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G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring
plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described
in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the
ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon;
and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each
and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government
of the United States under the administration and control of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in
accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale
made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with
the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of
Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit:
(1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between
the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in
question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is
entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the
annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela
Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the
register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by
virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for
new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac
sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession
thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been
destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5,
1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right
to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale,
Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the
proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property.
The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has
been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession
of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint
(Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the
land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914
(Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and
opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of
the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper
administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By
virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31,
1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed
with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate
the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and
action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace
court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and
M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions
raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely,
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year
1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the
forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had
been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been
in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for
thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac
had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December
18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariño vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable
here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with,
for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26,
1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon

applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of
the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action
to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute,
had already become, by operation of law, private property of the
plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin
Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof
and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER
CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in
favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as
amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the
trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
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2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant
to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation
particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes
(paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration
proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel
and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as
such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29,
1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed
and occupied the land from generation to generation until
the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and
Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from
1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the
Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought
said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is
already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-
Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00)
Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were
seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the
land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought
to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by
the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of
the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and
this negotiation came to reality when the Board of
Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had
donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N')
on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted

by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh.
'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings
except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter
at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable
lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in
favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the
quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by
the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before
this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members
of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and
through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since
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time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and
were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in
Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-
in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register
ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred
to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or
not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could
be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding
lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the
lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in
1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company
vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In
that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more
than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had
purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses.
The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by
their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco
applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots
were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that
Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for
registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed,
and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title
to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due
course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional
prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an

occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we
should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a
Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land
is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line
of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-
becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal
rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands.
It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes
title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that
this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may
be that an English conveyancer would have recommended
an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it
was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief
the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to
do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would
be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not
to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed
in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
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agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the
Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable
to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
 5

duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not
confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "...
(T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII
of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of
the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on corporation to purchase the land in question had become
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such controversy.
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in
force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land
effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
private lands.
segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in 919).
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did,
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were
there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring
another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings,
limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold
there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels,
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat
the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
constitutional mandate.
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot
impair vested rights.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds,
that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
Constitution took effect.
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act,
as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the

basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels
by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at
the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and,
again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act
allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not
having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their
sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is
there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result
of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law
and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in
their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets
when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended
to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of
the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly
sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands)
and granting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to
the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation
of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging
in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously
and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence
suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent,
but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
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soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination
and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the
majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to
public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to
the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only
tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,
in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in
short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby
affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision[1] of the
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February
26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-
Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application
for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the
respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and
married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas,
Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in
Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No.
10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains
an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial
confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government,
and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed
the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles
filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995,

the court issued an order of general default against the whole world
except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land
was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon
Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until
1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor
of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced
all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by
his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the
heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She
constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted
trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid
the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there
are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been
issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or
even the government until she filed her application for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present
any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the
heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision
ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of
the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name
of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG
stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from
Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18,
1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of
the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999,
the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12,
2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the
RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question
of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000.[10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending
that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need
for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public
domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the
7
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of
Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property which is
in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15,
1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not
alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It
expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession
is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the
plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the
provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of
ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify
only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated,

and not those distantly or remotely located. [13] Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule
would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v.
Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [15] In that case, the
subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status
of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to
allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case
at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980
by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been
in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question
were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had
filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which
form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes[19] the
possession of which cannot ripen into ownership. [20] It is elementary
8
in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
Appeals,[21] forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no
matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling
in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower
courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from
July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been
for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point
is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of

the public domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under
the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such
property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who
have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having
been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. [27] The
inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as
correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the
required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged
on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have
been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject
land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration
owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-
interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is
primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings
made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was
established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees
at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations
executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire
to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim
9
against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by
the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-
interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it
is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the
Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the
concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government itself makes
her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection
under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND
DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated
22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December
1999,[2] granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers,
Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998,
a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No.
8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject
Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots,
which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto
and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together with their application
for registration, respondents submitted the following set of
documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan
of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent
David;[4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;[5]

