11. [G.R. No. 116018.

November 13, 1996]

NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque,
Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the
Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and
Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.

After having the document drafted - with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land - petitioner
asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one
of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.

However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos.
T-292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision
plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property
purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the spouses
Severino and Consuelo Lim.

On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.[1]

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October
1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred and
three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105
identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407) square
meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-
292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.

In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as
yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the
survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that
they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses,
which was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.

The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to
enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was
completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984;
and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have been
signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the trial
court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.

Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September 1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to
pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.[2]

On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court, [3] and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider
its decision.[4]

Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely
technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.

Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as
late filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals.[5] We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
very rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case
as the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioners motion -

On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendants counsel, manifested in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he
be given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado x
x x x was not in Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs counsel, called the attention of the Court that Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with
the Court Order dated February 06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion, defendants right to file a formal
offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty. Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the defendant can (sic) no longer
make a formal offer of evidence.
On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado,
on May 02, 1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal
offer of exhibits was denied (underscoring supplied).

The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3)
months, had already passed before petitioners counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioners motion to admit
her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice.

Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot
occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private
respondents to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v.
Court of Appeals.[6]

These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that
there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the
premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the
parties.But even without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply substantiated their claims.

We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where
the subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary
public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him
and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.

The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional
detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten
(10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent
Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign
the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioners feeble claim to the contrary.

Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy
of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was
contradicted by petitioners own witness who positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the
signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon
the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to
sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto. [7] Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much
less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party
upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking
annulment.[8]

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly
manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the
statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document was
formalized.

WHEREFORE, there being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

12. [G.R. No. 116018. November 13, 1996]

NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S. ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S.
AUSTRIA, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque,
Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot, owned in common by the
Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners mother and sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses Severino and
Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale.

After having the document drafted - with several spaces left blank including the specification as to the metes and bounds of the land - petitioner
asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one
of the heirs, would be present when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed.

However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos.
T-292265 and T-292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision
plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents learned that the area of the property
purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the spouses
Severino and Consuelo Lim.

On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for
annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.[1]

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October
1984 wherein respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property with an area of one thousand five hundred and
three (1,503) square meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the property into two (2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105
identified as Lot 4-A with an area of one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four hundred and seven (407) square
meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-
292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the name of petitioner.

In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as
yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the
survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that
they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses,
which was already the subject of a previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.

The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Sale taking into account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary public and in her presence, she was not able to
enumerate all the signatories to the document; (b) while petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the survey of the land was
completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984;
and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have been
signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the trial
court relied heavily on the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.

Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September 1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to
pay private respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.[2]

On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court, [3] and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider
its decision.[4]

Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely
technical ground, and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.

Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as
late filing, citing Siguenza v. Court of Appeals.[5] We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
very rigid and technical sense as they are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Yet the holding is inapplicable to the present case
as the trial court had a reasonable basis for denying petitioners motion -

On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendants counsel, manifested in Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he
be given 15 days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado x
x x x was not in Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs counsel, called the attention of the Court that Atty. Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with
the Court Order dated February 06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion, defendants right to file a formal
offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty. Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the defendant can (sic) no longer
make a formal offer of evidence.

On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado,
on May 02, 1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal
offer of exhibits was denied (underscoring supplied).
 The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3)
months, had already passed before petitioners counsel made effort to formally offer his evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioners motion to admit
her exhibits would be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice.

Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot
occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim). Moreover, according to petitioner, the assertions of private
respondents to petitioner contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true and that the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Sale was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was situated, citing Sales v.
Court of Appeals.[6]

These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that
there was as yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the
premises. Obviously, the trial court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand letter after having weighed the respective evidence of the
parties.But even without the letter, the evidence of respondents had already amply substantiated their claims.

We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where
the subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary
public had the authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared before him
and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not.

The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional
detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten
(10) Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent
Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign
the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioners feeble claim to the contrary.

Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy
of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10 October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was
contradicted by petitioners own witness who positively asserted in court that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the
signing. Quite obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left
several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were persuaded to sign the document only upon
the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after
obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to
sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto. [7] Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank
spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much
less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party
upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking
annulment.[8]

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly
manifests that the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely handwritten while all the rest of the
statements therein were typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time the document was
formalized.

