1989 Bar Examination

457 Question No. 6

457. (2). Spouses “A” and “B” are registered owners of lot “1” consisting of 20, 000
square meters while spouses “C” and “D” are owners of lot “2”. These are separated by a
river. For a period of more than 40 years, the river overflowed its banks yearly and the
property of spouses “C” and “D” gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of
the current of the river so that an alluvial deposit of 29, 000 square meters was added to
their lot, 11, 000 square meters of which used to be part of lot “1”. Spouses “A” and “B”
contend that accretion should not extend to registered land because to allow spouses “C”
and “D” to acquire title over the accretion will be in derogation of the indefeasibility of
the Torrens title of Spouses “A” and “B”. Is this contention correct? Explain.

Answer:

No, the contention of A and B is not correct because the registration under the
Torrens Law does not protect the owner against diminution of his land
through gradual changes due to the effects of the current of the river. The
accretion will benefit C and D.

457. (2) Subsequent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a river, its
area was increased by accession. This additional area was not included in the technical
description appearing in the Torrens Certificate of Title having been acquired subsequent
to the registration proceedings. May such additional area be acquired by third persons
thru prescription? Give your reasons.

Answer:

The Land Registration Law provides that no title in derogation of the

registered owner may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisition
possession. Since the law refers to registered lands, the accession mentioned
in this question may be acquired by a third person through adverse possession
or acquisition possession.

Alternative Answer:

If the accession is man made, then it cannot be considered as private

property. It belongs to the public domain, and, therefore, cannot be acquired
by adverse possession or acquisition possession.

Question No 11.

921 (2). Jose and Ana are husband and wife. On January 10, 1980 learned that Ana
having illicit relations with Juan. In fact, Jose personally saw his wife and Juan leaving a
motel on one occasion. Despite all the evidence he had at hand. Jose did not bring any
action for legal separation against Ana. Instead, Jose simply prepared a will wherein he
disinherited Ana for her acts of infidelity. The validity of the disinheritance was
questioned by Ana upon Jose’s death. If you were the judge, how would you resolve this
question? Give your reasons.

Answer:

The disinheritance is valid. Under the Civil Code, the legal ground for
disinheriting a spouse is that the spouse has given cause for legal separation.
Therefore, a final judgement is not needed.

Alternative Answer:

The disinheritance is not valid. The facts indicate that there was
condonation by Jose of Ana’s illicit relationship with Juan since they appear
to have continued to live together.

Question No 13.

1403. (2). “X” came across an advertisement in the “Manila Daily Bulletin” about the
rush sale of three slightly used TOYOTA cars, model 1989 for only P200,000 each.
Findings the price to be very cheap and in order to be sure he gets one unit ahead of the
others, “X” immediately phoned the advertiser “Y” and place an order for one car. “Y”
accepted the order and promised to deliver the ordered unit on July 15, 1989. On the said
date, however, “Y” did not deliver the unit. “X” brings an action to compel “Y” to deliver
the unit. Will such action prosper? Give your reasons.

Answer:

The contract in this case has been perfected. However, unenforceable under
the statute of frauds. The action will prosper if there is no objection to the oral
evidence, which amounts to a waiver of the statute of frauds.

1988 BAR EXAMINATION

670 Question No.3

(c) About fifteen years ago, Adelaida constructed a house on her lot at Quezon City
adjoining a lot owned by Bernie. She provided it with several windows overlooking
Bernie’s lot half a meter away from the boundary line. A month ago, Bernie brought an
action against Adelaida for the closure of the windows alleging that they violate the law
on distances.

