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Bermoy v.

Philippine Normal College

May 18, 1956 G.R. No. L-8670

On July 6, 1954, twenty employees of the Philippine Normal College, who were working as cooks,
waiters, dishwasher, and in various other capacities in its dormitory known as Normal Hall, filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the said Philippine Normal College and/or
Philippine Normal School for the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The Solicitor General
filed an answer on behalf of the defendants denying the latter" s liability. But before the case was tried
on the merits, the court ordered it dismissed on the ground that neither one of the defendants was a
corporation or a juridical entity with capacity to be sued. Reconsideration of this order having been
denied, plaintiffs took this appeal to this Court, alleging that It was error to dismiss their case on the
ground mentioned.

Whether or not he PNC as a government corporation can be sued.

Republic Act No. 416, which took effect In July., 1949, converted the old Philippine Normal School into
the present Philippine Normal College and endowed it with the "general powers set out In section
thirteen of Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended" (Corporation Law)., entrusting
Its government and the administration of its affairs to a board of trustees therein created, which was to
exercise for It "all the powers of a corporation as provided in (said) section," and in particular, "to
administer and appropriate the funds of Normal Hill and to supervise and control its income and
expenses, all provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding."

One of the powers specifically enumerated in the said section. 13 of the Corporation Law is the
power "to sue and be sued in any.court." With this express grant of power, we don't see how
it could be doubted that the Philippine Normal College could be made a defendant in a suit in

The Solicitor General admits that the Philippine Normal College has a juridical personality of its own,
but contends that, as it is an Instrumentality of government for
the discharge of state functions, it may not be sued without the consent of the state. The answer
to that contention is that the state has already given that consent by investing the College with
the express power to be sued in courts That the Act Authorizes the College to be sued is also
made clear in section 6, where it is provided that "all process against the Board of Trustees
shall be served on the President or secretary thereof,"
G.R. NO. 171182, AUGUST 23, 2012

University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with
respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of
the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The
denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB
Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but
the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.

Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course
to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern
Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final
and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their
previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already
issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003
(although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently,
the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the
release of the funds.

Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.


I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time?


UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution"

performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality,
performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As
a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income
enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in
Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund,"
the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and
should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that
are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to
the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly
stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made
between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against
the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final
and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

HELD: The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of
record. (The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule;
computation of time)

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally
garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the
supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true
that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as
the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been
absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors;
(b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments;
and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution
unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the
exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in
clear violation of the UPs right to due process.

Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB
Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of
the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly
made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by
counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second
paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon
the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall
only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side."

Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that
the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still
not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to
the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC
as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period
resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and
the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing.

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that
the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application
of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any
serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the
denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of
the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the
UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably
with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day.