Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court

Manila

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172635

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEDRO DELIJERO, JR.,
Respondent. October 20, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the June 7, 2005 Decision[2] and May 2, 2006 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 00017.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public school teacher at
the Burauen Comprehensive National High School, Burauen, Leyte and was administratively
charged for Grave Misconduct.

A complaint against respondent was filed before petitioner Office of the Ombudsman as a
Request for Assistance (RAS) from the President of the Burauen Watchdog Committee for Good
Government. Philip Camiguing, Graft Prevention & Control Officer I, submitted his final
evaluation report and recommended that the RAS be upgraded into an administrative and
criminal complaint against respondent.

The complainant, Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the mother of the alleged victim Myra dela Cruz
(Myra). At the time of the incident, Myra was only 12 years old and a first year high school
student at the Burauen Comprehensive National High School. Respondent, on the other hand,
was Myra's 52-year-old Mathematics teacher.

Sometime in May 2003, complainant learned from her cousin that respondent was courting her
daughter Myra. Complainant then immediately confronted Myra, who admitted having received
from respondent several handwritten love letters, a Valentine's card and Two Hundred Pesos as
allowance.

In her Affidavit, Myra gave the following declarations, to wit:

2. Sometime on August 12, 2002, our Mathematics teacher, Mr. Pedro Delijero, started courting
me, by sending love notes, valentines cards thru my classmates Angelyn del Pilar, Maricel
Gayanes, Irene Cajote;
3. Last April 7, 2003, at about 10:00 a.m., more or less, my math teacher, Mr. Pedro Delijero,
who was inside his room, [called] my attention, and as I got inside the said room, he abruptly
closed the open door, thereby, immediately kissed my cheek, out of fear, I pushed him away
from me, and I rushed to the door of said room and went outside.
Maricel Gayanes, Irene Cajote and Angelyn del Pilar, all classmates of Myra, submitted their
Joint Affidavit the pertinent portions of which read:
 In several instances, which we cannot anymore recall the dates, we were
requested by our Math teacher Mr. Pedro Delijero, Jr. to handed the letters to my
classmate Myra Dela Cruz,

4. We have the knowledge of all the letters sent to her, as LOVE

LETTERS as it was confirmed by our classmate Myra dela Cruz, that those letters
which we brought to her, were all love letters from our Math teacher, Mr. Pedro
Delijero, since Mr. Delijiro is courting her, same were true with regard to
Valentine's Cards, as well as the 2 pieces of One Hundred Peso Bill (P100.00)
being inserted at the intermediate pad paper, x x x

Respondent submitted a Counter-Affidavit[ in his defense. Respondent denied kissing Myra in

the morning of April 7, 2003. Moreover, respondent claimed that Myra fell in love with him and
wrote him love letters. Respondent claimed that he was merely forced to answer her letters as she
threatened him that she would kill herself if he would not answer her and reciprocate her
love. Lastly, respondent claimed that their relationship was merely platonic.

Petitioner called the parties to a preliminary conference and, after which, ordered them to submit
their respective position papers.

Respondent, however, did not submit a position paper but instead submitted a
Manifestation stating that the administrative aspect of the complaint was likewise the subject of
a complaint filed by complainant before the Office of the Regional Director, Department of
Education, Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte.

On May 17, 2004, petitioner rendered a Decision finding respondent guilty of Grave
Misconduct and meted him the penalty of dismissal, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds respondent PEDRO

DELIJERO, JR. guilty of Grave Misconduct and, pursuant to Section 46 (b) of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, he is, therefore, meted the penalty of
 DISMISSAL from public service, forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.

SO DECIDED.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of petitioner's decision. Respondent asked that the order
of dismissal be reconsidered and, instead, be changed to a penalty of suspension. On May 14,
2004, petitioner issued an Order denying respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, respondent then appealed to the CA.

On June 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision ruling in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us GRANTING the petition filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Decision
dated May 17, 2004 and the Order dated July 30, 2004 rendered and issued by the
Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-A-03-0506-4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The CA, without ruling on the issues raised by respondent, instead tackled the issue of
jurisdiction motu proprio. The CA ruled that petitioner had no jurisdiction to investigate the
complaint filed before it as Republic Act No. 4670 (RA 4670), the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public
school teachers. The CA held that petitioner should have immediately dismissed the case after
respondent had informed it, through a manifestation, of the pendency of an administrative
complaint before the DECS. Moreover, the CA ruled that even assuming arguendo that
petitioner had the power to investigate the complaint; it still had no power to directly impose
sanctions against respondent as its power is limited to only recommend the appropriate sanctions,
but not to directly impose the same.

Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration assailing the
Decision of the CA. On May 2, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following issues for this Court's resolution, to
wit:

I.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS FULL AND COMPLETE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS, WHICH AUTHORITY CONCURRENT WITH OTHER IS
DISCIPLINING AUTHORITIES SANCTIONED BY NO LESS THAN
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MAGNA CARTA
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW (PD
807, BOOK V OF EO 292).

II.
SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO
THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS
EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMAN'S ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND
ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.

III.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF AN
ERRING PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE, AND TO DIRECT AND
 COMPEL THE HEAD OF THE CONCERNED OFFICE OR AGENCY TO
IMPLEMENT THE PENALTY IMPOSED, HAS ALREADY BEEN SETTLED
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF LEDESMA VS COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., 465 SCRA 437 (2005).[18]

The petition is meritorious.