1. Has Adelaida acquired an easement of light and view by prescription?

2. Will the action of Bernie prosper?
 3. If the action will not prosper, will that not be tantamount to saying that Adelaida
has already acquired an easement of light and view?
Answer:

(a) Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title
or by prescription of ten years (Art 620, CC), while continuous
nonapparent, can only be acquired by virtue of a title (Art. 622, CC).
(b) In order that an easement may be acquired by prescription, the time of
possession shall be computed thus: In positive easements, from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person who may have made
use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient estate;
and in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act which
would be lawful without the easement. (Art. 621, CC.)
(c) (1) Adelaida has not acquired an easement of light and view by
prescription after ten years. There are two reasons for this. In the first
place, there was no formal prohibition as required by law. This should
have been done by means of an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public wherein she should have prohibited Bernie from obstructing his
light and view. She did not. In the second place, she did not observe legal
requirement that there should be a distance of at least two meters between
the windows and Bernie’s lot, since the view is direct. According to the
Civil Code, non- observance of this distance does not give rise to
prescription.
(2)The action will not proper because more than ten years has already
elapsed from the time of the opening of the windows. Bernie’s action has
already prescribed.
(3) This is not tantamount to saying that Adelaida has already acquired an
easement of light and view. Under the Civil Code, nobody can prevent
Bernie from obstructing Adelaida’s light and view by constructing s
building on his lot or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to the windows
of Adelaida.

728 Question No. 4 (1988 Bar Examination)

(b) A donated to X a parcel of land in 1975. The donation was made in a public
instrument, while the acceptance made by X was embodied in the same public
instrument. The Deed of Donation was entitled “Donation Inter Vivos.” There is however
provision in the deed to the effect that, although the land donated shall be delivered
immediately to X upon the perfection of the donation with full right to enjoy all of the
fruits thereof, “title shall pass to the donee only upon the donor’s death.” Upon the death
of A, his widow and only heir, B, brought an action for the recovery of the property on
the ground that the donation is a donation mortis causa and not a donation inter vivos.
Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:

(A) When the Civil Code speaks of law as a distinct mode of acquiring
ownership, it refers to those instances where the law, independently of
the other modes of acquiring ownership, automatically and directly
vests the ownership of the thing in a certain individual once the
prescribed requisites or conditions are present or complied with.

Examples of this are:

(1) Land which belongs exclusively to either of the spouses where a

building is constructed with conjugal funds. Here, the ownership of
the land is vested automatically in the conjugal partnership once the
condition that its value has been reimbursed to the owner has been
complied with (Art. 158, par. 2, CC.)
(2) Hidden treasure which a stranger discovers by chance on another’s
property. Here, one-half of the treasure belongs by right of occupation
to the stranger, while the other half belongs by operation of law to the
proprietor. (Art. 438. par. 2, CC.)
(3) Abandoned beds, when a river or stream suddenly changes its course
to traverse private lands. The former owners of the new bed shall be
the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by
each. (Art. 58, P.D. No. 1067.)
(4) Fruits naturally falling from a tree upon adjacent land. Here, the
ownership of the fruits is vested automatically in the owner of the
adjacent land. (Art. 681, CC.)
(b) Yes, the action will prosper. In Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, and
Howard vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that in order
that a donation will be considered a disposition post mortem, it should
reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership,
full or naked, and control the property while alive;
(2) That before his death the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the property conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
It is clear from the facts stated in the problem that the
donation reveals the first characteristics. Hence, it is a
disposition post mortem. Therefore, in order that the donation
can take effect it is essential that it must be made in a will
 executed in accordance with all of the formalities prescribed
by law (Art. 728, CC) Since this requisite has not been
complied with, the donation in the instant case is void or
inexistent.

1174 Question No. 8(1988 Bar Examination)

1174 (a) Mario received from Edgar a pendant with a diamond valued at P5,000.00 to be
sold on commission basis or to be returned in demand. In the evening of August 31,
1987, while he was walking home, two men snatched his clutched bag containing the
pendant and ran away. Subsequently, the snatchers were apprehended and charged.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Edgar brought an action Mario for the recovery
of the pendant or its value and damages. Mario interposed the defense of fortuitous event
but Edgar contends—

(1) That the defense of fortuitous event is untenable because there was
negligence on the part of the defendant; and
(2) That if the defense is untenable, there must be a prior conviction or
robbery before it can be availed of. Decide the case.
(3) Distinguish between the effects of suspensive and resolutory conditions
upon an obligations.

