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BOLSHEVIK PARTY ORGANISATION

IN RUSSIA 1907-1912

D.E. Gollan

This thesis was submitted in fulfilment


of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Australian
National University

June 1967
This statement is to certify that
the research described in this
thesis was my own original work.

D.E. Gollan
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABBREVIATIONS iv

INTRODUCTION v

CHAPTER 1 ILLEGAL, HALF UNDERGROUND 1

CHAPTER 2 REPRESSION 57

CHAPTER 3 DISINTEGRATION 79

CHAPTER 4 PHOENIX DISTORTED 131


CONCLUSION 168

APPENDIX 1 RULES OF THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL


OBLAST * ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P.
1906 180

APPENDIX 2 DRAFT RULES OF THE PETERSBURG


ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P. 1907 182

APPENDIX 3 EXTRACT FROM THE LETTER OF THE


CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC WORK IN TRADE UNIONS
FEBRUARY 1908 185
APPENDIX 4 FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE MOSCOW
COMMITTEE R.S.D.W.P. FOR
DECEMBER 1908 190

APPENDIX 5 MODEL RULES OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC


FRACTION IN A TRADE UNION 192

APPENDIX 6 EXTRACT FROM THE PROVISIONAL


REGULATIONS IN RESPECT OF
ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES
MARCH 1906 195

BIBLIOGRAPHY 202
iv

ABBREVIATIONS

Lenin V.I. Lenin. Polnoe sobranie s o chinenii.


5th e d . , Moscow, 1958-

PR Proletarskaia r e v o l i u t s i i a .
Moscow, 1921-40.

Perepiska Iz perepiski mestnykh organizatsii s


zagranichnym b o l !shevistskim tsentrom
v 1909 g. PR, 1928, no. 9, pp.152-92.

Prot. V Piatyi (Londonskii) s 11ezd . . .1909 g »


P r o t o k o l y . Moscow, 1963.

SD So t s i a l *d e m o k r a t , Paris, 1909-12.
V

INTRODUCTION

Marxist ideas became a subject of discussion in the


circles of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia in the
eighties of the last century. Until that time the hopes
of Russian revolutionaries had rested upon the peasantry
as the class through which a socialist system would be
established. Although polemics between populists and
Marxists continued for some years, populism was a
declining intellectual force and most of the younger
members of the intelligentsia turned to Marxism, with the
result that a fundamental re-evaluation of the perspectives
and activity of the revolutionary movement took place.
Attention was now directed to the small but rapidly
growing urban working class. The early Russian Marxists
whose social origins were far removed from those of the
proletariat faced the same task as the populists of a
generation earlier - of ’going to the p e o p l e ’, that is, of
establishing links with the revolutionary class and
formulating the programme on which it was to go into
struggle. The political activity of the first Marxist
groups was confined to propaganda classes for the most
advanced workers and the composing and printing of
agitational leaflets which the worker members of the groups
distributed in the factories.

Russian workers at this time were entering upon the


fierce economic struggles arising from a harsh and rapid
industrialization, asserting their industrial demands,
since trade union organisation was banned, by means of
mass strikes. By the end of the century Marxists were
vi

divided as to the best way in which the organisation of


the working class in the struggle for socialism should
proceed. The immediate question was whether all efforts
should be directed towards assisting vigorous industrial
action in the factories and the political programme be
left to the liberal bourgeoisie, or whether the first step
should be to build up an illegal political party with a
programme of revolutionary socialism. The significance of
this division of opinion lay in the differing estimates
made of the ability of the workers to proceed beyond the
economic to the political struggle on their own initiative.
Those who pointed to the necessity of the political party
argued that revolutionary theory had to be brought to the
workers by the educated classes and would never be
generated by the economic struggle alone. The dispute was
decided in favour of the political party when a group of
intellectuals in exile, who included Plekhanov, Lenin and
Martov, founded a newspaper Iskra which was to expound a
political programme and act as an organiser to link the
scattered groups in Russia into a single Social Democratic
party. But at the congress of Social Democrats in 19^3 at
which a programme was adopted and the Party established as
a functioning organisation with central institutions, a
split also occurred among the founders of I s k r a . Was the
Party to be a tightly organised underground body of
professional revolutionaries or was it to be less
exclusive, less disciplined and counting among its members
those who sympathised broadly with the aims of Social
Democracy? Although the dispute was waged over the Party
rules, it was indicative of a deep disagreement between
Russian Marxists as to the nature of the coming Russian
vii

revolution. The congress ended with the formation of


rival Bolshevik and Menshevik factions, and after it the
work of setting up and consolidating groups within Russia
proceeded along separate lines with separate factional
centres.

The events of 1905 took Social Democrats unawares.


Unrolling in a series of actions from the massacre of
January through the spreading disturbances of the
summer to the general strike, the setting up of the
St Petersburg Soviet of W o r k e r s 1 Deputies and the armed
uprising in Moscow, the revolution of 1905 flung together
workers and Social Democratic intelligentsia and brought
the Party into the open political arena. Workers joined
it in large numbers, and constituted a majority of the
members for the first time. The concessions won from the
government in the October Manifesto provided political
parties, although still illegal, with greatly enlarged
opportunities for open agitation, propaganda and
organisation. For the Social Democratic Party there was a
partial abandonment of conspiratorial methods and the
introduction of democratic election to office although the
leading positions continued to be held by the
intelligentsia. The events of 1905 in opening up wide
fields of operation for the Party also brought to light a
feature of the local organisation that was to remain
characteristic of it, namely an impatience with factional
splits and a disregard of the underlying reasons for the
divisions between the left and right wings of Social
Democracy. The strong pressure within Russia for the
burying of factional differences brought about the uniting
of the factions at the Stockholm Congress in 1906.
viii

Although, the defeat of the Moscow uprising ensured


the steady recovery of the government 1s authority, the
gains won in the revolution were substantial enough to
enable the Social Democratic Party to lead an active semi­
legal existence with much open agitation and propaganda.
It was not until the Stolypin coup of June 1907 that the
organisation was forced back into the underground and
renewed faction splits occurred.

This thesis is concerned with the organisation,


activity and tactics of the Bolshevik faction of the
Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in Russia from
1907 to 1912. All Historians in writing of the R.S.D.W.P.
have to deal with the fact that, except for the interlude
of 1 9 0 5 - 7 » the leadership of the Party until 1917 was to
be found in exile and the rank and file in Russia. The
Party journals, except again in the years 1905-7» were
published abroad. It was the leaders in exile who decided
policy and it was between these that the decisive factional
struggles were waged. Both because of the importance of
the disputes between Lenin and other Party leaders in
determining the political direction of Russian Social
Democracy and because of the difficulty of obtaining
information about the organisation within Russia,
historians of the pre-revolutionary period have tended to
devote most of their attention to the life of the Party in
exile. S c h a p i r o 's work, The Communist Party of the Soviet
U n i o n , concentrates largely on the evolution of policy and
factional strife abroad. Keep's study, The Rise of Social
Democracy in R u s s i a , which deals with both aspects and
throws much light on the local organisations does not go
beyond 1906-7. The Social Democratic Party within Russia
ix

from 1907 to 1917 has been very little studied outside the
U.S.S.R. The most obvious reason for this is the scarcity
of source material. Even for the major Party
organisations the sources are largely confined to the
reports printed in the Party newspapers of the time,
correspondence from local organisations, police records
and memoirs. The reports from local organisations which
form such an important part of Bolshevik journals, while
necessarily incomplete and partisan give a great deal of
valuable information about membership numbers, the type of
activity undertaken and the difficulties faced. The
largest gaps occur when the organisations break down
through arrests and reports cease for a short or long
period to appear. Correspondence from the localities and
reports to the police give very clear descriptions of the
state of local groups. Much use was made of these records
in compiling regional Party histories after the 1917
revolution, but only a small amount has appeared in the
Soviet historical journals and archival publications.
Finally, there are the memoirs, of which a great many
appeared in the 1 9 2 0 s, in historical journals and as
separate works. Most of these are of course the
reminiscences of Bolshevik Party workers and give lively,
partisan and often detailed accounts of the organisations
of the pre-revolutionary years. The articles that appeared
in the historical journal Proletarskaia revoliutsiia were
obviously carefully studied and from time to time accounts
were challenged in letters to the editors from other Party
workers.

For an historian working in Australia in this field,


there is an added difficulty in that much of the printed
X

material which can be read in Europe and the United States


is still not available here. In the last few years,
however, the acquisition by libraries of photostated and
micro-filmed journals and books has made it possible to
begin work in this country. The primary sources for this
thesis consist mainly of the newspapers' Proletarii and
Sotsial*demokrat and memoirs and archival material printed
in Proletarskaia revoliutsiia and other historical
journals. It will be evident from the bibliography that
there are major gaps, of which the most important are
local Bolshevik illegal papers such as Rabochee znamia and
the journal Krasnaia letopis1.

The amount of material available has been enough to


give a fairly clear general picture of local organisations
in this obscure period. It is possible to suggest answers
to some of the questions that arise as to the changes in
the organisation occurring during the revolutionary years.
If 1905 had seen a change in the composition of the Party,
from one consisting mainly of professional revolutionaries
and intelligenty to one in which workers were in the
majority, one might expect to learn something about
relations in the local organisations between workers and
intelligentsia, in the years that followed. Indeed this
is so - from 1907 on there are frequent indications of
tensions between the two groups, with the worker Party
members relying on the intelligentsia for political
leadership and propaganda, but resentful of their own
dependence and contemptuous of the intelligentsia for their
political cowardice. There is evidence also of the solid
support among worker Bolsheviks for the left wing
opposition to legal political activity. This support was
xi

so strong, that although it was possible for Lenin to have


the emigre leaders of the left wing expelled, within
Russia the rank and file of the left wing were never
dislodged. There are plentiful signs of the comparative
lack of interest within Russia in the factional disputes
abroad. Finally the experience of the years of deep
repression in Russia clearly indicates that in spite of all
efforts of Social Democrats working legally, it was
impossible to establish effective legal working class mass
organisations - which largely accounted for the reviving
workers’ movement from 1912 onwards finding its real
leadership in the illegal Party.

Dates have been given according to the Julian


calendar in use in Russia until 1917} which was thirteen
days behind the Gregorian. The words faction and fraction
have been used with different meanings - faction to
indicate a group within the Party - the Bolshevik or
Menshevik faction, and fraction to denote an organised
group of Social Democrats within a non-Party organisation -
thus, the Duma fraction (the group of Social Democratic
deputies in the Duma) and fractions of Social Democrats in
trade unions.
CHAPTER 1

ILL E G A L , HALF UNDERGROUND

A picture of the Party organisation as it appeared in


the first half of 1 9 0 7 is full of contrast and variety.
Videly varying levels of political sophistication and
activity as well as of organisational complexity
distinguished local groups one from the other. Factors
such as the length of time a group had existed, the
proportion of inteiligenty to workers in the membership,
the number of professional revolutionaries available, the
cistance from the largest city centres and the occupations
of the local population strongly influenced the character
of organisations. There were Party bodies in every stage
(f development ranging from newly established groups which
remarkably resembled the circles of the time of the League
(f Struggle for the Emancipation of Labour, to the St
letersburg organisation, which in March 1907 changed its
rules to incorporate certain features of soviet
(rganisation within its own structure.

An example of the most primitive type of Social


I'emocratic group may be found in Vladivostock. In
I'ecember 1906 the group had been in existence for three
nonths. There were 500 workers in the area of operation
(f the group, and thirty Party members, ten of them
workers, with a leading collective of five (one a worker),
lo leaflets had been put out by the group because it had
10 technical facilities. Agitation was carried on orally.
nhree mass meetings of 3 0 > 7 0 , and 20 workers and one of

1
2

17 (for shop assistants) had been held. To carry on


propaganda there were four w o r k e r s ’ circles, with a total
attendance of forty-five, one railway w o r k e r s ’ circle of
twelve, one student circle of ten and two circles for
gymnasium students. There were no trade unions, wide
contacts existed with the countryside but no regular work
was carried on, 40,000 troops were stationed in the area
and it was proposed to form a propaganda circle for them.
Links had been established with other Siberian centres,
but in all this time not a word or a leaflet had come from
the Central Committee or the Siberian Soiuz. The group
was carryong on a campaign for the Duma elections entirely
independently.

Here is an account of Social Democratic political


activity which, except for the fact that there were now
opportunities for open mass agitation, had changed little
since the time of the early Marxist groups and which
faithfully reflects the relationship between intelligentsia
and workers outlined in What is to be done? The majority
of the members were intelligenty, the weight of whose
propaganda and agitational activity was directed towards
the workers. The group was operating in isolation,
relying (except for the matter of a purchase of seventy
r o u b l e s ’ worth of brochures) entirely on its own resources
to carry on its missionary work.

But elsewhere, under the impact of the revolution,


considerable organisational change and development had

1
Proletarii [hereafter cited as P r o l . ] no. 15, 25 March
1907, p.8.
3

ta k e n place. The original basis of local o r g a n i sa t i o n had


b e e n the town committees of p r o fe s s i on a l revolutionaries.
F r o m here the b u i l d i n g of f a c t o ry nuclei had b e e n
u n d e r t a k e n and as the latter m u l t i p l i e d they be came the
p r i m a r y units.

P a r t y members in the f a ct or y co ns tituted the factory


1
soiuz ( u n i o n ) . This term h o w e v e r does not ap p ea r to have
b e e n m uc h us ed and the fa ctory or g a n is a t i on was u s u a l l y
r e f e r r e d to as the fa ctory sob ranie (meeting). A nu m be r
of fac tory organi sat io ns were gr o u p ed into a ra i o n
(district) and the raions toge th er formed the city
organisation. R e p r e s en ta t iv e s from the raions co mp r i se d
the city conference, the l ea di ng body, from w h i c h came
mem ber s of the city committee w h i c h carried out the day to
d a y tasks of p ol it ica l leadership.

The first bodies l in kin g the local groups were also


k n o w n as s o i u z y . The Si be ri an So iuz had been formed in
1901, and the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n in 1 9 0 3 . The term s o i u z , as
ap pl ie d to regional b o d i e s , b e g a n to go out of use and be
repla ce d by o b l a s t 1 . The T r a n s c a u c a s i a n Soiuz was re named
in 1906, but the C r i m e a n and S i b e r i a n regions re t ai n e d the
term s o i u z .

In the ea rly stages of the Party*s growth the lin ki ng


bodies had simple f u n c t i o n s , w h i c h were ma i nl y to provide
techanical assis tan ce for the P a r t y workers and to issue
and distribute literature. The ea rly groups were self
acting organis at ion s wh ose basic purpose was to ca rry on
ag itatio n and propaganda, and at this low level their

1
P r o l . no. 15> 25 M a r c h 1 9 0 7 } p.8.
4

c on tin ued ex istence req uir ed m e r e l y the presence of


int el li ge nt y who were w i l l i n g and able to instruct, and
workers who were pre par ed to listen. The process of
simple unification, p ro ce e d i n g w i t h i n R u s s i a before 1905
was ho w ev e r gi ven a powerful p us h and made more co mplex b y
the efforts of le adi ng P ar t y i n t e l l i g e n t y abroad, in
pa rt icu la r Lenin, who w i s h e d to see the sc at te r e d Social
Democratic groups un ited th rough a ce ntral P a r t y l e ad in g
body and a central organ.

The gr owt h of the P ar t y was v a s t l y spe ed ed up du ri ng


1905 and p a r t ic u la rl y a fte r the O c t o b e r days. W i t h the
influx of thousands of ne w members two qu estions
immed iat ely arose, of o rg an i s a t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y and
orga ni sat io nal ramification. The new s i t u a ti o n was
re flected in the decisions of the T a m m e r f o r s co nf erence of
Bolsheviks in De ce mb e r 1905> w h i c h st ated that it was
essential to put into effect a b r o a d el ec to r a l principle
and grant el ect ed centres full powers in the m a t t e r of
ideological and practical leadership, tog et her w i th the
removability, wides t p u b l ic it y and strict a c c o u n t a b i l i t y
of such centres for their actions. The conf er enc e also
re com men de d the or g a ni sa t io n of oblas t x c o nf er en ce s and
soiuzy w it h oblas t * o r g a n s , in o rd er to u n i f y and
stimulate w o r k in the localities.

These o b l a s t 1 (regional) orga ni sat io ns, of w h i c h the


Central Industrial, Urals, Volga, Crimean, North-west,
Tr a n s c a u c a s i a n and S i be r ia n were the ones m e n t i o n e d in the
Bo lsh evi k press from 1906 on, were i m m e d i a t e l y ca lled u p o n
to furnish far more than technical a s si s t a n c e and reg io nal
publications for the P ar ty groups in their areas. This
was noted in the report of the se c on d co nf er e nc e of the
5

Central Industrial Region, which embraced the Moscow City


and Moscow Okrug o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and those of a number of
large industrial centres. The reporter from the Oblas t r
Bureau pointed to the number and variety of tasks falling
to the Bureau. Apart from technical functions in
connection with passports, transport and allocation of
forces (personnel), almost from the very first day of its
existence the Bureau had had to resolve organisational
questions, and if not formally, at least in practice, had
become an organ of political co-ordination and leadership
of the O b l a s t * , deciding disputes, assisting organisations
financially and acting as an organ for the exchange of
informatio n .

The rules of the O b l a s t 1 adopted at this conference,


which was attended by seventeen delegates representing
16,990 members, listed the nineteen local committees and
groups currently comprising the Oblast * organisation, and
stated that the regular Oblas t r conference was to be
summoned every three months for the discussion and
resolution of general Party and local questions and the
co-ordination of work in the O b l a s t 1 . The right of
representation with full vote belonged to all independent
organisations with not less than 200 members.
Organisations with more than 200 members could send one
delegate for every full 500 members. Organisations with
not less than 100 members had a consultative vote.
Delegates to the conference were to be elected either
directly by all members of the organisation or by
democratically organised conferences and congresses. The
O b l a s t * Bureau was to carry out the decisions of the
conference, allocate Party forces in the region, conduct
6

the r e g i o n a l institutions, organise the c a l ling of the


conf e r e n c e and prepare m a t erial for it, be in contact w i t h
the central P a rty i n s t i t u t i o n s , inform the P a r t y of the
progress of Party affairs, draw up plans of campaigns and
l e a f l e t s , and r e b uild local organisations w h i c h had
collapsed. Members of the O b l a s t * B u r e a u h ad the right to
be present w ith consu l t a t i v e vote at the meetings of all
or g a n i s a t i o n s in the Oblast*. Oblast* o r g a n i sations were
1
to remit to the B u r e a u 5 per cent of all moneys received.

In Augu s t 1907 an O b last * conference c h a n g e d some of


the rules, i n c luding those d e t e r m i n i n g the basis of
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at the conference. The organisation had
g r own c o n s i d e r a b l y in the past year a l t h o u g h most centres
r e p o r t e d a drop in n u m bers in the recent past. The ne w
basis was to be one d e l egate per o r g a n i s a t i o n of 3 0 0
members and o r g a n isations w i t h more than 1000 m e m bers were
entitled to one delegate for each full thousand. Election
of delegates was to take place in local c o n f e r e n c e s , o k rug
congresses and s i m ilar meetings. The n u m b e r of
rep r e s e n t a t i v e s was to be d e t e r m i n e d by the n u m b e r of
members registered. T he m e m b e r s h i p totals were to be kept
by the Oblast * Bureau, and the B u r e a u was to give
o r ganisations two to three weeks notice of conferences.

As well as c h a n g i n g the r u l e s , the c onference gave a


series of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l directives to the n e w l y e l e c t e d
Oblas t * Bureau, as follows:
The tasks of the B u r e a u were to arrange an O b l a s t *
m e e t i n g place and assist in the all o t m e n t of forces;

1
P r o l . no. 4, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1906, pp.3-5*
7

inform local organisations of what was happening in


the Party and inform the Central Committee of local
happenings and requests; set up an Oblast * printing
apparatus and issue agitational leaflets and supply
liter a t u r e .
The conference also expressed the wish that the Bureau
would send monthly circulars to the organisations and make
i
more frequent tours of the region.

Another linking organisation which came into


existence as local centres expanded was the o k r u g . Such
bodies as the Moscow Okrug organisation and the Ivanovo-
Voznesensk Okrug organisation were simply bodies covering
the districts surrounding, but excluding, a city. They
were similar in constitution to the city organisations,
worked closely with them but were in no sense superior
Party bodies. Frunze who took an active part in the
organisation of the Party in Ivanovo-Voznesensk remarks
that the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Okrug body was formed at a
conference of representatives from various centres in the
area in 1905 and was set up simply because the city
organisation was unable to cope with the demands made on
it from places outside the city. One special feature of
this organisation was that in November 1906, on the
initiative of the City and Okrug committees a raion
conference was held and it was decided to unite all
organisations in the area into one special collective
2
under the name of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk S o i u z . This

P r o l . no. 18, 29 October 1907 , pp.5-6.


2
M.V. Frunze, 1Vospominaniia o partiinoi rabote ivanovo-
voznesenskoi organizatsii b o l *shevikov*, in Partiia
b o l 1shevikov v revoliutsii 1905-1907 g o d o v . ( M . , 1 9 6 1 ),
p p .4 o 6 , 4 o 8 - 9 .
8

however, does not seem to have b een a practice fol l o w e d


elsewhere.

A c o n f erence of V o l g a O k r u g o rganisations in 1906


n o t e d three types of l e a d i n g okrug bodies. W o r k a m o n g the
p e a sants in the first stage was carried on by the town
c o m m ittees themselves in more or less regular contact w i t h
separate groups and individuals, by d i s t r i b u t i n g
lite r a t u r e and s e n d i n g out agitators. In the next stage
a g r a r i a n w o r k was u n d e r t a k e n separately. Special o k r u g
o r g a n i s a t i o n s were a t t a c h e d to local committees w i t h the
s t a n d i n g of r a i o n s . T h e y e m b r a c e d all the Social
D e m o c r a t i c nucl e i in the o k r u g , had their own o r g a nisers
and a c t e d autonomously. The third stage of d e v e l o p m e n t
was r e a c h e d w h e n the o k rug organisations became
independent of the town committees w i t h full powers and
m a i n t a i n e d direct contact w i t h the Central Committee,
is s u i n g their own lit e r a t u r e and f o l l o w i n g their own
1
tactical programme.

The O k r u g R a i o n a t t a c h e d to the P e t e r s b u r g C o m m i t t e e
appears to have b e e n an example of an o r g a n i s a t i o n of the
second type and the M o s c o w and I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k O k r u g
o r g a n i s a t i o n s were the best k n o w n fully i n d e pendent okrugs.

In some areas, however, it seems that the o k rug was a


l i n k i n g b o d y i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n small town o r g a n i s a t i o n s
and the oblast* centre. Instead of the o k rug groups b e i n g
at t a c h e d as a r a i o n to the town organisation, the l a t t e r
became the nucleus of an okrug o r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h h a d
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the o b l a s t 1 committee. The second

1
P r o l . no. 8, 23 N o v e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , pp.5-6.
9

c o n f erence of the Central I n d u s t r i a l R e g i o n a p p r o v e d the


r e n a m i n g of the K o s t r o m a C o m m i t t e e as the K o s t r o m a O k r u g
1
Committee. The account of w o r k to form the V l a d i m i r
O k r u g o r g a n i s a t i o n in 1907 said that d u r i n g the last few
months there had b een no O k r u g c o m m i t t e e b e c ause the
members h a d left the a rea or b e e n arrested. An organising
b u r e a u suc c e e d e d in ca l l i n g an O k r u g conference, w h i c h met
in March, to elect delegates to the P a r t y Congress. There
were f i f t e e n delegates w i t h full vote f rom a n u m b e r of
local centres in c l u d i n g the V l a d i m i r town organisation.
Rules for the V l a d i m i r O k r u g o r g a n i s a t i o n were adopted,
the O k r u g committee budget fixed and the amount of
contributions from the local o r g a n i s a t i o n s determined.
The O k r u g conference was to meet e v e r y three m o n t h s ,
el e c t e d on a basis of one to e v e r y h u n d r e d o r g a n i s e d
workers. The conference e l e cted an e x e c u t i v e b u r e a u w h i c h
together w i t h the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s (one each) from the
local organ i s a t i o n s n u m b e r i n g not less than 150 o r g a n i s e d
w o r kers c o n s t i t u t e d the O k rug committee. B e t w e e n the
m o n t h l y meetings of the committee w o r k was c a r r i e d on by
2
the e l e c t e d executive commission.

The city organisations, as has b e e n said, were


d i v ided into raions and as the m e m b e r s h i p grew, the raions
were d i v i d e d into podraions (sub-districts). Th e l a t t e r
w o u l d consist of the n u c l e i in one factory, if a large one,
or in a n u m b e r of small w o r k places. A small city
o r g a n i s a t i o n w o u l d have a m i x t u r e of t e r r i t o r i a l and

1
P r o l . no. 4, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1906, p .4.
2
Prol. no. 15, 25 M a r c h 1907, p.8.
10

o c cu pa t io na l raions. K h a r k o v for example had three -


Railway, C i t y and Lo comotiv e Construction. In M o s c o w the
division, except for the R a i l w a y r a i o n , was territorial,
the seven local raions b e i n g Central, Zamoskvorechie,
Rogozhskii, Lefortovo, Sokol, B u ty rs k and Presnia. At the
b e g i n n i n g of 1907 Pe t e rs bu rg ha d twelve r a i o n s , s ev en of
them, City, V a s i l e v Ostrov, Vyborg, Petersburg, Moscow,
N ar v a and Neva, ba sed on city districts, and the r e m a i n d e r
be i n g O k r u g , Railway, Shop Assistants, L a t v i a n and
Estonian.

In M a r c h 1907 a draft p la n of r e or g a n i s a t i o n of the


Pe t er s b u r g C ity or gan i sa ti o n was p u bli sh ed in P r o l e t a r i i .
The plan c on ta i ne d inter alia, the f ol low in g points:
No. 10. The lea din g organ of the St P e t e r s b u r g
or g an i s a t i o n as a whole is the city conference.
Con fe r en ce is elected by direct vote on the basis of
1 -50.
Note. Two stage elections are permi ss ibl e only in
case of insuperable police obstacles and then only
w it h the agreement of the P e t e r s bu r g Committee.
No. 11. Co nference is a st anding body, m e e t i n g at
least twice a month.
N o . 12. Elections for conference are h e ld every six
months.
Note. C onf er enc e elections may be h el d on req ue st of
ha lf the members of the or ga ni s at i o n or by d e ci s i o n
of the conference itself.
N o . 13» Al l members of the Pa rty are el igible for
ele ct i on b y conference to its executive organ, the
P e t e r s b u r g Committee.
11

The o r g a n i s a t i o n was to be d i v i d e d into territorial


r a i o n s , except for r a i l w a y workers who were to have
separate r a i o n s .^

In the f o l l o w i n g issue of Pro l e t a r i i appeared an


a c c o u n t of the c onference w h i c h h ad a d o p t e d the n ew rules.
It was h e l d in F i n l a n d on M a r c h 27 and attended by 133
de l e g a t e s of w h o m more than 100 were workers. Altogether
7,327 members took part in the conference elections w h i c h
c o n t i n u e d for over a m o n t h and were s u p e rvised by the
C e n t r a l Committee. The r e a s o n for the presence of the C.C.
was to a v oid a r e p e t i t i o n of the b i t t e r l y disputed votes
of the J a n u a r y 1907 P e t e r s b u r g conference. The main item
of d i s c u s s i o n was the p r o p o s e d reorganisation. Con f e r e n c e
a d o p t e d the B o l s h e v i k pla n by a large majority, declared
i t self a s t a n d i n g b o d y for six months w i t h permissible
re-elections if the w o r kers w i s h e d it, at two weeks
n o t i c e .^

On A p r i l 8, the conference assembled, again in


F i n l a n d in the seco n d r e g u l a r s e s sion u n d e r the new rules.
The agenda, not all of w h i c h was dealt w i t h because of
lack of time c o n t a i n e d the f o l l o w i n g nine items: M ay Day,
the m e e tings campaign ( p r o t esting against police
restrictions on meetings), the council of rep r e s e n t a t i v e s
(factory delegates who chose the electors from the
workers* curia), elections to the 5th Congress, reports
from D u m a deputies A l e k s i n k i i and Petrov, organ i s a t i o n a l

P r o l . no. 15, 25 M a r c h 1907, p.8.


2
P r o l . no. l6, 2 M a y 1907, p.8.
12

questions, the co-operative movement, the struggle against


1
the Bl ac k Hund red s and unempl oy men t.

In the same issue there was an article by L e n i n in


which, co m me nd i ng the reor gan isa ti on, he re ferred to the
def e at ed M e n s h e v i k proposal. The m a i n difference, he said,
was that the Mensheviks w a n t e d to dispense with the
Pe t e r s b u r g Committee a lt og e t h e r and instead, divide the
conference into a numbe r of c o mm is si on s (propaganda,
agitation, trade unions, etc.) to deal w it h various
aspects of Pa r t y work. A n e l e ct e d p r e s i d i u m of five w o u l d
att end to relations with the central Pa rt y institutions.
L e n i n desc ri bed the proposal to do aw a y with the executive
body, the P e te r sb ur g Committee, as r e d u c i ng the c e n t r a li s m
in dem ocratic cent ral is m to a fiction.

A n o th e r conference of the P e t e r s b u r g o r ga ni sa ti on was


h el d in Oc to be r and was a tt e n d e d by f i ft y -s ev en delegates
w it h full vote and el even w i th consul ta tiv e vote.
Re p r e s s i o n was al ready severe. The permanent session h ad
ob vio usl y been dropped. A l t h o u g h the six m o nt hl y term of
the conference was complete, it was d e ci de d not to p r o ce e d
w it h full elections until the end of the campaign in
con nec ti on with the trial of the So cial Democratic
deputies of the Second Duma. S u p p l e m e n t a r y elections were
he ld to replace those who had b e e n ar r es t e d or had gone
2
away.

1
Ibid.
2
P r o l . no. 20, 19 N o ve m be r 1907» pp.5-6.
13

A l t h o u g h there is no report in P r o l etarii of a


1
s i m i l a r r e o r g a n i s a t i o n in Moscow, it seems that in the
s u m m e r of 1907 the M o s c o w con f e r e n c e met f o r t n i g h t l y as in
Pete r s b u r g . Khodorovskii in his remini s c e n c e s of w o r k in
Moscow s a y s ,
C o n f e r e n c e s were h e l d r e g u l a r l y every f o r t n i g h t ,
all through S a t u r d a y night into Sunday. By 8
o ' c l o c k in the e v e n i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from all
the raions w o u l d g a t h e r at the I z m a i l o v s k i i Zoo.
150-200 raion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at t e n d e d the
c o n f e r e n c e s . . . [which] b e g a n in the e v e n i n g in
the twilight a nd g e n e r a l l y fin i s h e d at daybreak.
In these d e e p l y c o n s p i r a t o r i a l surroundings the
m o o d of the d e l egates was n o t a b l e for a special
earnestness. S p e eches were i n v a r i a b l y b u s i n e s s
like, not a w o r d too m any was to be heard.

A n d before m o r n i n g everyone set off on foot for


their r a i o n s . I u s u a l l y h ad to w a l k from the
I z m a i l o v s k i i Zoo to the S p a r r o w Hills (fifteen
versts) where there was a m e e t i n g of the Cit y
R a i o n conference at my place at 9 or 10 on
S u n d a y morning.^

It w o u l d also see m that the Sormovo town c o n f e r e n c e


3
was a s t a n d i n g b ody m e e t i n g monthly.

Wha t conclusions can be r e a c h e d on the changes that


ha d o c c u r r e d in the P a r t y structure since 1905? It can
c e r t a i n l y be said that the r a m i f i c a t i o n of the reg i o n a l

1
The set of Prole tarii av a i l a b l e to me lacks Nos. 10, 11,
14 .
2
I. Khodo r o v s k i i , 'Nekotorye m o m e n t y iz zhizni m o s k o v s k o i
p a r t i i n o i o r g a n i z a t s i i v 1907 g o d u * , in P r o l e t a r s k a i a
r e v o l i u t s i i a [hereafter cited as PRj (1925) , n o . 2~, p . 1 9 8 .
3
I. Flerovskii, 'Partiinaia r a b o t a v Sormove v gody
r e a k t s i i (1905-1907 g g ) 1 , in PR (1 9 2 5 ), no. 6, p.l8l.
l4

o r g a n i s a t i o n s a n s w e r e d local needs. The entire tenor of


reports in the B o l s h e v i k press was that more assi s t a n c e
was r e q u i r e d from the o b l a s t * l e a d e r s h i p and failure in
w o r k was o f ten b l a m e d on the i n a d e q u a c y of oblas t * forces.
The e i g h t e e n months of semi-legal o perations were not lon g
e n o u g h to indicate h o w relations b e t w e e n the Central
Committee and powerful local centres w o u l d develop. With
a M e n s h e v i k Central C o m m ittee in office for most of the
time B o l s h e v i k - l e d organ i s a t i o n s took an i n d e p e n d e n t stand
whenever they d i s a g r e e d str o n g l y w i t h its policy. H a d the
C.C. b e e n Bolshevik, relations w o u l d have b e e n more
cordial, but the c o n n e c t i n g links b e t w e e n the central b o d y
and the lower organ i s a t i o n s w o u l d still have b e e n somewhat
tenuous. The line of t r a n s m i s s i o n of p o l i c y f rom the top
d o w n w a r d r an through the central press and the leading
p r a c tical organisers. The shortage of these forces was so
acute that c onsiderable scope for initiative n e c e s s a r i l y
lay w i t h local organisations.

T h ree general P a r t y c o n f erences were h e l d in the


c o m p a rative safety of F i n l a n d in 1906-7 on occasions w h e n
it was n e c e s s a r y to resolve m a jor p o l i c y issues quickly,
in p a r t i c u l a r those c o n n e c t e d w i t h elections to the Dum a
and its dissolution. As well as s e r v i n g as a f o r u m in
w h i c h differences were made known, and p o l i c y was roughly
d e c i d e d b y m a j o r i t y v o t e , the c o n f erences acted as an
or g a n i s a t i o n a l stimulant for local P a r t y centres. So l o n g
as the delegates were able to make the journey to F i n l a n d
and b a c k w i t h o u t b e i n g arrested, attendance at the
conferences pro v i d e d a means for the rapid transmission
and c o - o r d i n a t i o n of policy. P r o v i s i o n for the r e g u l a r
h o l d i n g of such conferences was i n c o r p o r a t e d in the P a r t y
rules at the L o n d o n Congress.
15

The u n w i e l d y s t a n d i n g conf e r e n c e s of 1907 c o uld not,


of course, survive the repression. T h e y c o n s t i t u t e d an
i n t e r e s t i n g u n f i n i s h e d experiment. While their v e r y size,
h ad they continued, w o u l d have p r e v e n t e d them from d o ing
a n y t h i n g in P e t e r s b u r g and M o s c o w but de l e g a t e large
powers to the e x e cutive body, they did n e v e r t h e l e s s
establish close links b e t w e e n l e a d i n g committees and
m e m b e r s , a n d above a l l , they o f f e r e d the o p p o r t u n i t y for
the t r a i n i n g of w o rkers in forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and
leadership, thus r e d u c i n g the gap b e t w e e n the
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and the workers.

It w as primarily t h rough p r o p a g a n d a and a g i t a t i o n


that P a r t y members m a i n t a i n e d d ay to d a y p o l i t i c a l contact
w i t h the worke r s . In cities and okrugs the o r g a n i s a t i o n
of p r o p a g a n d a circles, elementary, intermediate and
advanced, was u n d e r t a k e n b y the r a i o n committees, or in
some ins t a n c e s in P e t e r s b u r g and Moscow, by the p o d r a i o n
committees. The circles were d i s c u s s i o n groups u s u a l l y
eight to f i f t e e n in number, of w o r k e r s who were members of
the P a r t y or close to it. T h e y read b a s i c p o l i t i c a l texts
and s t u d i e d the theory of Marxism, political economy, the
P a r t y h i s t o r y and p r o g r a m m e and tasks of the day. The two
difficulties in the w a y of o r g a n i s i n g stable p r o p a g a n d a
circles, w h i c h were always present, arose fro m the lack of
suitable q u a r t e r s an d c o m p etent tutors. T he crowded
w o r k e r s 1 dwellings c o u l d not a c c o m m o d a t e e v e n such small
g a t h e r i n g s , so all sorts of premises wer e used, from clubs
and u n i o n offices and student h o s t e l s to sympathisers*
apartments - but there were n e v e r e n o u g h of them. The
arrival of w a r m w e a t h e r b r o ught some r e l i e f , e n a b l i n g
outdoor classes to be held. Late in 1906 the l e a d i n g
16

M o s c o w raion, Central, r e p orted that w i t h a P a rty


m e m b e r s h i p of 1,373> twenty-four circles w i t h eight to
twelve members each were operating, and n i n e t e e n more had
just b een set up. It was a d m i t t e d that morale in the
r a ion was low owing to a recent u n s u c c e s s f u l strike and
wo r k e r s were apathetic and irr e g u l a r in their attendance
at f a c tory meetings. The B u t y r s k r a i o n w i t h 350 members
1
appears to have ha d nine circles at this time.

