Read:

POLITICAL LAW PART IV

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
1. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108
SCRA 757
The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is
“essentially presidential with parliamentary features.”
2. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418

a. The basic principles underlying the 1935, 1973 and 1987 The form of government is “essentially parliamentary with presidential
Constitutions. features.”

b.Manifestations of a republican state. g. Two-fold function of the government

c. Define “state” Read:

COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23
d. Elements of a state. Define each:
1. people
2. territory
3. sovereignty
4. government
e. Different meanings of the word “people” as used
constitution:
1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2);
2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7);
3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4)
f. Presidential & parliamentary forms of government
1)BACANI VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468 (Ministrant [merely
directory] and Constituent [Mandatory] Functions)
2) ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649
Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of
the government as classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant.
h. Parents Patriae
Read:
in the 1) GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738
2) CABANAS VS. PILAPIO, 58 SCRA 94
i. De jure govt.? De facto govt.?
Read:
1. AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect)
2. In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160
A government formed as a result of a people’s revolution, is
considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family of nations or
other countries like the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan,
and others.
3. Estrada vs. Macapagal & Desierto, infra.
j. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?
Read: CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75 Phil. 113
There are several kinds of de facto governments.
a. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is
that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments
and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the
government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector.
b. The second is that which is established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount
force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.
c. And the third is that established as an independent
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first
kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto
governments.
“But there is another description of government, called also by
publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are
(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and
lawful government; and
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to
such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to
bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the
territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during
the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of
justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is
militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole
administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary
tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges
and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the
authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in
their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities
appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These
principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have
considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court
and applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its
military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly
from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession,
during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of
such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such
rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the
usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists
and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate
private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so
far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at
his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which
are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-knownprinciple of postliminy (postliminium) in
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that
well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of
its legitimate government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very
few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for
one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial
acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take
effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done
during the same time by private persons under the sanction of
municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of
a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the
state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, it would be
hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be
ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the
sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the
disappearance of the intrusive government .” (Hall, International Law,
7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have
been each an incident of the same war as in the present case,
postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror
and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese
intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines
and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor,
International Law, p. 615.)
l. Sovereignty:
1. legal
2. political
m. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation?
Read:
1. REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
30 SCRA 968
“By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government
has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty.”
“Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits,
its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is
a diminution of sovereignty.” Then came this paragraph dealing with
the principle of auto-limitation: “It is to be admitted any state may, by
its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power
plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, “is the property
of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.” A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence.”
The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at
the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.
2. PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476
3. COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397
2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national police, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
among all nations.
a. difference between aggressive & defensive war
b. Read:
1) MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70
The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
since it is a generally accepted principle of international law. As such,
it should be applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner so that it would
be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an
unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing
to take him.
“The meaning of “reasonable time” depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of
transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this
Government desires to expel the alien, and does not relish keeping him
at the people’s expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry
out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of
this presumption assurances were made during the oral argument that
the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has
been under confinement since the last time he was apprehended.
Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad.
And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely
imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation 3
or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless
the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not
interfere.
2) KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no
Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare
and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory
to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that
the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form,
part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by
the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined
to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were
allegedly committed the Philippines was under the sovereignty of
United States and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and
obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at
all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our
own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against
crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember
what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):
3) SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121
4) AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195
The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered
part of the law of the Philippines since the same is a generally
accepted principle of international law in accordance with the
Incorporation clause of the Constitution.
5) REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance
No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of
rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet
from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to
be admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There was no
showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the
embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such
a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could
legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit
sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of
unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the
right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was
no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that
issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and
observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be
summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the
constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application
would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom
of assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of
whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500
feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.
3. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the
military. The armed forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.
See also:
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2)
Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)
4. Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
conditions provided by law, to render personal and military service. free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. NO
Read: RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE
1. PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13 OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.

