Published quarterly by Unesco

Vol. X X X V I , N o . 4, 1984

Editor a.i.: AM Kazancigil

Design and layout: Jacques Carrasco
Picture research: Florence Bonjean

Correspondents
Bangkok: Yogesh Atal
Beijing: Li Xuekun
Belgrade: Balsa Spadijer
Buenos Aires: Norberto Rodríguez
Bustamante
Canberra: Geoffrey Caldwell
Cologne: Alphons Silbermann
Delhi: André Béteille
Florence: Francesco Margiotta Broglio
Harare: Chen Chimutengwende
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London: Cyril S. Smith
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mm
:
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Moscow: Marien Gapotchka
Nigeria: Akinsola A k i w o w o

lhr-
Ottawa: Paul L a m y
Singapore: S. H . Alatas
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United States: G e n e Lyons

Topics of forthcoming issues:

International comparisons
Food structures
Education
Youth

Cover:
Eye reflecting a theatre, drawing by the French
architect Nicolas Ledoux (1736-1806). Edimcdia '
Right:
The mystery of human mind, drawing from Robert
Fludd, Utriusque Cosmi Historia (1619). Explorer
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL 0020 8701

SCIENCE JOURNAL

EPISTEMOLOGY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 102
Editorial 565

General analyses

Ernest Gellner T h e scientific status of the social sciences 567

Stefan Nowak Philosophical schools and scientific working methods
in social science 587
Emérita S. Quito Value as a factor in social action 603
Claude A k e Commodification of the social sciences 615

Disciplines

Philippe Braillard The social sciences and the study of international

relations 627
Edmund Burke III The institutionalization of sociology in France:
its social and political significance 643
Milton Santos Geography in the late twentieth century: n e w roles
for a threatened discipline 657

T h e social science sphere

T . V . Sathyamurthy Development research and the social sciences in India 673

G . B . Benko Regional science: evolution over thirty years 699
Jacques Lombard The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study 713

Books received
Recent Unesco publications 725
' ' - 727
Editorial
There are ways in which scientific activity
resembles the practice of a sport. A sports-
m a n must observe his movements and analyse
them in detail, in order to improve his
performance. Similarly, the researcher should
not overlook professional self-analysis and
reflection about the direction and scope of his
work, finding theoretical and methodological
ways to improve his results and better domi-
nate his subject.
Indeed, this type of analysis cannot be
isolated from research activity itself. This is of
particular importance in the case of the
sciences of m a n and society, where the re-
lations between the researcher and his field of
research present certain special characteristics
different from those prevailing in the sciences
of life and nature. H o w e v e r , the epistemo-
lógica! foundations of social science research
are not always explicitly stated; neither are
they analysed as systematically as they should
be. The theory of knowledge provides oppor-
tunities for a refreshing look at the social
sciences, provided that the Charybdis of
obsessive preoccupation with epistemology is
avoided as clearly as the Scylla of a narrow-
minded empiricism.
The articles in this issue are devoted, to
such a self-examination of the social sciences,
and present viewpoints o n certain of their
epistomological, axiological and institutional
aspects. Ernest Gellner raises the question
of ascertaining whether the social sciences
should be admitted into the exclusive club of
the sciences. C a n the social world be studied
scientifically, or should it b e left to the
philosophers and poets? Gellner has no ready-
m a d e answer to offer, but h e eloquently
demonstrates the weakness of attempts to
exclude the social sciences from the scientific
realm. Stefan N o w a k broaches the relations
between the scientific methods used in socio-
logy and various philosophical schools and
shows h o w methodological choices indicate
philosophical and epistemological prefer-
ences. Emérita Quito's contribution analyses
the relations between values as an object to
be studied, and values as factors influencing
social science research. Claude A k e offers an
approach that could be called a political
economy of the social sciences, showing that
the latter, operating under the constraints of
market laws and within an environment domi-
nated by exchange value and not use value,
are commodified. T h e last three articles of the
thematic section are epistemological analyses
of specific disciplines in various contexts.
E d m u n d Burke III studies the social and
economic forces that shaped the institutional-
ization of sociology in France, at the turn of
the century, Philippe Braillard discusses the
case of international relations, and Milton
Santos, that of geography.
The texts that appear in ' T h e Social
Science Sphere' are not foreign to the the-
matic section: T . V . Sathyamurthy describes
the striking growth of the social sciences in
post-independence India; G . B . B e n k o writes
about regional science, an interdisciplinary
field that has developed over the last few
566
decades; and Jacques Lombard provides a his-
torical account of the teaching of anthro-
pology in Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.
Past issues of the ISSJ devoted to topics
related to the current one include: Vol. X V I ,
N o . 4, 1964; Vol. X X , N o . 2, 1968; Vol.
XXII, N o . 1, 1970; Vol. X X I V , N o . 4, 1972;
and Vol. X X I X , N o . 4, 1977. The complete
list of back issues is provided at the end of this
volume.
\
Editorial
W e take this opportunity to inform our
readers of a recent change in the editorial
team. Peter Lengyel, editor of this Journal
since 1963, has left Unesco, which he joined
in 1953. His career in the service of the
Organization, devoted to m a n y aspects of
international co-operation in the social sci-
ences, was characterized above all by his
achievements with the ISSJ.
A.K.
[Translated from French]
The scientific status
of the social sciences

Ernest Gellner

The idea of the 'scientific' could they mislead us in this case, by falsely
identifying the object, or cluster of objects,
with which w e are to b e concerned, namely
T h e problem of whether the social sciences are the social sciences? N o . T h e central object of
genuinely scientific immediately raises two our inquiry is precisely the social sciences, as
questions: W h a t are the social sciences? W h a t actually practised and identified in contem-
is it to be scientific? porary societies. Public opinion, however
T h efirstof these questions raises no deep loosely defined, cannot here mislead us,
problems and can be answered by ostensión because the object that concerns us is, pre-
or by enumeration. T h e social sciences simply cisely, one defined by reference to current
are what social scientists cultural norms. W e m a y
professionally practise. of course also be in-
Ernest Gellner, formerly at the Lon- terested in s o m e trans-
The definition thus con-
don School of Economics and Poli- social, culturally neutral,
tains a covert (but hardly tical Science, is n o w Professor of
very covert) reference Anthropology at King's College, ideal social science, if
to the consensual or m a - , Cambridge, United Kingdom. His there is such a thing; but
jority or uncontested main publications are Words and our primary concern is
Things (1959), Thought and Change with the concrete prac-
judgements prevalent in (1965), Saints of the Atlas (1969), tices recognized currently
contemporary societies Muslim Society (1981) and Nations
and Nationalism (1983). as 'social sciences'.
and identifying, by their
tacit or express ranking, But the situation is
which universities, pro- quite different w h e n w e
fessional associations, c o m e to the second term,
individuals, are as it were which needs to be de-
norm-setting or paradig- fined—'scientific'. H e r e ,
matic and, in effect, de- ostensión or enumeration
fine, by their o w n attribution of labels, the are of n o help whatever. W e are not specially
nature and range of the social sciences. interested in the question of what society
This covert reference to public opinion or happens to call 'scientific', or at any rate, the
consensus does not vitiate the definition or actual use of this label by our contemporaries
m a k e it circular. Majorities, consensus, the is not conclusive. A s a matter of fact, society is
general cultural 'sense of the meeting'—all disunited on this issue, and there is a lot of very
these are of course not infallible or stable or significant pushing and pulling going o n about
unambiguous. There is n o contradiction in the just h o w far the blanket of the 'scientific' is to
suggestion that public opinion at a given date reach. B u t w e are not interested in holding a
is in error. If such sources can be mistaken, referendum about this, or in seeing which of
568
the m a n y warring groups manages to impose
its view at any given time. Instead, w e are
deeply concerned with s o m e normative, genu-
inely authoritative sense of 'scientific'. W e are
interested in finding out whether the social
sciences are really scientific.
This is in itself an interesting and sig-
nificant fact. In formulating our question—
A r e the social sciences scientific?—we seem
to employ for our subject a term which is
defined conventionally or by denotation—any-
thing currently in fact called by that n a m e ,
ipso facto falls under it—while our predicate is
Platonistic or normative, and intended not be
be at the mercy of h u m a n w h i m or conven-
tion. T h e rules of its application are meant
to be based o n s o m e higher, independent
authority.
O u r sentence thus seems logically a
hybrid—the subject is nominalistic or conven-
tional, the predicate is Platonistic, essentialist
and prescriptive. Is such double-talk per-
missible? I do not think this situation is actu-
ally all that anomalous or unusual. But it is
significant.
If both terms were defined convention-
ally, by reference to the actual or majority or
agreed use of the term, the question would be
easy to answer and lack any profundity or
importance. All w e should need to do would
be to commission a survey, set up tofindout
whether and to what extent people use one
label ('social sciences') in a manner such that
it falls within the range of use of another and
broader label ('scientific'). But no such survey
would in fact be felt to be relevant, or at any
rate conclusive, to the question which w e are
effectively asking. , W e cannot always choose our concepts, and
This 'Platonism of the predicate', which
obliges us to treat the term in question as
though it referred to something constituted
quite independently of our choice and custom,
and endowed with authority over us, is
interesting and significant.
Note that it is an old and pervasive
feature of discussions concerning the delimi-
tations of 'science' or 'meaning'. Those
famous demarcation disputes had all the
passion and intensity of circumscribing the
Ernest Gellner
saved and the damned, of defining the licit
and the illicit, of discovering an important
and given truth, and not of just allocating
labels.
Conventionalism with respect to the de-
limitation of concepts was only invoked, with
some embarrassment and visible lack of con-
viction, w h e n the theorist found himself cor-
nered by, for instance, the insistent question
concerning the status of the 'verification
principle' itself. W a s it itself an experiential
report, or a convention determining the limits
of a term?
The pretence was maintained that the
verifiability demarcation of meaning or of
science was merely a convention of ours. But
the real spirit in which this delimitation was
proposed was obviously quite different. It was
propounded as an objective, authoritative,
Platonic norm. It circumscribed cognitive
salvation.
There is not a shadow of doubt that
discussions concerning what is and is not
'scientific' are carried on in this utterly Pla-
tonistic, normative and non-conventionalist
spirit. These are debates about whether
something is really, really scientific. T h e
debates seem based on the assumption that
what is at issue is an important conceptual
boundary, in the very nature of things, and
altogether beyond the reach of what w e
choose to call what.
Another explanation is available: w e are
not conceptually rigid because w e are Pla-
tonists; w e become Platonists because w e are
conceptually rigid. It is w h e n concepts con-
strain us, that w e turn Platonist malgré nous.
our concepts do often have authority over us.
M a n can do as he will, but he cannot will as
he will; and he cannot always choose his
concepts at will. Sometimes they have an
authority over us w e cannot resist. A n d w h y
are w e in s o m e cases so conceptually rigid,
and w h y do w e allow ourselves to be bonds-
m e n to the values and imperatives incapsu-
lated in s o m e ideas?
Generically, one m a y say that this hap-
pens because some cluster or syndrome of
The scientific status of the social sciences 569

features, locked in with each other in this or mere opinion, and with the even m o r e acute
that concept of a given language or style of concern with the identification of the true
thought, has good reasons, so to speak, for faith. In the latter case, w e knew only too well
being locked in with each other in just that w h y the notion was so important: personal
manner, with that particular set of ingredi- salvation and damnation depended on it. But
ents, and for having some kind of compul- the demarcation of the scientific, though it
sive hold over our thought. Moreover, the m a y overlap, certainly is not co-extensivè (let
moral charge, positive or negative, with which alone co-intensive) with either true knowl-
such concepts are loaded, cannot be prised edge or with the true faith.
away from them. The reasons that lead to the If this be granted, then what is it?
crystallization of such concepts binding a
cluster of traits m a y be general or specific;
they m a y be inherent in the h u m a n condition Sociologizing science to the
as such, or they m a y be tied to some definite second degree: Popper and Kuhn
social or historic situation. But the overall
formula for this occurrence must be some- T h e 'scientific' has not been a crucial and
thing like this: situations arise (and some- authoritative notion in all ages and all so-
times persist) which impel a given speech and cieties. In societies in which the institution of
conceptual community to think in terms of a the 'sage' was well established, it was natural
concept T, defined in terms of attributes, a, b, that the preoccupation with the distinction be-
c, etc. ; moreover it is of great importance for tween real and spurious knowledge, genuine
the community as to whether a given object or and fraudulent access to recipes for good life-
practice does or does not fall under T, is part styles and excellence, should become wide-
and parcel of the very life, use and hence spread. It was a kind of consumer protection
operational definition of that concept. So is itsservice for those w h o entered the market-
moral charge. S o m e conceptual boundaries place for wisdom and counsellor services
have an importance for given societies, which about the 'good life'; and it seemed to provide
arises from the very nature of their situation, the first powerful stimulus for the develop-
and which cannot be abrogated by fiat. ment of the theory of knowledge. In the days
There is no doubt in m y mind that, in of competing putative messiahs, the criteria
modern society, the concept of the 'scientific' for identifying the true one seemed to b e
is precisely of this kind. W e need it, and it demonstratively spectacular rather than epis-
cannot but be an important and authoritative temological. B y the time Revelation came to
notion. A s so often, w e m a y or m a y not be be monopolized and scripturally codified, the
able to specify precisely what it is that w e central preoccupation became, naturally, the
m e a n by it; what m a y b e called Socrates' identification of the unique or nearly unique
paradox, namely that it is possible to use a point of revelation, and of the authenticity of
notion without being able to define it, does the putatively unique message, messenger, or
apply here, as it does so often. But whatever of the permanent institution or series of
it is that goes into the cluster of traits which personal links between the authentic point of
defines the idea, the idea is indisputably communication and the present. Against the
important, and is so to speak non-optional. background of these various institutional and
W e do not k n o w precisely what it is, but w e doctrinal assumptions, each of these ques-
do k n o w that it is important and that w e tions, and no doubt other variants of them,
can'not tinker with it at will. m a d e sense. Although they do have some
overlap and affinity with the question that
The idea of the 'scientific' is such a concerns us here, obviously they are not
notion. But it has not always been so. N o identical with it.
doubt it has some mild affinity with the old
desire to define true knowledge as against The main point of overlap is that in all of
570
these questions, m e n were concerned with the
validation or legitimation of more specific
claims, in terms of some more general cri-
teria. W h e n one determines whether or not
something is 'scientific', one is ipso facto
deciding whether or not it has a certain
legitimate claim on our attention, and perhaps
even on our credence. T h e status of being
'scientific' is not necessarily the only or the
dominant way of conferring such authority on
specific claims; but it is most certainly at least
one a m o n g such widely heeded and respected
ways of validation. T i m e was when it was not
even one a m o n g m a n y ; when it was, in fact,
unknown.
This, to m y mind, is a crucial clue. W e
needfirstof all to identify those background
social conditions that have engendered this
particular manner of validation, which bring
forth this n e w and potent notion or 'the
scientific', and e n d o w it with authority.
This automatically pushes our inquiry
into a sociological direction—by obliging it to
be sensitive to and concerned with general
differences in kinds of society. A t the very
least, w e shall need to be concerned with the
difference between the kind of society that
does and the kind that does not engender the
concept in question.
There are at least two ways of approach-
ing the problem of defining 'science': the
philosophical and the sociological. T h e philo-
sophical can be characterized as follows: the
practitioner of this approach works in terms of
s o m e kind of model of discovery or of the
acquisition of knowledge, where the elements
in that model are items drawn from individual
activities, such as having ideas, experiences,
setting up experiments, relating the lessons of
experience or the results of experiments to
generalizations based on the initial ideas, and
so forth. A n extreme individualistic theory of
science would be one that offered a theory
and a demarcation of science without ever
going beyond the bounds of a model con-
structed in this way. Such a theory might
concede or even stress that, in fact, scientists
are very numerous and that they habitually
co-operate and communicate with each other.
Ernest Gellner
But it would treat this as s o m e h o w contingent
and inessential. A Robinson Crusoe could, for
such a theory, practise science. Given re-
sources, longevity, ingenuity and ability, no
achievement of science as w e k n o w it would,
'in principle', be beyond his powers. Those
w h o hold theories of this kind are not de-
barred from admitting that, in fact, criticism,
testing and corroboration are, generally
speaking, social activities, and that they de-
pend for their effectiveness on a mathemat-
ical, technological and institutional infrastruc-
ture, which is far beyond the power of any
individual to establish; but they are, I sup-
pose, committed to holding that whether or
not a social environment makes these pre-
conditions available is, as it were, an external
condition of science, but not in any essential
way part of it.1
There are various ways and degrees of
injecting a sociological element into such an
individualistic vision. Minimally, one might
insist that society constitutes an essential pre-
condition—but only society as such, and not
necessarily this or that kind of society. Emile
Durkheim would be an example of such a
position: he held that thought was impossible
without conceptual compulsion, which in turn
depended on the existence of society and,
above all, on communal ritual. This, if true,
turns society into an essential pre-condition of
science and, indeed, of all thought; a genu-
inely pre-social individual, however able,
long-lived and well-equipped, could never
rise to the formulation of a general idea.2
A second degree of the sociologizing of
the theory of science involves insisting not
merely o n the presence of a society, but of a
special kind of society. Popper's theory of
science seems to be of this kind: society is not
enough, the w o m b of science requires the
'critical spirit'. Closed societies cannot
engender science but an 'open society' can do
so. A n open society is one in which m e n
subject each other's views to criticism, and
which either possesses institutional under-
pinning for such a practice, or at least lacks
the institutional means for inhibiting it. Pop-
per's views on this matter have a number of
The scientific status of the social sciences 571

LE PROVOCATEUR DE PLOIE
Promethean Science: the rainmaker, D . R .
572
aspects that m a y not be altogether in harmony.
W h e n stressing the continuity of trial and
error as the basis of all cognitive advancement
throughout the history of all life, it would
seem that the core secret of scientific method
is something w e share with all organic life and
never needed to learn. ( W e have only some-
h o w learnt to do it a bit faster and to show
mercy to carriers of unsuccessful ideas.) N o
special institutions seem to be required. In the
context of turning the tables on relativists w h o
invoke the h u m a n inability to overcome
prejudice and interest, however, Popper
seems prepared to concede that m a n y (perhaps
most?) m e n are unwilling to correct their o w n
views in the light of contrary considerations,
and perhaps even need prejudice to m a k e
discoveries at all; but he insists that science is
the kind of institution that is not at the mercy
of the virtues or vices of the persons w h o m a n
it. Public testing by a diversified and uncon-
trollable community of scientists ensures the
ultimate elimination of faulty ideas, however
dogmatic and irrational their individual ad-
herents m a y be. In this version, science and
its advancement clearly does depend on the
institutional underpinning of this public and
plural testing. O n the other hand again, in the
context of the discussion of the origin of the
scientific spirit, Popper is inclined to invoke
the figures of heroic, Promethean Ionian
founder-liberators, w h o s o m e h o w overcame
their o w n h u m a n proclivity to dogmatism, and
encouraged their disciples to criticize, thereby
inventing science. T h e Ionian proto-Popper
plays a role in this system, similar to that of
the philosopher in The Republic: he and he
alone, by his somewhat mysterious emerg-
ence, can break through the vicious circle, to
which otherwise mankind is in thrall.
Popper's overall philosophy is curious in
that science had to be invented in h u m a n
history, when seen as the great act of liber-
ation from the 'closed society', though it had
not originally needed inventing in the general
history of life, for the amoeba had it as its
birthright. Within nature, organisms elimin-
ated faulty hypotheses by eliminating each
other. Savage, pre-scientific m e n also glee-
Ernest Gellner
fully eliminated each other, but not hypoth-
eses; for s o m e reason they allowed ideas to sur-
vive, or rather they uncritically preserved
them, instead of eliminating them. Harsh
with each other, they showed tender soli-
citude for ideas. Modern scientific m e n elimin-
ate hypotheses, but not each other, at any
rate w h e n on their best behaviour. The curi-
ous consequence of Popper's philosophy of
history is that there is a kind of Dark A g e
or Fall, which took place between the, first
emergence of humanity and the beginnings
of science and the open society. The amoeba's
birthright was lost somewhere during the
early tribal, over-collectivistic period of
h u m a n history, and was miraculously, her-
oically recovered in Ionia. It is interesting
that the Dark A g e theory is shared by
Christianity, Marxism and Popper, though in
different forms.
The second currently most influential
philosopher of science, T h o m a s K u h n , would
also seem to sociologize the subject to the
second degree. Society appears in his view to
be essential for the existence and advance-
ment of science, and not just any society
will do: it has to be one endowed with a para-
digm. There appear to be societies not so en-
dowed—for instance, the community of social
scientists.3
A s far as one can m a k e out, the crucial
differentia between science-capable and sci-
ence-incapable societies in this view is just
this—the absence or presence of a paradigm.
K u h n does not seem to have any views
concerning the difference between scientific
and ««-scientific paradigms; a crucial weak-
ness in his position, to m y mind. Paradigms
seem to be not merely incommensurate, but
also to constitute a curiously undifferentiated
class. T h e prophet of their incommensura-
bility seems to have little sense of h o w very
different in kind they are—that some of them
are more incommensurate than others. But in
so far as the importance of paradigms, and the
fact that they are socially carried, perpetuated
and enforced, leads him openly and avowedly
to turn to sociology, he does lay himself open
to Popper's taunt: Which sociology is the
The scientific status of the social sciences
philosopher of science to use? Which socio-
logical paradigm m a y he trust, when using
sociology to grapple with the general problem
of the nature of science, so as to illuminate
the standing of all sciences, including socio-
logy itself? B y making all scientific activity
relative to paradigms, and the philosophy of
science dependent on sociology (which is
presumably n o more exempt from paradigm-
dependence than any other science or in-
quiry), his position would seem to have an
element of circularity in it.4
W h a t concerns us h e r e is this: both
Popper and K u h n sociologize the philosophy
of science to the second degree, i.e. they
m a k e science dependent not merely on the
sheer existence of society, but on the avail-
ability of a special kind of society.
T h e manner in which they do so, h o w -
ever, is contrasted and indeed diametrically
opposed. For Popper, the only science-
capable society is one so loosened up in its
social control as to permit criticism even of its
most respected sages (or better still, perhaps,
one endowed with institutional guarantees of:
the possibility or even the encouragement of
such criticism); for K u h n , science is m a d e
possible only by the presence of social-
conceptual control sufficiently tight to impose
a paradigm on its m e m b e r s at most (though
not quite all) times, notwithstanding the fact
that paradigms are not logically, so to speak
objectively, binding. They are m a d e binding
by social pressure, which thus makes science
possible. Unless the deep questions are arbi-
trarily prejudged, science cannot proceed, it
appears. But just as T h o m a s Hobbes insisted
that any sovereign is preferable to anarchy, so
T h o m a s K u h n insists that any paradigm is
preferable to the dreadful freedom of contem-
porary social scientists, ever questioning and 1
debating fundamentals and for that very
reason, through their great 'openness', in-
hibiting the emergence of genuine science in
their o w n midst.
It is not necessary here to choose be-
tween the near-anarchism of Popper and the
authoritarianism of K u h n , recommending loy-
alty to paradigms at most times though
573
evidently retaining the right of occasional
rebellion (during similarly ill-defined, and I
think in principle indefinable, conditions of
'scientific revolution'). W h a t is relevant for
our purpose is to single out an error that they
both share. T o define science, one needs to
sociologize the philosophy of science to the
third, and not merely the second, degree. It is
not sufficient to allow the relevance of society
and to distinguish between science-capable
and science-incapable societies; it is also
necessary to m a k e this distinction in terms of
features of society that do not pertain to their
cognitive activities alone, and to consider
those societies w h e n involved in activities
other than cognition. W e shall need to look at
the impact of cognition on its other activities.
This, in m y terminology, is to sociologize the
subject to the third degree; and it needs to be
done. H o w is it to be done?
Characteristics
of science-capable societies
If w e are to understand w h y the notion of
being scientific is so potent, w h y this accolade
is so very significant, w e must look at what it
is that 'science' does to society, and forget for
a m o m e n t the usual and fascinating question
of h o w it manages to do it. Philosophical
theories of science, such as those that are in-
corporated in various philosophical attempts
to demarcate science, basically endeavour to
answer the question concerning h o w it is that
science works, h o w it is that the great mir-
acle of scientific progress and consensus is
achieved. But from the viewpoint of ident-
ifying what it is that confers such magic and
charm onto science, w e must look not so
m u c h at h o w it is done, but what it is that
is done which is so enchanting. W h y is it
that science makes so m u c h difference to
society, that a special prestige attaches to
any activity that m a y be included within its
charmed circle, and can be withheld from
anything that fails to qualify as 'scientific'?
This contrast, as I formulate it, somewhat
simplifies a m o r e complex reality: philos-
ophers of science are of course also concerned
574
with the features of the output of science,
with the kind of theory it produces. Neverthe-
less, that tends to be a datum for them: their
problem is—How was it achieved? It is the
sociologist w h o is concerned primarily with
the effects and implications of the kinds of
knowledge that science provides. In the
interest of simplicity of exposition, I shall
pretend that this division of labour is neater
than in fact it is.
This question as posed can best be
answered by offering a highly schematic but
nevertheless relevant sketch history of m a n -
kind—one that divides this history into three
stages. Trinitarian philosophies of history are
c o m m o n : there is for instance Auguste C o m -
te's theory of the religious, metaphysical and
positivestages, or Sir James Frazer's doctrine
of the successive dominance of magic, religion
and science, or Karl Polanyi's less intel-
lectualist account of the succession of the
c o m m u n a l , redistributive and market so-
cieties. T h e n e w pattern of world history
which is n o w crystallizing in our time and
which constitutes, I believe, the unofficial,
unformulated and sometimes unavowed, but
tacitly pervasive view of history of our age,
is somewhat different. It shares some of the
intellectualism and the high valuation of
science with the Comtist and Frazerian
schemes, though it is m o r e preoccupied than
Frazer at least with the impact of science
on the ordering of society.
T h e crucial stages of h u m a n history are
the following:first,that of hunting and food-
gathering; then, that of food production
(agriculture and pastoralism); and, finally,
that based on production, which is linked to
growing scientific knowledge. Theories of his-
torical stages in terms of social organization
do not work: it is the cognitive productive
; base that seems to provide the 'big divide';
and on either side of the big divide w e find a
diversity of social forms. In the present
context, the world of hunters and gatherers
does not greatly concern us. But the differ-
ence between the agrarian and the scientific/
industrial world does concern us a very great
deal.
Ernest Gellner
T h e notion of a fully developed agrarian
society includes not merely that of reliance on
food production, but also two other important
features: literacy and political centralization.
Developed agrarian societies are marked by a
fairly complex but relatively stable division of
labour. But it is a mistake to treat the division
of labour as a, so to speak, homogeneous
commodity: its implications for society vary
according to just what it is that is being turned
into a specialism. Literacy and political cent-
ralization, the emergence of a clerisy and a
polity, have quite distinctive consequences,
which cannot simply be assimilated to the
minor economic specializations that occur
within the process of production taken on its
own.
Agro-literate polities are not all alike. In
fact, they differ a great deal a m o n g them-
selves. T h e diversity of agrarian political
regimes is well k n o w n . T h e clerical classes of
agrarian polities also vary a great deal in their
organization, recruitment and ethos. In one
place, they m a y be part of a single, cen-
tralized, and jealously monopolistic organiz-
ation; in another, they m a y be a loose and
open guild, open to all m e n of pious learn-
ing. Elsewhere again, they m a y be a closed
but uncentralized caste, or constitute a bu-
reaucracy selected by competitive examin-
ation, with an administrative but not a re-
ligious monopoly.
Notwithstanding this variety, certain im-
portant c o m m o n or generic traits can be ob-
served. Recorded knowledge in such societies
is used for administrative records, notably
those connected with taxation; for communi-
cation along a political and religious hier-
archy; as parts of ritual and for the codifi-
cation of religious doctrine, which has a kind
of shadow in the form of word magic, the
compliment paid by manipulative magic to
scriptural religion. Conservation of the writ-
ten truth, and possibly its implementation, are
central concerns, rather than its expansion in
the form of acquisition of more truth. (Cogni-
tive growth is not yet a plausible ideal.)
Despite inner complexity, sometimes very
considerable, both the status systems and the
The scientific status òf the social sciences 575

'Cognitive despair'. Roger-Viollet.

576
cognitive systems within such a society tend to
be fairly stable, and the same tends to be true
of its productive system. T h e normative and
conservative stress, on the written word, in the
keeping of the clerisy, tends to produce a
cultural dualism or pluralism in such a society,
a differentiation between the great (literate)
tradition and little tradition or traditions.
Parts of the written great tradition m a y
contain general ideas of great penetration and
potential, or acute and accurate observations
of reality, or deductive systems of great
rigour; none the less, generically speaking,
one m a y say that a corpus of this kind
s o m e h o w or other had no firm grip on, and
cumulative penetration of, nature. Its main
significance and role, lies rather in social
legitimation, edification, record-keeping and
communication, and not in a genuine cogni-
tive exploration of nature. W h e n it comes to
the manipulation and understanding of things,
the cognitive content of the corpus tends
to be inferior to the skills, such as they are,
of the craftsman or artisan or working prac-
titioner. T h e cognitive despair expressed
with such vigour in the opening speech of
Goethe's Faust is clearly a commentary on
this situation.
With less anguish and perhaps m o r e
indignation, and with a missionary zeal on
behalf of a putative alternative, a similar
sentiment can be found, for instance, in what
might be called the pan-human or carte
blanche populism of Michael Oakeshott. 5
Oakeshott's work enjoyed a considerable
vogue in post-war Britain, and he probably
continues to be the United Kingdom's fore-
most conservative political philosopher. His
w o r k is highly relevant for the present pur-
pose because, at its base, there is a premiss
that is half-epistemological, half-sociologi-
cal, and which runs as follows: genuine
knowledge is 'practical', which means that it is
maintained and transmitted by the practice of
a skill, and can be perpetuated only by a living
tradition; and its content can never be ad-
equately seized in written' documents, and
certainly cannot be transmitted from one m a n
to another by writing alone. The illusion that
Ernest Gellner
this can be done, which endows abstract and
written assertions with independent authority,
he names 'rationalism', in a highly pejorative
sense, and he clearly holds it to be the bane of
modern life. Oakeshott's doctrine vacillates
somewhat between, on the one hand, a global
pan-populism, endorsing all traditions, and
damning all their scholasticisms, which they
develop w h e n they adopt writing and printing
and take it too seriously, and, on the other
hand, the endorsement of one specific and
blessed tradition, which, thanks presumably
to an unwritten constitution, c o m m o n law,
and the pragmatic wisdom of W h i g politicians,
has resisted 'rationalism' somewhat better
than others—though about 1945, it did so less
well than it should and aroused his wrath. If it
is the achievement of one distinctive tradition,
can it also be a valid recipe for all of
them—without implicitly contradicting its
o w n central principle, namely the absence of
any abstract and universally valid principles?
T h e reason w h y this Oakeshottian pos-
ition is highly relevant for our argument is
this: whether or not it provides a good diag-
nosis of the political predicament of modern
m a n , it does unwittingly provide a very accu-
rate schematic account of the role of abstract
knowledge in the agro-literate polity. It is a
rather good account of the relation between
codified knowledge and practical skills in the
agro-literate polity—but only in the agro-
literate polity. T h e scriptures, law codes,
epics, manuals and so forth, in the keeping of
its scribes, jealously preserved and fairly
stable over time, are not superior to the
inarticulate practical wisdom of the life-long
m e m b e r of the clan or guild. They echo,
formalize, distort and travesty that wisdom;
and though, contrary to the anti-'rationalist'
diatribe, reverence for the codified version of
the wisdom m a y on occasion be beneficial—
because, for instance, reverence for the
codified rule makes it less amenable to oppor-
tunist manipulation—nevertheless it is true
that the absolute authority claimed for the
writ in the scribe's keeping is not justified.
The written theory is parasitical on the
lived praxis. So be it; or at any rate, so it was,
The scientific status of the social sciences 577

once, in the agro-literate polity. It is so no label. I believe this kind of 'continuity thesis'
longer. to be mistaken.)
But it is conspicuously untrue of modern This, as it were, external, sociological
science and the society based on it. A s a social account of science, described from the view-
p h e n o m e n o n , modern natural science has a point of what it does to the cognitive m a p and
number of conspicuous features: productive processes of society (leaving aside
1. Though not completely consensual, it is the question of its inner mechanics, the secret
consensual to an astonishing degree. of its success), m a y of course be challenged. It
2. It is intercultural. Though it flourishes m a y be denied that science constitutes the
m o r e in some countries than in others, it victory of trans-social, explicit, formalized
appears capable of persisting in a wide and abstract knowledge, over privately, inef-
variety of cultural and political climes, and fably communicated insights or skills or sensi-
to be largely independent of them. tivities. It m a y be asserted that the golden-
3. It is cumulative. Its growth rate is astonish- egg-laying goose is not, after all, radically
ing. This is also, a m o n g cognitive systems distinct from the old practical skills. The
in general, unique. perception and understanding of a scientific
4. Though it can evidently be taught to m e n problem, the capacity to propound and test a
originating in any cultural background, it solution, 'requires—it can be argued—some
requires arduous and prolonged training, in flair or spirit or 'personal knowledge' which is
thought styles and techniques that are in no beyond the reach of words or script, and
w a y continuous with those of daily life, and which cannot be formalized. Fingerspitzenge-
are often highly counter-intuitive. fuehl (adroitness) is alive and well, and, more
important, remains indispensable. Michael
5. T h e continuously growing technology it
Polanyi was only one adherent, though poss-
engenders is immeasurably superior to,
ibly the best k n o w n one, of such a view. 7
and qualitatively distinct from, the prac-
tical skills of the craftsmen of agrarian It is difficult to say h o w one could
society. evaluate this claim. It is sometimes supported
It is these features, or others closely related to by arguments such as the infinite regress of
them, which have engendered the persistent formalization, which can never catch up with
8
and haunting question—what is science? T h e itself; whatever is asserted is only a case of
question is no longer—what is truth, wisdom 'knowing that', and presupposes further prac-
or genuine knowledge? M e n possessed by the tical 'knowing h o w ' to apply it—and if that in
haunting question concerning the nature of turn is articulated and m a d e explicit, the
science do not necessarily deny that knowl- initial argument applies once again, and so on
edge or truth also exist outside science; they for ever. O r it can be supported by the widely
do not all say, as an anti-scientistic book once held and plausible view that while there can
ironically put it, 'extra scientiam nulla salus'.6 be a logic of testing, there is no logic of
But they are generally imbued with the sense discovery—only free-floating, uncontrollable
of the distinctiveness of this kind of k n o w - inspiration, which comes or does not c o m e as
ing, and wish to locate its source. They do not it wills, but appears to be m o r e willing to
want to kill the goose that lays the golden descend upon well-sustained, but elusive and
eggs, they only wish to identify it, so as to use indefinable, research traditions.
it to the full, and perhaps to guide it to n e w But even if all this is admitted, what
fields. (Some do wish to equate knowledge matters from the social viewpoint is that the
with scientific knowledge, not because they ratio, the entire balance, between ineffable
despise and abjure pre-scientific cognitive practical skill or flair on the one hand, and
styles, but because they consider them to be explicit formal knowledge, is transformed out
basically similar to science, being merely of all recognition in a science-using, industrial
earlier and feebler, and to deserve the same society. E v e n if an element of flair or tra-
578
dition, which is beyond words, is crucial
for the occasional outstanding great n e w dis-
covery, or, in small regular doses, for the sus-
taining of a vigorous research tradition, yet
the enormous mass of ordinary research and
technological activity works quite differently:
it rather resembles the old explicit scholasti-
cisms of agro-literate society, except in one
crucial way—it works. Scholasticism, for all
its ineffectiveness, seems to have been a
good preparation of genuinely productive
vigour. Talmudic societies take to science
with alacrity. .
Its general implications for the society
which uses science are also fairly obvious. A
society endowed with a powerful and con-
tinuously growing technology lives by inno-
vation, and its occupational role structure is
perpetually in flux. This leads to a fair amount
of occupational mobility and hence to a
measure of equality, which, though not suf-
ficient to satisfy out-and-out egalitarians, is
nevertheless far greater than that of most
agrarian societies. It is egalitarian because it is
mobile, not mobile because it is egalitarian.
Mobility, frequent abstract transmission of
ideas, and the need for universal literacy, i.e.
fairly context-free communication, also lead
to a completely n e w role of culture in society:
culture is linked to school rather than h o m e
and needs to be fairly homogeneous over the
entire catchment area of an educational sys-
tem. A t long last, 'great traditions' really
dominate, and to a large extent supplant,
'little traditions'. So the state, which once m a y
have been the defender of the faith, n o w
becomes in effect the protector of a culture.
In other words, the m o d e r n national state,
(based on the principle—one state, one cul-
ture) becomes the n o r m , and irredentist
nationalisms emerge where this norm fails to
be satisfied. T h e unprecedented.potential for
growth leads to cornucopianism, the attempt
to b u y off discontent and to smooth over
social conflict..by incremental Danegeld all
round—and this in turn, as w e n o w k n o w only
too well, becomes a dreadful trap w h e n , the
incremental Danegeld having become an en-
grained, as-of-right expectation, the cornu-
Ernest Cellner
copia temporarily dries up or even just slows
d o w n , as from time to time in the nature of
things it must.
These seem to be the generic traits of sci-
ence-using society. They differentiate it pro-
foundly from most or all agrarian societies,
which are Malthusian rather than growth
oriented, cognitively and productively stable
rather than growing (innovations when they
occur involve changes of degree rather than
kind, and in any case come as single spies, not
in battalions). Theories of historical stages or
epochs in terms of social organization (capi-
talism/socialism is the most popular) seem to
have failed, in as far as science-using (i.e.
industrial) society appears to be compatible
with diverse forms of organization, within the
limits of their shared generic traits; but those
traits, in turn distinguish it from all its prede-
cessors. T h e question about the nature of
science is in effect the issue of the nature of
this distinctive style of cognition, which in
turn defines an entire stage in the history of
mankind.
S o m e main philosophical
theories of science
Philosophical theories of science, as here
defined, do not define science, as was done
above, in the sociological manner, in terms of
what it does to society. They tend to ignore
that. Instead, they try to identify the secret
that enables it to do it.
It is impossible to list here all the con-
tending theories in thisfield,and even if w e
listed them, w e would have no w a y of de-
ciding between them. There is no consensus
in this area. Science m a y be consensual; the
theory of science is not.
But it is worthwhile, for our purpose, to
list some of the main contenders:
1. Ultra-empiricist: stick to observable facts.
Accumulate them, and only go beyond
them w h e n the accumulated data strongly
point in.some one direction. A b o v e all, do
not trespass into the transcendent! This
cautious version of empiricism, associated
The scientific status of the social sciences
with B a c o n or H u m e , and surviving in
m o d e r n behaviourism, has been m u c h de-
cried of late. Its detractors d o not always
fully appreciate the fact that the interdict
o n cognitive trespass once had a great
value. T h e belief systems of agrarian so-
cieties were often so constructed as to b e
cunningly self-maintaining in a circular
w a y , and the 'interdict o n trespass' w a s the
best w a y of eliminating these.
2. T h e Kantian diagnosis, which is a mixture
of the 'interdict on trespass' with rec-
o m m e n d e d daring within proper bounds,
and within the conceptual limits allegedly
imposed by the structure of the h u m a n
mind.
3. Collective self-propulsion by the resolution
of internal contradictions, with deference
to privileged praxis—the praxis of the
privileged class is a privileged praxis—and
to the direction of a prescribed social
development. This is the nearest I can get
to formulating o n e of the theories of
knowledge c o m m o n l y associated with
Marxism.
4. M a x i m u m daring of hypothesis within the
limits of testability, the Popperian theory.
5. Obedience to a given background picture
(thus eliminating the chaos characteristic of
unscientific subjects, and ensuring c o m -
parable w o r k and thus cumulation) except
at rare, 'revolutionary' occasions, which
cannot b e generically characterized nor
presumably predicted, and which then
lead to a progressive replacement of o n e
background picture b y another. Within
the limits of this theory, which declares
these successive background pictures to be
incommensurate, there cannot however
be any rational w a y of showing that the
post-revolutionary picture is superior to
the one it replaced. T h o u g h the idea of
scientific progress is presupposed, a n d
indeed sets the problem, it cannot coher-
ently b e asserted, for it would require
the comparison of successive 'paradigms',
which are said to b e incommensurate,
by comparing them to s o m e meta-para-
digm, which ex hypothesi w e do not and
579
cannot possess. This is the much-dis-
cussed theory propounded b y T h o m a s
Kuhn.9
6. T h e successive improvement of collectives
of propositions with a view to enhancing
both external predictions and manipulation
and internal coherence and elegance, b y
m e t h o d s asserted to b e continuous with
those which governed biological evolution.
This is pragmatism, ably represented in our
time by W . v a n O . Q u i n e . 1 0 In his ver-
sion, it asserted the 'continuity thesis' m o r e
coherently than is the case in the w o r k of
P o p p e r (where it clashes with the disconti-
nuity between 'open and closed' thought).
If a major break in the cognitive history of
life occurred at all, in this logical-pragma-
tist version, it arose at the point where
abstract entities c a m e to b e used and in a
w a y acquired reality, thus permitting the
dramatic growth of mathematics.
This is not the place to debate the merits of
these theories. N o doubt there are others. But
w e shall need to refer to the themes that occur
in them—such as accurate observation,
testing, mathematicization, shared concep-
tual currency, and the abstention from tran-
scendence or circularity.
M y argument has been that b y 'science' is
m e a n t a type of cognition which has radically,
qualitatively transformed m a n ' s relation to
things: nature has ceased to b e a d a t u m and
b e c o m e eligible for genuine comprehension
and manipulation. Science is a distinctive
cognitive system with s o m e mysterious built-
in m e c h a n i s m ensuring sustained a n d per-
petual growth—which has been profoundly
beneficial for h u m a n productive systems, and
corrosive for our systems of social legit-
imation. W e d o not really k n o w h o w this
sustained and consensual growth is achieved,
but w e d o k n o w that it is achieved, and
'science', is the n a m e for the m a n n e r in which
it is d o n e , whatever it m a y b e . H e n c e the
question concerning whether social studies are
or are not to b e properly included within the
limits of science is b y n o m e a n s merely
terminological: W e are asking whether the
580
same kind of thing is happening in our
understanding and manipulation of society.
But this w a y of presenting the issue
contains one important simplification. It
suggests that the evaluative charge contained
in the appelation 'science', because of its
implied promise of understanding and con-
trol, is entirely, wholly and unambiguously
positive. This is by no means so. Though there
exists one major academic industry of produc-
ing books telling social scientists what science
really is and h o w they can turn themselves
into genuine scientists, there also exists
another, with at least asflourishingan output,
putatively establishing that the study of m a n
and society cannot be scientific, or, alterna-
tively, if the positively loaded term 'scientific'
is to be retained, that they are scientific, but
in a sense radically different from that which
applies in natural science. The idea that the
methods of natural and social science are
basically identical, is nowadays almost a
definition of 'positivism', and positivism is a
term which in recent years has more often
than not been used pejoratively. This is
significant: originally, the central theme of
positivism was the interdict on transcendence.
M o d e r n anti-positivism seeks to escape from
the weaknesses that flesh and fact are heir to
(notably contingency and corrigibility), no
longer to some transcendent realm of pure
and certain truths such as were fashionable in
agrarian days, but to the social and h u m a n
realm; and to do so, it must insist that the
h u m a n or cultural is radically distinct
from nature. O n e also sometimes has the im-
pression that a 'positivist' is anyone w h o
subjects a favoured theory to the indignity of
testing by mere fact.
T h e arguments purporting to prove that
the study of m a n and society cannot be
scientific (variant reading: can only be scien-
tific in a sense radically different from that
applicable to the. study of nature) can also be
catalogued. Authors upholding this view of
course often combine or conflate these vari-
ous points. N o n e the less, it is useful to list
them separately.
1. T h e argument from idiography. H u m a n ,
Ernest Gellner
social or historical phenomena either are
inherently individual; or our concern is
with their individual and idiosyncratic
aspects; or, of course, both.
2. T h e argument from holism. Society is a
unity; the 'principle of internal relations',
which insists that everything is what it is in
virtue of its relationships to everything else
within the same system, applies to it. If the
main device of old metaphysics was the
reality of abstract objects, then this idea, in
various terminologies, is the central device
of modern socio-metaphysics. Empirical
inquiry, however, can ex hypothesi deal
only with isolated facts, and it cannot seize
any totality. Hence empirical inquiry essen-
tially distorts and misrepresents social re-
ality. This doctrine can be combined with
the view that it is the actual function,
conscious or latent, of empirical factual
inquiry to hide social reality and distort our
perception of it, in the service of the
established order, which has cause to fear
clear-sighted perception of social reality on
the part of the less privileged members of
society. This view can also naturally be
fused with a special dispensation for the
propounder himself and those like-minded,
w h o possess some means of privileged
cognitive access to the real nature of
society, insights that are beyond the reach
of mere atomic empirical facts, garnered by
the ideological watch-dogs of the estab-
lished order. 11
3. T h e argument from the complexity of
social p h e n o m e n a can be used to reinforce
the preceding two arguments.
4. T h e argument from meaning. H u m a n
actions and institutions are identified not
by some shared physical traits, but in terms
of what they m e a n to the participants. This
fact (if such it is) can be held, wholly or
partly, to entail the exemption of h u m a n or
social phenomena either from causation or
from external and comparative empirical
investigation, or of course from both. The
argument can be put thus: the nexus that
exists between natural phenomena or
classes of events is independent of any one
The scientific status of the social sciences 581