This Court shall jointly discuss the first and second issues as the same are interrelated. Petitioner
mainly argues that its administrative disciplinary authority over public school teachers is
concurrent with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disciplining authority.

Petitioner is correct. The issue is not novel.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano, (Medrano) this Court ruled that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power
but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DECS, to wit:

In resolving the second issue whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint against respondent it is necessary to examine the source,
nature and extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis--vis the
provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman. Hailed as the protectors of the people, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties
to act on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in
Sections 12 and 13 thereof, thus:

Sec.12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the

people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner again
st public officials or employees of theGovernment, or any subdivisi
on, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the

following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or age
ncy, when such act or omission appears to beillegal, unjust, improp
er, or inefficient;

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public

official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a

public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith;

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and

subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it
with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of
 public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action;

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information

necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents;

(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when

circumstances so warrant and with due prudence;

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,

mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of
high standards of ethics and efficiency; and

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure

and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law. (Underscoring supplied)

The above enumeration of the Ombudsmans far-reaching powers is not exclusive

as the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the leeway to prescribe, by
subsequent legislation, additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman,
as mandated in Section 13(8), quoted above.

Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the functional, structural organization,
and the extent of the administrative disciplinary authority of the petitioner. The
provisions of this law apply
to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any
officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
during his tenure in office. The acts or omissions which the petitioner may
investigate are quite extensive:

SEC.19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act

on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions wh
ich:

(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys
functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of
facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Its mandate is not only to act promptly on complaints against such public officers
or employees, but also to enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where theevidence warrants in order to promote eff
icient service by the Government to the people.

R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner from exercising its disciplinary
authority over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congres
s and theJudiciary, thus:

SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.

The Office of the Ombudsman shall
 have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive official
s of theGovernment and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by i
mpeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary.

SEC. 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the Ombudsman shall

have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office
allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for imp
eachment, if warranted.

In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the

government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in
the investigation and proceed against such private person as the
evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private
person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same
penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring supplied)

The above constitutional and statutory provisions taken together reveal the
manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow upon the
petitioner full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and
employees except those impeachable officials, Members of Congress and of the
Judiciary.

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher,

however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically
provides that the same shall be heard initially by
an investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division,
as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial
or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the division, as members,
thus:

SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against

a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of theDivision or a duly
authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a
division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the
last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. Thecommittee shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty da
ys from termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That
where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested
party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Education. (Underscoring supplied)

In Fabella v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public school
teachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear
public school teachers administrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers organization, and a supervisor of the
division
The
aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative intent to i
mpose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connectio
n with administrativeproceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some

proper disciplinary authorit[ies], such as the investigating committee of the
DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the
petitioner may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for theinstitution of appropriate administrative pr
oceedings against erring public officers or employees.

In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but
is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then OIC of a public

school and concurrently the school principal of another public school, is
undoubtedly covered by the definition of the term teacher under the second
paragraph of Section 2 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which
provides:

SEC 2. Title Definition. This Act shall x x x apply to all public

school teachers except those in the professorial staff of state
colleges and universities.

As used in this Act, the term teacher shall mean all persons
engaged in the classroom, in any level of instruction; on full time
basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians, industrial
 arts or vocational
instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/or ad
ministrative functions in all schools, colleges and
universities operatedby the Government or its political subdivision
s; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians, school
dentists, and other school employees. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should have been referred
by petitioner to the proper committee of the DepEd for the institution of
appropriate administrative proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman
Act of 1989.[20]

Based on the foregoing, while petitioner has concurrent administrative disciplinary authority
with the DECS over public school teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides
that the Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the
circumstances obtaining herein, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred
the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest
of justice considering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is
covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more
appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.

In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that this Court is
nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in.

In Medrano, this Court ruled that the active participation of an individual before the
administrative proceedings and the belated challenge to the jurisdiction of the said body bars him
from assailing such acts under the principle of estoppel, to wit:
x x x While petitioner should have desisted from hearing the administrative
complaint against respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given
that it had already concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision thereon,
respondent is now barred from assailing petitioners acts under the principle
 of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before
petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit, he asked petitioner for affirmative relief by
seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being
baseless. From then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing several motions. When
he was preventively suspended for six months without pay, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration praying that a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside the
preventive suspension Order. When this was denied, he again filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for the lifting of his suspension since he was already
replaced as OIC, which motion was granted. It was only after petitioner had
rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for Reconsideration, impugned
petitioners assumption of jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be
permitted to challenge petitioners acts belatedly. (Underscoring supplied).[21]

Likewise, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Galicia,[22] this Court ruled that the right to due process
was not violated, notwithstanding that the DECS had original jurisdiction to hear the complaint,
thus:

In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the right to due
process in the investigation of the charges against him. He participated in the
proceedings by making known his defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It
was only when a decision adverse to him was rendered did he question the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is now too late
for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation conducted and the decision
rendered against him.
xxxx
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity
to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. During the proceedings before the Ombudsman, Galicia filed
a Counter-Affidavit, Rejoinder-Affidavit, Comment on the Certification of the
CCPC Registrar, and a Rejoinder to Reply. He also submitted documents in
 support of his contentions. Likewise, there is no indication that the proceedings
were done in a manner that would prevent him from presenting his defenses.
Verily, these suffice to satisfy the requirements of due process because the
opportunity to be heard especially in administrative proceedings (where technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied) is not limited to oral
arguments. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that
the parties submit to present their charges and defenses.