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the
need for Surveyors Certificates for the Subject
Lots;[6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City
on the absence of certificates of title covering
the Subject Lots;[7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR
on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable
and disposable, by virtue of Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963;[8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property
(ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of
Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994;
and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of
David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994;[9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan
selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein,
Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was
sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David.[10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents
application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1)
Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession
of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents muniments of
title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and
(3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30
a.m.[12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent
copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as
well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion,
Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14]Finally, the Notice was
also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999[15] and The
Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC
issued an Order of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner Republic
opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The
respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC
10
commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the
respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent
Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No.
8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring
its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and
directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots.[18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of Appeals, in
its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC
Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to
be registered has been classified as within the alienable and
disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of
prescription and that Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents
already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this
application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and
planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed
that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied
and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively,
and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo
that appellees possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963
or from the time the subject lots had been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant
does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963
as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the
object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By
express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section
14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of
appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been
possessing the subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in
the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the
instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As
such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a
quo.[20]

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November
2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of
the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in
determining compliance with the periods of possession required by
law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only
on 25 June 1963, per CENROs certification. It also alleges that the
Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription
period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this
Court declared that Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased,
requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from
12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of
land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to
land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a
single application only in case they are co-owners. While an
application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the
subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in
case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated within
the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is
conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction
is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will
be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the
procedure for land registration under the Property Registration
Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did
not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the
MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from
those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents
application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents
Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity
committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the
MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for
11
registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Courts pronouncement
in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that
said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode
of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all
proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this
regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should
not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their
application for registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and expressly
allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by
several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of
land sought to be registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single
application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the
same are located within the same province.[25] The Property
Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation
wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of
land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the
parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for
such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to
determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property
Registration Decree itself provides that, [t]he Rules of Court shall,
insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be
applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict
accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of
action, then the defect in the joint application for registration filed by
the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal
thereof.[27]Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes
of action and parties involve an implied admission of the courts
jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the
motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of
misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on
motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the
MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for
registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the
petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact
by filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties,
raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree,
thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land
registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the
land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered
a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars
the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the
public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and to all whom it may concern. Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date
and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1)
of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals[30] that publication
in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land
registration court to validly confirm and register the title of the
applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then
all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a
12
newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and
must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court
expounded on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already
requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by
mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in
the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper
and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum,
the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC,
and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the
Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated
02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in
Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the
rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than
three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date
of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.
Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat
News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process
for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the
day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-
oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing,
he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting
respondents application for registration and even the registration
decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue
an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at
all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents application
for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the
title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and
directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for

the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the
MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession
of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents application for
registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to
public land.
Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged
therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his
parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
an owner since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by
respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are within Alienable and
Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No.
4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran
Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992. [33] The Subject Lots are
thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that the person
claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired
from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public
domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-
owned lands which reverted to the State. [36] It explicitly enumerates
the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). [37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate
chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific
requirements and application procedure for every mode.[38] Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,[39] then it
can be reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial
13
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over
the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete
title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may be availed of by
persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled
to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to
the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never
ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as
alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
shall not apply thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents
could not have complied with the period of possession required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire

imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially
confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents title by the Court of Appeals
was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were
claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration
Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree
allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law.
It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots,
by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25
June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application,
have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription
under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil
Code.[42]
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the
Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is
confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the
same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and
notorious possession.[43] As established by this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are
undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though
respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject
Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial
confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the
Property Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act
reads
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or
successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the
provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application
to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of the
alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be
issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. [44]
Hence, respondents application for registration of the Subject
Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of
ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land,
while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public
domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be
considered a special law[45] that must take precedence over the Civil
Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction
that between a general law and a special law, the special law
prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
14
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the
MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND
VOID. Respondents application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are
not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the
so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's
in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people
and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none
of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of
informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving
property ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their
own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems
of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which
they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru,
and you walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going
to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about.
The only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is
that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the
Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was
accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity
to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings
under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of
the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the
ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as

the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current
laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the
phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases
before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles
that have developed our public land law, though our social
obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-
452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he
had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more
than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)
Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite,
Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from
presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his
witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified
that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of
all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-
A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-
examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also
[knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by
Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
15
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding
decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the
RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in
Republic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited
by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration
of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had
already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural
land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession
prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may
be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title
under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis
of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision.
The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land
registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point
out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the
preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1)
to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also
cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman
Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
16
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the
land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural
land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been "converted" into private property
through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite
extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of
"private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and
not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property
and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made
to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has,
since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20 Alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or
for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public
and quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of
the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial
legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such