'The Pirandello effect', a w a y of breaking d o w n the neat distinction between actors and spectators of a
play. A scene from Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author. A 1936 performance by the Pitoeff
C o m p a n y in Paris. Rogcr-vioiict.

society, c o m m o n to t h e m all, and blind to generalization in which o n e of the links is a

the meanings prevailing in any o n e of
t h e m . B u t actions are identified b y w h a t
they m e a n to the participants, a n d the
m e a n i n g s that identify t h e m are d r a w n
from the, as it w e r e , semantic pool of a
given culture, w h i c h n e e d not b e , a n d
perhaps never is, identified with the reser-
voir of meanings used b y another culture.
H e n c e there cannot b e a valid causal
class of actions, i.e. events b o u n d together
only b y the so-to-speak collectively private
m e a n i n g s that h a p p e n to b e in use in a
given culture, for these d o not overlap with
any so-to-speak natural kind or category.
Nature could not recognize a n d identify
t h e m a n d thus cannot apply a n y causal
lever to t h e m . A s for the links obtain-
ing b e t w e e n t w o or m o r e such socially
582
meaningful categories, they are themselves
established in virtue of the semantics of the
culture in question, and can only be appre-
hended by penetrating, learning that sys-
tem, and not by external investigation.
Comparative intersocial research and gen-
eralizations are absurd and impossible, in
so far as the systems of meanings of diverse
cultures are not comparable or overlap- 7. The Pirandello effect. The allusion is to the
ping, or only contingently and partially
so. 12 A historical c o m m e n t one m a y allow Pirandello for breaking d o w n the neat
oneself on this position is that idealism is
alive and well, and operates under the n a m e
of hermeneutics. T h e views that had once
been articulated with the help of terms
such as Geist or spirit n o w see the light of
day in terms of 'meaning' or 'culture'.
5. 'The social construction of reality'.13 This
argument clearly overlaps with the preced-
ing one; perhaps it is identical with it,
differing only in the style of presentation
and in its philosophical ancestry. T h e
preceding formulation is rooted above all
in the work of L . Wittgenstein, whereas
this one springs from the ideas of E . H u s -
serl and A . Schutz.
6. T h e so-called 'individual construction of
reality'. This slogan, though not as far as I
k n o w actually used by the movement in
question, could be used to characterize the
approach of a recently fashionable school
k n o w n as 'Ethno-methodology' and associ-
14
ated with the n a m e of Garfinkel. T h e
central doctrine of this m o v e m e n t appears into
to be that of our ability to describe (make
'accountable') events is something w e indi-
vidually achieve, and that consequently the
only scientific understanding available is
the description (?) or highlighting (?) or
exemplification of the very acts of indivi-
dual accountability-creation. T h e m o v e -
ment is not marked either by lucidity of
expression or by willingness to indulge in
rational discussion (a reluctance that can in 8. Special cognitive status for the inquiry into
turn be rationalized in terms of its central
insight, which would preclude the testing of
interpersonal generalization, there not be-
ing any such; but which also conveniently
places the m o v e m e n t out of reach of
Ernest Gellner
criticism). This movement stands to the
'social construction of reality' as Fichte did
to Hegel; the ego rolls its o w n world,
instead of the world rolling itself in a kind
of collective effort. But the temporal order
seems reversed this time round, for Fichte
preceded Hegel. This view combines ideal-
ism with idiographism.
device most powerfully developed by Luigi
distinction between characters, actors, pro-
ducers, authors and spectators of a play.
His plays, in which characters discuss the
further development of the plot with each
other and, seemingly, the author or m e m -
bers of the audience, are of course meant
to induce bewilderment in the audience by
undermining the comfortable separation
of stage and auditorium, by compelling
involvement by the spectator. T h e play,
he seems to say, is not a spectacle but
a predicament. So in observation of
social reality—and this, it is claimed, dis-
tinguishes it from nature. O n e charge
which has been m a d e against empiricist or
scientistic social research (though it has not
as yet been m a d e in these words) is that it
pretends that a society can be a spectacle,
and not a predicament, for the investi-
gator. This pretence, the critics insist, is
false. It constitutes deception of others
and, if sincere, constitutes self-deception
the bargain. W e m a k e a commitment
in our choice of ideas or problems or
interpretations, and the choice is not or
cannot be impartial or guided by logical
criteria alone, or perhaps at all. Thus, the
inescapable involvement of the investigator
in his subject-matter makes any pretence at
'scientific objectivity' spurious. In actual pre-
sentation, this argument is generally fused
with several others in the preceding list.
m a n or society can also be claimed not so
m u c h in virtue of general considerations,
such as those listed so far, but in virtue of
alleged special substantive characteristics
of the specific object or style of inquiry.
The scientific status of the social sciences
For instance, in the lively debate concern-
ing the scientific status of psycho-analysis,
the claim is sometimes m a d e (in defence of
the legitimacy of this technique) that the
eccentric methods employed in it (by the
standards prevailing in other inquiries) are
justified by the very peculiar nature of the
object investigated, i.e. the unconscious.
Its cunning and deviousness in the face of
inquiry, which it tries to evade and deceive,
justify cognitive emergency measures,
which would be held illicit by the rules
of evidence prevailing in the normal court-
rooms of science. Faced with so ruthless an
e n e m y , the investigating magistrate is
granted special powers and dispensed
from the normal restrictions on methods
of inquisition. T h e unconscious cannot be
apprehended in any other way, and the
difficulty and urgency of the task justifies
extreme methods. (Whether these really
serve to outwit the quarry, or merely pro-
tect the reputation of the hunter, by en-
suring that he is never convicted of fun-
damental error, is another question.)
There is no space here to attempt any kind of
thorough evaluation of all these negative
arguments. Suffice it to say that none of them
seem to m e remotely cogent. Take for in-
stance the one which m a y seem most power-
ful, namely the one to the effect that the
categories of actions or events in a given
culture are defined in terms of the meanings
current within that culture, which are so to
speak private to that culture, and not coexten-
sive with 'natural kinds'. This, though true as
far as it goes, in no w a y precludes even a
physical determinism for the events within the
culture in question. It merely precludes the
identification of the determined events (if
such they are) in terms of the meanings cur-
rent in the culture. T h e determining forces,
so to speak, will select the events they
bring out in terms of s o m e characteristics that
only accidentally and contingently overlap
with the meanings that accompany and seem
to guide the events. For instance, w h e n w e
watch afilm,w e k n o w full well that what will
happen is already determined; and it is deter-
583
mined by the pattern found on the reels which
is being transmitted from the projection room.
T h e meaningful connections which interest us
and which appear to guide and give sense to
the series of events observed in the story on
the screen are really quite epiphenomenal and
powerless. W e do not actually k n o w that our
life is like that, and most of us hope that
indeed it is not; but the argument from the
meaningfulness of social life, alas, in no way
establishes that it cannot be so.
If on the one hand the arguments pur-
porting to establish that h u m a n and social
life cannot be subject to scientific explanation
are invalid, then, on the other hand, any
inspection of the lively and vigorous dis-
cussions in the field of the philosophy of
science indisputably reveal one thing—that
the issue of the nature of science, of the
identification of that secret which has m a d e
possible the unprecedented, totally unique
rate of cognitive growth since the seventeenth
century, remains unsolved. W e have some
very impressive candidates for the solution,
powerfully and elegantly presented. But to
have an impressive short list is one thing, and
to have a firmly identified, recognized, ac-
claimed winner is quite another. A n d that
w e do not have. T h e situation simply is that
science is consensual, and the philosophy of
science is not.
T h e two contentions which have been
affirmed—the putative demonstrations of the
impossibility of science in social spheres are
invalid, and the absence of an agreed account
of w h y and h o w science works in thefieldsin
which plainly it does work—will be crucial in
answering the question to which this essay is
devoted, namely whether or not the social ~
sciences are indeed scientific.
Conclusion
The question n o w in effect answers itself—
once w e have broken it up into its constituent,
normally conflated subquestions or variant
interpretations.
W e canfirstof all check the activités of
584
social sciences for the presence or absence of
the various traits that figure prominently in
diverse theories of science. Those traits are:
T h e presence of Well-articulated hypotheses
and their systematic testing.
Precise quantitative measurement, and the
operationalization of concepts.
Careful observation b y publicly checkable
methods.
Sophisticated and rigorous conceptual struc-
tures, and great insights.
Shared paradigms, at any rate over sizeable
communitites of scholars, and persisting
over prolonged periods.
There can be no serious doubt that all these
traits, often in combination, can be found in
diverse social sciences. M a n for m a n , or
community for community, it is doubtful
whether social scientists are inferior, in intel-
lectual daring and ingenuity, in formal rigour,
in precision of observation, to the prac-
titioners of disciplines whose scientific status
is not normally doubted. A s a distinguished
philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam, ironi-
cally and compassionately observed, 'the poor
dears try so m u c h harder'. 15 A s indicated, w e
do not k n o w the secret of science; w e do not
k n o w just which of the m a n y blazing beacons
w e are being offered really is the 'sacred fire'.
W e do k n o w that m a n y beacons are ablaze,
and given the short-list supplied to us by the
philosophers of science, w e rather think that
one of them (or perhaps a number of them
jointly) is it. But which one?
M o r e concretely, w e do k n o w that m a n y
of the indisputable characteristics of science
are often present in social research. T h e
aspects of social life that are inherently
quantitative or observable with precision (e.g.
in fields such as demography or social ge-
ography) are indeed investigated. with pre-
cision and sophisticated techniques; w e k n o w
on the other hand that sophisticated and elab-
orate abstract models are developed in vari-
ous areas and serve as shared paradigms to
extensive communities of scholars (e.g. econ-
omists); and on the other hand, in spheres
where the conceptual apparatus is not so very
far removed from the ideas of c o m m o n sense,
Ernest Gellner
w e nevertheless k n o w that a well-trained
practitioner of the subject possesses under-
standing and information simply not available
prior to the development of the subject. In all
these senses, social studies are indeed scien-
tific. Large areas of them do satisfy one or
another of the m a n y available, and convinc-
ing, theories of the sacred fire. A n d our
collective life would be m u c h poorer without
them.
So m u c h for the satisfaction of the
hallmarks of science, as they are specified by
the philosophy of science. But w e obtain a
different picture if w e look at it from the
viewpoint, not of methods employed, but of
the impact o n our cognitive world: if w e ask
whether there is a generally overall consen-
sual cognitive activity, radically discontinuous
from the insights and techniques of ordinary
thought, and unambiguously cumulative at
an astonishing and unmistakable rate. T h e
answer is obvious. In this crucial sense, in
terms of their impact on our social order,
social studies are not scientific—much as they
m a y rightly claim to be so by the previous
criterion or criteria. They claim to have stolen
the sacred fire. Does anyone pay them the
compliment of wishing to steal it from them?
W e can try to break up this failure into its
constituent parts. The quantitatively accurate
descriptive techniques are not accompanied
by correspondingly convincing theory of simi-
larly accurate prediction. T h e sophisticated
abstract models do not firmly mesh in with
empirical material. The powerful insights are
not consensual. Paradigms exist and prevail,
but only in subcommunities; and when they
succeed each other the situation is quite
different from that which prevails in natural
science. In natural science, w e are generally
sure that there is progress, but have great
difficulty in explaining h o w it is possible that
w e can k n o w that this is so, given that there is
no c o m m o n measure for comparing successive
visions. In the social sciences w e are spared
this worry. W e need not puzzle about h o w it is
that w e can k n o w that w e are progressing,
because w e are not so very sure that w e have
indeed progressed. T h e partisans of a n e w
The scientific status of the social sciences 585

paradigm m a y , of course, b y sure concerning
their o w n particular leap (they usually are);
but they are seldom sure about the w h o l e
series of leaps that constitute the history of
their subject. O n the contrary, their o w n leap
is very often a reverse leap, a return to an
earlier m o d e l .
If I a m right about the logical inadequacy
of the alleged proofs of the ineligibility of the
social world for science, w e need not despair-
ingly conclude (or confidently h o p e , as the
case m a y b e ) that this will always continue to
be so. If indeed the sacred fire of science has
not yet b e e n identified, w e d o not k n o w h o w
to r e m e d y this situation. T h e question re-
mains o p e n . B u t I suspect w e shall k n o w that
the social sciences h a v e b e c o m e scientific,
w h e n their practitioners n o longer claim that
they have at long last stolen the fire, b u t
w h e n others try to steal it from t h e m ; w h e n
the philosophy of social science b e c o m e s a
search for an ex-post explanation of a cogni-
tive scientific miracle, rather than for a recipe
or promise for bringing it about.

Notes

1. Sir Karl Popper has
propounded the much-discussed
doctrine of methdological
individualism, which requires all
explanations in the social
sciences to be, ultimately, in
terms of the aims and beliefs of
individuals, and which precludes
the invocation of holistic social
entities, other than as a kind of
shorthand (see for instance,
Karl Popper, The Open Society
and Its Enemies, Princeton
N . J . , Princeton University
Press, 1966). At the same time,
Popper has more recently
argued in favour of a 'World
Three' (see Karl Popper,
Objective Knowledge, Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1972), a realm
of objects of thought, in
addition to the relatively well-
established Cartesian worlds of
external objects and internal
experiences. It is interesting that
some of the arguments invoked
in support of this doctrine—the
incorporation in a social
tradition and its equipment of a
wealth of ideas never accessible
to any one man—are precisely
those which led some others to
be tempted by social holism. Is
there m u c h gained by option for
an essentialist rather than holist
terminology for indicating the
same facts? I suppose it depends
on whether all such cultural
worlds are simply parts of one
and the same third world, or
whether they are allowed, each
of them, to m a k e its o w n
world, which need not be
commensurate or compatible
with others. In the former case,
a Platonic language for
describing this would seem more
appropriate; in the latter, a
sociological-holistic one. It
should be added that his
individualism does not oblige
him to see science as only
contingently social; on the
contrary, in the appropriate
sense, he sees it as essentially
social. This is discussed later in
this essay.
2. Émile Durkheim, Elementary
Forms of Religious Life, tr.
Joseph W . Swain, Free Press,
' 1954. T h e main contrast
between the two great
sociologists, Durkheim and
Weber, is precisely in their
attitude to rational thought:
:
Durkheim sees this as a
characteristic of any society and
correlative with social life as
such, whereas M a x W e b e r is
preoccupied with it as a
differential trait, present in o n e
tradition far more prominently
than in all others. So one sees
rationality as ever-present, and
its explanation is ipso facto the
explanation of society: there w a s
indeed a social contract, but it
had the form of ritual, not of a
compact. The other sees it as
present in an uneven m a n n e r ,
and its explanation coextensive
not with society as such, but of
the emergence and distinctive
nature of one kind of society,
namely that which concerns us
most, our o w n .
3. T h o m a s K u h n , The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd
ed., Chicago, 111., University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
4. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
5. Michael Oakeshott,
Rationalism in Politics and Other
Essays, London, Methuen
& Co., 1962.
6. Paul Feyerabend, Against
Method, N . L . B . , 1975.
586
7. Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge: Toward a Post
Critical Philosophy, Chicago,
111., University of Chicago Press,
1974.
8. Gilbert Ryle, 'Knowing H o w
and Knowing That' Presidential
Address, Aristotelian Society,
Proceedings, Vol. X L V I ,
1945/46, pp. 1-16; Lewis
Carroll, 'Achilles and the
Tortoise' in The Complete
Works of Lewis Carroll,
N e w York, Random House,
1939.
9. Kuhn, op. cit.
10. Willard van O r m a n Quine,
From a Logical Point of View:
Nine Lógico—Philosophical
Essays, 2nd. rev. ed.,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1961.
11. Theodor Adorno et al.,
'Sociology and Empirical
Research' in Theodor Adorno et
al. (eds.), The Positivist
Dispute in German Sociology,
pp. 68-86, London,
Heinemann, 1976.
12. A n argument of this kind is
found in: Peter Winch, The Idea
of a Social Science and its
Relation to Philosophy,
Humanities Press, 1970. A n
even more extreme formulation
of this position, combined with
an ideographiom à outrance, is
found in: A . R . Louch,
Explanation and Human Action,
Oxford, Blackwell, 1966. This
position has been frequently
criticized; see, for instance,
Robin Horton's 'Professor
Winch on Safari' in Archives
européennes de sociologie,
Vol. X V I I , N o . 1, 1976; or
Percy Cohen, 'The Very Idea of
a Social Science', in I. Lakatos
and A . Musgrave (eds.),
Problems in the Philosophy of
Science, North Holland Press,
1968. Or m y own 'The N e w
Idealism', in I. C . Jarvie and
J. Agassi (eds.), Cause and
Meaning in the Social Sciences:
Ernest Gellner
London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973.
13. Peter L . Berger and
Thomas Luckman, The Social
Construction of Reality: A
Treatise on the Sociology of
Knowledge, Irvington Press,
1980.
14. See Harold Garfinkel,
Studies in Ethnomethodology,
Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice Hall, 1967. For
critical comments, see a very
witty article by A . R . Louch,
'Against Theorizing',
Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. Vol. V , 1975,
pp. 481-7, or m y o w n ,
'Ethnomethodology: the R e -
enchantment, Industry or the
Californian W a y of Subjectivity',
Spectacles and Predicaments,
Cambridge, Univeristy Press,
1979.
15. Bryan Magee (ed.), Men of
Ideas, p. 233, Viking Press,
1979.
Philosophical schools
and scientific working
methods in social science

Stefan Nowak

Philosophical orientations B y philosophical schools, from the point

in empirical social science of view of sociology, w e understand here
different metasociological orientations. T h e
editors of a volume of metasociological
T h e title of this article announces an analysis studies characterize this term in the following
of relations between the 'working methods' of way:
the social sciences o n the one hand and
'philosophical schools' o n the other. A m o n g 'Metasociology', a term popularized by Paul
the different 'philosophical schools' w e will Furley in The Scope and Method of Sociology: A
discuss only those that are (or are believed to Metasociological Treatise, refers to that branch
be) relevant for the of sociology concerned
social sciences, and es- with investigating the
pecially for ways of Stefan N o w a k holds the chair of assumptions and value
conducting sociological methodology of sociological investi- judgements underlying the
gations at the Institute of Sociology, theories and methods e m -
studies. T h e term 'work- University of Warsaw. A m o n g his
ing methods'- denotes for ployed by sociologists.
principal publications are: Method-
us here: (a) the different ology of Sociological Research (1977) Such assumptions and
ways (standardized pat- and Sociology: The State of Art (1982, value judgements often
co-editor). begin with the assertion
terns) of asking ques- that sociology is a science
tions about social reality; and proceed to incor-
(b) the different stan- porate the various theo-
dardized ways of deliv- retical (ontological) and
ering answers to these methodological (epistemo-
questions, meaning both logical) choices made
the logical structure of daily. Needless to say,
propositions which m a y such assumptive choices di-
constitute such answers and the ways of rectly affect the very content of sociology,
thereby making metasociology an enormously
substantiation of these propositions—both
important and far-reaching area of inquiry.
deductively and inductively; and (c) finally,
In m a n y ways, metasociology represents' a
the different standardized ways of organizing
mechanism for mapping the discipline of soci-
the whole sets of these propositions into m o r e
ology. . . . In doing so, discussions underlying
comprehensive and (in different meanings of assumptions remain analytically distinct from
the term), m o r e coherent descriptive or those of substantive sociology.1
theoretical pictures of that reality concerning
which the initial questions have been ad-
This passage stresses that the analysis of
dressed.
assumptions (at least s o m e of which are
 588
ontological) and of value judgements belong
to sociology. I agree that it is correct that
these assumptions are often used for mapping
different 'theoretical approaches' to the study
of social p h e n o m e n a .
But w h e n used for mapping different
approaches and theories, they are usually
regarded as essential components. T o quote
J. H . Turner:
M u c h of what is labelled sociological theory is,
in reality, only a loose clustering of implicit
assumptions, inadequately defined concepts, and
1
a few vague and logically disconnected prop-
ositions. Sometimes assumptions are stated
explicitly, and serve to inspire abstract theor-
etical statements containing well-defined con-
cepts, but most of sociological theory constitutes
a verbal 'image of society', rather than a rigor-
ously constructed set of theoretical statements
organized into logically coherent format. Thus
a great deal of so-called theory is rather a
general 'perspective' or 'orientation' for look-
ing at various features of the process of insti-
tutionalization which, if all goes well, can be
eventually translated into true scientific theory.
T h e fact that there are m a n y such perspec-
tives in sociology poses problems of exposition;
and these problems in turn, are compounded by
the fact that the perspectives blend into one
another, sometimes redering it difficult to ana-
lyze them separately.2
For these reasons, it seems m o r e fruitful not
to analyse here all 'theoretical-philosophical
approaches' to the study of society, but rather
particular assumptions that underlie, or m a y
underlie, m o r e than one such school. Fortu-
nately, these assumptions have been the sub-
ject of analysis and discussion for m a n y
years, both in the philosophy of science and of
social science. T h e latter have led to the crys-
tallization of a certain n u m b e r of generally
formulated questions, the answers to which
m a y be regarded as equivalent to those as-
sumptions mentioned above. A n y fairly c o m -
prehensive monograph in the philosophy of
the social sciences3 usually presents a longer
or shorter catalogue of such 'problem dimen-
sions' and defines a certain n u m b e r of poss-
ible positions on each. Let us mention here
s o m e of those most frequently discussed.
Stefan Nowak
1. A t one extreme of the first problem dimen-
sion w e locate those w h o believe that m a n
is a thinking and feeling being and whose
patterned feelings and ways of thinking
about the world, society and himself consti-
tute such essential components of social
reality that without proper 'understanding'
(Verstehen) of these p h e n o m e n a in the w a y
Dilthey, W e b e r or Znaniecki wanted us to
understand them, any attempt to study
social p h e n o m e n a is fruitless. A t the other
extreme w e usually locate behaviourists
with Skinner in thefirstplace and those
theoreticians of early positivist sociology
(like D o d d or Lundberg) w h o believed that
the study of society and of nature have one
most important feature in c o m m o n — b o t h
should be based only upon the observation
of reality and any other method, like
Verstehen, is n o more than pre-scientific
mysticism.4
2. T h e second frequent problem dimension
deals with the question of whether groups
are real, or whether the attribute of real
existence should be reserved for h u m a n
individuals only. Sometimes this question
refers not to groups or other collectivities
but to their properties. Here w e observe
the clash between holists (sometimes called
'realists') and methodological individual-
ists (or in other discussion contexts—
'nominalists').5
3. T h e third problem dimension—often dis-
cussed jointly with the second—is to what
degree the different propositions, and
especially various generalizations and laws
about h u m a n aggregates and social systems
can be explained by the propositions and
laws about 'lower level units' and especially
by the psychological laws of h u m a n behav-
iour. Here again the reductionists dis-
agree with the emergentists, i.e. those w h o
believe that, at each level of analysis, n e w
regularities and properties m a y emerge,
basically irreducible to the properties and
mechanisms of the lower level.0
4. Then w e have the old dispute between
determinists and indeterminists about the
applicability of the notion of causality to
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science 589

the world in general, and to social life in thoroughly by M a r x , Simmel, Coser, Dahr-
particular. T h e applicability of causal endorf and contemporary Neo-Marxists,
thinking to social life in particular. T h e that internal conflict and dysfunction are
applicability of causal thinking to social the essential features of any social system,
phenomena can be rejected either in prin- at both the macro and the micro levels.
ciple ('man has free will') or on more 7. If w e look at theories that deal with social
practical grounds—by demonstrating that behaviour and man's ways of thinking and
causality implies a both exceptionless (i.e. feeling about himself and the external
general) and spatio-temporally unlimited social world, w e m a y also find a number of
(i.e. universal) character for the discovered polarized dimensions along which ap-
regularities, whereas in the social sciences proaches and theories can be located. For
w e usually discover regularities which are example, w e m a y believe (with Skinner and
both statistical and 'historical', i.e. limited some radical behaviourists) that h u m a n
to some spatio-temporal area. In other nature is basically reactive, that people
words, philosophers of science (and socio- react to external stimuli, and that the pat-
logists themselves) differ in their opinion as terns of rewards and punishments shaping
to the degree to which the model of the learned patterns of behaviour in
universal causal theories, so successful in society m a y be apprehended in a w a y
certain natural sciences, is applicable to the similar to the study of rats in an experimen-
world of h u m a n thinking and actions and to tal maze. But w e can also believe with
the functioning and change of the social 'humanistic psychologists', that h u m a n
systems.7 nature has a creative potential and that
5. A t a slightly lower level of abstraction of aiming towards self-realization is more im-
philosophical discourse w e find the polarity portant than reaction to the m a z e of con-
of two approaches to the study of a straints imposed by the social structure,
multiplicity of people. O n e (called 'plural- and the need to exchange rewards and pun-
istic behaviourism' by D o n Martindale ) 8 ishments with others according to certain
assumes more or less consciously that rules of distributive justice.
society is something of an aggregate of hu- 8. Quite another aspect of h u m a n behaviour
m a n individuals, each of w h o m can be ex- is usually analysed along the dimension
plained by their o w n 'background charac- 'rational-irrational'. Here w e m a y believe,
teristics' taken in isolation from the following m a n y 'purposeful action theor-
characteristics and behaviour of other ists' from W e b e r to Parsons and contem-
people—as w e do in analysis of survey porary proponents of the application of
data. T h e other approach assumes that normative models of mathematical de-
society or social groups and institutions cision-theory to the explanation of real
constitute a system of interdependent el- h u m a n actions, that looking into conscious
ements; the nature of the elements can h u m a n motives of behaviour interpreted in
properly be understood only by taking terms of rationally oriented goals—means
into account their systemic contexts.9 relations m a y give us the proper insight.
6. Even w h e n scientists agree that a systemic But w e m a y also follow the line of Freud
perspective is essential, some of them are and Pareto and assume that what people
more inclined to believe (following Spen- perceive as the motives of their actions are
cer, Durkheim, Malinowski or Parsons in usually by w a y of being rationalizations
this belief) that the dominant internal (derivations) from actions not themselves
relations are those that guarantee the necessarily guided by principles of ration-
system its harmonious functioning and ality. A n d even if there is agreement that
homeostatic balance, while others have the knowledge of conscious motives is
more sympathy for the idea stressed so necessary for the proper explanation of
590
behaviour, there m a y b e disagreement
about the methodological scheme of such
explanations. S o m e insist that w e must ap-
ply certain 'covering laws' in the scheme of
deductive-nomological explanations, while
others stress the non-nomological charac-
ter of 'understanding explanations'.11
All these assumptions (and m a n y others) deal
with the nature of reality as applied to social
studies. But w e also find differences of ap-
proach to sociology rooted in the differences
of opinion about what should be the socio-
logist's attitude towards his o w n studies, or
opinions about h o w these studies can or
should be conducted. H e r e w e c o m e across
the old issue of 'objectivity' of social studies
with s o m e w h o believe that studies can be
value-free while others stress that it is imposs-
ible to get rid of one's values; therefore the
best thing a social scientist can do is initially to
declare his value preferences continuing to
express them both in his problem-formulation
and in the conduct and findings of his study.
All those w h o recall the disputes around this
problem in the late 1960s k n o w h o w m a n y
different meanings were attached to each.
possible attitude along this dimension. 12 This
applies not only to this particular problem
dimension in the philosophy of social sciences
but to most of them, because not only can
different attitudes be taken along each but
also the dimensions themselves can be, and
were understood in different ways.
U n d e r such circumstances, any attempt
to discuss the relevance of such assumptions
to the whole process of development of
research methodology would probably require
at least a whole volume. H e r e , w e intend to
look only into s o m e m o r e general problems of
relations between the assumptions underlying
sociological studies and the ways these studies
are or should be conducted.
The validity of philosophical
arguments for research
methodology in sociology
W h y should these assumptions play any role
Stefan Nowak
at all? That most philosophers and, m o r e
reflective sociologists believe in their import-
ance does not constitute sufficient proof of
relevance, especially as there are some w h o
are inclined to reject the whole matter c o m -
pletely. T h u s , Barry Hindess says:
I propose no methodology or epistemology to
the positions criticized here. O n the contrary, I
argue that the problems which these disciplines
pose are false problems and they arise only as a
function of a conception of knowledge which can
be shown to be fundamentally and inescapably
incoherent. Epistemology and such derivative
doctrines as methodology and philosophy of
science have no rational and coherent foun-
dation. In particular there can be no rational
or coherent prescriptive methodology. 13
Methodology, stresses Hindess, tries to pre-
scribe those procedures supposed to be useful
either for generating or for testing n e w
propositions, and tries to validate them on the
basis of philosophical argument. These pro-
cedures define what is, and what is not a
science:14
Scientific knowledge is thought to be valid only if
it conforms to the prescribed procedures: it
follows that the prescriptions of methodology
cannot be validated by scientific knowledge. . . .
Methodology lays down procedural rules for
scientific practice which it derives by means of a
'knowledge' provided by philosophy. Method-
ology is the product of philosophy and the
sciences are a realization of their methodology.14
W e r e this the only possible pattern of re-
lations between science and its methodology
on the one hand and metascientific assump-
tions on the other, I would agree with Hindess
that this would constitute either a case of
nice tautological circularity or, even worse,
a situation in which the whole of scien-
tific thinking constitutes nothing more than
carrying out the orders of a dogmatic dic-
tatorship of philosophers. Fortunately, this is
not the case, for several reasons.
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science 591

A n allegory of logic, seventeenth-century etching. Explorer.

592
The empirical, normative and
analytical premises of problem
formulations and research
methods in sciences
Before w e look at these reasons, let us first
remind ourselves here of the role of less
questionable assumptions in the research pro-
cess.15 Every empirical study begins (or at
least it should begin) with a set of ques-
tions, to which it is supposed to deliver the
answers. 16 A s is well k n o w n , the formulation
of each question logically presupposes that
certain assumptions about the studied objects
or p h e n o m e n a are accepted as valid. If—as
is often the case—these assumptions are not
explicitly formulated, it is because they m a y
seem so obvious that no one cares to recall
them. They would become more obvious if
one were to undertake a study of problems
based on obviously false assumptions. Should
one propose to study the attitudes of the
representatives of the Hispanic minority in
Poland towards the country's political system,
one would be reminded that the question is
'wrong' because it is based upon the obviously
false assumption that a Hispanic minority
exists. O n the other hand, for the undertaking
of a similar study in N e w York, the assump-
tion would be taken for granted. A question is
only applicable to the object or objects that
satisfy its assumptions. But the assumption
does not prescribe any specific answer to the
question. O u r assumptions only classify re-
ality into two subsets: one—in which it
'makes sense' to ask questions, and the other
one—to which the questions do not apply.
T h e same applies to theoretical ques-
tions. If one proposes to study in a n e w
experimental project what kind of people are
more likely to 'reduce cognitive dissonance'
than others, one starts from the (explicit or
implicit) assumption that 'cognitive disson-
ance' exists and that one wants to develop a
more detailed theory describing the conditions
under which this phenomenon is likely to
occur. If a study starts from a set of valid as-
sumptions, it does not matter whether they
Stefan Nowak
have been stated explicitly or only implicitly,
but if a study is begun from a wrong set of
assumptions, one discovers pretty soon
that the questions do not apply to the selec-
ted objects and phenomena since one obtains
answers that reject the initial assumptions.
The validity of the assumptions implies
only that w e m a y ask the questions with
respect to a given object or class of objects.
Whether w e ask or not depends additionally
upon our values. Only they can provide the
motivation to undertake a study seeking
answers to given problem formulation.
Whether w e specify our values (curiosity
being definitely one of them) explicitly or
take them for granted does not matter.
Similarly for the assumptions underlying
the use of a certain research method. T h e
formulation and use of m a n y research
methods is based upon certain identical or
descriptive propositions necessary for their
validity. W e m a y recall h o w m u c h theoretical
physics and engineering science underlies the
availability of such 'research tolls' as the
cyclotron, electron microscope, or Wilson
chamber for elementary particles. T h e situ-
ation in the social sciences is similar. Thou-
sands of studies have proved that 'projection'
as described by Freud really exists. Hence w e
n o w use 'projective tests' if w e suspect that
subjects m a y have difficulties in revealing
their needs, motives or aspirations. Again, w e
use information about the m a k e of a respon-
dent's car, or visible level of consumption
as 'indirect indicators' of income, because the
correlation between income and levels of
living has been well established.
W h a t these propositions usually imply is
that w e are free to use a given method for a
given cognitive purpose. Whether w e do use
any particular method often depends also
upon certain normative premises (value
assumptions), e.g. the degree of accuracy
yielded by different methods, possible mar-
gins of error connected with their use, com-
bined with the costs of applications of each.
Sometimes methodological decisions involve
strictly ethical premises like those which
exclude the application of certain (otherwise
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
efficient) methods for the study of h u m a n
subjects. T h efinalmethodological design of
any study arises from interaction of empirical
considerations relating to accuracy, with cer-
tain normative, axiological premises.
Another kind of premise—the analyti-
cally valid theorems ('laws') of formal logic or
mathematics—is used in the process of reas-
oning, in the transformation of the logical
or mathematical implications of one body of
information into another in deductions, in
deriving fresh propositions from those that
have already been tested, etc. Sometimes
these laws or theorems of logical thinking are
so simple (or w e are so used to applying them)
that w e are unaware of using them at all. In
other cases they are so complex that w e
employ the most powerful computers to fol-
low correctly (and with sufficient speed) the
prescribed paths of formal reasoning which
have their source in certain tautologies of
logic and mathematics.
'Visions' of social reality
as sources of philosophical
assumptions
W h a t has been said so far proves only that
sciences do indeed develop in a cumulative
manner, n e w research problems arising from
the state of knowledge in different disciplines
and n e w methodologies attempting to apply
positive knowledge about reality to devise
more efficient research tools. It does not
prove that philosophy—ontology or epistem-
ology—are enlisted for such purposes.
But the body of existing knowledge only
delivers the premises for n e w questions, if
these are not dramatically n e w , or in other
words, that the process of development is
what K u h n calls 'normal science'. The devel-
opment of 'normal science' is safe enough,
because it occurs within the existing and ac-
cepted paradigms; n e w questions m a y there-
fore be based upon well-tested empirical
assumptions. If the questions are so new that
the answers- might constitute a 'scientific
revolution', then the corresponding assump-
593
tions can usually not be found in the tested
body of existing scientific knowledge. O n e
must go beyond this knowledge and risk some
bold, more or less hypothetical guesses about
the nature of reality.
W h e r e d o such guesses belong at the
m o m e n t w h e n they are formulated, thus
opening the w a y to basically n e w scientific
questions? O n e might say that they are no
more than bold scientific hypotheses at the
highest level of generality, from which the
formulation of lower-level hypotheses were
stimulated. But if w e look closely at the
history of science in its relation with the
history of philosophy, it seems more reason-
able to say that m a n y such assumptions were
merely taken from philosophy or could be
classified with it. 'Visions' of society as an
organism go far back in our history,., but
anthropology as a science had to wait for
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown to use such
ideas as starting-points for explanatory prin-
ciples in empirical studies. There is no doubt
that the idea of Verstehen as formulated by
Dilthey belonged to philosophy, but all its
subsequent uses to explain concrete social
phenomena and for the development of cor-
responding methodologies belong to social
sciences. It is extremely difficult to point to
the border-line between philosophy and 'pos-
itive' empirical theory in Karl Marx's think-
ing, but there is no doubt that Hegelian
dialectics, transformed by M a r x into ' m a -
terialistic dialectics', played an important role
in his empirical thinking about society, guid-
ing it in the formulation of testable hy-
potheses about the relationships between class
structure, class conflict, and other aspects of
social p h e n o m e n a .
W h a t happens when the theory or re-
search generated from such philosophical as-
sumptions actually works? It implies that as-
sumptions can also be regarded as indirectly,
and partly, i.e. only inductively, confirmed
by the empirical findings, thus confirming the
theory. T h e validity of initial philosophical
assumptions is then proven at least for those
areas of reality where a theory works. But this
applies only to such philosophical prop-
594
ositions as are logically directly or indirectly
related to the questions of the theory or the
conceptual scheme of reality.
In principle one could try to formulate
these philosophical assumptions, hypothetical
as they are, by the rule of maximal parsimony,
i.e. postulating only what is absolutely necess-
ary for the n e w questions, e.g. postulating
the existence—or possibility of existence—of
certain n e w entities, the possibility that they
might be interrelated in a given way, that
they might change or that they might be
stable—and nothing m o r e . If research pro-
duces sensible answers, it would m e a n ad-
ditionally that indirectly and partially it
confirms (or at least does not falsify) the e m -
pirical validity of those assumptions on which
the questions were based.
But as w e k n o w , parsimony is not the
most typical w a y the h u m a n mind likes to
work at the pre-theoretical and equally most
creative stage of scientific thinking. N o r does
it like to limit itself to strictly verbal formu-
lations of such assumptions or to strictly logi-
cal procedures in their formulation. In think-
ing about the possible existence of basically
n e w p h e n o m e n a or relationships, w e often
use imagination and our tendency to visualize
things m u c h more than our logical, verbal
thinking. A neuro-physiologist would say that
the creative but pre-theoretical stage of a
basically n e w scientific study engages m u c h
m o r e of the right (imaginative and spatial)
hemisphere of the brain than of the left
one, believed to be responsible for logic and
verbalization. That is w h y n e w theories and
areas of study are so often manifested in
'images' and 'visions' and w h y so m a n y spatial
metaphors occur in such visions. These meta-
phors usually pass into theoretical language:
groups occupy 'higher' or 'lower' positions in
the social structure even though it is k n o w n
that they do not actually differ in spatial
location; systems are visualized as structures
composed of boxes with arrows between
them, even w h e n their elements are abstract
properties of these systems and the inter-
relations between them are in no way simi-
lar to wires in a television set.
Siefan Nowak
Even w h e n vaguely formulated, and
when they are closer to pictures than to
propositional hypotheses, these visions often
stimulate s o m e kind of strictly scientific ac-
tivity, by suggesting both the questions and
hypotheses. T h e y m a y determine an approach
to studied reality, understood narrowly as a
set of research questions; consequently such
visions or vague notions m a y eventually lead
to propositional theories.
Visions of this sort are usually 'struc-
tural', including certain components of the
visualized wholes. These components m a y
later be denoted by the concepts of the n e w
approach (if they have been properly concep-
tualized) or at least by a certain theoretical
terminology, the meaning of which is m a d e
more or less clear. These concepts constitute
the verbalizations of the structure of such
aspects of social reality as are in the focus of
interest of the approach; they constitute a
classificatory pattern or frame of reference in
which p h e n o m e n a are located and from which
they derive their more or less theoretical
meanings.
Both the 'visions' and their ultimate
verbalizations m a y also embrace, explicitly or
implicitly, relationships between phenomena,
thus transforming them into interconnected
structures. These seem to be the actual
proposition—like elements of the approaches,
but can seldom be classified as general prop-
ositions. E v e n if they sound general it is
because their generality has been overstated.
In reality they usually are so-called 'elliptical
propositions', which, for testability require
additional qualifiers, stating to what degree,
where and under what conditions they are
true. Usually the appropriate formulation for
these propositions—like elements—should
be: 'x is sometimes related to v' or 'x m a y be
related to y', etc.
But these propositions assuming the
existence, or even the possibility of existence
of certain p h e n o m e n a and possible relations,
m a y play the role of assumptions which
permit us to formulate research questions,
which determined the study of phenomena
from that particular angle, and hypotheses
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science 595

'Ontological Models': a philosopher inscribing a m a n and a w o m a n in geometrical figures, seventeenth-

century. Snark/B.N.