In sum, We reiterate that it is the School Superintendent and not the Ombudsman
that has jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Yet, Galicia is estopped from belatedly assailing the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. His right to due process was satisfied when he participated fully in
the investigation proceedings. He was able to present evidence and arguments in
his defense. The investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was therefore
valid.[23]

In the case at bar, respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached
annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from
the Ombudsman.

The case at bar is, however, somewhat peculiar because when petitioner asked the parties
to submit their position papers, respondent did not submit one and instead filed a
Manifestation informing petitioner of another proceeding before the DECS, to wit:

2. That the administrative aspect of the complaint is likewise the

subject of a complaint filed by the complainant before the Office of the Regional
Director, DepEd, Regional Office VIII, Government Center, Palo, Leyte, a copy of
which complaint is hereto attached and also made as part of this manifestation.
 3. The with the investigation being made by this office, and the
filing of the complaint with the Court as regard the criminal aspect of the
complainant, and the pendency of the administrative complaint before the DepEd,
it appears that the respondent is being charged and made to answer twice for the
same offense.

4. That with the submission of the foregoing manifestation,

and the respondent having already filed his counter affidavit and the affidavit
of his witnesses and the exhibits attached thereto, the respondent submits the
same for the resolution of this Office.

The CA ruled that in view of respondent's manifestation, petitioner should have

immediately dismissed the case filed before it as the DECS has the proper jurisdiction to hear
and determine the administrative complaint over respondent.

We disagree.

To this Court's mind, the foregoing manifestation cannot by any stretch be considered as
a direct attack on the proceedings before the Ombudsman. A plain reading of such manifestation
would even lead to a conclusion that respondent had in fact submitted himself to the body's
jurisdiction as he had already submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness and
exhibits. If respondent wanted to assail the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, he should have
clearly prayed for the same through a motion to dismiss, a manifestation ad cautelam, or any
other document of similar import. The phrase, the respondent submits the same for the resolution
of this Office, is indicative of respondent's submission to the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Such
conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that when respondent filed his petition for review before
the CA, he made the following declaration, to wit:

9. That with the filing of his counter-affidavit, and the affidavit of

his witnesses, and the filing of a criminal case by the respondent against petitioner,
which criminal case is now still pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
 15, Burauen, Leyte, and another administrative complaint with the Regional
Director, Region VIII, of DepEd, Government Center, Palo, Leyte, petitioner filed
a manifestation with the Ombudsman-Visayas, submitting this case for
resolution. x x x[26]

Lastly, anent the third issue raised by petitioner, the same is again meritorious.

The CA ruled that the power of the Ombudsman is only recommendatory and that it
cannot impose sanctions against respondent. Petitioner, for its part, argues that the Office of
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of an erring public official
or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the concerned officer or agency to implement
the penalty imposed.

Petitioner is correct.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[27] this Court settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but
actually mandatory, to wit:
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory. Implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has

the power to recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x
x of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3)
also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of RA 6770.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Court notes that the CA granted respondent's petition on the sole ground of petitioner's
alleged lack of jurisdiction which it tackled motu proprio. The CA did not discuss the other
issues raised by respondent involving the appreciation of the findings of fact of the Ombudsman
as well as respondent's appeal for the imposition of a lesser penalty. Just like in Medrano, given
the evidentiary nature of respondent's appeal, this Court deems that justice would be best served
to remand the case to the CA for it to decide the case on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated June
7, 2005 and Resolution dated May 2, 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No.
00017, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
which is directed to decide the case on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

RENE VENTENILLA PUSE, G.R. No. 183678

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and
LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Respondent.

Promulgated:

March 15, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order filed by petitioner Rene V. Puse assailing the Decision[1]dated 28
March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421.
Petitioner is a registered Professional Teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary School, East
District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, while respondent is a Barangay Rural Health
Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

It appears that on 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos Santos-Puse at the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte before the Hon. Judge Oscar T.
Osorio.[2] He had two (2) children with her, and had a church wedding before respondent found out
that petitioner was already married. Respondent discovered that petitioner had already gotten married
to Cristina Pablo Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27
December 1986. Respondent likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his first wife.[3]

Thus, on 2 August 2005, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director,
PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a
criminal case for Bigamy and Abandonment. She alleged that her husband has not been giving
her and their children support.[4]

In a letter dated 16 August 2005, petitioner was directed by the PRC of Lucena City to answer the
complaint for immorality and dishonorable conduct filed by respondent.[5] Per directive, petitioner
submitted his Compliance[6] dated 31 August 2005 denying the charges against him. He adopted
his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Jocelyn Puse Decena and Dominador I.
Blanco, which were submitted in Criminal Case Nos. 7228 and 7229 before the MTC of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. He argued that if respondents allegations were true, she herself
would be equally guilty of immorality and dishonorable conduct, as she was fully aware that
petitioner was already married when she married him. He added he has not abandoned respondent
or their children and continually gives support for their children.

In her Reply to Answer/Compliance[7] dated 6 September 2005, respondent said she married
petitioner in good faith, unaware that he was already married to Cristina N. Pablo.When she
learned of petitioners deception regarding his marital status, she filed a case for Bigamy before
the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, which found probable cause to hold petitioner
for trial. She found petitioners
explanation Na ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking unang asawa at ang paniwala ko
ay siya ay patay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala ng saysay to be lame and insufficient to justify
his contracting a subsequent bigamous marriage. She claimed that petitioner should have
instituted in court a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of his first
wife before contracting a subsequent marriage. In the absence of such declaration, her marriage
to petitioner is bigamous and void ab initio. She added that the affidavits of his sister and close
friend should not be given weight.