Answer:

(a) The factual setting of the above problem is identical to that of Asutria vs.
Court of Appeals (39 SCRA 527). In that case the Supreme Court held that
the defendant is not liable.
To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from
responsibility, it is necessary (1) that the event must be independent of the
will of the debtor; (2) that its must either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3)
that the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and (b) that the debtor must be free of
participation in, aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.

All of the above requisites or conditions are present in this case. It

is undeniable that in order to completely exonerate the debtor by reason of
a fortuitous event, such debtor must, in addition into the causes itself, be
free of any concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. We believe,
however, that her act in traveling alone in the evening, carrying a jewelry
of considerable value, cannot be considered as either concurrent or
contributory negligence. While it may be considered now, we are not
persuaded that the same rule should obtain ten years previously when the
robbery in question took place, for at that time criminality had not reached
the levels attained in the present day.
There is likewise no merit in the contention that to allow the fact of
robbery to be recognized in this case before conviction is secured in the
 criminal action, would prejudice the latter case, or would result in
consistency should be accused obtain an acquittal or should the criminal
case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery
has happened would not necessarily mean that those accused in the
criminal action would be found guilty of the crime, nor would be a ruling
that those actually accused did not commit robbery be inconsistent with a
finding that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts
would not necessarily be the same.

(b) It is evident that a resolutory condition affects the obligation to which it is

attached in a manner which is diametrically opposed to that of suspensive
condition. If the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the obligation arises or
becomes effective if the resolutory condition is fulfilled, the obligation is
extinguished. If the first is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is created; if
the second is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is consolidated. In other
words, in the first, rights are not yet acquired, but there is a ,hope of
expectancy that they will soon be acquired; in the second, rights are
already acquired, but subject to the threat of extinction (8 Manressa, 5th
Ed., Bk. 1,p.311.)

Suggested Alternative Answer to NO. 8 (a):

(a) (1) We would like to call attention to the fact that the question says”
contends”.” So perhaps we should make a distinction if negligence is
proven and if negligence is not proven. If the negligence of the defendant
is not proven as Edgar contends, then the defense of fortuitous event is
tenable. However, if negligence is proven to be present then the defense
or fortuitous event is not tenable here and the defendant will be liable.
(2) There is no need of prior conviction in either case.

1207 Question No. 9 (1988 Bar Examination)

(c)A, B, and C borrowed P12,000 from X. This debt is evidenced by a promissory note
wherein the three bound themselves to pay the debt jointly and severally. However
according to the note, A can be compelled to pay only on June 15, 1962, B can be
compelled to pay only on June 15, 1964, while C can be compelled to pay only on June
15, 1966. On June 15, 1962, X made a demand upon A to pay the entire indebtedness but
the latter aid only P4, 000.00. Subsequently, because of A’s refusal to pay the balance, X
brought an action against him for collection of the amount. Will such an action prosper?
Reasons.

Answer:

(c) For the present, the action will not proper. It is of course that the
obligation here is solidary and that is solidary character is not destroyed by
the fact that the debtors are bound by different periods for payment is
 expressly provided for in Art. 1211 of the Civil Code. However, in
solidary obligations of this type, the right of the creditor is limited to the
recovery of the amount owed by the debtor whose obligations has already
matured, leaving in suspense his right to recover the shares corresponding
to the debtors whose obligations have not yet matured. This restriction
upon the creditor’s right does not destroy the solidary character of the
obligations, because ultimately, he can still compel one and the same
debtor, if that is his wish, to pay the entire obligation. Therefore, in the
instant case, X shall have to wait for June 15, 1964, when C’s obligation
shall have also matured. On June 15, 1966, he can collect P4, 000.00 from
either A or B. On June 15, 1966 he can again collect another P4, 000.00
from either A or B or C. (See Ynchausti vs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978.)

Suggested Alternative Answer to :No.9 (c)

(d) It now being 1988, the action can no longer prosper because it has already
prescribed. Actions upon written contracts prescribe in 10 years.