The complaint of shortage of p r o p a g a n d i s t s to take


circles was universal, but in a d d i t i o n in P e t e r s b u r g in
1906-7 an i n c r e a s i n g l y critical attit u d e on the part of
a d v a n c e d workers to the courses p r o v i d e d b y B o l s h e v i k
circles became apparent. The G v o z d i l n y i p o d r a i o n (Vasilev
O s t r o v r a i o n ) r e p o r t e d that there were six factories in
the area w i t h circles in each, but that circles w h i c h had
b e e n almost the only means of i n f l u e n c i n g the masses no
long e r satisfied the workers. The most conscious ones,
even P a r t y m e m b e r s , were of the o p i n i o n that they had
heard it all before. T h e y hadn * t ar r i v e d at a
consc i o u s n e s s of partiinost * but h a d gone far b e y o n d the
stage of circles. The remedy, it was suggested, probably
lay in the serious o r g a n i s a t i o n of a d v a n c e d circles and
circles for t r a ining agitators an d p r o p a g a n d i s t s in w h i c h
2
the creative independence of the w o r kers could develop.
The state of affairs in the S e m i a n n i k o v p o d r a i o n (Neva
r a i o n ) was d i s c u s s e d in January 1 9 0 7 . D u r i n g the previous
two months, of twenty-two a g i t a t i o n a l and p r o p a g a n d a

1
P r o l . no. 4, 19 Sep t e m b e r 1906, p.4.
2
Prol. no. 7, 10 No v e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , p.8.
17

meeti n g s a t t e n d e d by 750 people only four lectures had


been devoted to programme and theory - the rest had all
b e e n on the e l e c t i o n campaign. Pro p a g a n d a w o r k was
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because the workers h ad ou t g r o w n the
circles in w h i c h p r o p a g a n d a leaders rep e a t e d for the
hundredth time, themes, words and phrases a l r e a d y familiar
to the workers. The nee d was for experienced, well read
comrades who could answer all questions and b r o a d lectures
were r e q u i r e d on the programme, tactics and h i s t o r y of
Social Democracy. It h a d been impossible to arrange this.
I n s istent a p p r o a c h e s to h i g h e r committees had b e e n
unavailing. A n attempt h ad b een made to carry on a
s ystematic course of lectures on the h i s t o r y of Social
Democracy, but only three had b een held. A f t e r that the
le c t u r e r h a d b e e n a r r e s t e d and imprisoned. A list of the
subjects of the lectures and d iscussions h e l d in the
p o d r a i o n was g i v e n in the report. The lecturers appear to
have inc l u d e d b o t h L e n i n and Zinoviev. The subjects dealt
w i t h were e l e c t i o n a g r e e m e n t s , agreements w i t h the Cadets ,
differences of v i e w points of Bolsheviks and M e n s h e v i k s on
the role of b o u r g e o i s democracy in the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n ,
o r i g i n of the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement, beginnings
of the labour movement, parliamentarism, economism, a nd an
1
agitational course.

By N o v e m b e r 1907 the d ifficulties of o r g a n i s i n g


p r o p a g a n d a in P e t e r s b u r g ha d become acute. Neva, C i t y and
2
N a r v a raions a nd the Central p o d r a i o n all report in

1
P r o l . no. 12, 25 J a n u a r y 1907 } p.6.
2
P r o l . no. 20, 19 N o v e m b e r 1907» pp.6-7*
18

a d d i t i o n to the shortage of m e e t i n g p l a c e s , demands from


w o r kers for serious education, w h i c h could not be
satisfied. In the City r a ion c o n scious w o r k e r s had
e x p r e s s e d a s t r o n g w i s h for a d v a n c e d circles to enable
them to u n d e r t a k e systematic study, but on numerous
occasions lecturers had failed to appear. In the Narva
r a ion an a d v a n c e d circle h ad b e e n o r g a n i s e d to train
w o r kers to s p e a k on political q u e s t i o n s at workers*
mee t i n g s and for a study of the P a r t y programme. Black
H u n d r e d a c t i v i t y and h a r a s s m e n t by spies in the P u t i l o v
works h ad p a r a l y s e d the energies of e ven the most active
workers, who f i n d i n g no s a t i s f a c t i o n in P a r t y work, were
le a v i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n *until times change* and in order
to engage in self e d u c a t i o n and i n d e p e n d e n t w o r k to
d e v elop their general outlook.

N o r was the critical a t t itude c o n f i n e d to Petersburg.


In E k a t e r i n o s l a v at the end of S e p t e m b e r 1907 it was
r e p o r t e d that h a r d l y any p r o p a g a n d a ha d b e e n ca r r i e d on
since May. The local p r o p a g a n d i s t s did not s a t i s f y the
demands made on them and wo r k e r s refused to a t t e n d their
lectures. T h ese propa g a n d i s t s were less i n t e r e s t e d in
their P a rty w o r k than in g e t t i n g p o s i t i o n s in trade unions
1
as s ecretaries or office workers. In the O r e k h o v o -
Pavlovsk raion (Moscow O k r u g ) , a p u r e l y p r o l e t a r i a n centre,
where there was enthusiastic s u pport for the P a r t y and the
o r g a n i s a t i o n n u m b e r e d 500, w i t h five p r o f e s s i o n a l s (two of
them workers) and a regular m o n t h l y income of 150-200
roubles, w o r k e r s were able to c a r r y out organi s a t i o n a l ,

1
Prol. no. 18, 5 N o v e m b e r 1907, p.7*
19

agitational and primary propaganda t a s k s , but for further


propaganda needs local propagandists were inadequate.
Workers complained that they already knew what they had to
1
say. There were six circles in the r a i o n .

A rare example of a satisfactory solution of the


problem both of premises and teachers was found in the
Sormovo organisation, a centre of quarrelling Mensheviks
and Bolsheviks. Here one of the liberal gains of the
revolution had been the occupation of two Church run
schools and the turning over of their administration to a
pedagogical council of thirty-five t e a c h e r s , thirty-two of
whom were Social Democrats. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks
settled their differences sufficiently to appoint their
factional nominees to the staff in strict alternation. A
flourishing Sunday school was established, which using
school buildings and staff, provided not only the elements
of grammar, arithmetic and geography for the masses but
also some fifteen classes a week in political economy,
historical materialism, the Party programme and history of
the revolution and the labour movement. Less advanced
2
workers were catered for in the usual propaganda circles.

The Lugansk organisation with over a thousand members


divided into four r a i o n s , City, Railway and two factory
r a i o n s , reported for the London Congress that in the
second half of 1 9 0 6 and the beginning of 1907 it was able

1
P r o l . no. 8, 23 November 1906, p.8.
2
I. Flerovskii, 'Partiinaia rabota v Sormove v gody
reaktsii (1907-1909 g g . )*, in PR (1925), no. 6, p a s s i m .
20

to car ry on extensive pr opa g a nd a w o r k in the spring and


summer but the classes in wi nt er d r op p e d to ten-fifteen
with at t en da nce s of t en -f ift ee n in each. Wo rkers showed
pa rti cul ar interest in the ag r ar i a n q u e s t i o n and relations
b e t w ee n So cial Demo cra ts and Soci al ist Re volutionaries,
1
Cadets and anarchists.

In the field of a g i t at io n reports from the localities


in dicated more success. Oral a g i t a t i o n in the form of
quick fac tory gate and mass meetings was ca rr ied on
wh e r e v e r agitators could manage to get a wa y w i t h it.
Con ditions v a r i e d en o r mo us ly from place to place even
w i t h i n the same city. Some podraions in P e te r s b u r g
re p ort ed as ea rly as 1906 that open me e ti n g s of workers in
par tic ul ar factories were not possible, but that leaflets
were ea g er ly read. The nu mb er of mass meet in gs grew
shar ply in summer w h e n people went to the n e a r b y forests.

One form of open a g i t a t i o n a l - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a c t i v i ty


w h i c h was v e r y po pular in some centres was the bi r zh a
(exchange). D es cr ip tio ns of this in Samara, D v i n s k and
E k a t e r i n o s l a v ap pear in P r o l e t a r s k a i a R e v o l i u t s i i a .
Zal ezhskii gives an account of what he says was the
classic bi rz h a in Ekaterinoslav. The P a r t y o r ga n i s a t i o n
in 1906 n u m b er ed several thousa nd and was in his w o r d s ,
illegal and h a l f underground. The ci t y and raion
committees, the c on sp ira tor ia l m e e t i n g places, passpo rt
b u r e a u and p ri n t i n g apparatus were all un de rgr ou nd, wh i l e
fac tor y nuclei and well k n o w n local So ci al Dem oc rat s
op er ate d openly. The basic form of open Pa r t y life was

1
P r o l . no. 16, 2 M a y 1907, P-7-
21

provided by the birzha which operated in the main city


boulevards every evening between five and seven. Each
party, Social Democrats, Bund, Socialist Revolutionaries,
Jewish Socialists and anarchists had its own stand. Here
the party members assembled, the news was discussed and
people came in from the raions and factories to see
agitators and organisers. Party literature was sold,
meeting arrangements made and organisational matters
attended to. At one time the police tried to clear the
people from the boulevards but found the birzhi operating
again next day, and thereafter contented themselves with
seeing that the closing time of seven o*clock was
punctually observed. Spies hung about the birzhi in large
numbers. Zalezhskii observes that it was the collapse of
the Ekaterinoslav Party organisation from within rather
than any particular police action that put an end, until
1
1912, to the Ekaterinoslav b i r z h a .

The most effective agitational weapon of the Party in


I905-I907 was the printed leaflet. One of the most
important tasks of any Party centre was to acquire some
sort of printing equipment, or at worst, duplicating
machine, for the production of leaflets on local issues
and current questions. The presses in Petersburg and
Moscow also supplied surrounding areas. The agitational
leaflet addressed to Party members, workers, peasants,
soldiers, or society at large, served as a means of
explaining Party policy and of organising support for it.

1
V.N. Zalezhskii, rV gody reaktsii: vospominaniia
profes s i o n a l a *, in PR (1923)» no. 2, p p . 352-3»
22

Pi at nit sk ii was in charge of the Mo s co w Committee


printing press in 1906-7• A shop was rented and stocked
as a greengrocery specialising in Caucasian products. The
printery was set up in the cellar. While the press was
working the sound could be heard in the shop above, so
that whenever a customer came in, a signal had to be given
to stop the press. All paper for printing was brought in
in the baskets of fruit and vegetables and all leaflets
1
for distribution left the shope in the same way.

In the eight months of the operation of the printery


under Piatni t s k i i ’s direction until its discovery in April
1 9 0 7 , a total of one and a half million leaflets was
turned out. Of the forty-five titles, seven were leaflets
addressed to workers on political and economic questions,
twenty-one to the general public mostly on the political
demands of the Pa rty and the a t ti tu de of Social D e moc ra ts
to various questions, four were leaflets for peasants, two
for soldiers and one for railway workers. Also printed
were two numbers of the railway w o r k e r s 12 journal, the
P a r t y ’s agrarian programme, an appeal for assistance for
arr e st ed persons, reports of the M o s c o w Committee for
November and December 1906, draft resolutions for the 5 th
Congress and an address to the Social Democratic d e pu ti es
2
in the Duma.

The Petersburg Committee reported for the month of


October 1906 that they had printed 264,688 copies of

1
0. Piatnitskii, Zapiski b o l 1s hevika. (M., 1956),
p p .106-8.
2
Ibid., p p . 119-20.
23

'i

leaflets, 4000 issues of P r o l et a r i i and 6000 of V p e r e d .


N e a r l y a year later they r e p o r t e d that »in the recent
period» they had pr inted a total of 2 3 1 , 0 0 0 leaflets,
m os tl y on the Duma el ec ti o n campaign. T h e y had also
p
di s tr ib u t e d 6 3,000 Central Co mm ittee leaflets.

But in spite of the form id abl e amount produced the


dem an d for ag ita ti ona l l ite rat ur e was u n en di ng and the
needs of the o ut l y i n g areas were ne v e r satisfied. The
dif ficulties of p ri n t i n g there were much greater than in
the capitals and the output of local leaflets was
inv ari ab l y insufficient. K u r s k from Ja nu ary to Au gu st
1906 issued 31,300 leaflets (22 titles).^ Lu g a n sk put out
30.000 leaflets in the second h a l f of 1 9 0 6 together w i t h
20.000 reprints of P e t e r s b u r g Co mm ittee and Central
4
Com mittee leaflets. In the O r ek h o v o- P a v l o v s k raion the
p o si ti o n was worse. The local equi pm ent could produce no
more than 3 0 0 - 6 0 0 copies three to four times a month.
T h e y also r e c ei ve d 10,000 leaflets a m on th from the M o s c o w
Commi tte e and M o s c o w Ok rug Committee, but they r e por te d
5
that they n e e de d 1 0 , 0 0 0 copies of each leaflet.

The Urals, wh ere the problems of distance and l ac k of


in t el li g e n t s i a were pa r t ic u l ar l y acute, re ported in
Oc t ob er 1907 that li teratur e was the nerve that u n i t ed the

1
P r o l . no . 7 , 10 N ov e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , p •7 •
2
P r o l . no . 1 7 , 2 0 > Oc tob er 1907, P •7 •
3
P r o l . no . 7 , 10 N ov e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , P •7 •
4
P r o l . no . 1 6 , 2 M a y 1 9 0 7 j P •7 .
5
P r o l . no . 8 , 23 N ov e m b e r 1906, P •7 •
24

far flung f a c tory or g a n i s a t i o n s w i t h the P e r m and O b l a s t 1


Committees. The n e e d was for t h e o r e t i c a l l y a d v a n c e d P a r t y
workers but there was a chronic shortage b o t h of these and
of literature. The Urals had technical equ i p m e n t but not
the li t e r a r y forces to make use of it.

The b r i e f f l o w e r i n g in 1905 of legal n e w s p a p e r s


p u b l i s h e d by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o s i t i o n was cut short
w i t h the s u p p r e s s i o n of the M o s c o w uprising. 1906 b e g a n
w i t h the closure of more than e i g h t y journals and the
arrest of s i xty editors. The Bols h e v i k s in P e t e r s b u r g
were able to do no more than p u b l i s h in s u c c e s s i o n three
legal dailies, V o l n a , V p e r e d and Ekho w h i c h s u r v i v e d from
April to July. W i t h the closure of the last they were
w i t h o u t a legal press until e a r l y in 1 9 0 7 » w h e n three
w e e k l y and four d a i l y papers w i t h even shorter lives
a p p e a r e d b e t w e e n J a n u a r y and April. In M o s c o w the legal
B o l s h e v i k papers S v e t o k , Svobodnoe s l o v o , V o p r o s y d nia and
Istina a p p e a r e d i n t e r m i t t e n t l y in 1906-7* The Caucasian,
Kiev, S a m a r a and L u g a n s k Social D e m ocrats also p u b l i s h e d
journals legally. But it was clear that there was v e r y
little future for a legal Social Demo c r a t i c press in the
a f t e r m a t h of 1905* By summer 1906 B o l s h e v i k leaders felt
an u r gent n e e d b o t h for a p l a t f o r m for their p o l i c y on
important p o l i t i c a l issues and for a journal to c o u n t e r
the M e n s h e v i k c o n t r o l l e d central o r gan S o t sial d e m o k r a t .
A n d so the c e n t r a l illegal B o l s h e v i k n e w s p a p e r P r o l e t a r i i
b e g a n p u b l i c a t i o n on A u g u s t 21, 1906, appearing
successively in Petersburg, Vyborg, G e n e v a a nd Paris.
L e n i n was the edit o r and c o n t r i b u t e d over a h u n d r e d
articles and pieces. Until its closure w i t h no. 50 on
N o v e m b e r 28, 1909 this r e d o ubtable f a c t ional o r gan serv e d

1
Prol. no. 20, 19 N o v e m b e r 1907» P*7*
25

as a journal of p o l i t i c a l news and opinion, the b l u d g e o n


w i t h w h i c h L e nin h a m m e r e d his opponents on the Left and
the Right, and ver y importantly, as a P a r t y organiser.
R e g u l a r reports of congress and c onference resolutions and
the a c t i v i t y of the C e n tral Com m i t t e e and accounts of
happenings in the Duma, trade unions, factories, prisons
and local o rganisations gave the L e n i n i s t political line
and p r o v i d e d a picture of P a r t y activity. Intended for
c i r c u l a t i o n throughout the local organisations, it was
e s s e n t i a l l y a journal for professionals, Party
functionaries and a d v a n c e d workers. P a r allel w i t h the
first t w e n t y numbers of P r o l e t a r i i the editorial b o a r d
p u b l i s h e d twenty numbers of an illegal p o p ular paper for
workers, Vpered. This c e ased p u b l i c a t i o n at the b e g i n n i n g
of 1908 w h e n the editorial b o a r d h ad to emigrate in order
to continue p u b l i c a t i o n of Prole tarii abroad. In the
p r e p a r a t i o n of V p e r e d w o r kers took a more active part and
meetings of the e d i torial staff w i t h w o r k e r c o r r e s pondents
were held.

The shortage and i n a d e q u a c y of B o l s h e v i k journals


suitable for w o r k e r readers w ere g e n e r a l l y recognised. An
a t t empt was made in the P e t e r s b u r g C i t y r a ion early in
1907 to p u b l i s h a paper that w o u l d appeal to the masses
b e c ause it was felt that Prole tarii was rather too
dif f i c u l t for u n d e v e l o p e d w o r k e r s to master. Since the
P e t e r s b u r g Committee press was fully oc c u p i e d w i t h
leaflets, a separate p r i n t i n g a p p a ratus h ad to be
assembled. The students of the O k h t a T e c h n i c a l S c hool
a s s i s t e d in the w o r k of the paper, R a b o c h i i , but there was
26

an informer among them and in June arrests put an end to


the venture.^

Kazarma, an illegal paper for circulation among


soldiers was published in Petersburg from February 1906 to
March 1907• It was the organ of the Bureau of Military
and Combat Organisations. At the end of 1906, 20,000
copies of each issue were published. The illegal paper of
the Moscow organisation was Bor12
ba which appeared between
March 1907 and February 1908.

Publishing underground newspapers in the provinces


was as a rule even more difficult than in the capitals.
Either the technical facilities would be lacking or the
people capable of acting as editors. Great efforts were
made in the Urals to publish illegal papers. Between
October 1906 and December 1907 five appeared, Ufimskii
rabochii, Rabochii (each issue 10,000 copies), Uralskij
rabochii, Krest1ianskaia gazeta (8000 copies) and
Soldatskaia gazeta (2000). According to Liadov,
sufficient type for three or four papers was provided by a
raid on a gubernia printery by the Party combat group at
the time when the Urals organisation was actively
campaigning in the elections for the 2nd Duma and the 5th
2
Party Congress.
Social Democratic work among the peasants was a
subject of discussion in Bolshevik okrug organisations in

1
A. Vasil*ev, xIzdanie gazety Rabochii v 1907 g o d u * , in PR
(1922), no. 5, pp.200-5.
2
M. Liadov, Iz zhizni partii nakanune i v gody pervoi
revoliutsii (M. , 19 26) , p .185•
27

1906 and 1907. Wit h the general tactic that the p e a s a n t r y


w o u l d be the ally of the u r b a n w o r k i n g class in carrying
out a democratic revolution, the immediate p r o b l e m was how
to involve the peasants in w i d e r issues than the shortage
of land, and to find suitable o r g a n i s a t i o n a l forms for the
political struggle in the villages. P a r t y organisers were
fully aware, as a report from the N i z h n i N o v g o r o d district
in S e p t ember 1906 put it, that it was impossible to
organise the peasants w i t h o u t u s i n g the slogan of the
1
seizure of the land. A conference of the Nizhni N o v g o r o d
O k r u g o r g a n i s a t i o n at this time saw its m a i n tasks as
b e i n g to encourage the peasants to refuse to pay taxes,
w i t h h o l d recruits, replace local a uthorities w i t h peasant
nominees and take p o s s e s s i o n of the land. The m e t h o d of
o r g a n i s a t i o n was to set up r e v o l u t i o n a r y peasant
2
committees and councils of p e a s a n t s 1Dum a deputies.

Reports from various localities agree that the


readiness of the peasants to l i sten to Social Dem o c r a t i c
ag i t a t i o n d e p e n d e d on the closeness of their contacts wit h
u r b a n workers. One r e p o r t e r from the Ukraine po i n t e d out
that in Central R u s s i a peasants who w o r k e d in towns and
re t u r n e d regularly, sometimes as often as once a w e e k to
their villages, were the transmitters of r e v o l u t i o n a r y
i d e a s , w h e reas in the U k r aine the poor h a d re m a i n e d in the
countryside as a rural p r o l e t a r i a t and the towns h a d not
3
revolutionised the villages.

1
Prol. no. 4, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1906, p.7»
2
Ibid.
3
Prol. no. 7> 10 N o v e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , p.7»
28

A c o n f erence of V o l g a O k r u g organisations w i t h
representatives from Samara, Saratov, Nizhni Novgorod,
S i m b i r s k and K a z a n p r e s e n t e d the most ambitious and
1
d e t a i l e d p l a n of w o r k for a large peasant area. The
general c onclusions from the reports given were that the
central point around w h i c h all peasant demands were to be
united was the slogan of the seizure of the land and that
the most r e v o l u t i o n a r y e l e ments in the village were the
semi-proletarians and p r o l e t a r i a n s created by the presence
of industry. There had b e e n a general decline of
confidence in the Tsa r a nd peasants were b e g i n n i n g to see
the value of f r a t e r n i s i n g w i t h soldiers and the n e e d for
u n i t y w i t h the workers. Forms of mass struggle were to be
directed towards u s i n g the peasants' traditional r e j e c t i o n
of a u t h o r i t y from above and e n c o u r a g i n g them to seize
a u t h o r i t y at the village level. T h e y were to be u r g e d to
refuse tax payments, bo y c o t t auctions of the p ossessions
of tax defaulters, b o y cott courts and police who wer e to
be r e f u s e d quarters and fodder for their horses and to
resist arrest, free those arrested, refuse to supply
recruits and d e s t r o y r e c r u i t i n g lists. The f a v oured type
of o r g a n i s a t i o n was the n o n - p a r t y r e v o l u t i o n a r y peasant
committee w h i c h w o uld l i n k the villages, d istribute
r e v o l u t i o n a r y literature and organise mass meetings. The y
should be in contact w i t h local o r g a n i sations of r a i l w a y
men and w o r k e r s in district factories. A n o t h e r f i eld of
a c t i v i t y was to ascertain what stores of firearms were
h e l d by the landowners, police and government and to
organise p e a s a n t combat groups. At the moment of decisive

1
P r o l . no. 8, 23 N o v e m b e r 1 9 0 6 , pp.4-6.
29

struggle the pe a s a n t c o m m ittees w o u l d assume the


leadershi p in the l o c a l i t i e s and c a r r y out land seizure
under the control of the village. The conference also
discussed a p l a n of o k r u g organisation.

The d e l i b e r a t i o n s of this conference clearly r e v e a l


the d i f f i culties that s t ood in the w a y of Social D e m o c r a t i c
orga n i s a t i o n in the countryside. While the forms of
struggle envisaged, disruption, n o n - c o - o p e r a t i o n and civil
disobedience, were f a m i l i a r enough to the peasants and
w i d e l y p r a c t i s e d in times of social disturbance, they
could not, b y their v e r y nature, be brought easily w i t h i n
the f r a mework of d i s c i p l i n e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i o n u n d e r
the control of the Party. To cope w i t h the peasants once
they did start to move the conference con s i d e r e d that it
was essential to train cadres of peasant agitators from
amongst u r b a n w o r k e r s who had r e t a i n e d their links w i t h
the v i l l a g e .

A report f rom Kasimov, R i a z a n province, stated that


peasants in that are a h ad al r e a d y b e e n i nfluenced by the
pure l y p r o l e t a r i a n sons of s e m i - p r o l e t a r i a n peasants, who
came bac k eac h y e a r from their factories in Petersburg,
Moscow, I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k and B a k u for the army call up,
bringing with them Social Dem o c r a t i c ideas and literature.
In K a s i m o v an o r g a n i s a t i o n c o m p r i s i n g twelve small
podraions w i t h five or six villages in each had b e e n in
1
existence for three months.

The most m a r k e d example of a pe a s a n t p o p u l a t i o n


r e s p o n d i n g to the ideas from the cities m ay be found in

1
Prol. no. 8, 23 N o v e m b e r 1906, p.8.
30

the reports from the St P e t e r s b u r g O k r u g . Here there was


strong c r i t i c i s m by organisers of the P a r t y 1s a g i t ational
material and a p o p ular o r gan was c a lled for. Proletarii
was d i s m i s s e d as u n s u i t a b l e but it was felt that V p e r e d
could be improved if the edi t o r i a l b o a r d w o u l d meet the
group w o r k i n g among the peasants to discuss articles about
1
the villages. In mi d - 1 9 0 7 it was r e p o r t e d that the w o r k
of Social D e m o cratic groups in the O k r u g had bee n much
as s i s t e d b y workers r e t u r n i n g to their native places
because of u n e m p l o y m e n t or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e banishment.
T h e i r role was more important than that of the village
teachers. The peasants r e g a r d e d the P a r t y v e r y seriously.
The report also stated that in some areas the whole
community cont r i b u t e d to P a r t y expenses and there were
districts where Social D e m o c r a t i c organ i s a t i o n s were in
the forefront in all local activities and led the economic
struggle against the landlords for the l o w e r i n g of rents
2
on pasture and m e a d o w land.

The e l e c t i o n ca m p a i g n p r e c e d i n g the c o n v o c a t i o n of
the 2nd Dum a in F e b r u a r y 1907 was the occ a s i o n of fierce
disputes b e t w e e n B o l s heviks and M e n s h e v i k s in the r e c e n t l y
re- u n i t e d Party. The S t o c k h o l m Congress r e s o l u t i o n on the
Dum a had s t ated that the a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n the new
bourgeois so c i e t y and the old regime w o u l d precipitate
conflicts b e t w e e n the g o v e rnment and the p a r l i a m e n t a r y
body, and it was the d uty of Social Democrats to use these
conflicts and those w i t h i n the D uma itself to extend and

1
P r o l . no. 9> 7 D e c e m b e r 1906, p.8.
2
P r o l . no. l6, 2 M a y 1907, p.7.
31

deepen the revolutionary movement. But each faction


emphasised different parts of the resolution. The
Mensheviks, whose views were later summed up by Martov at
the London Congress, recognised that with the defeat of
the revolutionary challenge in December 1905» the militant
mood of the masses was declining, but the Duma, owing its
existence to the revolution and forced to struggle with
the autocracy to survive, could constitute a rallying
point for broad sections of the population, and this would
assist the regrouping of social forces in the interests of
further revolutionary development. The linking of the
anti-government struggle of the Duma with the proletarian
movement became the overriding aim of Menshevik tactics.
They urged the conclusion of electoral agreements with the
liberals wherever this was necessary to keep out
candidates from the Right. They raised the slogans of the
Duma as an organ of power to achieve a constituent
assembly and of a ministry responsible to the Duma.
Bolshevik thinking expressed by Lenin rejected the
idea of constitutional development and insisted that the
political struggle between autocracy and people would have
to be resolved by revolutionary means. The Duma could not
be used to realise the demands of workers and peasants,
and the primary task of Social Democratic deputies was to
use the platform it provided, not for legislative purposes
but for revolutionary agitation and propaganda. There
could be no alliance between the working class and the
essentially counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. In the
matter of electoral agreements there could be no deal with
the Cadets who would compromise with the government.
Since Lenin discounted the danger of candidates of the
32

extreme Right winning support there was no general need


for agreements, but if they were called for, they must be
concluded only with the parties to the left of the
Cadets - the Socialist Revolutionaries and the T r u d o v i k s .

The opposing programmes resulting from these tactical


aims brought Bolsheviks and Mensheviks into collision in a
number of localities and in Petersburg led to a split in
the organisation. Under the electoral law there were four
categories of voters, landowners, peasants, urban dwellers
(determined by property and residential qualifications)
and workers. The elections were not direct, all
categories voted separately in their own curiae for
electors (v y b orshchiki), who met all together in city or
provincial assemblies and chose from amongst themselves
the number of deputies alloted to the district. For
peasants there were two extra stages in the elections and
for workers one. The workers first elected
representatives (upolnomochennie) on the basis of one for
factories of 50 to 1000 workers, and for larger factories
one for every 1000 workers. Work places with fewer than
fifty employees and certain establishments such as
bakeries and produce factories, which were not included in
the categories of industrial, manufacturing, mining,
metallurgical or railway undertakings were not entitled to
elect representatives. Meetings of representatives chose
electors from their number to go to the general electoral
assembly. In the workers* curia where Social Democrats
commanded overwhelming support the question of agreements
did not arise, but in the peasants* and urban curiae and
in the higher stage of the election, in the electoral
assemblies, it did. At the beginning of the campaign in
33

D ec e m b e r 1906 a P ar ty conf er enc e met at Tamme rf ors to


discuss the elections. M e n s h e v i k tactics were adopted.
In the workers* curia no agreements w i t h any parties w h i c h
did not accep t the idea of the class struggle of the
pr o le ta r ia t were permitted. In other curiae agreements
w i t h any o pp os i t i o n parties were pe rm it t e d to ensure the
defeat of the Right. The Bolsh ev iks were opposed to the
m a j o r i t y line but m an a g e d to get the conference to agree
to al low local org ani sa tio ns to make their own ag re ements
within the general directives of the Central Committee
w i t h ou t b e i n g force d to include no n Mar xi sts in their
lists.

The rift in the P e t e r s b u r g o r g a n i sa t i o n occ ur red in


Ja n u a r y 1907 w h e n the Me n s h ev i k s tried to carry out a
p ol ic y of ag re e me nt w i t h the Cadets, and the Bolsheviks,
in a m a j o r i t y on the city committee, used the loophole of
the con ference d e ci s io n g i vi n g d i s c r e ti o n to local
organisations. The wi t h dr a w al of the Me ns heviks from the
city conference in Ja nuary fol lo wed bi t te r disputes over
credentials. As a result of the split Socialist
Revolutionaries made consid er abl e gains in the workers*
curia in the D uma election. O r g an i s a ti o n a l unity, but not
harmony, was r es t o r e d w h e n a new city conference was
el ec te d un der the su pe r vi si o n of the Central Committee.
It was this co nference w i t h a B o l s h e v i k ma j or i t y of 92 to
4 l , w h i c h ad o p te d the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n proposals d i s c u ss e d
above.

In general in the conduct of the Duma cam pa ign the


f or m a t i o n or not of blocs w i t h other parties de p en d e d on
w h i c h fa c tio n was in control of the local organisation.
Od e s s a Bo l sh ev i ks co mplaine d that the local o r ga n i s a t i o n
34

having decided to support agr e e m e n t s w i t h the Cadets had


de v o t e d the o r g a n i s a t i o n ^ apparatus and expe r i e n c e d
agitators to the Cadet campaign. It turned out that of
the 82 O d e s s a electors, 27 were Cadets, 33 J e w i s h U n ion of
w h o m h a l f were Cadets, 17 Social Democrats and 5 Socialist
Revolut i o n a r i e s . T h ere n e v e r ha d b e e n any danger of the
B l a c k Hun d r e d s w i n n i n g p l a c e s , a c c o r d i n g to the B o l s h e v i k
a c c o u n t .^

As might be expected, the factional programmes were


i n t e r p r e t e d in some of the l ocalities in a grossly
sim p l i f i e d if not d i s t o r t e d way, c o l o u r i n g the whole
a p p r o a c h b o t h to the Duma elections and to P a r t y work.
L e n i n 1s f o r m u l a t i o n that the p o l i tical crisis was a
r e v o l u t i o n a r y one d e m a n d i n g direct struggle by workers and
peasants became for m a n y Bol s h e v i k s a programme of
p r e p a r a t i o n and a c c u m u l a t i o n of forces for the imminent
uprising. L i a d o v who was an org a n i s e r in the Urals
r e c a l l e d that for the B o l s h e v i k s the elections to the 2nd
D uma were c o n d u c t e d in the m a i n u n d e r the slogan of
p r e p a r a t i o n for a r m e d i n s u r r e c t i o n u n d e r the lead e r s h i p of
the Party. The address to the v o t e r was couched somewhat
as f o l l o w s :
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of v a r i o u s parties are a d d r e s s i n g
you, all of them p r o m i s i n g y o u that they will
achieve a great deal in the State Duma, if yo u
elect them. W e , on the contrary, promise y o u
n o t h i n g and e m p h a t i c a l l y declare that no m a tter
w h o m y o u send to the Duma, they w o n*t be able to
get y o u a thing. The Dum a is powerless to give
a n y t h i n g at all. If it meets as a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
Duma, it w ill be d i s s o l v e d by the Tsa r just as
the 1st D u m a was. If it is a B l a c k H u n d r e d or

1
Prol. no. 13, 11 F e b r u a r y 1907» p.6.
35

Cadet Duma, it will help the Tsar to stifle the


revolution and defend the landlords* land
against the peasants, and the factory owners*
profits from inroads by the workers. If you
want to carry the revolution through to the end,
if you want to drive the landlords from the
land for good and all, and if you want to
defend the eight hour working day for the
workers, then elect members of our Party. They
will not go to the Duma to give you anything or
to get through legislation that will benefit
you, but in order to organise, in conjunction
with you and workers and peasants throughout
Russia, the armed uprising, the decisive
assault on the whole Tsarist-landlord order.
Elect only those people as electors and
deputies, who can organise all you voters and
prepare for action. It won*t be the Duma, but
you yourselves with your elected deputies in
the van, who will carry through the revolution
to the end, beat back all the attacks of
reaction and take the whole of the landlords*
land. Let only those go to the Duma, who are
prepared to end up in penal servitude or on
the gallows instead of in the Duma.^
Khodorovskii in his article on Party life in Moscow at the
same time was scarcely more subtle. He said that at
workers* meetings discussions with the Mensheviks revolved
around two points - estimation of the present situation
and relations with non-proletarian parties. On the first
point the armed uprising was paramount - the crisis could
be resolved only by armed revolt, and on the second, there
could be agreement only with those parties that wished to
overthrow the autocracy and expropriate the land. 2
Bobrovskaia, who was working in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where

1
M. Liadov, op. cit., p p . 186-7.
2
I. Khodorovskii, op. cit., p.195*
36

it was generally recognised that the workers* militancy


had declined and there were sharp divisions among Party
members as to whether a planned regional strike of textile
workers had any chance of success, said that for both
supporters and opponents of the strike the prime need was
to build up strength for the final struggle, the armed
insurrection, which seemed closer to them then than it was
1
in fact. Disagreements were purely on a tactical level.

Equally the Menshevik idea of the broad popular


opposition was oddly interpreted at times, as in
Ekaterinoslav, where it was argued among Party members
that the weakness of the Party was due to it reaching only
a fraction of the working class, but that councils of
workers representatives (upolnomochennie) brought into
being by the electoral laws could be used entirely legally
to create a democratic nucleus for wide sections of the
proletariat. In the discussion which this evoked the
preoccupation with forms of mass organisation became
evident. It was suggested that the councils of
representatives might replace factory committees or that
they could serve, after being democratically broadened by
elections from all undertakings, as links between the
Party and the broad masses, or that they could act as
centres organising around themselves the population at
2
large and not just the working class. The element of
crackpottery in these suggestions and the impractical

1
Ts. Zelikson-Bobrovskaia, Stranitsy iz revoliutsionnogo
proshlogo 1903-1908 (M., 1955), pp.52-3.
2
Prol. no. 15, 25 March 1907» pp.6-7.
37

hopes e n t e r t a i n e d for a n o n - p a r t y workers* congress, a


p r o j e c t m u c h fav o u r e d in 1906 and still dis c u s s e d in 1 9 0 7 ,
are evidence of the i m m a t u r i t y and fl u i d i t y of
organisational forms at this t i m e , due to the absence of a
t r a d i t i o n and h i s t o r y of stable w o r k i n g class or any other
v o l u n t a r y o r g a n isations in Russia. In this context the
M ensheviks* search for ways of a p p r o a c h to the workers on
a b r o a d class basis was a difficult one, but on the other
hand, they could point to signs i n d i c a t i n g that the
w o r k e r s w o u l d re s p o n d to class organisation. Another
report from E k a t e r i n o s l a v said that the interest of
workers in the Social D e m o c r a t i c programme was v e r y great.
L e a f l e t s h a n d e d out at factories brought immediate demands
for p r o p a g a n d i s t s a nd organisers. But the local
p r o l e t a r i a t was n e i t h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y nor p o l i t i c a l l y
interested, it r e f r a i n e d from v o t i n g in the elections from
a p a t h y and indifference r a t h e r than as an active boycott.
What it was inte r e s t e d in, was a class programme and
t a c t i c s .^

The perf o r m a n c e of B o l s heviks in the Duma e l e c t i o n


c a m p a i g n showed that while L e n i n was e n g aged in w o r k i n g
out and e x p o u n d i n g the tactics w h i c h w o u l d m a i n t a i n intact
a r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the fr a m e w o r k of a
p a r l i a m e n t a r y regime, m a n y of his followers were only h a l f
c o n v e r t e d from a c o n v i c t i o n that the bourgeois
p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n should be boycotted. T h e y use d
the e l e c tions to provide themselves w i t h an a g i t ational
p l a t f o r m but their minds were filled w i t h the coming
insurrection. W i t h such a t t itudes it was natural enough

1
Prol. no. 18, 29 O c t o b e r 1907> pp.7-8.
38

that the g r e a t l y re d u c e d area of tolerated political


a c t i v i t y a f ter June 1907 w o u l d give rise to
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h all legal p o l itical w o r k and renewed
attachment to the bo y c o t t d u r i n g the 3Fd Duma elections.

F r o m s h o rtly a f ter the S t o c k h o l m Congress the


Bolshevik s h a d b e e n u r g i n g that an e x t r a o r d i n a r y congress
be called on the grounds that the Mens h e v i k s were g r o ssly
o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d on the Central Committee, and that the
slogan of the Duma as an organ of power to convene a
c onstituent a s s e m b l y was not supported by the P a r t y
1
membership. At the T a m m e r f o r s conference it was decided
that a r e g u l a r congress w o u l d be called in 1907 and the
Bolsheviks b e g a n to organise e n e r g e t i c a l l y for the numbers
to overt u r n the M e n s h e v i k Central Committee and reverse
M e n s h e v i k policy. L i a d o v describes h o w he was sent by
L e n i n w i t h four organisers to the Urals to collect as
large a cont i n g e n t as possible for the congress from that
solidly B o l s h e v i k region. This he did w i t h great v i gour
and a c c o r d i n g to his own account, f i n ding on arrival a
m e m b e r s h i p of over 5000 saw it d o ubled in a m a t t e r of
months, e n t i t l i n g the Urals to 24 delegates, all
Bolsheviks. In fact there seem to have b e e n 19 from the
Urals at the congress (one of them a Menshevik). To make
this o r g a n i s a t i o n a l tour de force p o s sible it was
n e c e s s a r y for the b o e v a i a dr u z h i n a (fighting squad) to

1
V.I. Lenin, S o c h i n e n i i a . 5th ed. ( M . , 1958- )
[hereafter cited as Lenin], XIV, pp.63-5*
2
Piatyi (Londonskii) s ne z d . . . l 9 0 9 g» P r o t o k o l y . (M., 1 9 6 3 )
[hereafter cited as P r o t . V , p p .621-5 J 5 Is toriia
K o m m u n i s t i c h e s k o i p a rtii S o v e tskogo S o i u z a ( M . , 1964- ),
v o l . 2, p.212 map.
39

carry out two expropriations - a robbery of a mail train


and a raid on a gubernia printery to give them the money
and type to publish newspapers, indispensable organising
agents in so large a region.