In his Rejoinder[8] dated 11 October 2005, petitioner reiterated the arguments in his Answer and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was not verified and for failure of
the respondent to attach a valid certification against forum-shopping.

After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings filed,
the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a prima facie case for Immorality
and Dishonorable Conduct against petitioner, and directed respondent to pay docket and legal
research fees.[9] The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016.

On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found
petitioner administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional
Teacher. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Board finds

Rene Ventenilla Puse guilty as charged and accordingly revokes his license as a
Professional Teacher. He is ordered to surrender his Certificate of Registration
and his Professional Identification Card to the Professional Regulation
Commission within ten (10) days from the time this decision becomes final
and executoryand to desist from the practice of the teaching profession under the
pain of criminal prosecution.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The Board ruled that contrary to petitioners contentions, it had jurisdiction over petitioner and
could validly order the revocation of his license, as petitioner was a professional teacher. Under
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as the Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994, the Board has the power and authority to regulate the practice of
teaching in the Philippines. The charge of Immorality and/or Dishonorable Conduct is also one
(1) of the grounds for the revocation or suspension of a license of a professional teacher. For
entering into a second marriage without first seeking a judicial declaration of the presumptive
death of his first wife and thereafter cohabiting with his second wife and having children with
her, petitioner is liable for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct. The Board added that whether
respondent had knowledge of the first marriage or not is irrelevant and further found petitioners
claim that his cohabitation with respondent was under duress, force or intimidation
untenable. Citing Section 3,[11]Article III and Section 3,[12] Article XI of the Code of Ethics of
Professional Teachers, and the Oath of Professionals,[13] the Board also explained that petitioners
official life cannot be detached from his personal life, contrary to his contention that the acts
complained of were purely private. His immorality and dishonorable conduct demonstrate his
unfitness to continue practicing his profession as he is no longer the embodiment of a role model
for young elementary school pupils, the Board ruled.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied by the Board per
Resolution dated 9 July 2007.[14]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100421, before the
Court of Appeals assailing the Resolutions dated 16 February 2007 and 9 July 2007 of the Board.

On 28 March 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal.[15] The appellate court
held that the applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers because petitioner was occupying the position of Teacher I at the S. Aguirre
Elementary School. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to investigate the complaint
was the Board of Professional Teachers. Thus, it was the Board of Professional Teachers that had
jurisdiction over the administrative case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the
Department of Education (DepEd) as contended by petitioner. As to the finding of immorality
and/or dishonorable conduct, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Board in finding as untenable
petitioners excuse that he believed his first wife to be dead and that his first marriage was no
longer subsisting. It said that petitioner should have applied for a judicial order declaring his first
wife presumptively dead before marrying respondent. It further found without merit petitioners
defense that the complaint is of a private nature, explaining that his actions relate to the very
nature of his career: to teach, mold and guide the youth to moral righteousness.

As to petitioners defense of pari delicto, the appellate court upheld the Boards finding that
respondent was in good faith when she married petitioner. The Board also afforded petitioner
due process.

On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.[16] Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner argues that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED

IN VALIDATING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD FOR
PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF PRC-MANILA DESPITE THE
LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME
AND ITS PATENT NULLITY FOR HAVING BEEN
ISSUED OUTSIDE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS;

II. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS

OF THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC)-
MANILA AND LUCENA CITY, GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT
ASSUMED PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE UNVERIFIED
COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT IN CONTRAVENTION WITH
EXISTING RULES AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
MATTER;
 III. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS
OF THE PRC-MANILA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY OF IMMORALITY AND DISHONORABLE
CONDUCT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKING HIS TEACHERS
LICENSE AS A PENALTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUSTAINING THE COMPLAINT,
WHICH IN EFFECT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[17]

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows: (1) Did the Board of
Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by respondent
against petitioner? (2) Was petitioner denied administrative due process? (3) Was there
substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold petitioner liable?

On the first issue, petitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint
was either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers). Since the charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.

We do not agree. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before
the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent jurisdiction
over administrative cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter
at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.[18] When the law bestows upon a government
body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that
such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the
same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. [19] The
authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional Teachers-
PRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively.

Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice
and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for
causes enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct. Section 23 reads:

SEC. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from

the Practice of the Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or
Special Permit. The Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing,
to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to
reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is
exempt from registration, for any of the following causes:

(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent

jurisdiction;

(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;

(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally

unsound or insane;

(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious

ignorance of the practice of the teaching profession;

(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a

certificate of registration, professional license or special/temporary permit;

(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;

(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations
and other policies of the Board and the Commission, and the code of ethical and
professional standards for professional teachers; and
 (h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops,
conferences and the like or the continuing education program prescribed by the
Board and the Commission. x x x[20]

Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same
falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC.

However, if the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then
under Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the
jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating
committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of
DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. Section 9 of
the Magna Carta provides:

SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher

shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at
least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty
days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members
of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee
which is under the DepEd.

As to the CSC, under P.D. No. 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on
appeal. These sections state:

SEC. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall

administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;

xxxx

SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.(a) The Commission shall decide upon

appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private
citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group
of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed or other action to be taken.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise
and discipline all government employees including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.[21] Consequently, if civil service rules and
regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC.

However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.[22] Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers, before which respondent filed the
complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to proceed and
decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.
 Petitioners reliance on the cases of Emin v. De Leon[23] and Office of the Ombudsman
v. Estandarte[24] to support his claim that it was the DepEd Investigating Committee created
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 which had jurisdiction to try him because he is a public school
teacher, is without merit as these cases are not in point. In Emin, the issue was which between
the DepEd Investigating Committee (under Rep. Act No. 4670) and the CSC (under P.D. No.
807) had jurisdiction to try the administrative case, while in Estandarte, the issue was which
between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DepEd Investigating Committee had jurisdiction
over the administrative case filed in said case. In contrast, the instant case involves the Board of
Professional Teachers which, under Rep. Act No. 7836, had jurisdiction over administrative
cases against professional teachers and has the power to suspend and revoke a licensed teachers
certificate of registration after due proceedings.

As to the issue of due process, was petitioner denied administrative due process?

Petitioner questions the authority of the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City to

assume jurisdiction over the complaint, arguing that venue was improperly laid as he and
respondent are residents of Parang, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte; they were married
in Daet, Camarines Norte where the alleged immoral and dishonorable conduct was committed;
his professional teachers license was issued in the Central Office of the PRC in Manila and
renewed in the PRC Regional Office in Legaspi City, Albay; and he is a Teacher I of S. Aguirre
Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

Moreover, petitioner also faults the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City for
acting on respondents unverified letter in violation of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which
provides:

Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a

civil servant shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under
oath.

He also asserts that respondent purposely filed the complaint before the Board of
Professional Teachers in Lucena City because the investigating officer was her colleague and
belonged to the same religious denomination as her. This, according to petitioner, showed
the partiality of the board. The Board of Professional Teachers also allegedly denied him due
process because he was allegedly informed of the retraction of the testimony/affidavit of his
witness (Dominador Blanco) only upon receipt of the Boards decision.

Petitioners contentions are without merit.

Petitioners allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under
oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case
was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In
administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.[25] The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner possible.[26]

Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which
is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[27] The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-
Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5)
Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary
conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had,
he cannot claim he was denied due process.

As regards his claim that the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City was partial
because the investigating officer knew respondent personally, the same was not
substantiated. Even assuming arguendo that the investigating officer knew respondent,
convincing proof was still required to establish partiality or bias. Extrinsic evidence is required
to establish bias.[28] For failure of petitioner to adduce such evidence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.[29]
 That he was allegedly informed of Dominador Blancos retraction upon receipt of the
Boards resolution is also of no moment. Even if it were true that petitioner was only informed of
the retraction when he received a copy of the Boards resolution, there was still no denial of due
process because he still had the opportunity to question the same in his Motion for
Reconsideration. This, he did not do.

But was there substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty of immoral and
dishonorable conduct? On this issue, we likewise find against petitioner.

Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the erroneous
belief that his first wife was already deceased. He insists that such act of entering into the second
marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts that he committed the act even before he
became a teacher. He said that for thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and loving father
to his children with respondent. He was even an inspiration to many as he built a second home
thinking that he had lost his first. He wanted to make things right when he learned of the
whereabouts of his first family and longed to make up for his lost years with them. He maintains
that he never violated the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers but embraced it like a good
citizen when he opted to stop his illicit marriage to go back to his first family. He adds that
respondent knew fully well he was married and had children when they contracted
marriage. Thus, she was also at fault. Lastly, he claims there was no substantial proof to show
that his bigamous marriage contracted before he became a teacher has brought damage to the
teaching profession.

However, the issues of whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and whether
respondent knew that petitioner was already married have been ruled upon by both the Board of
Professional Teachers and the Court of Appeals. The Board and the appellate court found
untenable petitioners belief that his first wife was already dead and that his former marriage was
no longer subsisting. For failing to get a court order declaring his first wife presumptively dead,
his marriage to respondent was clearly unlawful and immoral.

It is not the Courts function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A weighing of
evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues - an exercise that is not
appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
the parties may raise only questions of law in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence
introduced and considered in the tribunals below.[30] This is particularly true where the Board
and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. While there are recognized exceptions to this
general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion,[31] no such circumstances exist in
this case.

Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the Board as affirmed by
the appellate court. It is clear from the evidence that petitioners claim that he believed his first
wife Cristina Puse to be already dead was belied by the latters declaration. In the affidavit
submitted before the CSC in A.C. No. CSC RO5 D-06-012 entitled Cristina Puse v. Ligaya de
los Santos, Cristina Puse, petitioners first wife, declared that Sometime in 1993, complainant
decided to work in Hongkong x x x. Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent financial
support to her children and husband. From time to time, complainant would visit her family in
the Philippines at least once a year every year. From this statement, petitioner cannot claim that
he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that
she regularly sent her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a
year.

Petitioners contention that there was no substantial evidence to show his guilt because
respondent did not even formally offer her exhibits also does not persuade. As we have already
said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally offer her exhibits the way she would in
the courts of justice does not prevent the Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals
from admitting said exhibits and considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5
of PRC Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known as the New Rules of Procedure in
Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation Commission and the Professional
Regulatory Boards, technical errors in the admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the
substantive rights of the parties shall not vitiate the proceedings. Here, we do not find any
evidence that respondents failure to formally offer her exhibits substantially prejudiced
petitioner.