which are then empirically testable (to the
degree that w e can test any general prop-
osition at all).
If the 'images' of the p h e n o m e n a in-
volved in a given approach are detailed
enough it m a y happen that, from a strictly
logical point of view, only certain of their
elements are needed as assumptions of those
n e w questions leading to research on hypoth-
eses, while others m a y not be necessary.
Yet, while unnecessary for direct stimulation
of science they m a y be needed for other el-
ements which are direct assumptions of our
questions or at least they m a y be psychologi-
cally necessary as elements of a n e w Gestalt
which allows the familiar to be viewed in a
basically n e w w a y , as philosophy often does.
For at least twenty-five centuries of E u -
ropean intellectual tradition (and probably
longer in certain other areas) philosophy
played a reconnaissance role, trying to say
something about the nature, origin, function-
ing and development of the world or of such
of its components as caught the philosophers'
attention even w h e n science had little to say
about them. T h o u g h usually rather specu-
lative, imprecise, and sometimes almost n e b u -
lous, the products of philosophic thinking
596
nevertheless yielded a certain knowledge (true
or not) thus satisfying curiosity, and also
played an essential role in stimulating scien-
tific research and theories. S o m e philosophic
guesses were verified as scientific theories, but
others obviously proved false on the basis of
the research they stimulated. T h e history of
science within the last twenty-five centuries
give ample illustration of such a process;
almost all scientific disciplines evolved from
philosophical speculation (the rest evolved
from practical skills) proving it to be at least
partly right.
The same also holds true for social
philosophy and the social science evolving
from it. T o say that the visions of social reality
postulated by various approaches, or at least
s o m e of their m o r e speculative elements,
belong to the area of philosophy, does not say
enough about them. T h e tradition of philo-
sophical thought usually distinguished be-
tween several branches: gnoseology, ontology
and axiology. T h e 'visions' under discussion
include in a m o r e or less disguised form all
these three branches. First they often say
something about the process of cognition of
the social world, hence encompassing strictly
gnoseological assumptions usually matching
the approach adopted with its specific meth-
odology. Second, the images of phenomena,
which include or imply as well the concepts of
this approach and guide—at least conceptu-
ally—the formulation of research problems
and more or less general hypotheses often
belong to the ontology of the social world.
Finally, these approaches either explicitly or
implicitly involve certain normative, axiologi-
cal assumptions which lend the various
elements or aspects of the 'visions' their posi-
tive or negative values.
Philosophical assumptions of
scientific research methodology
Empirical and ontological assumptions also
have their importance for research method-
ology. First, w e m a y say that to the degree
to which the methods of study include the
Stefan Nowak
formulation of the research problem, or are
determined in their choice or in their charac-
ter by it, the implications of these assumptions
reach d o w n to the research methodology.
'Research method' is often understood to
imply or involve questions of a special kind,
including special concepts for the formulation
of these questions. Robert Merton's analysis
of 'manifest and latent functions' is, no doubt,
a contribution to 'functionalist methodology'.
W h a t it yields us—along with the result of
certain reflections on the nature of social
reality—are certain concepts, by using which
special kinds of functionalist questions can be
asked. These will lead to the formulation of
functionalist explanations or theories regard-
ing certain specific social phenomena. Marxist
methodology consists primarily in asking M a r -
xist questions along with the use of special
concepts, because a Marxist vision of social
reality in which these questions and concepts
are rooted is adopted. Neither approach tell
us m u c h about h o w concepts and the corre-
sponding questions are transformed into a
concrete research design, or what data o r .
research tools are used for testing hypotheses
and propositions. O n the other hand the
methodology of survey research, which consti-
tutes a detailed study design involving all the
techniques of data collection and analysis,
seems to be based on the assumptions that
what is being dealt with is a rather loose
aggregate of persons whose thinking and
behaviour depend primarily upon their indi-
vidual characteristics. This corresponds to the
philosophy of pluralistic behaviourism rather
than to any coherent system in which behav-
iour is primarily governed by interconnection
between people, both actions and reactions
being shaped by the network of systemic
constraints, which might, of course, m a k e
quite a difference to research methodology.
W h a t about the method of gathering data
or of testing hypotheses themselves? Certain
underlying assumptions about the nature of
studied p h e n o m e n a seem to underlie most of
them. B y adopting any method of indirect
assessment of what is in people's minds
(whether by survey questionnaire or clinical
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
interview, a projective test for assessing
anxiety or an intelligence test for the assess-
ment of verbal skills), w e are assuming (with
Dilthey) that people d o think—or at least that
they m a y think) and that one m a y obtain
indirect but s o m e h o w valid access to the
contents of their minds. Yet in order to use
any of the methods mentioned above, it is not
enough to assume that 'people m a y be under-
stood'. W e must m a k e m a n y additional as-
sumptions about the condition under which
understanding takes place, the possibility of
linguistic or. other kinds of communication
between the researcher and his subjects in
given conditions, circumstances under which
people feel free to reveal what they really
think, etc. Most of these assumptions are
empirically verifiable, but they m a y all be
m a d e only on the validity of the most general
assumptions about the possibility and necess-
ity of understanding what is going on in
other people's minds. T h e same applies to
m a n y other situations in which the philo-
sophical conditions constituting the most gen-
eral frame òf interpretative reference are
interwomen with empirically controllable
(and controlled) statements about the studied
fragment of the world. In adopting any
method to assess causal connections between
variables, whether it be an experiment
in cross-cultural comparison, 'path analysis'
of biographical data or traditional multi-
variate analysis, w e assume (more often im-
plicitly than explicitly) that the phenomena
(or at least some of them) m a y be causally
interconnected. Without such an assumption,
no attempt to discover causal connections
would m a k e any sense.
In addition, however, a lot more is
known about situations. It is known, for
instance, whether the variables are quantitat-
ive or qualitative, whether one can postulate
one-way causation or causal feedbacks with
mutual interdependences; whether it is
reasonable to believe that external, uncon-
trolled variables ('errors') are mutually depen-
dent or one should rather postulate their
mutual statistical dependencies; whether one
is able to select experimental and 'control'
597
groups at random, or must take them in
their natural clusters or series. All this
(which can, of course, be empirically tested
or manipulated) has essential implications
both for the choice of method of causal
analysis and for the conclusion concerning
the causal connections between the studied
phenomena. It implies the use of empirical
knowledge in the context of a broader philo-
sophical doctrine of social causality.
Let us look a little more closely at the
relations between the assumptions on the one
hand and the research methods on the other.
Assuming that w e seek results sufficiently
close (=) to the characteristics or relation-
ships in the real world, w e m a y designate the
results of study by R s , the nature of things in
the real world being represented by R w . What
w e seek is a method which will result in Rs=*
R w . The method applied is then designated by
M, the assumptions on the basis of which
method M is supposed to yield results suf-
ficiently close to the characteristics of the
real world being designated by A M . Schema-
tically the relationships in this area can then
be set out thus:
(AM • M) - > (Rs = R w ) .
M o r e simply, if the assumptions • are correct,
the method will lead to correct results. In
some cases w e k n o w that the assumptions of
our method are correct because they have
already been tested in research or belong to
c o m m o n knowledge. S o m e examples of this
kind were given earlier.
O n the other hand, m a n y methods are
not based upon assumptions that are or can be
proved to be completely valid. There is no
way to verify finally whether people really do
think. But were w e to reject this assumption,
w e would have to invent another and probably
extremely complex philosophy of the social
world to account for what can be explained by
means of the assumption of the 'Dilthean
model of minds'.
Nevertheless basic re-interpretations of
collected data and accepted generalizations do
sometimes occur, constituting a basic change
of 'paradigm' or 'scientific revolution'. Basi-
598
cally n e w assumptions are then m a d e , which
m a y compel a change in the meaning of all
previous findings and the indicative validity of
m a n y research tools and techniques. Fortu-
nately scientific revolutions d o not occur
often. A s long as the old paradigm obtains
the formal process, by which m a n y elements
of what was originally tentative and hypo-
thetical, more philosophical than theoretical,
but is slowly transformed into positive science
unfolds. This applies both to the assumptions
on which the questions of the accepted para-
digm are based, and to the hypothetical
guesses which underlie the construction of
research tools and validation of scientific
methods. In this w a y s o m e elements of visions
or ontological models of reality are trans-
formed into scientifically tested propositions,
others are rejected by research, while a third
category remains in the realm of philosophy.
W e can distinguish two kinds of 'onto-
logical model' of aspects or components of
studied reality. T h efirstconsists of reality,
e.g. the postulation of existence of social
classes, h u m a n minds. Most approaches to the
background of m a n y theories belong in this
category of substantive ontological models,
their concepts denoting m o r e or less clearly
defined, specific h u m a n and social p h e n o m -
ena, even if these are very general.
Another kind of ontological model is
strictly formal or content-free. T h e concepts
denote no particular substantive phenomena,
because they denote any phenomena in any sci-
ence which satisfies their formal assumptions.
They are formulated by the use of formal,
logical tools alone. T h e typology of elabor-
ations of statistical relations proposed by
Lazarsfeld, for example, constitutes only a
strictly formal model of a multivariate causal
process that could be valid for any cluster of
variables attaching to a loose collection of
elements, being either cumulative or inter-
active, either parallel or ordered in a causal
chain, etc. T h e reduction of one relationship
or theory to another m a y work in any sci-
ence, but before proof of its applicability to a
particularfieldis established, it is but a con-
tent-free, abstract ontological model of any
Stefan Nowak
imaginable reality which conforms to it.
Certain m o r e abstract formulations of 'func-
tionalism' (for example, those of Ernest
Nagel) are typical examples of a formal ap-
proach, as are certain analyses of the dynam-
ics of given processes.
S o m e specialized sciences construct what
I call ontological models of possible phenom-
ena, for example, by cybernetics and general
systems theory to the degree that they are
strictly formal, i.e. free from any reference to
substantive empirical science. In other cases it
m a y be suspected that content-involvement of
authors of a certain type of mathematical
model of social phenomena or a cybernetic
system is a pretext which permits them to lay
claim to empirical work w h e n , in fact, they
are m u c h m o r e interested in the construction
of logically or mathematically possible worlds.
The distinction I have proposed above
is rather analytical, because in the real ap-
proaches to social phenomena the substan-
tive and the formal 'structural' assumptions
usually occur together, being mutually inter-
connected. E v e n the simplest 'visions' as-
sume that the variables postulated by a
causal model constitute a loose cluster of
causes or effects of the variable.
The need for 'middle-range
ontologies'
The assumptions discussed—both the empiri-
cal and the philosophical ones—must be valid
at least for the studied area of reality. Can w e
say that they deserve to be called philosophi-
cal assumptions? It is usually assumed that
philosophy and especially ontology deal with
the most general characteristics of the world.
A s Barry Hindess observes, quoting Winch:
The difference between the respective aims of
the scientists and philosopher might be ex-
pressed as follows: Whereas the scientist investi-
gates the nature, causes and effects of particu-
lar real things and processes, the philosopher is
concerned with the nature of reality as such in
general.17
Philosophical, schools and scientific working methods in social science
This puts the philosophers' claim to universal
validity of their views rather well. 'Ontology'
conveys the notion of a set of concepts in a
way all-inclusive, embracing the totality of
social reality, and with an extremely broad
area of applicability. But if w e remember
that these ontological models are mere sup-
plements to necessarily partial knowledge,
that they are added by insight and imagin-
ation to what is k n o w n about various as-
pects or fragments of reality, or that they
stimulate these fragmentary pictures of scien-
tific knowledge, then w e understand that
ontological models are not all-inclusive. They
are merely a partial picture of social reality
from one particular perspective.
W h a t certain contemporary philosophical
perspectives in sociology have in c o m m o n
with traditional philosophies—or at least did
have until recently—is their claim to ultimate
and universal validity, and to total truth, at
least as some of their proponents are inclined
to believe. Thus, psychoanalysis is all of
psychology for those w h o believe that Freud
said everything essential about the h u m a n
mind. A n y attempt even to supplement Freud
therefore constitutes a danger of revisionism.
For believers in ethnomethodology, the multi-
variate analysis of standardized questionnaire
responses is a pseudo-science, and vice versa.
O n the other hand, ontological models
visualizing societies as torn by internal con-
flicts are as partial as those that focus primar-
ily on their integrative forces. If by analogy
Merton's well-known 'theories of the middle
range' were to be extended, the notion of
'middle-range ontologies', i.e. partially per-
spective, mutually complementary philosophi-
cal models of social phenomena could be
entertained.
Fortunately some such 'ontological'
approaches to the social world are consciously
partial and consequently usually called
'models'. A n author w h o presents a 'model' as
a starting-point for empirical research m a y
begin with certain commonsense assumptions
about the existence of objects or their charac-
teristics or m a y include assumptions based
upon earlier research. Then he usually pro-
599
ceeds to a conceptual restructurization, defin-
ing certain n e w concepts, usually enumerating
apparently relevant variables and denoting
them by certain 'boxes'. Finally, he draws
arrows between these bases and leaves it open
which values obtain for particular variables,
or whether and h o w strongly they are inter-
related in each particular case. Thus the
approach, the 'model', defines the research
strategy. A scientist would not be unhappy if
research were to reveal certain generalizable
constant relationships between the variables:
this would imply a nice propositional theory.
But, surely he would not advance the claim
that his model constitutes a universal ap-
proach to explain everything, from the class
struggle to the formation of unconscious
defence mechanisms. T h e partial nature of
every ontological model is obvious.
That m u c h should be equally obvious for
most other ontological assumptions about
problems and research methodologies in
science in general, and social sciences in
particular. There are societies for which it
makes more sense to assume that conflict is
the basic feature of relations between various
groups and others in which the idea of
harmony gives a better fit and m a y lead to
the formulation of more fruitful research
hypotheses. There are patterns of behaviour
about which it makes sense to assume that
they have been conditioned by external re-
wards and punishments and others that have
arisen as a result of intense moral or social
reflection in the course of a prolonged de-
cision-making process. There are situations
in which w e work better on the assumption
of dealing with an aggregate of people and
others w h e n w e learn more by assuming
that w e deal with a coherent social system.
The same is true for most general as-
sumptions. T h e choice between reductionism
and holism m a yfinallyturn out to be a
spurious one: in some areas of reality w e m a y
find interconnection between laws or theories
at different levels, while certain theories
remain without reductive interrelation, even if
this goes against the grain. Such is the
situation in contemporary science, there being
600
both plenty of reductionist connections as well
as reductionist gaps. T h e same m a y turn out
to be true for the assumption of causality.
O n e has been accustomed to explanations in
causal terms in complex situations; but one is
not able to explain everything in that manner.
E v e n in physics two basic theories exist:
strictly deterministic relativity geometry and
basically interdeterminate quantum theory.
Almost all other lower-level philosophi-
cal alternatives listed at the beginning of this
article are definitely spurious as disjunctive
alternatives. A s already pointed out, they are
complementary in the sense that different
fragments of social reality m a y satisfy the
assumptions of different philosophical (onto-
logical) schools. But their complementarity
m a y go even further. If two polarities of a
given problem dimension are not defined so
that one of them constitutes a simple logical
negation of the other (or in other words,
w h e n their joint existence in one particular
fragment of reality is logically impossible),
cases m a y well exist for which the postulation
of joint validity of assumptions believed to be
mutually exclusive is justified, and theoreti-
cally fruitful. O n e m a y assume, for instance,
that the h u m a n thought processes can be
understood as partly rational and partly
irrational—according to various meanings
of these terms—thereby attempting to explain
group beliefs and ideologies. O n e m a y also
sometimes have to assume that in a certain
society both the cohesive forces and the con-
Stefan Nowak
flicting ones operate strongly while in another
neither conflict nor cohesion seem to be at
work because the different groups and indi-
viduals m o r e closely resemble a loose aggre-
gate than a system marked by powerful
internal feedbacks both positive and
negative.
That, in the tradition of the philosophy of
science (or in substantive, methodological or
philosophical disputes in sociology), two
'opposite' assumptions are believed to be m u -
tually exclusive, thus requiring a 'philosophi-
cal option' in favour of one or the other,
does not m e a n that they are empirically
contradictory—as long as they are not logi-
cally contradictory. It is only as a result
of empirical knowledge or of more or less
intuitive philosophical (ontological) guesses,
that one can decide whether, for each particu-
lar case regarded separately, or for a whole
generally defined class of cases, both (or
none) of the 'opposite' ontological positions
can be the source of valid and fruitful as-
sumptions for the formulation of more precise
research problems and a m o r e complex re-
search design. A n d it is for consecutive
empirical studies, aiming towards the verifi-
cation of hypotheses or towards answering
of initial questions, to show to what degree
one or m o r e 'ontological options' believed
by some to be mutually exclusive turn out to
be valid either for the actual cases studied
or for the broader areas of reality around
us.
Philosophical schools and scientific working methods in social science
1. W . E . Snizek, E . R .
Fuheman and M . K . Miller,
Contemporary Issues in Theory
and Research—A
Metasociological Perspective,
p. vii, Westport, C o n n . ,
Greenwood Press, 1979.
2. J. H . Turner, The Structure
of Sociological Theory, p. 9,
H o m e w o o d , 111., T h e Dorsey
Press, 1979.
3. See, for example, M . B .
I Brodbeck (ed.), Readings in the
' Philosophy of the Social
Sciences, N e w York, 1968;
S. N o w a k , Understanding and
Prediction—Essays in the
Methodology of Social and
Beavioural Theories, Dordrecht,
Netherlands, D . Reidel Publ.
C o . , 1976; Snizek et al., op. cit.;
P. Sztompka, Sociological
Dilemmas—Toward a Dialectical
Paradigm, N e w York, Academic
Press, 1979; D . E m m e t and
A . Maclntyre (eds),
Sociological Theory and
Philosophical Analysis, N e w
York, Macmillan, 1970.
4. For a detailed discussion
of this problem see 'Concepts '
and Indicators in
Humanistic Sociology', in
N o w a k , o p . cit.
5. For an excellent discussion of
this problem, see M . Brodbeck,
'Methodological Individualism,
Definition and Reduction',
in Brodbeck, op. cit. See
also J. Coleman, 'Properties of
Collectivities', in J. Coleman,
A . Etzioni, and J. Poster
(eds.), Macrosociology,
Research and Theory, Boston,
Mass., 1970. See also
R . C . Bealer, 'Ontology in
American Sociology'.
6. See E . Nagel, 'Reduction of
Theories', The Structure of
Science, N e w York, 1961. See
also 'The Logic of Reductive
Systematizations of Social and
Behavioural Theories', in
N o w a k , op. cit.
7. See 'Comparative
Social Research and the
Methodological Problems of
Sociological Induction'; and
'Causal Interpretation of
Statistical Relationships in
Social Research', in N o w a k ,
op. cit.
8. See D o n Martindale, The
Nature and Types of Sociological
Theory, Boston, Mass., 1960.
9. See P . Sztompka, System and
Function, Toward a Theory of
Society, N e w York, Academic
Press, 1970; see also
J. W . Sutherland, A General
System Philosophy for the Social
and Behavioural Sciences, N e w
York, 1973.
10. See analysis of this problem
. in G . C . Hempel, 'Explanation
by Reasons', Aspects of
Scientific Explanations, N e w
York, 1965.
11. P . Sztompka discusses the
following list of what he called
'methodological dilemmas' in his
book: '1. Naturalism versus
anti-naturalism;
601
2. Reductionism versus
anti-reductionism ;
3. Cognitivism versus activism;
4. Neutralism versus
axiologism; 5. Passivism versus
autonomism; 6. Collectivism
versus individualism.'
(P. Sztompka, Methodological
Dilemmas, p. 28).
12. See 'Empirical Knowledge
and Social Values in the
Cumulative Development of
Sociology', in N o w a k , op. cit.
13. Barry Hindess, Philosophy
and Methodology in the Social
Sciences, p. 2, Brighton, T h e
Harvester Press, 1977.
14. Ibid., p. 4.
15. See another formulation of
the following views in:
5. N o w a k , 'Approaches,
Theories and Sociological
Subdisciplines', in:
T . Bottomore, S. N o w a k and
M . Sokolowska (eds.),
Sociology, the State of Art,
N e w York. Sage Publications,
1984. For an analysis of the
nature of assumptions in
induction, see 'Logical and
Empirical Assumptions
of Validity of Induction',
in N o w a k , op. cit.
16. In social sciences, of course,
the research problem is often
finally formulated after the data
have been collected and
analysed but it should be then
rather called the 'problem of the
research report' and not of the
study.
17. Hindess, op. cit., p. 3.
WSã^M^MíJMW^MM i)

Value as a factor
in social action

Emérita S. Quito

The question of value is so complex and yet renders it impervious to scientific scrutiny.
so c o m m o n that it is discussed in almost all T h e long discussion on the question of
fields of h u m a n knowledge. T h e list of books value is not to be repeated here. O u rfieldof
and articles on value never seems to end. inquiry is philosophical, and because it will
Ethics no longer holds exclusiverights-over it seek to determine the origin, levels and extent
for the social as well as the physical sciences of value in social action, it will also be
openly discuss it: whether the social sciences sociological.
can be value-free1 or whether the physical F r o m the outset, the following principles
sciences are exempt from the scientists' value- are to be laid d o w n : (a) that the values of
judgements in choosing their facts and data. 2 individuals are retained in the values of the
Value is ever-present society to which they be-
in all conscious and long; (b) that secondary
deliberate h u m a n acts Emérita S. Quito is Chairman of the values cannot be separ-
and yet this presence is Department of Philosophy of D e La ated from h u m a n free-
Salle University, Manila, and the
elusive, difficult to en- holder of the Professorial Chair of d o m ; and (c) that sec-
close in a definition; it Humanities. A m o n g her principal ondary values are con-
is still m o r e difficult to publications are: A New Concept of stantly being modified, if
determine its etiology Philosophy, (1967), Oriental Roots of not drastically changed,
and development. O n e Occidental Philosophy (1975) and throughout h u m a n life.
Homage to Jean-Paul Sartre (1981).
has but to look at the T h e central question
spectrum of definitions is whether value con-
formulated by a host of cerns the ethical or 'what
philosophers and social ought to be' or whether it
scientists to emphasize is simply a 'calculus of
this point.3 pleasure'.4 There is n o
Its very complexity, doubt that both these
however, stems from the fact that, if it is ever- views are correct for both conform to our
present in all conscious and deliberate h u m a n experience. W h a t has not been so widely
acts, it should be taken for granted; and if the discussed is that there are two levels of h u m a n
sciences are not exempt from value-judge- values.
ments, then value must at least be a scientific
datum, and hence accessible to scientific A theory of values
analysis. It is, of course, impossible to take
value for granted owing to its determining role H u m a n beings have a deep sense of values
in h u m a n behaviour and its far-reaching effect about good and evil or about 'what ought to
in social action; yet the indefinability of value be' which begins to be formed at the very
604
inception of consciousness and continues to
take firmer shape during formative years. This
level of values is referred to by moralists as
man's second nature, a system of right and
wrong deeply ingrained until the age of 12 s
after which no moral agency can supplant or
re-create it. This level constitutes the h u m a n
ethical system of primary values, a Freudian
super-ego which oversees actions. T h e indi-
vidual is very rarely conscious of this deeply
embedded ethical system, and even if he were,
would perhaps not be able to understand h o w
the system was formed in thefirstplace,
considering that it took place in early child-
hood of which he has no m e m o r y .
There is also another and more super-
ficial level of secondary values of which
people are conscious because it is of a later
formation. A t this level, the choice between
good and evil, right and wrong, black and
white is no longer m a d e since such choices
were already m a d e at the deeper level. A t this
m o r e superficial level, h u m a n beings operate
in a grey area, a spectrum of better or worse,
of pleasure or pain, of convenient or incon-
venient, of n o w or later, of here or there,
in short, a scale of relative values, not of
absolute ones.
This secondary level of values is the
immediate basis of our choices being, in turn,
rooted in the primary or deeper level of which
w e are no longer even conscious. The super-
ficial level of values is not permanent; it is
consciously modified throughout life as one
acquires fresh knowledge or experience. N o
amount of fresh knowledge or experience,
however, can shake the primary- or deeper
foundation of values; no modification is poss-
ible of this solid basis which firmed up in
early childhood. While the deeper level is the
bedrock of 'what ought to be', it is at the
secondary level that deliberate choices are
m a d e in later life. N o freedom in the forma-
tion of the level of primary values exists since
it is received from parents, teachers or surro-
gate parents, and thus belongs to the past that
can n o longer be recalled or recast. In a sense,
this deeper sense of values belongs to the
unconscious.
Emérita S. Quilo
Value plays an active role in purposive
h u m a n behaviour. Every goal set, every
motivation responded to, involves a value.
For this reason, the social sciences cannot be
value-free any more than physics can be
energy-free, or mathematics, quantity-free.
It is also w h y physical sciences cannot be
exempted from value-judgements, because
the scientist unwittingly bases his choice of
data on a system of values which determines
their degree of importance. Gunnar Myrdal
maintains that the biases or inclinations of
scientists are so deep-seated that they can in-
sinuate themselves into thefieldsof research
at all stages.6 Thus a system of values ac-
companies all deliberate h u m a n actions.
H o w does an individual initially form his
primary sense of values? T h e origin is to be
sought in early childhood. W h e n children are
rewarded or punished before the age of 12, a
sense of values is unconsciously formed.
Spankings and lollipops are determinants of
primary values. Until the age of 12 when real
freedom is not yet exercised, the child forms
its primary sense of values, i.e. of right and
wrong, of good and evil. This becomes a part
of its second nature for the child imbibes it as
naturally as mother's milk. In later life, this
sense of values m a y lie buried under thick
layers of experience, but exists none the less
at a deeper level of consciousness. '
In succeeding years, the individual con-
sciously or unconsciously forms a hierarchy of
values but always within the framework of the
primary scale, i.e. between the extremes of
right and wrong. The individual erects a scale
of pleasures, conveniences, of more or less, of
better or worse. This secondary scale of
values is modifiable throughout life, and in-,
deed it is modified, and sometimes drastically
changed. Only in old age does this second-
ary scale of values become set, when at last
the primary and secondary scales coincide.
W h e n the individual transfers from the
family fold into a wider society, the secondary
scale undergoes rigorous re-evaluation. Cen-
sure, ridicule,-praise can modify these values;
education can alter them to a great extent.
W h e n one acquires fresh knowledge, this
Value as a factor in social action
Relativity, etching by Escher. Snark.
acquisition impinges itself on the secondary
scale of values. N e w insights, theories, per-
spectives, n e w or alternative forms of behav-
iour rectify or recast one's scale of-values.
Mass media can also manipulate it. If tele-
vision affords every opportunity to win an
electronic gadget by simply phoning in the
right answer to a simple question; if news-
papers offer extravagant prizes for easy-to-fill
obligations, h o w can one's scale of values
remain unaffected? If the rewards of work are
attainable by other means, can the work ethic
605
continue to c o m m a n d a high priority in one's
scale of values? In fact, every factor or event,
be it economic, social or political, impinges
upon the scale of secondary values.
D o e s the individual retain his scale of
values w h e n he joins the wider society or
group? ' T h e institution is but the lengthened
shadow of one m a n . ' 7 '. . . individual praxis
is the synthetic mould from which must flow
c o m m o n action'.8
Contrary to popular belief, an individual
never really surrenders his values w h e n he
606
becomes a m e m b e r of an institution, party,
social group, etc. Group or collective action is
a juxtaposition of individual actions. Only in a
m o b where the individual subsumes his per-
sonality to the group does he really lose his
individuality and, with it, his individual
values.
A n individual can belong to three kinds
of groups, and in each, retains his values to a
varying degree. T h e cohesiveness of groups
depends largely on the objectives of those
w h o comprise them.
1. There are groups that c o m e together be-
cause of an identity of purpose, such as a
group of people w h o wait for transpor-
tation or w h o form a queue to enter a
cinema. O n c e the single purposes are
achieved, the group disperses. It is evident
that here the total scale of secondary
values is retained.
2. There are also groups whose objective m a y
be m o r e difficult to attain, as in the case of
revolutionary groups which aim to topple a
political regime. T h e coming together of
this group is spontaneous because it e m a -
nates from a deep-seated purpose which
has become habitual and which for the
same reason is less conscious than in the
first group. Those forming such a group are
desirous of a single, collective aim which
can be achieved only through collective
action, but this collectivity does not rescind
individual values.
3. There are groups that congregate for
mutual benefit or concern: institutions,
social clubs, political parties, unions or
syndicates belong to this kind. There is no
urgency in the objectives of such groups.
M e m b e r s coalesce because of social con-
cern, which at bottom is really self-interest
or utility. This is the very basis of in-
stitutions, collectivities the objective of
which is an abiding one. Institutions are
not questioned as to their social utility
because no society can really exist without
the stability afforded by them. T h e state,
for example, can be called an institution be-
cause citizens view membership in it as
desirable for protection and benefit. T h e
Emérita S. Quito
individual retains his full scale of values
in the institution.
Are there, then, values that can m o v e society
as a whole?,As a general rule, people w h o
share a culture, mores or mentality share the
same values. Every type of society has a
c o m m o n scale of values and hence a c o m m o n
code of conduct. Honour for the Japanese is a
socially accepted value that can m o v e them
to voluntary self-destruction. T h e defence of
democracy and justice can m o v e the A m e r -
ican and British people into war. Trampling
of Christian values can m o v e Christians into
collective action. Redress of grievances,
oppression, rampant injustice are some of the
more urgent and dramatic motives for social
action. Inequality of the sexes in terms of job
opportunities and compensation inspired the
W o m e n ' s Liberation M o v e m e n t to seek to
correct these anomalies.
A s a general rule, the people of the East
(by this is meant all Asians) differ from the
people of the West (i.e. Europeans, North
and South Americans) because of socially
accepted Eastern and Western values.
The Easterner, or Oriental, is person-
oriented, whereas the Westerner is thing-
oriented and from these value-orientations
flow their value-judgements and conscious
actions.
The thing-oriented Westerner values ef-
ficiency and productivity. For every effort
expended he must accomplish m a x i m u m re-
sults. Hence, time is precious for the West-
erner. Every 'unforgiving minute' must be
filled with sixty seconds' worth of exertion.
There is a standard of excellence that must be
lived up to: failure to conform to this stan-
dard is a fault for which one can be censured.
Self-reliance is another Western value.
Self-help is the true ideal. Parasitism on the
family is frowned upon. A s a result, young
people leave the family fold as soon as they
can survive on their o w n and, conversely,
when parents grow old, they are sent to
homes for the aged. T h e cycle is repeated
when these children become parents them-
selves. D u e to the emphasis on efficiency and
the apparent inability of certain Westerners
Value as a factor in social action
The scale of faculties and their transcendance, from Robert Fludd, Utriusque Cosmi Historia (1619). Explorer.
to cope with these socially accepted values,
m a n y suicides are committed.
T h e Oriental, o n the other h a n d , is
person-oriented. His regard for h u m a n feel-
ings is supreme. All other values are subordi-
nate to- this supreme value. T i m e or the
emphasis o n punctuality is not a rule. T h e
shoe-maker or tailor m a y have promised to
finish a job o n a specific day and time, but h e
607
can easily b e g off b y saying that h e w a s
slightly indisposed and therefore could not
fulfil his contract. This is n o major calamity in
Oriental culture: o n e does not fly off in a rage
because one's shoes or shirt w e r e not finished
at the appointed time. Forbearance is an
Oriental trait.
A n o t h e r value that flows from personal
or h u m a n feelings is 'saving face'. In the East
608 Emérita S. Quito

A n Easterner does not stand alone. H e rises

or falls with his family.
D o these Eastern, or Oriental, and West-
ern, or Occidental, values belong to the pri-
mary sense of values or to the secondary
scale of values? O n e sure w a y offindingout
is to determine whether a person acts uncon-
sciously (instinctively) or consciously (freely).
The primary sense of values belongs to the un-
conscious because it was formed when the
child exercised neither freedom nor epistemo-
logical awareness. W h e n a person acts almost
instinctively, i.e. without ratiocination, the
act emanates from the primary level of
values, hence from a 'sense of values', or the
lack of it. W h e n a person acts with knowl-
edge and epistemological awareness of the
consequences of his acts, then this act e m a -
nates from the secondary level, hence a 'scale
of values'.
The dispute over the question of values
stems from the argument that m a n does not
K ' u n g Fu-tZU (Confucius), 551-479 B.C. Edimedia.
always act with full awareness of a scale of
values. Indeed, because some actions e m a -
nate from the primary level they are totally
one does not trap a person between the two devoid of a scale of values. T h e Chinese sage,
horns of a dilemma. O n e always leaves an Confucius, m a d e the difference between yi
opening for the other person to exit grace- andft'.9A person acts out of yi when he acts
fully. Even when a person falls short of a out of a sense of Tightness or 'what ought to
standard of excellence, he is handled with be done at the m o m e n t ' . Thus, when someone
velvet gloves. O p e n embarrassments are is drowning or is in immediate danger, the
avoided in the East. action of one w h o saves him is out of yi if no
The Oriental is group- or family-oriented. conscious deliberation was previously made.
Smooth personal relationships are of enor- W h e n someone saves a person only after
m o u s value. Giving in to the majority's will determining w h o the drowning person is, and
without question is part of the Eastern sense the extent of possible danger to his o w n
of values. Wranglings or bickerings destroy safety, then he acts out of li. Acts of heroism
harmonious h u m a n relationships and have which transcend concern of one's own safety
therefore no place in the Eastern code of are m a d e out of yi, whereas acts for profit or
conduct. In this connection, the family is gain are m a d e out of //. Yi corresponds to the
supreme, and parents are honoured and primary level of values and li corresponds to
venerated. A s a result of this close contact the secondary level of values. O n e and the
with the family, the Oriental, as a general same act can therefore be both out of yi or out •
rule, does not develop singly or in isolation of //. A conscious act without deliberation
from the family and often becomes too emanates from yi or the primary level of
dependent on it. Even w h e n a son or daughter values, and a conscious, deliberate act stems
can afford it, they stay within the family fold from // or the secondary level of values.
until and even after marriage, continuing to Oriental values have been so woven into
consult their parents on important decisions. the very texture of the life that there is no
Value as a factor in social action
longer consciousness of them. A n Oriental acts
out of yi when he tries to 'save face'. Western
values likewise have become part of the
second nature of a Westerner so that idleness
and waste of time and energy are ruled out.
While there are always exceptions, these
oriental and Western values constitute unwrit-
ten codes of conduct. While some Westerners
and Orientals do violate these codes, it is
certainly out of li.
A s a modification of the Confucian doc-
trine, it m a y be useful to qualify that an adult
very rarely acts out of pure yi. In other words,
a person does not act simply from the primary
level of values, which would imply that one
can revert to that state of innocence whereby
one acts out of a sheer perception of good or
evil, or from 'what ought to be done'. In adult
life 'oughtness' depends largely on situations,
circumstances, convenience, selfishness, altru-
ism, nationalism, friendship and a host of
other motives, in short on //. These motives
are learned from the group or society one
joins. Rousseau asserted that m a n is good
only in the state of nature, and that once he
joins a society is slowly corrupted by it,
implying that without society, m a n would
retain his original virtue.
This theory of original virtue must, h o w -
ever, be refined. H u m a n beings are born
neither good nor evil: they are born in a state
of tabula rasa on which is slowly written a
'sense of values' through tlje rewards and
punishments received. O n e w h o is never
rewarded or punished will never form an
ethical sense or a deeply ingrained sense of
valúes. H e would be akin to an animal with no
sense of right or wrong and would live
according to his o w n pleasures. Rousseau
was, however, right in postulating that society
can corrupt an individual in the sense that he
makes re-adjustments to his scale of values to
conform to socially accepted behaviour.
The secondary scale of values is formed
within society, i.e. in the company of others.
It is therefore a sheen of culture, a gloss
of civilization, a mere 'patina which, when
scraped off, reveals the primary values. A
savage w h o grows up in a jungle and never
609
has any contact with parents or society, will
have neither the primary sense of values nor
the secondary scale of values;10 a person w h o
was subject to another, even in isolation, can
and does form a primary sense of values but
hardly any secondary scale of values; while
one w h o , without submission to authority at
an early age, was immediately projected into
a society, like an unwanted child, will only
develop a secondary scale of values that will
be fragile and foundationless. T h e difference
between one w h o was under the tutelage of
parents or surrogate parents and one w h o was
projected into a society at a very early age
without supervision is that the former will
always have a basis, a last recourse should the
secondary scale of values fail, whereas the
latter will act only out of expediency because
he does not k n o w any better.
Very often, a person is judged by the
laws of society according to prescribed stan-
dards of behaviour drawn from clearly estab-
lished principles of right and wrong. These
principles are rigid because they are based on
primary values; but people do not act only out
of primary but also out of secondary values. If
h u m a n beings always acted out of a primary
sense of values, they could d o no wrong.
Socrates was right in saying that 'if m a n knew
the law, he would not violate it'. Expressed in
another way, if the primary sense of values
were always the basis of deliberate actions,
then h u m a n beings would do no wrong. It
would be like Kant's categorical imperative,
whereby a m a n must because he must. Unfor-
tunately, people are never in a primitive state
where there are n o conventions, n o social
pressures, no h u m a n complications. H u m a n
behaviour is always in function of a society
with its o w n values to which one must con-
form: ' W h e n in R o m e , do as the R o m a n s do'
as the saying goes. The degree of adaptation
of an individual depends largely on h o w well
he is able to conform to the values of society.
A n Oriental m a y find great difficulty in
adapting to Western values just as it is
difficult for a Westerner to adapt to Oriental
values. Compromises can be found only at the
secondary level, never at the primary. It is
610 Emérita S. Quito

Changing relations between religious values and science: Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) is forced by the
Inquisition to forswear the theory of the rotation of the earth, D.R.

therefore essential to determine a person's have n o place in science. A n d yet, values

life-beginning, for the values inculcated at thiscontinue to bedevil the sciences, for their very
stage can never be taken away. choice of experimentation and ends are value-
loaded. T h e list of published works on value is
long because social scientists attempt to quan-
Philosophy of values tify what is unquantifiable, while physical
scientists attempt to analyse value with their
T h e primary level, however, resists quanti- o w n tools. T h e project is d o o m e d to fail from
fication and, therefore, analysis. There is no the very start.
yardstick whereby the sciences can determine Axiology, or the philosophy of values,
the depth and extent of primary values. T h e alone can disentangle the knotty discussion on
social sciences propose to study values to values, for values are rooted in freedom. If
determine h u m a n behaviour, but motivations m a n were an animal, it would be easy to plot
and goals are only the consequences of values. his behaviour, for animals are structurally
Before one can set a goal or be motivated by oriented towards values inherent in their
it, there is an anterior scale of values or species, from which there is no deviation. H u -
priorities which m o v e s one. T h e physical m a n beings, on the other hand, are oriented
sciences seek to eliminate value-judgements towards happiness, being free to seek this
from the scientific field, believing that values end through means of their o w n choosing.
Value as a factor in social action
Demonstration of the rotation of the earth by Léon Foucault's (1819-68) pendulum, in St Paul's Cathedral,
London. Camera Press.
A n d herein lies a g a m u t of imponderables
that cannot be plotted. W h y does a person
pursue an objective relentlessly? W h y not
abdicate in the face of overwhelming odds?
O n the other hand, w h y does a person
surrender to laziness at the slightest diffi-
culty? O r w h y does a m a n exchange his for-
tune a n d g o o d n a m e of a lifetime for a few
m o m e n t s or m o n t h s of pleasure? In each
case, w h y d o people value o n e good higher
than another?
A s Louis Lavelle points out, whenever or
wherever there is an 'inequality a m o n g things'
or whenever o n e thing is to b e placed before
another, or o n e is to b e judged superior
or inferior to another, a scale of value
applies.11 F o r this reason, values are always
philosophical in character because they in-
volve a choice, an option, thereby evoking the
611
entire spectrum of culture, experience, edu-
cation, w h i m s , caprices, etc.
T h e topic of values can never be exhaus-
ted b y social scientists because of the exist-
ence of freedom. N o h u m a n agency can
predict a future, free act. All h u m a n sciences
are reduced to impotence where freedom is
involved, for an individual can deny his entire
scale of values b y o n e supreme act of free-
d o m . H e can even d o violence to his sense of
primary values. Values are guidelines and
indices of behaviour but they are not the sole
determinants of social action because of hu-
m a n freedom. T h e w i s d o m of Bergson's
doctrine thus transpires: states the essence of
which is to flow like life, consciousness,
freedom a n d duration, can never be under-
stood by intellect; only by intuition.12 W h a t
intellect grasps are things that can be arrested
612
or are already accomplished, but it can never
grasp things in a state of flux. Since values
cannot be divorced from freedom and con-
sciousness which are continuously in a state of
flux, it follows that values are inscrutable to
the intellect.
W h e n m a n joins a society, he carries with
him his sense and scale of values. Social action
is therefore always tinged with individual
freedom. For this reason, man's behaviour in
society will remain an enigma. The question
of value is reduced to only one question: 'To
be or not to be', and to this question only the
individual, whether alone or in society, can
respond. Contrary to general observation,
society, as society, does not respond. Society
is m a d e up of individuals enjoying free-will or
a liberty of indifference. Social action is
therefore individual action first. M a r x was
right in saying that living h u m a n individuals
are 'thefirstpremise of all h u m a n history'.13
There is of course a reciprocal interaction
between the individual and society. Society
can influence the individual through its
accepted values just as the individual can
influence society through his reactions to
Emérita S. Quito
these values. Socialization is a complex pro-
cess. It is the transmittal of a totality of
culture accumulated through m a n y gener-
ations and for which reason, the term 'incul-
turation' is n o w preferred.14 There is no
way to measure the degree of reaction to this
inculturation for the element of freedom is
always involved.
All the boons of modern technology, all
the statistical sophistication of present-day
disciplines are impotent w h e n faced with
intractable freedom. It is perhaps salutary to
m a n that not all of his faculties can be
predicted or managed by computers.
Philosophy has lost a lot of ground to the
social and physical sciences in the twentieth
century. In the universities, the slots for
philosophy are being replaced by more quan-
tified subjects. A n d yet, have the sciences
really encompassed all h u m a n faculties? It is
evident that as yet, the twin faculty of m a n , as
a free-willed and evaluating being has not yet
been successfully plotted. Freedom and values
belong to man's deepest humanity, making
him what he is. In a sense, it can well be said,
'I value, therefore, I a m . '
Value as a factor in social action
Notes
1. M a x Weber, The
Methodology of the Social
Sciences, N e w York, T h e Free
Press, 1949.
2. Ernst Nagel, The Structure of
Science, N e w York, Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1961.
3. See two volumes of
W . H . Werkmeister, Historical
Spectrum of Value Theories,
Lincoln, N e b . , Johnsen P u b .
C o . , 1970. These two volumes
contain only German and
Anglo-American writers on
values. Not even French writers
are included.
4. Ibid., Vol I, p . 3. T h e
expression belongs to Jeremy
Bentham.
5. Child psychologists including
Piaget consider the age of 12 as
the end of the age of innocence.
Until the age of 12, the child is
considered impressionable,
Bibliography
A L I S J A H B A N A , S. T . Values as
Integrating Forces in Personality,
Society and Culture. Kuala
Lumpur, University of Malaya
Press, 1966.
B A I E R , K . ; R E S C H E R , N . Values
and the Future. N e w York, T h e
.Free Press, 1969.
B E R G S O N , H . Essai sur les
données immédiates de la
conscience. Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1961.
C O N F U C I U S . Analects. N e w
York, A Vintage Book, N e w
York, Random House, 1938.
E M U N G , J. F. Value
Perspectives Today. N e w Jersey,
docile and capable of imbibing
ethical or moral laws of
behaviour.
6. Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity
in Social Research, p. 57, N e w
York, Pantheon Books, 1969.
7. John F . Emling, Value
Perspectives Today, p. 21, N e w
Jersey, Associated University
Presses, Inc., 1977.
8. Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique de
la raison dialectique, p. 543,
Paris, Presses Universitaires de
France, 1960.
9. Confucius, Analects,
Book IV, p. 16. N e w York,
Vintage Books, 1938.
10. The Catholic philosopher-
theologian, T h o m a s Aquinas,
teaches that m a n is born with
synderesis, a quasi-angelic
power to discern between good
and evil so that even if m a n were
Associated University Presses,
Inc., 1977.
F A C I O N E , P . A . , et al. Values
and Society. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1978.
L A V E L L E , L . Traité des valeurs.
Vols. I and II, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1951-
55.
L O W E , C . M . Value Orientations
in Counselling and
Psychotherapy. San Francisco,
Calif., Chandler Pub. C o . , 1969.
M U R P H Y , G . Personality. N e w
York, Harper, 1947.
M Y R D A L , G . Objectivity in
Social Research. N e w York,
Pantheon Books, 1969.
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born and raised in a jungle, he
would still know the moral law.
This doctrine, however,
bordered on the theological.
Summa Theologiae, P.I, Q . 79,
A. 12.
11. Louis Lavelle, Traité des
valeurs, Vols. I and II, Paris,
Presses Universitaires de
France, 1951-55; see Vol. I,
p. 3.
12. Henri Bergson, Essai sur les
données immédiates de la
conscience, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1961.
13. German Ideology, Part I, on
Feuerbach.
14. S. Takdir Alisjahbana,
Values as Integrating Forces in
Personality, Society, Culture,
p. 132. Kuala L u m p u r ,
University of Malaya Press,
1966.
N A G E L , Ë . The Structure of
Science. N e w York, Harcourt,
Brace & World Inc., 1961.
S A R T R E , J.-P. Critique de la
raison dialectique. Paris,
Gallimard, 1960.
S I N G S O N , J. M . Philippine
Ethical Values. Manila,
Integrated Research Center, D e
L a Salle University, 1979.
W E B E R , M . The Methodology of
Science. N e w York, T h e Free
Press, 1949.
WERKMEISTER, W . H .
Historical Spectrum of Value
Theories. Vols. I and II.
Lincoln, Neb., Johnsen Pub.
C o . , 1970.
Commodif ¡cation
of the social sciences

Claude Ake

T h e social sciences have been commodified of production is revolutionized by the instru-

and it would appear that problems associated ments of labour which are n o w machines. T h e
with commodification constitute the greatest take-over of production by machines was
challenge to the social sciences today. C o m - really the essence of the revolutionary charac-
modification limits in very fundamental ways ter of the Industrial Revolution. W h e n m a -
the scientific development of the social sci- chines m o v e in as the basis of production,
ences and their contribution to h u m a n well- science begins to dominate production and
being. M o r e specifically, it divorces the pro- opens up infinite possibilities for innovation.
duction of the social sciences from social For, by its very nature, science never accepts
needs, renders social science knowledge m o r e the present situation as what must be, it never
prone to aid domination accepts absolute sol-
than enlightenment and utions or limits and is
focuses research o n Claude A k e , a Nigerian political forever straining beyond
problems of limited scientist, is Dean of the School of present achievements to
Social Sciences, University of Port-
scientific value. These Harcourt, Port-Harcourt, Nigeria. n e w challenges. M a r x was
problems can only b e H e has published books and articles right in saying:
seen and grasped in the on political science and the political
context of the speci- economy of Africa.
Modern industry never
ficities of the process of looks upon and treats the
commodification. W h a t existing form of a process
are these specificities? as final. T h e technical
basis of that industry is
therefore revolutionary,
The genesis of while all earlier modes of
commodification production were essen-
tially conservative. B y
T h e principal impetus means of machinery,
towards the commodification of the sciences chemical processes and other methods, it is
stems from the Industrial Revolution. Indeed continually causing changes not only in the
commodification of science lies in the very technical basis of production, but also in the
essence of this revolution. Following M a r x functions of labour, and in the social combi-
nations of the labour-process.
one can divide the revolution into two phases:
an earlier phase of manufacture, in which the
m o d e of production is revolutionized essen- This is all the m o r e so on account of the
tially by labour power and the instruments of dynamism of capitalism, which emanates from
production are still largely tools; a second competition. W h e n machines b e c o m e the
phase, 'modern industry' in which the m o d e pivot of production, competition tends to take
616
the form of using science to improve the
technical basis of production in a ceaseless bid
to maximize efficiency and corner the market.
In so far as capitalism lives up to its ideal
character, that is, remains competitive, it has
an insatiable appetite for science, a fact
epitomized by the ever-increasing corporate
investment in research and development. Not
surprisingly, capital (corporate and state) has
become the major consumer of science and,
as such, the decisive influence on the pro-
duction of science.
Inevitably, the production of science
responded to and became conditioned by
effective demand. A s capital pressed science
into its service and gave impetus to its pro-
duction, science was progressively commodi-
fied, for it was increasingly produced as an
intermediary product, a necessary input for
production of commodities or in demand from
consumers and therefore exchanged. H o w -
ever, there is a certain ambiguity in the
commodified nature of science. A t one level
there are ever larger armies of scientists
toiling at research, trying to produce ex-
change values, just like workers in a shoe
factory. F r o m this perspective the commodity
character of science is unambiguous. A t
another level, especially in larger corpor-
ations, there is a tendency to internalize the
consumption of the scientific product, to
monopolize aspects of it so that it is not
available for indiscriminate use or purchase.
F r o m this perspective it is seen that science is
not only commodified but also 'accumulated'
and hoarded.
These tendencies hold both for the natu-
ral sciences and the social sciences, although
in the social sciences their manifestations are
m o r e subtle. T h e Industrial Revolution cre-
ated an immense demand not only for natural
science knowledge but also for knowledge
about the social sphere. In the wake of the
process of primitive accumulation which pre-
ceded the Industrial Revolution, there was a
serious problem of controlling behaviour, of
finding adequate ideological representations
of the emerging m o d e of production. First,
masses of people had to be dislodged from
Claude Ake
pre-capitalist production relations and expro-
priated, then they had to be dissuaded from
occupying themselves in 'unproductive' ways
such as begging and thieving, and induced to
offer their labour power as a commodity. T h e
foundations of contemporary social sciences
were laid in the context of these problems and
grew in step with the development of indus-
trial capitalism. This can easily be seen in the
case of political economy. Political economy
developed as the discipline for understanding
and rationalizing industrial capitalism, and its
growth has followed the development of
capitalism. During its earlier history it was
easy for political economy to assume an
appearance of objectivity and universality.
But as the contradictions of capitalism grew
its ideological character was more and more
exposed. B y the middle of the nineteenth
century, political economy had entered what
Isaac Rubin called (in his A History of
Economic Thought) a 'vulgar phase' in which
its investigations were increasingly restricted
to 'superficially studying phenomena as they
might appear to the capitalist, instead of
probing into the internal connection between
them'. This was the period of the marginalist
school when political economy became more
and more engrossed in the refinement of
technique while the questions it posed got
narrower and more specific, and increasingly
unhelpful for understanding the social system
as opposed to its manipulation for desired
effects.
T h e process of commodification of the
sciences was reinforced by the development of
the modern state, itself a product of industrial
capitalism. T h e state is the political correlate
of capitalism. Ideally the state is the modality
of class domination specific to the capitalist
m o d e of production. For what is unique about
this modality of domination is that it is
mediated by commodity exchange. It is be-
cause of this mediation by commodity ex-
change that the institutional mechanisms of
domination are differentiated and dissociated
from the ruling class and even society and thus
appear as an objective force 'standing along-
side society'. Unfortunately, this must remain
Commodification of the social sciences 617

In Praise of Dialectics, painting by R e n é Magritte (1898-1967). Giwudon.

