Essentialism is the view that, for any specific entity (such as an animal, a group of

people, a physical object, a concept), there is a set of attributes which are necessary to its
identity and function.[1] In Western thought the concept is found as early as the work of
Plato and Aristotle: Platonic idealism is the earliest known theory of how all known things
and concepts have an essential reality behind them (an "Idea" or "Form"), an essence that
makes those things and concepts what they are. Aristotle's Categories proposes that all
objects are the objects they are by virtue of their substance, that the substance makes the
object what it is. The essential qualities of an object, so George Lakoff summarizes
Aristotle's highly influential view, are "those properties that make the thing what it is, and
without which it would be not that kind of thing".[2] This view is contrasted with non-
essentialism, which states that, for any given kind of entity, there are no specific traits
which entities of that kind must possess.
Essentialism has been controversial from its beginning. Plato's Socrates already
problematizes the concept of the Idea by positing in the Parmenides that if we accept
Ideas of such things as Beauty and Justice (every beautiful thing or just action would
partake of that Idea in some sense in order to be beautiful or just), we must also accept
the "existence of separate forms for hair, mud, and dirt". [3] In biology and other natural
sciences, essentialism provided the basis for and rationale of taxonomy at least until the
time of Charles Darwin;[4] the precise role and importance of essentialism in biology is still
a matter of debate.[5] In gender studies, essentialism (summarized as the basic proposition
that men and women are essentially different) continues to be a matter of contention.
French structuralist feminism was often accused of subscribing to an essentialism, which
was set in contrast to gender constructionism.[6]
In philosophy
An essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in
Platonic idealism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible
world. Classical humanism has an essentialist conception of the human being, which
means that it believes in an eternal and unchangeable human nature. The idea of an
unchangeable human nature has been criticized by Kierkegaard, Marx, Heidegger, Sartre,
and many other existential thinkers.
In Plato's philosophy (in particular, the Timaeus and the Philebus), things were said to
come into being in this world by the action of a demiurge who works to form chaos into
ordered entities. From Aristotle onward the definition, in philosophical contexts, of the
word "essence" is very close to the definition of form (Gr. morphe). Many definitions of
essence hark back to the ancient Greek hylomorphic understanding of the formation of the
things of this world. According to that account, the structure and real existence of any
thing can be understood by analogy to an artifact produced by a craftsman. The craftsman
requires hyle (timber or wood) and a model, plan or idea in his own mind according to
which the wood is worked to give it the indicated contour or form ( morphe). Aristotle was
the first to use the terms hyle and morphe. According to his explanation, all entities have
two aspects, "matter" and "form". It is the particular form imposed that gives some matter
its identity, its quiddity or "whatness" (i.e., its "what it is").
Plato was one of the first essentialists, believing in the concept of ideal forms, an abstract
entity of which individual objects are mere facsimilies. To give an example; the ideal form
of a circle is a perfect circle, something that is physically impossible to make manifest, yet
the circles that we draw and observe clearly have some idea in common — this idea is the
ideal form. Plato believed that these ideas are eternal and vastly superior to their
manifestations in the world, and that we understand these manifestations in the material
world by comparing and relating them to their respective ideal form. Plato's forms are
regarded as patriarchs to essentialist dogma simply because they are a case of what is
intrinsic and a-contextual of objects — the abstract properties that makes them what they
are. For more on forms, read Plato's parable of the cave.
Karl Popper splits the ambiguous term realism into essentialism and realism. He uses
essentialism whenever he means the opposite of nominalism, and realism only as opposed
to idealism. Popper himself is a realist as opposed to an idealist, but a methodological
nominalist as opposed to an essentialist. For example, statements like "a puppy is a young
dog" should be read from right to left, as an answer to "What shall we call a young dog";
never from left to right as an answer to "What is a puppy?" [7]
Metaphysical essentialism
Essentialism, in its broadest sense, is any philosophy that acknowledges the primacy of
Essence. Unlike Existentialism, which posits "being" as the fundamental reality, the
essentialist ontology must be approached from a metaphysical perspective. Empirical
knowledge is developed from experience of a relational universe whose components and
attributes are defined and measured in terms of intellectually constructed laws. Thus, for
the scientist, reality is explored as an evolutionary system of diverse entities, the order of
which is determined by the principle of causality. Because Essentialism is a conceptual
worldview that is not dependent on objective facts and measurements, it is not limited to
empirical understanding or the objective way of looking at things.
Despite the metaphysical basis for the term, academics in science, aesthetics, heuristics,
psychology, and gender-based sociological studies have advanced their causes under the
banner of Essentialism. Possibly the clearest definition for this philosophy was offered by
gay/lesbian rights advocate Diana Fuss, who wrote: "Essentialism is most commonly
understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed
properties which define the 'whatness' of a given entity." [8] Metaphysical essentialism
stands diametrically opposed to existential realism in that finite existence is only
differentiated appearance, whereas "ultimate reality" is held to be absolute essence.
Although the Greek philosophers believed that the true nature of the universe was perfect,
they attributed the observed imperfections to man's limited perception. For Plato, this
meant that there had to be two different realities: the "essential" and the "perceived".
Plato's dialectical protégé Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) applied the term "essence" to the one
common characteristic that all things belonging to a particular category have in common
and without which they could not be members of that category; hence, the idea of
rationality as the essence of man. This notion carried over into all facets of reality,
including species of living creatures. For contemporary essentialists, however, the
characteristic that all existents have in common is the power to exist, and this potentiality
defines the "uncreated" Essence.[citation needed]
It was the Egyptian-born philosopher Plotinus [204–270 CE] who brought Idealism to the
Roman Empire as Neo-Platonism, and with it the concept that not only do all existents
emanate from a "primary essence" but that the mind plays an active role in shaping or
ordering the objects of perception, rather than passively receiving empirical data. But with
the Empire's fall to the Goths in A.D. 476, Neo-Platonism gave way to the spread of
Christianity in the Western world, leaving Aristotle's multiple "essences" unchallenged to
dominate philosophical thought throughout the Middle Ages on into the era of modern
science.[citation needed]
In psychology

Paul Bloom attempts to explain why people will pay more in an auction for the clothing of
celebrities if the clothing is unwashed. He believes the answer to this and many other
questions is that people cannot help but think of objects as containing a sort of "essence"
that can be influenced.[9]
There is a difference between metaphysical essentialism (see above) and psychological
essentialism, the latter referring not to an actual claim about the world but a claim about a
way of representing entities in cognitions [10] (Medin, 1989). Influential in this area is Susan
Gelman, who has outlined many domains in which children and adults construe classes of
entities, particularly biological entities, in essentialist terms—i.e., as if they had an
immutable underlying essence which can be used to predict unobserved similarities
between members of that class. [11][12] (Toosi & Ambady, 2011). This causal relationship is
unidirectional; an observable feature of an entity does not define the underlying
essence[13] (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011) .
In developmental psychology
Essentialism has emerged as an important concept in psychology, particularly
developmental psychology.[11][14] Gelman and Kremer (1991) studied the extent to which
children from 4–7 years old demonstrate essentialism. Children were able to identify the
cause of behaviour in living and non-living objects. Children understood that underlying
essences predicted observable behaviours. Participants could correctly describe living
objects’ behaviour as self-perpetuated and non-living objects as a result of an adult
influencing the object’s actions. This is a biological way of representing essential features
in cognitions. Understanding the underlying causal mechanism for behaviour suggests
essentialist thinking[15] (Rangel and Keller, 2011). Younger children were unable to identify
causal mechanisms of behaviour whereas older children were able to. This suggests that
essentialism is rooted in cognitive development. It can be argued that there is a shift in
the way that children represent entities, from not understanding the causal mechanism of
the underlying essence to showing sufficient understanding [16] (Demoulin, Leyens &
Yzerbyt, 2006).
There are four key criteria which constitute essentialist thinking. The first facet is the
aforementioned individual causal mechanisms (del Rio & Strasser, 2011). The second is
innate potential: the assumption that an object will fulfill its predetermined course of
development[17] (Kanovsky, 2007). According to this criterion, essences predict
developments in entities that will occur throughout its lifespan. The third is immutability [18]
(Holtz & Wagner, 2009). Despite altering the superficial appearance of an object it does
not remove its essence. Observable changes in features of an entity are not salient
enough to alter its essential characteristics. The fourth is inductive potential [19] (Birnbaum,
Deeb, Segall, Ben-Aliyahu & Diesendruck, 2010). This suggests that entities may share
common features but are essentially different. However similar two beings may be, their
characteristics will be at most analogous, differing most importantly in essences.
The implications of psychological essentialism are numerous. Prejudiced individuals have
been found to endorse exceptionally essential ways of thinking, suggesting that
essentialism may perpetuate exclusion among social groups [20] (Morton, Hornsey &
Postmes, 2009). This may be due to an over-extension of an essential-biological mode of
thinking stemming from cognitive development. [21] Paul Bloom of Yale University has
stated that "one of the most exciting ideas in cognitive science is the theory that people
have a default assumption that things, people and events have invisible essences that
make them what they are. Experimental psychologists have argued that essentialism
underlies our understanding of the physical and social worlds, and developmental and
cross-cultural psychologists have proposed that it is instinctive and universal. We are
natural-born essentialists."[22]Scholars suggest that the categorical nature of essentialist
thinking predicts the use of stereotypes and can be targeted in the application of
stereotype prevention[23] (Bastian & Haslam, 2006).
In ethics
Classical essentialism claims that some things are wrong in an absolute sense, for example
murder breaks a universal, objective and natural moral law and not merely an
adventitious, socially or ethically constructed one.
Many modern essentialists claim that right and wrong are moral boundaries which are
individually constructed. In other words, things that are ethically right or wrong are
actions that the individual deems to be beneficial or harmful.
In biology
It is often held that before evolution was developed as a scientific theory, there existed an
essentialist view of biology that posited all species to be unchanging throughout time.
Some religious opponents of evolution continue to maintain this view of biology (see
creation-evolution controversy).
Recent work by historians of systematics has, however, cast doubt upon this view. Mary P.
Winsor, Ron Amundson and Staffan Müller-Wille have each argued that in fact the usual
suspects (such as Linnaeus and the Ideal Morphologists) were very far from being
essentialists, and it appears that the so-called "essentialism story" (or "myth") in biology is
a result of conflating the views expressed by philosophers from Aristotle onwards through
to John Stuart Mill and William Whewell in the immediately pre-Darwinian period, using
biological examples, with the use of terms in biology like species.[24][25][26]
Essentialism and society and politics
The essentialist view on gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, or other group characteristics is
that they are fixed traits, discounting variation among group members as secondary.
Contemporary proponents of identity politics, including feminism, gay rights, and/or racial
equality activists, generally take constructionist viewpoints,[citation needed]. For example, they
agree with Simone de Beauvoir that "one is not born, but becomes a woman". [27] As
'essence' may imply permanence, some argue that essentialist thinking tends towards
political conservatism and therefore opposes social change. Essentialist claims have
provided useful rallying-points for radical politics, including feminist, anti-racist, and anti-
colonial struggles. In a culture saturated with essentialist modes of thinking, an ironic or
strategic essentialism can sometimes be politically expedient.[citation needed]
Examples of books debunking various theories and claims of gender essentialism include:
The Daddy Shift, by Jeremy Adam Smith, Pink Brain/Blue Brain by Dr. Lise Eliot, and
Delusions of Gender by Cordelia Fine
In social thought, metaphysical essentialism is often conflated with biological
reductionism. Most sociologists, for example, employ a distinction between biological sex
and gender role. Similar distinctions across disciplines generally fall under the division of
"nature versus nurture". However, this has been contested by Monique Wittig, who argued
that even biological sex is not an essence, and that the body's physiology is "caught up" in
processes of social construction.[28]
In historiography
Essentialism in history as a field of study entails discerning and listing essential cultural
characteristics of a particular nation or culture, in the belief that a people or culture can be
understood in this way. Sometimes such essentialism leads to claims of a praiseworthy
national or cultural identity, or to its opposite, the condemnation of a culture based on
presumed essential characteristics. Herodotus, for example, claims that Egyptian culture is
essentially feminized and possesses a "softness" which has made Egypt easy to conquer.
[29]
To which extent Herodotus was an essentialist is a matter of debate; he is also credited
with not essentializing the concept of the Athenian identity, [30] or differences between the
Greeks and the Persians that are the subject of his Histories[31]
Essentialism is operative in colonialism, as post-colonial theorists such as Edward Said
have argued. It is the defining mode of Western historiography and ethnography until the
nineteenth century and even after, according to Touraj Atabaki, manifesting itself in the
historiography of the Middle East and Central Asia as Eurocentrism, over-generalization,
and reductionism.[32] Contrastingly, many historians reject essentialism because it
"dehistoricizes the process of social and cultural changes" and tends to see non-Western
societies as historically unchanging; in India this led to the anti-essentialist (even anti-
historiogriphal) school of Subaltern Studies.[33]
ESSENTIALISM (Merriam Webster)
1. an educational theory that ideas and skills basic to a culture should be taught to all
alike by time-tested methods — compare PROGRESSIVISM

2. a philosophical theory ascribing ultimate reality to essence embodied in a thing

perceptible to the senses — compare NOMINALISM
3. the practice of regarding something (as a presumed human trait) as having innate
existence or universal validity rather than as being a social, ideological, or intellectual
construct
— es·sen·tial·ist \-list\ adjective or noun

DUALITY
As hinted at by the word "dual" within it, duality refers to having two parts, often with
opposite meanings, like the duality of good and evil.
If there are two sides to a coin, metaphorically speaking, there's a duality. Peace and war,
love and hate, up and down, and black and white are dualities. Another term for a duality
is a dichotomy. Duality has technical meanings in geometry and physics. In geometry,
duality refers to how points and planes have interchangeable roles in projective geometry.
In physics, duality is the property of matter and electromagnetic radiation to be
understood best through wave theory or particle theory.
duality
1
n being twofold; a classification into two opposed parts or subclasses
Synonyms:
dichotomy
Type of:
categorisation, categorization, classification
a group of people or things arranged by class or category
n (geometry) the interchangeability of the roles of points and planes in the
theorems of projective geometry
Type of:
exchangeability, fungibility, interchangeability, interchangeableness
the quality of being capable of exchange or interchange
n (physics) the property of matter and electromagnetic radiation that is
characterized by the fact that some properties can be explained best by
wave theory and others by particle theory
Synonyms:
wave-particle duality
Type of:
property
a basic or essential attribute shared by all members of a class
Dualism
Dualism (from the Latin word duo meaning "two")[1] denotes a state of two parts. The
term 'dualism' was originally coined to denote co-eternal binary opposition, a meaning that
is preserved in metaphysical and philosophical duality discourse but has been diluted in
other usages to indicate a system which contains two essential parts.
Moral dualism is the belief of the great complement or conflict between the benevolent
and the malignant. It simply implies that there are two moral opposites at work,
independent of any interpretation of what might be "moral" and independent of how these
may be represented. The moral opposites might, for example exist in a world view which
has one god, more than one god, or none. By contrast, ditheism or bitheism implies (at
least) two gods. Bitheism implies harmony, ditheism implies rivalry and opposition, such as
between good and evil, or bright and dark, or summer and winter. For example, a
ditheistic system would be one in which one god is creative, the other is destructive.
Alternatively, in ontological dualism the world is divided into two overarching categories.
The opposition and combination of the universe's two basic principles of yin and yang is a
large part of Chinese philosophy, and is an important feature of Taoism, both as a
philosophy and as a religion (it is also discussed in Confucianism).
In theology, dualism can refer to the relationship between God and creation. The Christian
dualism of God and creation exists in some traditions of Christianity. The Paulicians, a
Byzantine Christian sect, believed that the universe, created through evil, exists separately
from a God that is good. The Dvaita Vedanta school of Indian philosophy also espouses a
dualism between God and the universe. The first and the more important reality is that of
Vishnu or Brahman. Vishnu is the supreme Self, God, the absolute truth of the universe,
the independent reality. The second reality is that of dependent but equally real universe
that exists with its own separate essence.
In philosophy of mind, dualism is a view about the relationship between mind and matter
which claims that mind and matter are two ontologically separate categories. Mind-body
dualism claims that neither the mind nor matter can be reduced to each other in any way.
Western dualist philosophical traditions (as exemplified by Descartes) equate mind with
the conscious self and theorize on consciousness on the basis of mind/body dualism. By
contrast, some Eastern philosophies draw a metaphysical line between consciousness and
matter — where matter includes both body and mind.
In philosophy of science, dualism often refers to the dichotomy between the "subject" (the
observer) and the "object" (the observed). Another dualism, in Popperian philosophy of
science refers to "hypothesis" and "refutation" (for example, experimental refutation). This
notion also carried to Popper's political philosophy.
In physics, dualism also refers to mediums with properties that can be associated with the
mechanics of two different phenomena. Because these two phenomena's mechanics are
mutually exclusive, both are needed in order to describe the possible behaviors. All
matter, for example, has wave-particle duality.

Moral dualism
Moral dualism is the belief of the great complement or conflict between the benevolent
and the malignant.
Like ditheism/bitheism (see below), moral dualism does not imply the absence of monist
or monotheistic principles. Moral dualism simply implies that there are two moral opposites
at work, independent of any interpretation of what might be "moral" and - unlike
ditheism/bitheism - independent of how these may be represented.
For example, Mazdaism (Mazdean Zoroastrianism) is both dualistic and monotheistic (but
not monist by definition) since in that philosophy God—the Creator—is purely good, and
the antithesis—which is also uncreated—is an absolute one. Zurvanism (Zurvanite
Zoroastrianism), Manichaeism and Mandaeism, are representative of dualistic and monist
philosophies since each has a supreme and transcendental First Principle from which the
two equal-but-opposite entities then emanate. This is also true for the lesser-known
Christian gnostic religions, such as Bogomils, Catharism, and so on. More complex forms
of monist dualism also exist, for instance in Hermeticism, where Nous "thought" - that is
described to have created man - brings forth both good and evil, dependent on
interpretation, whether it receives prompting from the God or from the Demon. Duality
with pluralism is considered a logical fallacy.
History
Moral dualism began as a theological belief. Dualism was first seen implicitly in Egyptian
Religious beliefs by the contrast of the gods Set (disorder, death) and Osiris (order, life). [2]
The first explicit conception of dualism came from the Ancient Persian Religion of
Zoroastrianism around the mid-fifth century BC. Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion
that believes that Ahura Mazda is the eternal creator of all good things. Any violations of
Ahura Mazda's order arise from druj, which is everything uncreated. From this comes a
significant choice for humans to make. Either they fully participate in human life for Ahura
Mazda or they do not and give druj power. Personal dualism is even more distinct in the
beliefs of later religions.
The religious dualism of Christianity between good and evil is not a perfect dualism as God
(good) will inevitably destroy Satan (evil). Early Christian Dualism is largely based on
Platonic Dualism (See: Neoplatonism and Christianity). There is also a personal dualism in
Christianity with a soul-body distinction based on the idea of an immaterial Christian Soul.
[3]