Bolshevik organising methods in other areas were less


crude. Bobrovskaia writing of the same campaign in
Ivanovo-Voznesensk spoke of the two factional platforms
being put to the Party members, even where it meant in the
2
absence of Mensheviks that a Bolshevik had to do it.
Khodorovski also said that in Moscow both programmes were
3
presented to the workers.

With a weak central organisation and clearly defined


differences of policy the two factions tended to
concentrate their strength and find support in separate
areas. Where one faction was stronger than the other and
entrenched in a higher committee the smaller faction would
try to consolidate itself in the leadership of a lower
Party body, exercising the utmost autonomy and ignoring as
far as possible the existence of the higher committee.
This was the case in the Petersburg organisation. In the
Bolshevik controlled City and Neva raions the Mensheviks
were in a majority in the Franco-Russian and Obukhov
podraions and were reported to be operating independently,
ignoring the raion committees and in the case of the
4
Obukhov p o d r a i o n , refusing to transmit dues.

M. Liadov, op. cit., pp.184-92.


2
T s . Zelikson-Bobrovskaia, op. cit., p.53*
3
I. K h o d o r o v s k i i , op. cit., p,19^+.
4
P r o l . no. 20, 19 November 1907» pp.5-6.
4o

In Sormovo with, a total membership of 500, the


Mensheviks with 300 had a majority on the town committee
and in two r a i o n s . In the third the Bolsheviks had a
strong organisation. Formal unity was maintained in the
form of the general meetings of the town conference of
delegates from factory nuclei once a month. The
Bolsheviks had one member on the town committee to keep
themselves informed. They had their own printing press,
issued their own leaflets, organised circles, had separate
meetings and a direct unofficial link with the Central
Industrial Oblas t * Bureau. Apart from this irregular
contact with the regional organisation, all their other
activities were formally in accordance with Party rules.
Their raion committee was elected at the raion conference.
Its members included outstanding Party workers who did not
necessarily belong to the r a i o n , and workshop
representatives from outside the raion. Where expedient
the committee resorted to co-option confirming this by
1
later election.

In the Vyborg raion on the other hand where the


Mensheviks were overwhelmingly strong and the Bolsheviks
supporters scattered, the latter were reduced to
complaints that the Mensheviks were preventing the
distribution of Bolshevik political literature, failing to
inform them of Party meetings and ignoring or ridiculing
Petersburg Committee decisions. In view of this, it was
reported, a meeting of thirty-seven representatives of
factories in the r a i o n , representatives from the shop
assistants and several Bolshevik organisers and

1
I. Flerovskii, op. cit., pp.181-2.
kl

propagandists had resolved to set up a commission of one


representative from each undertaking and to establish
contact with the city committee independently of the
raion.

The congress that finally assembled in London from


April 30 to May 19, 1907 was a trial of strength for both
factions. Their numbers were almost equal, 8 9 -8 8 ,^ but

both sides drew allies from the recently admitted national


groups. The Bundists tended towards the Mensheviks and
the Poles and Letts to the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik
censure of the policy of the Central Committee and the
conduct of the Duma Social Democratic fraction aimed to
discredit the Mensheviks but failed to win the support of
the congress. The weight of the attacks was directed
against the Central Committee*s concessions to the liberal
opposition and the abandonment of a revolutionary position
in the Duma. The vote on the Central Committee however,
was that having heard its report, the congress pass on to
the next business. The only implied criticism was in the
directive that the Central Committee in future should
circulate, not less than six weeks before a regular
congress a report on its activities, work in the
localities, electoral agitation where this had been
carried out, and a financial statement. On the report of
the Duma fraction, the Bolshevik resolution criticising the
group*s wavering attitudes and indicating the strictly

1
P r o l . no. 13, 11 February 1907» P*7*
2
Istoriia K o mmunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza
(M. , 196k- Y~, v o l . 2~, p .215.
42

Independent revolutionary path it was to follow, was


defeated. A short general resolution of Bundist origin
was carried approving its activities and expressing
confidence that it would work under the leadership of the
Central Committee.

The Bolsheviks however, did register some important


victories. The resolution on relations with bourgeois
parties characterising them by their class position and
calling for united action only with the Popular Socialists,
Trudoviks and Socialist Revolutionaries against reaction
and the liberal bourgeoisie was written by Lenin. The
resolution on the workers1 congress and non-party workers*
organisations in which the Mensheviks were isolated,
1
deserted even by numbers of the Bund, tersely asserted
the significance of the trade unions as the most important
form of mass organisation for the defence of the economic
interests of the masses other than the Social Democratic
Party, and while the importance of participating in mass
organisations was recognised, it was added that the idea
of a workers* congress led to replacement of Social
Democracy by non-party workers* organisations and to
disorganisation of the Party. The brief resolution on
trade unions supported the idea of partiinos t * (partyness)
recently adopted by the Bolsheviks.

The Party rules adopted by the congress provided for


the obligatory holding of Party conferences every three or

1
The voting figures were 165 for the resolution, 94
against, 21 abstaining. Unfortunately the names of those
voting have not been recorded in the Minutes. Prot. V,
p.561.
43

four months, elected on a basis of one delegate to every


5000 members. Their decisions were to become binding only
if they were subsequently confirmed by the Central
Committee. The institution of conferences as a means of
strengthening the links binding the local organisations
with the centre was regarded with satisfaction by the
1
Bolsheviks. The new Central Committee elected at the
congress comprising Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles,
Bundists and Letts gave the Bolsheviks a majority with the
support of the Poles and Letts. The abolition of the
favoured position of the editorial board of the central
organ, whose members had had a full vote in the Central
Committee on political questions, but was now relegated to
the position of a Party institution under the control of
the Central Committee was also welcomed by the Bolsheviks
as a strengthening of the authority of the central body. 2

The only vote at the congress which indicated a deep


division of opinion among Bolsheviks was that on partisan
acts. The resolution condemning partisan attacks and
expropriations (armed robberies) was carried 170-35 with
52 abstaining. There was very little discussion since the
item came up almost at the end of the congress. A
considerable number of Bolsheviks neither voted nor
abstained, were simply absent. In the report from the
Central Committee Martov had said that terrorist acts of
protest against government repression occurred when mass

1
G. Zinoviev, TOrganizatsionnie voprosy*, in Itogi
Londonskogo stfezda R.S.D.R.P. Sbornik s t a t e i T (Spb.,
1907), P.79.
2
Ibid., pp.77-8.
kk

political militancy and activity were declining. Partisan


terror and the armed robberies which accompanied it
demoralised the revolutionary elements of the proletariat.
He drew attention to the change in the role of the boevye
druzhiny (fighting squads) which at the height of the
revolutionary uprising had functioned as a necessary Party
organ carrying out certain technical tasks. But with the
subsiding of mass revolutionary activity certain elements
in the fighting squads attempted to set up independent
para-military organisations occupied with the preparation
of the armed insurrection. In order to secure supplies
these groups had to resort to expropriations from the
government and private individuals. Enjoying the sympathy
of anarchist minded workers the boeviki helped in the
process of demoralisation. The Central Committee wished
to dissolve the fighting squads but had met with
resistance from people engaged in creating a centralised
1
fighting organisation linked with the troops.
Lenin*s position on the question of partisan warfare
had been stated in September 1906 in his article Guerrilla
2
warfare. Starting from an historical analysis similar to
Martov*s he came to different conclusions. Guerrilla
actions arising as part of the mass struggle in the course
of the class war were a feature of that stage of the
Russian revolution that followed the defeat of the armed
uprising. It was not guerrilla actions in themselves that
demoralised the mass movement. Disorganisation and
demoralisation arose when the Party was incapable of
exercising control over them.

Prot. V, pp.79-81.
2
Lenin XIV, pp.1-12.
45

L e n i n had a r g u e d that gue r r i l l a warfare springs


sp o n t a n e o u s l y from a c e r tain stage of the class war. 1906
could be r e g arded as a case in point, when a combination
of d e c l i n i n g mass struggle, acute economic conditions and
repressive r e t a l i a t o r y acts by the government p r o duced
p a r t i s a n actions and expropriations. But by 1907
S t o l y p i n ts d r a c o n i a n measures h ad r e - e s t a b l i s h e d the
government's authority. A r m e d struggle h ad d e c l i n e d to
the point of individual acts of violence and robbery.
D e m o r a l i s a t i o n of the w o r kers was a f f e c t i n g the Party
ranks. It was at least time to draw a t t e n t i o n to the
dangers of the situation, as had b e e n done in a letter
1
from M o s c o w on expropriations. But L e n i n was n o t o r i o u s l y
silent on the m a t t e r at the congress. He v o ted against
the resolution. It is clear w h y he could have n o t h i n g to
2
say. He was too d e e p l y i n v olved w i t h the large scale
robberies b e i n g carried out by the B o l s h e v i k technical
commission. The last m a j o r one took place in Tiflis in
June 1907 shortly a f ter the congress. It was not until
1909 in the course of his struggle against the left w i n g
of the B o l s h e v i k f a c tion that L e n i n c h a r a c t e r i s e d the
tendency to w i t h d r a w into independent secret groups for
the p r e p a r a t i o n of terrorist acts and a r med insu r r e c t i o n
against the government as anarchism, h a v i n g n o t h i n g in
common w i t h Social Democracy.

1
Prol. no. 4, 19 S e p t e m b e r 1906, pp.5-6.
2
For an account of the i nv olvement of B o l s h e v i k leaders in
expropriations, see B e r t r a m D. Wolfe, T h ree who made a
r e v o l u t i o n (Penguin Books 1 9 6 6 ), chapter 22.
46

The voting figures on the partisan resolution give


some interesting information. Of the 34 who voted with
Lenin against the resolution, no fewer than 17 were Letts,
the greatest expropriators of them all. Of the remaining
17> all Bolsheviks, 5 were from Moscow, 4 from Petersburg,
3 from the Urals, 3 from the Central Industrial Region, 1
from Siberia and 1 from Odessa. Of these, Liadov (Urals)
and Yaroslavskii (Petersburg) had been leading figures in
the organisation of fighting squads. The most noticeable
feature of this voting is the fact that areas where
expropriations flourished, the Urals, the Volga and the
Central Industrial Region, provided so few supporters of
the practice among Bolshevik Party workers and
professionals. Turning to those who abstained from voting
we find even more eloquent figures. Of the Bolsheviks,
there were 9 from the U r a l s , 13 from the Central
Industrial Region, 3 from the Volga region, 3 from the
Caucasus, 5 from other provinces, 6 from Petersburg, 3
from Moscow, 1 from Siberia and 1 from the Finland army
group. There were also 5 Poles, 2 Letts and 1 Bundist.
Three Bolsheviks, two from the Central Industrial region
and one from Voronezh voted for the resolution.1

What seems to be indicated here is that in the


regions where Bolshevik professionals and Party workers
had experience of the effects of partisan actions and
expropriations, whether carried out by Socialist
Revolutionaries or Social Democrats, they found themselves
in general unable to dispute the correctness of the
resolution. Liadov in his memoir spoke complacently of

1
P r o t . V, pp . 582-3» 621-9.
47

the Urals d r u z h i n n i k i who carried out e x propriations and


h a v i n g o b s e r v e d that they o p e rated strictly u n der Party
c o n t r o l , a p p e a r e d to think that no problems of morale or
discipline existed. But c l e arly other delegates from the
U r als did not share this o p i nion and in the f o l l o w i n g year
there were reports of the s h a t t e r i n g effects on the P a rty
o r g a n i s a t i o n of the p a r t i s a n acts of Socialist
Revolutionaries and Social Democrats in that region.
Bobrovskaia spoke w i t h h e a r t f e l t d i s a pproval of the
expropriations in I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k and the offers of the
1
expropriators to share the loot w i t h the Party.

The Sormovo B o l s h e v i k s , whose income came e n t i r e l y


from membership subscriptions found themselves at the end
of 1 9 0 7 in extreme n e e d of m o n e y for an illegal paper,
literature and the support of professionals. When
at t e m p t s to organise fund r a i s i n g concerts and lectures
failed, their thoughts turned to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a well
m a n a g e d e x p r o p r i a t i o n of a local f a c tory pay roll. This
had just b e e n d e c i d e d u pon w h e n V.P. N o g i n a r r i v e d in the
town on tour from the Central C o m m i t t e e and flatly forbade
the v e n ture on the grounds that ex p r o p r i a t i o n s h ad
degenerated into h o o l i g a n i s m and r o b b e r y and were
c o r r u p t i n g the Party. No amount of p l e a d i n g about the
2
goo d of the cause could make h i m change his mind.

In O d e s s a on the other h a n d it appears to have b e e n


the expe r i e n c e of local o r g a n isations themselves that led
them to take active steps to d i s s ociate the Party from

1
T s . Z e l i k s o n - B o b r o v s k a i a , op. cit., p.51*
2
I. Flerovskii, op. cit., pp.188-91.
48

expropriations. Here these had begun with raids on stores


to secure clothing for people arrested as well as arms and
rapidly turned into robberies in which professional
criminals took part. Active agitation in the factories by
means of proclamations and talks with workers persuaded
the latter to leave expropriations to robbers and
1lumpens 1.^

The intensity and nature of partisan exploits and


expropriations varied according to the regions in which
they occurred. In the Baltic provinces and the Caucasus
they were bound up with the national struggle and in the
remote and backward Urals expropriations at times took on
a mass character with Robin Hood bands operating with the
sympathy and support of the local population. Partisan
actions in the Central Industrial Region declined rapidly
into small scale robberies and minor terrorism. Even
after acts of lawlessness lessened, the attitudes of mind
that went with them persisted, symptomatic of a raw,
militant and undisciplined working class movement at a low
level of political consciousness. The task of Bolshevik
professionals and Party workers struggling with the
demoralising results of criminal actions and indiscipline
amongst their supporters was of course made a good deal
more difficult by the Bolsheviks* own preoccupation with
hastening the development of the revolutionary movement
into armed insurrection.
The workers themselves seemed to have had a confused
recognition of the dangerous effect of widespread robbery

1
L. Vol*shtein, *Zapiski fabrichnoi rabotnitsy*, in PR
(l922), no. 9, p .l68.
49

and violence upon the standing of the Party, while at the


same time they held fast to the principle of expropriation
This may be seen in the recommendations from Moscow
factory committees in 1906 that the Party itself should
embark upon a major programme of controlled expropriations
The resolution of one meeting read,
In view of the fact that the [Stockholm] Congress
did not forsee the lamentable consequences of the
banning of expropriations of public property,
thus allowing expropriationist tendencies to
assume distorted forms; in view of the fact that
there are no forces to restrain these tendencies,
it is proposed, in order that the Party should
not be entirely discredited:-
1. that we take upon ourselves the organisation
of expropriations of public property, at the same
time pointing out the complete impermissibility
of public property expropriations and stating
this publicly;
2. in view of the spontaneous growth of militant
actions in the forms of all sorts of
confiscations and attacks, and the impossibility,
owing to the decisions of the Unification
Congress, of organising and regulating this
tendency within the Party, the meeting declares
itself in favour of the creation of non-party
revolutionary combat squads in order to carry out
partisan actions and assist the proletariat in
the organisation of the armed uprising^.
The congress resolution on trade unions, a brief
statement passed almost without discussion at the end of
the congress by a majority of 155 to 5> with 19
abstentions and 3 refusals to vote, declared support for
the Stockholm Congress resolution^ which had urged the
setting up of non-party trade unions and active

1
Prol. no. 4, 19 September 1906, pp.5-6.
50

p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Social De m o c r a t s in u n i o n work, but added


to this the f o l l o w i n g : -
Congr e s s reminds P a r t y o r ganisations and Social
D e m o c r a t s w o r k i n g in trade unions of one of the
f u n d a m e n t a l tasks of Social D e m o cratic w o r k in
them: to assist in the r e c o g n i t i o n by the trade
unions of the i d e o logical l e a d e r s h i p of the
Social D e m o c r a t i c Party, and in the
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l links w i t h it,
and of the n e c e s s i t y where local conditions
permit, to put this aim into effect.^
This last part of the resolution, a concise summary of
partiinos t * e x p r e s s e d the n e w l y a d o pted p o s i t i o n of
Bols h e v i k s on the trade u n i o n question, and r e p r e s e n t e d a
sign i f i c a n t change from the views they had h e l d for some
years. In What is to be d o n e ? L e n i n h ad s h a r p l y ass e r t e d
the prime importance of the pol i t i c a l struggle and the
prime n e e d to b u i l d the p o l i t i c a l party. B o l s heviks paid
little a t t e n t i o n to trade unions, but in 1905 the p r o b l e m
of d e f i n i n g the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the
industrial and pol i t i c a l wings of the w o r k i n g class
movem e n t s u d d e n l y became a p r e s s i n g one, w h e n the great
pol i t i c a l strikes were fo l l o w e d by massive moves by the
workers to form trade unions. D i s c u s s i o n in the B o l s h e v i k
press, and approval by the B o l s h e v i k Central C o m mittee of
certain articles give a clear idea of the reactions of the
leadership to the e m e r g i n g mass trade unions. While there
can be no doubt that they meant it, w h e n they said again
and a g a i n that the economic (trade union) struggle was an
i n d i s p e n s a b l e part of the struggle of the w o r k i n g class
and e v e r y e n c o u r a g e m e n t should be g i v e n to develop it,
there were pr e s e n t n e v e r t h e l e s s shades of the old

1
P r o t . V, pp. 583-4.
51

con tr ov er sy w i t h the economists, a patent fear of 1vu lgar


economism' in the careful def i n i ng they made of the
b o u n d a r y b et we e n the economic and political struggles.
Trade unions were r e ga r de d as important ma in ly because
they drew into ac ti on the b a ck w a r d elements of the w o r k i n g
class, enab lin g them to pr oceed further to the struggle
for socialism. B ei n g legal institutions they could
relieve revolutio na rie s of some functions in the field of
culture and economic agitation. A n attempt was made by
M. Bo r is o v to set down p re c i se l y the r e la ti on sh ip b e t we e n
Par ty and unions. W h e n his article On the Trade U ni on
Mo v eme nt and the Tasks of Social D e m o c r a c y appe ar ed in
Prole tar ii it re ce iv e d the explicit approval of the
editorial board and was later re pr i n te d in the B o l sh e v i k
legal journal N o v a i a Z h i z n . It m ay be said to re pr esent
the views of the B o l s h e v i k leaders in 1905* The author,
ha v i n g re co gni se d the gr owth of trade unions as an
inevitable ph e n om en o n saw them in co mp eti ti on with the
Pa rty not for the support of the masses but for the li mited
number of available functionaries. The needs of trade
unions however, could be met by workers who were not of a
re v olu ti ona ry turn of mind. A second p r ob le m of k e e p i n g
the trade unions free of po li ti c a l ly opportunist elements
could be solved by p re ve n t i n g any political co lo u r at i o n at
all. If it was impossible to indoctrinate the unions w i t h
the full socialist and political programme of the Party,
it was be tt er not to indoctrinate them at all. P o i n t i ng
to the danger p re se n te d to G e r m a n Social D e mo c r a cy b y the
rankly opportunist, m o ne y gr u bb i n g G e r m a n unions w h i c h
constituted an integral part of the Party, he u rg ed that
the economic o r ga n is at i on of the prole ta ria t should be
52

strictly separated from the political. In Russia the


Party must assist in the formation of trade unions but
confine their activities to strictly economic limits, not
permitting them to discuss Party affairs. Trade unions
were merely a sphere of influence not a component part of
the Party. The article gave a five point statement of
relations between Party and trade unions. (l) The trade
unions were completely autonomous in their own sphere.
(2) Trade unions were not to impinge on general Party
affairs. (3 ) Party members in unions and union
functionaries should take steps to ensure Social
Democratic agitation in unions. (4) Trade unionists with
influence and belonging to the Party were to form a
special agitational bureau and to be members of the raion
committee. (5) These people were on the raion committee
not as trade union representatives but as Party members
with special functions. Borisov*s concluding words
eloquently summed up the suspicions of the Party in regard
to the mass economic organisations and its determination
to preserve its own political purity.
In this way the Party has its own private agency
within the union, but not official
representation. Mutual relations of this kind,
in my view, are highly advantageous to our Party.
They free it from the necessity of expending
energy on the purely economic struggle and
enable the application of forces which otherwise
would remain dead capital. On the other hand,
they guarantee the Party from the intrusion of
opportunist elements and assist its further
growth without forcing it to change the ^
revolutionary tactics already adopted by it.

1
Novaia Zhizn, no. 7 , 21 November 1905» pp.12-^9»
53

One other point may be noted at this stage. In 1905 the


actual Bolshevik experience of trade union work in
Petersburg was negligible. The shop assistants were the
1
only trade union organisation under Bolshevik influence.
This view of the role of trade unions remained
official Bolshevik policy throughout 1906. The resolution
on trade unions at the Stockholm Congress in April which
was unanimously recommended by the trade union commission
of the congress, was passed with no dissentents and two
abstentions. The Menshevik draft with an additional
clause and minor alterations, became the final resolution.
The Bolshevik draft gave much more grudging recognition of
the value of trade unions and exhorted the Party to train
those workers belonging to unions in the spirit of
understanding of the class struggle and socialist tasks of
the proletariat in order that they might achieve a leading
role in the unions and these unions might under certain
conditions directly adhere to the Party without excluding
non-party members. Both drafts however, were agreed that
the prime tasks of Social Democrats was to facilate the
formation of non-party unions. The resolution in its
final form added that the class solidarity and
consciousness of unionists must be strengthened in order
organically to link unions with Party in struggle and
agitation.
As late as December 1906 Lenin once again
emphatically stated that Bolsheviks adhered to the policy

1
Iu. Milonov, Kak voznikli professional{nye soiuzy v
Rossii (M., 1929)> p .220.
54

of n e u t r a l i t y of trade unions (that is, that they should


be non-party) w h e n in a footnote to his article Crisis of
M e n s h e v i s m he a t t a c k e d a proposal by the M e n s h e v i k L a r i n
1
to admit trade unions into the Party. But b y the time of
the L o n d o n Congress in M a y 1907 the official B o l s h e v i k
attitude to trade unions h a d changed and they were
d e c l a r i n g for the i d e o l ogical l e a d e r s h i p of the unions by
Social D e m o c r a c y and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l
links. H ow may one account for this?

It w o uld a p p e a r that the rigid theoretical stance of


the P e t e r s b u r g or i e n t e d l e a d e r s h i p h ad b een s u c c e s s f u l l y
chal l e n g e d by p r a c tical P a r t y workers in the M o s c o w
organisation, who h a d a c t u a l l y h ad experience in trade
u n i o n work. A c c o r d i n g to V.P. Nogin, the B o l s h e v i k - l e d
M o s c o w Committee in O c t o b e r 1906 w h i c h had hi t h e r t o bee n
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the a r med revolt and l o oked on trade
u n ion wor k as o p p o rtunist c h a nged its attitude to the
unions and a p p o i n t e d one of its organisers, N o g i n himself,
to w o r k in the unions. The change in p o licy closely
followed N o g i n 1s own a r rival in M o s c o w from B a k u where he
had taken part in the strikes of oil workers. N o g i n soon
became chairman of the M o s c o w Central Trade U n ion Bureau.
In F e b r u a r y 1907 the n ew a p p r o a c h was apparent in the
c a l ling of a T e x tile Workers* C o n f erence spo n s o r e d jointly
by the u n i o n and the M o s c o w Committee, at w h i c h N o g i n
off i c i a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d the Party. On the w a y to the 5th
Congress N o g i n and other members of the Central Industrial
R e g i o n d e l e g a t i o n h a d d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h L e n i n in Fi n l a n d
and put the v i e w p o i n t of p a r t iinos t * of the trade unions,

1
L e n i n , XIV, p.l66 n.
55

w h i c h was b a sed on a r e c o g n i t i o n of the vast power of the


economic m o v ement and the n e c e s s i t y not to separate the
economic and p o l i t i c a l struggles, but to give the economic
struggle itself a po l i t i c a l cha r a c t e r through Social
1
D e m o cratic leadership.

The idea of a close lin k b e t w e e n the economic and


political wings of the w o r k i n g class movement was not a
n e w one. The p r o b l e m of the n e u t r a l i t y of the trade
unions had become an i n c r e a s i n g l y u n c o m f o r t a b l e one in the
G e r m a n Social Demo c r a t i c movement. K a u t s k y in 1905 had
w r i t t e n an article for the P o l i s h Social Dem o c r a t i c paper
c o n d e m n i n g n e u t r a l i t y and s u p p o r t i n g p a r t i i n o s t * in
general terms. R o s a L u x e m b u r g in h er pamphlet The Mass
Strike, the P o l i t i c a l P a r t y and the Trade Unions w r i t t e n
in 1906 had come out st r o n g l y against the theory of equal
a u t h o r i t y of the unions in the G e r m a n movement and had
called for u n i t y of the P a r t y and u n i o n s , w i t hout m a k i n g
any specific o r g a n i s a t i o n a l recommendations.

The dist i n c t i v e B o l s h e v i k c o n t r i b u t i o n to partiinost *


was in the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k they d e v ised to put it
into effect. But this cannot be f a t hered u p o n Lenin.
N o g i n in discreet but u n m i s t a k e a b l e terms claims credit.
R e c o g n i s i n g the nee d to make use of all legal
avenues, t a k i n g part in all institutions from
the State Dum a to the trade u n i o n and
co-operative organi s a t i o n s of the w o r k i n g
class, Bols h e v i k s e v e r ywhere laid p r i m a r y
importance on the n e e d to unite the Party
members in these organisations. At one of
the conferences of the M o s c o w o r g a n i s a t i o n I
was the first to introduce a resolution,

1
V.P. N o g i n in PR (1925), no. 2, p p . 206-12; N. N e l i d o v in
PR (1924), no. 7» p p . 154-7.
56

later s up po rte d b y the rest of the Party


organisations, on the creati on of P ar ty nuclei
(i a d r a ) as we ca lled them then, w h i c h later
became w i d e l y k n o w n un der the name of Party
cells (i a c h e i k i ).^
A g a i n ac c o r di ng to Nogin, the idea of P ar ty nu clei in
legal organisations was w or k e d out at the Pa r t y conference
at Kotka in Fi n l an d in July 1907, where al t ho u g h no
re s ol ut ion was passed, trade unions were d i scu ss ed at
length.
The basic ideas I put fo rward in my report to
the K otk a co nference were acc ep ted b y the
Bo l sh e vi k centre and then by the Central
C o m m i t t e e , and were dev el o p ed in my articles
in the B o l s h e v i k co lle ctions of the time. It
may be said, therefore that the basic po s it i o n
of Bol sheviks in their attitude to trade
unions or i g in at e d in the M o s c ow o r ga ni sat io n
and was co nf i rm ed by M o s c o w practice. Our
P e te r sb ur g comrades v er y soon took the same
line and in this w a y we practical workers in
this field found allies in the P e te r s b u r g
c o m r a d e s . Comrade Z i no v i e v was one of the
first of these.^

1
V. Nogin, r19 06-1907 g g l 2 , in R e v o l i u t s i i a i R.K.P.(b) v
m at er ia la k h i d o k u m e n t a k h ( M .- L ., 1 9 2 5 - 7 ) 5 v o l . 5^
p p .205-6.
2
V. Nogin, 1V o s p o m i n a n i i a ...o m o s k o v sk o i o r g a n i z a t s i i T , in
PR (1925), no. 2, p.211.
57

CHAPTER 2

REPRESSION

Shortly after the London Congress ended the Stolypin


coup of June 3 took place. The Duma was dissolved, the
Social Democratic deputies arrested for high treason and a
new electoral law proclaimed which reduced the
representation of workers and peasants and ensured a
reactionary majority in the next Duma. With the
parliamentary opposition greatly weakened and the liberals
thoroughly frightened, the government felt free to launch
oppressive measures against the Social Democrats. Arrests
of active members and seizure of Party literature and
printing presses had been going on since 1 9 0 6 , and had
become more frequent in 1907- But after June conditions
became much more difficult. The long tolerated open
agitational meetings could no longer be held, pressure on
the trade unions deprived the Party of meeting places and
an intensified search for printing presses began.

Articles 102, 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code


provided ample grounds on which to secure convictions in
the courts for membership of a revolutionary party.
Article 102 covered the most serious crime of belonging to
an association set up to carry out attempts on the life,
health and liberty of members of the imperial family or
attempts to dethrone the monarch, for which the penalty
was forced labour for life; or attempts to change by
violence the form of government or the order of succession
to the throne, for which the penalty was forced labour for
58

a fixed period. Article 125 provided that those guilty of


belonging to an association which deliberately aimed at
inciting disobedience or opposition to laws, decrees or
lawful orders, or of arousing enmity between classes or
estates, or employers and workers, or of inciting workers
to begin or continue certain strikes could be punished by
imprisonment in a house of correction or fortress.
Article 126 provided for those guilty of belonging to an
association deliberately set up to overthrow the existing
social order or of causing the commission of grievous
crimes with explosives or firearms, forced labour for not
more than eight years or exile. If the association itself
was in possession of explosives or a store of weapons the
term was forced labour for a fixed period.

Where evidence i n c r im i n at i n g suspects could not be


found, the practice of ad mi ni s t r at i v e b an ish me nt was
f req uen tly re so rt e d to. The police chief of a city was
e mpo wer ed wi thout resort to a court, to expel anyone for
periods up to five years. Simple bani sh men t from a
p art icu la r place was not a punis hm ent wh ic h det er red
pro fessional r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , but it was an effective
w e a p o n against trade u nio n leaders or rank and file
members.

Ev en in the most open pe ri o d of the Party*s existence


JU
some of its ac tivities re ma i n ed co ns pir at ora l and secret,
par tic ul ar l y those conn ect ed w i t h the p r in t i n g of Pa rty
literature. Pr ofe s si on a l rev ol ut i on a r i es also h a bi t u a l l y
observed e le me n t a r y rules of c o ns pi ra cy in the use of
false names and secret m e e t i n g places. In order to track
down lea ding activists and to d i sco ve r them w i th
incrimi nat ing evidence the police re li ed h e a v i l y on secret
59

agents. There were two kinds of informers, agents of


external observation, or simply spies, whose work was to
watch and follow suspects gathering as much information as
possible about them, and agents of internal observation
who entered the illegal organisations, carried out Party
tasks without exciting suspicion and passed on information
to the police. Informers within the organisation (or
provocateurs as they were universally known in the
revolutionary movement) were responsible for tremendous
losses in arrests and seizure of literature. They were
recruited from the intelligentsia and working class,
joining the service for many reasons, sometimes bribed or
blackmailed by the police, or quite often offering their
services voluntarily. Golubkov relates that on one
occasion when he was detained at the Moscow Okhrana
building he saw hanging behind the door of the cell a
schedule of rates of payment for information, beginning
with five roubles for an address where meetings were held
and rising to the top rate for the location of stores of
-]
explosives. As repression increased and the Bolshevik
wing of the Party went ever deeper underground,
necessarily becoming isolated from the w o r k e r s , it became
more and more the prisoner of the provocateurs in its
mids t .

The main political question facing the Party after


June was once again connected with the Duma. The
elections to the 3rd Duma were to be held in the autumn.
The electoral law had been amended to ensure one elector

1
A. Golubkov, *Iz epokhi reaktsii: otryvki vospom i n a n i i *,
in PR (1928), no. 9 , p.127.
60

for 350 p e ople in the landowners* curia, one for 1,000 and
1 5 j000 in the two categories of the u r b a n curia and one
for 60,000 and 125,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y in the peasants* and
workers* curiae. Since this meant that an u n s h a k e a b l e
m a j o r i t y of the deputies w o u l d come from the right Centre
and extreme r e a c t i o n a r y groups, most Bolsheviks,
professionals and rank and file alike, now advocated a
complete b o y cott of the elections. L e n i n re j e c t e d the
boycott, a r g u i n g that it was a w e a p o n to be use d only in a
peri o d of r e v o l u t i o n a r y u p s w i n g d e v e l o p i n g into
insurrection. In the absence of such conditions it was
correct to take part in the elections. His article
A g a i n s t Bo y c o t t was p u b l i s h e d jointly w i t h Kam e n e v * s
defence of the boycott.

At the general P a r t y conference at Kotka, F i n l a n d in


July, w h i c h d i s c u s s e d the Dum a elections L e n i n was the
only m e m b e r of the B o l s h e v i k d e l e g a t i o n to vote against
the boycott. However, his r e s o l u t i o n a d v o c a t i n g both
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a resolute struggle a g ainst r e a c t i o n and
against the h e g e m o n y of the Cadets in the l i b e r a t i o n
m o v ement was carried. The b o y c o t t e r s , a l t h o u g h en t i r e l y
u n c o n v i n c e d by his arguments, v o t e d w i t h L e n i n and the
Poles in order to prevent the b r oad M e n s h e v i k interpretation
1
of support for the Duma g a i n i n g ground.

W o r k in the e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n w h i c h for m any local


P a r t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s was the last oc c a s i o n for some years
upo n w h i c h the P a r t y a p p e a r e d o p enly before the public, was

1
K.P.S.S. v resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh ( M . , 1953) Part 1,
p p . 173-8.
61

carried on under the difficulties arising from government


repression and a lack of conviction that the campaign was
worth waging. The Petersburg organisation reported that
it was bound hand and foot, unable to carry on open
agitation and able only to distribute illegal leaflets.
Workers in many factories were in favour of boycotting the
elections and this feeling was shared by Party members. 1
The Central Industrial Oblast1 Bureau sounded a resigned
note when it said that the Oblas t * organisation was
boycottist but had bowed to the Kotka Conference decision.
The masses were apathetic and passive towards the elections
and Social Democratic workers were consciously boycottist
but it was hoped that their trust in the Party was
2
sufficiently great to take them to the polls.

Reporting after the elections the Petersburg


Committee said the campaign had been a bad one. The
strongly boycottist mood of the workers had meant that
very few of those entitled to had enrolled on the voting
lists and workers had taken an insignificant part in the
actual campaigning. Agitation at pre-electoral level had
been unsatisfactory and the Party had had no legal
3
election literature.

In the second part of 1907 trade unions for the first


time occupied an important place in Bolshevik discussions.
The relationship between Party and unions had been

1
Prol. no. 17, 20 October 1907» p.6.
2
00

Prol. no.
rH

29 October 1907» p.6.


3
Prol. no. 2 0 , 19 November 1907» p.5*
62

d i s c u s s e d at l e ngth at the K o t k a Conference because of the


forthcoming all-Russian trade u n i o n congress. Four draft
r e s o l u t i o n s had b e e n p r e s e n t e d but none adopted. At the
Stu t t g a r t Congress of the 2nd In t e r n a t i o n a l in A u gust
there h ad been a m a jor debate on the role of the trade
unions and of the p o l i tical parties in the e m a n c i p a t i o n of
the proletariat. A r e s o l u t i o n ha d b e e n carried which,
a s s e r t i n g the i n d e p endence of the unions and u r g i n g the
c r e a t i o n of close links b e t w e e n the political and economic
struggles, gave comfort b o t h to n e u t ralists and supporters
of 1partyness*. The B o l s h e v i k i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
*partyness* of trade unions was p u b l i s h e d in O c t o b e r in
the form of a report from a group of Bolsheviks w o r k i n g in
trade u n ion and P a r t y o r g a n i s a t i o n s in various parts of
Russia. The proposals in this document were a d o pted
wi t h o u t change by the C e n tr al Committee at the b e g i n n i n g
of 1908.

The draft r e s o l u t i o n on trade unions p r e s e n t e d by


L e n i n to the K o t k a Con f e r e n c e h ad urged that P a rty
organisations and the P a r t y press should study and discuss
the q u e s t i o n of trade u n i o n life in general and the
f o r t h c o m i n g trade u n ion congress in particular.

The response of B o l s h e v i k o r g a n isations in the


localities to this lead from above m ay be seen in the
appearance of trade unions as items on the agendas of
Party con ferences in the Urals, P e t e r s b u r g and the Central
Industrial Region. The Urals Oblast * conference u r g e d all
organisations to p ay i n c r e a s e d a t t e n t i o n to the for m a t i o n
of trade unions. Party m e m bers were to join unions and to
strive to b r o a d e n their aims and tasks to match those of
the Social D e m o c r a t i c Party. The Oblast * B u r e a u was
63

instructed to assist in the unification of trade unions in


the Urals through the organisation of an Oblas tr trade
union bureau and to arrange for the supply of trade union
literature from the centre.

The St„ Petersburg conference reported that its work


in the trade union field had been very weak. Bolshevik
workers and functionaries alike had stood aside from the
unions, but now they must take an active part in the day
to day work of unions, strengthening Social Democratic
influence in the lowest bodies by practical work and
consistent agitation. The Party organisation as such
should approach the union only with concrete proposals of
the sort recently put up to the unions, the question of
the trial of the Social Democratic deputies, unemployment
and so on. Only where it would cause no internal
upheavals should the Party propose to the unions that it
have official representation with consultative vote. This
sort of work had already had some results and workers had
responded in a friendly fashion. But trade union
functionaries, Social Democratic intelligentsia and
Mensheviks with few exceptions had been carrying on anti-
Party agitation in the unions, frightening workers with
stories that the Petersburg Committee wanted to turn all
legal unions into illegal ones and to attach a party label
2
to them forthwith.
The Central Industrial Region conference reported
that trade unions had been closed down and were showing

1
Prol. no. 17, 20 October 1907, p .8.
2
Prol. no. 17, 20 October 1907, P»7*
64

little sign of life. The question that arose was in what


form should the unions be liquidated - should they go
underground or become legal as mutual benefit societies?
The conference resolved that one of its central tasks was
to strengthen partiinost» in the unions. Party nuclei
which had survived when unions collapsed must carry out
1
the functions of unions.