618
a dogmatic assertion as its elaboration will
take us too far afield.
Like the corporations, the state had a
huge appetite for science. A s the classic
institutional expression of the capital relation
the state necessarily epitomized the uncom-
promising rationalism of capitalism. It needed
science to maintain the conditions for ac-
cumulation, to resolve the contradictions be-
tween private capitals and also between social
capital and private capitals. These contradic-
tions had to be resolved for capitalism to
survive but could not be done efficiently
without science at a time w h e n science had
m o v e d to a dominant position in material
production. Also as arbiter, the state was in
competition with private capitals (if it could
not match their power it could not discipline
them to maintain the conditions for accumu-
lation) and had to be well equipped, in fact,
better equipped than the corporations which
were obliged to engage in the assiduous
accumulation of science. Also, capitalism's
tendency towards globalization brought the
age of competing nation-states and competing
imperialisms and colonial struggles, and the
nation-state needed science to maintain itself
as a going concern in the n e w system. These
were the circumstances in which states them-
selves became avid consumers of science.
They consumed science in a manner
which gave impetus to their commodification.
This w a s particularly so in the case of the
social sciences. Since the social sciences deal
with h u m a n beings and social relations, they
are directly relevant to the maintenance of
existing social orders or their subversion.
Naturally, governments felt that they could
not afford to encourage the production of
social science knowledge in a generally uncon-
trolled w a y . They have been very concerned
about controlling the conditions under which
social science is produced. T o some extent
they have tried to exercise this control b y
establishing units within their structure for the
production of such social science as they need.
But this manner of dealing with matters raises
other serious problems which need not detain
us here. It has been m o r e convenient to farm
Claude Ake
out the production of social science knowl-
edge to client institutions which are formally
outside governments but largely dependent or
controlled by them. Notable among these
client institutions are University Social Sci-
ence Faculties and quasi-independent aca-
demic establishments. T h e process of com-
modification is inherent in these conditions for
the production of the social sciences, for
production is carried out by specialized insti-
tutions not for their o w n consumption but for
that of the state and the hegemonic classes. It
is well to note that this is a rather unique form
of commodity production; in some ways it is
rather like the putting-out system of guild
production. For here, the commodity pro-
ducer and the consumer of the commodity are
not really independent. It is not difficult to
imagine h o w this form of commodification
impairs the scientific development of the
social sciences.
T h e commodification of the social sci-
ences has received impetus from contempor-
ary functional specialization and the peculiar
circumstances in which science has been or-
ganized as a vocation. T h e production of
scientific knowledge demands lenghty, tedious
and very expensive training which has to be
constantly updated. It is an entirely absorb-
ing commitment. For those w h o produce it,
science is a vocation. O n e notable feature of
science as a vocation is that it invariably takes
the form of commodity production. Only in
very exceptional circumstances is anyone
likely to enjoy the luxury of independence
with personal facilities and freedom to pursue
any line of scientific inquiry that captures his
fancy. M o r e often than not the scientist seeks
work in an institution which pays him a salary
and in addition offers access to facilities such
as libraries, laboratories and research funds
necessary for the application of scientific
talent. In short, scientific talent is divorced
from the objective conditions for its un-
folding, the scientist obtains access to such
objective conditions only as a commodity
producer. T h e scientific product is thus a
means of exchange and scientific activity less a
free expression of creativity or a disinterested
 Commodification of the social sciences 619

quest for truth than routine application to survival w h o are not in a position to exercise
tasks in which the individual is not necessarily domination over others. Even if the need for
interested. Because of the value generally such knowledge came to.popular attention,
placed o n material well-being and status, there would b e little means of satisfying
scientists are often keen to exchange their it. In the circumstances, effective demand
scientific skills in a manner that will maximize is exercised by those narrow but powerful
these 'utilities' rather than knowledge or interests which control the state and the
h u m a n well-being. Scientists are under- corporations.
standably anxious to avoid devaluing their This is unfortunately reinforced by what
skills and reducing their exchange value. This happens on the supply side. O n e can normally
sometimes makes them into obstacles to expect some dissociation of supply from de-
scientific progress and the spread of enlighten- m a n d in the sense that effective demand
ment; for instance, they m a y denigrate n e w decides what is supplied only to. a limited
and better scientific thrusts and mask the extent. Actual products depend to some
irrelevance and deficiencies of certain skills, extent on what suppliers or-commodity pro-
procedures and theories in order to ensure ducers can offer while producers can often
continued d e m a n d for their o w n services. create a certain demand for their products
H o w e v e r , in our case, producers do not have
m u c h autonomy from those w h o wield effec-
Problems of commodification tive d e m a n d for the social sciences. The state
and the corporations provide the material '
Problems associated with commodification are conditions for the creation of social science
perhaps the greatest obstacle to the develop- knowledge, it is they w h o supply the insti-
ment of the social sciences and their contri- tutional context, the libraries and labora-
bution to h u m a n welfare. A comprehensive tories, the grants and research tools which
treatment of these problems will not be enable the social scientist to produce. This
attempted here. Only a few of the most lack of autonomy is reinforced by the socio-
salient features can be indicated and those economic specificity of social scientists. Those
only impressionistically. w h o are in a position to produce significant
social science knowledge are themselves highly
Whenever production is commodified it
privileged with essentially identical class
tends to be dissociated from social need. This
positions as those of the powerful interests
is especially so in the case of the social
that control the state and the corporations:
sciences. W h e n a good becomes commodified
indeed, the social science establishment is
the conditions of its production and the nature
a mechanism of such control.
of the product become defined especially
within the range of interaction between de- T h e import of all this is that social science
m a n d and supply. O n the one hand, the type knowledge is largely produced in response to
of social science produced is dictated by the very narrow interests. It is dissociated from
nature of the effective d e m a n d for it. In this social need, if not actually antagonistic to it.
case the effective d e m a n d comes from a For by virtue of their objective interests the
limited source, namely, the corporations, the controlling groups in the corporations and the
state and its apparatuses. There is very little state d e m a n d a very specific kind of social
effective popular d e m a n d for social science knowledf °-, namely, one that reproduces their
- and that which exists is not sufficiently fo- exploitative domination of the rest of society.
cused to compel changes in the types actually N o w h e r e is the dissociation of the pro-
produced. T h e need for social science knowl- duction of social science knowledge from
edge on, for example n o w to maintain order, needs more apparent than in post-colonial
does not immediately compel the attention of Africa. Outsiders tried • to influence the
people engrossed in the urgencies of daily characters and teaching of the social sciences
620
in Africa in order to further their imperial
purposes. This was done largely through the
big foundations, the provision of university
teachers to Africa, the award of scholarships
to promising African students as part of uni-
versity staff-development programmes, and
the sponsorship of textbooks. Such an effort,
combined with the legacy of Western edu-
cation surviving from the colonial experi-
ence firmly established Western mainstream
social science in most of Africa. H o w e v e r
these social sciences with their foundations in
the well-known classics, were oriented towards
defending the values of order and capitalism.
A n d that m a d e them exactly what African
countries did not need. T o illustrate briefly
with the value of order: those w h o were
producing and propagating order-oriented
social sciences were the ones w h o labelled the
newly independent countries underdeveloped
and submitted that they must, as a matter
of the highest priority, break out of their
condition because underdevelopment means;
a m o n g other things, crushing poverty, debili-
tating dependence, ignorance and disease,
technological backwardness, limited freedom
and political instability. In other words, under-
developed society is thoroughly undesirable
and needs to be changed drastically, quickly.
If that is granted, then it is a blatant contra-
diction to study such societies in the context
of social sciences the value assumptions and
conceptual apparatuses of which are primarily
concerned with h o w to maintain order. It
would appear that the type of social sciences
required would b e that with an affinity for
revolution.
T h e received social sciences in Africa
broke d o w n in contradiction even in relation
to their o w n purpose. In an attempt to seduce
by an appearance of relevance, they adopted
a developmental thrust; societies were seen as
existing along a continuum, the underdevel-
oped ones being assessed in terms of the
possibility of m o v e m e n t towards develop-
ment. Unfortunately, while the conceptual
and theoretical apparatus of Western main-
stream social sciences was perfectly capable of
elaborating on the problem of order, it
Claude Ake
was quite unsuitable and indeed inimical to
the elaboration of change, especially the
wholesale change that the underdeveloped
countries need. Hence the contradiction; the
tools of social science were dissociated from
the goal which it set itself.
The dissociation of the production of
knowledge from social need is related to the
fact that those interests promoting the pro-
duction of social science knowledge are ex-
cessively class-bound. This class bias is not
just contingent, it is objectively necessary. It is
inherent in the nature and origin of the social
sciences. A s sciences of h u m a n relations, the
social sciences actually arose from class differ-
entiation and the need for exploitative con-
trol of h u m a n behaviour and relations. U n -
fortunately space does not permit a detailed
argument of this thesis but a skeletal argu-
ment can be presented. In simple pre-capi-
talist societies such as those that Durkheim
characterized as having 'mechanical soli-
darity', the need for social sciences does not
really arise. While contradictions and conflict
do exist knowledge of social relations is un-
problematic, everyone knows their station
and duties, there is no need for specialist in-
terpretation of role expectations, laws and
punishment, or even of culture. Knowledge
of social relations is so widely shared, so
well inculcated as part of the socialization
process that a specialized study of social re-
lations would be largely redundant. For the
same reason m a n y forms of functional and
structural specialization are absent (for in-
stance, the presence of a specialized adminis-
trative apparatus) and roles can be function-
ally diffuse without any risk of orientational
confusion.
But w h e n mechanical solidarity gives way
to individualism and the differentiation of
interests, w h e n society splits into conflictual
social groups struggling for hegemony, the
situation changes fundamentally. Social re-
lations become problematic and so does
knowledge of social relations. T h e established
and widely shared knowledge of social re-
lations becomes m o r e and m o r e irrelevant as
the centrifugal pulls of the n e w social forces
Commodification of the social sciences 621

c o m e to the fore. T h e salient problems of Implications for the scientific

social relations n o w are those of co-ordination development of the social
for goal attainment, integration, system main-
sciences
tenance and the maintenance of order. It is
precisely these problems that the social sci-
ences deal with. Interest in them is essen- I n o w turn to consider the implications of the
tially class-specific; they arise primarily w h e n nature of social sciences and the conditions of
antagonistic contradictions have developed, their production for their scientific develop-
w h e n the maintenance of hegemony has be- ment. Since the social sciences are largely the
c o m e problematic and w h e n some people product of very narrow interests tendentially
must control and administer others. in fundamental conflict with the rest of
T h e class biases of the social sciences society, they tend to be ideological represen-
are not a historical accident. They are not tations rather than tools of scientific under-
contingent on the fact that a certain class standing. T o illustrate with political economy:
at a certain point in time captured control of cause is deliberately confused with effect by
a system of objective sciences and pressed representing as h u m a n nature m o d e s of
them into the service of its narrow interests. being (e.g. acquisitive individualism), which
They are inherent in the nature and genesis are the historical product of the capi-
of the social sciences. B y the same token, talist m o d e of production; the unequal ex-
they are not a product of the particular change of the market-place is misrepresented
manner in which conditions for the pro- as the exchange of equivalents, the contri-
duction of social science are constituted. But, bution of labour-power to value is minimized
of course, these conditions reinforce the or glossed over while self-seeking is rep-
class character of the social sciences not least resented as the vehicle for the optimization
by ensuring their commodification. For, as of the public interest.
w e have seen, the peculiar character of the W e can illustrate the ideological charac-
conditions of production of this commodity ter of social sciences more concretely by
is that its producers are not autonomous of reference to s o m e of the mainstream scholar-
its primary consumers w h o constitute a highly ship on the developing countries. Because of
monopolistic group. the interests of those w h o sponsored this
A t this point w e are in a better position effort, the central problem of development
to clarify the dissociation of the production of was essentially reduced to the question of h o w
social science knowledge from social needs. the developing countries could be m o r e like
This should not be construed in an absolute the West, and the practical concern became
sense. The social sciences serve some social that of fashioning these countries after the
needs. But they are primarily those of the image of the West. Not surprisingly this did
small hegemonic social group, which, by not conduce to m u c h scientific evolution as
virtue of its hegemony, controls the pro- development was trivialized and confused
duction of social science knowledge in ac- with a particular type of change; the desira-
cordance with its objective interests. T h e bility, feasibility or even the necessity of
problem, of course, is that these needs are effecting this particular change w a s not left
dissociated from and tendentially antagonistic an open question, but rather taken for
to those of the vast majority of people in granted. There was limited interest in under-
the social formation. It is in this sense, standing the uniqueness of these countries
that is, taking the social formation as a and their o w n laws of development.
whole, that one can refer to the dissociation In these circumstances, the work pro-
of the production of social science knowledge duced very limited scientific understanding of
from social need. development and of the countries in question.
Yet in the developed countries the social
622 Claude Ake

"Contemporary social sciences grew in step with the development of industrial capitalism.'
Above: Pre-capitalist industry: carpet-maker in El-Minya, Egypt. H . Cartier-BressonyMagnum.
Opposite: Powell's steam engine, which won a gold medal at the 1867 Paris Universal Exhibition. Explorer.

sciences have not fared m u c h better. Their
scientific unfolding has been hampered by
their preoccupation with the preservation
and rationalization of the existing social
order. T h e assumption that the existing
social order is as it ought to be forecloses in-
teresting scientific questions, depriving the
social sciences of essential stimulus and con-
fining them to relatively trivial problems
and the refinement of technique. W e can see
these tendencies in the famous 'end of ideol-
ogy' -stance associated with authors like
Daniel Bell, the confusion of empiricism with
science and incremental mathematicization
of minor problems with scientific progress.
T h e groups that control the production of
the social sciences, especially government and
the corporations, do encourage research. But
the research they encourage does not contrib-
ute m u c h to progress in the social sciences.
W e have already touched on one reason for
this state of affairs, namely, the tendency to
avoid certain kinds of problems. In addition,
there is the bias caused by their preference
for research supportive of their o w n policies.
They tend to lean heavily towards research
that will solve largely short-run policy pro-
blems. There is very little basic research of an
open-ended nature that questions fundamen-
tal assumptions of existing social science
practice. Research problems are often defined
by official functionaries and entrepreneurs
w h o want unambiguous answers to rather
narrow questions. A n d research is more
often than not evaluated and the possibilities
or further work determined not by those
Commodification of the social sciences
i #
' i ï-..,
1
1
É IIi ii
interested in scientific progress but by those
with practical concerns for w h o m the advance-
ment of science is a peripheral issue.
T h e situation is not helped by the trans-
formation of social scientists into commodity
producers. A s is to be expected, they gear
their productive effort to the locus of effective
demand and highest returns on their input.
This has encouraged some social scientists to
go along with the utilitarian concerns of
governments and corporations, to collaborate
in the use of science to rationalize instead of
promoting understanding. Since the market-
ability of their skills depends so m u c h on
social recognition which is largely controlled
by the hegemonic social groups, social scien-
tists are under pressure to remain in the
'mainstream' where practice is dominated by
623
the values of those same hegemonic groups.
Worse, some enter into active opposition to
novel and m o r e scientifically promising de-
velopments which threaten to devalue their
o w n skills. Taking account of all these factors,
it m a y well be that the limited scientific de-
velopment of the social sciences is due less to
the complexity of their subject-matter than
to the circumstances in which they are pro-
duced and consumed.
Conclusion
Problems associated with the commodification
of the social sciences limit in very fundamen-
tal ways their scientific development and con-
tribution to h u m a n well-being. These prob-
624
lems are perhaps the greatest challenge to
the social sciences today. H o w is this chal-
lenge to be met? T o begin with, it is necessary
to intensify criticism of current social science
practice. A considerable amount of critical
work is being done but there is need for an
increase in scope, depth and concreteness. In
the-past insufficient attention has been paid to
the conditions under which social science is
produced or to the phenomenon of corn-
modification and its effects. Also, certain
questions about the objective character of
the social sciences have not been examined
closely enough, in particular, whether the
problems under review here are due to the
historical specificities of particular producers
or consumers of the social sciences, or the
condition of production, or whether the social
sciences c o m e into being essentially as sci-
ences of exploitative domination. Here it is
pertinent to point out that even the existence
of radically critical social science, such as
Marxism, does not even settle such questions
conclusively. Marxism arose from the contra-
dictions of what w e have called mainstream
social sciences and is ultimately their ne-
gation. But as the product and antithesis of
the older social sciences it is paradoxically in
dialectical unity with them and it is not at all
clear h o w Marxism can be constructed as a
social science beyond this negation.
N o r does the experience of contemporary
socialist formations mitigate such uncertainty.
T h e differences between them and the capi-
talist formations are fundamental enough;
none the less the problems of the social sci-
ences reviewed here largely apply to them also
because these problems are inherent in the
nature of the state and the phenomenon of
commodification. Commodification is clearly
a feature c o m m o n to both socialist and
capitalist formations. In contemporary social-
ist formations, labour power is also divorced
from its means of realization and alienated as
a condition for gaining access to the means of
its realization. T o be sure, in this case, its
alienation m a y not be exploitative, that is, it
m a y not entail the expropriation of surplus
value. However, the adverse effects of corn-
ClaudeAke
modification of the social sciences which have
been discussed here have little to do with the
expropriation of surplus value. A s to the
state, it represents a modality of domination
and presupposes antagonistic contradictions
and class struggle. T h e state is never really the
state of all, but rather expresses the he-
gemony of some. A s a relation of domination
characterized by intense hegemonic struggles
the state can never be democratic in the
concrete sense. This is all too clear in the case
of capitalist formations. However, it is also
true, though to a lesser extent, even for social
formations in which the popular class has
become hegemonic.. For one thing the necessi-
ties of domination and class struggle impose
hierarchic structures that tendentially alienate
those w h o directly control state power from
those they are supposed to be representing.
Thus Marxism in power invariably falls into
serious contradiction with Marxism in oppo-
sition and is unable to provide a reliable
image of what a social science rooted in
popular interests would look like. The prob-
lem is not solved by invoking the authenticity
of Marxism in opposition and extrapolating
from it. For Marxism is so completely in
dialectical unity with the system it seeks to
negate that such an exercise will be futile,
and it is so geared to the limited purpose of
negation that it does not formulate what
happens afterwards. Indeed, the doctrine
would have contradicted its very essence if it
did not leave the determination of the future
to the dialectics of history.
T h e conditions under which social science
knowledge is produced and consumed render
the task of broadening and deepening critical
work along the lines suggested very difficult.
However, there is some leverage in the
contradictions of prevailing social science
practice: the contradiction between its latent
functions as ideology and its manifest func-
tions as science, the contradiction between its
practical utility for the manipulative purposes
of hegemonic groups and its uselessness far
making sense of social life. These contradic-
tions provide an objective basis for the pro-
motion of the kinds of heightened critical
Cotnmodification of the social sciences
consciousness which has been suggested
here.
T h e n e w critical consciousness will not
just materialize from anywhere but must be
based on objective conditions, especially con-
tradictions in material life. T h e implication is
that the task of dealing with the problems of
commodification in the social sciences is first
and foremost a 'political' task and only inci-
dentally a scientific task. For thefirstorder of
business must be to decide what and whose
problems are to be solved by the social
sciences, what interests are to be served, what
values maximized. A n d these are clearly
political decisions. T h e social sciences will
625
serve the well-being of humanity to the extent
that social scientists decide to commit them-
selves firmly and concretely to popular
interests in their practice. This commitment
will provide the greatest stimulus to the de-
velopment of the social sciences. For with this
commitment the social sciences enter into the
mainstream of history, confront and concern
themselves with the problems that are critical
for mankind and develop from the impetus of
their challenge. Whether the social sciences
can m o v e decisively in this direction must
remain an open question. But if they do, they
will be radically different from what they are
today.
 wmmMmmÊSimËMMgssËsaÊSgmm
The social sciences and the study
of international relations

Philippe Braillard

T h e rapid development of the social sciences as to call fundamentally in question the idea
is no doubt one of the m o r e striking p h e n o m - of the social sciences as a rigorous scientific
ena of our century. T h e diversification of discipline, on the grounds that the inevitable
approaches, adoption of n e w research tools ethnocentrism ideological commitment of any
and methods, broadening of analytical scope researcher impose radical limitations on her
and penetration into n e w areas have caused a or him.
profound upheaval in the social science land- Since the impression given by the social
scape, especially in the last few decades. T h e sciences today is of a complex field in a state
n u m b e r and pace of these developments have of flux, it is legitimate and indeed necessary to
led the social sciences to lay a claim to proper ask what functions m a y be assigned to them
scientific status, and to and what challenges and
recognition and a role of difficulties, and even
their o w n in academic Philippe Braillard teaches the theory limitations, they encoun-
institutions and in the and sociology of international re-
ter in their development.
lations at the Graduate School of
world of research in International Studies, Geneva. H e Rather than indulge in
general. W h a t is m o r e , has published several books, including general, abstract specu-
a large n u m b e r of n e w Théorie des systèmes et relations inter-lation, however, w e felt
fields have emerged as a nationales (1977), L'imposture du that it would be useful to
result of the desire to Club de Rome (1982) and Tiers
focus our attention on one
Monde et relations internationales
give the social sciences a (1984). particular aspect of social
direct active role to play. reality. This will enable us
However, these to adopt a m o r e precise
changes have not oc- and m o r e concrete ap-
curred entirely smoothly proach to s o m e of the
and without clashes be- problems faced today by
tween different concep- the social sciences.
tions of the actual nature of social relations O f the various aspects of social reality
and between different approaches and analyti- that m a y be investigated, there is one that
cal methods. They have also had the effect of seems to lend itself particularly well to this
bringing about increasingly marked specializ- kind of inquiry, namely international re-
ation in the various disciplines, and this has lations, for here w e have a subject of research
led to increasing criticism and expressions of that, m o r e than any other, is n o w c o m m o n
concern over the tendency in the social ground for the various social sciences.
sciences to reflect in a piecemeal and often Whereas, traditionally, political philosophy,
reductionistic manner the richness and c o m - diplomatic history, international law and pol-
plexity of real life. S o m e even go so far today itical e c o n o m y all used to contribute to the
628
study of international relations, in the course
of this century m a n y of the social sci-
ences—sociology, political science, ethnology,
psychology, anthropology, demography, etc.
—have progressively laid claim to the subject.
This is w h y it can be said that ever since the
period between the two wars not only have
international relations earned themselves the
position of an independent field of study but
there has also been a degree of decentraliz-
ation in research o n the subject, which has
been increasingly extended to include m a n y of
the rapidly developing social sciences in ad-
dition to traditional disciplines.
Furthermore, the growing importance of
international relations today in the life of
societies cannot leave social scientists indif-
ferent, as attested to by the swift expansion
of research on the subject. W e live in an era
deeply marked by conflict and one in which
the potential for destruction available to us
renders the consequences of a major confla-
gration quite incalculable. After the Second
World W a r , the cold w a r , reflecting the
strategic and ideological antagonism of the
two superpowers, deeply affected the struc-
ture, development and lives of m a n y societies,
particularly as a result of the building of
systems of alliance dominated respectively
by the United States of America and the
U n i o n of Soviet Socialist Republics. Again,
the emergence of the Third World on the
international scene hs opened u p a n e w
dimension in international relations and has
led to confrontation between the developing
countries and the industrialized countries.
Within the Third World itself, there are ever-
growing conflicts whose consequences often
reach far beyond the borders of the regions
directly concerned. In the course of this
century the international system has thus
b e c o m e truly worldwide in scale; international
relations have acquired a global dimension,
it being no longer possible for any single
country to stand outside the international
strategic context.
These changes and the importance of
international relations today do not, however,
stem solely from technological developments
Philippe Braillard
in weaponry and the—at least potential—glo-
balization of conflicts: they are also the result
of the growth of economic, technological
and cultural exchanges between the various
societies. This growth, which is one of the
end results of the modernization process set
in train by the Industrial Revolution, has un-
questionably provided the framework for a
complex network of interdependent relations
between the various societies. While this
p h e n o m e n o n is no doubt characterized by
the existence of serious inequalities or imbal-
ances within that interdependence, to the
point where it has often become a means
for penetration and domination, the fact re-
mains that on a global scale there is n o w
more interpénétration between societies, it is
m u c h m o r e difficult to distinguish foreign pol-
icy from domestic policy and there are m a n y
transnational forces and non-state actors that
tend to restrict governments' scope for
manoeuvre. International relations, therefore,
are tending to play an ever more decisive
role in the functioning and development of
our societies.
The need for interdisciplinarity
It is not unusual to hear researchers—par-
ticularly political scientists—assert that the
study of international relations has, in the
course of its development, given birth to a
separate, self-contained discipline.1 A s -
sertions of this kind are usually based on
the belief that it is essential to take ac-
count of the specific nature of international
relations as an object of study. Particular
emphasis is placed on the difference between
the structures and political processes specific
to integrated societies and the international
system, the latter being characterized by a
low degree of intergration and by the ab-
sence of political structures binding its
m e m b e r s . In other words, the conceptual
and methodological tools developed in the
study of integrated societies are considered
to be inoperative and even dangerous as a
means of studying a social system in its
natural state.
The social sciences and the study of international relations
It seems difficult to dispute the specific
nature of international relations. T h e exist-
ence of an international sphere m a d e up of
sovereign state entities able, within certain
limits, legitimately to resort to armed force to
defend their interests2 characterizes a specific
field of social relations. Admittedly, it is
increasingly difficult today to draw the line
between domestic and foreign policy, and
there is clearly an increasing part played in
international relations by non-state entities
such as multinational corporations and trans-
national forces, which tend to restrict the
power of states. T h e swift development of
bonds of economic, technological, cultural
and strategic interdependence and the emerg-
ence of countless co-operation structures,
whether governmental or non-governmental,
are also signs that international relations are
becoming increasingly highly organized, re-
ducing the gap between the international
system and the various integrated political
systems of nation-states.
Despite this growth in international re-
lations, however, there is no denying the
existence of states and of frontiers between
the various societies forming states. T h e
specific characteristic of international re-
lations is the fact that they constitute flows
that cross frontiers. International relations are
therefore determined primarily not by the
nature of the actors involved—states or other
social entities—but by the structure of the
system in which they develop—the existence
of frontiers crossed by communication flows.
The specific nature of international relations
can thus be brought out by defining them as
social relations that cross frontiers and link
the various societies forming nation-states.
Describing them as relations established
between various societies covers not only
intergovernmental relations, in which the
actors are states but also infra-govern-
mental relations, in which the actors are
such diverse social groups as enterprises,
scientific societies, sporting and religious
associations, etc.
There is no doubt that this definition of
international relations is conditioned by his-
629
tory, for it applies strictly to something whose
existence m a y be limited in time. It is con-
ceivable, for instance, that state structures
will disappear one day. Such a change would
not only m a k e this definition obsolete but
would even render the very notion of inter-
national relations meaningless. 3
T h e fact that international relations are
recognized as possessing a specific nature—if
only relative and partial—is a legitimate
reason for making them a clearly defined
object of study or field of analysis but does
not, in m y view, justify the claim for a n e w
discipline within the social sciences under the
n a m e of 'international relations'. T h e fact is
that what is properly characteristic of any
discipline is not just its object but the ap-
proach adopted in the study of that object
and therefore the w a y of delimiting the field
of analysis. W h e n w e look at the study of
international relations today w e are bound to
recognize that, far from being conducted by a
single discipline, it involves a great m a n y of
the social sciences, such as political science,
sociology, economics, law, history, anthro-
pology, social psychology, etc., with each of
these disciplines approaching the subject from
a particular standpoint. There are in fact
m a n y aspects to inernational relations—econ-
omic, political, social and cultural—and,
unless international relations are reduced to
just one aspect considered to be of paramount
importance, it is not possible to explain the
eminently complex subject of international
p h e n o m e n a through just one discipline, n e w
though it m a y be.
A n d yet, as has already been suggested
above, is it not likely that the social sciences
m a y be unable to study international re-
lations to any good effect by using concepts
and models developed in the analysis of
integrated societies? T h e specific nature of
international relations—social relations across
frontiers—does not preclude the existence of
s o m e degree of organization and co-operation
in those relations. Moreover, there is a
widespread tendency in the study of what are
k n o w n as integrated societies to reject—and
in this they are following the path opened up
630
by Marxist sociology—the model of a society
exempt from conflict and proof against anar-
chy. A s a result, the social sciences have to a
great extent included in their approaches the
conflictual dimension characteristic of any
social relationship, and this enables them to
develop models that m a y shed light on inter-
national relations.
Because there are several disciplines
involved and hence a number of different
approaches, the study of international re-
lations today gives the impression of being
piecemeal or even completely disjointed. T h e
wealth of knowledge gained from a multi-
plicity of approaches tends to be achieved at
the expense of coherent analysis. W h a t at the
outset was meant simply to be a guarantee of
comprehensiveness has tended tö become
actually a source of incoherence. W e have
c o m e to the point today where the study of
international relations is broken up into a host
of different approaches and disciplines with
all too often little or n o connection between
them and too little concern to relate their
different approaches to an overall view of the
object studied. W e have here a phenomenon
that is typical of all the social sciences today
and one scientists have become increasingly
aware of, prompting m a n y of them to
advocate an interdisciplinary attitude and
approach.
Interdisciplinarity has thus become a
fashionable cry, and the study of international
relations has not remained outside its range.
It must be admitted, however, that there has
not been m u c h progress beyond solemn pro-
nouncements about the virtues of integrating
the various disciplines, which has prompted
m a n y people to accuse interdisciplinarity of
being a failure or in any event an illusion. In
m y view it cannot in fact be otherwise as long
as interdisciplinarity continues to be seen as a
global, undifferentiated exercise that has the
effect of merely juxtaposing different view-
points in a haphazard fashion. T h e inter-
disciplinary enrichment based on integration
of the various dimensions of social reality
cannot be brought about either on a global
scale or by decree. W h a t must be done, as
Philippe Braillard
increasing numbers of scientists are doing,
is to start out more modestly from the pre-
cise needs that emerge from the study of a
phenomenon or a structure and to seek to
achieve cross-fertilization between different
standpoints w h e n analysing the object in ques-
tion. Thus, to take but a few examples in the
field of international relations, subjects like
the study of development, that of trans-
national corporations or international organ-
izations and that of international conflicts
might lend themselves to interdisciplinary
working methods.
A n initial approach to such working
methods might be to incorporate into a
discipline dimensions, variables and hypoth-
eses taken into account and brought to light
by other disciplines. Thus, for example, the
political scientist wanting to study the strati-
fication of the international system and par-
ticularly the ascendancy of the industrial-
ized countries over the developing countries
must consider in his analysis the norms of
international public law as an element of that
stratification and as an instrument of domi-
nation.4 Conversely, a jurist looking at the
progressive emergence of development law
cannot afford to overlook the power structure
characterizing the contemporary international
system, for it is against that structure that the
Third World countries seeking to establish the
broad principles of a n e w international econ-
omic order are fighting.
H o w e v e r , this initial form of interdisci-
plinary enrichment cannot alone meet all the
requirements that arise in the study of certain
phenomena. It1 is not enough merely to
incorporate into one particular discipline
viewpoints stemming from other disciplines,
because certain phenomena must be con-
sidered globally from the outset. Only a
transdisciplinary approach going beyond tra-
ditional disciplinary frameworks and opening
the way to a paradigm of complexity5 can do
justice to the multidimensional and complex
nature of certain objects. The study of devel-
opment is highly revealing in this respect. It is
n o w realized that the phenomenon of devel-
opment, which plays a very important role in
The social sciences and the study of international relations
'An increasing part is played by multinational corporations and transnational forces'. Rapho.
the study of international relations, cannot be
apprehended satisfactorily from models de-
veloped within the frame of a specific disci-
pline, even if such models take into account
the contributions of other disciplines.6 There
is n o such thing as economic development,
social development or political development
taken separately. Development is a global
p h e n o m e n o n that must be seen as such from
the start in all its m a n y dimensions—econ-
omic, political, social, cultural, etc. This
requirement can be satisfied only by a trans-
disciplinary approach in which an attempt is
m a d e to cut across the boundaries of tra-
ditional disciplines, developing n e w concep-
tual frameworks and models. It is by seeking
to respond to this need for transdisciplinarity
that the study of international relations will n o
doubt m a k e s o m e progress in the future
beyond its present fragmented state.
'631
Looking for a paradigm
T h e study of international relations is frag-
mented or piecemeal not only because of the
diversity of disciplines or viewpoints upon
which it is based but also—and to a far greater
extent—because of lack of agreement a m o n g
scientists about what it is that constitutes the
specific nature, the essence, of its object and
about the general explanatory framework to
be built for organizing the research. In other
words, the study of international relations is
characterized by the absence of a paradigm 7
and by the fact that there are several gen-
eral explanatory models pitted against one
another, several conceptions of its object.
This situation is not in fact peculiar to the
study of international relations: it is charac-
teristic of the whole field of investigation
covered by the social sciences.
An initial conception of international
632
relations, which stems from T h o m a s Hobbes'
theory of the natural state, puts emphasis on
the non-integrated anarchical and therefore
conflictual nature of the international system.
It sees the specific characteristic of internatio-
nal relations in the recourse to conflict, or
m o r e precisely in what R a y m o n d Aron calls
'the legitimacy of recourse to armed force on
the part of states'. F r o m this standpoint, the
state is seen as the central actor in inter-
national relations, whose dynamic is the
evolving pattern of the balance of power
a m o n g states. T h e sphere of foreign policy is
quite distinct from that of domestic policy,
and its central concern in the security of the
state. Foreign policy options are rational
choices m a d e in the national interest. T h e
foreign policy of states, while it does not
succeed in obliterating the profoundly an-
archical nature of the international system,
can nevertheless ensure a m i n i m u m degree
of order and s o m e balance of power,
notably through diplomacy and the develop-
ment of international law and international
organizations.8
F r o m the end of the Second World W a r
onwards, this conception of international
relations was widely disseminated by the
American realistic school of thought which set
itself up in opposition to the Wilsonian ideal-
istic and legalistic view of an international
society progressing towards pacification and
integration as a result of a process of d e m o -
cratization. T h e failure of the League of
Nations, the Second World W a r and then the
development of the cold war unquestionably
lent weight to this 'conflictual' conception
of international relations, which prevailed
until the 1960s and still has a considerable
following.
A second conception of international
relations places emphasis on interdependence
and co-operatjon and subscribes to the view
that contemporary international relations do
not correspond to the conflictual and inter-
state model of the realistic paradigm. T h e
dynamic of modernization set off by the
Industrial Revolution and given an unpre-
cedented impetus after the Second World
Philippe Braillard
W a r as a result of the development of tech-
nology and growth of international exchanges
has helped to construct a complex pattern of
interdependence between the various societies
and has led to the emergence of new types of
actors in international relations. This modern-
ization process has for instance given rise to
n e w needs and demands in our societies and
to value systems based on economic and social
welfare. T h e development model progress-
ively adopted by the various societies,
whether in the Third World or in the indus-
trialized countries, has placed n e w social
and economic responsibilities on the state,
which has proved less and less1, capable of
meeting these n e w demands on its o w n . Other
forces—supranational, transnational and sub-
national—have thus emerged on the inter-
national scene and in m a n y cases have tended
to restrict states' room to manoeuvre, as
testified to, for example, by the development
of transnational corporations. In order to
meet the demands for economic and social
development, states have as a rule had to
open themselves up increasingly to exchanges
with the outside world, thereby heading
towards growing interdependence and as a
direct consequence, a restriction of their
o w n autonomy. This is w h y it is becoming in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish foreign
policy from domestic policy and to account for
the international behaviour of a state in
purely strategic and military terms.
In this context the development of inter-
national co-operation with, in particular, a
growing number of co-operation mechanisms
in the form of international organizations,
reflects a far-reaching change in international
relations, whose conflictual nature is coming
to be of secondary importance, and a tend-
ency towards the organization of an inter-
national system characterized ever more
deeply by interdependence and community
of interest.
This view of international relations was
already to be found in the functionalistic ideas
of such theorists as David Mitrany, w h o saw
the foundations of a n e w , more integrated
international system in the demand for func-
The social sciences and the study of international relations 633

tional, technical and economic co-operation,9 international relations is today central to the
and it served as an ideological framework for demands for a n e w international economic
the development and functioning of m a n y order and to a significant school of thought on
international organizations after the Second development problems that rejects an analysis
World W a r . It has also taken on increasing of underdevelopment in terms of endogenous
importance since the beginning of the 1960s in factors alone (cultural, political, social, etc.)
political-science studies on international re- and attempts to explain the p h e n o m e n o n by
lations, particularly those on international or- the dependence of Third World societies and
ganizations,10 the settlement of conflicts,11 m o r e specifically by the incorporation of these
the formulation of foreign policy12 and certain societies into the world capitalist economy.
other themes. In addition, it is central to T h e development of international relations,
m a n y analyses of North-South relations.13 with, in particular, the division of the world
A third conception of international re- into rich and poor countries, is thus alleged to
lations, stemming more or less directly from be a logical corollary of the word capitalist
a Marxist view of social relations, considers system. 15
that the international system today is the direct T h e compartmentalization of the object
expression of the functioning, development of research that emerges from these three
and contradictions of capitalism. In other paradigms of international relations is, no
words, the international system is held to be doubt, not entirely insurmountable. It is clear
marked by the dynamic of capitalism, which, that each of these conceptions of international
because of its contradictions, is a vehicle for relations is based on an important dimension
imperialistic policy. This conception of inter- of the p h e n o m e n a studied and that by at-
national relations was formulated in the works tempting to highlight that dimension it tends
of Rudolf Hilferding, Nicholas Bukharin, to overlook other no less important aspects. It
Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin in an attempt to can also be seen that the development of each
account for colonial expansion at the end of paradigm is connected with the way in which
the nineteenth century and the conflicts that international relations have themselves de-
arose a m o n g the imperialist powers. After veloped and that each conception of inter-
decolonization, a great m a n y neo-Marxist national relations tends to reflect certain
I schools of thought or those drawing on certain trends and concerns of a particular period,
Marxist-Leninist theories m a d e attempts to neglecting quite naturally other factors that
demonstrate that imperialism was still the m a y have been brought to the fore previously.
dominant factor in international relations and Thus for instance the second paradigm, by
the reason for the underdevelopment of the according somewhat less attention to conflict,
Third World. gives precedence to the growth of interdepen-
They suggested that capitalism, in order dence and the development of non-state
to survive, has to rely on the exploitation of a actors—significant phenomena of the 1960s
'periphery' to which it can export its capital at that, in the prevailing climate of détente,
higher profit rates and where it can find an seemed to be conducive to an abatement of
outlet for part of its production and secure East-West conflict. Hence, as is beginning to
raw-material supply sources. This state of de- be realized today, the various paradigms m a y
pendence of the 'periphery', maintained and well be complementary rather than irrevo-
reinforced by various means—transnational cably antagonistic in that they show up the
corporations, international organizations, aid, various facets of a single reality m a d e up, like
export of capital, self-colonization, the part any social reality, of both harmony and
played by Third World élites as relays of conflict, interdependence 16
and dependence,
imperialism, etc.—is thus held to lead to a balance and change.
plundering of the Third World by the indust- There is, however, a fundamental limita-
rialized capitalist countries.14 This view of tion to this complementarity of paradigms as
634 Philippe Braillard

they can be seen today in that their taking into tion of the field of study, a departure to
account this or that aspect of international s o m e extent from notions of c o m m o n sense
relations is based o n philosophies of history, and the possibility of intersubjective control,
on views of social relations and on ideological rather than indiscriminate adherence to
options that are difficult to reconcile. In other rigid procedures. 18
words, although one can hope to integrate T h e question remains whether there is
within a c o m m o n model the various aspects of not an essential difference in kind between
international relations channelled by the para- the social sciences—whether nomothetic or
digms, that integration can be effected only by idiographic—and what are k n o w n as the
dissociating those aspects from the philosophi- exact sciences. A s Jean Piaget clearly d e m o n -
cal and ideological frameworks within which strated:
they appear. It stills remains to be seen h o w
they can be integrated within a coherent having h u m a n beings in their countless activities
structure that might one day b e c o m e the as their object and being developed by human
paradigm around which the research could beings in their cognitive activities, the human
develop. This is n o easy matter, however, for sciences find themselves in the distinctive pos-
it is not a technical problem but one that ition of depending on h u m a n beings both as
involves the philosophical and ideological subject and as object.19
choices o n which such a paradigmatic struc-
ture would be based. This epistomological situation means that
it is m u c h m o r e difficult to separate the
epistemic subject from the egocentric subject.
Towards a scientific approach It is even doubtful—if one agrees with Jürgen
H a b e r m a s that the social sciences derive from
In the last three decades a marked feature of gnoseological interests (Erkenntnisinteresse)
the study of international relations, as of fields that are different from those upon which the
of social reality, has been the trend towards natural sciences are based 20 —whether such a
acquiring scientific status. Increasing numbers separation is really possible in the social
of scientists have been striving to adopt a sciences. This is w h y the scientist studying
scientific approach to the study of inter- social reality must constantly be ideologically
national p h e n o m e n a , and several debates critical of his o w n approach and of his o w n
have grown u p over the criteria for such an situation in relation to its object, while recog-
approach. nizing the relative and partial nature of such
T h e fallacious argument consisting in an approach. Only then can the social sciences
contrasting the so-called classic approaches acquire a genuinely critical dimension, adopt
relying to a great extent on intuition and a critical outlook on society and avoid being
21
qualitative analysis with the so-called scientific merely techniques for solving problems and
approaches based o n the quantification of instruments that, under cover of a value-free
social p h e n o m e n a and recourse to formal- approach, tend to justify an established social
22
ization is fortunately n o w a thing of the order.
17
past. It has n o w been realized that neither This, however, has all too often been the
quantification nor formalization can m a k e case until n o w in the study of international
an approach scientific, for these are merely relations. W h o l e areas of research have been
instruments that c o m e into play only once determined largely by ideological options—of
an object of study has been delimited, the which the scientists themselves have been
problem areas identified and a conceptual unaware—channelled by the choice of analyti-
framework and certain initial assumptions cal tools or conceptual frameworks. A n
adopted. It is coming to be accepted that a example of this is systems analysis. For one
scientific approach involves precise defini- thing it is all too often reduced to a mere
The social sciences and the study of international relations 635