WHEREFORE, there being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

13. [G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:

"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my
name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow,
shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the
ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also
at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies,
every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his
heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE
(75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the
latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command
in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide to
sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498
thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52
of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25
piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint
as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
 3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late
Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of
title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to
defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the
property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on
the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of
1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y
Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be
in the next succeeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of
piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of
every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91;
and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-
92."[5]

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action
against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not
warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left
estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to
give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED."[6]

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla,
to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since
1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to
the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No.
1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja
 Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year
out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED."[7]

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending
that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of
the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the
New Civil Code.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that
Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the
substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants"
and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it,
which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The
Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution
was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which
issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents,
and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would
be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights
and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was
a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the
obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should
die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, [12] or (2) leave his/her property to one
person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.[14] In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is
strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the instituted
heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his
will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will
only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to
whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. [17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all
related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution
and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on
him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for
compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests,
if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner
stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a
modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by
the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or
be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but
does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a
condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be
considered as modal and not conditional.[22]

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize
the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. [24]

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they
sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
performance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants.
Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been
assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his
death.[25] Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose
of making a Will.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

SO ORDERED.

14. [G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in
the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the
final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with
her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs
of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. [5]

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the recognition of the children by the
deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to
the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. [7] Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the
circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual
issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the
present petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
 We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner
failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or
without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to
inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. [14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. [15]The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." [16] It maintained that their divorce
obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that
she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to
file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by
the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as
his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code.Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. [20]

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. [22] The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
15. [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35,
Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor
by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife
and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating
that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the
family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would
be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father
and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. [12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided
in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
 On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by
Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children, to wit:

(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;

(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in
Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;

(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;

(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one
of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will
and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. [19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended
(1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his
property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. [23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. [24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the
Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia
F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three
(3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

SO ORDERED.[27]
 In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz
Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the
trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

SO ORDERED.[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the
deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to
Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit
equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos
will.[38]

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a
mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during
their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities
of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession
to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not
wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. [44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's
national law.[45]

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised. The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor
of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4,
1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and
determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

16. G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA,
RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA
CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.;
HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors; 1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in
SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its
resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting
of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly,
his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the
couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence,
Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis
Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and
Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to
establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no
marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein.
Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to
petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of
the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage
transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife
until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends
to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
 3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United
States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J.
Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia
Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one
Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and
continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as
her parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she
cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of their ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the
sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married
but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was
concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision
read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and
enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on
September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to
the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to
the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing
of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is
likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration
of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral
arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on
appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of
the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs
of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay
or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila,
Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals
amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally
married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition
among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as
the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee
of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn
over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty
(60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 isREMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was
such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They
make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado
as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support
the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo
Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but
strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who
had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in
society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety.Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio
must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on
the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with
Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood
siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit
that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were
all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972
of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. 54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section
1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is
the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in
the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only
upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia
only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first
recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
 (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

62
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the
courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing
admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo
Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of
Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted
as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper
clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of preference does
not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, 72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and
nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October
24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the
full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In
this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived
Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia
Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

RESERVA TRONCAL CASE

G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed
MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-
CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA
M. MENDOZA,Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. 1

The Facts

The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square
meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the
name of respondent Julia Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio.
Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of
Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to
his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue.
They claimed that after Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to
them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally
owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It
appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties. 6

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

 1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs
enumerated in the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the old title, TCT No.
T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-
149035(M) and reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and

3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney’s fees and damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion
of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution 9 dated January 17, 2007.

In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also
ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel. 11

Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:

A.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES,
COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.

B.

THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12

Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be
subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of
Exequiel.13

Ruling of the Court

This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of
law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the trial court. 14 This being the
case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise – one,
whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.

Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:

Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be
relatives within the third degree from which the property came.15

The lineal character of the

reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.

The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil
Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;

(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and

(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor. 16

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17It was also immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or
lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.

Ascendants, descendants and

collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative.

Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.1âwphi1 A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)

Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the
relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her
mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her
aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.

First cousins of the

descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios

Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. 19 It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. 20

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the
third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court stated:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article
811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third
degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x x. 23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal.
First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second,
because petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code,
which provide:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the cause of action relied
upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception
of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.

A reservista acquires ownership of

the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished

Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the properties,
the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done,
assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact,
respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title. 24 In reserva troncal, the reservista
who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.25

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the
reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The
transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. 26 (Citations omitted)

It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.28 In
any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice
to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria

Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the properties in question.

SO ORDERED.