land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in
1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
"agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain." The OSG submits that this amendment
restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.23 This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
"agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural
lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The
Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period
of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their
title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July
26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the
registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of
the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title
17
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree
and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or
that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section
14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of
the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive
of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14
of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the
pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for
the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has
primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been "in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper
court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion
that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that
primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes
the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration
procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or
incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one
may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep.
Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That
this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this
Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31
December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the
OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to
seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all lands certified as
alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide
18
claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule
would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is
that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in
Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June
1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a
bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration
proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of
the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court’s

acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the
Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession
prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession…" That
statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.
Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be
considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted,
citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein
did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not even
apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their
position being that they had been in exclusive possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before
12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling
Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section
14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section
14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to
which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the
Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for registration
had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule
between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in
Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared
alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent,
the attempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated
November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map
2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to
19
show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in
this case. Worth noting also was the observation of the Court of
Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property
still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that
the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err
in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for
they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of
the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member
who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section
48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-
five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed
nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That
crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to
Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning
Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be

an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership
of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the
Civil Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus,
even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date
later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open,
continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this
case where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on
that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their
claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we
can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription
as the possible basis for application for original registration under
Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal
foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain
are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands
that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands
and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private
ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real
property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
years,32 or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
20
years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly
provides that persons "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the
registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that
specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the
critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2)
does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly
it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins
of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right
to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D.
1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the
first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to
1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No.
1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by
implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that
there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code–ordinary
acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
which, under Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted
adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep.
Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only
legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However,
there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil
Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code
provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the
property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier
finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which
now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime
of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true
with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles
on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to
apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil
Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar
demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus:
"[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and
421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
21
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription
or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public
domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration
by the President or any duly authorized government officer of
alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under
the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable
and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man;
Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that
those property "which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can

begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus
affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or
occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in
accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption
that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the
Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with
their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is
the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by
an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA law.
Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,
including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own,
hold and/or administer them.41 The President is authorized to sell
portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the
BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof are
"alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes
the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and
Subic.44Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at that
time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and
disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to
a private person or entity that such lands become private property
and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
22
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor
of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that
the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according
to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section
14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the
land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted
to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify
registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section
14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property
Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under
Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year
period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of
a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter
concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended
by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone
without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil
Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the
vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is
not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code
when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect
to Section 14(1).
IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today
is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our
law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes
for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is
brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which
are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription,"
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables
may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires
possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134,
is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing
in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor
is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same
time, there are indispensable requisites–good faith and just title.
The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles
526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes
of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of
ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership if
the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily
precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to
patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that
"the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership
to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that
the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the
one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive
prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation,
succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription
or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding
the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
23
begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period
has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial
property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person
in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code
acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is
the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should
be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition
of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the
system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title
brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites
for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the
Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial
property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof
expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon

as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject
to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable.
There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of
the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under
the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which
patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in
good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless
of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish
that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
24
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the
legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless,
discomfiture over the implications of today’s ruling cannot be
discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the
country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot
be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social
responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law
without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable
or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural
acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between
a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent,
have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties. 52Judicial confirmation
of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and
raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive
idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for
generation by their families and their communities as common law
owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to
translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as
property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to
set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are
lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble.
This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending

the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of
public dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of
well-being not only of that individual, but also to the person’s family.
Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on
stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181502 Feb. 2, 2010
Florencia Diaz, petitioner, v.
Republic of the Philippines, respondent
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time)
of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for
review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and
Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva
Ecija on August 12, 1976.[2] She alleged that she possessed the land as
owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural
products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and
adversely for more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in
question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation
(FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation
237)[3] in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public
domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already
ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes[4] that the property subject of
Garcias application was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title
No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla
on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque
Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the
land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued
in its favor was declared null and void.
25
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a
decision[5] dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court
of Appeals (CA). In its decision[6] dated February 26, 1992, penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),[7] the appellate court
reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found
that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as it involved the same
property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of
the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As
Garcias right to the property was largely dependent on the existence
and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of
which had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and
inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the
CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed
away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.[8]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA,
petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the former
CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate
court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a
resolution[9] upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the
case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to
reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the
parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise
agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or
less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part,
petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property
inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the
amicable settlement in the CA.[10]
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the
compromise agreement.[11] On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land
Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in petitioners favor.[12]
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty.
Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the
CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The
OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution
(amended resolution)[13] annulling the compromise agreement
entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive
portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x