A report from the Donets basin described the great


difficulties trade unions had to face in areas outside the
large cities. The conditions of savage exploitation in
this centre of mines and metallurgy were described - low
wages, extremely long working day, child labour, health
hazards and lack of amenities. Then there were the miners
who responded with their hearts more than their minds to
speakers* ideas, rejecting subtleties of political economy
and the like. The reason for this was the extremely low
level of intellectual development of the miners
who spend two-thirds of their life underground;
the rest of the time in most cases is devoted
to Bacchus and it has only been with the coming
of organisations that their former drunkenness
has decreased to any extent.
But in these circumstances so favourable for industrial
organisation of the workers we read that the unions were
not growing because of the prohibitory measures of the
Governor of the province. The union in one particular
mine was unable to get its rules registered. A normal set
of rules adopted by it was mutilated beyond recognition by
the Governor, who altered point one, which read *The union
defends and improves the economic position of its members*,

1
Prol. no. 18, 29 October 1907» pp.5-6.
65

to *The union expounds the economic position of its


members1. Amongst the established unions the only one to
flourish was one which was exclusively occupied in
1
managing shops and putting on theatrical performances.

The Governor, in demolishing the first point of the


unions* aims, was in fact merely interpreting literally
the regulations applying to rules of societies. The trade
union movement in no way escaped the repression which
enveloped the Party. Legalised under the Provisional
Regulations of March 1906, the unions were never formally
declared illegal but they could be closed down if they
constituted any threat to public order and security and
the objectives they were permitted to work for excluded
any active defence or improvement of wage standards or
hours of labour. They could seek means to remove
misunderstandings between employees and employers, explain
rates of pay and other conditions of work to their members,
organise funeral benefit and mutual benefit funds and
undertake cultural and educational activities. A circular
sent out in May 1907 from the Police Department directed
local authorities to pay particular attention to union
rules and activities and permit their registration only
where there was undoubted evidence of absence of links
with Social Democratic groups, and the slightest attempt
of unions to retreat from their stated limits of activity
was to bring about their closure. In addition where there
was sufficient foundation for charging of active members
of the unions, criminal prosecutions were to be launched
against them.

1
Prol. no. 19, 5 November 1907> p.8.
66

Throughout the a u t u m n conditions in all localities


g r e w worse. The C e n tral Industrial R e g i o n r e p o r t e d that
the o r g a n i s a t i o n was on the defensive. In n e a r l y all
centres there h a d bee n a fall in membership, professionals,
finance and p r i n t i n g presses were l a c k i n g and there was a
shortage of l i t e rature and local intelligentsia.
Organisations in Tver, Tula, Kostroma, Yar o s l a v l and
N i z h n i N o v g o r o d h a d collapsed. An unsuccessful strike of
textile workers ha d f u r t h e r e d the decline in the K o s t r o m a
and I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k areas. The m a i n tasks were to
s t r e n g t h e n the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l nuclei, improve pro p a g a n d a
a n d reduce the d e p e ndence on the int e l l i g e n t s i a by p u t t i n g
1
wo r k e r s into resp o n s i b l e positions.

P e t e r s b u r g w h i c h was e n d e a v o u r i n g to organise a one


d a y mass strike to take place on the first d ay of the
trial of the Social D e m o c r a t i c deputies of the 2nd Duma
also r e p orted l a g g i n g work, a decline in morale and the
2
n e e d to r e build factories committees.

The decline in the organi s a t i o n s in the Donets b a s i n


was a c c o m p a n i e d by expropriations. Here the workers had
ex p e c t e d that the d i s s o l u t i o n of the 2nd Dum a w o u l d be
followed by a general strike and perhaps armed insurrection.
The a u t h o r i t y of the C e n t r a l Committee h a d suffered
because this h ad not occurred. T h e n mines and r a i l w a y
stations had b e e n oc c u p i e d by troops, arrests and searches
had followed and some m e m bers h ad to leave the area and
3
others had a b a n d o n e d P a r t y work.

1
Prol. n o . 18, 29 O c t o b e r 1 9 0 7 , p p .5-6.
2
P r o l . no. 18, 29 Oc t o b e r 1 9 0 7 , P .7 .
Jo
P r o l . no . 1 9 , 5 November 1 9 0 7 , p .8.
67

The Central Committee was having its own difficulties


It was reported as suffering from an unstable majority.
Only Bolsheviks supported its practical work and assisted
it financially. The other factions, it said, were at best
neutral, or at worst like the Mensheviks, actively hostile
In the last few months the Committee had been unable to
reach decisions on such questions as the central organ, a
leaflet dealing with terror and expropriations, the trade
unions, what the Duma fraction should do first and
contributions to the bourgeois press. The objective
conditions under which the Committee worked were
appallingly difficult but it was its composition and the
conduct of some factions on it, that would place both
Party and Committee in an impossible position if things
1
continued in this way.

In November the entire Petersburg committee was


betrayed and arrested. Finland, which with a liberal
constitution and a certain measure of independence had
provided meeting places for Party conferences and the
Petersburg organisation, premises for the printing of
Proletarii and asylum for Party leaders long after they
had had to leave Russia, was now, under the pressure of
Russian reaction, no longer a possible base for the
leadership. By the end of the year the leaders of both
factions were once again in emigration.
When Proletarii resumed publication with No. 21 in
Geneva at the end of February 1908 after a break of three
months, reports from local centres showed a drastic

1
Prol. no. 20, 19 November 1907» P*5*
68

worsening of the situation. The police actions in the


autumn of 1907 had been followed by a severe and
widespread wave of arrests in January 1908. Arrests of
members of leading committees, removal of professional
revolutionaries through flight or imprisonment, seizure of
printing presses, breaking of the links connecting groups
with each other and with oblas t * centres and the Central
Committee, and the disappearance of members, above all of
the Party intelligentsia, had, in the space of six months,
reduced the loud voice of revolutionary protest to a
whisper.

It is very difficult to estimate by how much the


numbers in the organisation fell in the first months of
repression. Some figures have been suggested for various
areas and various periods. In the Ukraine, the Kiev
organisation numbered 1,235 in spring 1907; 80 remained at
the end of 1908; Kharkov from April 1907 to March 1908
1
declined from 762 to 150. In May 1907 Social Democratic
organisations in Transcaucasia had 15>670 members; at the
beginning of I9O8 14,100, and this number fell to 12,530
in the next nine months. 2 In Ivanovo-Vosnesensk in the
middle of 1907 there were 2,000 members; not more than 600
3
remained by May 1908. The well entrenched and ramified
organisations of Petersburg and Moscow also suffered. In
1907 the Petersburg membership had been 8,000 and Moscow

1
Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy (Kiev,
1964), p.101.
2
Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Gruzii (Tbilisi,
1957) > Part T~, p .186 .
3
Prol. no. 30, 10 March 1908 , p.3»
69

7 j500. In F e b r u a r y 1908 it was 3>000 in Petersburg.^


2
M o s c o w cl aimed 3>500 in A u g u s t 1908. What f r a ction of
the 1907 m e m b e r s h i p r e m a i n e d by m i d - 1 9 0 9 , h o w much lower
than one-tenth, it is impossible to say. By that time
there a p pear to have b e e n less than 1,000 in P e t e r s b u r g
a n d 1,500 in Moscow.

The reasons for the ou t f l o w of members that b e gan


befo r e the q u e s t i o n of d e c i m a t i o n through factional fights
h a d a r i s e n can be sought first in the r e p r e s s i o n itself.
F or i n t e l l i g e n t y , m e m b e r s h i p of the P a r t y meant
impr i s o n m e n t and the end of chances of a d v a n c e m e n t in
their careers. Some left politics altogether, others went
into legal activity. This h a p p e n e d to w o r k e r members as
well, but the m a i n reasons w h y workers were lost were to
be found in the i ndustrial d e p r e s s i o n o c c u r r i n g in a
n u m b e r of centres and a general c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e by
employers against the w o r k i n g class. The c onsiderable
advances in hours and wages w o n piecemeal by workers were
n o w subje cted to a massive attack. W h o l e s a l e dismissals
a c c o m p a n i e d the w o r s e n i n g conditions, employers1 black
lists were d r awn up and w o r kers who were unable to get
certificates of r e l i a b i l i t y from the police could not find
employment. Since man y f a ctory workers did not have
permanent lodgings but were h o u s e d in b a r racks or
subrented rooms, loss of a job often meant that they had
to leave a district. U n e m p l o y m e n t was h i g h in parts of
the Central Industrial Region, some P e t e r s b u r g industries,

1
P r o l . no. 22, 19 F e b r u a r y 1908, p.6.
2
P r o l . no. 34, 25 A u g u s t 1908 , p.6.
70

the South, and above all in the Urals where many


enterprises were closed down in the disorders of the
summer of 1 9 0 7 and did not return to normal operation for
some years. According to a report from the Urals in
February 1909 the industrial crisis affecting half the
population there had had a worse effect on the
1
organisation than police repression. And a Party
Menshevik in 1910 surveying the experience of the worst
years said that the loss of three-quarters of the Party
membership had been due less to direct repression than to
unemployment and dismissals. In the Motovilikha factory
at Perm, the most revolutionary centre in the Urals, only
those workers who were members of the Union of the Russian
People had escaped dismissal and some Party members had
2
actually joined that highly reactionary organisation.

It can be said of the drop in membership beginning in


the second half of 1 9 0 7 that all centres suffered, the
provinces much more severely than the capitals. In some
places organisations disappeared almost entirely and the
areas which suffered most were those in which unemployment
was severe or where expropriations had been carried out on
a large scale either by Social Democrats or Socialist
Revolutionaries or both, as in the Urals and in the Volga
region. There the losses sustained were due not only to
the severity of police reprisals but also to the
resentment of the inhabitants who were often victims of
3
the more irresponsible acts of violence.

P r o l . no. 42, 12 February 1909, p.7*


2
So tsial1demokrat [hereafter cited as SD ], no. 13,
26 April 1910, p .8.
3
M.S. Aleksandrov ( 0 1 Tm i n s k i i ), 'Posle 1905 g . 1, in
Revoliutsiia i R.K.P, (b) v materialakh i dokumentakh
(M.-L., 1925-27), Vol. 5, p.6.
71

That aspect of the repression which was emphasized


repeatedly in Proletarii in 1908 as having the most
disastrous immediate effect on the Party was the flight of
the intelligentsia. What silenced the local organisations
of the Party at the beginning of 1908 was not so much the
absolute loss of members, which became much more severe
later, as the disappearance of the key Party workers,
without whom written agitation and propaganda work could
not at that time be carried on at all. These were the
Party intelligenty, the majority of whom were not
professional revolutionaries. The breakdown clearly
showed the extent to which the Party still depended on the
intelligentsia for political leadership and instruction.
Although the old relationship of teacher and taught
between professional revolutionaries and a few advanced
workers had been much modified in the revolutionary years
when workers had flocked into the Party and shown great
aptitude for mass organisation and action, for the
political word they still relied on the agitation and
elementary propaganda classes supplied by the intelligentsia.
In conditions of increasing repression when it became
impossible to hold mass meetings of workers the printed
leaflets and illegal newspapers became indispensible
agitational, propaganda and organisational weapons but the
workers simply did not have the necessary political
knowledge, literacy or technical competence to produce
these unaided.

The effect of the loss of the intelligentsia was


discussed in the Party press at length. From Petersburg
it was reported in February that the numbers of Party
intelligenty were decreasing, those elements having gone,
72

that had come from a bourgeois milieu and only worked in


1
the organisation when it was safe to do so. In the
following issue of Proletarii it was estimated that nine-
2
tenths of the Petersburg intelligentsia had left.

A long report appeared in August discussing what was


described as the internal revolution in which workers had
replaced the intelligentsia in all fields of activity in
the city organisation. It was recalled that in September-
October 1907 there had been four or five workers and the
rest intelligenty on the city committee, whereas now there
were four inteiligenty (two with full vote) and the rest
workers. By the middle of June in the whole Petersburg
organisation there were 12 inteiligent y ; as many as had
been in one podraion nine months before. There had been a
mass desertion of the students. Only four were still
working in the organisation. Student fractions in the
higher educational organisations no longer supplied Party
workers but were turning into groups occupied with
academic questions. Most of the Party workers of six
months before had literally fled from their work. They
had been students. The reasons for their disappearance
suggested in the report were fear of punishment, careerism,
the humdrum nature of organisational work, political and
moral instability and finally that general spiritual decay
which now possessed the whole of the bourgeois intelligentsia.
Between January and June only twelve inteiligenty had come
into the Party and all of these were from other cities or

1
P r o l . no. 21, 13 February 1908, p.3»
2
P r o l . no. 22, 19 February 1908, p.6.
73

prison or had escaped from exile. The most damaging


aspect of the flight of the intelligentsia was the loss in
the numbers of professional revolutionaries that it caused,
since the intelligentsia supplied nine-tenths of the
professionals. Many of these had now been arrested or
were in hiding or had left work altogether and it was
difficult to replace them, since workers had always been
reluctant to become professionals. In Petersburg in
November 1907 there had been 15-17 inteiligenty who were
professionals; by June 1908 there were 5. The other side
of the picture was that workers were obliged to take over
the jobs of the intelligentsia. By the beginning of 1908
the organisational and technical work of the raion
committees was being done by workers. But propaganda and
political leadership in the raions were still in the hands
of the intelligentsia. Resolutions were constantly being
passed in raions asking for help from the Petersburg
Committee, but, said the reporter, unless the question was
strongly raised of workers carrying out all functions, the
1
organisation would collapse.

From other places the story was the same. In the


strongly working class centres of the Central Industrial
Region where there had always been a shortage of them,
Party intelligenty had disappeared almost entirely. A
conference of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Soiuz Council
reported in May that in the whole region with its tens of
thousands of workers there was not one intelligent left
working in the organisation. This information had a mixed

1
P r o l . no. 33) 23 July 1908, pp.4-5.
74

r e c e p t i o n at the conference. Some said it was a good


t h i n g that the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a had left. At least it was
n o w possible for the w o r kers to stand on their own feet
a n d it was to be h o p e d that the in t e l l i g e n t s i a w o u l d not
come back. T h e y couldn* t be trusted. The workers w o u l d
do e v e r y t h i n g themselves. Others p o i n t e d out that all
i n t e l l i g e n t y could not be lumped together and a l t h o u g h the
w o r k e r s were capable of d o i n g all the usual organi s a t i o n a l
tasks and even e l e m e n t a r y p r o p a g a n d a and agitation,
p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p was also n e c e s s a r y and they were not
able to provide that for the time being. The Soiuz
Co u n c i l d e c i d e d to ask the Oblas t * B u r e a u and Central
1
Com m i t t e e to send a comrade to give political leadership.

In or g a n i s a t i o n s w h i c h h a d b e e n h e a v i l y d e p e ndent on
the intelligentsia, their g o i n g was a t t e n d e d w i t h
bitterness. In T ver the o r g a n i s a t i o n h ad almost col l a p s e d
through lack of professionals, a l t h o u g h workers were
receptive to Social Democracy, and Social D emocratic
i n t e l l i g e n t y were plentiful. It had not b een possible to
develop r esp o n s i b l e funct i o n a r i e s from amongst the workers,
a nd the T v e r i n t e l l i g e n t y were now either p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h
their p r o f e s s i o n a l interests and g r a d u a l l y turning into
obyvateli w i t h paunches and nice little homes (s b r i u s h k o m
i domkom) , or were e n g aged in *self-perfection* , p a y i n g no
2
attention whatever to the workers.

It was r e p o r t e d from the C r imea that P a rty committees


were now w o r k i n g class in composition. Some of the

1
P r o l . no. 30, 10 M a y 1908, pp.3-4.
2
P r o l . no. 26, 19 M a r c h 1908, p.7*
75

intelligentsia had left altogether, others were


demoralising those around them with complaints about the
futility of underground work. Such whining was often a
cover for political cowardice. In order to justify
themselves these people were assuring everyone that the
Party had ceased to exist and the Central Committee was
1
not functioning or had collapsed.

From Nizhni-Novgorod the report was that after the


organisation had been shattered in the previous summer and
practically no meetings were being held, it was decided to
concentrate all forces on work in the trade u n i o n s , which
however were soon suppressed. Only two, the metalworkers*
and bakers* unions were still left. When the results of
the decision became apparent a provisional organising
commission was formed, which called a conference in
February and a committee was elected. The conference with
an attendance of 112 was a stormy one. Some comrades put
forward a proposal that the Party organisation should be
disbanded, there being no need for it, and Party work
replaced with cultural and educational activities. The
2
proposal was rejected.

The position in Moscow received attention in


Proletarii in July and August. In a report of activity in
Moscow from August 1907 to April 1908 it was stated that
work had been carried on within narrower limits since the
dispersal of the 2nd Duma due to the reaction and the
massive withdrawal of Party functionaries, which had had a

1
Prol. no. 25j 12 March 1908, p. 7.
2
Prol. no. 30, 10 May 1908, p .5.
76

serious effect on the worker Party members, some of whom


had followed the intelligentsia while others accepted the
necessity of doing the work themselves. The departing
workers echoed to some degree the sentiments of the
intelligentsia with such remarks as,
We have done our job, we are tired and need a
rest to do a little of our own work and study.
Younger people must be drawn in, we certainly
haven1t changed our beliefs, we are old time
Marxists in outlook, we*11 return to work
when necessary and we*11 come back with new
knowledge and new strength. But frankly just
now revolutionary work amounts to bashing
one *s head against a wall.
On the other hand some workers said of those that had gone
out, that we were well rid of them. The intelligentsia
had played out their role and it was time for the workers
to get started. Certainly study was necessary, but study
within the Party.
The question of the shortage of functionaries and the
lowering of standards of work, continued the report, was
being discussed throughout the organisation. At a recent
meeting in the Lefortovo raion, Bolsheviks said it was
necessary for workers to be trained as functionaries to
take the place of the intelligentsia by forming special
circles for training them from among the most advanced.
The Mensheviks were against this narrow posing of the
question and supported the wide use of legal
1
opportunities.
In August in a discussion of the flight of the
intelligentsia in Moscow it was suggested for the first

1
Prol. no. 32, 2 July 1908, pp.6-7*
77

time that the desertion was due to something more than the
cowardice and instability which had been suggested as the
reason in an earlier article in March. This had said that
the great mass of the intelligentsia now racing each other
away from the proletariat had embraced Party work in 1905
inspired only by the idea of political freedom and when
reaction triumphed temporarily and the working class and
1
Party were driven underground such intelligenty deserted.

By August a new factor was observed. The writer


described what he considered to be the most harmful of the
many forms of flight, which was not a quiet peaceful one.
Some people wanted an official sanction, that is, to
receive permission to flee, *to have their hands untied*,
as they put it. This urge to have their hands untied had
appeared at the beginning of March among some Petersburg
Mensheviks who wanted to call a conference of
representatives of separate organisations in order to
state that
only remnants of the Party remain; it doesn* t
exist in fact, and therefore all those who
have hitherto had in one way or another to
take account of the views of these remnants
are now freeing themselves from this burden
and can go freely into legal organisations
where they will be carrying out work it is
possible to do, that of creating a new
workers* party.
A delegate from this group was sent to Moscow in March to
have a talk with the Mensheviks but in spite of his
argument that Petersburg workers did not want to hear of
any sort of illegal work and would not even read illegal
newspapers the proposal was rejected. But, added the

1
Prol. no. 26 , 19 March 1908, p.3*
78

reporter, there were nevertheless people in Moscow who


thought that the Party no longer existed and were urging
that since the organisations that did exist were led by
the intelligentsia, a new workers*
party should be created
1
free from the yoke of the intelligentsia.

Although according to the writer of the Moscow


article the main arguments in support of what was later
known as liquidationism were being advanced in Petersburg
and Moscow as early as March, in the form of suggesting
that the most effective work could be done by Social
Democrats freeing themselves from the burden of the
disintegrating illegal organisation, working legally and
trying to lay the basis of a legal workers* party, it does
not appear that it was until August that the flight of the
intelligentsia was connected with the liquidation as well
as the desertion of the Party.

1
P r o l . no. 34, 25 August 1908, p .7•
79

CHAPTER 3

DISINTEGRATION

In 1908 in a series of articles in Proletarii Lenin


continued the examination begun in 1 9 0 7 of the lessons of
the revolution. He found confirmation in the political
events of the period of reaction of the argument advanced
by him in 1905 in Two Tactics of Social Democracy that the
Russian bourgeoisie was unable to complete its own
revolution and would become counter-revolutionary and that
the overthrow of the autocracy and the establishment of a
bourgeois democratic republic would have to be undertaken
by the working class in alliance with the revolutionary
peasantry. He drew the conclusion that the main tactical
need was to strengthen and consolidate the illegal Party
organisation in the period of reaction.

In the article On to the Straight Road written in


March after studying a number of reports coming from the
localities he observed that the flight of the
intelligentsia had made necessary a reconstruction of the
class basis of the Party in the sense of drawing leaders
from the advanced workers. In the mass organisations
where a movement from non-party to Party ideology was
taking place, the aim should be to establish Party groups
and give leadership in the spirit of revolutionary class
struggle. He pointed to the path the Party was taking -
that of
a strong illegal organisation of Party centres,
systematic illegal publications and, most
important of all, local and especially factory
80

Party nuclei, led by advanced members Prom among


the workers themselves, living in direct contact
with the masses: such is the foundation on which
we were building, and have built, a hard and
solid core of a revolutionary and Social
Democratic working class m o vement.1
It was this form of adaptation to conditions of severe
repression which, Lenin stated again and again in the next
few years, was essential if the Party was to survive.

Mensheviks were also examining the experience of the


revolution and the blows suffered by the Party and were
coming to the conclusion that it was not possible for the
working class to return to the old conspiratorial methods.
They believed that the bourgeoisie in spite of its
manifest weakness in 1 9 0 5 , would be forced by its own
class interests into decisive struggle against the old
order and a majority of the class would be fellow
travellers of the proletariat. They also recognised that
the bourgeois revolution was not completed and there would
be a new revolutionary upsurge in the future, but for the
present period of reaction it was necessary to work in the
most appropriate way within the limits of the legal
framework; to direct the Duma activity not towards
stepping over the barriers in a revolutionary way, but
towards exploiting the laws for the preparation of
conditions that would make it possible to step over them.
It was this tactic of Social Democratic work as intensive
as possible within the legal framework as a means of
accumulating organisational forces for the coming new

1
Lenin XVII, p.7.
81

r e v o l u t i o n that gu ided M en sh ev iks in the next few years,


most of all in the field of p a r l i a m e n t a r y work.

Me nsh evi ks em ph as i se d the im po rtance of the


de ve l op me n t of the class con sc iousness of the workers and
they cla imed that the in sti tutions and organisations
p e r m i t t e d as a result of the partial gains of the
revolution, the trade unions, clubs, trade un i o n press,
n o n - p a r t y fa ctory committees, co -operatives and the Duma
f ra c t i o n had become centres of co nc e n tr a t i on of the masses.

H a v i n g had m u c h more expe ri enc e in the mass


o rg ani sa tio ns than the Bo lsheviks they saw in them the
best hope of m a i n t a i n i n g contact w it h the masses in the
p e ri od of repression.

At the b e g i n n i n g of 1908 the reports in Golos sotsial1


d e m o k r a t a , the m o n t h l y p ape r edited by Ma r to v and Dan drew
a t t e nt io n to the same state of affairs as the Bolsheviks
were not i n g in P r o l e t a r i i . The flight of the
in t ell ig ent sia and the failure of the s t u d e n t s ’ fr a ct i o n to
act as a P a r t y b o d y were r e fe rr ed to in April. T h e y spoke
of the need to recrea te the p o lit ic al or ga nisations of the
prole tar ia t as an essential task of the p r o l et a r i an
movement, not as a me cha n ic a l act to unite scattered
groups but as the o r g a ni s at i o n of conscious elements
acti vel y w o r k in g in the name of re vo l u ti o n a ry soci al ism in
all fields of the w o r k i n g class movement. The importance
of the Duma was e mph as ise d and the B o l sh e v i k slogan for
recall of the Duma f ra ct ion was critised. The reports
from Kiev, Kharkov, Baku and the South were similar to
those app e a ri ng in P r o l e t a r i i , speaki ng of the g r ow i n g
diff icu lt y of m a i n t a i n i n g support for the trade un io ns as
they became less effective and the d i f f i c ul t y of
82

organisation owing to the lack of Party workers. In Kiev


and Kharkov there were joint Menshevik-Bolshevik
organisations, in Baku in 1908 parallel factional
organisations existed.

During 1908 a critical change in emphasis took place


in Menshevik work in Petersburg and Moscow. Whereas in
the early months, the reports from the capitals in Golos
sotsial* demokrata dealt with Party matters as in
P r o l e t a r i i , by the end of the year the emphasis, in No^.
10-11, was entirely upon the mass organisations of the
working class and the legal public congresses, of which
three, the congresses of popular universities,
co-operatives and women were held in I 9 Ö 8 . In the
capitals where the legal organisations existed, the
Mensheviks in devoting their attention to this form of
work appear to have made a sober estimate of its limited
value in providing schools of political education for the
workers but accepted the limitations as temporarily
necessary. In Petersburg most of all, links with the
underground Party were abandoned by Mensheviks not only as
a necessary condition of effective legal work but also
because they found themselves increasingly opposed to the
policy of the Central Committee and the Petersburg
Committee, both Bolshevik controlled. With the otzovist
Petersburg Committee it was impossible for them to work
and their opposition to the Central Committee stemmed
both from factional disagreements abroad and from the
attempts of the Central Committee to exercise control over
the Duma fraction. During 1908 they proposed that the
Central Committee be no longer recognised as a leading
body but be transformed into an information bureau. The
83

tendency in centres where legal work was possible to


regard it as incompatible with membership of the
underground organisation, the talk of forming a purely
legal w o r k e r s ’ party and the challenge to the authority of
the Central Committee were developments to which Lenin
responded late in 1908 by speaking of a trend towards the
liquidation of the Party. In his article Assessment of
the Present Situation he stated that the task was to
strengthen the illegal Party organisation in spite of the
reactionary outcry of the Mensheviks who were trying to
1
bury it, and again in the following issue of Proletarii
in Two Letters in which he discussed otzovism, he spoke of
the tendency of Menshevism which was directly and openly,
or secretly and shamefacedly, burying the Party and was
scarcely represented at all within the local
2
organisations. But it was not until 1909 that the
Leninist campaign against the trend of liquidationism
became vehement.

The main ideological issue occupying L e n i n ’s attention


in 1908 was the dispute with the Bolshevik left wing - the
otzovists. The resolution of this conflict was important
in determining the political direction of Bolshevism. The
defeat of the left wing with its anarchist leanings
brought the theory and practice of Bolshevism close to the
position occupied by the left wing of Menshevism (Party
Menshevism) by 1910. The dispute is often seen as little
more than an intra-factional brawl between Lenin and the

Lenin XVII, p.284.


2
I b i d . , p. 290.
84

emigre leaders of the trend, led by A.A. Bogdanov, which


ended in the expulsion of the otzovists-ultimatumists in
1909 and the formation of a new faction known as the
Vperedists from the name of the journal they published.
But this view entirely neglects the support the Bolshevik
left wing received in the localities and its persisting
influence on the outlook of working class members of the
Party.

During the years when the revolutionary Party was


able to operate semi-legally and carry on the agitational,
propaganda and organisational activities of an open
political party, the Mensheviks had been concerned above
all with the legal mass organisations, particularly trade
unions and with the creation of a parliamentary Social
Democratic group - all this activity being directed
towards using to the utmost the gains of the revolution.
The Bolsheviks who wanted to use the gains of the
revolution to make new demands on the autocracy never lost
sight, as we have seen, of the importance of the armed
struggle as the culmination of the revolution to overthrow
the autocracy. Even after the defeat of the December
uprising they still expected that a new revolutionary
upsurge would offer a more successful challenge to the
regime. Although in many parts of the country Bolsheviks
and Mensheviks using the available political opportunities
competed side by side for the support of the members and
local workers and undertook similar activities, the legal
organisations were in the main left to the Mensheviks
while the subversive para-military operations of the Party
were in the hands of the Bolsheviks. What Dan called the
military-technical side of the revolution including the
recruiting and training of combat groups, the carrying out
85

of acts of violence and the smuggling of arms was the


concern of men who had little interest in legal political
activity. The combat groups in the localities were
supposed to function as separate bodies under the
leadership of the Party committee, but they frequently
acknowledged no control at all from the Party. Some of
those most closely involved in organising the supply of
weapons and in the expropriations, such as Krasin and
t
Bogdanov, later became the emigre spokesmen of the left
wing. But more important than the combat groups, as the
solid core of the left wing within Russia, were the
working class members of the Bolshevik faction. Workers
who had joined the Party or came close to it during the
revolution knew from their own experience that the main
gains of 1905 in the matter of hours, wages and conditions
had been won by the massive confrontation of capital by
labour in the form of strikes waged without benefit of
trade unions and certainly without benefit of leadership
from Social Democratic professional revolutionaries.
During the twelve to eighteen months when trade unions
enjoyed comparative freedom and some strikes were legal,
workers joined up in great numbers. But the support given
to the institutions won from the autocratic government
remained, in the view of many revolutionaries, conditional
as long as the autocracy survived. This was particularly
the case with the parliamentary institution. Once the
Duma was established in 1906 the response of most
Bolsheviks and many Mensheviks was to reject it as the
creation of tsarism and to support the slogan to set up a
constitutional assembly by revolutionary means. When it
became apparent both that the workers had ignored the
slogan to boycott the Duma elections and that the peasants
86

had unexpectedly elected the most militant candidates


offering, Mensheviks threw their entire efforts into
making the Duma an instrument of legal opposition to the
autocracy. Two Party conferences were given over to
disputes on the attitude to be taken by Social Democrats
to the Duma. In the elections to the second Duma in 1907,
Lenin supported a change in the tactics of boycott on the
ground that the revolutionary wave was receding and the
Duma offered a platform for Social Democrats. He managed
to get the support of a majority of his faction for
participation in the elections on a platform different
from that of the Mensheviks, that is to say, rejecting
agreements with the Cadets or the formation of a united
opposition. As we have seen in the case of the 2nd Duma
the application of Lenin*s election programme was heavy
handed and at times disruptive. And with the 3rd Duma,
participation in the elections went deeply against the
convictions of the Bolshevik rank and file and of large
numbers of urban workers. The tendency to reject any
dealings with the reactionary institutions of the
autocracy persisted and when the boycott was no longer
appropriate after the elections, it reappeared in the form
of a campaign to recall the Social Democratic deputies
from the Duma (otzovism).

The otzovist programme was a simple one. Since the


tasks of the revolution were not completed and a new
social uprising would take place in the future, it was the
duty of Social Democrats basing themselves on the coming
rise in militancy and not the present stagnation to
prepare for the new upsurge by preserving the illegal
party. In the Duma the Social Democratic group had failed
to fulfil its task of agitation and propaganda, all hope
87

of expanding its work must be abandoned, its continued


presence in the Duma was a mistake and it should be
recalled.
The boycott had been supported by the great majority
of Bolsheviks in the period of working class militancy.
Its successor, otzovism (recallism) had to win acceptance
when the revolutionary tide was retreating and workers
were in no mood for political gestures of defiance, and it
found support only among the left wing of the
revolutionary opposition. Whereas the right wing of
Social Democracy, Menshevism, accepting all the
restrictions imposed by police repression, worked within
legal limits so constricted that its activity appeared to
lose all political complexion, the left wing in the face
of the apathy of the masses and the emasculation of their
organisations proposed to retreat entirely into
conspiratorial conditions in order to preserve the kernel
of the Party, and to form small underground groups to keep
the militant spirit alive - and with this went rejection
of work in legal organisations, especially the Duma. As
developed by Bogdanov the ideas of the left leaned more
and more to the training of combat groups in preparation
for the next mass upsurge and their anarchist character
became more pronounced after the split from the main body
of Bolsheviks.
The problems of political tactics brought forward by
the otzovists were much discussed by Bolsheviks within
Russia from the spring of 1908. Articles by the emigre
spokesmen were matched by resolutions in local committees.
An otzovist resolution demanding the recall of the Social
Democratic deputies was debated in the Moscow Committee in
88

i
May 1908 and defeated 18-14. In the Petersburg
2
organisation the otzovist and ultimatumist supporters
were strongly represented and indeed held a majority of
the Petersburg Committee for much of 1908 and I9O9 . In
November 1908 Lenin opened up a full scale campaign
against otzovism which continued throughout 1 9 0 9 .

If we try to estimate the strength and nature of the


otzovist-ultimatumist tendency within Russia it has to be
said that it appears to have been widespread among the
Bolshevik rank and file. In areas where Bolsheviks had
either organised combat groups and engaged in
expropriations or sympathised and co-operated with those
that did, the support for boycott had been very strong.
Where the Party organisations in such places survived into
the period of deep repression otzovism also found
supporters, Saratov and the Urals, the only two centres
outside Moscow and Petersburg which sent delegates to the
Conference of Combat Groups and Military organisations in
1906 were strongly boycottist. In June 1907 five-sixths
of the Saratov organisation voted for boycott of the 33rd
3
Duma, Expropriations in that area continued till 1908.
There was no record of otzovism in Saratov but it must be
remembered here that the expropriations (mainly the work

1
P r o l . no. 31» ^ June 1908, p.6.
2
Ultimatumism was a variant of otzovism popular in
Petersburg, which called for an ultimatum to be presented
to the Social Democratic deputies to adopt a genuinely
revolutionary policy in the Duma. If they failed to
comply they were to be recalled.
3
P r o l . no. 35» 11 September 1908, p.7«
89

of the Socialist Revolutionaries) brought down such


severe police reprisals that there was practically no
organisation left for some years. The forests surrounding
the Motovilikha works near Perm had been the scene of the
exploits of the legendary Socialist Revolutionary
expropriator, Lbov, There were supposed to have been more
than a thousand Party members in the works at the time of
the London Congress.^ Both the Perm and the Motovilikha
organisations had a record of strong support for boycott
and recall. By 1909 the membership had declined to two
groups of 25-30 each in the town and at the factory and
2
the workers were said to be no longer otzovist. This was
hardly surprising, since police repression and
unemployment had combined to reduce the Social Democratic
organisations in the Urals to a dim half life after the
turbulance of 1906-7, from which they feebly emerged in
1911-12 to participate in the Russian Organising
Commission and the Prague conference.

But the boycottist-otzovist tendency was also strong


in Petersburg and Moscow where boevism had not greatly
influenced the minds of Party members. Here the tendency
expressed itself in an insistence on the importance of the
underground Party, contempt for the futility of legal
organisations, utter dislike of the feeble part the Social
Democratic fraction was playing in the ,Black Hundred
Duma*, and at times resentment against the intelligentsia.
The last was most noticeable in Moscow. An early report

1
P r o l . no. 32, 2 July 1908, p.7»
2
P r o l . no. 46, 11 July 1 9 0 9 , p.8.
90

on the flight of the intelligentsia mentioned a tendency


1 2
towards makhaevshchina among Moscow workers. By 1909
when the disputes between Bolshevik leaders had become
prolonged, public and bitter, the disposition of the rank
and file to blame the squabbling intelligentsia for the
P a r t y ’s troubles increased. Meetings of otzovist
supporters were reported as saying that although the
intelligentsia could not be dispensed with entirely, they
should be carefully vetted and the role of the small
number of elected representatives reduced to that of
1ideological technicians f. The reporter commented that
this sort of thing could only end in the old dated
3
makhaevshchina.

Throughout 1908 the decline in the strength of the


Party continued. Unremitting police persecution, arrests
of those who had replaced the committee members,
disappearance of the professionals and the extreme
difficulty of circulating Party publications had meant the
breakup of the organisation outside a few centres, into
isolated groups. Only in the Central Industrial Region
and the Caucasus did the o b l a s t * organisation continue to

1
This refers to the ideas of V.K. Makhaiskii (1866-1926),
Polish sociologist who held that intellectuals, possessing
a fund of invisible capital in their higher education, had
interests distinct both from the capitalists and the
manual workers. They led anti-capitalist movements in
order to win political democracy and jobs under capitalism,
or in order to occupy leading political and managerial
positions, in a socialised economy. Makhaiskii rejected
the political struggle in favour of a purely economic
struggle of the workers.
2
Prol. no. 32, 2 July 1908, p.7
3
Prol. no. 44, 8 April I 9 O 9 , p.
91

function. In the provinces arrests, the departure of


members and the loss of links were much more important
than faction fights in bringing activity to a standstill.
The needs of the small centres so frequently expressed in
Proletarii were for the help of professionals, guidance
from the Central Committee, a supply of Party literature
and restoration of links with other groups. The question
of open liquidationism was not relevant where there were
no legal organisations. But in the capitals and the few
other areas where legal work was possible recriminations
between the factions was an important factor in further
reducing, dividing and demoralising the members. There
were particularly acute difficulties in Petersburg where
the decline and demoralisation were much more marked than
in Moscow. Here a strong legal Menshevik centre led by
Potresov and Akselrod and firmly based on the Duma
fraction and the legal trade union centre with its journal
Professional’nyi Vestnik attracted many members away from
the underground organisation. The rival claimant for
Social Democratic leadership, the Petersburg Committee,
dominated by the otzovists and characterised by bitter
left hostility to the Duma fraction, harassed by spies and
provocateurs and disrupted by frequent arrests had little
authority.

Those Mensheviks who regarded the existence of the


illegal Party as something to be defended were quite
unable to accept the Petersburg Committee and worked
independently.