Neither is there merit to petitioners contention that because he contracted the bigamous
marriage before he even became a teacher, he is not required to observe the ethical standards set
forth in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers.[32]

In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required to

strictly adhere to, observe and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and
values laid down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he was not yet a teacher when he
contracted his second marriage. His good moral character is a continuing requirement which he
must possess if he wants to continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed
to abide by the tenets of morality. Petitioner kept his first marriage secret to his second
wife. Unfortunately for him, his second wife discovered his true marital status which led to the
filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him.

In Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, a case involving a teacher dismissed from work on account of
immorality, we declared:

On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the

circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated
in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. American
jurisprudence has defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the
morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher
is supposed to foster and to elevate, x x x Thus, in petitioners case, the gravity and
seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at the
same time a teacher.

xxxx
 As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially
during their formative years and stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their
importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental
authority under our laws.

Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must

adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy
of morality. A teacher, both in his official and personal conduct, must display
exemplary behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his
conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the
personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond
reproach.

Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which

not only proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior
creating a suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might
have on the students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and
honesty.

From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in

extra-marital relationship, especially when the parties are both married,
such behaviour amounts to immorality, justifying his termination from
employment.[33]

The Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers contains, among others, the following:

PREAMBLE
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who possess dignity and reputation
with high moral values as well as technical and professional competence. In the
practice of their noble profession, they strictly adhere to, observe, and practice
this set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values.

xxxx

ARTICLE II

THE TEACHER AND THE STATE

Section 1. The schools are the nurseries of the citizens of the state. Each teacher is
a trustee of the cultural and educational heritage of the nation and is under
obligation to transmit to learners such heritage as well as to elevate national
morality, x x x.

xxxx

Section 3. In the interest of the State of the Filipino people as much as of his own,
every teacher shall be physically, mentally and morally fit.

xxxx

ARTICLE III

THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY

xxxx

Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which
purpose he shall behave with honor and dignity at all times and refrain
from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other excesses,
much less illicit relations.

xxxx

ARTICLE XI
 THE TEACHER AS A PERSON

Section 1. A teacher shall live with dignity in all places at all times.

xxxx

Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which

could serve as model worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others.
[Emphasis supplied.]

The foregoing provisions show that a teacher must conform to the standards of the
Code. Any deviation from the prescribed standards, principles and values renders a teacher unfit
to continue practicing his profession. Thus, it is required that a teacher must at all times be
moral, honorable and dignified.

The discovery of petitioners bigamous marriage has definitely caused damage to the
teaching profession. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the
community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets
of morality?

The fact that he is now allegedly walking away from his second marriage in order to be
with his first family to make up for lost time does not wipe away the immoral conduct he
performed when he contracted his second marriage. If we are to condone immoral acts simply
because the offender says he is turning his back on his immoral activities, such would be a
convenient excuse for moral transgressors and which would only abet the commission of similar
immoral acts.

His assertion that he fulfilled his responsibilities as a father and a husband to his second family
will, even if true, not cleanse his moral transgression. In a case involving a lawyer who raised this same
defense, we held:

Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain

points in view of respondents additional reason why he should be exonerated that
he loves all his children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed
 provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show
his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It
has always been the duties of parents e.g., to support, educate and instruct their
children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. But
what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is
obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help
and support. And most important of all, he is obliged to remain faithful to her
until death.[34]

Petitioners claim that he is a good provider to his second family is belied by the
complaint of respondent wherein it was alleged that he failed financially to support his second
family. Moreover, he is already delinquent as to his duties to his second wife. How can he live
with her, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render help and support, and to remain
faithful to her until death when he has another family to whom he is returning to?

All told, petitioners act of entering into said second marriage constitutes grossly immoral
conduct. No doubt, such actuation demonstrates a lack of that degree of morality required of him
as a member of the teaching profession. When he contracted his second marriage despite the
subsistence of the first, he made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.

We now go to the penalty imposed on petitioner. The penalty imposed on petitioner was
the revocation of his license which penalty was upheld by the Court of Appeals. He claims that
such penalty was harsh and inappropriate. He cites Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations which states that disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave
offense punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that the charge was supposedly his
first offense and taking into account his years of committed service, the commensurate penalty,
according to petitioner, is only the suspension of his professional license. He refers to the case
of Vitug v. Rongcal,[35] where this Court considered remorse and the brevity of the illicit
relationship as mitigating circumstances taken in favor of the respondent lawyer.

It must be remembered, however, that petitioner was charged before the Board of
Professional Teachers under Rep. Act No. 7836 and not under Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board has the power to suspend or
revoke the certificate of registration[36] of any teacher for any causes mentioned in said section,
one (1) of which is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The Board has the discretion,
taking into account the circumstances obtaining, to impose the penalty of suspension or
revocation. In the imposition of the penalty, the Board is not guided by Section 22 of Rule XIV of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides for suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense for
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Petitioner, therefore, cannot insist that Section 22 be applied to
him in the imposition of his penalty, because the Boards basis is Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836
which does not consider whether the offense was committed the first or second time.

As to the supposed mitigating circumstances of remorse and brevity of the illicit relationship,
these cannot be appreciated in petitioners favor, as these circumstances are not present in the instant
case. We do not find any expression of remorse in petitioner. What we note, instead, is obduracy on
his part. Despite the clear evidence (first wifes statement that she regularly sends financial support to
her children and husband [referring to petitioner] and that she visits them in the Philippines at least
once a year) showing that petitioner knew that his first wife was still alive, he remains unyielding on
his stand that he thought that his wife was already deceased. We also cannot consider the illicit and
immoral relationship to be brief because it lasted for more than twelve (12) years until respondent
learned about petitioners deception.