Duotheism, bitheism, ditheism

In theology, 'dualism' may also refer to 'duotheism', 'bitheism' or 'ditheism'. Although
ditheism/bitheism imply moral dualism, they are not equivalent: ditheism/bitheism implies
(at least) two gods, while moral dualism does not imply any -theism (theos = god)
whatsoever.
Both 'bitheism' and 'ditheism' imply a belief in two equally powerful gods with
complementary or antonymous properties. However, while bitheism implies harmony,
ditheism implies rivalry and opposition, such as between good and evil, or bright and dark,
or summer and winter. For example, a ditheistic system would be one in which one god is
creative, the other is destructive (cf. theodicy). In the original conception of
Zoroastrianism, for example, Ahura Mazda was the spirit of ultimate good, while Ahriman
(Angra Mainyu) was the spirit of ultimate evil. (This Zoroastrian conception of polar
opposition and conflict would later come to influence the development of Christianity as it
elaborated upon the idea of the Devil as an ultimate source of evil opposed to the
Christian God, an idea that was previously absent in Judaism.) [citation needed]
In a bitheistic system, by contrast, where the two deities are not in conflict or opposition,
one could be male and the other female (cf. duotheism). One well-known example of a
bitheistic or duotheistic theology based on gender polarity is found in the neopagan
religion of Wicca, which is centered on the worship of a divine couple - the Moon Goddess
and the Horned God - who are regarded as lovers. However, there is also a ditheistic
theme within traditional Wicca, as the Horned God has dual aspects of bright and dark -
relating to day/night, summer/winter - expressed as the Oak King and the Holly King, who
in Wiccan myth and ritual are said to engage in battle twice a year for the hand of the
Goddess, resulting in the changing seasons. (Within Wicca, bright and dark do not
correspond to notions of "good" and "evil" but are aspects of the natural world, much like
yin and yang in Taoism.)
However, bitheistic and ditheistic principles are not always so easily contrastable, for
instance in a system where one god is the representative of summer and drought and the
other of winter and rain/fertility (cf. the mythology of Persephone). Marcionism, an early
Christian sect, held that the Old and New Testaments were the work of two opposing
gods: both were First Principles, but of different religions. [4]
Ontological dualism