The position in Moscow was rather different. Here


the legal Mensheviks lacked the strong rallying point of
the Duma fraction. They were entrenched in the trade
92

unions although less strongly than in Petersburg. There


was a separate centre of legal Mensheviks but there were
also Party Mensheviks, as was shown by the letter from
’Alexei M o s k o v s k i i ’ (G.I. Khundadze) published in Rabochee
Z n a m i a , the paper of the Central Industrial Region, at the
end of 1908 and reprinted in S o t s i a l ’demokrat in 1 9 0 9 .
This was a brief statement dissociating the Mensheviks
working in the Moscow organisation from the inteiligenty
in legal organisations calling themselves the Group of
Social Democratic Mensheviks who were, according to the
writer of the letter, carrying on a struggle against the
1
R.S.D.W.P. Reacting indignantly to the accusation the
legal Mensheviks demanded its retraction at a meeting of
2
Moscow Mensheviks, but without success. Proletarii
branded the Group of Social Democratic Mensheviks as hidden
liquidators. It would seem however, that since the basis
of pure legalism in Moscow was narrower than in
Petersburg its attraction for Mensheviks was
correspondingly less.

Although there was a solid core of otzovists in the


Moscow organisation, the Leninist policy of combination of
legal and illegal work was supported in the Moscow
Committee and only one raion, Lefortovo, was regarded as a
stronghold of otzovism. Bolshevik; and Mensheviks did not
polarise into such bitterly opposed groups as in
Petersburg, with the result that the organisation was less
fragmented. In spite of severe losses through arrests,

1
SD, no. 2, 28 January I 9 O 9 , p.9*
2
P r o l . no. 3 3 } 8 April I 9 O 9 , p.8.
93

the Moscow City and Okrug committees were recognised as


leading bodies even when they were temporarily out of
action. It was a considerable achievement that in 1908
they managed to publish seven issues of their paper and to
hold Party conferences.

The Fifth Conference of the Party which met in Paris


at the end of I 9O 8 (o.s.) marked a very low point in the
organisation. It was summoned with great difficulty,
opposed by the Mensheviks as being unrepresentative, and
only sixteen delegates representing organisations within
the empire could be mustered - 5 Poles, 3 Bundists, 3
Mensheviks representing the Caucasus (emigres) and 5
Bolsheviks (3 of them otzovists). Of the Bolsheviks there
were one each from Moscow, the Central Industrial Region
and the Urals, and two from Petersburg. The otzovists
came from the C.I.R., the Urals and Petersburg. One more
Menshevik from Kiev arrived as the conference was ending
and a Bolshevik from the North-west region after it was
1
over. Four Bolsheviks from other parts failed to arrive.

The main resolutions of the conference which were all,


as Krupskaia said, in the Bolshevik spirit, dealt with the
current situation and tasks of the Party, the Duma
fraction and organisational questions, and all made
2
significant statements of Bolshevik policy. The brief
resolution arising from the reports merely stated that in
a number of places there had been attempts by a certain

1
KPSS v resoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh ( M . , 1953)> Part 1,
p.19^-; P r o l . no. 42, 12 February I 9O 9 , p.2.
2
KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, 1, pp.195-205.
94

section of the Party intelligentsia to liquidate the


existing organisation and replace it with an amorphous
union within legal limits, although this would be
purchased at the expense of the programme, tactics and
traditions of the Party. Conference found necessary the
most resolute ideological and organisational struggle
against liquidationist attempts and called on Party
workers regardless of faction and tendency to an energetic
rejection of these attempts. It was further stated in
this resolution that the Central Committee would not
function properly unless the minority submitted to Party
discipline and worked loyally within the one institution
and its executive organs.

The resolution on the current situation and tasks of


the Party was the work of Lenin at his most terse and
lucid. It noted the evolution of the autocracy into a
bourgeois monarchy, the present role of the various
classes, the unresolved problem of the bourgeois
revolution, the deepening conflict between ruling and
working classes and the certain development of a new
revolutionary crisis. The tasks were to strengthen the
Party in the form in which it had been built up during the
revolutionary period and to resist attempts to whittle
down the slogans and liquidate the illegal organisation.
The functions of the intelligentsia were to be transferred
to the workers themselves. The economic struggle of the
workers was to be assisted along the lines laid down by
the London Congress of the Party and the Stuttgart
Congress of the International. The Duma was to be used as
a rostrum for revolutionary Social Democratic propaganda
and agitation.
95

The resolution on the Duma fraction directly opposed


the Menshevik view of its role, in stating that it was to
serve as one of the organs of the Party in propaganda,
agitation and organisation, and to refrain from so-called
positive legislation and chasing after trifling reforms.
It should bring forward measures on the 8-hour day,
freedom of unions and strikes and workers insurance. In
listing the fraction's mistakes, laying down a militant
agitational policy and insisting on its subordination to
the Central Committee the resolution was clearly designed
to meet some of the criticism of the performance of the
Social Democratic deputies, upon which a great deal of
otzovist dissatisfaction was based. The otzovist
Bolsheviks here found themselves in a difficult position.
They voted for the resolution on the current situation
although with the rider that they did not agree with point
5, on the use of the Duma. On the Duma resolution they
voted with the Leninists to maintain a united front against
the Mensheviks. On the organisational resolution they had
no position other than the official Bolshevik one.
The resolution on organisational questions having
repeated the Leninist estimate that present political
conditions made it less feasible to maintain Social
Democratic work within the limits of legal and semi-legal
workers’ organisations and made impossible the full
application of the principle of the democratic structure
of the organisation, recommended that the greatest
possible use be made of both legal and illegal
organisations. However work could be undertaken fruitfully
only where Party committees, even small ones, existed in
every industrial enterprise and if all work in legal
96

organisations were carried on under the leadership of


illegal Party organisations. In order to co-ordinate
Party work in the localities, oblas t * centres were to be
organised in each oblast 1 to give technical assistance and
ideological leadership, to rebuild organisations which had
collapsed and to establish close links between local and
oblast 1 organisations and the Central Committee. The
principle of co-option should be permitted in local
organisations with the co-opted members being replaced as
soon as possible by properly elected comrades.

On the Central Committee the conference supported the


Central Committee plenum decision to set up a bureau in
Russia with plenary powers although questions of principle
should be decided by a plenum. Links with the centre were
to be strengthened by more frequent tours by Central
Committee members and improvement of communications. The
conference insisted that the printing of the central organ,
S o t s i a l 1demokrat should be resumed as soon as possible.

Lenin, unlike Zinoviev who dismissed the 5 th


Conference in his history of the Party as of little
importance, had a high regard for its decisions. He
considered that it had made a correct estimate of the
political situation in the years of counter revolution and
had laid down a policy (his own) which remained
substantially correct for the next few years. He not only
referred in later works with approval to its decisions,
but at his suggestion the Prague Conference of 1912
mentioned the 5th Conference resolution on the current
situation
whose propositions on the historical
significance and class content of the whole
June 3 regime on the one hand and the growth
97

of the revolutionary crisis on the other


have been fully borne out by the events of
the last three y e a r s J

From the resolution on organisational questions it is


clear how weak the Central Committee had become. The
recommendation to set up a small committee (fixed at five
by the plenum following the conference), to lead the work
inside Russia was not a new one, but the record of the
Russian bureau in 1908 had not been impressive. The
Central Committee had begun the year with brisk
resolutions on trade unions and co-operatives and letters
to Party members on how to work in trade unions. Zinoviev
in his report on the 5 th Conference described these
resolutions outlining the method of fraction work in mass
organisations as amongst the most important the Central
Committee had taken between the 4th and 5th conferences.
The record of activity was not long. The Central
Committee had published one number of a trade union paper
and had endeavoured without success to call a conference
of Social Democrats working in trade unions. It had
carried on agitation in connection with the trial of
Social Democratic deputies of the 2nd Duma, it took part
in the preparation and work of Social Democrats in the
congresses of co-operatives, popular universities, women
and students (the last one was illegal). Members of the
Central Committee had made a number of tours to organise
and consolidate o b l a s t T centres in Central Russia, the
South, Urals, Volga, Crimea, North West, Caucasus and
Northern Caucasus. They participated regularly in local

1
KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, 1, p.271»
98

work in Petersburg. A Bureau to assist the military


organisation with agitation and propaganda had been set up
and Central Committee members sent to settle
organisational disputes in Baku and Taganrog. It
published one number of the central organ, S o t s i a l Td e m o k r a t ,
in Petersburg and several leaflets, and had made a number
of attempts to get the central organ published regularly
in Russia. Finally it had devoted a good deal of
attention to the task of leading the Duma fraction, but
absolved itself from responsibility for a number of its
mistakes, since the fraction at times acted contrary to
the advice or instructions of the Central Committee. It
had done its best to establish close contact between the
fraction and local organisations by issuing appeals to the
Party and on their tours Central Committee members had
drawn the attention of local comrades to the matter.

One reason for the ineffectiveness of the activity of


the central body, Zinoviev observed, was the unstable
majority which meant that obstructive actions by the
Mensheviks at times prevented the Central Committee from
1
acting at all.

A plenum of the Central Committee had met in Geneva


in August 1908. This meeting was marked by bitter
quarrels between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The former
managed to divert an enquiry into expropriations pressed
for by the Mensheviks into a Bolshevik controlled
commission, while the Menshevik proposal to turn the
Central Committee into an information centre was brought
to light. These two points of dissension showed the gulf

1
P r o l . no. 42, 12 February 1909, pp.2-4.
99

existing at that time between the two wings - the


Mensheviks condemning the resort to anarchist lawlessness
and the Bolsheviks denouncing the attempts to liquidate
the Party. 1908 had begun with the two factions on the
Central Committee disagreeing but able to reach decisions
at least by majority vote and occasionally unanimously.
During the year the Menshevik members virtually boycotted
the Central Committee. The question after the 5th
conference was whether the organisational proposals would
make the Committee a functioning body. In the event they
did not.

The record of Bolshevik activity in the trade unions


in I 9 O 8 vividly illustrates the gap between intentions and
performance. In February 1908 a resolution was published
on Social Democratic work in trade unions which it was
stated, had been drawn up by a commission of the Central
Committee and adopted by the Committee in January. As
mentioned earlier, this resolution contained the same
proposals as those put forward by a conference of
Bolshevik activists late in 1907 .

It began with the statement that Social Democratic


work in trade unions must be carried out in the spirit of
the London and Stuttgart resolutions, that is, not in the
spirit of neutrality or non-partyness of trade unions but
on the contrary, in the spirit of unremitting striving for
the closest possible rapprochement of unions with Party.

Trade unions in their period of legal existence had


not in general succeeded in creating solid, organised
nuclei in industrial enterprises. Therefore government
repression had led not only to the closing of many unions
100

but to complete destruction of some. Thus the central


task was the creation of such solidly organised nuclei.
Without such nuclei it was impossible either to build
stable unions or to lead the economic struggle of the
prole t a r i a t .

In existing legal trade unions these nuclei had to be


organised in all factories, that is, primary trade union
organisations had to be created. Members of the Party
should form solid groups in all such organisations in order
to influence them systematically in a Social Democratic
spir i t .

Where police repression had entirely broken up the


legal trade unions, illegal trade unions were to be
organised. As with the legal ones the basis of these
illegal unions must be the organisation of as many workers
as possible in the trade union nucleus of an undertaking,
and within this nucleus it was necessary to organise a
trade union group of Social Democrats in the undertaking.

In order to co-ordinate all Social Democratic work in


trade unions, union groups of Social Democrats were to be
set up in every occupation, which would unite the union
groups of the various enterprises. All these groups were
to carry on work in close organisational contact with the
1
local Party centre.

This resolution was followed by a long explanatory


letter from the Central Committee on work in trade unions
in which the reason for the collapse of unions in the face

1
P r o l . no. 21, 13 February 1908, p.4.
101

of repression, namely the instability of their


organisation, was examined and the tasks of Social
Democrats in restoring them outlined.

The organised groups of Social Democrats were to work


(1) through meetings of Party members of union management
boards and delegate meetings for preliminary discussion of
important questions; (2 ) by discussion in raion and other
Party meetings of trade union questions; (3) by
organisation where possible of meetings at city, raion and
podraion level of Social Democrats in a particular
industry for such discussion; (4) because of the
organisation of Russian trade unions on industry and not
occupational basis, the discussion of trade union
1
questions could take place in workplace Party meetings.

In the discussion that these proposals brought forth


there were objections on the ground that they presented a
danger both to the unions and to the Party. The Party
would be in danger of degenerating into a trade union
party, or on the other hand, the existence of Social
Democratic groups within the unions could lead to schisms,
even to the formation of special Party unions. The
defenders were ready for this, they pointed out that the
groups were not Party nuclei and political questions would
be decided not by meetings of Party members of this or
that union but at Party meetings. There would be nothing
to fear from the second danger, that of splits caused by
the operations of Social Democrats within unions, since
the groups would meet only to discuss important questions

1
P r o l . no. 23» 27 February 1908, pp.4-5.
102

on which it was essential to have a final decision. In


the end a compromise was reached - organised groups were
to be formed only in union boards of management and
1
delegate meetings.

It seems clear that the proposers of the new system


of organised groups within the mass organisations were
aware of the possible danger of an independent body
parallel to and challenging the authority of the Party
being set up and they were careful not to construct a
fraction in which the chain of authority ran directly from
the leading Social Democrats in the mass organisation to
the rank and file Party members, but instead at every
level, Social Democrats in the unions were in
consultation with and subordinated to the appropriate
Party body. The system was devised as much to protect the
Party from encroachment by the mass organisations as to
bring the latter speedily and efficiently under the
ideological influence of the Party.

In the same issue of Proletarii a letter from the


Central Committee appeared proposing that an all-Russian
conference of leading Party workers in the trade unions be
held in April 1908. It pointed out that Social Democrats
had taken a leading part in the development of trade
unions in the last 2^- years but their trade union work had
no organised character, it was carried on in isolation and
mistakes occurred again and again. There was a need to
sum up the experiences of these years. The Central
Committee had recently decided to set up organised groups

1
P r o l . no. 28, 2 April 1908, p.3»
103

in trade unions and the completion of the uniting of these


groups must be an all-Russian co-ordination of Social
Democratic activity by means of a special conference.

The suggested method of election of delegates to the


conference was that it should be as democratic as possible,
embracing all Social Democrats working in trade unions, or
if that were not possible, embracing Party members on
union boards of management and in union delegate meetings,
or in extreme cases, only those on the central trade union
bureau. The final order of election was left to o b l a s t T
1
and local organisations to arrange.

Police persecution was too intense for the conference


to be held.

A Moscow Committee resolution on trade unions in 1908


is of some interest. It stated that under existing police
conditions legal leadership of the economic struggle was
impossible, and illegal boevye prof, tsentry (militant
trade union centres) would have to be organised to
undertake this leadership. To form these centres, city
conferences by trade of the most active members of unions
and representatives of factory Party nuclei should be held.
It was essential to reactivate and re-establish the legal
trade unions. Boevye prof, tsentry were to elect
representatives to a central all-trade union group
attached to the Moscow Committee which would have
representatives from the Moscow Committee and every Party
raion and would lead the trade union struggle under the
2
control of the Moscow Committee.
_

P r o l . no. 28, 2 April 1908, p . 3 .


2
P r o l . no. 31) ^ June 1908, pp.6-7*
104

The Moscow resolution on work in trade unions was


adopted by a Party city conference.

The elaborate plans of work in trade unions drawn up


by Bolshevik committees in 1908 proved quite impossible to
put into effect. Shattered by internal dissension and
loss of members the Bolshevik faction was too preoccupied
with its own difficulties to restore unions which had
collapsed or to challenge Menshevik domination of the
legal unions. Articles by faction leaders continued to
appear in the Party press defending neutrality or
partiinos t *. Martov attacked the bureaucracy of the
Bolshevik proposals pointing out that the main activity
should be energetic agitation against repression of the
unions and the barbarous policies of the government. His
view of the role of the trade unions which cast them as
organs of struggle while respecting their organisational
independence was more constructive than Lenin*s. But
there was one catch. Under Russian conditions there was
no possibility for the time being of the trade union
movement developing in that direction. The emasculated
legal trade unions on which the Mensheviks lavished so
much care failed precisely to protest against the
repression of the unions or to attack the barbarous
policies of the government. A perusal of Professional *nyi
Y e s t n i k , the journal of the Petersburg legal trade union
centre, for 1908-9 shows that it conducted no agitation on
wages and conditions and made no overt protests against
government policy. In I 9O 8 it did indeed print an article
on the eight hour movement - in western Europe. It
recorded without comment the enormities perpetrated by the
authorities against the trade union organisations. For a
105

small p o l i t i c a l l y literate section of the workers there


was an e l o quent message in this A e s o p i a n l a n g u a g e . But to
the mass of the R u s s i a n workers it h ad n o t h i n g to say.

In a report from K i e v in Golos s o t s i a l *dem o k r a t a on


the p o s i t i o n of the trade unions there, the story was that
of unions r a p i d l y l o sing b o t h members and funds, fearing
for their c o n t i n u e d existence and r e d u c e d to a state where
they were c a r r y i n g on no economic struggle at all. There
was one exception, the w o o d w orkers, who h a d gone on strike
and after a w e e k were s u c c essful in h a v i n g the w o r k i n g day
re d u c e d from 1 0^ to 9 and 8 hours and in r a i s i n g wages in
six workshops. There was also a sequel. The u n i o n was
1
closed by the K i e v administration.

The con d i t i o n s of e x p l o i t a t i o n of l a bour in Russia, a


r a p idly i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g b a c k w a r d c o untry were severe, as
they were in m a n y parts of Europe at that time. But
whereas e l s ewhere o r g a n i s e d labour had a voice and could
state its grievances, in R u s s i a complete silence was
imposed on the legal l a bour mov e m e n t on the issues w h ich
concerned it most. It was not a l l owed to state such a
simple fact of industrial life as that the boss was an
exploiter or to prepare a programme of claims to be made
against him. In the end it was the illegal r e v o l u t i o n a r y
political p a r t y w h i c h h a d to do these t h i n g s , w h i c h was
not at all wha t L e n i n h a d e n v i s a g e d in What is to be d o n e ?

1909 was a yea r of c o n t i n u i n g disintegration. Even


as the B o l s h e v i k o r g a n i s i n g centre, the R u s s i a n B u r e a u of
the Central C o m m i t t e e failed and by the end of the year

1
Golos s o t s i a l *d e m o k r a t a , no. 6-7» May - J u n e 1908, p.27*
10 6

h a d almost ceased to function. The B u r e a u h ad five


members w i t h one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e each from the B o l s h e v i k s ,
Mensheviks, Bund, Poles an d Latvians, but n e ver functioned
w i t h full n u m b e r s . The d a y to day w o r k was done by
I.F. Dubrovinskii (innokenty) as the P o l i s h delegate, wit h
the B o l s h e v i k c h a i r m a n M e s h k o v s k i i r e s p o n s i b l e for w o r k
w i t h the D uma fraction. S o o n after the 5th C o n f erence the
Central C o m m ittee p u b l i s h e d a q u e s t i o n n a i r e a d d r e s s e d to
P a r t y organisations. T h e y were a s ked to state their
numbers, h o w they d e f i n e d m e m b e r s h i p and to propose a date
for the next P a r t y congress, basis of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at it
1
and an agenda. It was in the answers to this
questionnaire that r o ugh figures for the m e m b e r s h i p of
various organ i s a t i o n s were given. The few replies
pu b l i s h e d to the q u e s t i o n of d e f i n i t i o n of m e m b e r s h i p
c o n formed fairly c l o sely to the L e n i n i s t formula put
forward at the 2nd Congress. F rom the b r i e f reports of
the a c t i v i t y of the Com m i t t e e a p p e a r i n g in So t s i a l *demokrat
in 1 9 0 9 it w o u l d a p pear that it con c e r n e d itself w i t h the
policy to be ad o p t e d at the legal congress of factory
medical officers, a n n o u n c e d that a M a y D ay leaflet c a l l i n g
for a one day strike w o u l d be published, dre w up a protest
for Social D e m o c r a t i c supporters against the death penalty,
different from the liberal one w h i c h was b e i n g w i d e l y
circulated, d i s c u s s e d the D uma fraction, made a n u m b e r of
proposals on the p o l i c y it should adopt and a s s e r t e d its
right of veto over f r a c t i o n decisions, p r o n o u n c e d on the
d e s i r a b i l i t y of a separate o r g a n i s a t i o n for w o m e n workers,
r e g a r d i n g it as t e m p o r a r i l y admissible, and sent agents to

1
SD no. 2, 28 J a n u a r y 1909» p.7*
107

restore organisations. No further reports for 1909 appear


after the issue of Sot s i a l tdemokrat No. 5 in May.

A report on the work of the Central Committee Bureau


was given by Me^shkovskii at the enlarged editorial board
meeting of Proletarii in Paris in June 1909» which
unfortunately was not preserved in the m i n u t e s , but from
the discussion it would appear that there had been
disagreements with the Petersburg Committee and some of
the practical workers at the meeting were very critical of
the Bureau for its lack of activity. The reason for the
complete inability of the Bureau in the first half of 1909
to fulfil its function as the leading Party body seems to
have been with a remarkable performance of provocation by
a trusted functionary in the Bureau secretariat. A memoir
of work with the Bureau in 1908 and 1909 by Golubkov gives
a vivid account of the undermining process which both
halted the work of the centre and made it so dangerous
that local organisations boycotted it. From the first
message received early in 1909 from Burtsev in Berlin,
through Krupskaia, that there was a provocateur, identity
unknown, close to the centre, Golubkov recounts the
growing uncertainty and tension as the signs pointed to a
most valued secretarial worker Lucia (Julia S e r o v a ) , wife
of one of the exiled Social Democratic deputies of the 2nd
Duma. The centre had suffered a series of setbacks, the
two leading professionals Dubrovinskii and Nogin had been
arrested unexpectedly, the printed resolutions of the 5th
Conference had been seized when the police raided the
apartment where they were awaiting distribution, and the
May Day leaflets printed in Poland had been lost when the
courier bringing them in was arrested. It seemed clear
108

that the Bu re au was able to carry on some w o r k of a


co nsp ira tor ial nature, find premises, have appointments,
provide ac c om m o d a t i o n and supply passports and money. But
as soon as it mo v e d be yo nd these n a r r o w limits and tried
to do any real w o r k such as p r i n t i n g r e s o l u t i o n s ,
d i s t r i b u t i n g leaflets or g et t i ng people out of the country
it met w i t h some obstacle.

By June s us pi cio n of L u c i a was almost a certainty.


G o l u b k o v a t t e n d i n g the e nl ar ge d editorial bo ard m e e ti n g
as ked Le n i n what should be done and r e cei ve d the
char ac ter is tic re p l y that they should b ui ld the
or g an is a ti o n so that provoc at eu rs could not get in. T he n
he re l ent ed and a dv is e d G ol u b k o v to remove anyone on w h o m
there lay the smallest suspicion. It was de cided in Paris
to wind up the B u r e a u office.

Rumours that p ro v o c a t i o n was ce ntred in the l e a di n g


bodies of the P a rt y had b e e n c i r c u la t i n g in the P e te r s b u r g
or ga ni sa ti o n for months. In M a r c h 1909 the fourte en
members of the P e t e r s b u r g Co mmittee present at a m e e t i n g
were surprised and arrested. The Pr ov i s io n a l Ex ec u t iv e
C om mi s s i o n w hi c h e nd ea v o u r e d to r e bu il d the Co mmittee
found the P e t e r s b u r g ra i o n or ga nisations extr em ely
suspicious and r el uc tan t to have a n yt h i n g to do w i t h it.
Four raions p r op o se d the s e t ti ng up of an inter-raion, but
not city, i n v es ti g at in g committee to examine the arrests
and rumours. The P ro vi s io na l E x ec u t i ve itself set up an
i nv es ti ga ti n g committee and pr o po s e d more cons pi rat or ial
methods of r e c o n s t i t u t i n g the P e t e r s b u r g city committee,

1
A. Golubkov, op. cit., pp.121-51*
109

that i s , by reducing the number of raion representatives


from two to one each, to be nominated by the raion
executives instead of being elected by the raion
conferences. It was hoped that nomination would ensure
greater safety for d e l e g a t e s , as would the smaller city
committee of 8-10 which would replace the former
cumbersome body numbering 16 - 1 7 .

The Petersburg organisation had given up the practice


early in 1908 of electing representatives to its leading
committee at the city conference because it had become
impossible to hold large meetings, and had adopted the
system of having the raion conferences elect two
2
representatives each.

As finally adopted, the new rules provided that


delegates to the Petersburg Committee were to be elected
by the raion executive commissions wherever it was not
expedient for them to be elected by the raion committees.
An executive commission of three, with power to co-opt two
more members was to be elected by the city committee. The
term of office of the committee continued to be six
3
months. But even these extreme conspiratorial
precautions were not successful in protecting the
committee and in the new batch of members that took office

1
*Iz perepiski mestnykh organizatsii s zagranichnym
b o l *shevistskim tsentrom v 1909 g * 1 j [hereafter cited as
P e r e p i s k a ] in PR (1928 ), no. 9> pp.162-6.
2
P r o l . no. 21, 13 February 1908, pp.4-5.
3
Partiia bol^shevikov v period reaktsii (1907-1910 g g ) .
Dokumenty i m a t e r i a l y ( M . , 1961 ) , p p .254-5•
110

in the summer, there was the inevitable provocateur


-J
present, this time Poliakov (‘Katsap*).

For the Petersburg organisation as powerful a


disruptive factor as arrests and provocation was the
bitter intrafactional struggle between Leninists and
otzovists which flared up after the conference of the
enlarged editorial board of Proletarii expelled Bogdanov
from the Bolshevik faction and condemned otzovism and
ultimatumism as a deviation from the path of revolutionary
Marxism. This conference was attended by the editors of
Prole tarii, five Bolshevik Central Committee members and
three representatives from localities. The resolutions
dealing with the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the Party, and
the tasks of Social Democrats in relation to the Duma
restated Leninist policy. The resolution on otzovism and
ultimatumism described the origin of the tendency and
stated that it had nothing in common with Bolshevism. The
resolutions on God building tendencies, the Party school
abroad and agitation for separate Bolshevik congresses and
conferences condemned the various splitting activities and
un-Marxist tendencies amongst otzovists and their
associates.^
In a report on the conference which accompanied the
publication of the resolutions in a supplement to
Prole tarii, Lenin clearly stated that the conference had
not declared a split in the Bolshevik faction and the
resolutions were not to be understood as an instruction to

1
Perepiska, p.l65.
2
KPSS v resoliutsiiakh, 1, pp.211-32.
Ill

1
expel otzovist-minded workers. Nevertheless the last
paragraph of the resolution on otzovism and ultimatumism
disclaiming any common ground between Bolshevism and the
otzovist tendency and Lenin*s article Liquidation of
Liquidationism, where he stated that the Party could make
no headway until it liquidated otzovist as well as
2
Menshevik liquidationism were bound to produce the
impression that a split was about to occur.

The minutes of the enlarged editorial board


conference reveal that some of the practical workers
present, in particular Tomskii and Rykov, were greatly
concerned that members should not be driven out. Tomskii
after twice saying that he feared that the pages of
Proletarii would be filled with the struggle against
otzovism made a statement supported by Rykov and Shantser
(Marat) asking the editorial board not to be carried away
by the discussions on otzovism to the detriment of more
3
important questions. He also made a statement on the
main resolution on otzovism supporting it as a whole, but
opposing the last paragraph. Other practical workers
4
present shared his views. Tomskii1s gloomy predictions
about the content of Prole tarii were fully borne out. The
next two issues had supplements devoted to otzovism, and

1
Lenin XIX, pp.6-7.
2
Ibid., p .5 0 .
3
Prole tarii. Protokoly soveshchaniia rasshirennoi
redaktsii. ..1909 (M., 193^) > p p .110 , 119-23 •
¥
Ibid., p .3 8 •
112

there were polemics against B o gda no v who had issued a


statement d ef e n d i n g his viewpoint.

There was an immediate r e act io n in Petersburg.


Em ph ati c letters from P ar t y functionaries, F.I. Goloshchekin
and V.O. V o l o s e v i c h ex pr e ss e d similar views to those of
T om ski i and R yk o v - support of the pol it ica l line of
P r ol et ar i i co mbined w i t h outright r e je c t i on of any move to
expel otzovists. Ev er yo n e was ag reed that ot zovism
re pr e s e n t e d a mood or an attitude and not a policy. The
way to change this attitude, a c co r d i ng to the m en on the
spot, was through p ers is ten t r e -e d u c a t i o n and not the
i
se tting off of a factional brawl.

On A ug us t 9 the P e t e r s b u r g Committee, at that time


divi de d 4-4 b e t w ee n otzovists and Leninists, at a m e e t i n g
at wh ic h there h a pp e ne d to be a m a j o r i ty of otzovists
resolved, apropos of the p e n d i n g Duma by-elections,
On the q ue s t i o n of the elections the Ex ecutive
Committee, wi thout a tt a c h i n g special importance
to the State Duma and our fr action there, but
b ei n g gu ide d by the general P ar ty decision,
resolves to take part in the elections, not
inves ti ng all the av ail able forces, but me re ly
pu t ti ng forward its own candidates to collect
the Social Demo cra ti c votes and o r g a n i si n g an
el ec tio n c omm is sio n an sw erable to the executive
of the St P et er s b u r g Com mittee th rough its
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .2
This crass but not un typ ic a l example of otzovist po li tical
th inking caused great e mb arr as sm en t in the or g a n is a t i on and
an u n of fi c i a l in te r -r ai o n m e e t i n g of activists was h a s t i l y

1
P e r e p i s k a , pp. 166-9, 173-9*
2
Ibid., p p .170-1.
113

ca lle d wh i c h r ep ud i a t e d the r e s o l u ti o n and e x pre ss ed


support of the p ol it ica l line of P r o l e t a r i i , together with
str ong di s ag re e me nt w ith the methods of struggle against
u l t i m a t u m i s m p ur su e d by the editorial board. A later
m e e t i n g of the P e t e r s b u r g Commi tt ee r e sci nd ed the otzovist
resolution. On the o cc asi on of the in t er - ra ion meeting,
G o l o s h c h e k i n wrote to the B o l s h e v i k centre sa yi ng h o w w r o n g
they had b een to adopt disruptive methods of struggle,
1
dr ow n i n g a gr ain of truth in a sea of muck. Volosevich,
organ ise r in the V a s i le v O s t r ov ra io n and a me m be r of the
Pe t e r s b u r g Co mmittee also wrote in stron g terms. He said
that a split was l oo mi n g in the o r g a n i sa t i o n w i t h the
inevitable a cc om p ani me nts of intrigue, ra gi ng quarrels,
dem a go gy and other mo r a ll y dubious methods of factional
struggle. The w i s h to di scredit the theoretical p o sit io n
of o n e ls opponents of ten led to en t ir e l y impermissible
means of d i s c r e d i t i n g Pa rty or ga nisations and even the
Party itself. All this put on the alert comrades who
val ue d the organisation, w e a k as it was and forced them to
concentrate all their forces to prevent a split. This had
be en the re as on for the cal li ng of the un of fi c ia l inter-
raion meeting. V o l o s e v i c h b e l i e v ed he was co rr ectly
ex pr es si ng the f ee lin g of the m e e t i n g in saying that they
2
w o u l d not al l o w a split to occur.

The u n c o m p r o m i s i n g r ej e c t i o n of a h e r e s y hunt by the


me n in P e t e r s b u r g and their critical attitude to the

I b i d ., p .171•
2
I b i d ., p p .173-5•
114

editors of P r ol e ta ri i p r od u ce d a c o n c i l ia t o r y article from


Lenin, A W or d to the Bo lshevi ks of St P e t e r s b u r g .

The P e t e r s b u r g Comm itt ee however, rem ai ned de ad lo c ke d


and incapable of action, because the No v em b e r six m o nt h l y
elections ret ur n ed a 5-3 m a j o ri t y for the otzovists.
Rep or ts of me etings told of arid arguments and lack of
1
action. The ul t i ma tu m is t va r i e ty of o t zov is m w h i c h
f lo uri she d in P e t e r s b u r g lacked any positive policy. In
No ve m b e r their m a i n co nce rn seems to have b ee n to prevent
work er s from p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the co mi n g congress on
alcoholism. It is diff icu lt to a vo id the co nc lu s io n that
had the Central Comm itt ee had a f u n c ti o n i ng centre or had
there been any of the l ea di ng pro fe ssi on als able to w o r k in
the city at this time, the c on fu si on in the P e t e r s bu r g
Committee could have b e e n cleared up. But the centre had
di s in t e g r a t e d and there is no evidence of the co nt inued
presence of e x p e ri en c ed p r o f e s s i o n a l s . G o l o s h c h e k i n had
gone on to M o s c o w and local fu nctionaries re tr eated to the
raions. W hile the committee was foundering, such w o r k as
did go on was in the r a i o n s , where a cautious r a pp ro che me nt
b e t w e e n some P a r t y M en sh ev ik s and no n- otz ov ist Bo ls heviks
had begun.

The si tua ti o n in the eight raions was d i sc u s s ed in


S o t s i a l *demokrat and Prole tarii in 1909* A report to a
m e e t i n g of the city committee at the end of J a nu a r y 1909
gave numbers of o rg an i se d members. This report co v er i n g
2
six raions gave a ro ugh total of 520. M e n ti o n was made of

1
Ibid., pp.179-86.
2
P r o l . no. 42, 12 F eb r u a r y 19 0 9 ,P*7*
115

united work with Party Mensheviks in the P e t e r s b u r g and


V a s i l e v O s t r o v raions and there was a m e mber of the
Petersburg Committee on the Central Trade U n ion Bureau.
L e a d e r s h i p was e n t i r e l y in the hands of workers in three
r a i o n s , Narva, N e v a and Moscow, where there were no
intelligenty. In those raions arrests and u n e m p l o y m e n t
were severe. V a s i l e v O s t r o v was the raion where the
otzovists were strongest. It c l aimed 200 members and seven
intelligenty. C i t y r a ion No. 1 w i t h 250 members had four
intelligenty. V y b o r g b e l o n g e d to the Mens h e v i k s and there
was v e r y little B o l s h e v i k o r g a n i s a t i o n there.

In June an article d e s c r i b e d the parlous c o n dition of


the P e t e r s b u r g o r g a n i s a t i o n as a whole. Rumours of
p r o v o c a t i o n h a d u n d e r m i n e d confidence and ot z o v i s m h ad done
great h a r m because it caused the n e g lect of organi s a t i o n a l
work. A c t i v i t y was b e i n g s t a rted a g ain but because of the
shortage of p r o f e s s i o n a l s most organisers h ad to w o r k bot h
in the city committee and in the r a i o n s . Police
p e r s e c u t i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y intense because the O k h rana
w h i c h h ad h i t h e r t o de v o t e d a t t e n t i o n to the Socialist
Revolut i o n a r i e s , maximalists, m a k h a e v t s y and anarchists was
now c o n c e n t r a t i n g solely on the Social Democrats. There
had been almost no a c t i v i t y for M a y Day. A radical change
in methods of w o r k was necessary. H a v i n g grown u s e d to
legal cond itions a nd h a v i n g e x p a n d e d e n o r m o u s l y in the *days
of freedom* the P a r t y found it d i f f icult to adapt itself to
repression. The o r g a n i s a t i o n of nucl e i w h e r e v e r there were
l i n k s , eve n in v e r y small e n t e r prises r e q u i r e d forces w h i c h
the Party did not have. The task therefore was to b u ild up
s t r ength in the large undertakings. There was an extreme
shortage of funct i o n a r i e s and propagandists, and the P a r t y
116

press from a b r o a d came in such small q u a n tities that it


could not give guidance, n or were its articles u n d e r s t o o d
by the w o r k e r s . T h ere were at the present time less than
1000 members in P e t e r s b u r g a l t h o u g h the prestige of Social
D e m o c r a c y stood as h i g h as it had done b e f o r e . 12

The attitude of w o r kers in the o r g a n i s a t i o n at this


time as it o c c a s i o n a l l y appears in corre s p o n d e n c e w i t h the
B o l s h e v i k centre a b r o a d r e f l e c t e d a mixture of dependence
a nd resentment. A letter full of e m o t i o n from a w o r k e r
said,
A n d k n o w what we people w o r k i n g in the raions
and factories have decided. We have d e c ided
to exclude the otzovists from the executive
and take their places. Y ou are g o ing to make a
fuss about this? What is g o i n g on? Dumping
the p r o f e s s i o n a l s ? Yes, comrades, the P a r t y is
dear to us, as dear as Social Democracy. If we
can manage to get our people on to the
executive things won*t be any worse than before
because they couldn*t b e . ..we have d e c i d e d that
a l t h o u g h we are not e d u c a t e d in the sense of
h a v i n g l o f t y thoughts we will be able to
organise a r o u n d us an i d e o l ogical lea d e r s h i p
and leaders from a m o n g those not w i s h i n g to
w o r k w i t h the present e x e c u t i v e ...a serious
q u e s t i o n faces us. Is there to be a P e t e r s b u r g
o r g a n i s a t i o n or not? There has got to be hel p
from u s .^

The te n d e n c y of a good m a n y p o l i t i c a l l y conscious


w o r kers at this time h o w e v e r was to w i t h d r a w from the
o r g a n i s a t i o n and wait. W o r k e r activists, M i t r e v i c h and
Pireiko, b oth s p e a k of this in their memoirs.

1
SD no. 6, k June 1 9 0 9 , p.7*
2
K. Ostroukhova, l0tzovisty i u l 1timatisty1 , in PR (1924),
n o . 6, p p .27-8.
117

Our revolutionary activity consisted merely of


meeting together frequently and chatting about
the past over a bottle of beer and belonging
to cultural and educational circles and
technical schools in the factories.^
Pireiko wrote,
Of workers who had formerly been in the Party,
some took to exes [expropriations], others to
drink and a few went off to study in evening
courses or at a club. This latter workers'
group represented the Party at that time.2

Accounts of Party life in Moscow and the Central


Industrial Region testified to the livelier state of the
organisation there. Although otzovists had considerable
support they were not as obsessed by the shortcomings of
the Duma fraction as were the Petersburg otzovists.
Otzovist workers boycotted the legal trade unions but
provided great support for the Party school abroad. Free
of the exacerbating presence of the Duma deputies and an
overwhelmingly strong legal Menshevik centre the Bolshevik
left wing was less disruptive in Moscow than in Petersburg.
Another reason for the greater solidity of the Moscow
organisation may be found in its being somewhat less
plagued, until 1909 , with spying and provocation than the
Petersburg organisation. It was not until after the 5th
Conference that Moscow adopted the more conspiratorial
system of raions electing two representatives each at their
own conferences, to the city committee.