... í *

'The positivist illusion is firmly rooted in the collective mentality', Temple of Humanity, the Positivist
Church of Brazil. Edimedia.

pseudo-scientific language that b y a confused high value o n the status q u o , treating as

use of terms and concepts employed by the
various exact sciences—system, structure,
function, balance, homoeostasis, morphostasis,
morphogenisis, feedback, etc.—is designed to
confer scientific status and social recognition
on the social scientists. M o r e seriously, sys-
tems analysis as it has usually been employed
in the study of international relations tends to
have a highly normative effect by placing a
normal anything that contributes to the in-
ternal h a r m o n y of the system by maintaining
existing structures a n d as deviant a n d dys-
functional anything that upsets the balance of
the system. 23 T h u s , for example, John B u r -
ton considers that in studying international
systems, systemic patterns of behaviour must
be distinguished from non-systemic patterns,
the former implying integrative processes and
636
the latter disintegrative processes based on a
differentiation of power. 2 4
T o take another example, the fact of bring-
ing into play—as is increasingly done today
—the concept of interdependence, which is
indeed the basis of one of the paradigms of
contemporary research on international re-
lations, also tends to introduce implicit ideo-
logical choices into the analysis. Emphasis on
the growth of interdependence and its depic-
tion as a symmetrical situation (the mutual
dependence of social actors) to obscure the
conflictual aspect of international relations
and the stratification of the international
system. This type of attitude is very clearly to
be seen in m a n y analyses of North-South
relations that underscore the bonds of inter-
dependence between industrialized and Third
World countries, ignoring the asymmetrical
nature of that interdependence and the far-
reaching clashes of interest between the two
groups of countries, as are attested to by the
breakdown of the negotiations to define in
concrete terms the structure of a new inter-
national economic order. T h e report of the
independent commission chaired by Willy
Brandt provides a good illustration of this.
T h e report endeavours to show that the
conflict between the North and the South can
be resolved only if there is a recognition, both
in the North and in the South, of interdepen-
dence reflecting a profound community of
interests. B y proclaiming that the develop-
ment of the North necessarily involves the
development of the South, and vice versa, and
that that interdependence should be the basis
for a new international economic order foun-
ded on a community of interests, the Brandt
report obscures the fact that such interde-
pendence is asymmetrical and supports a plan
for restructuring the world economy de-
signed merely to reinforce the Third World
countries' incorporation into a world econ-
omic system in which their situation is one of
dependence.
A s can be seen, ideological criticism is
essential, both in the study of international
relations and in that of other sectors of social
reality. It does, however, if it is considered
Philippe Braillard
merely a technique, entail the danger of a
return to the positivism its function is to
combat, by giving the illusion of an approach
that has been thoroughly purged of all ideo-
logical contamination. This danger is all the
greater in that the positivist illusion is firmly
rooted in the collective mentality, a fact that
moreover enables some scientists to speak of
scientific and ideology-free analysis for the
purpose of deliberately concealing their ideo-
logical commitment and political options.
A good example of this attitude is to be
found in the approach adopted by the Club of
R o m e , which is a grouping of about a hun-
dred leading figures—company directors, aca-
demics, etc.—and has set itself the aim of
shedding light on the complex problems of the
world today and proposing new courses for
action so that the world m a y be saved from
the dangers threatening it.25 T h e Club of
R o m e maintains that it has 'no ideological or
political prejudice'.26 It has moreover at-
tempted to authenticate its analysis of the
contemporary world by several reports drawn
up by research-teams, sometimes using math-
ematical analysis and computers. 27 The stated
aim is thus to replace the myth of growth,
which lies at the heart of the model for the
development of our societies and threatens to
lead them to their downfall, by a scientific,
clear-sighted view of the world today and its
problems.'However, as w e have shown else-
where, 2 8 the picture that emerges from all
the reports presented at the Club of R o m e
and sanctioned by it and from the publications
and declarations m a d e by the Chairman of the
group, the Italian Aurelio Peccei, remains a
fanciful hypothesis and surreptitiously intro-
duces a whole set of political options which it
tries to pass off simply as self-evident con-
clusions drawn from lucid, scientific analysis.
While proclaiming that it speaks on behalf of
mankind, and more specifically as the de-
fender of the survival of the human race,
the Club of R o m e is trying, by means of a
technocratic ideology, to impose on us a
planned world society whose leadership takes
as its model the transnational corporation.
The social sciences and the study of international relations 637

> i
*"** "^.»i/ " • < • . . ' • * a r - i ^ « - ' ; W

Le Père Ubu, the central character of the satirical plays of Alfred Jarry (1873-1907), exploring modern
absurdity. Lithography by the author. Snark.
638 Philippe Braillard

The nature and limitations of international relations very little satisfactory

theory progress has been m a d e towards any such
process of selection and ordering. Most of
In their bid for scientific status and social the 'explanatory models' that have been de-
recognition, the various nomothetic social' veloped are in fact merely taxonomies or
sciences—sociology, political science, econ- conceptual frameworks pointing up a set of
omics, etc.—set themselves in their study of variables that m a y have a bearing o n the
international relations the goal of developing p h e n o m e n a and processes studied, without
an explanatory theory of an abstract, general there being really any selection and arrange-
and timeless nature. Their approach w a s ment of the kind needed in developing an
based on a positivistic epistemology modelling explanatory model.
the social sciences on the natural sciences. T o take just one example, w h e n G r a h a m
T h e aim was to single out a number of Allison attempts to shed light on the processes
recurrent themes from all the various events of foreign-policy decision-making, he places
coming within the scope of international emphasis, in each of the three paradigms he
relations and to formulate the explanatory proposes (rational, organizational, bureau-
models or laws governing the behaviour of cratic), on a number of variables that m a y
those involved in international relations. In have a determining role in decision-making
other words it meant developing explanatory but does not establish any precise relation-
models composed of a n u m b e r of variables ships between these variables and confines
and putting these models to the test by using himself m o r e to a description of the process
history as a laboratory, either by comparing governing the formulation of a particular
the models to the past record of international foreign policy (that which w a s behind the
relations or by endeavouring to apply them C u b a n missile crisis in 1962).31 W h a t is m o r e ,
to the present time, or again by making he does not really tell us h o w to integrate
forecasts—which would in due course b e the three different interpretations he makes
tested—of the future pattern of international of the decision-making process in terms of
relations. T h e collection of statistics in an the three paradigms h e presents. Allison's
attempt to find correlations in the study of contribution is therefore descriptive and
international conflicts29 and the construction taxonomic.
of models in sectors like foreign policy O n e might of course be tempted to
decision-making30 are altogether representa- bypass this difficulty in incorporating the
tive of approaches directed at this type of various potential explanatory variables into a
objective. model by resorting to a reductionistic ap-
T h e fact must be faced today that this proach basing the explanation o n a single
goal is far from being attained and that the factor.32 But it has been amply d e m o n -
quest for a general, timeless explanatory strated that such an approach is unable to
theory applicable regardless of w h o is apply- explain the multidimensional character of
ing it or where and w h e n it is applied has social p h e n o m e n a and their m a n y and varied
brought research to a dead end. causes.
A n y explanatory model involves a T h e current block to finding an explana-
choice, a selection from a m o n g the huge tory theory of international relations, without
range of variables relating to a set of p h e n o m - any progress in fact having been m a d e beyond
ena. It means singling out from the c o m - the taxonomic stage, can but lead scientists to
plexities of real situations those factors that become m o r e fully aware of the possibilities
are significant and leaving aside those that and limitations to which the formulation of a
are not. In addition, precise relations must be theory is subject. In opting for a general
established between the variables selected. approach, the representatives of the n o m o -
T h e fact is that in the contemporary study of thetic social sciences strove to devise too
The social sciences and the study of international relations 639

timeless a theory, w h o s e only link with history
would c o m e from the scientist's neutral action
in a particular experimental field. T h e y did
not realize however that it is not possible to
understand international relations without
incorporating the dynamic of history into
the explanatory models themselves. E v e n if
the establishing of a set of potential explana-
tory variables m a y b e valid in general terms
and is hence not linked to a specific situation,
it is only b y interpreting a given set of
historical circumstances that the scientist can
and must select and arrange those variables.
In other w o r d s , progress beyond the taxo-
n o m i c stage can be m a d e only by taking into
consideration a specific historical dynamic,
by analysing a given set of historical
circumstances.
N o doubt there are explanatory factors
c o m m o n to latter-day conflicts like the cold
w a r or the Viet N a m W a r and to the major
conflicts of European history in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Explanatory models
of these various conflicts cannot be con-
structed, however, without taking into ac-
count the dynamic and the forces at w o r k in
the international system during the period
in question. Furthermore, o n e cannot set out
to infer laws governing the functioning and
balance of international systems merely from
a comparison of the polarity of the con-
temporary system with that of the E u r o p e a n
system in the nineteenth century and without
taking into consideration the other basic
structural characteristics of each of these two
systems (in particular stratification a n d the
degree of ideological and cultural h o m o g e n -
eity) and the dynamic of their development. 3 3
It is n o doubt possible to conceive of
spheres of generalization other than that of
highlighting potential explanatory variables.
B y elaborating various explanatory models
concerning specific historical situations,
scientists m a y reasonably expect to discern
certain trends evolving as laws 3 4 and certain
explanatory structures c o m m o n to different
phenomena.35
Trying to find a general theory in the
study of international relations should not,
however, m e a n negating the cultural dimen-
sion of international relations, as has unfortu-
nately too often the case in the past. 36 It is
not by generalizing from the study of a
particular society—particularly the United
States of A m e r i c a in the case under dis-
cussion—in other words by refusing to con-
sider cultural diversity, that the theory of
international relations can acquire a genu-
inely transcultural, transsocietal and trans-
national dimension consistent with the
requirements of anomothetic approach. Cul-
tural diversity, as indeed the dynamic of
history, m u s t b e central to the social sciences'
proposed theory for the study of international
relations.
[Translated from French]

Notes

1. See for example Hoffman
(ed.), I960, pp. 2-3. See also
Taylor (ed.), 1978, p. 1.
2. This is the characteristic
emphasized by Raymond Aron
(1962) to identify the specific
nature of international relations.
3. O n e might in that case
speculate whether it would not
be preferable to see
international relations as the
expression—at a given m o m e n t
in history—of the development
of a world system—which would
thus become the object of study.
See, for example, Immanuel
Wallerstein's works in which he
sets out to develop a theory of
world systems, in particular The
Capitalist World Economy,
1979. Thus the possible
disappearance of state entities
would not m a k e the object
640
studied a dead letter, being just
one stage in the evolution of a
social system. While not denying
the danger of a reductionistic
approach seeing all international
relations merely in terms of state
entities, and therefore while
acknowledging the merits of a
systems approach of this kind
(see m y work Théorie des
systèmes et relations
internationales, 1977), I do not
think it possible—without
resorting to another form of
reductionism—to overlook the
fact that the state is a structuring
element in international affairs.
4. See Bedjaoui, 1979, on the
subject.
. Orders . . .', 1981, p. 129.
5. See Morin's comments in
Science avec conscience (1982,
p. 273).
6. See in this connection the
comments by McGranahan
(1974).
7. O n the paradigm concept,
see K u h n , 1972.
8. See, for example,
Morgenthau, 1955.
9. See Mitrany, 1946.
10. See Haas, 1964.
11. See Burton, 1969.
12. See Morse, 1969.
13. See, for example, the
Brandt Commission report, 1980.
14. See the work by Jalée, 1973.
O n the various theories of
imperialism, see Braillard and
de Sénarclens, 1981.
15. See, for example,
Wallerstein, 1974.
16. See in this connection the
highly pertinent comments by
Ralph Dahrendorf (1967,
p. 486), w h o stresses the
necessary complementarity of
the co-operative and conflictual
models in the study of society.
17. O n this fallacious argument,
Knorr and Rosenau, 1969, m a y
be consulted.
18. See on this point m y Théorie
des relations internationales,
1977, pp. 21-2.
19. cf. Piaget, 1970, p. 45.
20. See Habermas, 1976.
21. Cox speaks of 'problem-
solving theories'. See his study
'Social Forces, States and World
22. See Himmelstrand's
comments (1982, p. 542). It
m a y also be noted that in the
development of peace research
in Europe over the past twenty
years there has been, at the
instigation of Johan Galtung in
particular, an attempt to adopt a
genuine critical attitude, which
has strongly influenced the study
of international conflicts.
23. See m y work Théorie des
systèmes . . ., op. cit.,
pp. 99-101. This conservative
trend is not, however, in m y
view inherent in the system
concept itself.
24. See Burton, 1968, Chapters
VI and VII.
25. See Peccei, 1976, pp. 128-9.
26. See Peccei, 1975, p. 75.
27. See, in particular, M e a d o w s
et al., 1972; Mesarovic and
Pestel, 1974.
28. See m y work, L'imposture
du Club de Rome, 1982.
Philippe Braillard
29. See, for example, Singer
and Small, 1962.
30. See Snyder, Brück and
Sapin (eds.), 1962; Rosenau,
1971.
31. See Allison, 1971.
32. For example, the sociology
of conflicts as seen by Gaston
Bouthoul, w h o , in the final
analysis, reduces conflictual
interaction to population
dynamics (1970).
33. This is w h y the various
analyses made until n o w of the
stability of international systems
seen from the standpoint of their
polarity are so unconvincing.
See for example: Deutsch and
Singer, 1964; Waltz, 1964; Haas,
1970.
34. O n e of the attendant
dangers in trying to ascertain
such laws lies in adopting a
teleological approach whereby,
it is thought, an evolving process
can be explained and justified by
its outcome, as has often been
done by the advocates of
functionalistic analysis.
35. See on this subject the
highly pertinent comments by
Boudon and Bourricaud in their
Dictionnaire critique de la
sociologie, 1982, pp. 261-7.
36. See Preiswerk's comments
in 'La place des relations
interculturelles . . .', 1975. The
study of foreign policy is a field
that illustrates particularly well
this negation of the cultural
specificity of the societies
constituting the international
system. See on this subject
Korany's comments (1974).
The social sciences and the study of international relations
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the Functional Development of
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MORGENTHAU, H . 1955. Politics
Among Nations. The Struggle
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pp. 311-26.
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T h e institutionalization
of sociology in France:
its social and political significance

Edmund Burke III

Introduction: consequences. M y argument is that the insti-

structures, discourses, crises tutionalization of a n e w discipline is not
simply the result of strong ideas, strong
personalities and money—to take a prevailing
H o w d o disciplines b e c o m e established, im- notion—but that it must be situated in its
pose their authority and decline? These particular political and intellectual context.
questions are central to the sociology of T h e results of reconstructing the origins of
knowledge, and have renewed relevance disciplines and schools of thought can often be
today. Perhaps because our o w n time is a surprising, as a consideration of the case of
m o m e n t of' intellectual openness and epis- the Durkheim school in France in the period
temological self-con- 1880-1914 m a k e s clear.
sciousness, in which T h e autonomous de-
the boundaries between Edmund Burke III is professor of velopment of colonial
disciplines are blurred history and director of the Compara- sociology in France in
tive and International Studies re- the same period points to
and the governing para- search activity at the University of
digms are being called California, Santa Cruz. H e is the a de facto division of
into question, concerns author of Prelude to Protectorate in labour within the field,
about the origins of the Morocco: Patterns of Protest and and constitutes our sec-
m o d e r n social sciences Resistance (1977) and (co-editor with ond topic of discussion.
Ira Lapidus) Islam and Social Move- Here I shall be particu-
and their impact upon ments (in press).
society are at the centre larly concerned with
of intellectual discussion. tracing the emergence
In this m o m e n t of open- of the field of the soci-
ness, the basic presuppo- ology of Islam. A n insig-
sitions of social thought nificant back eddy in the
stand revealed with onrushing stream of Pari-
special clarity, and it is possible to trace the sian science, the sociology of Islam was none
formation and crystallization of disciplines, the less tied into metropolitan politics in ways
and the discourses to which they have given that had a direct bearing upon the nature of
rise.1 its production. Ideologically saturated but
intellectually flabby, the discourse of the
Through an examination of the develop-
sociology of Islam was none the less politically
ment of the discipline of sociology in France
powerful. H o w authoritative discourses are
in the period 1880-1925 this article seeks to
generated, h o w they impose themselves, and
shed light o n s o m e of the more general
with what effect are all subjects that can be
processes at work in the institutionalization of
examined through the study of this case.
the social sciences, and its social and political
644 Edmund Burke III

Finally, through the exploration of the dissatisfied with the explanatory value of this
approach, at the same time as they have
role of controversies in the life of disciplines, I
shall examine the crisis of authority to which become suspicious of the assertion of auth-
all disciplines are subject, arguing that such ority it necessarily involves. T h e emergence
crises are integral to the development of of the disciplines has been seen not as the
disciplines, and are the vehicle by which n e w inevitable triumph of stronger ideas over
views are imposed or resisted by establish- weaker ones (as was implied by the history
ments. T h e struggle for a scientific paradigm of ideas approach), but as a multi-faceted
is integral to this operation—competition for- struggle for intellectual and political advan-
epistemological domains and objects of study tage between different groups and factions.
are inseparable from the advance of science. The sociology of knowledge has thus m o v e d
At the core of the institutionalization of the towards a m o r e sociological understanding
social sciences, as w e shall see, is the inter- of the question.
relation of ideological, scientific, political and The establishment of the Durkhèim
rational processes. T h e problem of the auth- school in France (1880-1914) is one of the best
ority of scientific pronouncements is thereby studied cases of institutionalization in the
posed: h o w is this authority created, im- literature on the sociology of knowledge. A s a
posed and institutionalized? F r o m the work result, w e k n o w more about the exact cir-
of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu cumstances in which Durkheim and his fol-
w e k n o w that science arises not from the lowers were able successfully to establish the
naivety of the m o m e n t of critical insight, but
discipline of sociology in France than w e
in a given social and intellectual conjuncture.2 do about any other case in the history of
All knowledge is therefore contingent. This the social sciences.4 Precisely because it has
raises s o m e important questions about the been studied in such detail, the establish-
sociology of knowledge and the institutional- ment of the Durkheim school is an especially
ization of the social sciences which will be useful one to consider in coming to some
dealt with in a brief conclusion. understanding of h o w disciplines are formed.
T h e central discipline in the French
university system in the nineteenth century
Institutionalization: was philosophy. It attracted the best and
the case of sociology in France most ambitious students, awarded the most
degrees, and by virtue of its control of
Recent studies of the origins of the modern the baccalauréat and agrégation examinations,
social science disciplines have considerably exercised its dominance over the educational
altered our sense of the ways in which they system. Towards the end of the century it
became institutionalized. Previously the study entered a period of prolonged intellectual
of the history of ideas had focused upon the crisis as a consequence of a fatal attraction of
intellectual origins of contemporary social spiritualism. This m o m e n t of crisis provided
science thought, stressing the influences of the opportunity for the emergence of n e w
successive generations of thinkers upon one disciplines. U n d e r the influence of positivism,
another, and the importance of intellectual Kantianism and rationalism (distinct minority
innovation.3 T h e implicit or openly avowed tendencies at the time), the intellectual con-^
aim of this approach was to valorize one's o w n ditions were created for the launching of
intellectual genealogy by connecting it to a proposals for the reorganization of the
prestigious chain of authorities, while simul- teaching of philosophy in the university which
taneously delegitimizing that of one's adver- stood s o m e chance of success. T h e D u r k -
saries by demonstrating the relative weakness heimian enterprise, it has been suggested,
of their intellectual tradition. can best be seen as one of the major efforts to
M o r e recently, scholars have b e c o m e resolve the crisis of philosophy in the univer-
The institutionalization of sociology in France 645

the French A c a d e m y . H o w can the insti-

tutionalization of sociology in the French
university system b e explained? Clark asks.
W h y only in its Durkheimian version? Clark
notes that at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury four schools of sociology existed in
France, yet only one of them, the D u r k -
heimians, were able to establish themselves
successfully in the university. T h e four schools
were: (a) the several groups of followers of
L e Play, (b) the social statisticians Bertillon
and Levasseur and their associates, most
of w h o m were employed in the government;
(c) the somewhat anomalous group gath-
ered around R e n é W o r m s , and his journal,
Revue internationale de sociologie and
Gabriel Tarde; and (d) the followers of
Durkheim.
Clark's approach focuses u p o n the insti-
tutional structures and emphasizes an inter-
active perspective. 'For most n e w fields to
develop,' h e argues, 'three fundamental el-
ements are essential: good ideas to build on,
talented individuals, and adequate insti-
tutional support.' 6 Clark notes that the
Durkheimians were able to succeed because
they were recruited from the most prestigous
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), played a leading role academic backgrounds, were-more coherently
in the institutionalization of sociology in France; organized than their rivals, were able to
portrait from Leçons de sociologie (reproduced impose their definition of the field within the
with permission from Presses Universitaires de
France). university (via Durkheim's The Rules of
Sociological Method,1 and his definition of a
'social fact'), and because they enjoyed the
sity b y changing the intellectual content of patronage of the president of the Sorbonne,
the p r o g r a m m e of study, as well as replacing Louis Liard. Rival groups, h e notes, were'
the spiritualists in the teaching corps with less favourably placed and less adroit in as-
n e w professors having a scientific and posi- serting their o w n claims to predominance.
tivist approach. 5 T h e importance of crises Through their writings, and still m o r e
in the authority of intellectual fields in the through the review, Année sociologique, the
emergence of n e w disciplines is a subject w e Durkheimians h a d the m e a n s to impose
will return to at the end of this essay. For their authority and definitions of the field.
the m o m e n t it is sufficient to note the intel- Clark argues that Durkheim's highly publi-
lectual context of the development of socio- cized debates with rivals, notably Gabriel
logy in France. Tarde and Georges Sorel enabled him to
clarify the boundaries of the field, and to
O n e of the first to study the emergence of
draw the attention of the public to his school.
the social sciences in m o d e r n France was
Terry N . Clark, whose b o o k and articles B y de-emphasizing Durkheim's ideas and
focused upon the context and strategies e m - focusing u p o n the strategies he employed to
ployed by the different contending groups in establish the n e w discipline, Clark provided a
646
n e w perspective o n the subject. Informative
as it is, however, Clark's approach has its
limits. Thus, for example, it cannot explain
the reception of Durkheim's ideas in France,
nor the sociological conditions that governed
their institutionalization. Indeed, upon reflec-
tion, Clark's schema stops asking questions
just at the point it should begin to do so. His
lack of close attention to the intellectual and
political context in which thefieldof sociology
developed makes his conclusions unsatisfac-
torily vague, if not wrong. H o w e v e r , thanks
to the work of the G r o u p e d'Études D u r k -
heimiennes, it is possible to c o m e a lot closer
to understanding precisely this aspect of the
question.8 A s a result, w e can attain a m o r e
satisfactory and complete understanding of
the general process by which the social sci-
ences have been institutionalized.
In order fully to understand the D u r k -
heim strategy, it is necessary to situate
sociology in the intellectualfieldof its day, as
well as to the institutional setting in which it
developed. According to Victor Karady, a
leading specialist, despite the unquestioned
prestige and charisma of Durkheim and the
Durkheimian quasi-monopoly of sociology
positions in the French university system,
their institutional weakness is clear. Karady
m a k e s a useful distinction between intellec-
tual and institutional prestige. H e argues that
despite the unquestioned intellectual auth-
ority of Durkheim and the recognized social
utility of the field, major institutional w e a k -
nesses seriously impeded the development of
the Durkheim school within the university.
Durkheimian sociology w a s never able to
establish its institutional autonomy from phil-
osophy, could not find a job market for its
graduates, and had degree programmes that
led nowhere. Also, the fact that sociology
developed in the Faculty of Letters, rather
than in the Faculty of L a w , meant that it had
greater difficulty in establishing itself, since
the social science fields that developed in the
law faculty were better able to assure their
autonomy and prestige. But it also benefited
from the higher intellectual standing of the
classic disciplines in letters, particularly phil-
Edmund Burke III
osophy. In s u m m a r y , from the perspective
of the dominant system of values of the uni-
versity, the requirements for advancing in a
career, and the hierarchy of the disciplines
in the French academic world, the Durkheim
school achieved at best only a partial success.
Finally, to round out the discussion, it is
important to consider the political and social
significance of sociology within the political
field of fin de siècle French society. T h e
central role of the social sciences in the period
was to aid in the elaboration of the republican
ideology of the embattled Third Republic.
T h e contribution of the Durkheimians was to
inculcate correct ideas facilitating the life in
c o m m o n of individuals and classes. Thus at
the close of his first year at Bordeaux,
Durkheim concluded his class o n the social
sciences with a definition of the social role of
sociology. According to him, since the social
problem resulted from the weakening of the
spirit of the collectivity, it w a s necessary to
reinstil a consciousness of the organic unity of
society:
Well, gentlemen, I believe that sociology is more
capable than any other science of restoring these
ideas. It is sociology which will m a k e the
individual understand what society is, as it will
complete him, and [show him] h o w small he is
[when] reduced to his o w n power. Sociology will
teach him that he is not an empire in the midst of
another empire, but the organ of an organism. It
will show him h o w good it is to carry out
conscientiously his role as organ.9
B y virtue of its republicanism, anti-clerical-
ism, Dreyfusard convictions, and non-Marxist
concern with the social question, Durkhei-
mian sociology was politically near the centre
of the politicalfieldof pre-war French society.
The Catholicism and internationalism of its
chief rivals—the L e Playists and the followers
of R e n é Worms—placed them in a less-
favourable position, and helped seal their fate.
T h e political centrality of sociology in the
liberal effort to reform society was not limited
to France. Neither was the ambiguous re-
lationship to the intellectual and political
legacy of Karl M a r x . T h e formation of the
The institutionalization of sociology in France
modern social science disciplines resulted
in the emergence of separate specialized
studies of different aspects of h u m a n exist-
ence. T h efieldof sociology split off from
political economy in the English-speaking
world, or from philosophy in France, and
elected as its domain the study of social re-
lations. Its formation, w e can n o w see, was
directly connected to the ripening of the
'social question' in nineteenth-century
Europe—the emergence of an increasingly
militant working class, and the challenge to
bourgeois order produced by the breakdown
of social structures. T h e work of Ferdinand
Tönnies, M a x W e b e r , Henry Maine, Auguste
C o m t e , Emile Durkheim, Robert Redfield
and Talcott Parsons all in various ways can be
perceived as responses to the dangers posed
by social anomie arising from the Industrial
Revolution, and as so m a n y dialogues with
the ghost of Marx. Thus, in some ways, the
development of Western sociology can be
seen as an attempt to deal with the social
disorder arising from the collapse of com-
munity by offering a theory of social order.
The basic postulates of the emerging disci-
pline of sociology considered social relations
as causal in their o w n right, apart from the
political or economic context.10
The sociology of Islam:
a discourse of domination
The definition of the field of sociology in
France excluded for all practical purposes the
study of colonial societies. This was left to the
odd amalgam of gifted amateurs, enlightened
colonial officials and (somewhat later) pro-
fessional ethnologists whose writings taken
together comprise the corpus of what was
then called colonial sociology. Despite the
extremely broad coverage of subjects in
Année sociologique, Durkheim showed little
interest in colonial societies, while Marcel
Mauss and his other principal collaborators
were only slightly m o r e attracted by colonial
subject-matter. There seems little doubt that
647
the lack of prestige of the study of colonial
subjects in France played an important part in
the establishment of this de facto division of
labour. But the resolutely metropolitan intel-
lectual orientation of the Durkheim group had
perhaps even more to do with it: in contrast to
the- emerging anthropological profession in
the English-speaking world, with its cel-
ebration of field-work, the Durkheimians
were against such participant observation and
in favour of utilizing printed sources.11 T h u s
it was that sociology as an academic discipline
in France emerged bifurcated, with the high-
prestige Durkheimians focusing o n the di-
lemmas of modern society, while the soci-
ology of the colonies was left to ethnologists.
O n e of the most important branches of
French colonial sociology was the sociology of
Islam. A n exploration of its several dimen-
sions can help us to understand not only the
process of institutionalization, but also the
political and social context of ideas, and their
consequences in policy. T h e most important
aspect of the sociology of Islam, as w e shall
see, was less its intellectual importance or its
institutional significance in France, than the
political potency of its discourse.
The French tradition of the empirical
study of Muslim societies began in 1798 with
the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt. T h e
central paradigms of the tradition were laid
d o w n in the volumes of the Description de
l'Egypte (23 vols., Paris, 1809-23), and devel-
oped subsequently in Algeria (1830-70) and
Morocco (1900-30). T h e major phases of its
development correspond to the shifting pat-
terns of French colonialism. B y the outbreak
of the Algerian war in 1954, it had become a
mummified version of its former self, and in
its evident inability to explain the outbreak of
the war, or its raison d'être, collapsed under
its o w n weight. S o m e h o w a tradition that had
begun with aspirations of bringing the fruits of
the French Revolution to the lands of Islam
had become an apologist for empire, a dis-
seminator of racist stereotypes, and a pro-
ducer of irrelevant folklore. It is n o accident
that the life-span of this intellectual tradition
m a y be demarcated by the beginnings of
648
French imperialism in the Middle East, and
its bloody and convulsive end.
If w e examine the French tradition of the
sociology of Islam in historical perspective, it
can be seen to consist of three broad strands,
the complex patterning of whose interactions
over a century and a half constituted the
field.12 T h e Algerian experience is in m a n y
ways paradigmatic for what was to come later.
These were the traditions of the Arab B u -
reaux, the civilian amateurs, and the aca-
demics. Attached to real social forces with
real interests and perceptions of the so-
ciety, these three groups are of primary im-
portance in understanding not only the un-
folding of the intellectual field, but also
m u c h of the dynamics of French colonial
politics.
T h e most important of the three as they
developed in colonial Algeria was the military
tradition of native-affairs officers embodied in
the Arab Bureaux. F r o m these 'Robinsons
galonnés', as Jacques Berque has called them,
came a major share of the most important
works on Algerian society, customs and re-
ligion.13 T h e officers were especially con-
cerned with uncovering the structures of
tribal society, no less than its 'moral topo-
graphy' and material culture. T h e second
major strand of French sociology of Islam
was the work of civilian amateurs and ex-
plorers, whose writings were coloured by
their direct interest in the acquisition of
land, and the well-being of settler society.
Their intellectual contribution to the field
was the weakest of the three. If that contri-
bution is assessed in political terms, however,
it emerges as fundamental.
The intensification after 1871 of the
debate in colonial Algeria between settler
, interests and the chief protectors of the
Muslim populations, the Arab Bureaux, led to
the growing politicization of French eth-
nography. F r o m a quasi-autonomous intel-
lectual by-product of the Arab Bureaux, the
ethnography of Algeria became increasingly
dominated by the discourse of French col-
onial politics. N o longer a serious threat,
Muslims did not have to be taken seriously.
Edmund Burke III
There was thus little incentive to study them.
Between 1871 and 1919 the stereotypes of
the colonial vulgate crystallized into a racial-
ist image of Algerian society.14 Though el-
ements of this view can be found in earlier
writings, what is n e w about the post-1871
version is its comprehensive character, and
the effort to forge a systematic policy based
upon them. I shall have more to say about
the development of the discourse of the socio-
logy of Islam further on in this essay.
French academics, the third strand of the
sociology of Islam, emerged as a distinct
group only after 1871, in response to the
expansion of French education and the devel-
opment of the social sciences in their modern
forms. T h e individual w h o more than any
other endowed the academic study of Alge-
rian society with prestige and legitimacy was
Emile Masqueray. His Formation des cités
chez les populations sédentaires de l'Algérie
appeared in 1886. 15 A graduate of the pres-
tigious École Normale Supérieure, Masqueray
was at the centre of the intellectual currents
of his time, rather than on the fringes as
were the other French Algerian academics.
Although he did m u c h to establish the École
d'Alger as a respectable provincial institution,
and might have been the Durkheim of the
sociology of Islam (he was not lacking in
ambition: his thesis was a frontal attack on
the work of Fustel de Coulanges, the leading
historian of his time), he wasfinallyunable
to transcend the crippling effects of the pol-
iticization of colonial sociology, and had no
disciples.
The emergence of a group of French
academics interested in the study of Algerian
society comes into sharp focus with the
establishment of the École d'Alger, in par-
ticular with the group that gathered around
René Basset at the end of the century. A
manifestation of m a n y of the same forces that
had led to the transformation of French
higher education at the end of the nineteenth
century (including the crystallization . of the
Année sociologique group which gathered
around Durkheim), the École d'Alger group
possessed considerable ambitions. In E d m o n d
The'institutionalization of sociology in France
Doutée, they had an important intellectual
leader, whose sociology was largely self-
taught, but w h o w a s able to attach himself
through s o m e artful manoeuvring to the D u r -
kheimians. 16 T h e intellectual production of
the École d'Alger group focused upon the
study of folklore, popular religion, and dialec-
tology—that is to say, subjects of lesser
interest and intellectual ambition. It was also
highly politicized, exacerbated especially by
the atmosphere of chauvinism which domi-
nated the period that led to the Morocco
Crisis of 1905. O n the eve of its professional-
ization, then, the sociology of Islam (and of
Algerian society) had generated a discourse
that was profoundly imbued with and shaped
by the fact of the French colonial presence.
H o w and w h y did this c o m e to be the case,
and with what effect? H e r e a brief detour
seems in order.
T h e study of Islamic subjects in France
was dominated by the discipline of oriental-
ism, an intellectual tradition grounded in the
discipline of philology and concerned with the
study of classical texts produced by Asian
peoples as exemplary models of the different
aspects of their civilizations. In its Islamic
studies variant (which here includes what I a m
calling the sociology of Islam), Orientalism
claimed to speak in an authoritative voice
about Islamic civilization based on a knowl-
edge of the relevant languages. Like other
Asian civilizations, Islamic civilization was
said to be defined by s o m e essential traits,
which the orientalist, by virtue of his training
was best placed to discern. T h e highly
interested (not to say racialist) character
of m u c h of orientalist production has been
pointed out by numerous authors, myself
included.17
T h e critics of orientalism have d e m o n -
strated the numerous ways in which it w a s
characterized by distortions, misrepresen-
tations, and errors in the portrait it painted
of Islamic societies. But it has taken the publi-
cation of Edward Said's remarkable Oriental-
ism18 to demonstrate the ways in which
orientalism constitutes a discourse in the
Foucaultian sense of the term. 19 Said's contri-
649
bution is to show h o w the development of the
discourse of orientalism was shaped by the
particular context and auspices under which
thefielddeveloped.
Orientalism is thus a timely effort at the
deconstruction of an entire intellectual tra-
dition, and its political and cultural corre-
lates: imperialist domination and the literary
and artistic image of the exotic East. Through
a detailed study of the work of some of the
major orientalists of the period (chiefly
French and British)—Silvestre de Sacy, Ernest
R e n a n , E d w a r d Lane, Louis Massignon, and1
H . A . R . Gibb—Said explores the c o m m o n
assumptions and attributes of the practice of
orientalism. His chief concern is with oriental-
ism as a discourse of power, which by a series
of calculated intellectual moves was able to
assert the dominance of the West over East-
ern peoples. B y drawing attention to the
ways in which orientalism represents its sub-
jects, through figures of speech, rhetorical
flourishes, and narrative devices, as well as to
the audiences for w h o m orientalist production
was intended. Said shows the pervasiveness
of the orientalist version of the history of
Asians. Said argues that orientalism creates
not only knowledge, but in a sense the very
reality it claims to describe. B y reducing
Islamic civilization to a few key texts that
purport to explain everything that needs to
be k n o w n about it, rather than confronting
the universe of alternative texts not selected,
or the manifold complexities of actual
existing Muslim societies, the orientalist as-
serts his authority over them: that which can
be k n o w n , can be controlled. T h e connections
that bound orientalism to imperialism were
never very far from sight.
Crises in authority
All disciplines in some sense generate a
dominant discourse, and are outgrowths of
particular intellectual contexts. All as well are
located within the politicalfieldof their time.
W h a t the example of the sociology of Islam
makes clear in a particularly dramatic way is
650
'Orientalism creates not only knowledge, but in a sense the very reality it claims to decry.'
A n Orientalist painter at work in El-Kantara, Aurès region, Algeria, at the turn of the century. Roger vioiiet.
that discourses are powerfully moulded by
these contextual factors, often in ways quite
unforeseen. Both the authority of dominant
schools (like the D u r k h e i m school, or the
École d'Alger), and their political potency in
the societies in which they existed derive from
these considerations. W h a t w e c o m e to under-
stand as a result of these examples is the
degree to which and the manner in which all
knowledge is knowledge for, that is connected
to, power and its exercise. But, w e m a y ask,
are social science discourses (as Said uses the
term) iron cages that irrevocably trap the
minds of their practitioners, orienting
thoughts and feelings without alternative,
even as they generate authoritative versions
of their object.of study? H o w can w e under-
Edmund Burke III
stand the relationship between the institution-
alization of the social science disciplines,
the consequences (both political and intel-
lectual) of the discourses they generate, and
the fact of change? A consideration of the
role of crises in the authority of disciplines
in their fates and that of the discourses. to
which they have given rise can illuminate this
question.
A curiosity of the word 'discourse' not
remarked by either Foucault or Said, is that in
its root meaning, it implies a shuttling back
and forth between subject and object, in-
terrogator and interrogated. A discourse,
then, refers less to an assertion of power
and authority, than to a m o r e complex and
dialectical relationship. Such an observation
The institutionalization of sociology in France
Algerian Women in Their Quarters, oil painting by Eugène Delacroix (1798-1863), Louvre M u s e u m . Buiioz.
prompts a reassessment of h o w the dis-
course of orientalism w a s constructed, but
also of the ways in which discourses and disci-
plines c o m e into existence. Finally, it suggests
a reconsideration of the role of crises of
authority in the production and reproduction
of knowledge.
Is orientalism the authoritative represen-
tation of Asian realities as part of a discourse
of power and domination? Such a view, while
coveying a certain truth, places the emphasis
upon what orientalism as a discourse does,
rather than o n the process by which it has
emerged, and reifies rather than explains.
B . S . C o h e n , in a forthcoming work, studies
the emergence of the tradition of British
orientalism in India.20 A crucial example
651
from this unpublished study brings the ques-
tion of the nature of the discipline into high
relief: it is the compilation of thefirstSans-
krit-English dictionary. W h a t C o h e n has dis-
covered is the extent to which the diction-
ary was not just a manifestation of British
power to n a m e and control the very language
of India, but a m u c h m o r e complex and
mediated joint product in which both British
orientalists and Indian pundits were active.
T h e words included in the dictionary, n o less
than those discarded, and the meanings at-
tached to them were the result of discussion
and debate. M u c h the s a m e w a s the case of
the mapping of the boundaries of the Indian
languages—again the result is far from a
straightforward application of power. T h e
652
discourse thus generated was reflective of the
interests of the informants no less than of the
imperial designs of the colonial overlord. If
there is a textualism of the orientalist, w e are
reminded, there is also the textualism of the
guardians of the sacred scriptures. Each makes
use of the other; each serves and is served in the
elaboration of the resultant product.
T h e image of a discourse as a mere
expression of authority and power is false in a
second respect which a brief consideration of
the so-called crisis of orientalism makes clear.
T h e intellectual origins of nationalism in m a n y
Asian and Islamic countries have been care-
fully studied. O n e finding, not generally m a d e
in this context, is the w a y in which the
writings of orientalists could and did serve as
authorizing and legitimizing sources of the
emerging nationalist counter-discourse. These
philo-orientals, as they m a y be called, played
a crucial role, for example, in the intellectual
roots of Indian nationalism. David K o p f
(among others) has shown h o w the work of
E . L . Jones and his collaborators were seized
upon by some of the earliest nationalists
( R a m m o h u n R o y a m o n g others) to validate
the greatness of the past of Indian civilization,
and the hope of its resurrection in the pre-
sent.21 Similar observations have been
m a d e for nationalism in Turkey, Egypt and
Iran, where once again the writings of the
philo-orientals (men like Leon Cahun, W . S.
Blunt, and Arthur de Gobineau) played an
important role in providing inspiration and
legitimation for thefirstgeneration of cultural
nationalists.22 M u c h the same uneasy re-
lationship between nationalists and revisionist
Western historians can be observed in the
development of the Algerian nationalist coun-
ter-version of the colonial period of Algerian
history.23 If w e study the elaboration of a
nationalist counter-discourse, then, once again
w e remark the complex relationship between
the orientalist and oriental. In s u m , orien-
talism was a negotiated product deriving from
the reciprocal relationship between the
studiers and the studied, the seeds of its
destruction as a discourse already planted at
the m o m e n t of itsfirstsprouting. This relation-
Edmund Burke III
ship was necessarily both an intellectual and a
political one. Both the origins and significance
of the crisis of orientalism of the present era
take on a rather different coloration when seen
from this angle, and the limitations of the study
of discourse appear more clearly.
W h a t is the role of crisis in the trans-
formation of disciplines? W h a t sorts of crises
result in enduring transformations in disci-
plines, and which ones do not? It is in the
nature of things that disciplines are always
undergoing challenge. It is also clear that
disciplinary paradigms can be consolidated
only by excluding those elements of. the
discipline that call the credentials of the disci-
pline into question. H o w can w e distinguish a
serious crisis likely to result in a n e w break-
through from the quotidian trumpeting and
clash of academic elephants?
For example, just n o w in the United
States m u c h has been m a d e of the attack
Derek Freeman has launched on the work and
reputation of the late Margaret M e a d . 2 4 The
challenge is directed at fundamental issues:
the validity of field-work (the hallmark of the
discipline) and beyond it some of its basic
assumptions. W h a t has m a d e Freeman's at-
tack significant is that he explicitly connected
it to a generalized assault on what he calls
'cultural determinism', and with it the school
of Franz Boas, A . L . Kroeber, and Robert
Lowie. In its place he argues for the primacy
of biological determinism, and the socio-
biology of Edward Wilson and his school. In
fact, in the guise of an attack on M e a d ,
Freeman seeks to discredit the governing
paradigm in American anthropology since the
1920s—the notion that h u m a n beings are the
products not only of nature (as propounded at
the time by the pseudo-science of racist
eugenics), but also of 'nurture', that is of
culture. Franz Boas and his disciples (among
them Margaret M e a d ) werefightingto estab-
lish the legitimacy of their position in the
1920s. T h e stakes in the Freeman/Mead
debate are therefore extremely high. But it
is unlikely to result in any significant trans-
formation of the discipline.
A complete explanation cannot be given
The institutionalization of sociology in France 653

here. It is perhaps sufficient to note the founder, Alfred LeChatelier, w h o held the
marginal position of both M e a d and Freeman chair of Muslim Sociology and Sociography at
in the discipline, the lack of any rival insti- the Collège de France. I have elsewhere
tutional network (Freeman's attack, despite reviewed the remarkable openness of the
its claims to wider relevance, is largely ad Revue to the currents of the age, its refusal to
feminam—he himself has no school, and is hypostasize Islam and Muslims, its love of
not a m e m b e r of one). Finally, the challenge dialogue. All of these traits were distinctively
of psycho-biology to the discipline of anthro- new, and posed a sharp challenge to the older
pology (and indeed the whole nature/nurture orientalist view, which concentrated upon
debate) has long been settled as far as texts, spoke of Islam as a timeless essence,
American anthropologists are concerned: in- and resolutely refrained from recognizing the
deed it was precisely this debate which helped dynamism of Muslim societies in the period.
launch the profession in its modern form. A s a W h y then did thefirstcrisis of oriental-
result, the positions taken by each side are ism, though it possessed m a n y of the features
k n o w n , and established defences exist against of the crisis that gave birth to sociology in
them. It is not in this way that the discipline of France, not giveriseto a modern discipline of
anthropology will be overthrown. the sociology of Islam? It is not possible to
A second negative example will permit us give a fully adequate answer here, because of
to grasp the point more completely. In m y constraints of space. Those interested are
o w n research on the French sociology of Islam referred to m y above-mentioned essay. But
I have argued that the field underwent a the answer has several parts. O n e has to do
period of profound crisis in the period 1890- with the particular historical context for re-
1914. T h efirstcrisis of French orientalism, as lations between France and Islamic societies
I have called it, was an expression of the more early in the twentieth century. T h e uncertain-
general crisis of French higher education out ties of the French colonial offensive in M o -
of which the modern disciplines (notably the rocco in the period 1890-1904 created an
Durkheim school) emerged. 2 5 That is, it was opening for views that did not agree with the
a crisis in the conception of the field, its stereotypes of the colonial vulgate view of
internal organization, and its relationship to Muslim society.
the larger intellectualfieldof French science. Secondly, and more generally, the period
In this period something called the sociology is one of unusual openness in the relations
of Islam in a modern sense first emerged. between European and Muslim liberals. In
N e w institutions were created, n e w journals their c o m m o n hope for the establishment of
launched, claims were m a d e to the scientific constitutional regimes, representative govern-
status of the n e wfield,and n e w conceptions ments and the principle of the rule of law, and
of the work process were developed: just their c o m m o n awareness of the forces in their
the sort of thing that characterized the o w n societies which threatened these pos-
Durkheimians. itions, European and Muslim liberals had
T h e crisis was simultaneously a crisis m u c h upon which they could agree. T h e
within the orientalist paradigm itself, a break Revue du monde musulman is the fruit of this
with its stereotypes and essentialism, a m o - joint political expectation. T h e shifting of
mentary openness to the historicity and var- political winds with the First World W a r
iety of the Muslim peoples, a time when M u s - undermined the basis on which this m o m e n -
lims themselves where permitted to appear as tary openness could exist, and the old orien-
both the subjects and objects of study. T h e talist paradigm reasserted itself.
prime expression of this aspect of the crisis The primary reason w h y the so-called
was the journal, Revue du monde musulman, first crisis, of orientalism did not yield a new
which appeared from 1906 to 1926. It was school or a modern discipline of the sociology
'ni orientaliste, ni colonialiste', according to its
of Islam, then, is because the field itself was
 654 Edmund Burke III

so politically saturated that any h o p e of a to lead to a transformation of thefieldand

fundamental transformation was crucially de-
pendent u p o n particular political conjunc-
tures. A slight shift in political currents, and
the opening w a s closed. Finally, the relatively
marginal intellectual position of both the
École d'Alger and of Alfred LeChatelier to
the emerging French mainstream social sci-
ence disciplines further w e a k e n e d any possi-
bility of a m o r e fruitful outcome of this
fortuitous m o m e n t .
T h e study of a crisis which in fundamen-
tal w a y s might very well have been expected
lead to the forging of a n e w paradigm and the
crystallization of a n e w discipline, but which
did not, is therefore particularly interesting. It
permits us to see h o w the ways in which the
authority of discourses is created, imposed
and institutionalized depends u p o n a complex
interrelationship of intellectual and political
forces, as well as u p o n the place of the
intellectual challenger within them. T o study
the institutionalization of the social sciences
and their impacts must necessarily involve an
uncovering of these relationships.26

