THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,petitioners,

vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively
the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the
criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad
interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.

The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931,
petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a
protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well
as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January
8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty
ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal, the court,
on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision
correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other
respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which
were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The
defendant thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but
the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the
petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.
Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was
convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch,
Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.

In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
further contends that Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen
years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1),
Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the
provincial board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective
provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of
the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution (section 1,
Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the
Constitution (section 2, Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First
Instance of different provinces without uniformity.

Issue:

Whether Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws

Held:

The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously,
is permitted.The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the
law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the
provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces,
in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming
within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any
resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the
probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the
Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not
made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that
while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result.

But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination
and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal
protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises
and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial.

A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it
is within the constitutional prohibitions. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in
operation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one
province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year —
and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes
rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a
situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of
the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to
equal-protection clause of our Constitution.