1
A. Mitrevich, *Vospominaniia o rabochem revoliutsionnom
dvizhenii*, in PR (1922), no. 4, p.219.
2
A. Pireiko, 'Partiinaia rabota v 2-m gorodskom raione
Peterburga (1905-1910 gg.)1, in PR (l923)> no. 4, p.163.
118

One of the m a n y proposals to cope w it h the internal


di ff ic ul ti es ca use d by the di sa pp e a ra n c e of the
i nt el li g en t s ia and the i na bi lit y of worke r Pa rt y members to
un der tak e p ol it ica l l ea de rs hi p was for an adv an ced
pr o p a g a n d a and o rg an i sat io nal school to be or ga nised
outside R us si a to give workers a basic theoretical and
p r act ica l tr a in i ng l as tin g some months. First s u gge st ed in
circles abr oa d by the otzovist Aleksinskii, the idea was
ta ken up by Bogdanov, G or k y and a M o s c o w P ar ty wo rk e r
N. Vilonov (*M i k h ai l Z a v o d s k o i * ), who, s u ffe ri ng from
tuberculosis, was at that time li vi n g in Capri. E a r l y in
1909 V i l o n o v s ub mi t te d a prospectus for p u b l ic a t i on in
Proletarii. U nf o r t u n a t e l y for the future of the school,
its most active supporters ab ro ad were to be found am ong
the otzovists and the God builders L u na r c h a r s k i i and Gorky,
and Capri, Gor ky* s he adquarters, was the place where it was
to be held. At a time w h e n the struggle b e t we e n L e n i n and
the otzovists was a pp ro a c h i n g a critical stage and both
sides were m a n o e u v e r i n g for tactical advantage, this was
eno u gh to damn the project w i th the B o ls h e v ik centre, wh i c h
u n d e r s t a n d a b l y c on si d e r e d that the purpose of the school
w o u l d be to lay the basis of a ne w factional tendency. It
r e f us e d to c oun te nan ce the school unless it was run in
Paris under its control. Vilonov, a B o l s h ev i k comm it ted
ne it h e r to the Len ini st s nor to the otzovists, but single-
m i n d e d l y inv olved in g et ti n g the school launch ed w i s h e d to
see it kept u nde r the control of local or ga nisations and
s t an d i n g outside factional disputes. He ap p ro a c h ed the
Mo s c o w Committee d ir e c t l y for approval of the plan. Under
pressure from the editorial bo ar d of P ro let ar ii this was
119

refused. Vilonov returned to Russia to organise support


for the school himself and members throughout the Central
Industrial Region responded enthusiastically. In otzovist
organisations such as the Lefortovo r a i o n , approval was
combined with charges that the Bolshevik centre was trying
to freeze the plan. Other Party bodies, in Shuia, Sormovo
and Yaroslavl, gave their support on condition that the
school should be held under the aegis of the Bolshevik
2
centre or the Central Committee. Finally the otzovist-led
Central Industrial Oblas t * Bureau gave its approval and
candidates were elected in the organisation.

The school which opened in Capri with thirteen


students, all from the Central Industrial Region, in August
1909 was in the hands of the otzovists and God builders.
Its stormy history, the revolt and withdrawal of Vilonov
and some of the students and the organisation of later
schools are not the concern of this work. What may be
noted here is that the first Russian Party school was
brought to fruition by the dedicated efforts of a worker
Party functionary and received its greatest support from
worker Party members. The project was caught in the
crossfire of factional battles and the particular interests
of those who stood to benefit by it were lost to sight. It
was not until Lenin met Vilonov for the first time, not
long before the latter died, that he understood the motives
of the man who had fought to get the school started and saw

1
S. Livshits, 'Kapriiskaia partiinaia shkola (1909 g * )*> in
PR (1924), no. 6, p.39*
2
Ibid., p.47.
120

that for worker Party members it had an importance which


had nothing to do with factional disputes.
I regarded the school merely as the centre of a
new faction. It has turned out that this is
wrong - not in the sense that it was not the
centre of a new faction (the school was that
centre and is so n o w ) , but in the sense that
this was not complete, not the full truth.
Subjectively, certain people made such a centre
out of the school, objectively, it was such,
but in addition the school attracted genuine,
leading workers from real working class life.
(Lenin to Gorky, November 16, I 909).1

The Central Industrial Region had managed to hold an


Oblast1 conference in November 1908 to elect delegates to
the 5^h Party Conference. Sixteen representatives with
full vote attended from Moscow, Moscow Okrug, Ivanovo-
Voznesensk, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Orel, Kineshma,
Morshank, Briansk and Vladimir Okrug. The six with
consultative vote were made up of members of the Oblast*
Bureau, reporters to the conference and secretaries. It
had proved very difficult to summon the conference since
the Oblas t * Bureau was not functioning and links with local
centres had been broken. The Moscow Committee had done
most of the organising work and in the absence of
ideological direction from the centres had drawn up the
political platform and practical recommendations.

The reports from the localities all pointed to the


decline in activity and the disappearance of the local
intelligentsia. The workers were giving both ideological
and practical leadership. The difficulties created by this

1
Lenin XL V I I , p.219.
121

change were i ncr ea sed by the sca rc ity of P a r t y literature.


Pr ol eta ri i a r r i ve d in small qu an tities and did not give the
answers to q ues ti ons ra ise d by the workers. The local
illegal paper R ab och ee Znami a was also in short supply and
was too small to deal in detail w i t h theoretical and
tactical p r o b l e m s . The consensus of the reports was that
the worst ill was not the in di fference of the masses but
the lack of a f u n c ti on i ng Pa rt y apparatus. The ne e d was
for ag i ta tio na l m at er ial and the tr aining of wo rk er
organisers and propagandists. A r e s o l u ti o n was carried
ca ll ing for a Pa r t y congress to h el p the or g a n is a t i on to
adapt to co nsp ir a to ri a l conditions and create effective
1
central institutions.

In Apr il 1909 the M o s c o w me m b e rs h i p was r e po rt ed as


b e i n g 1500. All seven raions were s u pp or ti ng one
profe ssi ona l each and five or six were m a in t a i n e d by the
city committee. A recent m e e t i n g of the committee had b ee n
informed that the raions h ad c on sid er ed the new form of
election, ad o p te d it and were to h o l d elections for
2
r ep re se nt ati ves to the committee. D u r i n g the year however,
a maj or br e a k d o w n occurred. The city committee was put out
of act ion by arrests in M a y and a p ro vis io nal executive was
set up, but the full committee was not yet fu nc t i on i n g in
October, wh en only three of the raions were re p or t e d as
still h a v i n g organisers, al t ho u g h the ra ion committees were
meeting. The m a i n di ffi cu lti es were the usual ones of lack
of organisers, pr op a ga nd i st s and m e e t i n g places. It was

1
P r o l . no. 4 l , 7 J a n u a r y 1909» pp.5-6.
2
P r o l . no. 44, 8 April 1909» pp.5-6.
122

pointed out that in Petersburg between seven and ten per


cent of workers rented their own dwellings but in Moscow
it was between one and two per cent. The reasons for this,
it was said, were the very low wages and high rents.
Considerable numbers of workers still lived in barracks
1
attached to factories.

In September the Moscow Okrug organisation of eight


raions reported a membership of about 300* There had
probably been between two and three thousand at the time
of the London Congress. The Okrug conference at which
these figures were produced, was attended by sixteen
delegates, eleven of whom were workers and five
inteiligent y , Nine, eight of them workers, had full vote.
The organisation was reported to be firmly on its feet
after two years of unsuccessful effort. Local groups had
survived even where they had had no contacts with higher
bodies for over a year. The conference listened with
great attention to a report by the executive on the
present situation but refused to carry the anti— otzovist
resolution presented with it. Instead it deferred its
2
decision, asking for more time to consider. The
conference was by no means fully otzovist in sympathy,
since it passed a resolution on the Duma fraction
recognising the value of work in the Duma. The refusal to
accept the e x ecutive1s lead seems to have been an instance
of local worker Party members resisting the attempts of
intelligenty on leading committees to carry the anti —

1
Prol, no. 49» 3 October 1909» P*9*
2
Prol. no. 47-48, 5 September 1909» pp.6-8.
123

otzovist campaign to the point of hounding the otzovists


in the local organisations.
From the various centres of the Central Industrial
Region reports continued to come in of collapse of
organisations through arrests# The most complete seems
to have been that of the formerly vigorous Ivanovo-
Voznesensk organisation. Two groups which did survive
were in Yaroslavl and Kineshma, Both of these reported
that the closing down of, or the failure to launch such
much needed mass organisations as co-operatives, clubs
and trade unions left no alternative but to build the
1
illegal Party.

The Kineshma area was one of backward workers of


whom only 20 to 23 per cent were literate. The reason
why the organisation survived the first years of the
repression appears to have been that a core of
intelligenty remained in the town, several of whom were
women working at the zemstvo hospital. According to
R. Kovnator's account of work in the organisation, an
active worker Party member was recruited as a provocateur
in 1909 and from then on all the affairs of the
organisation were known to the police. Indeed, police
reports give a very detailed picture of the fortunes of
the organisation. In an endeavour to combat provocation
a new plan of organisation was drawn up. It was decided
to give up electing a committee, and calling factory
meetings and instead, to organise one stable independent
circle of eight to ten of the most conscious workers on
whose shoulders would rest all Party activity. The
organisation was able to carry on local work but when it

1
SD, no, 3, 23 April 1909? p,10.
124

endeavoured in 1910 to call a conference to reunite the


unlinked Party organisations in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Shuia,
and other places, the police descended and arrested the
participants. By 1911 the last active Party workers in
Kineshma were arrested and the revolutionary movement
there died down until 1917»^
As has been said before the decline in the Urals was
especially drastic. The Oblast* organisation collapsed
in 1908 and could not be revived. Perm and Ekaterinburg
suffered very severely from repression. At the beginning
of 1909 not one trade union remained in Ekaterinburg and
the city Party committee was overtaken by arrest every
three months. 2 There were cases of partial revival in
isolated centres such as Tiumen, After arrests as a
result of a strike in 1907 the organisation there was
rebuilt by Party members coming to the town in 1908. The
numbers grew from 18 to 180 and more than 35»000 copies
of leaflets, brochures and newspapers were issued. The
Party printing press was one of the very few that
survived in the Urals. But collapse occurred again in
3
1909 as a result of provocation.
The position in the Urals was one of extreme
repression and frequent arrests of Party committees. The
Oblast * bureau being beyond revival, particular
difficulty was experienced in maintaining any contact at
all with the centre because of the area* s remoteness.
_

R. Kovnator, 1Rabochee i s.d, dvizhenie v Kineshemskom


raione (1897-1910 g.g.)1» in PR (1924), no, 6, pp.167-85*
2
Prol. no. 42, 12 February 1909» p.7*
3
SD no, 6, 4 June 1909» p.8.
125

A report from the Donets basin showed that the


miners were still militant although the Party
organisations were weak and disrupted by provocation.
The Petrovsk organisation, with a membership of fifty-
five, had recently had its printing press seized, which
it had had for eighteen months and on which it had printed
eight leaflets of 24,000 copies each for the Iuzovka—
Petrovsk district and two local leaflets of 2,000 copies
each. In spite of the lack of meetings, leaflets or
organisation a number of mines had struck on May Day,
The report ended with an appeal for Party literature that
the workers could read and help from the Central Committee
and the declaration that matters were bad only because of
1
lack of organisers.

During 1909 there were frequent complaints from the


members in the localities that P roletarii was not the
sort of newspaper that the workers wanted. Its style was
critised as well as the content. Since locally produced
illegal newspapers could not survive long, the
desirability of a popularly written central paper was
stressed, T r o t s k y 1s Pravda was often mentioned as being
more popular with the workers than Proletarii because it
could be understood. At the enlarged editorial board
meeting the needs of the Party press were discussed. All
agreed on the desirability of having a popular organ
printed, if possible, in Russia and for Proletarii to be
replaced or radically changed. It was decided to explore
the possibilities of having Pravda made an organ of the
2
Central Committee,

Prol, no, 46, 11 July 1909* pp.7-8.


2
Proletarii. Protokoly soveshchaniia,,,1909 g*? pp , 109-12.
126

Finances were also discussed at the editorial board


meeting. Much was made of the needs of the localities by
the practicals present. A reduced budget of three to
four thousand roubles a month for the Bolshevik centre
was decided upon. It was also resolved that subsidies to
local organisations would have to be reduced in the
autumn, Tomskii dissented. He wanted the subsidies to
the national organisations and legal press reduced
1
instead, The reductions that took place in the autumn
were keenly felt in the local organisations and loud
protests were heard. There was extreme distress in
Petersburg because the Bolshevik centre entirely cut off
supplies pro tern to prevent them going to the otzovist
Petersburg Committee, Goloshchekin was ungracious enough
to point out to the editors of Proletarii that raions
struggling to put out little papers and leaflets were
stopped for lack of five or ten roubles when Proletarii
was arriving in minute quantities, not answering local
2
demands and had vast sums to spend. In November
Bagdatiev wrote asking for money to be sent since it was
two months since they had had any, but it was not to be
3
sent to the Petersburg Committee,
The story from Moscow was the same. In October
Goloshchekin and Golubev writing from Moscow said that
either the existence of the Party organisation must be
ensured with a minimum subsidy to the Moscow Committee of

1
Ibid., pp.129-3^*
2
Perepiska, p,172,
3
Ibid,, p . 180,
127

200 roubles a month (even if the publication of Proletarii


had to be cut down) or nothing remained but to liquidate a
fully functioning Party apparatus. The Moscow Committee
had no money and professionals were going hungry. An
urgent plea was also sent from Moscow for 120 roubles a
1
month to enable Rabochee Znamia to be published.

While Party organisations were still functioning


regularly they occasionally issued brief monthly financial
statements which would appear on the back pages of
Proletarii and Sotsi a l fdemokrat. Most of these came from
the Moscow Committee and all related to 1908. The budgets
were usually small. Receipts of the Moscow Committee were
692 roubles 45 kopeks in April, 423.65 in. July, 405*83 in
August and 1014.31 in December, The main items of
expenditure were in respect of printing and the
maintenance of professionals.

Policy and tactics for the Bolshevik faction


appropriate to the period of repression were worked out by
Lenin in 1908 and remained the basis for Bolshevik policy
for some years. He argued that because the revolution of
1905 had not been carried to completion and the
bourgeoisie itself had become counter-revolutionary, the
minimum programme of social and political reforms had
still to be fought for by the working class. Since the
struggle had to be carried on against a reactionary regime
unwilling to yield anything, it had to go on by
revolutionary means.

1
Ibid., pp , 187-9*
128

The autocracy feared to permit the growth of a legal


trade union movement which could have separated the
industrial from the political struggle, and indeed
constantly frustrated the development of working class
leaders by its repression of the unions, hence workers
were driven along the path of semi-legal and illegal
economic struggle into close association with the entirely
illegal political movement. The Russian working class in
the course of striving for the most elementary economic
demands were made politically conscious. The relentless
persecution of the trade union movement in the years of
repression had the effect of combining the political and
economic leadership of the working class in the
revolutionary political party. The opposition to the
government took on a character that was to prove deadly to
the autocracy when even the struggle for a minimum
programme of moderate reforms had to be carried on by
revolutionary means.

The revolutionary years had brought large numbers of


workers into the Social Democratic Party. In the
decimation of the succeeding years when the leaders were
forced into emigration and the intelligentsia deserted,
the workers constituted the solid core of what was left in
Russia. The Party never again reverted to being circles
of intelligenty instructing a few workers. Leadership had
been exercised from the emigration before 1905 but a
different relationship developed between the membership in
Russia and the leaders in the second emigration. The
Russian members had a greater sense of their own identity
and capacity to judge local affairs. The bitter factional
brawls of the emigres could not be carried on entirely
129

independently of the Russian scene. In the end the policy


reached the members and was judged by them. The protest
that arose in 1909 against the anti-otzovist campaign of
the Bolshevik centre was couched in terms of rejecting a
split imposed on them from outside. On the other hand
many of the issues violently debated by the emigres were
of little or no interest to the membership within. The
Bolshevik record with Party finances which aroused
scandals abroad and discredited them in the international
socialist movement did not worry Party workers in the
localities. What was unpardonable was to fail to send
supplies to keep the work of revolution going or to waste
money in the printing of polemics.

Within the Russian membership the workers began to be


aware of their own weight. They had always been conscious
of the gulf that separated them from the intelligentsia.
But the desertion of the intelligenty in 1908 left worker
Party members with no alternative but to try with a
mixture of resentment and determination to take their
place. The idea of a Party school at which workers would
receive a thorough political training was warmly supported
by workers in spite of Lenin*s anathema. Although they
never ceased begging for help and guidance from abroad,
the members within Russia felt upon occasions that their
interests were not identical with those of the emigre
leaders. They were quick to criticise the Party press as
unsuitable for workers. Although their needs varied
somewhat, they all required an effective Russian centre,
functioning regional centres, Party literature and the
services of professionals. In the provinces there was
little criticism of policy but in the capitals the workers
130

brought an increasingly appraising judgment to bear on the


policy resolutions presented to them.

The structure of the organisation which had been


based on democratic election to office in the years of
revolution adapted slowly to the conspirational
requirements imposed by the repression and democratic
elections were abandoned piecemeal.
131

CHAPTER 4

PHOENIX DISTORTED

By the end of 1909 there was a strong f e e ling a m ong


m a n y Social D e m o c r a t s b o t h in exile and w i t h i n R u s s i a who
were members of the illegal P a r t y that u n i t y of all
factions prepared to r e c o gnise the n e c e s s i t y of an
u n d e r g r o u n d o r g a n i s a t i o n was possible. These factions,
from the left, were the o t z o v i s t s - u l t i m a t u m i s t s who
regarded themselves as B o l s heviks who cor r e c t l y e s t imated
the importance of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y u n d e r g r o u n d and
c o n s i d e r e d legal w o r k as the sowi n g of illusions a m o n g the
masses; the m a i n b o d y of B o l s heviks who since the Fifth
Conference at the end of 1908, had, while r e c o g n i s i n g the
p r i m a c y of the u n d e r g r o u n d organisation, stressed the
n e c e s s i t y of u s i n g all legal possi b i l i t i e s of work; the
P l e k h a n o v M e n s h e v i k s who sup p o r t e d P l e k hanov's defence of
the illegal a p p a ratus in face of its a bandonment by many
Mensheviks and finally, the M a r t o v Men s h e v i k s who
represented the m a i n b o d y of M e n s h e v i k thinking, seeing
the illegal o r g a n i s a t i o n as a n e c e s s a r y evil but d e f e n d i n g
the value of the a c t i v i t y of those Social Democrats who in
the interests of w o r k in legal organisations, h ad severed
all c o n n ections w i t h the u n d e r g r o u n d Party. All these
tendencies h ad their ideological l e a d e r s h i p in exile and
their rank and file in Russia, and in all cases the latter
found that the r e a l i t y of R u s s i a n p o l itical conditions
modified, te m p e r e d and sometimes even c o n t r a d i c t e d the
theoretical p o s i t i o n s a d o p t e d by the leaders a b r o a d and
132

transmitted through the four factional journals. There


was a fifth journal Pravda edited by Trotsky, written in a
popular style which had a fairly wide sale in Russia and
stood for the unity of all factions.

Nineteen hundred and nine had been a year of severe


inner-Party struggle. Lenin had concluded his ferocious
campaign against the otzovist-ultimatumist leaders in the
Bolshevik faction and had had them expelled. His other
campaign, against the so-called liquidators of the right
had assumed a particular form. He no longer identified
the whole of Menshevism as a non-revolutionary trend in
Russian Social Democracy, but indicated that a minority
opinion within it expressed by Plekhanov had remained
true to revolutionary tradition, and the future
development of Social Democracy lay in the rapprochement
of the Bolsheviks and Party Mensheviks on a programme of
struggle against 1 iquidationism of the left and right.
The public ideological defeat of the Blanquist policies of
the otzovist-ultimatumists and the firm assertion of the
need for partyness by Plekhanov emphasised that for the
time being many old points of disagreement between
Bolshevism and Menshevism such as the armed uprising, the
Duma boycott and expropriations had ceased to be relevant.
For Social Democrats in the period of counter-revolution,
the policy was to carry on the struggle for the overthrow
of the autocracy with tactics adapted to the conditions of
repression, strengthening and uniting the illegal
organisation and making the utmost use of legal
opportunities. For this, the overriding need was the
combination of available forces and ideological and
organisational guidance from a reconstituted Russian
cent r e .
133

The Leninist programme of unity was laid down at a


meeting of members of the Proletarii editorial board with
Social Democrats working directly with the masses, which
discussed the problem of revolutionary Social Democratic
work in legal w o r k e r s 1 organisations. It stated once
again that what was necessary was a strong network of
illegal Party nuclei surrounded by legal workers*
organisations and the transformation of these
organisations into strong points of systematic Party
Social Democratic work among the masses.

In order to achieve this it was essential to discuss


the practical experience of Party Social Democrats working
in legal organisations and congresses.

The meeting recommended that at the next Party


conference there should not only be delegates with full
vote elected by o b l a s t 1 conferences but also delegates with
consultative vote coming in the first place from raion
Party nuclei and other Party bodies in direct contact with
the masses, and in the second place, from Social
Democratic Party groups working in legal and semi-legal
workers* organisations.

Measures should be worked out to strengthen the links


between illegal nuclei and Party groups in legal
organisations. Bolsheviks were reminded that all Party
Social Democrats should be drawn in without regard to
fac t i o n s .

Bolshevik Central Committee members were asked to


introduce the proposal of the Party conference at the next
meeting of the committee. The meeting regarded the
bolding of a conference of Party activists in legal and
134

sem i-legal organisations, wh i c h was not linked w it h a


general P ar ty conference as an u n de si ra bl e step.

The qu es t io ns w h i c h should be co ns idered by the Party


con ference were those of the p u b l ic a t i on of a po pular
workers* paper by the Central Committee, the issue of
brochures, de ve l op me n t of the trade un i o n movement, P a rt y
schools and an effective Pa r ty centre.

The m e e t i n g de scr ib e d its delibe ra tio ns as b ei ng


dir e ct ed towards the c o n s o l i da t i o n of all Pa rt y Social
Dem ocrats un d e r the P ar ty ba n n e r ar ound its institutions,
with the aim of r es t o r i n g and st ab i l is i n g the influence of
1
the Party in all fields of work.

The r e c o m m en da t io ns of this m e e ti n g cl early indicated


the Bo l s h e v i k co n c er n to assert the lea di ng role of the
Pa rt y in the w o r k i n g class mo vement and to exclude from
u nit y moves those people who might re ga rd themselves as
Social Demo cra ts but were not prep ar ed to accept the
ideological and o rg an isa ti on al l ea der sh ip of the Party.

In the m ea nti me in P e t e r s b u r g the renewal of


relations b e t w e e n Bols hev iks and M en she vi ks was taking
place less formally. The first move came from the
Me nsh evi ks of the V y b o r g r ai on who a d dre ss ed a letter to
Social Dem ocr at s w o r k i n g in trade unions, educational
associations, schools, co-ope ra tiv es and other legal
workers* institutions. T h e y e m ph as is ed the value of w o r k
in the mass m o v em en t but drew a t te n t i on to a ne w danger
thr ea te ni ng w o r k in legal organisations. As a result of

1
P r o l . no. 50, 28 N ov e m b e r 1909» pp.2-3*
135

the loss of organisational unity and ideological clarity


which had been provided by membership of the Party, parish
pump politics and unprincipled opportunism were frequently
a feature of mass work. They pointed to the shrinking of
the aims of workers' educational associations, which
bypassed lectures on subjects of social and political
significance in favour of narrowly technical instruction
and social activities. Trade unions were tending to become
dues collecting organisations, to avoid discussion of
controversial issues and to stand aside when issues of
importance to the working class arose. The authors
concluded with a call for the uniting of Social Democrats
in the ranks of the illegal Party without any sacrifice of
legal work.

Proletarii reprinted the letter under the title


Legalists' Hangover, happily greeting it as a sign of a
change of heart and a return to partiinost' among some
1
members of the right wing of Social Democracy.

The Petersburg Committee followed with a resolution


to the effect that disagreements in the Party were the
result of the disruptive activities of the legalists and
it called on all comrades who valued the Party to join a
single Party organisation and break with the Menshevik
centre.^

The steps which effectively brought about a


rapprochement of the factions in St Petersburg were taken

1
P r o l . no. 43, 13 May 1909, p.2.
2
P r o l . no. 47-48, 3 September 1909, p.9*
136

by the Mensheviks, who su mmoned two meetings of Social


De moc rat s w o r k i n g in legal organisations, wh i c h were
a tt e n d e d by trade un ion activists and Pa r t y wo rkers of
b o th factions. Be t w ee n thirty-five and forty people,
in cl udi ng re pr es e nt at i ve s of the P e t e r s b u r g Comm it tee and
some raions were pr esent at the second m e e t i n g in November.
A l e a d in g trade un ionist gave the main report and po inted
to the damage done by the isol at io n and fr ag m e nt a t i on of
Social De mo cr ats in the mass organisations. The only
possible w a y to end this was by u n i t i n g Pa rt y members and
P a rt y act ivists in the open mov em ent in a single illegal
organisation. There was general agre em ent on the basic
points of the report, except for the otzovist
re pr es en ta ti v e of the P e t e r s b u r g Committee who charged all
present wi th o p p o rt un i sm and legalism. The m e e t i n g played
an import ant part in e s t a b l i s h i n g links b e t we e n the Party
and those who had left the ranks. It was followed by
am a l g a m a t i o n of factional groups in the r a i o n s , most
im por tan tly in Vyborg. By the end of D e cem be r two
Men she vi ks were on the city committee and u n i t e d w o r k in
pr e pa r a t i o n for the congress on a l c o h o l i s m was u n de r way.
The Pe t e r s b u r g Co mmittee however, still otzovist inclined,
1
conti nue d to act obstructively.

The ge neral f e e l in g that u n i t y in the Pa rty was both


desirable and possible led to the c a ll in g in J a n ua r y 1910
of a ple n um of the Central Comm it tee in Paris. It was on
this point of u n i t y that Le n i n found h i ms e l f in op po si t io n
to all other members of the plenum, incl ud ing the l e ad in g

1
SD nos. 15-l6, 30 S ep te m be r 1910, p.l4.
137

Bolshevik practical workers, particularly Dubrovinskii and


Nogin. As we have seen, Lenin*s view was that the only
basis of unity within the Party was in a rapprochement of
the Leninist Bolsheviks and Plekhanov Mensheviks. He held
that the policy of Martov and Dan as expressed in Golos
s o t s i a l *d e m o k r a t a , was in fact liquidationist although
they remained within the Party. L i q u i d a tionism of the
left was represented by the otzovist-ultimatumists with
the journal V p e r e d . Both these trends were dangerous to
the Party and should be named and condemned. He tried in
the discussion in committee to get a formal condemnation
included in the main resolution but this ran counter to
the whole feeling of the meeting and all that emerged was
a careful passage which named neither the liquidators nor
the Vperedists, but stated that the influence of the
bourgeoisie on the proletariat was to be seen both in the
denial and underestimation of the role of the illegal
Party, and in the denial of Social Democratic work in the
1
Duma and of the use of legal opportunities.

The resolution on the summoning of the Party


conference was a compromise between Lenin*s position that
the admission of Social Democrats working in the legal
movement to the conference should rest upon their
recognising themselves as linked with the Party and the
Menshevik view that the establishment of formal links
should not be a pre-condition. It was decided to allow
*supplementary* representation of Social Democratic groups
in legal organisations which were prepared to establish

1
KPSS v re s o l i u t s i i a k h , 1, p.236.
138

links with local Party centres. It was to be left to the


conference to decide whether such delegates should be
given full or consultative vote. The Letter to Party
Organisations in which these approaches to Social
p
Democrats in legal organisations were explained in detail
was drawn up and agreed upon unanimously by a commission
consisting of Zinoviev, Dubrovinskii and Martov.

The extent to which Lenin was overruled in the plenum


may be seen by comparing two articles he w r o t e , one before
and one after the plenum, on Party unity. The first,
Methods of the Liquidators and the Party Tasks of
B o l s h e v i k s , was along the familiar lines of the basis for
co-operation between Bolsheviks and Party Mensheviks, the
need to combat liquidationism and the need to strengthen
the illegal organisation for persistent work through the
strong points of legal opportunities. In the second
article, Towards U n i t y , published in February 1910, he
gave a nonfactional analysis of the decisions, pointing
out that conditions of work in the l o c a l i t i e s , the
difficult position of the Social Democratic organisation
and the urgent tasks of the economic and political
struggle of the proletariat had impelled all factions to
unite Social Democratic forces, and further, *a year of
acute factional struggle has led to the decisive step being
taken in favour of abolishing all factions and every kind
3
of factionalism in favour of unity of the P a r t y * .

1
I b i d ., p .237•
2
SD no. 11, 13 February 1910, pp.11-2.
3
Lenin XIX, p.194.
139

But within six weeks of that article being published,


his attacks on liquidationism had been resumed at full
strength. In the next issue of So tsial*demokrat he
attacked Martov for interpreting the decisions of the
plenum to mean equality of the legalists with the illegal
organisation, and the Menshevik centre in Russia for
refusing to take part in the work of restoring the Russian
Bureau of the Central Committee. From this time on Lenin
resumed the attacks on Martov and Golos sotsial*demokrata
accusing them of shielding liquidationism, along exactly
the same lines as before the plenum. He continued to seek
the support of the Party Mensheviks, referring frequently
to Plekhanov*s articles in Dnevnik sotsial*demokrata. His
practical efforts were devoted at this time to finding
some way of getting the Russian Bureau of the Central
Committee to work.

The plenum had fixed the number of the Russian


collegium as seven, made up of two Mensheviks, two
Bolsheviks and three representatives of the national
parties. The Mensheviks had left the naming of their
representatives until the practical leaders in Petersburg
could be consulted. But very soon reports began to come
back from the Bolshevik members that the Mensheviks were
refusing to have anything to do with the Russian Bureau.

The January plenum marked a brief truce secured with


unwilling concessions from the main contenders in the
factional war. If we leave aside the precariousness of
the balance of forces and the unreconciled differences
among the leaders abroad and turn to the Russian scene, it
must be said that the proclamation, unreal as it was, of
the unity of the Party and the end of factional strife
l4o

answered the desires of those left in the u n d e r g r o u n d


organisation.

In a more fund a m e n t a l sense the p l e n u m decisions also


r e f l e c t e d a t e m p o r a r y state of equilibrium, or rather,
dead point at w h i c h the R u s s i a n w o r k i n g class mo v e m e n t had
arrived. By 1910 the m i l i t a n c y of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y years
h a d died down, the wo r k e r s were silent and the
o r g a n i s a t i o n w h i c h ha d b e e n the sp e a r h e a d of the
r e v o l u t i o n was fragmented. A legal labour mo v e m e n t of
sorts h ad s t r u g g l e d into existence. The q u e s t i o n to be
a n s w e r e d was w h e t h e r the w o r k i n g class w o u l d move a l o n g a
b r o a d path of l e g a l i s m or w h e t h e r there was a l e a d i n g role
for the illegal r e v o l u t i o n a r y party. In 1910 the new
phase of the class struggle w h i c h w o u l d determine the
issue h a d not b e g u n - hence the balance b e t w e e n l e g a l i s m
and the underground, r e p r e s e n t e d in the J a n u a r y plenum.

The p o s i t i o n of the P a r t y w i t h i n R u s s i a at the time


of the p l e n u m was one of s c a t t e r e d u n l i n k e d groups in
w h i c h in general the oblas t * o r g a n i s a t i o n had b r o k e n down.
This was r e c o g n i s e d to be the p o s i t i o n by the p l e n u m w h e n
it p r o p o s e d that where it was impossible to h o l d oblast *
c o n f e rences to elect delegates to the f o r t h c o m i n g
conference, del e g a t e s should be e l e cted d i r e c t l y by the
m a jor centres. I n s tead of, for example, the Central
I n d u strial R e g i o n s e n ding four delegates from its o b l a s t ’
conference, it might be decided, d e p e n d i n g on the state of
the o r g a n i s a t i o n in the v a r ious cities to designate
Iv a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k , Kineshma, T v e r and Orel as centres to
send one de l e g a t e each. F r o m So t s i a l rdemokrat itself in
the reports fro m l o c a lities a p p e a r i n g in 1 9 1 0 and I 9 H it
a p p e a r e d that the central o r g a n isations in Moscow,
Petersburg and the Central Industrial Region frequently
lost contact with the lower Party bodies. The Central
Industrial Region was reported in March as having restored
links with nine centres, but in some of these places the
organisation was not functioning, and was in desperate
need of assistance. In December 1909 there were massive
arrests in the Moscow Committee and the work of leadership
fell to the Central Raion between December and February.
By this time an Executive Commission had re-established
1
links with four raions.

The solution to the organisational collapse as far as


Party members could see was in restoration of links,
assistance from professional Party workers and more
efficient transport of illegal literature. By now the
great majority of those left in the locality organisations
were workers and they still needed assistance in the
conduct of propaganda circles. Workers were described as
being much less politically experienced, but with more
interest in general social questions than the worker
members who had joined before and during the revolutionary
years.
The news of the plenum which had taken place unknown
to those in Russia reached the underground organisations
after some delay. The decisions on unity and the holding
of the conference were received with great enthusiasm.
Reports of reactions in the localities began to appear in
July. In Petersburg Bolsheviks and Mensheviks of the
Moscow raion were working together in spite of the

1
SD no. 13, 26 April 1910, p.ll.
142

op p os i t i o n of the Vperedists. In M o s c o w where, owing to


the arrests at the end of 1909 the Central r ai on still
occ u pi ed the l ea d i n g position, that ra ion h ad disc us sed
the pl e n u m decisions, s up por te d the ca l l i ng of the Pa rty
conf ere nc e and at the ra ion committee elections six
Bolsheviks, one P ar t y M e n s h e v i k and one V p ere di st were
el e cte d to office.

Fr om P e t e r s b u r g in S ep t e m b er it was report ed that


uni ty of a c t io n of B ols he vi ks and M e nsh ev iks had p r oce ed ed
in the p r e p a r a t o r y w o r k for the Congress for the Struggle
against A l c o h o l i s m in J an ua ry 1910, in face of the
o b s t ru ct i on of the otzovists who w a n t e d to boycott the
congress. In spite of this a co ns iderable amount of joint
a gi ta tio na l w o r k ha d b e e n carried on in trade u n i o n s ,
ed uc at i on al associations, schools and clubs. A f t e r the
congress there h a d b e e n arrests of members of workers*
delegations, w h i c h de pl et e d trade unions and other
or g ani sa ti on s of their best activists. In the reports on
the congress made to P ar t y g r o u p s , raions and legal
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , two tendencies were apparent in the
discussions, that of the otzovists who ur ged the
use les sne ss of p a r t i c i p a t i o n for the workers in such
undertakings, and a tenden cy wh i c h was bo yc ot t is t from
opposite premises, namely, that to pa rt ici pa te in
congresses in a poli tic al w a y led only to arrests and
r e pr es s io n and hence less politics. Ru mours of the pl en um
ha d come to P e t e r s b u r g at the end of J a nu a r y and the text
of the re so lutions r ea ch e d them in F e b r u a ry in Pravda.
The p ol ic y of c o m b i n a t i o n of legal and illegal w o r k and

1
SD no. 14, 22 June 1910, pp.9-10.
143

the turn in g of factions into tendencies not disr up tiv e of


the u n i t y a c t i v i t y 'was h a i l e d w i t h j o y * , a c c o r d i n g to the
report. In the raions where there were few otzovists the
ar r an ge m e n t of joint ac ti vi ty p r oc e e d ed smoothly, but
wh ere they were in c o n t r o l , o r gan is ati on al u n i t y was
either b e i n g p re v e n t e d or red uc ed to a formality.

Ther e seems to have b e en less trouble w i t h the


otzovists in Moscow, where, it was reported, Bo ls heviks
w o r k e d w i th some P a r t y Me ns he v i k s and V pe red is ts in the
same org an is a ti on s w i t h v er y little wrangling. Vper ed ist s
even joined legal organisations. The liquidators gave no
trouble, since they were so b u s y w it h their legal paper
and so oc cu pie d w i t h the struggle against the Pa r t y that
they had no time to think of the existence of the w o r k i n g
c l a s s .^

If in the capitals the r e so l u t i o n de voted to u ni ty


re c e i v e d m u c h attention, in the smaller centres it was the
promise of re vival of the o r g an i s a ti o n that was w a r m l y
greeted. It was here that the q u e s t i o n of a f u nc t i o ni n g
illegal o rg a n i s a t i o n was critical and that of co mbined
legal and illegal w o r k not an immediate one, b e ca us e there
were eith er no legal org ani sat io ns or they were severely
circumscribed. A lette r What is to be d o n e ? from a Party
M e n s h e v i k e x a mi ne d the p o si t i on of P a r t y or ga nisations in
the areas outside the capitals. He p o in te d out h ow na r ro w
and i n w a r d - t u r n i n g P ar t y circles had become. Th e i r

SD nos. 15-16, 3 0 Au gu s t 1910, p.13»


2
SD nos. 19-20, 13 J a n u ar y 1 9 U » p . 10.
144

failure to put out leaflets on local issues was not through


lack of printing presses but through isolation and
inactivity. In discussing means by which Social Democrats
could take a more active part in day to day struggles he
said that on the one hand Social Democrats working in
legal organisations tended not to operate as organised
g r o u p s , and hence adopted a narrow and opportunistic
approach, submitting to the limits imposed on them, while
on the other, because of the inadequacy of the trade
unions as organs for the protection of workers* economic
interests , the real battles were being carried on outside
the unions. He recommended the setting up of Party cells
in legal organisations and where legal unions did not
exist, he proposed, since he was doubtful of the value of
illegal unions, a reversion to the old pre-revolutionary
forms of trade union activity - temporary unions of
struggle, strike funds, fighting funds and regular mass
meetings. These were forms of organisation not usually
defined in Party relationships but they had stable
personnel and would be in some sort of liaison with the
1
local Party leadership.