1. See, for example, Clifford
Geertz, 'Blurred Genres',
American Scholar, 1980,
pp. 165-79.
2. Michel Foucault, The Order
of Things: An Archeology of the
Human Sciences, Paris,
Gallimard, 1966, Vintage Books
edition, 1973; Pierre Bourdieu,
Esquisse d'une théorie de la
pratique, Geneva/Paris, Droz,
1972.
3. For two of the most
influential examples of this
approach, see Raymond Aron,
Main Currents in Sociological
Thought, 2 vols., N e w York,
Basic Books, 1965; French
edition: Gallimard, 1967;
Talcott Parsons, The Structure
of Social Action, 2 vols.,
N e w York, McGraw-Hill, 1937;
reprint: Free Press, 1968.
4. O n Durkheim, see among
other works Terry N . Clark,
I Prophets and Patrons: The
French University and the
Emergence of the Social
Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.,
Harvard University. Press, 1973;
Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim:
His Life and Work, London,
Allen Lane, 1973; and the
several special issues of the
Revue française de sociologie on
Durkheim ' À propos de
Durkheim' Vol. XVII, N o . 2,
1976, and 'Les Durkheimians'
Vol. X , N o . 1, 1979, especially
the articles by Philippe Besnard .
and Victor Karady.
•5. Victor Karady, 'Stratégies de
réussite et modes de faire valoir
de la sociologie chez les
durkheimiens', Revue française
de sociologie, Vol. X X , N o . 1,
1979, pp. 54-6.
6. Clark, op. cit., p. 242. See
also his 'Emile Durkheim and
the Institutionalization of
Sociology in the French
University System', Archives
européennes de sociologie,
Vol. IX, 1968, pp. 37-71.
7. First published in 1895, and
now a classic in the history of
the social sciences, this volume
is important for its authoritative
definition of the scope of the
field. It played an important role
in shaping the parameters within
which sociology developed in
France until the Second World
War.
8. The following is based upon
two articles of Victor Karady,
'Durkheim, les sciences sociales
et l'Université: bilan d'un semi-
échec', Revue française de
sociologie, Vol. XVII, N o . 2,
1976, pp. 267-311, and
'Stratégies de réussite et modes
de faire valoir de la sociologie
chez les durkheimiens', ibid.,
Vol. X X , N o . 1, 1979,
pp. 49-82, as well as Philippe
Besnard, 'La formation de
l'équipe de l'Année
sociologique', ibid., Vol. X X ,
N o . 1, 1979, pp. 7-31. See also
Lukes, op. cit.
9. Durkheim, quoted in
Georges Weisz, 'L'idéologie
républicaine et les sciences
sociales: Les durkheimiennes et
la chaire d'économie sociale à la
Sorbonne', Revue française de
sociologie, Vol. X X , N o . 1,
1979, p. 84.
10. Leon Bramson, The
Political Context of Sociology,
Princeton, N.J., Princeton
University Press, 1961; also
Alvin W . Gouldner¡ The
Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology, N e w York, Basic
Books, 1970.
The institutionalization of sociology in France 655

11. O n the relationship of literature, see among others, in Turkey, Montreal, McGill
French ethnography and the Anouar Abdel-Malek, 'The E n d University Press, 1964; Albert
Durkheimians, see Donald R a y of Orientalism', Diogenes, Hourani, Arabic Thought in the
Bender, Early French Vol. 44, 1963, pp. 103-40, and Liberal Age, London, Oxford,
Ethnography in Africa and the Abdallah Laroui, La crise des 1962; and Nikki R . Keddie,
Development of Ethnology in intellectuels arabes, Paris, Roots of Revolution An
France, Northwestern Maspero, 1974. English Interpretative History of Modern
University: Anthropology, 1964 translation: The Crisis of the Iran, N e w Haven, C o n n . , Yale
(Ph.D. dissertation). Arab Intellectual, Berkeley/Los University Press, 1982.
Angeles, University of
12. The following account is California Press, 1976. See also 23. Here the locus classicus is
drawn from m y 'The Sociology m y essays 'The Image of the Yves Lacoste, André Nouschi,
of Islam: The French Tradition', Moroccan State in French and André Prenant, Algérie
in Malcolm H . Kerr (ed.) Ethnological Literature: A passé et présent, Paris, Éditions
Islamic Studies: A Tradition and N e w Look at the Origin of Sociales, 1960.
its Problems, pp. 73-88. Malibu, Lyautey's Berber Policy,' in
Calif., Undena Publications, Ernest Gellner and Charles 24. Derek Freeman, Margaret
1980. Micaud (eds.), Arabs and Mead and Samoa: The Making
13. Jacques Berque, Le Berbers From Tribe to Nation in and Unmaking of an
Maghreb entre deux guerres, North Africa, pp. 175-99, Anthropological Myth,
p. 124, Paris, Éditions Seuil, London, Duckworth, 1973, and Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
1962. 'Fez, the Setting Sun of Islam: A University Press, 1983. Freeman
Study of the Politics of Colonial attacks Mead's early work on
14. O n the French colonial Ethnography', The Maghreb Samoa, especially her Coming of
vulgate and the Kabyle myth, Review, Vol. II, N o . 4, 1977, Age in Samoa (New York,
see Charles-Robert Ageron, 'La pp. 1-7. William Morrow, 1928). A
France a-t-elle eu une politique debate of major proportions had
kabyle ?' Revue historique, 18. Edward Said, Orientalism, been going on for the past six
Vol. 223, 1960, pp. 311-52. N e w York, R a n d o m House, months. A m o n g the more
1978. important contributions, see
15. Recently reissued, with an 19. For an important critical George E . Marcus, New York
important introduction by Fanny examination of Foucault's and Times Book Review, 27 March
Colonna, Aix-en-Provence, Said's use of the term 1983, and James Clifford, Times
Edisud, 1983. See also her essay 'discourse', see the review Literary Supplement, April
(with Claude Brahimi) ' D u bon article by James Clifford in 1983. For a Samoan view, see
usage de la science coloniale', History and Theory, Vol. 19, Robert Trumbull, 'Samoan
Le Mal de voir. Ethnologie et N o . 2, 1980, pp. 204-23. Leader Declares: 'Both
orientalisme: politique et Anthropologists are Wrong'.
épistemologie, critique et 20. B . S. Cohen, 'The New York Times, 24 M a y 1983,
autocritique, Cahiers Jussieu, C o m m a n d of Language and the p. 18.
N o . 2, Paris, Collection 10/18, Language of C o m m a n d ' ,
1976, pp. 221-41. unpublished manuscript, 1983. 25. For a more complete
Also his lecture, 'The Colonial discussion, see m y article, 'The
16. Lucette Valensi, 'Le Sociology of Knowledge', Santa
Maghreb vu du centre: sa place First Crisis of French
Cruz, University of California, Orientalism', in Vatin, op. cit.
dans l'école sociologique February 1979.
française,' in Jean-Claude Vatin
(ed.), Connaissances du 21. David Kopf, British 26. Pierre Bourdieu, 'Les
Maghreb : Étude comparée des Orientalism and the Bengal conditions sociales de la
perceptions françaises et Renaissance, Berkeley/Los production sociologique:
américaines, Aix-en-Provence, Angeles, University of sociologie coloniale et
Éditions du C N R S (in press). California Press, 1969. décolonisation de la sociologie',
in Henri Moniot (ed.) Le mal de
17. For an introduction to what 22. See, for example: Niyazi voir, Paris, Collection 10/18,
has become an extensive Berkes, The Rise of Secularism 1976.
Geography in the late twentieth
century: n e w roles for
a threatened discipline

Milton Santos

W h e n w e consider the multi-faced reality of of the Second World W a r , w h e n , through the

the world today, it is essential to recognize the shiftjo ajlobal outlook, an entirely n e w page
revolution in both history and science which in the history "of mankind was turned?
gives the sciences of m a n and society a O r course, today's world has been long in
prominent position a m o n g all fields of the making, and the internationalization pro-
knowledge. In a world thus restructured, a cess is no recent phenomenon. T h e trend
special role should be allocated to the science towards worldwide economic, social and poli-
of geography—the science of h u m a n space— tical relations began with the pushing back of
and w e must ponder the problems of ensuring trade frontiers in the early sixteenth century,
that this special science realizes its full poten- m a d e a rapid headway during the centuries of
tial and keeps pace with capitalist expansion, and
modern progress. Will hasfinallybecome an es-
inertia prevent geogra- Milton Santos is professor of geog- tablished fact at a time
raphy at the University of São Paulo,
phy from developing, or Brazil. H e has published several w h e n a n e w scientific and
will a n e w , re-invigorated books, including Les villes des pays technical revolution is
discipline begin to assert soiis-développés (1971), The Shared occurring and patterns of
itself? Space (1979) and Por uma geografia life on earth are suddenly
nova (1978). His address: rua Nazaré changing: relations be-
Paulista 163, apt. 64, 0548 São Paulo,
Brazil. tween M a n and Nature
The rediscovery have reached a turning-
and remaking of point as a result of
the world in the the tremendous power
age of science n o w at man's disposal.
Startling qualitative
and technology
changes are occurring: in
and the n e w role particular, the possibility
of the sciences of knowing everything and using everything
on jt_\yorld._ scale, which from n o w on will
From international to global form the background to social relations. It
makes sense to speak of a world-system,
K . Polanyi (1957) rightly spoke of The Great whereas in the past there w a s simply "a
Transformation when hailing the far-reaching tendency towards an international system
changes that have affected our civilization (Amin, 1980, p. 188).
since the beginning of the century. W h a t , Given the n e w scope of history, 'the en-
then, can be said of the.profound upheaval tire structure of the postulates and prejudices
that the world has experienced since the end on which our world-view was based' must be
658 Milton Santos

revised, according to G . Barraclough (1965, through dominant forms and techniques of

p. 10). M o r e recently, Katona and Strum- production which use the universal scientific
pel (1978, pp. 2-3) have critized our concep- labour envisaged by Marx (Mandel, 1980,
tion of economics, in which n e w phenomena p. 132). All these forms of production also
play too small a part, and have deplored a have a universal basis, and n o w depend on the
state of affairs in which factors such as finance existence of a world market.
are still being studied in a purely national Is the globalization process n o w com-
setting and not in their world context. Socio- plete? For m a n y , there can be no question of
logy as developed in the second half of the establishing universal social classes (Navarro,
nineteenth century, according to A . Bergesen 1982; Bergesen, 1980, p. 10) or a universal
(1980, p. 1), should be replaced by_a_wprldr- moral code, even if this were to be the moral
system approach, better adapted to the n e w code of states. Although multinational cor-
reality. porations are everywhere producing a trans-
C a n w e conclude that this world-system national middle class (Sklar, 1977), and
(Bergesen-and Schoenberg, 1980), regardless although institutions of a similar nature exist
of whether it is called world society (Pettman, in all countries, social classes are still defined
1979), or global system (Modelski, 1972) on a territorial basis, just as the aspirations
actually exists? It is alleged to be the corollary and characteristics of a people are still deter-
of linkages connecting the most distant and, in mined by their historical inheritance. States,
every respect, the most disparate of national which have increased in number with n e w
societies, as a result of the n e w conditions historical circumstances, m a k e up a world
governing life in society, namely, a capitalist system, but, taken individually, they offer
division of labour on a world scale, based on both an invitation and a barrier to outside
the development of the forces of production influence. Their action, even when authori-
throughout the world and operated by states tarian, is rooted in the past, and therefore the
and giant corporations or transnational underlying structures of the nation never
companies (Mazazavala, 1976, p. 43.) become fully universal. Nevertheless, global-
Universalization is n o w a fact: universal- ization is a phenomenon to be reckoned with.
ization of production, including agricultural Today, anything which is not globalized must
production, production processes and market- be defined in terms of globalization.
ing, trade, capital and the capital market,
goods, prices and m o n e y as a standard c o m -
modity, finance and debts, the model for An age of science and technology?
utilizing resources through universally inter-
related techniques (Breton, 1968, p . 112), O n e m a y disagree about the features of the
labour (i.e. the labour market and non- present age and about what it should be
productive work), the working environment called. W e are living through it, and nothing is
of firms and households; and universalization, more difficult than defining the present.
too, of tastes, consumption, food, culture and However, w e k n o w already that our age has
models of social life, universality of rationality encompassed a worldwide revolution which is
' in the service of capital, which have c o m e to not yet quite complete, but'whose effects are
enshrine an equally universal standard of apparent in every area of life. A s Lucien
morality, universality of a trade ideology Goldmann (1978, pp. 185-6) has said:
imported from abroad, universalization of
space, of society which has become a world
Since the Second World W a r , it has become
society, and of m a n , threatened with total more and more obvious to serious-minded re-
alienation. searchers that w e are faced with a third type of
W e live in a world in which all production capitalism, which goes by a whole series of
is governed by a worldwide standard of value, names: organizational capitalism, mass society,
Geography in the late twentieth century 659

Global economic relations: a Panamanian vessel at Kawasaki shipyard, K o b e , Japan. Pierre Biouzard.
660
etc. It is still capitalism, without a doubt, but
fundamental changes have occurred.
The w a y w e live today should prompt us to
remember Marx's warning that n e w historial
departures are doomed to be regarded as
mere counterparts of earlier, even defunct,
forms of social life, which they resemble
(Marx, 1970, p. 58).
W e believe, like m a n y others, that the
upheavals characteristic of this phase of hu-
m a n history are largely the consequence of
the unprecedented progress achieved in sci-
ence and technology. This is the age of tech-
nological capitalism, according to L . Karpik
(1972), or of the technological society, in
the words of H . Lefèbvre (1971).
W e m a y , of course, object that economic
development has always depended on scien-
tific progress (Tsuru, 1961; Jalee, 1969;
Bettelheim, 1967; A r o n , 1961; Ellul, 1954), or
recall, like Mandel (1980), that this is only the
third scientific revolution; on the other hand,
Heilbroner's question (1967), ' D o machines
m a k e history?' must be . raised again and
again. S o m e thinkers believe in a kind of
technological determinism (Ferkiss, 1969,
p . 30), while others warn against the dangers
of believing in a 'technological illusion'.
W e prefer to side with the latter without,
however, underrating the fundamental role
played by scientific and technological progress
in recent changes that have occurred on this
planet. Such a 'total transformation of the
foundations of h u m a n life' mentioned by
Bernai would have otherwise been impossible
(Richta, 1970, p . 43.)
There is n o w a true interdependence
between science and technology that did not
exist before. A s R . Richta (1970, p. 37) has
stated, nowadays 'science precedes technical
knowledge', although scientific achievement is
increasingly dependent on it. T h e resultant
technology is used worldwide and, where
circumstances are favourable, nothing matters
apart from a frantic .quest for profit. This is a
salient feature"of the present situation. T h e
fact that technology has become a foreign
element for m u c h of mankind, as pointed out
Milton Santos
by Herrera (1977, p. 159), has far-reaching
consequences; for its use throughout the
world, most frequently without regard for
local natural resources or manpower, causes
seriously false situations. This has come about
only because scientific work has always been,
directly or indirectly, harra&ed to production.
Science n o w has a directly productive role to
play (Thibault, 1967). ^ ^ ^ .
Misguided globalization
and misuse of science !
I T h e present-day shift „to a world scale is
\ misguided (Santos, 1978). T h e concentration
and centralization of the economy and of
political power, mass culture, the scientific
invasion of bureaucracy, and over-centraliz-
ation of decision-making and information,
are the root causes of worsening inequalities
between countries and between social classes,
as well as causing oppression and alienation of
individuals. It is thus not surprising that there
is a connection between world society and
world crisis. N o r is it surprising, though
regrettable, that this general trend has affec-
ted scientific activity itself.
The rediscovery of the planet Earth and
of m a n , in other words, the growth of
knowledge about them, yields only the two
terms of a single equation. That equation in
conditioned by production, in both material
and immaterial forms. T h e state of our
knowledge affects the tools that w e use, while
at the same time it often changes them
abruptly, and introduces constraints or ben-
efits, according to the conditions under which
they are used.
! W h e n science is co-opted by a technology
/ whose objectives are economic rather than
social, it becomes subservient to the interests
of production and of producers w h o reign
supreme, and it abandons any vocation to
serve society. It becomes a body of knowledge
confined to its practical uses, in which meth-
odology replaces method.
Knowledge that is corrupted by vested
Geography in the late twentieth century
A fifteenth-century m a p of the world. Arts Décoratifs.
interests and institutionalized on rigidly
restrictive lines eventually splits apart: the
result is not the desirable autonomy of scien-
tific disciplines, but their separation.- Econ-
omic developments widen these gaps and in- i
creasingly obscure the global perspective.],
and its corollary, a critical awareness of the
world as a whole. T h e work of the scientist
is thus deprived of a sense of purpose, and
must be carried out from purely pragmatic
motives to meet the requirements of those
661
w h o commission research work or control
educational institutions. W h e n scientific work
is chained to utilitarian goals, theory is div-
orced frompraxis (Gouldner, 1976). Hence
the likelihood-of" false theories achieving
practical success (Bunge, 1968). It is appro-
priate, then, to talk of the corruption of
science (Ravetz, 1977, p . 79).
T h e social sciences are no exceptions to
this rule. They have also been distorted by
this tendency. N o t enough emphasis has been
662
laid on the dangers of a monodisciplinary
social science that is unconcerned by the
relations—albeit universal—linking the multi-
farious components of society as a whole. O n e
of the most potent causes of the current crisis
in the social sciences m a y well prove to be
their insularity. M u c h of the intellectual
output in this field neglects comprehensive,
worldwide studies. This short-sightedness in
planetary terms is one of the signs that the
h u m a n sciences have gone astray.
Since they have become incapable of
distinguishing between principles and stan-
dards (Catemario, 1968, p. 74), and have
thus become degenerate, it is not surprising
that they n o w serve,theJnterests, often some-
what inglorious, of the world of production
in m a n y and various ways. Sometimes,
they commit themselves, without demur, to
the marketing of what is called h u m a n re-
lations, to all kinds of 'social engineering'
and to the production of ideologies to order
(Useem, 1976), thereby gradually reducing
their scope. T h e social sciences, then, support
a tendentious selection of major contradic-
tions: the state and transnational corpora-
tions, the state and the nation, growth and
impoverishment, East and West, develop-
ment and underdevelopment, etc., while ob-
scuring the real causes and predictable results
of interlinked phenomena.
B y narrowing their scope in this manner
and curtailing their field of action, they
b e c o m e internationalized while at the same
time they are incapable of taking a compre-
hensive and critical view of the world. Over-
specialization and loss of ambition to attain
any degree of universality are two aspects of
one phenomenon which leads to misuse of the
social sciences.
Geography does not escape this trend.
Developed partly for utilitarian ends, and
based on neo-classical and therefore aspatial
^economics, it was bound to contradict its o w n
nature. Its weaknesses therefore include a
lack of a clearly defined purpose and the
shaky theoretical and epistemológica! foun-
dations on which its practice rests. Moreover,
the absence of a more reliable system of
Milton Santos
reference accounts for the key role played by
this discipline in the inegalitarian reorganiz-
ation of space and of society, both locally and
internationally.
Fresh possibilities
for the h u m a n sciences
Although the present historical period is
typified by scientific activities that are very
often channelled into short-term, utilitarian
concerns, it is also showing signs of a different
trend. W h e n science becomes a direct force of
production, there is a corresponding increase
in the importance of man—that is, of h u m a n
knowledge—in the production process.
Knowledge permits broader and deeper fam-
iliarity with the planet, a true rediscovery
of the world and its vast possibilities, since
new value is attached to h u m a n activity itself.
O n e need only harness these tremendous re-
sources to m a k e them serve mankind. This
a long-term, though not impossible, task,
and it calls for the autonomy of science as
defined by W u t h r o w (1980, p. 30).
For the time being, local conditions
under the international economy tend to give
priority to technological requirements and
technical units, which are regarded as fixtures,
since the postulates of economics itself seem
to be organized around rigid technical
equations. W e must n o w find a w a y of
escaping from the dictates of technology and
subordinating technological choices to goals
that are m u c h wider even than the economy.
Clearly, then, this is by no means a technical
issue, nor does it concern the natural sci-
ences; on the contrary, it concerns the social
sciences, and gives them added responsibility.
Although historical needs inevitably pro-
duced it, the recent rediscovery of nature and
m a n should be attributed more particularly to
the biological and physical disciplines known
as 'the sciences'. It has also infused n e w
value, as yet inadequately measured, into the
'non-sciences', the disciplines concerned with
society and m a n , in the reasoned construction
of history.
Geography in the late twentieth century
N e w 'scientific' knowledge points to the
realm of the possible, whereas its concrete
embodiment depends m o r e on economic,
cultural and political circumstances. A s the
future is not unique but has to be chosen, the
social sciences should take the lead in the
voluntary construction of history, by ex-
panding their philosophical frame of refer-
ence to include the postulate that the teleo-
logical concerns are not an obstacle to the
faithful transcription of p h e n o m e n a .
N e w circumstances are both cause and
effect of a host of latent or actual possibilities
whose multiple patterns are a ^factor j)î
growing complèloty^r^differentiation. T h e
present Tieed is not to adapt tHé^ past, but
to overturn fundamental concepts, methods
of approach and paradigms of analysis. Conse-
quently, content, methods, categories of
study and keywords must all change at once.
A s a promise for the future, the growth
of possibilities concerns the entire world and
all mankind, but the historical and geographi-
cal implications of the possibilities are subject
to the laws of necessity. Divisions are seldom
clear-cut between the variousfields,but there
is reason to believe that, in tomorrow's world,
it is the h u m a n sciences that will broaden this
scope. Moreover, m a n y of the combinations
n o w possible are not desirable; others,
equally numerous, cannot be applied indis-
criminately to any country or region.
Regeneration
of a threatened discipline
A threatened discipline
T h e current importance of territory (to avoid
the term 'space') in the making of history is
probably indicated by the growing interest
that it attracts, not only a m o n g geographers
but also, and increasingly, on the part of town
planners, planners in otherfields,scientists in
fields as diverse as economics, sociology,
ethnology, political science, history, popu-
lation studies, etc. Both Neis Anderson (1964,
p. 5) and, m o r e recently, Pierre George
663
(1982, p . 1) noted that the so-called tra-
ditional subject-matter of geography w a s
being increasingly taken over b y various
specialists. ' O u r subject' is apparently better
studied by others, complains V . D . Dennison
(1981, pp. 271-2).
Moreover, geography, which has suc-
c u m b e d to the blandishments of the world of
production, m a y well be a victim of over-
specialization. A s early as 1957, M . Sorre
(p. 10; p p . 35-6), wrote of a threat of 'dis-
m e m b e r m e n t ' . J. Allan Patmore (1980)
drew attention to these dangers, and, de-
spite his scepticism, R . J. Johnson (1980)
nevertheless suggested that if it continued
along the s a m e route, the discipline w a s
heading for anarchy. T h e same concern
prompted Brian Berry (1980, p . 449) to say
in his presidential address to the Association
of American Geographers that the trend was
from pluralism to a free-for-all. Must w e there-
fore agree with M . E . Eliot Hurst (1980, p. 3 ) ,
w h o claims that it is a dying discipline? It
is, without a doubt, a threatened discipline;
but as things stand at present it is threatened
m o r e from within than menaced by related
disciplines.
T h e issue becomes m o r e complicated if
one adopts the view of R . J. Johnson (1980)
that there are as m a n y geographies as ge-
ographers, or if one agrees with H . Lefèbvre
(1974, p. 15) that
specialized texts inform readers about all kinds
of fields that are themselves specialized . . .
there is probably an infinite number of fields:
geographical, economic, demographic, socio-
logical, ecological, commercial, national, conti-
nental, global, etc.
Y . Lacoste (1981, p . 152) summarized these
two points of view to s o m e extent w h e n he
wrote:
In fact there are as many concepts of 'the
geographicalfield'or of 'the social field' as there
are 'schools of thought' in geography, sociology
or ethnology; in the extreme case, there are as
m a n y ways of viewing things as there are
664
individual personalities conducting investi-
gations within a scientific procedure.
Perceptions of the same things do indeed
differ because individuals differ. But should
all attempts to achieve an objective definition
of something be abandoned on that account?
If so, one would not k n o w where to begin
scientific work and one would always be
vulnerable to ambiguity. In fact, with regard
to the issue at hand, what is seemingly a
twofold problem must be reduced to a single
one. T h e problem is that of defining the field
of geography, whether regenerated or re-
defined, and thus of determining its subject-
matter and its limits (Holt-Jensen, 1981, p . 4).
In search of subject-matter: space
A system of reality, that is, a system m a d e up
of things and the life that sustains them,
implies laws: a structure and rules of oper-
ation. A theory, i.e. its explanation, is itself
a system, constructed in thought and with
categories that reproduce the structure that
determines the interlinking of facts. It m a y be
called spjtialjDrganization, spatial.structure,
organization.of.space," territorial structure or
simply space, but only the n a m e changes, and
this"is not of vital importance. O u r concern is
to find the analytical categories that will
enable us to build up systematic knowledge of
it, so that both analysis and synthesis become
feasible with the same components.
M u c h time and talent have recently been
wasted by geographers in fruitless semantic
debate. They have even indulged in the g a m e
of inventing new names. For example, some
prefer to speak about the spatiality or even
the spatialization of society, while rejecting
the word 'space', even if they m e a n social
space. However," the n e w geography calls for
a refinement of the concept of space and a
quest for new categories with which to analyse
it. W h e n A r m a n d o Correa da Silva (1982,
p. 52) said that there is no geography without
a consistent spatial theory, he also said that
this 'consistent spatial theory' is valid analyti-
Milton Santos
cally only if it rests on a 'conception of the
nature of space'.
¡ Space is neither a thing nor a system of
i things, but a relational reality: things and
| relations together~(Maboguhjë,' 1980, p . 58).
"Hence it can be defined only in relation to
other realities: nature and society, through
the m e d i u m of work. Space is therefore not,
as in conventional definitions of geography,
the result of interaction between m a n and
nature in the raw, or even an amalgam of
present-day society and the environment.
Space must be consideredas an indi-
visible whole, comprising both a certain ar-
rangement of geographical, natural and
social objects, and the life that runs through
them, that is to say, society in motion.
Content (society) is not independent of form
(geographical objects) and each form
contains a fraction of the content. Space,
then, is a set of forms, each containing frac-
tions of society in motion. Forms therefore
have a role to play in the achievements of
society.
A s a totality, society is a set of possi-
bilities. Totality, according to Kant, 'is plu-
rality viewed as unity', or 'the unity of di-
versity' according to A . Labriola (1902) and
E . Sereni (1970). That unity is none other
than n e w or regenerated essence whose pur-
pose is to cease to be a potentiality and
to become action. That content—essence—
can be compared to a society on the m o v e .
O r better yet, to its as yet unrealized
present.
. Embodied content, being that has
already become existence, is society moulded
into geographical forms, society which has
become space. Hegel's phenomenology would
speak of the transformation of total society
into total space. Society would be being and
space would be existence. Being is metamor-
phosed into existence by processes imposed
by its o w n determining factors, which m a k e
each form appear as a 'form-content', a sep-
arate entity capable, in its turn, of influencing
social change. It is perpetual motion, and
through this infinite process society and
space evolve dialectically.
Geography in the late twentieth century
'Do machines make history?' from Stanley Kubrick'sfilm2001: A Space Odyssey (1967). Edimedia.
The importance of space today
T h e globalization of society and of the
economy lead to the globalization of geo-
graphical space, infusing it with new signifi-
cance ( A m i n , 1980, p. 226). In the develop-
ment of society, each component has a dif-
ferent role in the m o v e m e n t of the whole, and
the roles differ from m o m e n t to m o m e n t .
Space today is acquiring fundamental
importance, for nature in its entirety is
becoming a productive force (Prestipino,
1973, 1977, p . 181). W h e n all places have
been affected, directly or indirectly, by the
needs of the production process, patterns of
selectiveness and hierarchies of utilization
also develop, with the active or passive
assistance of various agents. Hence there is a
reorganization of functions a m o n g the various
fractions of territory. Each point in space thus
becomes potentially or actually important; its
importance depends on its o w n virtualities,
665
whether natural or social, pre-existing or
acquired according to selective interventions.
A s production becomes globalized, the possi-
bilities of each place assert themselves and are
differentiated o n a world scale. With the
growing internationalization of capital and the
rise of transnational corporations, w e shall
observe a trend towards global rather than
national fixing of production costs, and
towards the equalization of profit returns^
owing to the international mobility of capital
(Mandel, 1978, p p . 187-8), while the search
for the most profitable areas will be a constant
factor.
So it is that geographical distinctions are
acquiring basic strategic importance, as noted
by Y . Lacoste (1977, p . 147). T h e ideal
location for a given firm can be chpsefl^frprn_
'ä|ar~Ross"et al. (1980) have recalled in this
connection that local projets today are sub-
jected to world constraints.
With regard to these new developments,
666 Milton Santos

w e m a y thus conclude that such specialized known as physical geography (Voropay, 1978,
uses of territory, whether originally natural or p. 616), whereas success has been more,
cultural, or due to political and technical difficult to achieve in the sphere of social
interventions, imply a true rediscovery of factors. In fact, it is hard for attempts at
nature, or at least, a total reassessment, in theorization in this field to get beyond the
which ^a^h gart,_each_lpcation, is given a n e w embryonic stage, even supposing that they do
"rolé and acquires a n e w value. not fail miserably or lapse into mere verbiage.
A s the phenomenon is a general one, it The internationalization of economics
might be claimed that the geographical nature , had m a d e it possible to speak of global cities,
of society which C . van Paassen referred to in I authentic links in the chain of multiple re-
1957 (Grano, 1981, p. 22) is n o w coming to Ilations which determine the shape of social
the fore. M a n isfinallygaining analytic and life on this planet (Santos, 1978). But, in
synthetic knowledge of the whole of nature, fact, space in its entirety has been globalized,
and is acquiring the ability to m a k e general and there is no longer a single point on the
use, on a world scale, of things around him. globe which can be regarded as isolated.
W h e n nature is given a n e w definition and its Geographical theory should therefore be
relations with h u m a n beings are cast in a n e w constructed on m u c h broader lines. A s long
mould, it becomes necessary to renovate the ago as 1950, J. F . Unstead was advocating
disciplines with which it is studied. In ge- the need for a 'world geography' or 'global
ography, n e w outlooks and a n e w ability to geography'. But plans to achieve this goal
work with universal laws will be needed. were not followed through. Vacillating be-
tween description and generalization from
Towards a global geography antiquity to the nineteenth century, geogra-
phy has never been able to describe every-
But was not geography already global? A thing or avoid generalizations that have
century ago, K . Ritter and Vidal de la Blache often been inconsistent. In the late nineteenth
spoke of the unity of the earth. A n author and early twentieth centuries, it opted for
such as K . Boulding (1966, p. 108), though theorization—or at least scientific indepen-
an economist, unhesitatingly affirmed that of dence—with the postulation of principles.
all the disciplines, geography was the one However, m u c h remains unknown about the
which viewed the earth as a global phenom- earth, and m a n y other branches of knowledge
enon to be studied. But, in a recent article, are still in their infancy. However, geography
V . D . Dennison (1981, pp. 271-2) seems be is making a tremendous effort to become
answering both yes and no in reply to the established as a science, although it has not
question, although, in his opinion, this disci- been entirely successful.
pline is synonymous with world studies. W e believe that the reason for these
T h e ambition to m a k e it global, that is to failures lies not in geographers' lack of talent,
say, the desire to embrace the totality of but in the fact that actual historical conditions
phenomena and express them in scientific were not ideal; hence the difficulties of
terms, is one thing; success in doing so is working out a geographical theory. Through-
another (McConnell, 1982, pp. 1633-4). out this century, while the debate on the true
The old tradition of national schools of nature of geography has merged with dis-
geography, or, at any rate, the historical cussion of its claims to be a science, more
assumptions underlying the development of substantial epistemological concerns have
geographical science in various national con- been set aside. Even efforts m a d e after the
texts, m a y have hindered attainment of the Second World W a r have yielded only a small
stage of global geographical studies. It is true portion of the expected results. W e believe,
that the concern to be all-encompassing has however, that historical conditions are n o w
w o n greater success in thefieldof what is ripe for establishing a geography that is
668 Milton Santos

both global and theoretically based, thereby empirical events and relationships prior to
fulfilling a century-old ambition. being grasped by the intellect.
W e can n o w say that the great universais
become empirical when, on the one hand, the
T h e globalization
practical development of technologies occurs
and the empiricization of categories independently of the recipient environment
and w h e n , on the other, all the technologies
N o w that the world has become global, what used are potentially the same everywhere.
will happen to geography? T h e world has, Technologies' independence of the environ-
undoubtedly, always.been-a-single-unit. H o w - ment and the globalization of the technologi-
ever, it has not always been possible to grasp cal model m a k e technology an authentically
its oneness,,, except in the, case of a few concrete universal (Ladrière, 1968, pp. 216-
p h e n o m e n a with more general impact, which 17; Breton, 1968, p. 114), the instrument of a
tend to occur outside the social field. Today, growing bond between times and places. W e
with the internationalization of techniques, are dealing with a homogeneous collection of
production and products, capital and labour, techniques which has become systemic be-
tastes and consumption, the globalization of cause it is governed and animated by global-
social relations in every respect (economic, ized international relations, and consequently
financial, political, etc.) is a guarantee of these are also unified in a system. Supra-
universality that allows every inch of space in national institutions and transnational cor-
the world to be understood in terms of global porations have a part to play in this scenario,
space. ' ','""""" together with major centralized bureaucratic
Only through such universality, which is organizations which o w e their existence to the
empirical, can certain philosophical categories worldwide expansion of transport and com-
be translated into geographical language with- munications.
out loss of meaning. This is true of the The universal value of the m o d e of
categories of universality, particularity andj production at the present m o m e n t is the
singularity and of the categories of form,| stepping-stone to universal concepts. Samir
function, process and structure, this last being A m i n (1980, p. 4) states that concepts of
synonymous with essence, defined through general applicability are generally valid, re-
the opposition—not yet sufficiently studied— calling that the feudal m o d e of production
between landscape and society of even be- does not necessarily have universal validity,
tween landscape and space. since it was an intrinsic part of a period of
Geography is n o w equipped to go beyond history and a place, namely Europe. H e also
the 'palaeo-dialectic' of classical and even thinks that M a r x failed to arrive at certain
present-day geographers. A s the 'zero law' of universal laws because of his limited ex-
the dialectic proposed by E . Marquit (1981, perience of social conflict and ignorance
pp. 309-10)—the law of universal intercon- of non-European countries, which at the time
nection—can be verified empirically, the role was quite usual. This is perhaps not quite
of contradiction in the process of developing true, but since internationalization has not yet
knowledge, rightly emphasized by Sean reached its current stage of development, it
Sayers (1981-82), is an absolute require- was often impossible to work out universal
ment. W e are succeeding precisely because categories.
the internationalization process that started T h e quantity of relations involved in the
nearly five centuries ago has become a functioning of society, the economy and the
globalization process. Until then, the concept political scene increases exponentially, so that
of totalization with which w e were able to the range of variables related to one particular
work was primarily an intellectual one, and object or phenomenon is m u c h greater today
not a fully fledged fact. Today, it occurs in than it was in the past. Broad generalizations
Geography in the late twentieth century
are therefore not only possible, but necessary,
and they are becoming both more systematic
and more sophisticated. Their basis, it should
be recalled, is empirical.
So w e could return to the old theme of
geography as a 'science of places', associated
with such names as Vidal de la Blache and
C. Sauer, or w e could revive this same dis-,
cussion with the debate on uniqueness, par-i
ticipants in which have inclu3èa"Hartshorne
(1955), James (1972), Schaefer (1953), G o u -
rou (1973), Grigg (1965), Kalesnik (1971) and
Bunge (1966, 1979).
A s places become more globalized,, so
they become more singular and specific:, unique /
in other words. This is attributable to the unre-
strained specialization of components of
space—people, firms, institutions, the en-
vironment—the ever-widening dissociation
of the processes and subprocesses required
for greater accumulation of capital, the in-
creasing number of actions which turn space
into a field of multidirectional and variously
complex forces, where every place is very
different from every other but also clearly
bound to alUhê,others.by_a^ngle_nexus_pro;y
duced by the driving forces behind the he-
gemonically_uniyersal ...pattern of accumu-
lation. Thus it seems that w e are faced with
a concrete totality, perceptible through a con-
crete dialectic, as presented by G . Lukacs
(1960) and by Karel Kosik (1967).
W e can no longer speak of a contradic-
tion between uniqueness and globalism. T h e
two are complementary and mutually ex-
planatory. A place is a point in the world
where some of the world's possibilities be-
come reality. A place is part of the world and
plays a role in its history, or, to quote
Whitehead (1938, p . 188), 'any local agitation
shakes the whole universe'. T h e world has
always been a set of possibilities; today,
however, those possibilities are all inter-
dependent.
Towards a new geography
Today, as w e have seen, technology is used
everywhere without reference to local, natu-
669
ral and h u m a n resource systems, and it is
superimposed on differing economic and
social situations. T h e results, which create
distortions and inequalities everywhere, give
each place special combinations, which are all
specific forms of the complexity of social life.
The problem is therefore that pLrecognizing
the effects of these jugerimpositions o n the
life of each society.
W a y s of bridging gaps between half-
formed possibilities and of building a n e w
history will be found in the complex sphere
where these data occur, in varying combi-
nations. Hence the renewed importance of
the sciences of space and of m a n , that is to
say, of geography, if w e are to gain proper
control of the forces n o w at our disposal.
Outgrowing the old framework, the n e w ,
larger and differentiated store of knowledge
and possibilities calls for a general re-ordering
of all the sciences, with redivisions and re-
arrangements in scientificfields,the creation
of n e w disciplines and the regeneration of
existing ones. T h e sciences must start afresh
from real circumstances which influence their
development and which are a challenge to
them. That challenge is primarily defined by
the n e w relations, already established or
already a possibility, between a society that
has become universal and the resources of the
world as a whole.
For geography, the n e w and dominant
factor is that which w e m a y call its historical
maturity, or all the n e w data that world
history imposes on the history of the disci-
pline. For geographers, w h o are professionally
concerned with h u m a n space, the n e w situ-
ation is a fascinating one. O n the one hand,
their_hflrizo_ns_are.^wid^ning, _since so-called
geographical space has become, m o r e than
ever before, IT fundamental "feature of the
h u m a n adventure. O n the other, the global-
ization of space creates the necessary condi-
tions—hitherto unfulfilled—for the establish-
ment of a conceptual framework, a system of
reference and an epistemology, a stock-
in-trade which has always been lacking in
this discipline, and which has accordingly
narrowed its field of study so far this century.
670 Milton Santos