(2) xxxxxx
(3) xxxxxx
(4) xxxxxx
(5) xxxxxx
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of
this Court approving the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the
Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia
Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the
Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia
Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is
hereby DECLARED to be without force and
effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General and,
consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated
January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other
matters, that a certificate of title be issued in
the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia
Diaz over the portion of the subject property in
consonance with the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in
its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999
approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable
Settlement and the Resolution dated
September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid
June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992
dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz
registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she
assailed the validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992
decision adverted to in the CAs amended resolution. She alleged that
Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial
stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and
therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the
CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her
constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision
should be declared null and void. The motion was denied. [14]
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari[15] in this Court. It was denied for raising factual
issues.[16] She moved for reconsideration.[17] This motion was denied
with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument
warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly,
we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.[18]
26
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry
of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en
banc.[19] The Court denied[20] it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.[21] Furthermore, the motion
to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may
be appealed.[22] We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings
would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due
course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical
letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then
Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
himself.[23] The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third
motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:
This is in response to your call for Moral
Forces in order to redirect the destiny of our
country which is suffering from moral decadence,
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts
us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the
Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer
has done all that is humanly possible to convince
the court to take a second look at the miscarriage
of justice that will result from the implementation
of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First
Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case
may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc.
I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in
resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a
copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex
A.
The issue that was brought before the
Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision
of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny
placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position
in which it became possible for him to discharge
the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.]
the ability of the court to render impartial justice,
because Mr. Justice Mendoza became
the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision,
reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who
appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the

oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the
duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same
case.
In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the
public was outraged by the actions of Atty.
Verano who admitted having prepared a simple
resolution to be signed by the Secretary of
Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the
worst kind of violation of my constitutional right.
It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional,
for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge,
and reverse the very decision in which he had
lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will
certainly evoke even greater spite from the
public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I
must confess that I was tempted to pursue such
course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for moral force
that will slowly and eventually lead our country to
redirect its destiny and escape from this moral
decadence, in which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least,
the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces
that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court
endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do
not happen again, so that the next person who
seeks justice will not experience the pain and
frustration that I suffered under our judicial
system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR.
(Emphasis in the original).
The language of petitioners letter/motion is
unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and
calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to
honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk
of being vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny
petitioners letter/third motion for reconsideration.
27
APPLICABILITY
OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable
to this case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must
concur:
(1) the former judgment or
order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must
be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and
parties; and
(4) there must be between the
first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of
action. [24]
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied
with. However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite,
particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for
review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the
two cases are different, the merits of the two cases should,
accordingly, be determined independently of each other. [25]
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those
in Aquino v. Director of Lands.[26] In that case, Quintin Taedo
endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of
his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually
reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the
proceedings as the property in question was part of the public
domain. Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter
sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to
have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in
this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another
person was the applicant constituted res judicata as against his
successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration
cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as
part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the
adverse claimant, but also against allpersons.[27]
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the
decision in the first action has become the law of

the case or at least falls within the rule of stare
decisis. That adjudication should be followed
unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and
should be taken as the authoritative view of the
highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice
especially by a court of last resort that a question
once deliberately examined and decided should
be considered as settled and closed to further
argument. x x x[28]
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came
out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court,
in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that
the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings of fact of the
trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle
that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and
bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the
court a quo to respect this Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other
way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's
findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice
in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding
and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject
land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the
commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually
nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave
abuse of discretion.[29] Notably, a judgment rendered with grave
abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal
contemplation.[30]
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this
case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions
of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts
demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently
declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court
from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."[31]
ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself
recognizes that its effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there
be.
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the
property where the military reservation is situated is forest land.
Thus:
28
Before the military reservation was
established, the evidence is inconclusive as to
possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and
forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the
hearing, it was conceded that approximately
13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)[32]
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind
petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of
CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public agricultural land. Forest lands or area
covered with forest are excluded. It is well-
settled that forest land is incapable of
registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether
such title be one issued using the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system
of registration, nullifies the title. (Emphasis
supplied).[33]
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when
they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper
department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands)[34] coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of
her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was
not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation
thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have
ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to
the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with
the thirty-year possession requirement under Commonwealth Act
141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.[35] This was our ruling in Almeda
v. CA.[36] The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through
an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. [37]
Coming now to petitioners contention that her private
rights to the property, meaning her and her predecessors possession
thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected,
the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized
the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was
established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was
established, the evidence is inconclusive as to
possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and
forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the

hearing, it was conceded that approximately
13,957 hectares of said land consist of public
forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could
never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable
land before it was established as a military reservation, there was
nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation
by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30
years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died
on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the
inscription of the informacion possessoria, could
not have converted the same into a record of
ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small
portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under
the kaingin system, while some portions were
used as grazing land. After his death, his
daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for
the purpose. During the Japanese occupation,
Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land
by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle,
do not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered
with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock
upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other
permanent improvements, is not sufficient to
support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription. The possession of public land,
however long the period may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to
public land does not operate against the State
unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.[38]
xxx
29
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title
on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to
be inexistent in Reyes,[39] thus rendering its probative value suspect,
further militates against granting her application for registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we
agree with the CA that the same was null and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in
the nature of a contract and must necessarily comply with the
provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of
the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the
consent of the Republic, through the appropriate government
agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the
Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the
agreement with her.[40] The lack of authority on the part of the OSG
rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and
void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State
in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only
within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the
Republic of the Philippines.[41]
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as
counsel for respondent, it was never given the specific or special
authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This
is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of
Court which requires special authority for attorneys to bind their
clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to
bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind
their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their clients litigation, or
receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but
the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid
subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was
inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not
outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized
by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the
obligation contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement
provided that, in consideration of petitioners withdrawal of her
application for registration of title from that portion of the property
located within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing
its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The
Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject
matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONERS CONTEMPT
OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice,
cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it
comes under attack.
That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the
integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter
innocently enough by stating:
This is in response to your call for Moral
Forces in order to redirect the destiny of our
country which is suffering from moral decadence,
that to your mind, is the problem which confronts
us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed
resentment for what she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise
utmost prudence in rendering impartial justice in deciding her case.
Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the
Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer
has done all that is humanly possible to convince
the court to take a second look at the miscarriage
30
of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE
RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First
Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case
may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I
hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in
resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a
copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex
A.
The issue that was brought before the
Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision
of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of
Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny
placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position
in which it became possible for him to discharge
the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.]
the ability of the court to render impartial
justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became
the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision,
reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant
Solicitor General, was the very person who
appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the
oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to
shove, she has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the
Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant
declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will
certainly evoke even greater spite from the
public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to
pursue such course of action. I however believe
that such an action will do more harm than good,
and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice
Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do
not happen again, so that the next person who
seeks justice will not experience the pain and

frustration that I suffered under our judicial
system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner
answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled
threat[.] It was written in response to the call of
the Chief Justice for a moral revolution.
Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the
Alabang Boys case and the Meralco [c]ase,
involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also
enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media,
petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale
in comparison to the facts of her case where the
lawyer of her opponent eventually became
justice of the appellate court and ended up
reversing the very decision in which he lost, in
clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to
fundamental fair play for no contestant in any
litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is
basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been
emotional in the delivery of her piece, because
correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are
irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional
delivery, she has offended your honors
sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and
only prays that his Court temper its strike with
compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice was
never written with a view of threatening the
Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to
obtain redress and correction of the inequity
bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never
meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible
insinuations and threats of going public with this case. We are not
blind to petitioners clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating
with false concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently
rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this
case was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the
facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records
31
of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by
petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the
appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition
through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of
due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating
the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court
is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias,
extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its
authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal
basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court
upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained.[42]
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court
by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including the
letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated
warnings that no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this
Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside
her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public
sympathy although the tone of petitioners compliance with our show-
cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier
letters constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,[43] we held:
A statement of this Court that no
further pleadings would be entertained is a
declaration that the Court has already considered
all issues presented by the parties and that it has
adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive
to the parties to desist from filing any further
pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court,
it must be strictly observed by the parties. It
should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-
disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her
constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the
validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only
after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent
annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious
that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to
resuscitate his clients lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This
is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:
It is this fresh discovery by the
undersigned counsel of the nullity of the

proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places
in doubt the entire proceedings it previously
conducted, which led to the rendition of the
February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped
the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L.
Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano
Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late
Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as
counsel for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-
interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G.
Garcia.[44] (Emphasis supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause
at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become
for petitioner and her counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of
petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for
reconsideration. The motion is DENIED considering that a third
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea
utterly lacks merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court.
Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her,
payable within ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is
hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more
severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by the
petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the
decision dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June 27,
20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA
reversed and set aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in
Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457,
32
situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application
was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned
by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her
children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of
adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her
interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold
the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the
same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale
dated May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse
and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50
years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical
description, and certificate of assessment.
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
opposed the application,5 it did not present any evidence in support
of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was
filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11,
1996 against the whole world, except the Republic.6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application
for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared
that "[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession,
including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to
be registered, has been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against
the whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a
period of over fifty (50) years."8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that
the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from
the government that the lot has been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses
Fortuna’s evidence – Tax Declaration No. 8366 – showed that
possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet
the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were
able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the
land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length of
possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed
with the Republic’s argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only
showed that the spouses Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora,
proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of
its decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006. 11
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of
the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the
PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural
land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession
should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD
No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on
January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was
issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the
basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
al.,13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed
effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively.
By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year
requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s
possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in
1948, this does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot
No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence
proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar,
Records Officer of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that
the records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World
War II.
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than
1948, the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating
that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax
Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new
tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax
Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos.
10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in
1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of
the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one
Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced
by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are
adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was
born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the three lots.
She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to
school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora
because the latter’s family had constructed a house and planted
fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis
of Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No.
2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for
registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of
January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision has lapsed into finality
unappealed.
33
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373
should be considered to prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948.
Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it
pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and
belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their
failure to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC
No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception
of evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the
identity and competency of Macaria[.]"17
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied
mostly on the CA’s ruling which denied the registration of title and
prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to
sufficiently prove their compliance with the requisites for the
acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are
owned by the State.18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e.,
agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national
parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has
not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for
registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land.
The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public
lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only
from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural
and declared as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the
reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive
Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or
executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or
excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by
law to approve a land classification and declare such land as
alienable and disposable.21
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for
registration of title acquired through a public land grant must
present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land
was established by the notation in the survey plan,22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No.
13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil
or military reservation.23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that
"there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor
title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find
that neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act
from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of
the covered properties’ alienable and disposable character. 25 These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved alienable
and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper
government office. The applicant, however, must also present a
copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed
by the President.26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court
ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO28 or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared
by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof
that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and
released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that
prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal
custodian of the issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary
declaring the public land as alienable and disposable. 29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457
has been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain though a positive act of the Executive Department, the
spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under
the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to
establish the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457
serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition and terminate the
34
case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other important
legal issues raised in the petition.
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and
disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the
PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of,
among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48(b) of
the PLA, the original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except
as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen
hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a
30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of
the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of
possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of
PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years
– from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 – is required. This
effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants who had complied
with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942
amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-
off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073
amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v.
Nabasa30that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-
off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from January
25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No.
1073 was enacted; based on the certification from the National
Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the
Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977.
This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall
take effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in
Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the publication of
laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073
should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon
its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off
date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In
other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May
8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses
Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not prosper
for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since
May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation
that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the
35
notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier
Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the
land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that
Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner
that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these
circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none
proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947.
Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does
not show the nature of Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b)
of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation. "Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law
is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that
Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as
cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described
as "cogonal."36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration
No. 8366 by relying on Macaria’s testimony in a separate land
registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she
passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora’s
family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the
area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria’s testimony
constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in
cases of this nature.
The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining
parcels of land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged
to Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three separate
applications for registration, to wit:
a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total
area of 2,961 sq. m., commenced by Emeteria;
b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098, with a total area of 4,006 sq. m., commenced by
the spouses Fortuna; and
c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457,
with a total area of 2,597 sq. m.
As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to
the same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that
the final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37 upholding Pastora’s
ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to
have previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an
area for the Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed acts of
 36

possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed

the entirety of the lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that
Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that
its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession
and occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As
mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No. 4457 as
"cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot
No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on
her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,
upholding Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into
ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots
have been officially reclassified as alienable lands of the public
domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met
the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either
disregard the rules of evidence or consider their merits. In this
regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos:38

Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the

conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is
ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such
proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing
such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands
of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16,

2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed
the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration
of title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against
the spouses Fortuna.

SO ORDERED.