Trade unions received considerable attention in the


Party press at this time. The failure of the unions to
form any effective organisations for the carrying on of
the economic struggle was frequently mentioned. In one
report it was stated that the employers had calculated
that union membership, estimated at 235>000 in 1907> had
dropped to 20,000 at the end of 1909- Between 1906 and

1
SD no. 13j 26 April 1910, pp.7-8.
145

1910 the rules of 106 unions had been submitted for


registration through the Moscow factory inspectorate,
resulting in sixteen legally registered unions in that
city in 1910. Other figures equally eloquent of the
decline were cited. Trade unions having no opportunity to
do what they were intended for, that is to carry on
economic struggles, were felt even by the workers to be
useless. The extreme legal constrictions imposed on them
led many activists to seek artificial paths to the masses,
through mutual benefit activity. They might frankly
acknowledge that this was inadequate but asked what was to
be done. On the possible lines of action for the unions
the writer rejected that of legality - the campaigning for
a fully legal existence by permitted methods alone, and
the renunciation of all revolutionary slogans, as a
surrender to the enemy. He urged the organisation of
illegal unions when all legal possibilities had been
exhausted and like the author of the letter What is to be
done? he thought the fluid pre-revolutionary
1
organisational forms should be used.
Reports from centres outside Petersburg and Moscow
consistently indicated that in places and situations where
there was a need for trade union organisation at a basic
economic level, it was there and then that trade unions
were most stringently banned. In Ekaterinoslav gubernia
it was said that wages had been lowered, there was serious
unemployment, with employed workers maintaining those out
of work and there had been outbreaks of cholera and

1
Ibid., pp.3-5.
l46

terrible s a n i t a r y c o n d itions in the iron foundries in the


Iu z o v k a raion, but all attempts to get u n i o n rules through
the g u b e r n i a office h ad b e e n unsuccessful. The police
were active s p e c u l a t i n g on the w o r k e r s 1 p o v e r t y and it was
said they were o f f e r i n g 70-100 roubles a m o n t h for
1
collaborators. In a large sou t h e r n town, unnamed, where
a few m u t i l a t e d unions h ad survived, the w o r k e r s 1 attitude
was that only the a r i s t o c r a c y of l a bour became unionists
b e c ause this gave such people their only chance of public
activity, since politics on the job were m u c h too
dangerous. The result of this was that apart from the
careerists, only the v e r y few r e a l l y a d v a n c e d and
conscious w o r k e r s joined the u n i o n s , while less ad v a n c e d
2
militants failed to see any value in d o i n g so. In M o s c o w
until 1909, it was reported, a n u m b e r of unions had
op e r a t e d actively, but in the a u t u m n there h a d b e e n such a
severe clamp d o w n that onl y m i nor unions were left, with
the e x c e p t i o n of the T e x t i l e Workers w i t h one thousand
members w h i c h h a d s u r v i v e d on c o n d i t i o n that it did not
h old meetings. The M e tal W o r kers h a d a p p l i e d eight times
for r e g i s t r a t i o n and the Bakers three, but h a d been
rejected. But b a d as the p o s i t i o n h a d n ow become in Moscow,
it was worse in the s u r r o u n d i n g industrial r e g i o n where in
most towns, i n c l u d i n g such large m a n u f a c t u r i n g centres as
I v a n o v o - V o z n e s e n s k there were no legal unions at all. In
the w h ole of Russia, said the report, there were only four
3
or five points where legal w o r k could be carried on.

1
SD no . 12, 23 M a r c h 1 9 1 0 , pp. 9-
2
SD no . 13, 26 A p ril 1910, p .12.
3
SD no . 18, 16 N o v e m b e r 1910, p.
ikj

W i t h the no table ex cep t i on of Petersburg, and less


n o t a b l y Moscow, the trade unions in the first five years
of their legal existence in R u s s ia had failed to es ta bl i s h
themselves as independent organis at ion s of the w o r ki n g
class. The n a r r o w limits all ow ed them and the constant
h a ra ss m en t of the police forced them to operate at the
prim iti ve level of fri end ly so ciety ac tivity and made it
almost impossible to lead any mov em ent for b e t t er wages
and conditions. If they obs er ve d the re st rictions and
o pe ra te d leg all y they were un der pressure to bypass the
vital economic interests of the workers. If they became
d i r e c t l y involved in these interests, they were thrown
b ac k into illegal a ct i v i t y where they became an appendage
of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y poli tic al movement. An example of
the marg in al r e l e v a n c e , even of semi-legal trade un i o n
activity, to the basic needs of the workers ma y be seen in
the list of a gi ta ti ona l leaflets pu bl is h e d by the
St P e t e r s b u r g Central Trade Un io n B u r e au for the year 1909»
T h e y conce rn ed the W o m e n s 1 Congress, cholera, workers*
insurance, the lockout of Vilno l e a t h e r w o r k e r s , the
bri stl e workers* lockout, the b u i l d i n g di saster in the
Sou th and the strike in Sweden. T e n thousand copies of a
q ue st io nn ai r e on the reasons for the w i d e s p r e a d a l c o h o li s m
1
am on g Pe t e r s b u r g workers were also published. That there
was even one leaflet, on workers* insurance, d e a l i n g w it h
a ma jor economic p r e o c c u p a t i o n of la bour wo ul d be
co n ne ct e d w i t h the fact that workers* insurance was a
p ro j e c t e d go vernment measure and a subject of wide public
discussion. It was not until 1912 that the eight ho u r day

1
SD no. 11, 13 F e br u ar y 1910, p.9*
148

slogan was widely raised again for the first time since
the revolutionary years - and then it was on the
initiative of the Bolsheviks, not the trade unions.

As has already been said, the overwhelming need in


Party circles outside the capitals was for restoration of
the organisation and links with the centre. It was the
plenum decisions for the holding of an all-Russian
conference and re-establishment of the Russian centre
which were welcomed. The tenor of the reports from
provincial centres in 1910 indicated that a certain
stability of local groups had been reached. There were no
longer professional revolutionaries attached to them, the
old members had disappeared and the new ones were
inexperienced, but the groups existed. There was a little
more money available. A laconic report from Tver by a
functionary (Oblastnik) from the Central Industrial Oblasjt*
organisation who had managed to make a tour of the area,
stated that there were none of the old members left, the
work was entirely in new hands, a recruiting leaflet had
been issued, there were 120 paying members in the city and
they wanted someone from the O b l a s t * Bureau to lead the
work. He said of Sormovo which had a long history of
revolutionary activity and which Nogin had described as a
rare exception among provincial o r g anisations, that the
Social Democratic collective had existed all along,
leaflets had been well distributed, particularly those on
May Day and the reason for inactivity was the need for a
political line and a lack of confidence in their own
forces. The summing up of Oblastnik was that there was an
overriding need to unite the isolated groups and that this
149

"I
was the function of the Party centre. In the Central
Industrial Region, in the absence of links with the Oblast*
Centre in 1909, it was found that Social Democratic
workers themselves without outside assistance had been
trying to restore Party organisations. In some towns,
Kineshma and Teikhovo, they had been successful. In
others such as Ivanovo-Voznesensk, where arrests and
provocation had been particularly severe, the general mood
of apathy and suspicion had been too much for them.
During 1910 and I9 H there were no reports from the Urals
until the Russian Organising Commission organiser Semen
Schwartz made his way there on the autumn of I 9H and
found Social Democratic groups in Ufa, Perm and
Ekaterinburg entirely isolated not only from the rest of
Russia but from each other.

The mingled hope and anxiety of the Party members in


Russia in respect of happenings abroad became more evident
by the end of 1910 as news of the violent, renewed faction
fighting became known, and confusing proposals and counter
proposals about the Party conference were put forward in
Sotsial* demokrat and Pravda. Two letters from Stalin,
coming to the end of a term of exile at this time gave a
view which was probably widespread among the Bolshevik
practicals. The first written in December 1910 to Semen
Schwartz and intended for Lenin*s eyes, supported the
Lenin-Plekhanov bloc against the liquidators, but insisted
that the most important thing was the organisation of work
inside Russia. The liquidators had established a firm

1
SD no. 18, l6 November 1910, p.ll.
150

p o s i t i o n in the legal o r g a n isations and had their own


R u s s i a n centre, w h ile the Bolsheviks were still only
rehearsing. The immediate task was to organise a central
R u s s i a n group c o - o r d i n a t i n g illegal, semi-legal and legal
1
w o r k in the m a i n centres. In a n o ther letter w r i t t e n
s h o r t l y afterwards, in J a n u a r y I 9 H and not intended for
L e n i n he said
¥e have of course h e a r d from a b r o a d of the
1tempest in a teapot* there; the blocs b e t w e e n
L e n i n - P l e k h a n o v , on the one hand, and b e t w e e n
T r o t s k y - M a r t o v - B o g d a n o v , on the other. The
attit u d e of the w o r k e r s towards the first bloc
is, as far as I know, favourable. But the
w o r k e r s are g e n e r a l l y b e g i n n i n g to look w i t h
d i s d a i n on what * s g o i n g on abroad: let them
climb the walls to their h e art's content. So
far as we ourselves are concerned, wh o e v e r
holds dear the interests of the movement, will
k e e p on working, the rest will take care of ^
itself. This, in my opinion, is for the best.

By the end of 1910 all efforts of the B o l s h e v i k


o r g a nisers to get the R u s s i a n B u r e a u of the Central
Committee c o n v e n e d and f u n c t i o n i n g h a d failed. In
December the B o l s h e v i k s a b r o a d d e n o u n c e d the p l enum
a g r e e m e n t and a p p l i e d for the r e t u r n of funds d e p o s i t e d
w i t h the G e r m a n trustees. This action, which had been
p r o v i d e d for in the 1910 Central Com m i t t e e p l enum
a g r e e m e n t s , shou l d have b e e n f o l lowed by a s u m m o n i n g of a
p l e n u m a b r o a d b y the B u r e a u of the Central Committee
Abroad. In an a r t icle The State of Af f a i r s of the P a rty

1
I .V. Stalin, Sochineniia (M., 19^6-9)» Vol. 2, p p . 2 0 9 - H *
2 /
L. Trotsky, The S t a l i n School of F a l s i f i c a t i o n (N.Y.
1937), p.182.
151

L e n i n e x p l a i ne d this step as be in g the only possible w ay


of h a v i n g a p l e n u m summoned. By this time however, he
must have d ec id e d to act u n i l a t e r a l l y to the extent of
s e t t in g up p ar al lel bodies to the B u r e a u of the Central
Co mm i tt ee A b r o a d and the R u s s i a n B u r e au of the Central
Committee, w h i c h w o ul d un de rt a k e the task of o r g a n i si n g a
R u s s i a n conference. F rom what P i at n i t sk i i in his Zapiski
b o l 1she vika s a y s , L e n i n was c o n t e mp l a t in g this by the end
of 1 9 1 0 . 1

In the s p r in g of I 9 H a private m e e ti n g of seven


B o l s h e v i k and P o l i s h members of the Central Committee
liv in g ab roa d took the first steps towards the un il ateral
ca l l i n g of a P a r t y conference. It was de cided that the
B o l s h e v i k and P o l i s h members of the Bu re au of the Central
C om mit tee A b r o a d wo u l d w i t h d r a w from that body, and R y k o v
as a mem b er of the R u s s i a n B u r e a u w ou ld summon a Central
Commi tte e p l e nu m abroad. B ot h these decisions were
ca rri ed out, the B ol s h e v i k Se mashko m ov ed out of the
B.C.C.A. w i t h its funds and in June the m e e t i n g of Central
Co m mi tt e e me mbers su mmoned by R y k o v took place. It was,
of course, in no sense a plenum, only eight members were
present, two of w h o m a M e n s h e v i k and a Bundist, withdrew
before the r eso lu tio ns were adopted.

At this m e e t i n g two bodies were set up, a Tech ni cal


C o m m i s s i o n w h i c h was to find the ma terial and technical
means for the s u m m on i ng of a conference and an O r g a n i si n g
Commission Abroad (Z.O.K.) w h i c h was to b ri ng into ac tion
r e p r e se n t a ti ve s of local org an isations in Ru s si a to

1
0. Piatnitskii, op. cit., p p .154-5.
152

establish a new Russian collegium of the Central Committee.


The other Party groups abroad with the exception of the
Golosists were invited to join these bodies. All refused,
although Plekhanov’s group was not in opposition.

Four agents of Z.O.K. were sent to Russia to set up a


Russian Organising Commission (R.O.K.). T w o of them,
Breslav and Rykov, were arrested on reaching Moscow in
August, Semen Schwartz who went to the Urals and
Ordzhonikidze to the south, escaped arrest.

In spite of the scandals and indignation which the


completely unconstitutional actions in setting up Z.O.K.
and the Technical Commission had aroused in Party circles
abroad, the appeal of the Z.O.K. agents to local Party
groups to take active steps for the summoning of a
conference and the transfer of the initiative to Russian
organisations, met with considerable support. The feeling
in favour of practical action was very strong, the widely
known refusal of the Menshevik practicals to restart the
Russian Bureau made people inclined to accept the idea of
a substitute organisation and the furore over the
unconstitutional actions of Z.O.K. was much muted in
Russia. There were reports of meetings in St Petersburg
(4 raions), Kiev, Tiflis and Moscow (2 raions) supporting
the efforts being made to call the conference.

In September a meeting, gathered by the two remaining


Z.O.K. agents, was held in Tiflis, of representatives from
the Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Baku, Tiflis and Ekaterinburg
organisations and four others with consultative vote. The

1
SD no. 23) 1 September 1911, pp.9-10; SD no. 24, 18
October I9 H , p.8.
153

r ep re se n t a t i v e from P e t e r s b u r g failed to arrive. This


m e e t i n g co ns t i t u t e d itself the R u s s i a n O r g a n i s i n g
Commission (R.O.K.) a fte r d i sc u s s i n g w h et h e r such a na rr o w
g a t h e r i n g could p r o p e r l y so constitute itself, wit ho ut
representation from Petersburg, M o s c o w and the Ce ntral
In d us tr i al Region. It was d e ci de d that the ma t te r could
not be de l ay ed any further.

The re lations of R.O.K. w i t h its disrep ut abl e parent


Z.O.K. were co ns id e re d at its second session. It wo u l d
a p pe ar that the local deleg ates who now c on sti tu ted R.O.K.
were anxious to se ver connections as soon as possible, to
the extent of d e c l a r i n g Z.O.K. dissolved. But
Or d z h o n i k i d z e as re pre se n ta t i v e of Z.O.K., w it h
co ns ul tat iv e vote, p r o t es te d that this wo u l d be a
prema tu re step if the members of R.O.K. were to be a r re st ed
and put out of action. A com promise was re ached wh e r e by
Z.O.K. and the T ec hn i ca l C o m m i s s i o n were d e cla re d to be
sub ordinate to R.O.K. and were told not to pub li sh
a n y t h i n g or spend m on e y w it ho ut the agreement of R.O.K.

In a l l o t t i n g ma ndates for the conference the factors


to be taken into c o n s i d er at io n were the importance of a
given centre, the numbers of org an ise d members and the
len g th of its existence. To have a vote a centre must
have ha d at least 30 me mbers and have b e e n in existence at
2
least two mo nths before the b e g i n n i n g of the conference.

1
SD no. 25, 8 D e c e m b e r 1 9 1 1 , p.8.
2
0. Bosh, 12
P ra zh s k a i a k o n f e r e n t s i i a ' , in PR (1925)> no• ^>
p .200.
15 ^

If we look at the Party organisations whose


representatives took these audacious decisions we see that
there were only two which had any claim to being stable or
well established. They were those of Kiev and Baku, in
both of which Party Mensheviks were prominent. Kiev was
led by Mensheviks with Bolsheviks participating as junior
p a r t n e r s , and this organisation had not only
enthusiastically responded when approached by
Ordzhonikidze but had undertaken to help him by reviving
the Ekaterinoslav organisation. In Baku the leadership
was in the hands of a united Bolshevik-Menshevik committee
which carried on legal and illegal work.

In spite of the participation of Mensheviks the


action of the September Tiflis meeting in constituting
itself Russian Organising Commission and serving an
ultimatum on Z.O.K. bore all the marks of a Lenin
organised coup. And indeed this was how the Polish and
Bolshevik lconcilator members* of Z.O.K. and the Technical
Commission interpreted it. In thtdi" Open Letter to the
Russian Organising Commission in November they criticised
it for its untimely haste and the narrowly Bolshevik
character of its support. They accused R.O.K. of
misinterpreting its organisational tasks and allowing
itself to be manipulated by the Leninist Bolsheviks into
organising, not a general Party conference but a narrowly
factional one. Such a factional policy could only
frighten Party Mensheviks away from work on the conference
and strengthen the sceptical attitude of their leaders,
particularly Plekhanov. If such a conference were to be
called the Poles would not participate, and it would not
be a conference of unity but of a split.
155

It was pointed out that R.O.K. had been constituted


without representation from Moscow, Petersburg and the
Central Industrial Region, the Poles had not been invited
to R.O.K. before its constitution, and although the Z.O.K.
agents had been sent to Russia with precise instructions
to safeguard the Party character of the conference, they
did not inform Z.O.K. of a number of their actions but
consulted with the Leninists instead. By giving the Urals
three votes at the conference as against Petersburg's
three and Moscow and the Central Industrial Region with
four between them, the impression was created of a biased
representation against the Menshevik Oblasts in favour of
Bolshevik ones.

Z.O.K. insisted that R.O.K. should not consider


itself finally constituted but should hold a second
session with wider representation and the time of holding
the conference should be decided to allow for the inclusion
of a considerable majority of the Party if not of all
1
Party tendencies.

Ordzhonikidze replied to the Open Letter and other


criticisms of Z.O.K. in a letter to the editors of
Sotsial*demokrat with a series of flat denials of the
charges - R.O.K. did not have an exclusively Bolshevik
character, it was working in a hurry because it had
urgently been instructed to do so, it was receiving wide
support in Russia. The Moscow, Petersburg, Nikolaev,
Rostov, Saratov, Kazan and Vilno organisations now
supported it, the Poles had been invited to join but had

1
0. B o s h , o p . c i t ., pp.193-8.
156

not replied and the withholding of funds by Z.O.K. at a


1
critical moment had meant the arrest of Semen Schwartz.
By the end of the year it was stated that twenty
organisations had given their support to R.O.K.

But in fact Z . O . K . ls charges remained unanswered.


The conference that was organised in such haste was
thoroughly Bolshevik, even though the Kiev and
Ekaterinoslav Mensheviks stayed to attend it. It was not
widely representative of Russian organisations. It would
seem that a much broader conference could have been held
in spite of the extraordinarily difficult conditions of
organisation due to the presence of provocateurs in the
heart of the Bolshevik faction. But by I 9 H Lenin had
decided not only that there was to be a split in the Party
and how it was to be done, but also that it was essential
to carry the operation through with the utmost speed.

The question of the kind of Marxist party the Russian


working class needed, which had been raised in 1908 in the
context of the defeat of the revolution and the break up
of the Social Democratic organisation through repression,
was by I 9 H being discussed in terms of immediate
perspectives, of what to do next. Political conditions
had changed to the extent that the Duma had become a
nuisance that the Government had learnt to live with and
was approaching the end of its term without further
curtailment of its rights or arrests of its members, a
good deal of political argument was permitted in the p r e s s ,
and there had been a general widening of the area of

1
SD no. 25, 8 December I 9 H , P*9*
157

public activity and discussion. Reforms of land ownership


designed to tackle the problem of low agricultural
productivity and to create a stratum of prosperous peasant
owners on the surface of the impoverished and turbulent
villages, together with the resumption, after prolonged
social disturbance and depression, of rapid industrial
growth brought to the fore social problems which received
attention in the press and in public congresses.

As the elections for the 4th Duma came near there was
much discussion of campaign strategy and political
programmes, and a general expectation of more active
participation in political life. Stabilization of the
regime after the upheavals of 1905-6 had been achieved by
Stolypin with savage military and police repression and
the destruction of the political organisations of the
revolutionary opposition together with the breaking of
their links with the working class. With the completion
of the pacification however, decontaminated left wing
intellectual groups, free from contact with the remnants
of the proscribed underground parties were able to take
advantage in 1910 of the greater leniency of the press
laws and establish legal journals in which they could
write not only of theoretical questions of Marxism, but
also, in Aesopian terms, of the state of the working class
movement and the political tasks of Social Democrats. The
most important of these journals were Nasha Zaria, the
organ of legal Mensheviks in Petersburg and Zvezda, the
journal of the Social Democratic deputies in the Duma, to
which Lenin frequently contributed.
For Social Democrats discussing the form that the
working class political organisation should take, the
158

immediate q u e s t i o n was w h e t h e r the electoral s y s t e m of


June 3, 1907 p r o v i d e d the pr e r e q u i s i t e s of a slow but
c e r t a i n advance of n ew bo u r g e o i s forces w i t h o u t nee d of a
fu r t h e r b o u r g e o i s revolution, or w h e t h e r as a result of
1905» the old p o wer h ad but taken a step a l o n g the path of
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n into a b o u r g e o i s monarchy, p r e s e r v i n g the
real power of the feudal land-owners, so that the
c o n d itions w h i c h gave rise to the r e v o l u t i o n w o u l d
continue to operate. If the first a s s e s s m e n t was accepted,
a ne w type of workers* o r g a n i s a t i o n was call e d for, which
w o u l d draw in the w i d e s t possible m e m b e r s h i p and, in
defence of its p a r t i c u l a r interests, w o u l d g a t h e r its
forces and a c quire socialist consciousness. In the second
case the nee d was for the m a i n t e n a n c e of the h e g e m o n y of
the w o r k i n g class to lead a po p u l a r r e v o l u t i o n a r y mo v e m e n t
to d e s troy the remna n t s of feudalism, hence the
r e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the illegal r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y was also
required. The line up of forces s u p p o r t i n g the d i f f e r i n g
v iewpoints was b y no means a simple M e n s h e v i k - B o l s h e v i k or
R i g h t - L e f t division. The most c onsistent advocates of the
open, class p a r t y were the P e t e r s b u r g M e n s h e v i k s engaged
in legal w o r k w i t h the trade unions and Duma group but
they r e c eived s t r o n g b a c k i n g from the fo r m e r l y B o l s h e v i k
intellectual N. Rozhkov. On the other side, d e f e n d i n g the
n e c e s s i t y of an illegal p a r t y were P l e k h a n o v and K a m e n e v
who took up pos i t i o n s a r g u e d from the t heoretical
p r o p o sitions of Marxism. The pra c t i c a l w o r kers in the
localities who w a n t e d a revival of the old p a r t y were those
who were r u n n i n g up a g ainst the barriers imposed on any
but n a r r o w l y o p p o r t u n i s t legal a c t i v i t y or w ere struggling
u n d e r conditions w h i c h p e r m i t t e d no legal work. The
159

M a r t o v Me ns h e v i k s who p ro ce ed e d from an analysis of the


regime as a c o n t r a d i c t o r y com bi n a ti o n of a b s o l u ti s m and
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m b el i e v e d that the b u i l d i n g of the open
w o r k e r s 1 mo ve me n t was the prime task, together w it h the
fight for l e ga l it y by ev ery means, and w i t h in this
mo ve men t w ou l d be found the elements for the revival of
the Party. The d i f f i c u l t y of this case lay in the
ass ign me nt of priorities. While the need for the gui di ng
role of the P a r t y was not denied, it was dependent upon
the cr ea tio n of a wide mass movement, w h i c h left M a r t o v
open to Len in* s charges of liquidationism.

Lenin*s polemi cs in I 9 H were g r ea tl y e n li v e n ed by


the de s er t io n of R o z h k o v to the class p ar ty viewpoint.
Unlike the lega lis ts who argued in fairly general terms
R o z h k o v tried to set out a pr og ramme for the immediate
fo rm at i on of an open workers* association. His article A n
Ess en ti al B e g i n n i n g sent to S o t s i a l *demokrat late in 1910
pro v ok ed a st ron g r e a c t i o n in the editors. K a m e n e v with
Zi no vie v and L e n i n concurring, argue d the opposite case in
1
a letter b e g g i n g R o z h k o v to w i th d r a w his article, and in
April 1911 L e n i n r ep li e d ( although Rozh ko v*s article had
not been published) w i t h his C o n v e r s a t i o n be t w e en a
Leg ali st and an Op po ne n t of L i q u i d a t i o n i s m in w h i c h he
coun ter ed the arg ume nt s for an open a s s o ci a t i on w i t h the
obj ec ti on that the G o v e r n m e n t w o u l d not permit any such
o r ga ni s at io n g e n u in e ly to de fe nd the interests of the
w o r k i n g class. In replies later in the year to other
articles of R o z h k o v in N as h a Zaria on open political

Le n in sk i i s bo rni k (M.-L. 1924-45), V o l . 25, p p .66-70.


l6o

association he elaborated the argument that under existing


Russian conditions such an organisation could not adopt
anything more radical than a liberal policy.

As ha been shown earlier there was fair support by


1911 for the reconstitution of the underground Party.
Since the Central Committee was deadlocked, this could not
be done within the bounds of strict legality, but a
general Party conference, provided it was representative
of as many Party organisations as possible from inside
Russia and of the factional groups abroad which recognised
the need for the illegal Party would have been regarded as
a satisfactory means of beginning the rebuilding. Lenin's
moves in bypassing the still existing central institutions
and setting up his own initiating bodies were condemned by
his opponents abroad, but they were powerless to stop him.
It was only when it became apparent that the Party
conference he contemplated was to be confined to the
supporters of the Leninist line on liquidationism, that
his allies, the Poles, and the 'conciliator* Bolsheviks
revolted and protested publicly. In reply to the
defectors he wrote one of the most interesting of his
polemics, The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous
in which, sweeping away the plea of the conciliators for
organisational unity of the arty and representation of
factions, he defended the exclusion of the Vpered, Pravda
and Golos groups on the ground that they represented non-
Social Democratic trends. He asserted that it was no
longer a question of organisation but one of the entire
programme, tactics and character of the Party, 'or rather
a question of two parties - the Social Democratic Workers*
Party and the Stolypin Workers Party of Potresov, Smirnov,
l6l

Larin, Levitsky and company*. The question was now


whether the Party was to be Social Democratic or liberal
in character. Summing up, he said,
Certain objective soil already exists (for the
first time in Russia) for the liberal labour
policy of Potresov, Levitsky, Larin and
company. The Stolypin liberalism of the
Cadets and the Stolypin workers* party are
already in the process of formation.^

This admission, guarded as it was, was the largest


Lenin made publicly of the possibility of a successful
launching of a mass party. His own plans for the calling
of a factional conference which would speak in the name of
the whole Party, excluding all who did not accept his
uncompromising stand against liquidationism were nowwell
under way, and in January 1912 the conference he had
planned met in Prague.

The question must be asked why Lenin, in the face of


support for a conference which would probably have
repudiated liquidationism but maintained the unity of what
was left of the Party, decided on a split. It is clear
that well before the plenum of January 1910 he had felt
that a formal break between the revolutionary and
reformist wings of the Russian Social Democratic movement
would have to be made. At the plenum he had done his best
not only to have liquidationism declared an anti-Party
trend, but also to name and outlaw certain groups as
liquidationist. He was overruled. In common with various
orthodox Marxists elsewhere he was watching with concern
the growing influence of reformism in the German Social

1
Lenin XX, pp.337, 353.
162

Democratic movement. Having attended the Copenhagen


Congress of the International in 1910 , he spoke of the
crisis in the German Social Democratic Party which was
'due to the growth of an inevitable and decisive break
1
with the o p p o r tunists1 . For Lenin 1 iquidationism was the
manifestation of reformism in Russia. In the conditions
of 1 9 1 1 ? it did look as though there was some chance of a
wider base of political activity being tolerated and some
sort of mass w o r k e r s 1 association might be set up. This,
in Lenin's view, would mean the smothering, instead of the
revival of the spirit of revolutionary Social Democracy.
Martov's insistence that the party should not be isolated
from the mass movement and could not be rebuilt without it,
was in these circumstances, particularly obnoxious to
Lenin. It cannot be said, in spite of Lenin's attacks on
him, that Martov's position was identical with that of the
legalists. He never denied the necessity of the political
leadership of the working class by the Social Democratic
Party, but if the recreated party envisaged by Martov was
to spring out of a liberal working class m o v e m e n t , its
centre could only have been pulpy, quite unlike the rock
hard nucleus that Lenin believed to be necessary.

The resolutions of the gathering at Prague began with


an account of the calling of the conference and the
support that had been received from upward of twenty
organisations in Russia. The conference constituted
itself a general Party conference, 'the supreme party
body*.2 It was stated that the three non-Russian national

1
Lenin XIX, p.352.
2
K.P.S.S. v r e s o l i u t s i i a k h , I, p.270.
163

parties had been invited and that non-attendance was their


own responsibility.

On the tasks of the Party, the policy adopted was an


endorsement and a continuation of that laid down by the
3th Conference. The beginning of a political revival in
the form of strikes and demonstrations was noted. Arising
from this, the task was the continued work of socialist
education, organisation and unification of the politically
conscious masses, and the re-establishment of the illegal
organisation of the Party, using every legal opportunity,
extending political agitation and giving support to the
incipient mass movement.

The Duma elections and the Duma group were treated at


some length. Participation in the elections was seen as a
means of carrying on socialist, class propaganda and the
organisation of the working class. The election slogans
were to be a democratic republic, the eight hour day, and
confiscation of all landed estates. The general tactical
line on the elections was to maintain the independent
position of the Party, rejecting common platforms with
other groups and electoral agreements with any other
parties in the workers* curia, but in other curiae to have
agreements with the democratic (Trudovik, Populist and
Socialist Revolutionary) groups, and in certain cases with
the Cadets against the Government parties.

In the resolution on the character and organisational


forms of Party work, the conference noted that the new
upswing of the working class movement made possible further
development of work through the formation of illegal
Social Democratic nuclei surrounded by the widest possible
164

n e t w o r k of legal workers* associations. Social De mo cratic


nuclei in unions or ga n is ed on an industrial basis should
fu nc ti on tog ether w i t h nucl e i o r gan is ed territorially.
The importance of e xt e n d i n g legal w o rk in unions, libraries,
r e a di n g rooms, workers* e nt er ta inm en t societies, and the
press was emphasised. R ef er en ce was also made to the need
to revive the forms of illegal mass acti vi ty such as the
bi rzh i and f ac tor y P ar t y meetings.

On l i q u i d a t i o n i s m the co nf erence dec la red that by its


conduct, the N a s h a Zaria and Delo Zhizni group h a d pl aced
itself outside the Party.

Changes in the Pa r t y rules were made wh i c h re co gn i se d


the extreme d i f f i c u l t y of s u m m o ni n g general conferences
and congresses. Cl ause 8 of the rules ad opted at the
L on d o n Congress w h i c h p ro vi de d for the su mm oning of
conferences e v e r y three or four months was r e pla ce d by one
to the effect that conferences of repr es ent at ive s of all
Pa rt y org an isa ti ons were to be c o nve ne d as often as
possible. In r e g ar d to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at P ar ty congresses
the basis was to be d ec ide d by the Cen tr al Committee. An
add e nd um to Clause 2 (which stated that all Pa r t y
organisations were to be c o n s tr uct ed on the pr inciple of
democratic centralism) was made to the effect that
co -o pti on was c o n s i d e r e d per mi ssi bl e
- in ac co rdance with
1
the decisions of the De ce mb e r 1908 conference.

The po lic y and pr ogram me of the Prague Conf er enc e


were based on an estimate of the r e vi v i n g temper and
political interest of the masses; the illegal P ar ty was to

1
K.P.S.S. v r e s o l i u t s i i a k h , I, p p . 270-84.
165

be reconstructed on the supposition that wide sections of


the working class were prepared to accept its leadership,
the opportunities for legal work were recognised to be
much wider and more varied than in the years of repression,
and above all, it was now considered timely to raise
illegal militant slogans as mass political demands.

The conference to split the Party had been organised


by Lenin to the accompaniment of violent polemics, rifts,
defection of long time supporters, recriminations,
scandals in the international socialist movement and the
hearty disapproval of most Social Democrats in the
emigration. But having laid down the policy of
revolutionary Social Democracy, the Leninists turned with
a remarkably conciliatory mien to the Russian membership.
In the resolution on the reports of the local
organisations it was noted that everywhere in the
localities Party work was being conducted jointly and
harmoniously by the Bolsheviks and the pro-party
Mensheviks in the main, as well as by Vpered supporters
wherever there were any, and by all other Social Democrats
who recognised the need for an illegal R.S.D.W.P. As has
been said, the only group on which anathema was
pronounced was that of the St Petersburg legalists. To
all other Social Democrats in Russia, a cordial invitation
was extended to join the ranks.

It is not possible to estimate the numbers who


participated in the elections to the conference, but they
must have been very small indeed. Eighteen voting
delegates attended, five from the emigration and the rest
directly representing local organisations - Petersburg,
Moscow, Central Industrial Region, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav,
166

Nikolaev, Baku, Tiflis, Saratov, Kazan, Vilno and Dvinsk.


There was not one of the l e ad in g B o l s h e v i k prac ti cal
wo rke rs pr esent (they had all b ee n arrested). The
t hi rte en were me mbers of local organisations, some of w h o m
had wor k ed as dis tri ct or city organisers, three had gone
thr ough Lenin®s P a rt y school at L o n g j u m e a u and two were
police spies. As well as the centres represented, four
other centres h a d su pported the conference but were unable
to send d e l e g a t e s , and the Urals contingent was pr ev e n te d
by arrests from attending. A Ce nt ral Committee of seven
was elected w h i c h included one provocateur, Malinovsky.

Because of the b r e a kd o w n of P a r t y committees in a


n um be r of centres, delegates had b ee n d i re ct ly e l ec te d at
general meetings. In P et er s b u r g 110 members from five
raions took part in the voting. In Kiev, where M e nsh ev iks
and Bolsheviks w o r k e d together, a city conference of 16
r ep re se nt ati ve s e le cte d a delegate, and in E k a t e r i n o s l a v a
city conference of 10. B a ku and Tiflis delegates were
elected by the members d ir ec tl y - more than 200 in B a k u
i
and more than 100 in Tiflis.

Lenin®s co nference ar oused vio le nt co n d e mn a t i on in


emigre circles. His opponents, d e n o u n c i n g the
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of its actions d e c l ar e d that the
conference r ep r e s e n t e d no more than a fra ct ion of all those
who called themselves Social Democrats, and they were
cert ain ly right. On the other hand the Bo ls heviks in
cl a imi ng that the twenty and more organi sa tio ns as s oc i a t ed

1
Vs e ro s s i i s k a i a k o n f e r e n t s i i a R o s , sots. - dem. rab.
partii 1912 goda ( P a r i s , 1912), p p .6-7.
167

with the conference represented the majority of the


functioning organisations in Russia were probably not
outrageously wrong either. Certainly, no counter
conference was ever called of representatives from Russian
local organisations to denounce the usurpers of the Party
name, authority and central newspaper. This may well have
reflected both the weakness of the illegal organisations
up to 191^ and the chronic tendency of the Russian
membership to consider itself Social Democratic first and
factional second.
168

CONC L U S I O N

The R u s s i a n Social D e m o c r a t i c Workers* P a r t y at the


b e g i n n i n g of 1 9 0 7 was an illegal but vigorous and
r a m i f i e d o r g a n i s a t i o n n u m b e r i n g u p w a r d of 80,000 members,
h a r a s s e d b y a r r ests and police spying but in m a n y places
still e n j o y i n g u n d e r thin disguise the freedom to meet and
associate w o n in 1905* Its a g i t a t i o n and m uch of its
pro p a g a n d a was c a r r i e d on openly. Its press, after the
s u p p r e s s i o n of the s h o r t - l i v e d legal journals of 1905 was
printed under conspiratorial conditions but c i r c u l a t e d
freely. Mass meeti n g s were held, p a r t i c u l a r l y in summer
as open air g a t h e r i n g s . A great v a r i e t y of premises in
u n i o n o f f i c e s , p r ivate dwellings and e ducational
institutions was still a v a ilable for P a r t y conferences,
committee m e e t i n g s and p r o p a g a n d a classes. Widespread
a g i t a t i o n and p r o p a g a n d a p e r m i t t e d general d i s c u s s i o n of
P a r t y poli c y b y the rank and file and n o n - p a r t y workers.
The o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c o r e , the c o m m i t t e e s , r e m ained
u n d e r g r o u n d a nd p r o f e s s i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ob s e r v e d
e l e m e n t a r y rules of c o n s p i r a c y to a v oid arrest.

The years of deep r e p r e s s i o n that followed S tolypin*s


coup d*etat of June 1907 saw the flight of the leaders
into exile, d e s t r u c t i o n of the central institutions, loss
of the g r e a t e r part of the m e m b e r s h i p and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n
into a numb e r of b i t t e r l y hostile factions m u t u a l l y more
a ntagonistic a b r o a d than w i t h i n Russia. At the end of the
period o c c u r r e d the r e c o n s t i t u t i o n from outside of part of
the B o l s h e v i k faction, the d e c l a r a t i o n of an open
169

organisational break between the Leninists and other


factions, the assumption of the Party name and central
institutions by the Leninist group and the rebuilding of
the organisation within Russia as an underground party
with a programme of revolutionary socialism.

The severe political persecution of the revolutionary


opposition on which the June 3 regime was established was
for the Social Democratic Party a blow which suddenly
interrupted its organic development, separated leaders
from members and members from the mass milieu, driving
those Social Democrats whose work lay in legal spheres to
sever their connection with the Party, and constraining
within the proscrustian bed of the underground those who
remained.

The government took a decision to deal the coup de


grace to a political organisation whose revolutionary
actions had already been defeated, an organisation which,
placed on the defensive by the rapidly declining militancy
of the workers, was adjusting to a phase of legal
parliamentary opposition and to work in the emerging legal
trade unions. In a situation in which it was recognised
by the Menshevik wing that the revolutionary period of
armed struggle had passed, and by the Bolsheviks that a
mass of day to day political activities now stood between
them and the next armed uprising, the differences between
the reformist and revolutionary perspectives were not so
acute that the possibility of an open break was an
immediate one. The tendency in the formally united Party
was rather for the rival factions to concentrate their
forces in certain areas and in certain fields of a c t i v i t y ,
170

with the Mensheviks entrenched in mass work and the


Bolsheviks in the central Party apparatus.