T h e pledge of universality is a trump oping a science that is critically aware. T o d o

card, for it entails the possilility of better
understanding of every fraction of world
space in terms of global space, a n d thus
m a k e s it possible to recognize and interpret in-
terventions that have occurred while devel-
this w a s impossible before the world b e c a m e
truly a world-system, that is, before it b e -
c a m e at each and every the point the object
of action by variables o n a planetary scale.
[Translated from French]

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Development research and the
social sciences in India

T. V . Sathyamurthy

Introduction effort and the difficulties of gaining access to a

critical awareness of work done all over the
country.
During the last decade or so there has been a It is not our purpose to list, let alone
veritable explosion of institutions of higher summarize, the substantive concerns of the
learning and research throughout India in the fifty-odd institutes of research and develop-
fields of social science study as well as various ment in India or to focus upon any specific
aspects of development. N o t only traditional aspect of their work 1 or on the methods used
centres of higher learning such as universities, to organize research and the criteria applied
but also the central government, state govern- to choose questions for research. Our purpose
ments and various is to set the emergence of
autonomous and semi- an impressive number of
autonomous bodies, such T . V . Sathyamurthy is Fellow at such institutes in a con-
as the Indian Council of the Christian Michelsen Institute, text of development of
Bergen, Norway.
Social Science Research ideas concerning social
(ICSSR), and the Uni- science research and its
versity Grants Com- priorities as part of inde-
mission ( U G C ) , have pendent India's intellec-
taken initiatives in es- tual history. W e leave
tablishing such insti- out of account the great
tutions. Interdisciplin- volume and range of re-
ary, multidisciplinary as search carried out in
well as discipline-orien- numerous institutions or
tated research; policy ad hoc bodies on behalf
studies; data-gathering; of or under the aegis of
commissioned work as important government
well as work of more or less purely intellectual ministries, international agencies and other
or academic interest; and, research of a statutory bodies such as the Universities
speculative or future orientated kind, pour Grants Commission ( U G C ) .
out of these institutes. Yet, surprisingly,
It is useful to point out that, in no other
although individuals from these various insti-
developing country (with the possible excep-
tutes m a y have knowledge of what research
tion of Sri Lanka) w a s there already in
others are doing, there is a notable lack of
existence, at the time of independence, such a
knowledge of each other's work at an inter-
pool of trained personnel in the social sciences
institutional level. This has certain disadvan-
which could be entrusted with the bulk of
tages, the most serious being duplication of
research needed as a continuous back-up for
674
policy-making and for the generation of e m -
pirical data, theoretical models, or the
specification of relevant research problems as
could be found in India. T h e interesting
feature, given such an initial advantage, lay in
the fact that, during the firstfifteenyears of
independence, the growth of institutions of
higher learning and research in thefieldof
social science and development was incredibly
slow and partial. It was only during the period
subsequent to the early 1960s (and especially
during the 1970s) that centres of development
study and various other bodies devoted to
research in social sciences began to appear in
considerable numbers. T h e reasons for this
delayed fruition of India's potential are not
far to seek, as will become evident in the
course of this account.
Psychologically, too, it must be r e m e m -
bered that in India the climate for indigen-
ously initiated research on problems facing
the country's economy, society, political sys-
tem and culture was far more favourable than
research based on mechanically following the
example of developed countries. The psycho-
logical predilection in favour of nationally
rooted thinking is partly attributable to a
preference based on qualitative consider-
ations, buttressed by the specific course that
the nationalist m o v e m e n t took (stressing, for
example, swadeshi; indigenously evolved
techniques of non-cooperation and struggle
against the colonial power; the importance,
at least in principle, of the c o m m o n m a n as
the main beneficiary of social reform, pro-
gress, development, etc.), and partly also to
the fact that, in sheer quantitative terms, the
country had, at independence, a vast pool of
qualified social scientists (initially consisting
mainly of economists) which could be drawn
upon for extending horizons.
A caveat must, however, be added to this
general observation on Indian intellectuals.
Let us bear in mind that, at independence,
almost all Indians w h o had received university
education in the country or abroad had been
intellectually moulded by ideas, values,
theories, models and techniques generated
over a long period in Western institutions
T. V. Sathyamurthy
of higher learning, even though these were
ostensibly applied to problems of a specifi-
cally Indian nature in such fields as econ-
omics and, to a lesser degree, sociology and
anthropology. This meant that the same
educated and academically highly trained
people w h o gave their unqualified support to
the nationalist m o v e m e n t (led by Gandhi,
w h o attached great importance to Indians
refusing to be a part of the colonial, i.e.
Western, value system), were, in the context
of post-colonial India and by virtue of their
intellectual training, to provide a direction
to India's economic, social, and political
development that would be essentially along
. the path that had already been followed in
the past by countries that are n o w regarded as
industrialized, modern or advanced—be it
capitalist or socialist.
This duality of orientation derived from
their psychological preferences and intellec-
tual training being wide apart, was a dominant
feature of Indian research in the social sci-
ences until a n e w generation of scholars and
researchers emerged during the 1960s which
questioned the relevance of colonially in-
herited world views from different stand-
points, e.g. by returning to neo-indigenous
modes of formulating urgent problems facing
the country, by turning to n e w forms of
Marxism specifically responsive to conditions
of underdevelopment and dependence, or
by re-formulating Gandhian ideology to
suit contemporary Indian conditions.
The first phase (1947-60)
During thefirstfifteenyears after indepen-
dence, the main responsibility for research
and higher study in development and the
social sciences was borne by universities. For
decades before independence, departments
of economics (as indeed departments of
history) of a number of universities (chiefly,
but not only, the three Presidency universities
of B o m b a y , Calcutta and Madras) had suc-
ceeded in building up a corpus of research
on problems relating to the Indian economy
Development research and the social sciences in India
and to Indian economic and social history.
The B o m b a y School of Economics, under
C . N . Vakil, and the Madras University de-
partment of economics under the leadership
of John Mathai and P . J. Thomas, had been
specially active in research in the field of
Indian economics though they concentrated
on fairly orthodox fields such as public
finance, taxation, budgeting problems,
national income, etc., rather more than on
questions of development per se.
Yet, at independence, university depart-
ments of economics had an infrastructure and
adequately trained personnel which could
serve as nuclei for development-focused
research. In a limited sense, even prior to
independence, these university researchers in
economics had taken an interest in questions
of a developmental nature. Thus, the B o m b a y
School of Economics had been successful in
generating an impressive array of empirical
knowledge on the agrarian scene (though as
yet without the theoretical sophistication that
was to follow during subsequent years) under
the leadership of such teachers as Jathar and
Beri; and all the three Presidency universities
departments of economics were engaged in
work directly relevant to India's industrializ-
ation—work upon which, for example, those
engaged in drawing up the B o m b a y Plan
relied to some degree.
While the study of economics (and econ-
omic and social history) in universities had
been raised to a fairly sophisticated academic
level according to the standards prevailing in
metropolitan universities, the level of instruc-
tion and research in the other social sci-
ences—sociology, anthropology and political
science—was low (here again with certain
exceptions, e.g. Calcutta and Lucknow in
anthropology, and B o m b a y and Pune in
sociology) while interdisciplinary social sci-
ence was conspicuous by its near total ab-
sence throughout the Indian higher edu-
cation system.
T h e first crop of n e w economists re-
turning from abroad constituted the nucleus
of higher studies and research in the field in
independent India. In the new political order,
675
a disproportionate amount of importance
was attached to a knowledge of economics,
considered as the queen of social sciences
by the more intellectually inclined leaders
of India—both in government (e.g. Nehru,
Rajagopalachari, Krishnamachari and
Krishna M e n o n ) and in the opposition (e.g.
Asoka Mehta, Minoo Masani and Hridaya
Nath Kunzru). But neither interdisciplinarity
(or, for that matter, multidisciplinarity) nor
even balanced economic development (rural
and urban; agricultural and industrial) was
given m u c h importance during this phase.
A great deal of attention was paid to the
study of economics with special reference to
planning (and, of course, to modern theory)
and statistics (and latterly econometrics), as
well as to the economics of industrialization
and modernization of the Indian economy. 2
The main thrust of development-oriented
study of social sciences and research was felt
in n e w schools of advanced learning which
were established with government patronage
and liberal financial support. Within a few
years of their establishment, centres of re-
search and higher study such as the Delhi
School of Economics (subsequently also the
Institute of Economic Growth) and the Indian
Statistical Institute at Calcutta (subsequently
both at Calcutta and at Delhi) under the
leadership, respectively, of V . K . R . V . R a o
and K . N . Raj; and P . C . Mahalanobis
and C . R . R a o , acquired a considerable de-
gree of national and international prestige.
The more traditional departments of econ-
omics in the older universities were, to some
extent, eclipsed by these n e w centres of
research. A t the same time, a few indepen-
dent centres of research—mainly in the field
of economics—such as the National Council
of Applied Economic Research ( N C A E R ) ,
initially under the leadership of P . S . Loka-
nathan, also came into being.
Researchers w h o received their training
in these n e w institutions went on to teach
economics and statistics in some of the estab-
lished universities; but a substantial number
of them started departments of economics
in n e w universities (e.g. Jadavpur, Pune,
676
Baroda, Saugor, etc.) established during
the 1950s and 1960s. They inculcated in their
students a n e w awareness of quantitative
rigour and the need for empirical thorough-
ness, as well as of appropriate research
methods and techniques. T h e better depart-
ments of economics in India thus became
the production line of a vast corps of quali-
fied economists and statisticians, a large pro-
portion of which were absorbed in govern-
ment posts in the field of development and
planning, the remainder becoming teachers
and university researchers. There was also
s o m e brain-drain to more advanced countries
and to bodies such as the United Nations
and its Specialized Agencies from the ranks
of this n e w generation of Indian economists.
B y and large, during.thefirstphase of
India's independence, disproportionate atten-
tion was focused on economic aspects of
development in the research carried out in
universities. Other social sciences were not
encouraged nearly to the same extent, though
sociology was gradually beginning to c o m e
into its o w n by the early 1960s. Apart from
economics, only in thefieldof economic and
social history was there a steady growth and
accumulation of freshly researched knowledge
in Indian universities during this period.
During the latter half of the 1950s,
however, it was already becoming evident
that Indian universities were subject to enor-
m o u s pressures that rendered sustained re-
search of a high quality difficult to ensure on a
continuous basis. First, education being a
state prerogative under the Constitution,
most universities (with the exception of
national universities of which there was only
a handful) were controlled by state govern-
ments which had to cater to large numbers of
students with limited resources. Second, the
quantitative increase in access to education
of ever larger numbers meant that the qual-
ity of teaching and research inevitably suf-
fered. Third, the question of whether and
to what degree higher education ought to
be in the language of the state concerned was
never satisfactorily settled, and this led to
a great deal of confusion about the aim,
T. V. Sathyamurthy
scope and standards of higher education in
almost all states.
At the same time, the demand for devel-
opment of technological education was keenly
felt. Indian universities, which had had a long
tradition of engineering as well as medical
education, lacked (with the exception of very
few such as Benares Hindu University and the
much less well-known Pilani College and
Madras Institute of Technology) centres of
technological education and research. During
thefirstdecade of independence, the govern-
ment sought to fill this gap by planning to
establish, with the help of models adopted
from different advanced countries—the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the United States
and the USSR—Indian Institutes of Tech-
nology (IITs) to which recruitment of
students would be on the basis of an all-India
competitive entrance examination. In these
institutes (at Kharagpur, Madras, Powai near
B o m b a y , Kanpur and Delhi), undergraduate
and postgraduate students have been trained
in the entire gamut of technological and
associated 'pure science' disciplines, while aca-
demic staff have engaged in research and
publication activities in addition to their
normal teaching and examining work.
A characteristic feature of IITs has been
the importance attached in their curricula and
research programmes to the socio-economic
aspects of modernization and technological
development as well as to the humanities. The
departments of humanities in these centres
of learning are not mere adjuncts to a core of
technological subjects but consist of fine
complements of established scholars with
intellectually sound programmes of research
on the social and h u m a n implications of
technological developments in the Third
World in general and India in particular.
India's experience of this n e w kind of
educational enterprise has, however, thrown
into bold relief a few problems. IITs, by
virtue of their sheer size and the vast number
of disparate departments, soon became hot-
beds of interdepartmental competition for
resources. It was not long before the penchant
for heavily hierarchical bureaucratic styles of
University of Bombay, India. Roger Viollct.
functioning, for which India is noted, invaded
the corridors of power in these centres of
higher learning. Resentment and frustration
mounted not only among students but also
among the academic staff.'
More serious even than the erosion of
academic morale was the gap between the
quality, range and number of qualified young
m e n and w o m e n (belonging, it might be
added, to the cream of the Indian intelligent-
sia) produced by IITs on the one hand, and,
on the other, the capacity of the government
and various industrial and other establish-
ments in the country to absorb them in
suitable employment. A s a result, large n u m -
bers of graduates and research degree holders
from IITs have, oyer the years, emigrated to
the advanced countries of Western Europe
and North America. The very success of the
Indian Government's policy of technological
education, judged in terms of the quality of its
product, has thus resulted in a considerable
loss to the Exchequer while depriving the
country in the long term of the services of
some of its best-trained talent.
B y 1960, universities could no longer be
depended upon to ensure, on a predictable
basis, the promotion of research and higher
learning in the social sciences or in thefieldof
economic, social and political development. 3
A t the same time, the narrower vision of the
first decade of independence according to
which development was seen as essentially
economic in character and the crux of econ-
omic development was thought to lie in strat-
egies of rapid industrialization and in the
development of modern capitalist relations of
production under the auspices of state plan-
ning, was rapidly yielding place to a wider
and much more complex vision of the Indian
reality.
Economic development was seen, not least
678 T. V. Sathyamurthy

by the more sensitive a m o n g the econom- graduate study) were well placed to emerge.
ists themselves, as only a part of the overall Even so, it must be remembered that, during
process of development which was integrally this phase, social scientists continued to be
tied to social, political and cultural develop-shy of widening their disciplinary horizon to
ment; most important, in the Indian econ- m a k e economics a truly interdisciplinary part
o m y , the rural sector was going to be the of social science taken as a whole, though
dominant sector for the foreseeable future, there was a m u c h greater readiness on their
and, as such, agricultural production, agrarianpart to diversify their interest within econ-
relations, land reform, rural sociology, mofus-omics itself to include close attention to the
sil politics and agriculture-linked industry problems posed by the rural economy.
would have to be brought within the ambit of Thus, interdisciplinary research, initially,
academic research in a more systematic and had as its votaries researchers drawn from
rigorous manner than had hitherto been the non-economic subjects. A m o n g these were
case. the founders of what was thefirstcentre for
Thus the feeling grew, during the late the study of development, as an integrated
field of study—the Centre for the Study of
1950s, a m o n g academics, professional people,
government leaders and some bureaucrats Developing Societies ( C S D S ) established in
that Indian development problems should 1963 under the leadership of Rajni Kothari, a
be studied in a genuinely interdisciplinary leading political scientist, with the help of
manner and that, even in economic research, foreign finance, which, at the time, was not
greater attention should be focused on rural tainted by suspicion. Here, research was
society, and on the balance between agricul- undertaken on political participation, psycho-
ture and industry in the emerging Indian logical aspects of politics, psychiatry, rural
economy. A t the same time, with the rapid sociology, cultural psychology, studies
expansion of the public sector and the increas-of political attitudes, politics of intercommu-
ing interest evinced by the state governments nal relations, urban development, d e m o -
in economic and social development and cratic decision-making and problems of
planning within their jurisdiction, the climatenation-building. The approach was largely be-
had become suitable for establishing separate havioural though in more recent years this
centres of research and higher study in the has been tempered somewhat by other orien-
field of social sciences and development rathertations and by systematic attempts to collect
than continuing to rely on universities to takeand store different kinds of empirical data
over an expanded agenda and to carry out the of state and district level politics obtained
tasks involved to which, clearly, they were no from various parts of India.
longer equal. T h e uneasiness expressed in a number
of quarters throughout India over foreign
funding of development and social science
research institutes4 indirectly served to stimu-
The second phase (1960-70) late the establishment of national and
indigenous higher institutions in these
5
T h e years of prospective thinking underlying fields. In fact, the 1960s constituted the
the Third Five Year Plan in the government, seed time of such activity, and the period
which reflected to a considerable degree the during which more and more thought was
need for information and knowledge in fields bestowed upon development studies as a cog-
that ranged far beyond economics, narrowly nate field of research and higher education.
or technically conceived, spawned a general Apart from C S D S and a few centres of
climate in which centres of development area studies established in certain universities
studies and social science research (with or (e.g. Delhi, Rajasthan and B o m b a y ) , the
without facilities built into them for post- period under review was noteworthy for the
Development research and the social sciences in India 679

emergence of three different types of higher sociologists, political scientists, geographers,

research institutions. anthropologists, environmentalists and others
First, the central government itself gave were recruited to the ranks of social scientists.
recognition to the importance of interdisci- Unlike economics, the other social sciences in
plinary research and data collection and Indian universities were, by and large, either
storage in respect of rural India by establish- antedeluvian or underdeveloped (or both)
ing the National Institute of Community D e - and lacked academic distinction. Under such
velopment ( N I C D ) in Hyderabad. 6 Here, circumstances, social scientists in these n o n -
equal importance was given to public ad- economic disciplines returning from abroad
ministration, community development, econ- had n o indigenous intellectual moorings or
omics and sociology. T h e work was of im- academic loyalties. This meant that, apart
mediate use to such central government from those locally educated (disadvantaged
ministries as Food and Agriculture, Rural since their intellectual training was widely
(and Community) Development, Health and regarded as substandard by any normal inter-
Family Planning, Planning, etc. C . Subra- national reckoning), an increasing number of
manian, the then Food Minister, took a keen specialists had as their academic reference
interest in the functioning of this institute. group or peer group the foreign research
H e was responsible for the highly contro- schools where they had received their training.
versial treaty relationship under which the Thus, any institution of higher study or
data gathered from all over India, as a result research infieldsother than economics could
of laborious field-work at N I C D was m a d e be expected to become a battleground in
automatically available (at no cost) to the which protagonists of different methods,
University of Michigan for storage and use. 7 techniques, theories, models and intellectual
The establishment of an institution of values would c o m e into conflict, rather than a
higher study and research such as N I C D also centre in which divergent orientations would
served as an occasion to illustrate another blossom together to yield the best possible
problem faced, from time to time, by social results. Sharp clashes sometimes took place
scientists on the Indian academic scene. T h e between, say, those w h o took a 'nationalistic'
first generation of social scientists (mainly approach to problems of research and those
economists) bred in Indian and British univer- w h o were thought of as 'pro-American', or,
sities were, by their academic provenance and between those w h o were 'Marxist' orientated
training, characterized by a more or less on one hand, and, on the other, those w h o
homogeneous outlook, and their ideological were regarded as 'functionalist' or 'behav-
inclinations blended well with the Nehru iouralist' in inclination.
Government's general policy of creating the Academic differences thus tended to
conditions for the emergence of a domestic become translated into wider ideological div-
mixed economy ('the socialist pattern of isions yet the interesting feature during this
society') and equidistance from both super- period was that there were not m o r e of such
powers (with a commitment to identify with clashes. T h e reason lay in the fact that Indian
poor countries) abroad. This generation of academic establishments have in general a
social scientists was followed by others w h o record of toleration on the one hand, while,
constituted a mixed bag, both by virtue of the on the other, there has been, over the years, a
number of social science disciplines to which strong sympathy for approaches of a broadly
they belonged, and by virtue of the fact that liberal or leftist character.8
they received their academic training in Second, the idea of establishing national
foreign universities in ideologically and universities, exclusively devoted to postgradu-
politically diverse environments. ate education and research and designed to
Although economists continued to consti- become centres of academic excellence, w a s
tute the largest contingent, more and more strongly canvassed, a m o n g others, by Nehru.
680
Even though such centres were to be engaged
primarily in 'pure' research, their concerns
would be directly relevant to the problems
faced by Indian society in different spheres;
thus, they would not be far removed from the
concerns of 'applied' research. In the event,
however, that thefirstof these centres—the
Jawaharlal Nehru University ( N e w Delhi)—
did not c o m e into being until the latter part
of the 1960s; to be followed, over a decade
later, by a similar institution in Hyderabad. 9
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) has
been the focus of student politics, and, it must
be pointed out that it is not a research centre
in the same sense as those with which this
article is primarily concerned. But the latter,
like the former, almost invariably have a
certain proportion of researchers w h o are
registered for higher degrees (M.Phil, and
D.Phil.); at the same time the'former, being a
university, has a large concentration of
students preparing for higher degrees, and
staff time in it is divided between post-
graduate teaching and research. Even so, it
would be a mistake to ignore such national
postgraduate universities while, at the same
time, remembering that research focused on
social sciences and development is bound to
represent only a fraction of their total output
of research and intellectual work.
In particular, the centres for political
studies, economic studies, historical studies,
social studies, and the various area studies in
the School of International Studies at Jawa-
harlal Nehru University are engaged in a wide
variety of theoretical and empirical research
affecting India's development and throwing
light on problems of comparative develop-
ment in the Third World. However its very
situation and highly articulate student body
places it in the maelstrom of national politics,
leading to the criticism, often voiced by those
in authority, that J N U has not really justified
the hopes of its founders and the expectations
of the wider community.
A t about the same time that the idea of
setting up such national centres of academic
excellence was conceived, the central govern-
ment (and especially Nehru) also undertook
T. V. Sathyamurthy
to establish a well-provided research insti-
tution to which established senior scholars in
different disciplines could repair from their
normal teaching duties in order to write up
their latest books or monographs in peace. Its
actual functioning did not begin until 1965, a
year after Nehru's death, the old Viceregal
Lodge in Shimla being converted into the
premises of the Indian Institute of Advanced
Study ( H A S ) . 1 0 A small core of permanent
Fellows in the historical and social science
disciplines acted as catalysts to attract and
stimulate academics, drawn from different
parts of the country. T h e turnover was im-
pressive. A large number of publications of
varying calibre resulted while research con-
ferences, symposia and seminars were also
organized from time to time on interdisci-
plinary social science themes.
B y virtue of the direct patronage of the
central government (as well as the political
identification of some of its permanent senior
staff), H A S also attracted some adverse criti-
cism. W h e n , in 1977, the Janata government
came to power, Prime Minister Morarji Desai
was inclined to close it d o w n , as a prelude to
restructuring it radically into an autonomous
body akin to the 'think tanks' in some West-
ern countries. With the return to power of
M r s Gandhi's government in 1980, however,
the institute was given a new lease on life.
Towards the end of the 1960s, two major
ideas began to circulate in higher education
and policy-making circles concerning the
organization and funding of research in the
social sciences. There was a growing feeling
that research in development should take
place in a number of centres, and that these
should be set up in different states (their
capitals as well as other towns) and not be
crowded into the national capital or the
metropolitan cities. T o some extent, experi-
enced academics entertained the notion that
the existence of a number of decentralized
facilities pursuing similar goals would, in
and of itself, betoken a will to national inte-
gration in a country in which, they felt, the
pull of regionalism to be growing stronger
with each passing year.
Development research and the social sciences in India 681

T h e urge to decentralize development charge that its style of functioning is a trifle

and social science research went hand in hand too bureaucratic, it performs the tasks ex-
with a burgeoning consciousness of the need pected of a huge umbrella organization, e m -
to diversify work beyond the disciplinary bracing the whole of India, in a generally
realm of economics to include other social commendable manner. Its overall organiz-
sciences, as afirststep in the long-term task of ational responsibilities include evaluation of
building up a corpus of genuinely interdisci- projects, general supervision andfinancingof
plinary research. In the general ambience the various centres of research, and keeping
provided by such thinking, a number of an inventory of work done in different
different institutions emerged towards the disciplines by commissioning trend reports,
end of the second phase and throughout the compiling bibliographies, and conducting
current phase. For our purposes, it would be seminars and research conferences at which
fruitful to take the view that, while the latter latest results of work in progress in different
part of the period with which this section is specified fields m a y be more or less directly
concerned witnessed the birth of the idea communicated to scholars drawn from differ-
of institutional decentralization, it was only ent institutions of research.
in the subsequent period that a truly p h e n o m - Given the complexity of the tasks in-
enal growth of institutions and of substantive volved, it would appear that I C S S R has de-
research was going to take place. W e shall, veloped the skills necessary to encourage
accordingly, consider in detail the emergence the various centres of development research
of these institutions in the following section. to push forward the frontiers of their chosen
Here, w e shall simply note that, under this disciplines and to contribute to our knowledge
rubric, four different kinds of institutions and information relating to the developmental
were brought into existence.11 problems faced by the country as a whole and
1. Academies or institutes of administration its various parts severally.
(both at the central government and at the
state government levels).
2. Institutes of management. The current phase (from 1970)
3. T h efirstfew of the centres of development
studies and social science research.12 T h e main point to note about this period is
4. Centres of research devoted to the that it has witnessed no innovations in the
study of different forms of 'alternative realm of ideas concerning development re-
development'. search, but it rather represents a period of
Let us conclude with a brief reference to the ramification, growth and development; or the
• methods available for central co-ordination implementation of ideas that had already
and financing of such centres and their work. begun to géstate during an earlier period.
T h e main body concerned is the Indian However, it should be noted ithat policy-
Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR), makers as well as professional administrators
which was set up during the 1960s, and which and academics have, during the last fifteen
occupies a position of crucial importance in years, c o m e to appreciate the need for a
the organization, funding and commissioning multi-pronged approach to the task of build-
of all social science work throughout the field ing n e w research institutions. Three main
of research and higher learning. It received its areas have been identified as requiring
original impetus from the indefatigable attention.
labours of its founding secretary, the late First, of course, research and application
J. P . Naik, and its work n o w is conducted by of the findings of research to the general area
a rapidly expanding army of social science of policy: in other words, centres where
researchers drawn from different disciplines. social sciences c o m e to be seen not only as
Although I C S S R is open to the familiar subjects of basic research but also as instru-
682
ments of policy or simply as policy sciences.
Second, the area of training managers in
a systematic manner in modern methods,
tailored to suit Indian conditions, has also
received m u c h attention in recent years. T w o
kinds of managers and administrators con-
stitute the target groups—middle-level and
higher-level managers—of large enterprises in
the public sector and administrators entrusted
with the tasks of development (rural and
urban) as well as with the maintenance of law
and order.
Third, there has been a growing tendency
to impart training for management on a
scientific and academically sound basis
through intensive short-term courses under
the direction of experts (drawn from both the
public and the private sectors, as well as
from academic institutions). Legal, financial
(auditing and accounting), organizational,
operational, and research and development
( R & D ) aspects, a m o n g others, are focused
upon in these courses in which the substan-
tive material m a y be drawn upon either from
a body of theoretical literature or from case-
studies or both.
T h e sociological significance of such :
heavy emphasis laid on managerial training
must not be missed. Despite claims that such
courses encourage India's managers to adopt
a rational approach to the h u m a n , economic
and social dimensions of their work, it is
difficult to overlook the fact that the resources
poured into thefieldof managerial in-service
education betoken a bias in favour of those
enjoying power and privilege and exercising
control over the m u c h m o r e numerous work-
force where production takes place. The class
basis of the Indian state (emphasized by the
dirigisme of this managerial élite), despite the
claims of its rulers that they are engaged in
the task of creating conditions suitable for the
emergence of 'a socialist pattern of society', is
clearly evident from the growth and general
direction of such elitist institutions.
Managerial consciousness on the part of
the bureaucracy and the public enterprise
sector rose rapidly as a consequence of the
close proximity between a rising generation of
T. V. Sathyamurthy
Indian managers w h o were being trained to
take over these large n e w institutions, and
managers imported to train them from the
advanced capitalist and socialist countries,
along with industrial and other plants and
turnkey projects. T h e rise of an indigenous
technocracy is one of the main indicators of
social and economic change in the urban and
industrial sectors of the society. A rising tide
of political radicalism a m o n g the intelligent-
sia, however questions the relevance of tech-
nocratic power for the wider problems of
poverty and underdevelopment faced by a
vast majority.
Another educational innovation is the
rising consciousness, a m o n g policy-makers, of
the need to give prominence to the develop-
mental needs and imperatives of the country-
side. Rural development and agricultural (and
extension) education were seen as areas in
need of fresh injections of vigour and im-
aginative expansion. Agricultural education
and research, which received only peripheral
attention during the colonial period, n o w
began to attract a larger slice of resources ]
twenty-two agricultural universities being es-
tablished on the initiative of both the central
and the state governments.
T w o main influences have been at play
in this vast process. T h e few successful ex-
periments in the private and governmental
spheres in agricultural education and re-
search constituted models for this sphere of
education. A t the same time, the Indian
Council of Agricultural Research (under the
Ministry of Food and Agriculture), led suc-
cessively by M . S. R a n d h a w a and M . S.
Swaminathan, 13 provided vigorous leader-
ship in the field of agricultural education
during the period of its greatest expansion.
A s in the case of Indian Institutes of
Technology (IITs), agricultural universities
too have become prone to the addictions of
hierarchism and bureaucratism as well as to
some of the undesirable features of the
general tendency of upper-echelon academics
and administrators to adopt feudal attitudes
of work. A t the same time, the student in-
take has been, by and large, a reflection of the
Development research and the social sciences in India 683

class structure of Indian rural society: the financed by the central government a n d
largest proportion tends to come from the situated in Delhi. It has its o w n scholarly
families of rich peasants, to a lesser degree journal, the quarterly Indian Journal of Public
from middle peasant families, very few having Administration, containing thematically ar-
a poor peasant social background, let alone ranged articles based on research o n a wide
one in agricultural or landless labour.14 variety of relevant topics.
Despite such difficulties, a generally high During the tenure of Gobind Ballabh Pant
standard of academic and research work as India's H o m e Minister, and subsequently
(subject tofluctuationsof the general political during the Prime Ministership of Lai B a h a d u r
climate of the milieu in which these univer- Shastri, fresh thought w a s devoted to the
sities have to function) has been maintained. training appropriate for new recruits to I A S
Unlike IITs, the agricultural universities and the allied central services. S o m e dissat-
have, for understandable reasons, not isfaction w a s felt o n the ground that I A S
been very prone to brain-drain to advanced probationers were still being trained16 as
countries. though they were ICS probationers of the
The sharper awareness of rural con- colonial epoch and not as public servants of
ditions that agricultural education necessarily independent, democratic India. A t the s a m e
provides, as well as the fact that students are, time, dispersion throughout India of the
despite all bias, drawn from a wider social centres of training for probationers recruited
spectrum than the largely urban meritocracy to over a dozen different central services w a s
from which the student intake of IITs is thought to involve not only a waste of infra-
drawn, have led to a rise of political radical- structural facilities and teaching personnel but
ism and a clearer understanding of the also an unnecessary repetition of teaching
problems faced by the poorer sections of a number of core subjects c o m m o n to all the
services.
the Indian peasantry which is often reflected
in the research problems chosen by some of A n initiative of Pant, a single National
the academics.15 A c a d e m y of Administration in Mussourie
(subsequently n a m e d as the Lai B a h a d u r
Academies and institutes Shastri National A c a d e m y ) was established to
of administration which all probationers recruited by competi-
tive examination (with the exception of IPS),
At the time of independence, there were are sent for initial training in c o m m o n sub-
practically no such institutions, though re- jects before they disperse to different centres
cruits to the Indian Administrative Service for further training in subjects relevant to
(IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) their particular service. For IPS, a separate
(and, to a lesser degree, those recruited to the academic centre was established in H y d e r a -
administrative and police services of the bad.
states) and the other central services were A major impetus for such restructuring
given probationary training in establishments was provided by the rise in development-
set up for the purpose. consciousness of politicians and administra-
The importance of public administration tors in the growing realization that ruling or
as an academic discipline, integrally related to administering, predominantly rural India, w a s
the tasks and policies of development, was a radically different kind of responsibility
first recognized through the establishment of from that involved in maintaining law and
the Indian Institute of Public Administration order seen by m a n y as the colonial viewpoint
(IIPA) which has a large staff engaged in of government. In both the national acad-
research on various aspects of administration emies, therefore, curricula consist not only
spread across the entire spectrum of social of manuals of rules and regulations and laws,
sciences. IIPA is an autonomous institution but also of case material put together as exer-
684
cises in research by qualified social scientists.
During the lastfifteenyears. T h e initia-
tive provided by the central government has
stimulated the creation of state-level acad-
emies. Their aim is to train administrative
service recruits to the state governments (and
in s o m e cases even lower-grade officials) the
training offered generally consisting of a
mixture of academic courses and practical
work.
While these academies are primarily con-
cerned with the relations between the admin-
istrators and the public, a small number of
centres have also been established which
address themselves to the task of toning up
the managerial cadre in the governmental,
public and private sectors. T h e best k n o w n
and most high-powered is the Administrative
Staff College of India (ASCI) in Hyderabad.
It has a staff of well-qualified experts w h o
have the advantage of combining high aca-
demic attainment with long and varied prac-
tical experience in senior administrative or
managerial positions. They have the re-
sponsibility for designing short and intensive
courses on different subjects for carefully
chosen groups of recruits. In addition A S C I
also employs a number of experts as consult-
ants commissioned to carry out research
projects or provide teaching skills in subjects
of a highly specialized character. A S C I is
thus a highly prestigious institution, com-
parable to a military staff college.
Institutes of management
In India, problems of development and social,
economic and regional policy-making, as well
as the shaping of suchfinancialand banking
institutions of immense social depth as the
Reserve Bank of India and the State B a n k of
India, with their numerous lending and other
facilities reaching d o w n to the villages, have
c o m e to be seen as requiring systematic
m a n a g e m e n t for which training is needed in a
n u m b e r of related disciplines. A n approach to
m a n a g e m e n t , adapted from the American
institutions to suit the particular problems of
developing India was sought in the form of
T. V. Sathyamiirthy
curricula available both to young graduates
seeking higher academic qualifications, and
to others belonging to various professions
seeking to improve their efficiency an3
career prospects.
The Institute of Management (IIM),
established at A h m e d a b a d twenty years ago,
was modelled on the Harvard School of
Management and Business Administration.
Its staff m e m b e r s were largely theoretically
orientated and the curriculum steered clear of
case material, preferring instead to generate a
body of first principles applicable to con-
ditions of underdevelopment on the basis of
which concrete problems in various spheres
could be tackled. This somewhat resembled
the generalist approach to administrative
training associated with the colonial period,
but the similarities should not be stretcched
too far. IIM (Ahmedabad) has, by and large,
retained its professionalism and steered clear
of politics (both in the sense of party politics
and in the sense of ideological politics), while
of course making itself useful in planning and
public sector economics. Its staff is also
marked by a spirit of camaraderie rare in
Indian institutions of higher learning.
Not long after the establishment of IIM
(Ahmedabad), another group interested in
management from a very different vantage
point started the Institute of Management at
Calcutta. Its orientation was much more
sympathetic to the use of case material, IIM
(Calcutta) being modelled on the school of
management of M I T .
However, not long after IIM (Calcutta)
was founded, the radical politics to which
West Bengal was prone reached its portals. A t
the height of the Naxalbari uprising in the
mid and late 1960s, the majority of the
academic staff was split up between varying
shades of left-wing sympathies ranging over
the entire spectrum.
The interesting feature of this phenom-
enon of politicization was that some of the
academics (the majority being social scientists
of considerable international stature) viewed
their politics as integrally related to their
academic activities, including the choice of
Development research and the social sciences in India 685