“The appellant’s argument that he does not want to join the armed 2. ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches,
forces because “he does not want to kill or be killed” and that “he has mosques, non-profit cemeteries…actually, directly and exclusively
no military inclination” is not acceptable because it is his obligation to used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
join the armed forces in connection with the “defense of the State” from taxation.
provision of the Constitution. 3. ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No public money or property shall be
2. PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721 appropriated, applied, paid, for the benefit, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or
3. PD1706, August 8, 1980 religion, except when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
4. Exec. Order No. 264 leprosarium.
5. Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of 4. ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are be registered…as political parties. (NOTE: Religious organizations are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of also prohibited ion connection with sectoral representatives under Art.
democracy. VI)
6. Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable. 5. ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents,
Read: religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children in elementary
and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors
1) PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413 designated or approved by religious authorities to which said children
belong, without additional cost to the government.
2) GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514
7. Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign
(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases) policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration
3) Other provisions: shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination,
Other provisions on church & state:
8. Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national
1. ART. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.
1. meaning of “nuclear-free” Philippines;
2. Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25
9. Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social
order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard
of living, and an improved quality of life for all..
10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
11. The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
a. Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII
12. 9. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support the support
of the government.
NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand
on divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to be passed by Congress may or
may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing abortion ,
other than therapeutic, is unconstitutional.
1. Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.
2. Read:
a) GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)
A law prohibiting the sale of “girlie magazines” [bold?) is
constitutional and does not violate the above provision. This is so
because parents could buy said magazines for their children if they
believe the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child.
This is in accordance with this provision which states that the parents
have the “natural and primary right in rearing their child for civic
efficiency…”
b) MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922)
c) PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925)
A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is
unconstitutional since it interferes with the right of parents in rearing
their children. They have the right to choose which school is best
suited for the development of their children without interference from
the State.
d) PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806
e) CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94
10. Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
Read:
1) PD 684
2) PD 935
3) PD 1102
4) PD 603; see the objectives of the law
11. Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
men and women.
12. Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
13. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
14. Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science
and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote human liberation
and development.
1) Read together with Article XIV
Read :
VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993;
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals
with the timber licensing agreements entered into by the government
which if not stopped would be prejudicial to their future. This is so
because the DENR holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations the natural resources of the country. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise
declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative
enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil
case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they
are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand
to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements
above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications
are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
13. Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.
1) Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.
2) Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
3) Read:
a. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59
SCRA 54
The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such,
an Iglesia Ni Kristo member may refuse to join a Union and despite
the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the establishment
where he was employed, his employment could not be validly
terminated for his non-membership in the majority union therein.
13. Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
See Art. XII
14. Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives
to needed investments.
a. Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it
the welfare state concept? Distinguish the two.
b. Read: ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the
separate opinion of former Chief Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO
only)
The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the
welfare-state concept which is being followed as shown by the
constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to
labor… (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions
which provide for “free enterprise)
PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286 SCRA 109
Mendoza, J.
c. Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE CODE OF AGRARIAN
REFORMS OF THE PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on
this matter)
d .Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into law by the President on June 7,
1988.
e. Read:
Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, July 14, 1989
16. Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.

The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 15- 21.
REPUDIATED laissez faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an
economic principle, and although the present Constitution enshrines Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:
free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government 1. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. 2. Art. X, Secs. 15 - 21

As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective 3. Art. XII, Sec. 5
regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because
under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government 4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6
reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the 5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17
general welfare and when the public interest so requires.
6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12
15. Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
development and agrarian reform. 17. Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare
a. Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution of the nation.
b. Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS 17-a. Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication
regime
and information in nation-building.
18. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
a. Define "autonomy"
b. See Art. X
Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its
provisions evidencing "autonomy" to local government units.
19. Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.
20. Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption.
To be discussed under Article XI.
a. Please see RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195..
b. PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to
givers of bribes and other gifts and to their accomplices in bribery
other than graft cases against public officers.
c. RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to
have been illegally acquired by a public officer or employee.
21. Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public
disclosure of government transactions
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006, 504 SCRA 704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced
Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4]
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.” The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and
entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as
compared to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC
subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC
funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been
allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to
PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported
that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released
P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an
executive committee member; to date there have been no payments
given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of
P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due
to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board
of directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority
of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the
PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
theCommittee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting
was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[2][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of
prior commitment.[3][7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum,[4][8] approved by Senate President Manuel Villar,
requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public
hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know
relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. All were
disregarded by the petitioners.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General
Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No.
82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises
where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P.
Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier;
and the PCGG’s nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first,
respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by
respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the
inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;and
fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power
of contempt.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents
countered: first, the issues raised in the petitions involve political
questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction;second, Section
4(b) has been repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate
Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth, Senate’s Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly
published; fifth, respondents have not violated any civil right of the
individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and (b) right
against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute
undue encroachment into justiciable controversies.
I S S U E:
Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its
implementation wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in
investigations involving their transactions violates Section 28, Art. II
of the Constitution?
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative
inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
The Congress’ power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v.
Daugherty,[5]ﾧ[15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[6]ﾧ[16] In those
earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as
inherent in the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing
McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is “an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function,” thus:
Although there is no provision in the “Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who possess it.”
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the
broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,
Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is
invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent
to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust
for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or
of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust
extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the
office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the
people, and not their rulers.[7]ﾧ[24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with
the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members
and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability,
the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña,[8]ﾧ[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter”
the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections
4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the
PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted,
clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the
literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4
(a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any
member thereof from civil liability “for anything done or omitted in
the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the
constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to
most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize
the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the
PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official
of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
x x x
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or
staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the
Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying
with orders of this Court.

Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the

Constitution which mandates that “Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”

Read together with Section 7, Article III and Sec. 20, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution.