
civil case for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail.
ISSUE:
Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners
HELD:
Bedanias and de Silva are liable.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v.
Smith, we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
person would have used in the same situation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to
signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the
collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is
another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that
Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact
occurred. If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane
where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road
and the car had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly,
the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does
not make it improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s
decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a fast speed when it made the
U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a sudden U-turn, meaning the U-turn
was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the trucks
signal lights were not turned on.
Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which
claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of
Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in
all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without
signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent
or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led
to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of
petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for
the damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.