The yin and yang symbolizes the duality in nature and all things in the Taoist religion.
Alternatively, dualism can mean the tendency of humans to perceive and understand the
world as being divided into two overarching categories. In this sense, it is dualistic when
one perceives a tree as a thing separate from everything surrounding it. This form of
ontological dualism exists in Taoism and Confucianism, beliefs that divide the universe into
the complementary oppositions of yin and yang.[5] In traditions such as classical Hinduism,
Zen Buddhism or Islamic Sufism, a key to enlightenment is "transcending" this sort of
dualistic thinking, without merely substituting dualism with monism or pluralism.
In Chinese philosophy
The opposition and combination of the universe's two basic principles of yin and yang is a
large part of Chinese philosophy, and is an important feature of Taoism, both as a
philosophy and as a religion. Yin and yang is also discussed in Confucianism, but to a
lesser extent.
Some of the common associations with yang and yin, respectively, are: male and female,
light and dark, active and passive, motion and stillness. The yin and yang symbol in
actuality has very little to do with Western dualism; instead it represents the philosophy of
balance, where two opposites co-exist in harmony and are able to transmute into each
other. In the yin-yang symbol there is a dot of yin in yang and a dot of yang in yin. This
symbolizes the inter-connectedness of the opposite forces as different aspects of Tao, the
First Principle. Contrast is needed to create a distinguishable reality, without which we
would experience nothingness. Therefore, the independent principles of yin and yang are
actually dependent on one another for each other's distinguishable existence. The
complementary dualistic concept in Taoism represents the reciprocal interaction
throughout nature, related to a feedback loop, where opposing forces do not exchange in
opposition but instead exchange reciprocally to promote stabilization similar to
homeostasis. An underlying principle in Taoism states that within every independent entity
lies a part of its opposite. Within sickness lies health and vice versa. This is because all
opposites are manifestations of the single Tao, and are therefore not independent from
one another, but rather a variation of the same unifying force throughout all of nature.
Mind-matter and mind-body dualism
In philosophy of mind
In philosophy of mind, dualism is any of a narrow variety of views about the relationship
between mind and matter, which claims that mind and matter are two ontologically
separate categories. In particular, mind-body dualism claims that neither the mind nor
matter can be reduced to each other in any way, and thus is opposed to materialism in
general, and reductive materialism in particular. Mind-body dualism can exist as substance
dualism which claims that the mind and the body are composed of a distinct substance,
and as property dualism which claims that there may not be a distinction in substance, but
that mental and physical properties are still categorically distinct, and not reducible to
each other. This type of dualism is sometimes referred to as " mind and body" and stands
in contrast to philosophical monism, which views mind and matter as being ultimately the
same kind of thing. See also Cartesian dualism, substance dualism, epiphenomenalism.
In Buddhist philosophy
During the classical era of Buddhist philosophy in India, philosophers such as Dharmakirti
argue for a dualism between states of consciousness and Buddhist atoms (the basic
building blocks that make up reality), according to "the standard interpretation" of
Dharmakirti's Buddhist metaphysics.[6] Typically in Western philosophy, dualism is
considered to be a dualism between mind (nonphysical) and brain (physical), which
ultimately involves mind interacting with the physical brain, and therefore also interacting
with the micro-particles (basic building blocks) that make up the brain tissue. Buddhist
dualism, in Dharmakirti’s sense, is different in that it is not a dualism between the mind
and brain, but rather between states of consciousness (nonphysical) and basic building
blocks (according to the Buddhist atomism of Dharmakirti, Buddhist atoms are also
nonphysical: they are unstructured points of energy). Like many Buddhists from 600-1000
CE, Dharmakirti’s philosophy involved mereological nihilism, meaning that other than
states of consciousness, the only things that exist are momentary quantum particles,
much like the particles of quantum physics (quarks, electrons, etc.).[citation needed]
History
The first significant argument against dualism came from Thomas Hobbes's (1588–1679)
materialist critique of the human person. Hobbes argues that all of human experience
comes from biological processes contained within the body (see: The Leviathan[7]). In
response to Hobbes, the French philosopher 'René Descartes (1596–1650) developed
Cartesian dualism, which posits that there is a divisible, mechanical body and an
indivisible, immaterial mind which interact with one another. The body perceives external
inputs and the awareness of them comes from the soul. The point of interaction between
the two is at the pineal gland in the brain. [8]
During the 19th and 20th centuries, materialistic monism has became the norm. [9] Still, in
addition to already discussed theories of dualism (particularly the Christian and Cartesian
models) there are new theories in the defense of dualism. Naturalistic dualism comes from
Australian philosopher, David Chalmers (born 1966) who argues there is an explanatory
gap between objective and subjective experience that cannot be bridged by reductionism
because consciousness is, at least, logically autonomous of the physical properties upon
which it supervenes. According to Chalmers, a naturalistic account of property dualism
requires a new fundamental category of properties described by new laws of
supervenience; the challenge being analogous to that of understanding electricity based
on the mechanistic and Newtonian models of materialism prior to Maxwell's equations.
A similar defense comes from Australian philosopher Frank Jackson (born 1943) who
revived the theory of epiphenomenalism which argues that mental states do not play a
role in physical states. Jackson argues that there are two kinds of dualism. The first is
substance dualism that assumes there is second, non-corporeal form of reality. In this
form, body and soul are two different substances. The second form is property dualism
that says that body and soul are different properties of the same body. He claims that
functions of the mind/soul are internal, very private experiences that are not accessible to
observation by others, and therefore not accessible by science (at least not yet). We can
know everything, for example, about a bat's facility for echolocation, but we will never
know how the bat experiences that phenomenon. In Jackson's mind experiment, he
imagines a girl who grows up in a black-and-white room. She may grow up learning all
about the scientific facts of colors, but has no way of experiencing colors other than black
or white. When someone brings a red tomato into her room, she is stunned. She discovers
a new fact: the experience of red is 'like this.' That experience is not a physical fact but a
conscious one.[10]
Soul dualism
In some cultures, people (or also other beings) are believed to have two (or more) kinds
of soul. In several cases, one of these souls is associated with body functions (and is
sometimes thought to disappear after death, but not always), and the other one is able to
leave the body (for example, a shaman's free-soul may be held to be able to undertake a
spirit journey). The plethora of soul types may be even more complex.
The Bipartite view of theology recognizes the existence of both material and immaterial
aspects of human life, typically body and soul. This is distinct from the Tripartite view that
holds soul and spirit to be separate aspects of a person along with the body.
Theistic dualism
In theology, dualism can refer to the relationship between God and creation or God and
the universe. This form of dualism is a belief shared in certain traditions of Christianity and
Hinduism.[11]
In Christianity
In Christianity, there exists a dualism between God and creation. The two are distinct, yet
interrelated through an indivisible bond. God created the universe and then humankind,
made from his own image.[11] He kept humankind separate from God by granting it free
will, and the capability of committing sin, and yet man remains created from the image of
God and the result, according to a libertarian or compatibilist view of free will in Christian
theology. The theologian Leroy Stephens Rouner compares the dualism of Christianity with
the dualism that exists in Zoroastrianism and the Vedanta tradition of Hinduism. The
theological use of the word dualism dates back to 1700, in a book that describes the
dualism between good and evil.[11]
There tolerance of dualism ranges widely among the different Christian traditions. As a
monotheistic religion, the conflict between dualism and monism has existed in Christianity
since its inception.[12] The 1912 Catholic Encyclopedia describes that, in the Catholic
Church, the "the dualistic hypothesis of an eternal world existing side by side with God
was of course rejected" by the thirteenth century, but mind-body dualism was not. [13] The
problem of evil is difficult to reconcile with absolute monism, and has prompted some
Christian sects to veer towards dualism. Gnostic forms of Christianity were more dualistic,
and some Gnostic traditions posited that the Devil was separate from God as an
independent deity.[12] The Christian dualists of the Byzantine Empire, the Paulicians, were
seen as Manichean heretics by Byzantine theologians. This tradition of Christian dualism,
founded by Constantine-Silvanus, argued that the universe was created through evil and
separate from a good God.[14]
In Hinduism
Dvaita Vedanta (dualistic conclusions of the Vedas) school of Indian philosophy espouses
a dualism between God and the universe by theorizing the existence of two separate
realities. The first and the more important reality is that of Vishnu or Brahman. Vishnu is
the supreme Self, God, the absolute truth of the universe, the independent reality. The
second reality is that of dependent but equally real universe that exists with its own
separate essence. Everything that is composed of the second reality, such as individual
soul (Jiva), matter, etc. exist with their own separate reality. The distinguishing factor of
this philosophy as opposed to Advaita Vedanta (monistic conclusion of Vedas) is that God
takes on a personal role and is seen as a real eternal entity that governs and controls the
universe.[15] Because the existence of individuals is grounded in the divine, they are
depicted as reflections, images or even shadows of the divine, but never in any way
identical with the divine. Salvation therefore is described as the realization that all finite
reality is essentially dependent on the Supreme. [16]
Consciousness–matter dualism
While Western philosophical traditions, as exemplified by Descartes, equate mind with the
conscious self and theorize on consciousness on the basis of mind/body dualism; some
Eastern philosophies provide an alternate viewpoint, intimately related to substance
dualism, by drawing a metaphysical line between consciousness and matter — where
matter includes both body and mind.[17][18]
In Samkhya and Yogic philosophy
In Samkhya and Yoga schools of Indian philosophy, "there are two irreducible, innate and
independent realities 1) consciousness itself (Purusha) 2) primordial materiality (Prakriti)".
The unconscious primordial materiality, Prakriti, contains 23 components including intellect
(buddhi,mahat), ego (ahamkara) and mind (manas). Therefore, the intellect, mind and
ego are all seen as forms of unconscious matter. [19] Thought processes and mental events
are conscious only to the extent they receive illumination from Purusha. Consciousness is
compared to light which illuminates the material configurations or 'shapes' assumed by the
mind. So intellect after receiving cognitive structures form the mind and illumination from
pure consciousness creates thought structures that appear to be conscious. [20] Ahamkara,
the ego or the phenomenal self, appropriates all mental experiences to itself and thus,
personalizes the objective activities of mind and intellect by assuming possession of them.
[21]
But consciousness is itself independent of the thought structures it illuminates. [20]
By including mind in the realm of matter, Samkhya-Yoga avoids one of the most serious
pitfalls of Cartesian dualism, the violation of physical conservation laws. Because mind is
an evolute of matter, mental events are granted causal efficacy and are therefore able to
initiate bodily motions.[22]
In philosophy of science
In philosophy of science, dualism often refers to the dichotomy between the "subject" (the
observer) and the "object" (the observed). Another dualism, in Popperian philosophy of
science refers to "hypothesis" and "refutation" (for example, experimental refutation). This
notion also carried to Popper's political philosophy.
In physics
In physics, dualism refers to mediums with properties that can be associated with the
mechanics of two different phenomena. Because these two phenomena's mechanics are
mutually exclusive, both are needed in order to describe the possible behaviors. All
matter, for example, has wave-particle duality.
Dualism in modern and contemporary philosophy
The American philosopher Arthur Oncken Lovejoy in his *The Revolt Against Dualism
(1960) develops a critique of the modern new realism, reproposing a form of dualism
based on a "fork of human experience."
Political dualism
In politics, dualism refers to the separation of powers between the legislature and
executive.
Definition of DUALISM
1
: a theory that considers reality to consist of two irreducible elements or modes
2
: the quality or state of being dual or of having a dual nature
3
a : a doctrine that the universe is under the dominion of two opposing principles one of
which is good and the other evil
b : a view of human beings as constituted of two irreducible elements (as matter and
spirit)
— du·al·ist \-list\ noun
— du·al·is·tic \ˌdü-ə-ˈlis-tik, ˌdyü-\ adjective
— du·al·is·ti·cal·ly \-ti-k(ə-)lē\ adverb