Certainly the differences in tactics arising from the


differing perspectives were considerable. The Mensheviks
looked to a period of accumulation of the forces of the
working class, training in political organisation and
activity and the use of legal opportunities to build a
broad popular opposition to the autocracy. The Bolsheviks
with the prospect of the armed revolt moving away into the
future, were turning to a militant use of legal
opportunities both to put forward the revolutionary
viewpoint and to demonstrate the impossibility of using
bourgeois institutions in radical defence of working class
interests. These differences however led more often to
work along separate lines than to headlong confrontation
except on certain immediate issues such as the Duma
election campaign which provoked opposing policies on the
relationship with bourgeois parties.

By 1907 the militancy of the economic movement of the


working class was declining rapidly. The sweeping mass
strikes of 1905 which had won important improvements in
wages and hours had been followed by a lowering of morale
after the defeat of the Moscow uprising, hastened by some
unsuccessful strikes and fairly widespread unemployment in
1906. But at this time the creation had begun of those
institutions, the trade unions, which would channel and
direct the economic demands of the class, both those which
were common to the entire work force and those which made
up the vast number of bitterly felt sectional grievances.
In addition, right from their inception Russian trade
unions had undertaken broad cultural-educational activities
171

and some social services. A trade u n i o n m o v e m e n t was


c o m i n g into being, b e l a t e d but vigorous and m a n y sided,
u n c l u t t e r e d by r e s t r i c t i v e traditions, directly reflecting
in its a c t i v i t y the social and economic needs of its
members and the shortage of v o l u n t a r y institutions in
R u s s i a n society. Like the political parties, the trade
unions d e p e n d e d on the e d u c a t e d classes for the conduct of
their c u l t u r a l - e d u c a t i o n a l programmes, legal aid and
medical services a nd for technical assi s t a n c e w i t h press
and management, a state of affairs taken for g r a nted as an
i n termediate stage in the workers* development.

B o t h factions of the P a r t y took an active interest in


trade unions. The M e n s h e v i k s stood for the utmost
en c o u r a g e m e n t of the unions w i t h o u t organi s a t i o n a l
attachment, s o - c a l l e d neutrality. The B o l s heviks had
r e c e n t l y c h a n g e d their a p p r o a c h from one of rigid
n e u t r a l i t y to that of partiinos t * , that i s , the w i n n i n g of
ideological influence over the unions and the
establishment of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l links b e t w e e n P a r t y and
unions. The r e s u l t of the e n try of the Bolsheviks into
the field of trade u n i o n work, w h i c h they h ad hithe r t o
left to the Mensheviks, w o u l d most l i k e l y have b e e n a fierce
struggle for i n f l uence in some unions, w i t h the B o l s heviks
w i n n i n g c o m m a n d i n g positions in a s s o c iations of u n s k i l l e d
and s e m i - s k i l l e d wo r k e r s and the M e n s h e v i k s influence
r e m a i n i n g p r e d o m i n a n t amongst s k i lled workers.

While the immediate prospects of the R.S.D.W.P. in


the first h a l f of 1907 were those of further r e t reat and a
loss of m e m b e r s h i p in the face of p r e s s i n g r e a c t i o n and
disillusionment of the e d u c a t e d classes w i t h the results
of the revolution, it h a d n e v e r t h e l e s s e s t a b l i s h e d itself
172

as the only political party that the great majority of


urban workers considered in any way as their own and it
had close links with the growing trade union movement. It
faced the difficult but not impossible position of being
illegal but only half underground, persecuted by the
government but retaining its links with society.

The Party had reached a stage in its development on


the eve of the coup in which there was increasing
interaction between the membership and leading committees,
at least in the most advanced centres. Policy was
determined by the leadership and constantly assessed by
the rank and file. The influx of thousands of workers
into the Party in 1905 had meant the introduction of
democratic forms of election and in addition, the system
of standing conferences in Petersburg and Moscow provided
both an immediate indication as to how policy was received
by the members, and through the conference delegates
elected directly from the work places, information on the
mood of the workers at large.
The Stolypin reaction destroyed all this, with
momentous consequences both for the Social Democratic
Party and for the Russian working class.
Although the drastic step taken was not dictated by
any immediate danger, the government did recognise the
serious threat to its stability that had been posed by the
events of the revolutionary years. The political motives
for the Stolypin land reforms were to lessen the social
unrest in the villages by the creation of a conservative
layer of peasant landowners. As Lenin himself recognised,
the reforms had a fair chance of succeeding, given time.
The problems facing the government in dealing with the
173

numerically small but highly volatile class of industrial


workers were more formidable. The revolutionary years had
presented the alarming spectacle of industrial mass
militancy in alliance with a conscious political element.

Stolypin acted ruthlessly and efficiently to sever


the connection between the working class and the
revolutionary intelligentsia. But while the revolutionary
political party could be reduced to fragments, the problem
still remained of what form the working class movement
could be allowed to take. The German path of permitting
the development of an industrial trade union movement cut
off from the outlawed political party could hardly be
followed in Russian conditions. Industrialization was
still at the stage where a large unskilled labour force of
low productive capacity endured the severe exploitation of
long hours, low wages and bad working conditions.
Extensive unionisation of the huge Russian industrial
enterprises must have led to insistent demands being
placed on highly resistant employers. But Russia*s heavy
dependence on foreign capital for industrial investment
called imperatively for a stable, cheap and docile work
force. Pressed by the contradictions in which it found
itself, the government was not prepared to allow the
development of a viable, legally recognised trade unionism,
which could have hastened the emergence of a stratum of
conservative working class leaders and provided a broad
alternative channel for working class demands to that
offered by the illegal political Party.
The government *s attack on the Party institutions,
carried out over a period of time was highly effective.
First, the entire semi-legal superstructure was swept away,
174

the mass contacts broken and serious inroads made into the
illegal apparatus. Then in 1908-9 the underground
organisation itself was broken up, mainly through the
successful use of spying and provocation. The loss of
members and the danger to the very existence of mass
organisations presented by any link with the proscribed
revolutionary Party sharply pointed up the problems of the
underground organisation divorced from the class it was
supposed to lead and educate. The Mensheviks pointed out
the self destroying character of the isolated
conspiratorial circles, but the alternative they sought in
the broad path of reformist work with the class likewise
yielded barren results. The type of persecution to which
the legal movement and in particular the trade unions were
subjected, was not of the kind which would allow them to
come back time after time to fight the employers. They
were simply headed off by state regulation from any
effective activity on wages and hours on behalf of their
members. Specifically bound as they were by the
Provisional Regulations of 1906 not to defend but to
elucidate the economic interests of their members, as soon
as the rules were literally and obstructively applied they
found themselves deserted by the majority of those who had
joined with such enthusiasm. In the years of repression,
in spite of the efforts of Social Democrats working
legally, no mass class organisation was able to take the
place of the Party.
Those Social Democrats, the Bolsheviks, who retained
a revolutionary perspective and clung to the illegal Party
were faced with a catastrophic situation. The noisy
outgoing Bolshevik local organisations, left with a
175

fraction of their membership and shorn of their leading


committees found themselves reduced to the hunted life of
the underground and dependent for funds, literature and
leadership on the Bolshevik centre in exile. The attack
on the over-extended Party organisation revealed the
organic weaknesses that sprang from excessive dependence
on the services of the intelligentsia. When this
underpinning was suddenly removed with the mass withdrawal
of the intelligentsia the structure collapsed and
propaganda and agitation in many areas ceased altogether.

Considerable numbers of Social Democrats accompanied


the Party leaders into exile. In the various European
cities in which they settled they tended to form emigre
communities and to continue the arguments of the immediate
past. The Party lived two lives - one in the brawling
emigration and the other in the shrinking underground.
Leaders of the factions abroad studied the lessons of the
revolution, outlined political programmes and diagnosed
the ills of the Party largely in terms of the misdeeds of
factional opponents. In addition to the fundamental
divergence between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, bitter
differences of opinions developed within the Bolshevik
faction itself. Tactical disagreements, which when the
leaders and members were together, could be argued,
discussed, put to the vote as they arose and the decision
tested in practice, became when leaders and members were
separated, prolonged and deadly disputes leading to splits
and expulsions among the emigres, and in the decimated
local organisations, confused quarrelling. Although the
tendencies of the Right to abandon the Party
(liquidationism) and of the Left to renounce legal action
176

(otzovism) arose naturally from the disintegration and


demoralisation within Russia, the mutual antagonisms of
the embattled local members were never as fierce as those
of the emigres. Most legalists were regarded as being
entirely outside the Party, but amongst the remaining
members, Leninist Bolsheviks and many otzovists and Party
Mensheviks, a disposition to forget past disputes was
evident by the end of 1909. This mood was strongly
expressed by the practical workers in the Bolshevik
organisation. These men who had influenced aspects of
policy in regard to the Party*s relations with mass
organisations in 1906-7, continued in 1908-10 to urge upon
the Bolshevik centre views which reflected the state of
affairs in Russia and from time to time were directly
opposed to those held by Lenin. The most noteworthy
instances were the fierce objections to extending the anti-
otzovist campaign in the form of expulsions to the local
organisations and the strong support for the unity moves
leading to the January 1910 plenum.
During the years of severe repression when the local
illegal press was almost silent the views of the Bolshevik
membership are to be inferred mainly from their response
to initiatives from the Bolshevik centre. As the
energetic representations of the professionals indicated,
the responses were sometimes negative. Aware of their
dependence on the centre for the means to carry on Party
agitation and propaganda, they resented the unending
brawls of the emigres. Even when they were in firm
agreement with Lenin*s general line they felt at times
that their urgent needs were neglected, while time, energy
and money were spent by the Bolshevik leaders scoring off
177

factional opponents. The scandals that enlivened and


poisoned the atmosphere of the emigration were of much
less interest to those in Russia. Menshevik charges that
the Bolshevik leaders had been deeply implicated in major
expropriations could hardly be expected to arouse echoes
of indignation in the rank and file otzovists who had
either done their share of small robberies themselves or
sympathised with the men who had. While the Bolshevik
record with Party finances excited horror abroad, the main
complaints from Bolshevik Party committees concerned the
meagreness of the subsidies allowed them.

The Central Committee plenum held in January 1910


represented the last concerted attempt to arrive at a
working agreement between all factions still in the Party.
When news of it reached Party Social Democrats in Russia
they welcomed with enthusiasm the possibility it offered
of reviving the illegal organisation on as broad a basis
as was then possible. These hopes were destroyed in the
internecine war that broke loose again in the emigration
and the process of disintegration of the Russian
organisation into unlinked groups continued to the point
where whatever response the membership could offer, either
of support or resistance, to moves from abroad, was
negligible.

Lenin who had been overruled at the plenum in his


attempts to prevent the reconstitution of the Party in any
form but that of the centralised illegal organisation,
resumed his attacks on liquidationism at the first sign of
obstruction by the Mensheviks. Fearing the possibility,
in view of the disintegration of the underground
organisation, of a revival of Social Democracy as a legal
178

mass party, he moved with great speed to recreate an


exclusively Bolshevik organisation. He finally managed,
having lost all his practical men who had been elected as
Central Committee members or candidates at the London
Congress, to put together a flimsy organisational framework
using new agents. In the face of denunciations abroad and
the passive abstention of the inert Russian membership,
the Prague Conference took the Party name and drew up a
Party building plan along the old lines of the constitution
of a network of illegal nuclei surrounded by legal
organisations. The programme adopted - that of
revolutionary Social Democracy, called for the broadest
possible struggle against the autocracy.

The Party organisation that was rebuilt in 1912 bore


the marks of the years of repression. Political conditions
were still such that neither a large membership nor
democratic procedures were possible. In comparison with
the Party of the revolutionary years it was cramped and
undemocratic. The forms of organisation and activity
however were well suited to ensure the maximum amount of
influence among broad masses of workers. The concept of
stable groups of Social Democrats working in mass
organisations evolved a few years earlier proved
particularly useful. The field in which the Bolsheviks
could operate was now much wider than it had been in the
post-revolutionary period of reaction. The daily illegal
newspaper Pravda offered the means of reaching and
influencing large numbers of workers and strikes and
demonstrations provided a broad basis for agitational
activity.
179

The programme of revolutionary Social Democracy


combining political with economic demands, with its
minimum programme of the democratic republic, the eight
hour day and confiscation of the landed estates, suited
the reviving the temper of the industrial workers and won
their support. Large numbers, certainly, did not flock
to join the Bolshevik organisation, because it was indeed
the minimum demands that interested them more than
socialism at that time. Battered by the repression and
the years of factional fighting the organisation remained
fragile. The severely shaken Petersburg Committee did not
regain its standing among Bolshevik-minded workers of the
capital until 1917* But for Lenin the essential task was
to bring about a formal division between the revolutionary
and reformist wings of Russian Social Democracy and this
was accomplished in 1912 .
He had no doubt that a new revolutionary crisis would
come and that the maturing revolution would be bourgeois
and democratic. That the Russian bourgeois revolution
could be rapidly followed by a socialist revolution he
believed possible, but the necessary condition of this end
was leadership of the proletariat by a revolutionary party
from which all trace of bourgeois influence, that is,
reformism had been removed.
In 1917 the Bolshevik organisation hacked out by
Lenin in 1912 was able, after only a brief hesitation to
accept the new revolutionary perspectives opened up by the
April Theses of that remarkable man.
180

APPENDIX 1

RULES OF THE CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL O B L A S T t


ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P. 1906

The Central Industrial Oblas t * , or Raion as it was


often called, was the most important of the Bolshevik led
oblas t * organisations. These rules were adopted at a
conference in 1906.

1. The Central Raion embraces all organisations that


look towards Moscow.
Note. At the present time the Central Raion comprises
the following organisations: 1. Vologda group,
2. Yar oslavl Committee, 3* R y b i n s k group, 4. K o st r o m a
Okrug Committee, 5* N i z h n i - N o v g o r o d Committee,
6. Vladimir Okrug organisation, 7» Ivanovo-Voznesensk
Committee, 8. Ivanovo-Voznesensk Okrug Committee,
9* Moscow Committee, 10. Moscow Okrug Committee,
11 Tver Committee, 12. Sm o le n s k Committee, 13* Ka l ug a
Committee, 14. T u l a Committee, 13* Orel Committee,
1 6 . B ri an s k Committee, 17» K u r s k Committee, 18. T a m b o v
Committee, 19*V o r o n e z h Committee.

2. Regular O b l a s t * conferences are summoned quarterly to


discuss and resolve general Party and local questions
and to co-ordinate work in the oblast.

3. Independent organisations with not fewer than 200


members are entitled to representation with full vote.
O r g a n is at i on s n u m b e r i n g more than 200 are ent it led to
one delegate for each 500 m e m b e r s .
Indep end en t organi sa ti on s w i t h not fewer than
100 members are en ti tl ed to a co ns ultative vote.
I nde pe nde nt o rg an is ati on s w i t h less than 200
members may combine to send a delegate w i t h full vote
on matters of commo n interest.

Delegates to co nference are e l ec te d either di r ec t l y


b y all members of the o r ga n i s a t i o n or by
de m o c r a t i c a l l y or ga n is e d co nf erences and congresses.

The O b l a s t * B u r e a u puts into effect the decisions of


the Oblast* conference, assigns the party forces in
the raion, man age s general ra io n u n d e r t a k i n g s ,
organises the c al li n g of conference and prepares
materia l for it, communi ca tes w i t h the central
institutions of the Party, informs local
organi sa tio ns of the progress of P a r t y a f f a i r s , draws
up drafts of c a mp a ig n plans, leaflets and so on, and
restores local o rg ani sa ti on s w h i c h have collapsed.
Note. Mem ber s of the B u r e a u or its agents are
entitled to at ten d me etings of all organisations in
the Oblas t * w i t h co ns ul ta ti ve vote.
O rg ani sa tio ns of the oblast remit 5 per cent of
all receipts to the Bureau.

Prole t a r i i , no. 4,
19 S e pt e m b er 1906, p.4.
182

APPENDIX 2

DRAFT RULES OF THE PETERSBURG


ORGANISATION R.S.D.W.P. 1907

The rules under which the conference of the St,


Petersburg organisation constituted itself a standing body
were adopted in March 1907»

1. A member of the Petersburg organisation of the


R.S.D.W.P. is one, who, in accordance with Point 1 of
the Party rules, accepts the Party programme, pays
membership dues and belongs to some local Party
organisation.

2. The members of the Petersburg organisation working in


a factory or workshop constitute the factory union
(soiuz) . Small factories and workshops may combine
to form one union.

3. All Party work in the factory or workshop is led by


the factory c o m m i t t e e , which is elected by a general
meeting of the factory union. The number of members
of the factory committee is determined by the meeting
of the union.
Note. Members of the Party not working in a
particular factory but carrying on Party work there
enjoy the rights of members of the factory union.

4. The Petersburg organisation as a whole is divided


into territorial raions.
183

Note I . The final d et e r m i n a t i o n of boundaries


be t we en raions rests w it h raions themselves in
col l a b or at i on w i t h the P e t e r s b u r g Committee.
Note II. R a i l w a y workers are gr ou ped into separate
raions.

5. The l ea di n g or gan in each ra io n is the ra ion


conference el e c te d by direct vote on a basis of 1 to
25- Elec tio ns to the ra ion conference are ca rried
out at the m e e t i n g of the f a ct or y un io n or at the
meetings of a n u m be r of unions.

6. The raion confe ren ce directs all ra ion w o r k in


accordance w i t h the directives of the city conference
and un der the direct l ea der sh ip of the P e t e r s b u r g
Committee.

7. The raion conf ere nc e elects the ra io n committee to


carry out day to day work in the raion.

8. The m il i t a r y o rg a n i s a t i o n is a t t a ch e d to the
P e te r sb ur g C om mi tte e as a special autonomous raion,
be in g r ep r e s e n t e d at the city conference by one full
vote, if it is not possible for all members of the
org ani sat io n to take part in the election.

9. The combat o r g a n i s a t i o n is a technical or g an i s a ti o n


attached to the P e t e r s b u r g Committee, and is en titled
to send its own re pre s e nt a t i ve to the city conference
with co nsu ltative vote.

10. The city c onf er enc e is the l e ad i n g organ of the whole


of the St P e t e r s b u r g organisation. Co nf erence is
elected by direct vote on the basis of 1 to 50.
Note. Two stage elections are pe rm it t e d only in case
of insuperable police obstacles, and then only w i t h
the ag reement of the P e t e r s b u r g Committee.
184

11. Con ference is a st an di n g b o d y m e e t i n g not less than


twice a month.

12. Ele ctions for the conference are h el d e ve ry six


months.
Note. El ect io n s for conference m a y be h e l d upon
request of h a l f the m e m b e r s h i p or b y de c is i o n of the
conference itself.

13* All Pa rty me mbers are eligible for e l ect io n by


conference to its executive organ, the P e t e r s b u r g
Committee.
Note. Attached to the P e t e r s b u r g Co mm ittee and to
each raion are special co ll ectives created for w o r k
am on g artisans, trade unions and na tional groups.

14. Exec ut iv e organs, as ele ct ed institutions, are not


entitled to co-opt, but have the right to invite
comrades to a t t en d w it h co ns ultative vote.

P r o l e t a r i i , no. 13» 23 M a r c h 1907» p.8.


185

APPENDIX 3

EXTRACT FROM THE LETTER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE


ON SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WORK IN TRADE UNIONS
FEBRUARY 1908

Once the Bolsheviks had adopted the position that the


workers1
*3
2 mass organisations offered valuable opportunities
for Social Democratic activity, the Central Committee in
resolutions and letters explained how the work was to be
done. The following letter gives an idea of the
importance attached to work in trade unions, the way in
which Social Democratic fractions were to be organised,
and the role of the Party in assisting the economic
struggle of the trade unions.

*The following tasks in connection with the trade


unions ... face the R.S.D.W.P.:

1. To give the activity of the trade unions a more


strikingly militant character and to direct all S.D.
agitation in the spirit of the London and Stuttgart
congresses.

2. To strengthen d i s i ntegrating, unstable organisations.

3. To create new stable trade unions in place of the


ones that have disappeared.

All these aims can be realised only when Social


Democrats in trade unions stop carrying on their work
entirely without contact with each other, when they form
186

compact groups throughout the unions, which will have a


clear idea of the immediate problems of the trade unions,
and direct their own activity in the spirit of Social
Democracy under the leadership of local Party centres.
The absence of such links has already caused great damage
and, in St Petersburg for example, has led to a whole
series of undesirable complications. It is enough to
point out that for this reason many unions did not take
part in the organisation of the one day strike on November
22, and even agitated against it while on January 9 the
typographers struck on their own and have now been
subjected to severe repression. On the other hand
numerous examples can be cited of economic action taking
place without the Party as such participating, although
individual Social Democrats have taken an active part in
them. The Central Committee calls upon all Social
Democrats to start upon the organisation of the above
mentioned groups in all trade unions, legal and illegal,
both in the union as a whole and in its separate sections.
In the local organisation all such groups must be united
and in close organisational contact with the local Party
centre. All Party organisations must devote great
attention to trade union activity and to see to it that
all members belong to their trade unions, and that having
joined the union they try to get all union members to join
the Party.
Co-ordination of the activity of Social Democrats in
a union may be achieved only through great expenditure of
energy and will probably cause difficulties at first
because of the non professional pattern of Party
organisations, which as a rule answers all needs.
187

However the fo llo wi n g tasks m ay be pl ac ed on the


immediate order of the day wit ho ut difficulty.

1. Meet in gs of Social Democrats who are members of un io n


boards or delegate meetings for p r e l i mi n a r y
d is cu s s i o n of the most important trade un io n and
Pa r t y questions.

2. Di s c u s s i o n in raion and other (Party) meetings of the


most important general trade un i o n questions.

3» Mee tings - and this will prove more difficult - at


city, raion and p o d ra io n level of Social De mo crats in
a pa rt icu la r trade for the purpose of such
discussions.

4. Ow in g to the o r ga n is at i o n of our trade unions by


in dustry and not by occupation, di s cu s s i on of trade
uni on questions are quite feasible in Pa r t y meetings
of Social D e m o c r a t s .

5. F o r m at i on of perm ane nt l e ad i n g Social De mo cratic


commissions in separate unions and city commissions,
wh ic h are d e m o c r a t ic al l y el ected by S.D. un io n
members; or the o r ga n is a t io n of Social De mo cr a ti c
l ead ers hi p in a no the r form, d e p e n d i n g on local
conditions.

All this a ma lg a m a t i n g of Social Democrats w i t h i n the


p ro fe ss ion al organisations, in the lowest as well as the
hig hes t bodies, must be e ff ec te d g r a du a l l y and to be g i n
with, have a fairly loose form d e p e n d i n g on local
conditions.

Social Democrats must not at te nd the un io n w i t h


resolu tio ns prepared b e f o r e h a n d on each and ev ery question.
188

This could have undesirable effects in the unions, where


the Social Democratic line must be put forward with great
tact and particular care. All this amalgamation has as
its aim the consolidating of Social Democrats in the
unions for the general direction of union work in a Social
Democratic spirit, for preliminary discussion and working
out of basic principles for the resolution of the main
questions arising from the day to day struggle. At the
same time Social Democrats must certainly raise with
workers who join the Party all current questions of the
economic struggle and factory life.

All Party organisations must concern themselves


closely with these day to day questions. Together with
Social Democratic groups from the trade unions and with
their help they must involve themselves in the economic
life of the working masses; carry on a struggle against
overtime work, and against worsening conditions of labour,
take up collections for the strikers in the name of the
Party, during economic strikes call for solidarity strikes
organise help for the unemployed and so on.
One of the main tasks in unions at the present moment
is the organisation of cultural-educational work. Social
Democrats working in unions here too must be in the front
rank and place the whole matter on a class basis. By
means of our national Party apparatus we can and must
facilitate oblast* and national unification for the unions
We must help unions to become as well informed as possible
about their particular branch of industry, we must help to
raise union literature to the required level.
189

F r i e n d l y mutu a l w o r k of P a r t y and u n i o n o r g a n isations


will s t r e n g t h e n both, l e a d i n g to m u tual improvement of
w o r k and e n a b l i n g the more r a pid u n i f i c a t i o n of the b r o a d
masses un der the b a n n e r of socialism.* C .C .R .S .D .W .P

P r o l e t a r i i , no. 23 > 27 F e b r u a r y 1908, p.5


190

APPENDIX 4

FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE MOSCOW COMMITTEE


R.S.D.W.P. FOR DECEMBER 1908

The few financial statements of Party committees


published naturally conceal more than they reveal. The
main items of interest relate to the expenditure on the
printery (tekhnika) and on the maintenance of professional
revolutionaries.

Financial Statement

Moscow Committee of the R.S.D.W.P. for December 1908.

(Owing to circumstances beyond our control the


Statement for November has not been published and will be
issued l a t e r ) .

Receipts

Brought forward to December 1 (printery fund) 3H rub.;


from Seraphima 50 r . ; from anon, for Rabochee Znamia 100 r.
6 k . ; per E.E. 15 r.; received from commercial employees
12 r . ; from Zamoskvor, raion for R a b . Znamia 6 r . ; from
Financial Commission 396 r . ; from M.N. for R a b . Znamia 25
r u b . ; from G.S. for prisoners 15 r. 75 k . ; from G. as a
loan 20 r.; from M.N. as a loan 50 r.; from students*
union for B. (political prisoner) l4 rub.
Total 10l4 rub. 31 kop.
191

Expenditure

Printery 3^3 rub.; small printery 11 r . ; maintenance of


professionals 243 r . ; subsidy to 3 raions 30 r . ; loan to
M.O.K. 25 r . ; to prison from G.S. 15 r. 75 k . ; for
purchase and transport of books 60 r . ; organisational
expenses 20 r. 25 k . ; to Yaroslavets 3 r . ; debit to
commercial and industrial employees 25 r . ; S. and G. 125 r.
secretarial expenses 22 r. 75 k. Total 9^3 rub. 75 kop.

Carried forward to 1st Jan. 1909 51 rub. 6 kop.


Total 1014 rub. 31 kop.

Sotsial*demokrat, no. 4, 21 March 1909j p.8


192

APPENDIX 5

MODEL RULES OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC


FRACTION IN A TRADE UNION

MOSCOW
MODEL RULES OF A FRACTION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC
MEMBERS OF A TRADE UNION

1. The fraction is organised with the aim of influencing


the activity of the association in the spirit of the
programme and tactics of the R.S.D.W.P.

2. With this purpose in view:- (l) all questions


concerning the activity of the association are
discussed at general meetings of fraction members,
(2) all questions of Party and political life in
general are discussed, (3 ) reports are given on the
activity of the Party collectives.

MEMBERSHIP OF FRACTION

3. All members of the association who accept the


programme and tactics of the R.S.D.W.P. and abide by
the organisational rules of the fraction are
recognised as fraction members.

4. Members of the fraction not paying dues to a Party


organisation are to assign 1 per cent to the fraction
funds.

5. All members of the fraction must observe Party


discipline and the decisions of the general meeting
and Bureau of the fraction.
193

GENERAL MEETINGS

6. General meetings of fraction members are summoned by


the fraction Bureau.

7. All questions at general meetings of the fraction are


decided by simple majority vote.

FRACTION BUREAU

8. A fraction Bureau of eight is elected at a general


meeting.

9. The fraction Bureau elects from its number one


representative to the Party-trade union group as a
link with the Party.

10. The fraction Bureau is the executive organ.


Note. In exceptional circumstances the fraction
Bureau may itself decide various questions and the
general meeting may challenge such decisions.

11. All questions at Bureau meetings are decided by


simple majority vote.

12. The Bureau elects from its number a secretary and


treasurer.

PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO


ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION OF MEMBERS

13. Newly admitted members are confirmed by the fraction


Bureau.

14. Members of the fraction may be excluded from its


ranks only by decision of the general meeting.
19 ^

The editorial board of Sotsial*demokrat added the


following comment on the above rules.

*The present draft of model rules was drawn up in


Moscow. We print it, as an interesting first experiment
in this field. The Central Committee of our Party with
its well known (unanimously adopted) resolution on trade
unions long ago pointed out the necessity of organising
Social Democratic nuclei in all workers* trade unions.
The last general Party conference also emphasised the
necessity of organising these Social Democratic Party
nuclei in all workers* organisations. Using the
opportunity once again to remind comrades of this urgent
task we draw attention to the first attempt at a legal
formulation of this problem, which must first of all be
solved practically in those places where for some reason
or another it has still not been done.*

Sotsial*demokrat, nos. 7-8, 8 August 1909 > p.9*


195

APPENDIX 6

EXTRACT FROM THE PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS


IN RESPECT OF ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES
MARCH 1906

The Provisional Regulations in respect of


Associations and Societies comprise 73 articles.
Reproduced are some which apply specifically to
associations of employers and employees. These indicate
the extent to which the economic aims of trade unions were
circumscribed, the close and constant scrutiny to which
they were subjected, and give an idea of the opportunities
for delay in registering the rules presented by the many
authorities through whose hands they had to pass to secure
approval.

The following regulations in respect of professional


associations set up for persons employed in commercial or
industrial enterprises or for the owners of such
undertakings are laid d o w n :-

1. Professional associations have as their aim the


elucidation and co-ordination of their members'
economic interests and the improvement of working
conditions, or the raising of the productivity of
enterprises belonging to them.

2. In particular professional associations may have as


their aim: (a) the investigation of means of removing
by agreement or arbitration misunderstandings arising
196

from conditions of contract b e t w e e n employers and


employees; (b) the a s c e r t a i n i n g of wage rates and
other conditions of w o r k in the va rious br anches of
indu st ry and commerce; (c) the pa yment of grants-in-
aid to their members; (d) the e s ta bl ish me nt of
funeral be nefit f u n d s , e n d o w m e n t s , mutual benefit
funds and so on; (e) the e s ta bl ish me nt of libraries,
trade schools, courses and public readings; (f) the
p r o v i s io n for their mem bers of opport un iti es of
advant ag eou s a c q u i s i t i o n of items of n e c e s s i t y and of
instruments of production; (g) the r e n de r i n g of
as si stance in the se arc h for empl oy men t or for a
labou r force; (h) the p r ov i s i on of legal aid for
members.

3. Ins ti tutions fo rme d by pr of es s io n a l as so ciations for


the r e a l is at i on of their aims are subject to the
general r egu la tio ns g o v e r n i n g such institutions.

4. Pro fe ss i on al a s s o ci a ti o n s ma y pr esent to the appropriate


authorities peti tio ns on matters a f f e c t i n g the aims
and a ct ivi ty of the a s s o c i a t io n and likewise co nvey
the c on si der at ion s m o v i n g them in the matters
aforesaid, u p o n the demand of these authorities.

5. A profes sio na l a s s o c i a t i o n may open branches of the


a s s o c ia t io n for c er t a i n districts or ce rtain groups
of its members on c on d i ti o n only that the above
me n ti o ne d b ra nch es do not have ma na g e me n t s separate
from that of the association.

6. The co mbi ni n g of two or more p r of es si on al assoc ia tio ns


into a un i o n is forbidden. Pr of es s i o na l as so ciations
co nt rol le d b y in sti tu tio ns or persons abroa d are also
forbidden.
197

7. On ly those persons of b o t h sexes ma y join a


profess io nal a s s o c i a t i o n who are en gaged in the same,
similar or li nked o ccu pa ti ons or trades in commercial
and industrial u n d e r t a k i n g s , public and private;
likewise owners of identical, similar or linke d
industrial or c omm er ci al enterprises.

8. Minors may join a pr o fe s s i on a l a s s o c i a t i o n if the


rules of the a s s o c i a t i o n do not restrict their
adm is si o n as members.

9« Persons w i s h i n g to form a pr o fe s s i on a l a s so c i a t i o n
must, not less than two weeks be fore the co mm encement
of their activities, supply the Ch ie f F a c to r y
Ins pector or D is tr ict M i n i n g E n gi n e e r in the place
where the a s s o c i a t i o n ^ m a n a g e me n t bo a r d is located,
with a w r i t t e n n o t i f i c a t i o n a c c o m pa n i e d by a notarial
cer t i fi ca t io n of the legal ca p ac i t y of applicants and
the a u th e nt ic i ty of their signatures, together with
two copies of the c er ti fi ed rules of the association,
and also m on e y for the n e c e s s a r y approval of the
n o t if i ca ti o n of the f or m a ti o n of the institution.

10. Details of the mode of o p era ti on of the a s s o c ia t i o n


and its branches a nd the form of control of its
a f f a i r s , in so far as this is not laid down in the
present r eg ul at ion s are to be d e fi n e d by the rules of
the association.

11. The rules of an a s s o c i a t i o n (Art. 10) must indicate


(a) the name of the association, its aims, area and
mode of o pe ra t io n and the l o c a ti o n of the association;
(b) the full names, rank and addresses of its
founders; (c) co nditio ns of a d m i s s i o n and e x cl u s i on
198

of members; (d) rights and duties of members; (e)


m e m b e r s h i p su bsc r ip ti on rates and m e t h od of pa yi ng
them; (f) members of the ma n a g em e n t b oa rd and their
addresses; form of ow ne rs h i p of p r o p e r ty of the
association, me th od of e l ect io n and powers of the
ma na g em e nt b oar d and persons en tr us t e d w i t h the
d i r e ct io n of the affairs and p r ope rt y of the
association; (g) the term of office of the m an age me nt
bo ar d and of persons en t r u st e d w i t h the d i re c t i on of
the affairs and pr op er ty of the association, and
procedure w i t h re gar d to di sm issal from office before
the a p p o in te d time; (h) the m e t h o d of b o o k keeping;
(i) pr ocedure in re gar d to the ca ll ing of general
meetings of the a s s o c i a t i o n and its br anches and the
length of notice given; (j) matters bro ug ht before
the general meeting; (k) conditions un der wh ich
decisions of the general m e e t i n g are de em e d valid;
(l) procedure w i t h re ga rd to a l te r i n g the rules and
clo si ng the as so c ia ti o n and the m e t h o d of l i qu i d a ti o n
of the affairs of the association; (m) the
e st ab li sh men t of various a n c i l la r y institutions of
the association, mutual be ne fit funds, funds for
payment of g r a n t s - i n - a i d , libraries, trade schools
e t c . , if such are envisaged; (n) pr oc edure with
re gard to o pe nin g bran ch es of the a s s o c ia t i o n in
app ro priate cases.

12. No t i f i c a t i o n of the f o r m a ti o n of pr of es s i o na l
assoc iat io ns w i t h drafts of their rules are to be
pr es ent ed by the Senior F a c t o r y I n sp e c t or or District
M i n i n g E ng i n e e r to the G o ve r n o r or the Ch ief City
Official (g r a d o n a c h a l 1nik) who will pass them on to
199

the Pr ovi n ci al or C i t y Office for Ma tters r e l a t i n g to


As soc iations, for c o n s i d e r a t i o n and further
su bm is si on on the basis of A r tic le s 23 and 24 of
Se ct i o n I of the pr esent re gu lat i o n s. *

13* For the i nv es t i g a t i o n of ma tters co nc er n in g


pro fe ss io n al as s o ci at i o ns the Se ni or F a c to r y
In sp e ct or or D is tr ict M i n i n g E n g i n e e r or persons
a c ti n g in their st ead are de em ed to be members of the
P rov in ci al or C i t y Office for Ma tters r e la t i n g to
Associations.

14. The Mi ni s t e r of Trade and In d us t r y in agre em ent w i th


the ap pro pr iat e m in is t e rs is empowered, in respect of
those places w her e the po si tions of Senior F a ct or y
Inspectors or Di st ri c t M i n i n g E n gin ee rs have not b e e n
approved, to entrust their duties to other local
officials.

15* The form of the r eg i s t e r of profes si ona l assoc ia tio ns


is laid down by a gr ee m e nt of the M i nis te rs of the
Inte ri or and Ju stice w it h the M i n i s t e r of Trade and
Indus t r y .

16. The Prov inc ia l or C i t y Office for Matters r e l a ti n g to


As so ci at i on s informs the De p ar t m e nt of In d us t r y in
the M in i s t r y of Tr ade and In d us t r y of the
re g i s tr a t i o n of a p r of es s i o na l a s so c i a t i o n and sends
the articles for a pp ro va l in the p r e s c r ib e d ma nn e r in
the Senate A n n o u n c e m e n t s and local pr ov incial or
oblas t * gazettes.

17. E v e r y pr ofe s si on a l a s s o c i a t i o n elects at its general


m e e t i n g from the n u m be r of its adult members a bo a r d
for the m a na g em en t of the affairs of the a s so c i a t i o n
200

on the basis of the rules of the a s so c i a t i o n (Art. 11)


and special decisions of the general meeting.

18. The management board of the professional association


immediately upon its election (Art. 17) must supply a
written notification of the same to the officials
designated in Article 9 enclosing a list of the
persons who are members of the board and also other
persons taking part in the management of the affairs
of the association with the designation of the
position and occupation of each of them.

19* The management board of the professional association


must immediately notify the officials designated in
Article 9 (a) of every change in the composition of
the board and generally, in the composition of the
persons taking part in the management of the affairs
of the association; (b) of all changes in the rules;
(c) of the opening or closing of a branch of the
association (Art. 5) and (d) of the closing of the
association.

20. Persons and institutions mentioned in Articles 12-1 4


are obliged, in case of necessity, to give
information about the notifications filed (Art. 9> 18
and 19) to state and public institutions and also to
officials and private individuals upon their
notifications and requests in the matter.

21. The Senior Factory Inspector or the District Mining


Engineer or officials acting in their stead (Art. 14)
inform the officials in charge of public institutions
of the notifications received (Arts. 9> 18 and 19)
and of information concerning the approval of
professional associations for persons working in
public enterprises.
201

Articles 23 and 24 of the regulations in Section I


provided that the Provincial or City Office for Matters
relating to Associations had a month in which to
investigate and accept or reject the draft rules of an
association; and that registration of association rules
was to be signified by the affixing of the signature of
the Governor or Chief City Official.
202

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