Under the circumstances, we find the penalty imposed by the Board proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013

ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks to set aside the April 6, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 101700, affirming the April 11, 2007 Decision2 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Alberto Pat-og, Sr. (Pat-og) from the service for grave
misconduct.

The Facts

On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school
student of the Antadao National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an affidavit-
complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the Civil
Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).

Bang-on alleged that on the morning of August 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball
court of the school, where Pat-og and his third year students were also holding a separate class;
that he and some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year students who were practicing
basketball shots; that Pat-og later instructed them to form two lines; that thinking that three lines
were to be formed, he stayed in between the two lines; that Pat-og then held his right arm and
punched his stomach without warning for failing to follow instructions; and that as a result, he
suffered stomach pain for several days and was confined in a hospital from September 10-12,
2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he sustained a contusion
hematoma in the hypogastric area.

Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injury with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province.

Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-
affidavit. He denied the charges hurled against him and claimed that when he was conducting his
Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health (MAPEH) class, composed of third year students, he
instructed the girls to play volleyball and the boys to play basketball; that he later directed the
boys to form two lines; that after the boys failed to follow his repeated instructions, he scolded
them in a loud voice and wrested the ball from them; that while approaching them, he noticed
that there were male students who were not members of his class who had joined the shooting
practice; that one of those male students was Bang-on, who was supposed to be having his own
MAPEH class under another teacher; that he then glared at them, continued scolding them and
dismissed the class for their failure to follow instructions; and that he offered the sworn
statement of other students to prove that he did not box Bang-on.

On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima faciecase for misconduct and
formally charged Pat-og.

While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment
in the criminal case and found Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. He was
meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (20) days. Following his
application for probation, the decision became final and executory and judgment was entered.

Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated
postponement by Pat-og. With the approval of the CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its
position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and formally offered its evidence,
which included the decision in the criminal case. It offered the affidavits of Raymund Atuban, a
classmate of Bang-on; and James Domanog, a third year high school student, who both
witnessed Pat-og hit Bang-on in the stomach.

For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of his witnesses - Emiliano Dontongan
(Dontongan), a teacher in another school, who alleged that he was a member of the Municipal
Council for the Protection of Children, and that, in such capacity, he investigated the incident
and came to the conclusion that it did not happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who testified that he
was in the basketball court at the time but did not see such incident. Pat-og also presented the
affidavits of thirteen other witnesses to prove that he did not punch Bang-on.

Ruling of the CSC-CAR

In its Decision,3 dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty and disposed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent Alberto Pat-og, Sr., Teacher Antadao National
High School, is hereby found guilty of Simple Misconduct.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on
the first offense of Simple Misconduct is suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months.

Due to seriousness of the resulting injury to the fragile body of the minor victim, the CSC-CAR
hereby imposed upon respondent the maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six
months suspension without pay.

The CSC-CAR gave greater weight to the version posited by the prosecution, finding that a blow
was indeed inflicted by Pat-og on Bang-on. It found that Pat-og had a motive for doing so - his
students’ failure to follow his repeated instructions which angered him. Nevertheless, the
CSCCAR ruled that a motive was not necessary to establish guilt if the perpetrator of the offense
was positively identified. The positive identification of Pat-og was duly proven by the
corroborative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were found to be credible and
disinterested. The testimony of defense witness, Dontongan, was not given credence considering
that the students he interviewed for his investigation claimed that Pat-og was not even angry at
the time of the incident, contrary to the latter’s own admission.

The CSC-CAR held that the actions of Pat-og clearly transgressed the proper norms of conduct
required of a public official, and the gravity of the offense was further magnified by the
seriousness of the injury of Bang-on which required a healing period of more than ten (10) days.
It pointed out that, being his teacher, Pat-og’s substitute parental authority did not give him
license to physically chastise a misbehaving student. The CSC-CAR added that the fact that Pat-
og applied for probation in the criminal case, instead of filing an appeal, further convinced it of
his guilt.

The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of
Grave Misconduct. It, however, found the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service
too harsh under the circumstances. Thus, it adjudged petitioner guilty of Simple Misconduct and
imposed the maximum penalty of suspension for six (6) months.

On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of
merit.4

The Ruling of the CSC

In its Resolution,5 dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the CSC-CAR as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the CSC-CAR is affirmed with the modification that Alberto Pat-og, Sr., is adjudged
guilty of grave misconduct, for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service
with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.6

After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion that there existed
substantial evidence to sustain the finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in the stomach. It gave
greater weight to the positive statements of Bang-on and his witnesses over the bare denial of
Patog. It also highlighted the fact that Pat-og failed to adduce evidence of any ill motive on the
part of Bang-on in filing the administrative case against him. It likewise gave credence to the
medico-legal certificate showing that Bang-on suffered a hematoma contusion in his hypogastric
area.

The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-on’s witnesses were not bereft of evidentiary value
even if Pat-og was not afforded a chance to cross-examine the witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no
moment because the cross- examination of witnesses is not an indispensable requirement of
administrative due process.

The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully acquiesced in his conviction in the
criminal case for slight physical injury, which was based on the same set of facts and
circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues. It, thus, considered his prior criminal
conviction as evidence against him in the administrative case.

Finding that his act of punching his student displayed a flagrant and wanton disregard of the
dignity of a person, reminiscent of corporal punishment that had since been outlawed for being
harsh, unjust, and cruel, the CSC upgraded Pat-og’s offense from Simple Misconduct to Grave
Misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.

Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC
over the case. He contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should
have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.

On November 5, 2007, the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration.7 It ruled that Pat-og was
estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering that he actively participated in the
administrative proceedings against him, raising the issue of jurisdiction only after his appeal was
dismissed by the CSC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed April 6, 2011 Decision,8 the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that
Pat-og was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed
that he actively participated in the proceedings. It was of the view that Pat-og was not denied due
process when he failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was given the
opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the CSC.

The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into account the conviction of Pat-
og in the criminal case. It stated that his conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his
dismissal from the service because there was substantial evidence proving that Pat-og had indeed
hit Bang-on.

In its assailed Resolution,9 dated September 13, 2011, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Pat-og.

Hence, the present petition with the following

Assignment of Errors

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS AGAINST THE
PETITIONER WITHOUT CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LONG YEARS OF
GOVERNMENT SERVICE?

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TO HEAR
AND DECIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM?

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL DESPITE
LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
On Jurisdiction

Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, provides that administrative charges against a public school
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee constituted under said section. As no committee
was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process and that the CSC did not
have the jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that
notwithstanding the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal, the
rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has no jurisdiction over
the cause of action or subject matter of the case.

The Court cannot sustain his position.

The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A.
No. 4670 is misplaced.

In Puse v. Santos-Puse,10 it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the
Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.

Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment
and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the
government.11 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987)12 and
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines)13 expressly
provide that the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases
instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service,
including public school teachers.

Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public
school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee constituted therein.14 Also, under
Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994), the
Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or
revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.15

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the
same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.16

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of
the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC
which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it
had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the Board of
Professional Teachers.17

In CSC v. Alfonso,18 it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC
of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including
public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is first and foremost, a civil servant
accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a
public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public
school teachers would negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established and would
impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud19 that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing
a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against
public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to the specific procedure to be followed
in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No. 4670
confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.

At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped
from raising the issue. Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any
time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.20 Here,
instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by
actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal
before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration
after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable
practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.21

On Administrative Due Process

On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are of
questionable veracity having been subscribed in Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the
residences of the parties. Furthermore, he claimed that considering that the said affiants never
testified, he was never afforded the opportunity to cross-examine them. Therefore, their
affidavits were mere hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.

The petitioner does not persuade.

The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a

fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.22 Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary23 and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence,
the right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process.24 The
petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on and his witnesses are hearsay and
insufficient to prove his guilt.

At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and
the CA, the petitioner was apparently afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek
reconsideration of the ruling against him.1âwphi1

As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits, such is a question of fact which cannot now be
raised before the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the
CA did not, therefore, err in giving credence to the affidavits of the complainants and his
witnesses, and in consequently ruling that there was substantial evidence to support the finding
of misconduct on the part of the petitioner.

On the Penalty

Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues that there is no substantial evidence to prove
that he did so with a clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of the established rule,
as required for a finding of grave misconduct. He insists that he was not motivated by bad faith
or ill will because he acted in the belief that, as a teacher, he was exercising authority over Bang-
on in loco parentis, and was, accordingly, within his rights to discipline his student. Citing his 33
years in the government service without any adverse record against him and the fact that he is at
the edge of retirement, being already 62 years old, the petitioner prays that, in the name of
substantial and compassionate justice, the CSC-CAR’s finding of simple misconduct and the
concomitant penalty of suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.

The Court agrees in part.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or t1agrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.25

Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be competent in the practice of their
noble profession, but must also possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values. They
must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards,
and values laid down in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which apply to all teachers
in schools in the Philippines, whether public or private, as provided in the preamble of the said
Code.26 Section 8 of Article VIII of the same Code expressly provides that "a teacher shall not
inflict corporal punishment on offending learners."

Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a
teacher in loco parentis to discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public
school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics. Such violation is a flagrant disregard for
the established rule contained in the said Code tantamount to grave misconduct.

Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, the penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.27 This penalty must, however, be tempered with
compassion as there was sut1icient provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the
mitigating circumstances that the petitioner has been in the government service for 33 years, that
this is his first offense and that he is at the cusp of retirement, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension for six months as appropriate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the April 6, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-og, Sr. is
found GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct, but the penalty is reduced from dismissal from the service
to SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo. pp. 35-47: Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in
by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia.

2
Id. at 97-100.

3
Id. at 79-91.

4
Id. at 97-100.

5
Id. at 111-119.

6
Id. at 119.

7
Id. at 123-129.

8
Id. at 35-47.
9
Id. at 49-50.

10
G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 500, 513.

11
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.

xxxx

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the
President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

12
Chapter 3, Title I(A), Book V:

Section 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions: x x x

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it

directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. x x x

13
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer
the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
 xxxx

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed directly with
the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in
which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of
the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as
to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x

14
Section. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of
the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a
division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local
or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of
Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party,
all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.

15
Section. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice
of the Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. — The
Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the
certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to cancel the
temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration, for any of
the following causes:

(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;

(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or

insane;

(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the

practice of the teaching profession;

(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of

registration, professional license or special/temporary permit;

(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;

(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and
other policies of the Board and the Commission, and the code of ethical and
professional standards for professional teachers; and

(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and

the like or the continuing education program prescribed by the Board and the
Commission.

The decision of the Board to revoke or suspend a certificate may be appealed to

the regional trial court of the place where the Board holds office within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the said decision or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration filed in due time.