Essentialism
Essentially Speaking, 1989
One of the central modes of representation is essentialism. Diana Fuss says that
essentialism
is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable
and fixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity … Importantly,
essentialism is typically defined in opposition to difference … The opposition is a helpful
one in that it reminds us that a complex system of cultural, social, psychical, and historical
differences, and not a set of pre-existent human essences, position and constitute the
subject. However, the binary articulation of essentialism and difference can also be
restrictive, even obfuscating, in that it allows us to ignore or deny the differences within
essentialism. (Essentially Speaking [1989]: xi-xii).
As evidenced by the range of the critics quoted below, the term essentialism spreads
across multiple fields of study. The fact that this page exists as part of a postcolonial
studies web site points both to the broad-based nature of postcolonial studies and to the
debate on where the borders of postcolonial studies should be drawn, if at all.
In a specifically postcolonial context, we find essentialism in the reduction of the
indigenous people to an “essential” idea of what it means to be African/Indian/Arabic, thus
simplifying the task of colonization.Nationalist and liberationist movements often “write
back” and reduce the colonizers to an essence, simultaneously defining themselves in
terms of an authentic essence which may deny or invert the values of the ascribed
characteristics (see discussions on reclaiming the term “Third World,” particularly in
Chandra Mohanty’s “Introduction”to Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism , ed.
Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres [1991] 1-47). Edward Said argues
against this inversion, suggesting that “in Post-colonial national states,the liabilities of such
essences as the Celtic spirit, négritude, or Islam are clear: they have much to do not only
with the native manipulators, who also use them to cover up contemporary faults,
corruptions, tyrannies, but also with the embattled imperial contexts out of which they
came and in which they were felt to be necessary” ( Culture and Imperialism [1994] 16).
Salman Rushdie describes essentialism as “the respectable child of old-fashioned
exoticism. It demands that sources, forms, style, language and symbol all derive from a
supposedly homogeneous and unbroken tradition. Or else” (“‘Commonwealth Literature
Does Not Exist,” Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991 (1991) 67). Wole
Soyinka strikes a similar note in his analysis of the potential pitfalls of an essentialist
movement such as Négritude, which “stayed within a pre-set system of Eurocentric
intellectual analysis of both man and his society, and tried to re-define the African and his
society in those externalized terms”( Myth, Literature and the African World (1976) 129,
136).
While Rushdie and Soyinka are right to point out the potential for locking oneself within a
framework set in place by the colonizers, other writers insist that some subversive,
empowering force can come from the employment of essentialist strategies. While she
recognizes the shortcomings, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak also pays a great deal of
attention to what she calls “strategic essentialism,” as engaged in by the Subaltern Studies
group (“Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography). Trinh T. Minh-Ha personalizes
this dilemma for us:
Every path I/i take is edged with thorns. On the one hand, i play into the Savior’s hands
by concentrating on authenticity, for my attention is numbed by it and diverted from other
important issues; on the other hand,i do feel the necessity to return to my so-called roots,
since they are the fount of my strength, the guiding arrow to which i constantly refer
before heading for a new direction. (“Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism” in The Post-
colonial Studies Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin [1995] 268.
Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o is certainly less troubled by this quandary. Ngũgĩ complicates the issue
by placing the question of language at the base of the debate: “[t]he choice of language
and the use to which language is put is central to a people’s definition of themselves in
relation to their natural and social environment … by our continuing to write in foreign
languages, paying homage to them, are we not on the cultural level continuing that neo-
colonial slavish and cringing spirit?” (Decolonising the Mind: the Politics of Language in
African Literature (1986) 4, 26). Interestingly enough, where Ngũgĩ would disagree with
Rushdie and Soyinka on issues of essentialism or authenticity, he also differs on language:
Ngũgĩ has chosen to reject English for Gikuyu and Kiswahili (in fact, Decolonising the Mind
is Ngugi’s “farewell to English”), whereas Rushdie and Soyinka have chosen to write in
English.
These writers represent, at best, a mere cross-section of those who concern themselves
with questions of essentialism and authenticity. Ironically, the very process of selecting
these writers and these quotations depends on the use of essentialism and representation.
As Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean, the editors of The Spivak Reader (1996), put it,
one “cannot simply assert, ‘I will be anti-essentialist’ and make that stick, for you cannot
not be an essentialist to some degree. The critique of essentialism is predicated upon
essentialism” (7).
Works Cited
 Fuss, Diana. Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference. New
York: Routledge, 1989.
 Minh-Ha, Trinh T. Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism”. The Post-colonial Studies
Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, 1995. 264-268.
 Mohanty, Chandra.”Introduction”. Third World Women and the Politics of
Feminism, ed. Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres [1991] 1-47.
 Rushdie, Salman. Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991. London:
Routledge, 1991.
 Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage, 1994.
  Soyinka, Wole. Myth, Literature and the African World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976.
 Spivak,Gayatri Chakravorty. ”Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography”.
Selected Subaltern Studies. Ed. Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
 –”Introduction”. ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean. The Spivak Reader, 1996.
1-12.
 wa Thiong’o, Ngũgĩ. Decolonising the Mind: the Politics of Language in African
Literature. Westlands: East African Educational Publishers, 1986.
Author: Brian Cliff, Spring 1996
Last edited: June 2012

Read more: http://postcolonialstudies.emory.edu/essentialism/#ixzz2chsxqmWp

SPIVAK’S KEY TERMS:

Strategic Essentialism -
Essentialism is the belief that language has an essential meaning; that there is a concrete,
stable, unchanging, meaning for a term such as “British” or “Canadian”. Spivak believes
that words take on their meanings through usage and discursive power; that language is
arbitrary, and therefore disagrees strongly with the term essentialism. Spivak stresses that
“... we must of course remind ourselves, our positivist feminist colleagues in charge of
creating the discipline of women’s studies, and our anxious students, that essentialism is a
trap.” She underlines this because of the limited thinking that comes with essentialism; it
is the basis for exclusion and exploitation. Spivak also states that it is impossible to be
completely non-essentialist, therefore essentialism is something to which the individual is
committed even when rhetorically rejecting it. It is with this in mind that Spivak introduces
strategic essentialism. A strategy is different from a theory - it is not general but directed,
combative and particular to a situation. Although Spivak rejects essentialism, she also
recognizes the importance of using it from time to time to obtain her goals. This is a
strategy, and encompasses her concept of strategic essentialism. An example of this is
that in order to make an argument regarding the “East”, Spivak must first acknowledge
that there is a stable meaning for the “West”. If Spivak denies that there is an essential
“West”, than there is no way that she will have any basis for argument.
Subaltern -
Another perfect example of the way Spivak uses strategic essentialism to aid in her
theories, is her concept of the subaltern. “Subaltern” refers to the people who have been
as equally instrumental in history as the Europeans, but have been under-represented,
their hidden history, and to the historiographers who study them. Subaltern can be broken
up into sub, meaning under, and altern, meaning alternative or marginalized. Spivak’s
main concern is with the people of India, and repressed females in Asia. Spivak’s main
argument concerning the subaltern is that there is no way the subaltern can ever be
heard. She addresses this problem in one of her most influential essays, Can the Subaltern
 Speak?. The answer, according to Spivak, is no. As soon as the subaltern tries to acquire a
voice, they must move into the dominant discourse to be understood. Therefore, they
must remove themselves from the subaltern position, which also means that they are no
longer speaking from that position. Since there is no way to get out of this cycle, Spivak
has concluded that the subaltern is a silent position.
FURTHER RESEARCH:
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s works -
- translation of and introduction to Derrida’s Of Grammatology
- essay, Can the Subaltern Speak?
Books on Spivak -
-An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory; Spivak and the Subalter\

Key Terms in Post-Colonial Theory (http://www3.dbu.edu/mitchell/postcold.htm)

You should read over the following definitions in order to understand some of the basic
ideas associated with post-colonialist literature:
colonialism: The imperialist expansion of Europe into the rest of the world during the last four
hundred years in which a dominant imperium or center carried on a relationship of control and
influence over its margins or colonies. This relationship tended to extend to social, pedagogical,
economic, political, and broadly culturally exchanges often with a hierarchical European settler
class and local, educated (compractor) elite class forming layers between the European "mother"
nation and the various indigenous peoples who were controlled. Such a system carried within it
inherent notions of racial inferiority and exotic otherness.
post-colonialism: Broadly a study of the effects of colonialism on cultures and societies. It is
concerned with both how European nations conquered and controlled "Third World" cultures and
how these groups have since responded to and resisted those encroachments. Post-colonialism, as
both a body of theory and a study of political and cultural change, has gone and continues to go
through three broad stages:
1. an initial awareness of the social, psychological, and cultural inferiority enforced by
being in a colonized state
2. the struggle for ethnic, cultural, and political autonomy
3. a growing awareness of cultural overlap and hybridity

ambivalence: the ambiguous way in which colonizer and colonized regard one another. The
colonizer often regards the colonized as both inferior yet exotically other, while the colonized
regards the colonizer as both enviable yet corrupt. In a context of hybridity, this often produces a
mixed sense of blessing and curse.
alterity: "the state of being other or different"; the political, cultural, linguistic, or religious other.
The study of the ways in which one group makes themselves different from others.
colonial education: the process by which a colonizing power assimilates either a subaltern
native elite or a larger population to its way of thinking and seeing the world.
diaspora: the voluntary or enforced migration of peoples from their native homelands. Diaspora
literature is often concerned with questions of maintaining or altering identity, language, and
culture while in another culture or country.
essentialism: the essence or "whatness" of something. In the context of race, ethnicity, or
culture, essentialism suggests the practice of various groups deciding what is and isn't a particular
identity. As a practice, essentialism tends to overlook differences within groups often to maintain
the status quo or obtain power. Essentialist claims can be used by a colonizing power but also by
the colonized as a way of resisting what is claimed about them.
ethnicity: a fusion of traits that belong to a group–shared values, beliefs, norms, tastes,
behaviors, experiences, memories, and loyalties. Often deeply related to a person’s identity.
exoticism: the process by which a cultural practice is made stimulating and exciting in its
difference from the colonializer’s normal perspective. Ironically, as European groups educated
local, indigenous cultures, schoolchildren often began to see their native lifeways, plants, and
animals as exotic and the European counterparts as "normal" or "typical."
hegemony: the power of the ruling class to convince other classes that their interests are the
interests of all, often not only through means of economic and political control but more subtly
through the control of education and media.
hybridity: new transcultural forms that arise from cross-cultural exchange. Hybridity can be
social, political, linguistic, religious, etc. It is not necessarily a peaceful mixture, for it can be
contentious and disruptive in its experience. Note the two related definitions:
catalysis: the (specifically New World) experience of several ethnic groups interacting and mixing
with each other often in a contentious environment that gives way to new forms of identity and
experience.
creolization: societies that arise from a mixture of ethnic and racial mixing to form a new material,
psychological, and spiritual self-definition.
identity: the way in which an individual and/or group defines itself. Identity is important to self-
concept, social mores, and national understanding. It often involves both essentialism and
othering.
ideology: "a system of values, beliefs, or ideas shared by some social group and often taken for
granted as natural or inherently true" (Bordwell & Thompson 494)
language: In the context of colonialism and post-colonialism, language has often become a site
for both colonization and resistance. In particular, a return to the original indigenous language is
often advocated since the language was suppressed by colonizing forces. The use of European
languages is a much debated issue among postcolonial authors.
abrogation: a refusal to use the language of the colonizer in a correct or standard way.

appropriation: "the process by which the language is made to 'bear the burden' of one's own
cultural experience."
magical realism: the adaptation of Western realist methods of literature in describing the
imaginary life of indigenous cultures who experience the mythical, magical, and supernatural in a
decidedly different fashion from Western ones. A weaving together elements we tend to associate
with European realism and elements we associate with the fabulous, where these two worlds
undergo a "closeness or near merging."
mapping: the mapping of global space in the context of colonialism was as much prescriptive as it
was descriptive. Maps were used to assist in the process of aggression, and they were also used
to establish claims. Maps claims the boundaries of a nation, for example.
metanarrative: ("grand narratives," "master narratives.") a large cultural story that seeks to
explain within its borders all the little, local narratives. A metanarrative claims to be a big truth
concerning the world and the way it works. Some charge that all metanarratives are inherently
oppressive because they decide whether other narratives are allowed or not.
mimicry: the means by which the colonized adapt the culture (language, education, clothing, etc.)
of the colonizer but always in the process changing it in important ways. Such an approach always
contains it in the ambivalence of hybridity.
nation/nation-state: an aggregation of people organized under a single government. National
interest is associated both with a struggle for independent ethnic and cultural identity, and
ironically an opposite belief in universal rights, often multicultural, with a basis in geo-economic
interests. Thus, the move for national independence is just as often associated with region as it is
with ethnicity or culture, and the two are often at odds when new nations are formed.
orientalism: the process (from the late eighteenth century to the present) by which "the Orient"
was constructed as an exotic other by European studies and culture. Orientalism is not so much a
true study of other cultures as it is broad Western generalization about Oriental, Islamic, and/or
Asian cultures that tends to erode and ignore their substantial differences.
other: the social and/or psychological ways in which one group excludes or marginalizes another
group. By declaring someone "Other," persons tend to stress what makes them dissimilar from or
opposite of another, and this carries over into the way they represent others, especially through
stereotypical images.
race: the division and classification of human beings by physical and biological characteristics.
Race often is used by various groups to either maintain power or to stress solidarity. In the 18th
and19th centuries, it was often used as a pretext by European colonial powers for slavery and/or
the "white man's burden."
semiotics: a system of signs which one knows what something is. Cultural semiotics often provide
the means by which a group defines itself or by which a colonializing power attempts to control
and assimilate another group.
space/place:space represents a geographic locale, one empty in not being designated. Place, on
the other hand, is what happens when a space is made or owned. Place involves landscape,
language, environment, culture, etc.
subaltern: the lower or colonized classes who have little access to their own means of expression
and are thus dependent upon the language and methods of the ruling class to express themselves.
worlding: the process by which a person, family, culture, or people is brought into the dominant
Eurocentric/Western global society.

UNIVERSALITY
What is UNIVERSALITY?
1. the propensity to presume that one's personal traits and personality features, inclusive
of outlooks and morals, are shared in the main social group or cultural society. 2. with
regard to mob and crowd environments, the propensity for people to presume that
abnormal, uncommon actions are permittable since many other people in the environment
or scenario are engaging in such acts. 3. with regard to self-help and psychotherapy
groups, a curative aspect encouraged by the member's acknowledgement that their
dilemmas and troubles are not just their own, but rather are encountered by a multitude
of other people belonging to the group.
UNIVERSALITY: "Universality is commonly referred to as impression of universality."

Psychology Dictionary: http://psychologydictionary.org/universality/#ixzz2chvNVvya

Definition of UNIVERSALITY
1
: the quality or state of being universal
2
: universal comprehensiveness in range

UNIVERSALISM
The concept of universalism is one of particular interest to post-colonial writers because it
is this notion of a unitary and homogeneous human nature which marginalises and
excludes the distinctive characteristics, the difference, of post-colonial societies. A crucial
insistence of post-colonial theory is that, despite a shared experience of colonialism, the
cultural realities of postcolonial societies may differ vastly. The washing out of cultural
difference becomes a prominent effect of European literary criticism, since some appeal to
the essential humanity of readers has been constructed as a function of the value and
significance of the literary work. We are often told that what makes Shakespeare or Dante
or Goethe ‘great’ is their ability to reveal something of ‘the universal human condition’.
Indeed the universality of writers has been invoked in literature discussions across the
English-speaking world as an infallible sign of their stature or their ‘seriousness’. The myth
of universality is thus a primary strategy of imperial control as it is manifested in literary
study and that is why it demands attention early on in this Reader. The universalist myth
has, according to Chinua Achebe, a pernicious effect in the kind of colonialist criticism
which denigrates the post-colonial text on the basis of an assumption that ‘European’
equals ‘universal’. But even a brief analysis of the ‘universal human condition’ finds it
disappearing into an endless network of provisional and specific determinations in which
even the most apparently ‘essential’ features of human life become provisional and
contingent.
The assumption of universalism is a fundamental feature of the construction of colonial
power because the ‘universal’ features of humanity are the characteristics of those who
occupy positions of political dominance. It is these people who are ‘human’, who have a
legitimate history, who live in ‘the world’. Because language is a discourse of power, in
that it provides the terms and the structures by which individuals have a world, a method
by which the ‘real’ is determined, notions of universality can, like the language which
suggests them, become imperialistic. The language itself implies certain assumptions
about the world, a certain history, a certain way of seeing. If one’s own language, or one’s
immediate perceptions of the world do not concur then they must be suppressed in favour
of that which the language itself reveals to be ‘obvious’.

UNIVERSALITY AND DIFFERENCE

56
George Lamming has reminded us in his essay The Occasion for Speaking’ of Hegel’s
assertion that the African is somehow outside of History, that Africa is ‘no historical part of
the world’. This is simply because History is the story of ‘Civilisation’ and it is only when
that language becomes ‘appropriated’ by other cultures that the very concept of history
can be questioned, and that the universal condition of humanity can be revealed
as far more heterogeneous. At a strategic moment in the British occupation of India,
English literature was invoked precisely for its imputed power to convey universal values.
As Gauri Viswanathan points out, the concept of universalism became part of the
technology of Empire: when the introduction of Christianity was considered by the Indian
colonial administration to be too great a threat to good order, the ‘universal’ discourse of
english literature (see n.1, p. 4) was consciously adopted as the vehicle for educating the
Indian élites in tenets of civilised morality. Not only is the supposed universal human
nature found to be spurious when the post-colonial engages the European text (‘What is a
kiss?’ asks Charles Larson’s African student) but it is not even true of that most ‘universal’
of discourses—mathematics—as is explained by Alan Bishop. Yet such assumptions about
literature and its relationship to human life profoundly influence the critical reception of
post-colonial literatures. And not only is it true of both conservative and liberal humanism,
but it also insidiously affects the responses of those critics who, like Frederic Jameson,
passionately argue for a consideration of literatures other than the trans- Atlantic. Aijaz
Ahmad points out the degree to which the habit of ‘worldism’ (as in first, second and third
worldism), can obliterate the cultural distinctionsbetween societies. The value of post-
colonial discourse is that it provides a methodology for considering the dialogue of
similarity and difference; the similarity of colonialism’s political and historical pressure
upon non- European societies, alongside the plurality of specific cultural effects and
responses those societies have produced.