problems for research, methods of teaching, the directorate was criticized for a degree of
choice of subject-matter for intensive dis- arbitrariness and dirigisme. After such teeth-
cussions, etc. Thus, even though IIM (Cal- ing troubles were over, I I M (Bangalore) at
cutta), like IIM (Ahmedabad), is a privileged the start of its second decade, has indeed
institution, its political sensitivity and the become, like its two older sister IIMs, a
sympathies of its senior staff with generally power house for generating n e w information
popular policies, has led to the use of the and data as well as fresh knowledge about
case-method approach in originally unin- different aspects of developmental policies
tended ways and have radically changed its and institutional performance. Perhaps, our
character over the lastfifteenyears or so. remarks about IIMs should be brought to a
T h e emergence of two such institutions, close with the observation that, despite their
strongly identified in the first instance with sympathy for applied and policy-related work,
two major American schools (and, in fact, they are essentially institutions of an academic
set up with foreign aid and under close character and, in this sense, they are vitally
supervision of their metropolitan counter- different from the academies of adminis-
parts) provoked some thought in certain tration and A S C I discussed in the previous
quarters. It was felt that no amount of subsection.
adaptation to suit the specific conditions of
India could really bring the staff and students Centres for d e v e l o p m e n t studies a n d
of such heavily borrowed institutions close to social science studies a n d research
Indian reality. W h a t was needed, it was
argued, was an institute of management that It was not until the mid-1960s that national
was entirely homespun and capable of gener- centres for the study of development began
ating the interdiscipline of management with to appear in different places and, not until
special local reference by immersing itself in the mid-1970s that centres of development
the research and teaching problems of Indian studies sponsored and financed by various
society and economy. state governments were started. A s already
Ten years after the IIM (Ahmedabad) noted, these centres predominantly tended,
was established, a third Indian institute of at least in the beginning, to have a rather pro-
management was set up in Bangalore in 1973, nounced inclination towards a study of the
staffed largely by professionals essentially quantifiable, which meant that economic
(and, it should be noted, paradoxically) of the development studies involving collection of
IIM (Ahmedabad) vintage. It was directed by hard data and the use of statistical tech-
an engineer-economist, N . S. R a m a s w a m i , niques were pursued by staff drawn largely
whose main claim to fame has been his work from the allied disciplines of economics, econ-
on h o w to m a k e draught animals more ef- omic history, demography, planning, economic
ficient and h o w to persuade the ordinary statistics, etc.
peasant to be more responsive to elementary But this picture soon changed, partly
innovations in the field of locomotive power. because institutions that started as centres of
Under his IIM (Bangalore) rapidly ex- research in economic development problems
panded as an institution in which such fields as quickly saw the need to root economic re-
the sociology of law and civil rights, rural and search in sociological and subsequently also
urban development problems, agricultural pro- political understandings of a complex society,
duction, financial management, and various and partly also because n e w centres emerged
others were included in the curriculum and in which there was an explicit initial commit-
among the projects investigated. Because of ment to interdisciplinary research reflected in
the smaller scale on which IIM (Bangalore) the staffing and the choice of long-term re-
began, it was thought by some to be rather search priorities, programmes and initiatives.
more personalist in its initial direction, and It should not, however, be thought that
686
an awareness of the need for a broad inter-
disciplinary approach to the study of devel-
opment was n e w to the Indian intellectual
scene. In fact, a number of the senior social
scientists w h o took the initiative to set up
such centres had been occupying positions of
influence in the policy-making sections of the
central and state governments, in universities
and in other public institutions.
At the same time, a few institutions and
university departments, with a m u c h longer
history of promotion of research in social
science disciplines directly related to Indian
problems, provided inspiration to the n e w
centres, even though there was a difference of
emphasis between the older institutions
(which are m u c h more discipline-orientated)
and the newer centres (which tend to focus
m u c h m o r e on specific problems and concrete
policies).
T h e Gokhale Institute of Politics and
Economics (GIPE) in Pune (under the di-
rection of the late D . R . Gadgil and V . M .
Dandekar), and the precursor of the Insti-
tute of Social Studies in Surat, South Gujarat
(under the direction of I. P . Desai, an emi-
nent sociologist), were centres well k n o w n
and respected for the quality and range of
their output. In fact, unlike the founding di-
rectors of a majority of the new centres w h o
had had a career in government policy-
making bodies prior to devoting their whole
time to directing research, the staff of the
Gokhale Institute contributed to • a flow of
talent in the reverse direction. Thus, for
example, the institute m a d e available D . R .
Gadgil's services to the Planning Commission
to which he gave distinction as its vice-
chairman for a number of years.
O f the centres for development studies
and those for the study of social science (both
referred to as C D S s , unless otherwise speci-
fied), the Centre for Development Studies
( C D S ) at Trivandrum and the Institute for
Social and Economic Change (ISEC) at Ban-
galore were started by the economists K . N .
Raj and V . K . R . V . R a o respectively. T h e
former, after a distinguished academic career
and public life, and the latter, after a long
T. V. Sathyamurthy
career in the academic profession culminating
in political experience as a Cabinet Minister in
the Union Government, conceived the idea of
concentrating research of both applied and
fundamental kinds in centres intended exclus-
ively for the purpose.
A few years of later, another centre of a
similar nature, the Madras Institute of Devel-
opment Studies ( M I D S ) was set up in Tamil
N a d u by Malcolm Adiseshiah, retired Deputy
Director-General of Unesco. Both C D S (Tri-
vandrum) and M I D S started as centres of
economic research, but soon appreciated the
importance of broadening their interdisci-
plinary scope to include other social science
disciplines. Over a period of years, socio-
logists, anthropologists, political scientists and
economic historians were recruited as full-
time academics. C D S (Trivandrum) and
M I D S fulfilled both a student programme
for postgraduates and a research programme
for staff and doctoral candidates. I S E C
started as an interdisciplinary centre with an
ambitious programme and a m u c h larger
staff than the other two institutions.
In order to grasp the nature and scope of
the work done in thefieldof social studies and
development research, it is useful to describe
the activities of these three institutes, which
happened to be pace-setters for the many
more that followed suit during the mid and
later 1970s.
First, these were centres in which there
was an initial dominance of economic research
and scholarship, a bias that has never quite
been overcome despite a great show of
willingness on the part of the founders to
widen the scope of work to include the other
major social science disciplines. A n important
reason for this lies in a certain intellectual
modesty on their part that prevents them from
'dabbling' in other social sciences; this m o d -
esty is often combined with a commitment
to m a x i m u m theoretical and methodological
rigour in the practice of their o w n disci-
pline, which, in this case, happens to be the
relatively harder social science of economics.
A s has already been suggested, I S E C
overcame the difficulty of accommodating all
Development research and the social sciences in India
social sciences as equals by starting with a
number of academic staff members drawn
from the various disciplines. M I D S is n o w
making conscious efforts to widen its inter-
disciplinary input by following an advisedly
cautious policy of recruiting permanent staff
from the sociological and political disciplines.
C D S , on the other hand, with its almost
entirely economics-trained professoriat, has
started a policy of ramifying into the other
social sciences by recruiting middle-rank aca-
demic staff in such fields as sociology and
anthropology.
Second, almost equal importance is at-
tached in these institutions to the two facets
of producing original work of quality on the
one hand, and on the other, of training
qualified economists (and, to a limited de-
gree, other social scientists) by putting them
through a rigorous academic course leading
to a M.Phil, degree and supervised research
leading to a P h . D . degree. This teaching
activity, with a full programme of academic
work, is a part of C D S ' s (Trivandrum) normal
activities, and has already paid rich dividends
in the form of an excellent annual crop of
students ready to undertake independent re-
search or jobs in thefieldsof social, economic
and agricultural development.
A rather interesting variation of this kind
of experience is M I D S ' s emphasis on training
university and college teachers (mainly but
not only of economics) in the state of Tamil
N a d u to teach effectively and with a greater
sense of commitment as well as with a better
awareness of their disciplines. A t Madras,
unlike Trivandrum, there is no full-time
academic course leading up to a M.Phil,
degree. Instead, a number of workshops are
organized throughout the year for university
and college teachers of economics at which
rigorous and intensive short-term courses are
given on methodological, theoretical and
interdisciplinary questions. T h e staff input
as well as the teaching work carried out by
guests has indeed been truly impressive.
Tne I S E C is m u c h more an institution
that provides a variety of established re-
searchers (including young scholars from
687
abroad, especially from the Scandinavian
countries), engaged in projects of their o w n ,
with a sound intellectual base and a local
infrastructure to back.up their work. It has a
large number of ongoing projects of its o w n
in the different social science disciplines
ranging over the entire field of development
in which its o w n staff as well as others
visiting I S E C are engaged.
Like the other two centres at Trivandrum
and Madras, I S E C also holds conferences on
topics of contemporaneous relevance. Thus,
at the height of the national controversy on
centre-state relations, I S E C organized a sem-
inar (August 1983) on the subject to which a
large number of participants drawn from
various walks of life—academic, political and
professional—were invited. T h e papers that
emerged from the conference were not only of
topical importance but, in some-cases, also
constituted excellent researched contributions
on a subject.on which there has of late been a
pronounced tendency to produce more heat
than light.
Third, these institutes, in their o w n
separate ways, concentrate on problems of
development at two interrelated levels. In the
first place, of course, they are involved in
problems on a global (i.e., in this case, all-
India or India-wide) scale in the fields of
planning, resource mobilization, energy con-
servation and use, industrialization, rural
development, agricultural production, etc. In
the second place, and more important, they
also tend to concentrate on local problems
centred in the states, districts and villages
within them, and often in the states of the
region in which they are situated.
Their task is threefold in this latter
respect: gathering raw data and storing them,
as well as making them available to those
interested in research within the region or
outside; undertaking policy-orientated studies
in an academic setting, either at the request
of appropriate state or central government
bodies or both, and generating their o w n re-
search programmes linking the needs of the
region with the needs of the country as a
whole, comparing different regions or sub-
688
regions, and providing links of understanding
encompassing the different aspects (and not
merely a particular one defined narrowly in
terms of a single discipline) of the specific
problems with which they m a y be concerned
at a given time.
Thus, M I D S has become, over the last
decade or so, a very advanced data bank
giving an up-to-date account of the political
economy of Tamil N a d u (within an all-India
setting) through its monthly Bulletin. C D S
and I S E C have produced a vast quantity of
literature covering different aspects of the
political economy and sociology of Kerala and
Karnataka.
Mention should also be m a d e of the
rather fewer occasions on which members of
these institutes undertake research com-
missions—jointly as well as individually—
from such international bodies as the Econ-
omic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific ( E S C Á P ) , the International Labour
Organisation (ILO), the World Health O r -
ganization ( W H O ) and the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization ( F A O ) (but not, it m a y be
added, generally, from the International B a n k
for Reconstruction and Development ( I B R D )
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
In n o centre has this aspect of the work been
given more than minor or secondary im-
portance to the task of generating an even
flow of information and knowledge about the
problems of economic development and social
change of the region in particular and India
in general. Consultancy work on an inter-
national (developed country) scale is not
usually considered to be a socially useful way
of utilizing scarce academic skills. Academic
researchers in the field of development w h o
have a tendency to deploy their skills in this
direction to a disproportionate extent often
forfeit the respect of their colleagues.
Lastly, attention must be drawn to the
style of functioning of these centres of ad-
vanced study and research. T o be sure, each
has its o w n idiosyncracies and academic folk-
ways and mores, not to speak of values gen-
erated over a period of time. Yet certain
c o m m o n characteristics can be gleaned even
T. V. Sathyamiirthy
from a cursory observation of their func-
tioning. These centres attach a great deal of
value to their autonomy and intellectual free-
d o m which they have no wish to compromise,
either by too great an involvement in the
affairs of the state or central government, or
by becoming enmeshed in too close a relation-
ship with the local university or other insti-
tutions of higher learning.
They are indeed jealous of their pro-
fessional and research time, which they are
commendably keen to put to the best possible
use. This applies both to individual re-
searchers on the staff of these centres as
well as to these institutions in a collective
sense. A spirit of dedication is universally to
be found in these centres. A t the same time,
it must be pointed out that there is a great
deal of variation of style in their internal func-
tioning, and in the relationships that prevail
within them between staff and students,
among staff members on different levels of
seniority, or between academic and non-aca-
demic (e.g. karmacharis) staff.
Over the past decade or so, these centres
and especially their senior scholars have been
in great d e m a n d as advisers, consultants and
members of government committees of in-
quiry, both at the centre and in various state
governments. T h e amounts of advisory and
policy assistance expected is far out of
proportion to the time scholars are able to
spare from their teaching and research re-
sponsibilities and obligations, which have to
be carried out in an institutional setting
with fairly limited infrastructural facilities
(by international standards).
The general atmosphere of stimulation
for development research provided by these
centres coincided with the interests shown
by I C S S R in encouraging the establishment
of a string of such institutes of higher learning
and research specifically devoted to the study
of social sciences. At the same time, there was •
a growing feeling in the minds of a number of
social scientists and politicians that, in a
country divided by language and culture on
the one hand, and, on the other, by problems
engendered in its uneven economic develop-
Development research and lhe social sciences in India
ment, centres of scientific research on
problems of political, economic and social
development, set up in different parts of
the country, would represent a unifying influ-
ence. Although such thinking never really
gained sufficient force, the impetus for the
emergence of a large number of centres
of development and social science studies,
funded in most cases on afifty-fiftybasis by
I C S S R and the state government, was indeed
considerable.
Certain state-level political leaders as
well as social science academics teaching in
universities in state capitals perceived the
need for social and economic research de-
voted to problems at the state level and be-
low. Anugraha Narayan Sinha, a former Chief
Minister of Bihar, w a s one such. T h e first
centre for development research to be started
on the initiative of a state government was
the A . N . Sinha Institute of Social Studies
(ANSISS), Patna, founded in 1964. In the
neighbouring state of Uttar Pradesh, a similar
institute, n a m e d after Gobind Ballabh Pant
(the first Chief Minister after independence),
was established sixteen years later in Allaha-
bad. There are several other institutes of
similar provenance by n o w which owe their
origin to the initiative andfinancialencour-
agement of state governments.
A N S I S S , as a typical product of the
1960s, started with a rather heavy emphasis
on economic research. It has been influenced
by the interests of sociologists and political
scientists as well as academics engaged in
labour and agrarian studies at Patna Uni-
versity. In recent years, A N S I S S has under-
taken a number of projects embracing politi-
cal sociology and political economy as well
as research focusing on the economic social
and political conditions of the tribal peoples
of Bihar.
G B P S S I , a m u c h younger centre, was
conceived and founded at a time when inter-
disciplinary social science was very m u c h in
vogue and the dominance of economics
among the social sciences was no longer axio-
matically or universally accepted. A m b a Datt
Pant, its founding director, is a political
689
scientist and teacher with à fine reputation at
Allahabad University for nearly three dec-
ades. Within a brief span, he has been able
to gather a varied group of scholars drawn
from the neighbouring disciplines of sociology,
political science, economics and geography.
G B P S S I , like similar institutes in India,
does face certain problems. First, the fluctu-
ation of political power within the state,
between the different factions of Congress (I)
as well as between the Congress Party and the
Janata/Lok Dal combinations, has imparted a
degree of uncertainty to the prospects of (if
not sometimes an altogether destabilizing
effect on) such institutions, dependent as
they are on thefinancialsupport of the state
government. T o some degree, this has been
offset by the I C S S R providing 50 per cent
of the annual running cost in the form of
recurring grants. But there is n o denying
that these institutions are vulnerable to the
pressures and counter-pressures of state
politics.17
Second, bringing together very senior
and quite young social scientists researching
in different disciplines can sometimes be
difficult to handle. T h e generation gap in a
setting in which hierarchical social relations
are invariably carried into the work-place
inhibits free exchange or communication
between the two sides, each having certain
preconceptions about the other which it finds
difficult to shed. T o this must be added the
problems created by disciplinary insularity of
which certain older specialists are readier
victims than s o m e younger ones. T h e result of
such tensions tends to be a dilution of that
interdisciplinary orientation which is so im-
portant a founding premiss.
A slightly different subgroup of centres is
constituted by those that start from a specific
disciplinary orientation other than economics
and m o v e from there into the recesses of
interdisciplinary work. A n example is the
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences (CSSS)
at Calcutta, started by a group of economic
and social historians about ten years ago.
They strongly felt that history w a s an im-
portant social science and held the key to a
690
scientific understanding of the background to
the current problems of development. During
his ten-year stint as CSSS's first director,
Barun D e , a well-known historian, strength-
ened the historical side of the work of the
centre with the help of a number of colleagues
already well k n o w n for their contributions to
the economic and social history of Bengal and
the north-eastern part of India.
T o this team was added A m i y a K u m a r
Bagchi, one of India's most distinguished
economists, w h o cheerfully abandoned the
temptations of international jet-setting and
academic power-wielding as professor of econ-
omics at the University of Calcutta to be-
c o m e a Fellow at C S S S . His role in promot-
ing, leading and picking up cues for further
work from younger researchers and, above
all, in keeping the level of research at the
centre both academically unimpeachable and
socially and politically appropriate to India's
problems, cannot be exaggerated. H e is in-
deed a m e m b e r of that rare species of scholars
w h o are able to combine an excellent knowl-
edge of their o w n subjects with a penetrating
insight into the core concerns of other social
science disciplines.18
T h e Centre for Social Studies (CSS) at
Surat in South Gujarat is an institute of very
long standing started by I. P . Desai, a socio-
logist of high repute.19 His total dedication
enabled the centre to develop into a power-
house for the generation of academic knowl-
edge concerning Gujarat, one of the most
dynamic and economically advanced states of
India. A s a sociologist with sympathy for the
condition of the poor and oppressed, he has
been able to stimulate research to highlight
the oppression and social relations of domi-
nance to which agricultural labour, migrant
workers, urban industrial workers, w o m e n ,
tribal peoples and backward communities as
well as communal minorities are subject.
After I. P . Desai's retirement, C S S came
under the direction of Ghanshyam Shah, a
young sociologist with an excellent record of
empirical andfieldresearch, especially in the
states of Gujarat and Bihar. C S S has m a d e an
effort, in recent years, to broaden even
T. V. Sathyamurthy
further its disciplinary scope by recruiting
social scientists from anthropology, political
science, education, • economics and women's
studies. T h e Giri Institute of Development
Studies ( G I D S ) at Lucknow was founded in
1973 and attained national status in 1977,
headed by T . S. Papóla, originally an econ-
omist but whose formative years were spent
át IIM (Ahmedabad). Before his arrival in
Lucknow, the institute had virtually been the
research a r m of the Department of Econ-
omics of the University of Lucknow but had
a far-sighted approach to interdisciplinary
research in development studies from as far
back as the 1950s.
At G I D S , a number of economists, socio-
logists, anthropologists and political scien-
tists are engaged in a joint study of Uttar
Pradesh's agarian problems with special refer-
ence to the poorer areas in its eastern parts,
the districts of the Terai region, and the
poorer sections of the areas covered by the
Green Revolution. G I D S is indeed an example
of a centre which,- between 1973 and 1977,
when it graduated from transitional to
national status, showed its capability of suc-
cessfully ramifying its previous orientation
towards economics to include other social
sciences. This was a particularly sensitive
period both in national and in Uttar Pradesh
politics. Immediately after the Emergency
(1975-77), both the n e w Janata Government
at the centre and its counterpart in the state
were suspicious of the credentials of G I D S ,
not being altogether happy with institutions
that had enjoyed the patronage of previous .
Congress regimes.-
T h e fact that the newly appointed direc-
tor had had n o close political association with
the Congress, as well as the encouragement
provided by • senior Indian Administrative
Service (IAS) officers of a scholarly dispo-
sition and with intellectual interests which
n o w enjoys an eviable position as a gener-
ator of reliable sociological, economic and
political data relating to different levels in the
state.
O u r last example of centres, starting with
disciplinary commitments somewhat different
The Observatory of Jaipur, dating from 1740. H . Cartier-Bresson/Magnum.
from the first three, is the Institute of Devel-
opment Studies in Jaipur (IDSJ). The moving
spirit behind its establishment in 1980 was
Professor S. P . V a r m a , a highly respected
political scientist whose long association with
the University of Rajasthan led to IDSJ being
located in the sprawling premises of the
former. But it is an autonomous research
institute set up with the help of the govern-
ment of the state of Rajasthan and I C S S R in
equal proportions in the same manner as
similar institutions in a number of other
states.20
T w o interesting features relating to the
origin of IDSJ deserve to be noted: First, it is
consciously modelled on similar institutes in
the Western world. A s its founding docu-
ment 2 1 makes clear, it traces its establishment
back to a blueprint that a Canadian visiting
scholar (who happens to be of Indian origin)
prepared at the request of both the Honorary
Director-Designate of IDSJ and the Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan.
This was quite unnecessary in view of the fact
that, by the late 1970s, India had accumulated
the rich and varied experience of setting up
sound indigenously conceived institutions of
this kind with excellent results, from which
fledgling institutes and centres could easily
derive the inspiration they needed.
Second, after C S D S (which was founded
nearly twenty years prior to the establishment
of the IDSJ), this was the first development
research institute to be started on a disciplin-
ary base provided by political science. Inter-
disciplinarity at IDSJ has certain character-
istics that stem from this fact alone. Like
C S D S , IDSJ is not likely to engage in research
on problems relating to the Indian political
economy; but it does have an interest in
interdisciplinary work involving problems of
environment, energy and science policy ques-
tions, and in thefieldof administration.
O n paper, however, the commitment of
IDSJ to interdisciplinary research is far more
wide-ranging in character,.though, from the
692 T. V. Sathyamurthy

w a y this is phrased, it is by no means clear technological innovations at the cost of

whether what is intended is bringing different indigenous crafts and small industries.
disciplines to focus on a set of problems, or Hitherto, the demand for fundamental
making institutional r o o m at IDSJ available structural transformations to put the people
for a number of disciplines in order to enable at the centre of the political process and
them 'to d o their o w n different things'.22 democratizing decision-making by increased
IDSJ, being still in a formative stage, has yet political participation at all levels in an
to prove its mettle, but there is no reason to essentially decentralized polity, has been
doubt that it will, in its o w n w a y , m a k evoiced only by parties on the left of the
significant additions to our knowledge of political spectrum.
India's development problems in general and In recent years, however, the initiative
Rajasthan's in particular. for this kind of thinking and action has c o m e
T h e era of expansion of social science; from grass-roots organizations in different
and development research is perhaps rapidly parts of the country, often starting as ener-
drawing to a close. During the next few years, getic campaigns in respect of specific issues,
with at least one such centre based in each such as environmental questions, campaigns
state and funded by both the central and state against deforestation as in the chipco m o v e -
governments, the main task will be to consoli- ment, questions relating to agricultural labour
date by producing research work and generat- conditions in specific areas where the
ing data likely to be useful to policy-makers stranglehold of caste manifests itself with
and social activists. S o m e adjustments m a y undue severity, the w o m e n ' s health m o v e -
well b e required such as a shift from rigid ment in rural Maharashtra, issues affecting
academic approaches to more supple policy- the living conditions and social oppression
orientated approaches, or a m o v e away from of tribal people or the conditions of urban
data-gathering to problem-solving, or a slum dwellers.
change of methodological focus from hard At the same time, such thinking is also
empiricism to theorizing or vice versa, or reflected in the distinction that some of the
a variation of interdisciplinary strategy in aid donors m a k e between aid so packaged as
order to solve n e w problems that confront re- to reach the beneficiaries direct and aid
searchers in the course of their work. channelled through governments. Implicit in
this general orientation is a distrust of the
countries of the North and, in particular,
Research centres devoted to Western countries which are widely believed
'alternative' studies of development to have stayed the hand of progress by their
policies of encouraging military dictatorships
T h e strengthening of state power in India (as and repressive anti-democratic and counter-
indeed in the Third World countries as a revolutionary regimes in a number of poor
whole) during the last two decades, and the countries.
increasing remoteness of left-wing alternatives Unfortunately, however, not all of this
to the populist politics of the day, have acted n e w awakening in the form of 'micro' as well
as a stimulus to thinking in certain quarters as 'large-scale' popular movements points in a
about a serious, indigenously based alterna- progressive or democratic direction. A s one
tive path of development. T h e enormity of the observer has pointed out, massive disillusion-
power wielded by the state is seen as directly ment of the kind experienced over the past
related to the policies of modernization; rapid two decades in a number of poor countries,
industrialization and government policies instead of leading to changes in a more
aimed at supporting industry in favour of democratic direction,
agriculture, mechanized agriculture in favour
of labour-intensive agriculture, and large may breed retrogressive movements that tend to
Development research and the social sciences in India
push these societies towards attempts at reviving
the dark periods in their history, or movements
that feed on the newer and much darker shades
of chauvinist and fascist assertions. Both types
of movement are in fact emerging today.23
T h e Indian scene has already begun to absorb
this n e w tendency to think outside the frame
of reference of the m o r e conventional ap-
proaches as yet another dimension of insti-
tutionalized social science research, under
the broad rubric of 'alternative approaches
to development'. T h e key to the evolution
of this particular feature of study and re-
search lies in the involvement of intellectuals
and activist workers in research focusing on
social and economic problems at different
levels. Already, C S D S has accumulated
several years of experience of this kind of
work in its project k n o w n as Lokayan.24
M e m b e r s of the Lokayan project have,
over the last four years or so, undertaken a
kind of social science research equivalent of
padayatra25 with the express purpose of
identifying the various efforts that have been
initiated in 'alternative development' at the
grass roots in various parts of the country. Its
aim is to change 'the existing paradigm of
social knowledge and its use'. In order to
work towards the creation of n e w paradigms,
the researchers engaged in Lokayan, led
by Rajnai Kothari, have identified 'action
groups and micro movements and the key
participants of these processes' w h o are then
brought together 'in dialogues among them-
selves, as well as with intellectuals, journal-
ists, and w h e n possible, even concerned
public officials'.26
Given the fact that such projects as
Lokayan are still oriented towards 'opinion
makers' and 'trend setters' in the local areas,
it is difficult to avoid a degree of scepticism
that, in thefinalanalysis, the emphasis in this
approach m a y not have been shifted away
from local power-holders (or those beholden
to them) and élites in the direction of the
voice of true democracy, to a sufficient
extent. It m a y really turn out to be old wine in
n e w bottles.
693
In a number of institutes of research,
Gandhian ideas are m o r e or less systemati-
cally pursued within the disciplines of the
social sciences, while, in a few, far greater
energy is expended o n elaborating and
deepening Gandhi's thoughts and beliefs in
the development especially suited to rural
Indian conditions.
T h e Gandhi Peace Foundation ( G P F ) ,
with its headquarters in Delhi, has been
engaged in giving Gandhism an international
focus in addition to encouraging w o r k o n it
bearing upon domestic problems. A third type
of institute engaged in Gandhian studies is
devoted almost entirely to rural development
(e.g. Gandhigram Rural Institute of Higher
Education). 27
T h e Gandhian Institute of Studies at
Varanasi ( G I S V ) is perhaps the, most high-
powered research institute engaged in social
science research, as it is commonly under-
stood, using Gandhian methods and para-
digms in a critical and sensitive manner. O n e of
the projects, for example, makes an interesting
differentiation between two mutually contra-
dictory strands of Indian political, social and
economic, as well as scientific, experience—
one based o n a conscious act of withdrawal
from the colonial value structure, and the
other based on willing incorporation into
it—both of which run through the political
experience of the nationalist and anti-
colonial m o v e m e n t in all their phases and
have persisted throughout the period since
independence.
In the work carried out at G I S V , an
awareness is shown of other theoretical
positions besides Gandhi's ideas—positions
originating in the West as well as elsewhere
—with a view to subjecting Gandhism to a
general critique, and not simply to putting it
forward as a panacea for India's problems.
Such institutes receive support from the
government in one form or other, G I S V
itself being recognized and funded by the
ICSSR.
694 T. V. Sathyamurthy

Conclusion rigidity not tended to induce a premature

ossification of the system as a whole, given the
In both their qualitative and quantitative enormous initial advantages with which it
28
dimensions, interest on the part of India's started?
social scientists in the complex endeavour of In social science research, the main factor
improving the living conditions of the most of interest is that the political system as a
disadvantaged sections of society has paid whole is undergoing a crisis of confidence, one
s o m e important dividends, not least the enor- of the main characteristics of which is to put
m o u s push given by a sense of commitment on the long-term future of the institutional struc-
the part of large numbers of them to socio- tures through which state power is exercised
political goals as well as to intellectual rigour in some doubt. U n d e r these circumstances, it
of analysis, fact-finding, data-gathering and is difficult for active social science and devel-
generalizing o n a sound basis. opment-oriented researchers, w h o have been
Yet it would be folly to ignore that, in nurtured in a relatively stable atmosphere, to
certain spheres of research and higher learn- become suddenly aware of the demands of a
ing at any rate, s o m e hard lessons have had to system in the throes of change, the precise
be learnt. Thus, for example, in thefieldof directions of which it is as yet difficult to
technological education, two questions are predict.
often raised in attempts at reappraisal of the Even so, there is a vanguard among
nature and scope of IITs. H a s the expansion social scientists and policy analysts in socio-
occurred too fast for the infrastructure of economic and political development which is
technological education to cope with the well placed to experiment with different kinds
pressures generated by numbers as well as by of possible scenarios to which political
the rapid strides m a d e in the field internally? changes involving different kinds of tensions
Further, is it too far in advance of the rate and the need to resolve acute social and
of technological development of the country economic contradictions could possibly give
as a whole? There is some truth in the view rise in the next quarter of a century. T o give a
advanced by critics of IITs that higher techno- rough estimate, if even 20 per cent of the
logical education has developed in a lopsided total n u m b e r of researchers in the different
manner so that Indian industry has not been social science fields are tuned in to these
able to m a k e the best use of the graduates of problems, the investment of financial re-
these institutions. Lastly, has the rapid expan- sources and h u m a n talent will have been
sion of such a rarefied field in a political worth while. O u r assessment would point to
atmosphere of hierarchical and bureaucratic India as a whole having achieved such a target.
Development research and the social sciences in India
Notes
1. A s , for example, the links
between social science research
and public policy, which were
examined in a controversial
paper some years ago by M y r o n
Wiener. See his 'Social Science
Research and Public Policy in
India' (in two parts), The
Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. X I V , Nos. 37 and 38 (15
and 22 September 1979),
pp. 1579-87; and pp. 1622-8.
For controversial
correspondence on it, see ibid.,
Vol. X I V , 1979, p. 2029, and
Vol. X V , 1980, p. 49.
2. It is interesting that, during
this period, economists focusing
attention on agricultural
problems in a big way tended to
be of foreign extraction, or
Indians w h o happened to be
orientated to economic history
as their main discipline (e.g.
Daniel Thorner; Irfan Habib).
3. It must, however, be pointed
out that, despite odds, there
seemed to be a determined
though small corps of teachers
and researchers in most
universities w h o were able to
carry out work of a high
standard and reliable quality.
4. This reached particularly
acute proportions in 1967,
when, for thefirsttime, the CIA's
involvement in social science
research activities throughout the
Third World was admitted to in
Washington, D . C . , in the wake of
an international scandal that
broke out around a social science
research project in Chile code-
named 'Camelot'.
5. There are indeed very few
instances of research institutes
in the social sciences in India
that were started with foreign
resources. Another example
of American-financed
institution of higher study and
research is the Centre of South
Asian Studies of the University
of Rajasthan. Over a period of
time, such institutions have
come under complete financing
from Indian sources, usually by
means of annual recurring
grants given by I C S S R . It is
quite another point, however,
that I C S S R itself is a recipient of
resources of foreign provenance,
but since it is a body responsible
to the central government which
in turn is responsible to
Parliament, this is a problem of
a quite different order.^It is true
that, for nearly two decades
n o w , no institution of higher
learning in India has been
allowed to raise financial
resources directly from abroad.
6. Founded in 1958, N I C D was
thefirstorganized research body
to collect an impressive range of
raw data of all sorts from the
whole of rural India. Its
Directors of Sociology and
Political. Science, during the
1960s, travelled throughout the
length and breadth of the
country, solely with a view to
mapping out the social and
political forces in the
countryside with the aid of data
derived from direct observation.
7. Indian social scientists,
including a sizeable proportion
of those employed in N I C D ,
deeply resented the fact that a
foreign university (and
American at that) had access to
sensitive data on India. Given
the fierce independence of social
scientists in such matters, and a
general tendency on their part to
be wary of American academia,
the then Food Minister's brazen
policy of sharing (or rather
giving away) information in this
manner was widely criticized.
8. A sizeable proportion of
social science scholars w h o have
gone to American universities
(especially in the post-1960
period) were either already 'left-
695
orientated' before leaving India,
or, have returned from their
American experience rather less
sympathetic to 'functionalism',
'positivism', 'behaviourism' or
'number crunching' of most
descriptions.
9. Jawaharlal Nehru University
differs from other longer
established national or central
universities—Benares, Aligarh,
Santiniketan, and Jamia
Milia—in one essential respect.
The latter are based essentially
on undergraduate training with
postgraduate education and
research added to it, while the
former, as has already been
indicated, has no undergraduate
departments (except in the field
of foreign languages).
10. The founding director, the
art historian N . R . Ray was
succeeded by S. C . D u b e , a
social anthropologist. It is worth
noting that a characteristic
feature of the H A S has been to
give less importance to
economics than to the other
social sciences. Apart from the
social sciences and history,
culture, archaeology, linguistics,
and philosophy seem to have
claimed a good deal of
attention. In fact, D u b e was
succeeded by B . B . Lai, a well-
k n o w n archaeologist, w h o is at
present holding the fort as
caretaker-director, pending the
restructuring of the institute.
11. This categorization does
not, of course, include a whole
host of institutions that are
directly or indirectly concerned
with development-orientated
research, but in such highly
specialized and exclusive
contexts as labour union
research, productivity research,
pollution research, research
relating to Antyodaya, which is a
homespun term for alternative
development steering clear of
696
modernization in both the
Western and the socialist
senses. It gained wide currency
in India during the Janata
regime.
12. It should be noted that,
henceforth, Centres for
Development Studies and
Centres for Social Science
Research or Studies will be used
interchangeably in the text,
because, in both of these, the
same kind of activity takes place.
13. M . S. Randhawa was a
senior ICS officer w h o was
sympathetic to rich farmers and
highly knowledgeable about
practical agriculture.
M . S. Swaminathan is a
scientist w h o recently resigned
from the Planning Commission
in order to take up the
directorship of the International
Rice Research Institute in
Manila. Before joining the
Indian Council- of Agriculture
Research in Pusa, he had had a
long scientific and research
career as a scientist and
subsequently as the director of
the Indian Rice Research
Institute in Bhubaneswar.
14. There are, however, a few
Naxalite sympathizers both
a m o n g students and a m o n g staff
in some of the agricultural
universities. These pockets of
left-wing sympathy become
activated from time to time,
w h e n there is some glaring
injustice that needs to be fought,
or, on occasions when the
authorities adopt an attitude of
arrogance or complacency or
patronizing indifference to
elementary demands concerning
working conditions, learning
conditions, food in the hostels,
etc. In the agricultural
universities in the Punjab at the
present time, for example, there
is a considerable degree of
political activity, not all of which
by any manner of means
Naxalite in nature, that is
directed against the centre's
policy, on the Punjab crisis.
15. I have c o m e across several
commendable examples of such
teachers and researchers w h o ,
by dint of their commitment,
have been able to amass a
wealth of research material
germane to an understanding of
the character of exploitation
suffered by the Indian peasantry
in a number of different parts of
the country.
16. Until the mid-1950s, that is,
for nearly ten years since India's
independence, IAS probationers
used to be given their initial
general training at Metcalfe
House in Civil Lines, Delhi,
where they were turned into
little sahibs w h o were expected
to maintain the traditions of
their ICS forbears when they
went to their subdivisions and
districts. T h e m e n in charge of
the training, needless to say,
were, during this period, senior
members of ICS. It must, in
fairness, be added that a good
proportion of officers trained in
this manner have subsequently
sloughed off the cultural
'whitewash' to which their
training at Metcalfe House
subjected them, in order to
become sensitive discerners of
Indian problems, if not exactly
true servants of the Indian
people.
17. A t the time of this writing,
G B P S S I , which is housed in
temporary accommodation, is
trying hard to persuade the
government to part with the
m o n e y already committed for
building n e w premises into
which its expanding staff could
m o v e . Constant trips to
Lucknow to get the ministers to
agree to release funds, already
committed long since, is quite
wasteful, for the effort involved
in making frequent cross-
country trips to the state capital
is great. IDSJ is experiencing
similar problems with the
government of Rajasthan,
though its good fortune consists
in its being situated in Jaipur
T. V. Sathyamurlhy
itself (which happens to be the
seat of the Government of
Rajasthan). There is no
intention to suggest any bad
motive on the part of the
governments concerned, but
these examples are given merely
to point out the bureaucratic
bottle-necks that stand in the
way of quick and effective
translation of promises into
concrete results before it
becomes too late.
18. A m o n g the m a n y projects in
which Professor Bagchi is
involved is a history of the State
Bank of India (SBI),
commissioned by the authorities
of the bank, thefirstvolume of
which has already been
completed. There is little doubt
that Bagchi's history of SBI will
•become an important source
material for a study of
contemporary India's economic
and banking history.
19. I. P . Desai received his
training in Pune where he
studied sociology and
anthropology under
G . S. Ghurye and Iravati
Karve, w h o were highly
respected not only for their
learning but also for their radical
brand of political liberalism.
20. Under the sixth Five Year
Plan, Orissa was to have its o w n
Social Science Research
Institute at Bhubaneswar in
1978/79, and Assam was to
follow suit. T h e Lalit Narayan
Mishra Institute of Social
Sciences ( L N M I S S ) , named
after the former Union Railway
Minister w h o was killed in 1974
at Samastipur, was set up by the
Government of Bihar at Patna,
mainly as a result of the efforts
of his brother, D r Jagannath
Mishra, w h o was Chief Minister
of Bihar during the Emergency,
and again during the period
1980-83.
21. This document is entitled
Institute of Development Studies,
Jaipur: Genesis and Growth of
Development research and the social sciences in India
an Idea. It was written by
Professor S. P . V a r m a and
published in Jaipur towards the
end of 1981 or the beginning of
1982.
22. See, for example, the
following passage: 'Professor •
Somjee was requested to
prepare a note on the Institute,
and it was on the basis of that
note that Professor
S. P.' V a r m a drew up a
proposal for the setting up of the
Institute of Development
Studies. [The institute] while
confining itself mainly to social,
economic, cultural and political
problems, would, it was
envisaged, be able to take up
problems of research
transcending social sciences'
[emphasis added] Ibid., pp. 7-8.
23. D . L . Sheth, 'Grass-Roots
Stirrings and the Future of
Polities', Alternatives, Vol. IX,
1983, pp. 1-24 (p. 8).
24. Lokayan (of Sanskrit
derivation), literally means,
'people's movements', i.e.
movements o / a n d by the people
for the people. Sheth refers to
the project as being 'action cum
research' in kind, and describes
it as operating 'at the interface
of social knowledge and social
institutions, of academic
institutions and activist groups'.
Ibid., p. 11.
25. Padayatra is a special term
used to refer to political leaders
in quest of the social truth or
political reality, by going out on
their o w n two feet throughout
the length and breadth of the
country on a fact-finding walking
tour. The most recent political
figure to undertake such a
padayatra (1983) was Chandra
Sekhar, the Janata party leader.
In their times, Gandhi and
Vinoba Bhave, the 'Sage
Paunar' (d. 1982), used to
undertake periodic padayatras.
697
26. Sheth, op. cit., p. 11.
27. T h e inspiration for this
originally came from the
Bhoodan movement, which was
started by Vinoba Bhave not
long after independence. T h e
movement itself was not
successful, but the various
institutes of rural studies
spawned as vehicles for the
propagation of Gandhi's ideas
on rural development and
cooperation have been
functioning without interruption.
28. For a recent critical
evaluation of the work of
research institutions in the
sphere of agricultural
economics, see a report entitled
'Agricultural Research: Decline
of Agro-Economic Research
Centres' (by a special
correspondent), The Economic
and Political Weekly,
Vol. XVIII, N o . 23, 4 June
1983, pp. 993-6.
Regional science:
evolution over thirty years

G. B . Benko

The essentials of regional cases presented by the region, certain basic

science: an attempt at laws concerning the distribution of activities.
a definition A t the centre of gravity of regional
science w e find economics and, m o r e particu-
Regional science is perhaps the newest branch larly, a specialized branch k n o w n as spatial
of social science. It owes its existence to the economics, which is mainly concerned with
m a n y problems that could not be adequately the location of economic activities, the spatial
dealt with by the traditional methods of social behaviour of firms, territorial accounts, etc.
science. With the introduction of this n e w T h e spatial economists felt at a disadvantage
science, existing lines of research are the a m o n g their colleagues and, in order to lend
richer for m a n y theories, greater weight to their
techniques and concepts. concerns, broke away
Regional science is a G . B . Benko is a researcher at the from general economics
Centre for Spatial Research and to form a separate m o v e -
discipline situated at the Analysis (University of Paris I—
crossroads where econ- C N R S ) and the author of studies on ment. In their studies,
omics, geography, soci- regional development and urban they turned to math-
ology, political science geography. ematics and econo-
and anthropology meet. metrics to test the hy-
Its main subject of study potheses advanced.
is h u m a n intervention on Along with the
the terrain. T h e descrip- economists, the geogra-
tions given by engineers, phers are the most
geologists, meteorol- closely concerned with
ogists or biologists are regional study inasmuch
of scant relevance to re- as h u m a n geography by
gional science, but it definition describes and
makes use of them if need be. A research explains the distribution of h u m a n beings,
worker or practical user of this discipline their actions and their works on the surface of
takes a m o r e quantitative view; he shows the earth (Claval, 1984). A t the time w h e n
interest in population distribution, the lo- regional science emerged, geography w a s
cation of activities, environmental pollution, radically changing; the old methods devel-
tourism, urban development, etc. oped by the various national schools n o longer
In short, regional science is by nature a satisfied the researchers' curiosity. In the
science of synthesis: from the analytical data 1950s the research workers set about develop-
supplied by various specialists it is possible to ing the n e w instruments they needed in order
deduce, from among the aggregate specific to meet the n e w social demands. In the post-
700
war period, economic and population growth
was strong and there was an increasing need
for land-use planning and for control of urban
development. Towards the 1970s changing
economic and social conditions brought a
m o r e insistent demand for pollution control,
energy conservation, environmental protec-
tion, social balance and, in general, environ-
mental management and planning: afieldthat
was invaded by the geographers in connection
both with economic and with social problems.
F r o m the standpoint of sociology—which
studies social reality and h u m a n action in
different social and physical settings—as from
the standpoint of economics and political
science, the physical environment and the
spatial prospect are minor considerations.
F r o m the standpoint of regional science, on
the other hand, knowledge and understanding
of the objectives, goals and interests of
different social groups situated at different
points in space are priority concerns. Thus the
study of family life, of relationships between
individuals and between social groups, and of
social classes provides the data needed for the
examination of societies as a whole. It is
essential to understand the aims and values of
different social groups in the various regions
of the world and to follow their development
and their approaches to regional problems if
w e are to find the means of attaining social
objectives and settling social conflicts. Thus
regional science has m a d e a great contribution
to economic development; o n the social
plane, o n the other hand, it contributed
nothing, at least in its early days, and so
far as the environment is concerned, it m a y
even be said to have been destructive. A s
w e k n o w from wide experience, economic
development cannot be set in motion with-
out a knowledge of the social and physical
environment.
A s to anthropology, a distinction must be
drawn between physical anthropology, which
is concerned with the biological factors affect-
ing the h u m a n being and his relationship to
his physical environment, and cultural anthro-
pology, which studies vanishing societies and
cultures, and, above all, the unidentified
G. B. Benko
elements of social life by identifying the
geographical distribution of peoples and cul-
tures throughout the world. Anthropology has
greatly influenced the development of post-
war social sciences, contributing both theor-
etically and empirically to the building of
development policy models, especially in the
Third World, and to the preparation of
economic and social plans in which regional
science plays a dominant role.
Political science provides administrative
and legislative support for the implementation
of regional development. T h e mid-twentieth
century brought a new awareness of regional
disparities in development, with the result
that town and country planning (which can
also b e termed regional planning or spatial
organization, and which is a political and
economic development of space) is a concern
c o m m o n to all industrialized or developing
countries. T h e United Nations and its Special-
ized Agencies are making efforts to promote
the economic and social advancement of
economically weak countries whose inhabi-
tants live under precarious conditions. Even
in the most advanced countries, economic
growth is unevenly distributed in space, re-
sulting in regional disparities and inequalities.
This has attracted the attention of economists
and politicians, w h o are trying to reduce the
imbalance using the instruments of regional
science.
A s w e have just seen, the difficulty of
defining this discipline stems from its c o m -
plexity; there are almost as m a n y definitions
as there are researchers. Walter Isard, in his
Introduction to Regional Science (1975), gives
thirteen definitions. B y comparison with
earlier publications, which put economic con-
siderationsfirst,relatively recent descriptions
tend to focus on the environment, ecology
and m a n ; hence the following summary defi-
nition: 'in brief, regional science as a disci-
pline concerns the careful and patient study
of social problems with regional or spatial
dimensions, employing diverse combinations
of analytical and empirical research'.
 Regional science: evolution over thirty years
Regional Econometrics Regional Economic and Regional Political sociology
science science social geography science and sociology
development

a. .b a. .c a. .d

. Social and politica1 science

CO
E. Spatial eco nomics G. Human geogr

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ca
CU

x¡
00
ca

00
00
W

ca-
ca-

—,
•+-<
cj

¿S
(e) Economic geography f) Land-use and devel (h, i) Human ecology and

oo* >
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3
and location analysis, demograph town-and-country planning

^>
Decision-making
[Spatial organization] [Human organization] [Land-use policy]
Spatial or *aniz ion

ca
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ob

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Human organizatic
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00

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Land-us e policy

701
Fig. 1. An attempt to define regional science in terms of set theory.
702 G. B. Benko

T h e historical foundations different schools of thought; and he gave n e w

and birth of regional science impetus to the multiplier theory—a trail
blazed by H o m e r Hoyt (1933), one of the
T h e earliest origins of regional science go founders or urban economics, w h o applied the
back to van Thiinen, w h o published Der multiplier concept in 1937. Isard was quick to
isolierte Staat in 1826. Its true precursors were provide regional analysis with an essential tool
economists and geographers like August for use in theoretical discussions and practical
Lösch and Walter Christaller, w h o showed applications alike.
interest in problems connected with the lo- During the post-war period of economic
cation of activities. Their theoretical models expansion this teaching was of great social
represent what is termed central-place theory. value. Furthermore Isard had no difficulty in
A t the beginning of the century, space was a bringing together researchers and decision-
variable u n k n o w n to or neglected by the makers from different walks of life in a n e w
world of science, and of economics in particu- association aimed at facilitating the spread of
lar. Only the geographers, by vocation, knowledge. In December 1954, the Regional
formed an exception to the rule; beginning in Science Association was established and held
the nineteenth century, they developed the its first meeting. T h e expression 'regional
concept of the region that was later to serve as science' has been in regular use ever since.
a framework for m a n y spatial studies. From The association, which is international, has
the 1930s onwards, research became more set itself scientific objectives which it ap-
systematic; it progressed from sectoral ana- proaches along economic, social and political
lyses—agriculture, industry, trade, tertiary lines.
activities in general—to the general schema of In s o m e respects, Isard's approach to this
the spatial balance of the system: a schema n e w discipline resembles Auguste Comte's
established by Lösch which constituted the approach to sociology. C o m t e believed that
unifying concept for specific models and also scientific thought would continue to evolve
served as the link with general economic until it reached what he called 'a positive
theory. During this period the Germans and stage' marking the culminating point of scien-
Scandinavians in particular emerged as the tific evolution. Comte m a d e use of the idea
pioneers. In the United States Edgar Hoover that the knowledge embodied in different
(1948) broke n e w ground in thefieldof sciences was unified and correlative, and he
transport costs and devised a general theory assumed that the different strands of scientific
of the 'margin line' as a factor in enterprise thought would ultimately converge in a posi-
location. During the war years, territorial tive sociology. H e obviously overestimated
accounting techniques m a d e progress and the capacity of scientists for keeping abreast
were brought into use in regions and cities. of the latest developments in allfieldsof
Various models were built to measure mi- thought. H e believed, for the distant future,
gratory movements of population and areas in a single unified science. Similarly, at the
capable of attracting commercial activity; the beginning, Isard and his followers regarded
gravity model m a d e its appearance; and the regional science, not as an interdisciplinary
notion or urban hierarchy, Zipfs rank-size activity, but as a n e w , unified discipline. •
rule (1949) and the density-distance relation- Growing attention was paid to this
ship came into increasing use. The first stages branch of science. Annual symposia have
in urban analysis were past. been held regularly in Europe since 1961, and
Walter Isard, an economist by training, since then other regions of the world have fol-
remains a major influence to this day. His lowed suit. Associations have been founded
works are grounded in Keynesian economics. one after another: in France, on the initiative
H e s u m m e d up the work of his predecessors, of Jacques Boudeville and François Perroux
introducing n e w ideas and drawing upon with Isard's support; in Scandinavia, Japan,
Regional science: evolution over thirty years 705

Contrasted uses of space.

Opposite: an urbanized countryside. Magnum.
Above: a bit of countryside in an urban setting. Magnum.

entity such that it is possible to describe natural ; with o n e another, and particularly with the
and h u m a n p h e n o m e n a , to analyse socio-econ- dominant nodes, than with the neighbouring
omic data and to apply a policy. It is based o n region', strongly influenced spatial thinking
two principal features—homogeneity and func- and town-and-country planning alike.
tional integration—and culminates in a sense of
Since the early 1950s the developing
practical solidarity and in relations of interde-
countries have engaged the attention of the
pendence with other regional aggregates and
with national and international space. theorists, w h o have looked into the difficulties
experienced b y enterprises in those countries.
Studies o n the regional development process Their failure to function properly has to d o
began in France with Claude Ponsard (1955, with external e c o n o m y . T h e first to explore
1958) w h o , in neo-classical vein, started by the problem and propose remedies w e r e
reviewing the w o r k already d o n e ; at the s a m e Ragnar N u r k s e (1953) a n d Albert O . Hirsch-
time h e broke n e w ground b y constructing m a n (1958), w h o suggested that investment
mathematical spaces to correspond to econ- - should b e m a d e in strategic sectors in order to
omic spaces. In the mid-1950s François achieve rapid and lasting growth and to
Perroux (1955) invented both the term and benefit from ; external economies. T h e first
the theory of polarisation, which gave n e w analyses m a d e of this p h e n o m e n o n , b y Alfred
impetus to research and m a r k e d the starting- Marshall, w e r e taken further b y M e a d a n d
point for original thinking in French in this Scitovsky (1954), and Balassa (1962) e x a m -
field. T h e notion of the région polarisée or ined the question of economic integration.
nodal region, defined as a 'heterogeneous T h e techniques of spatial analysis evolved
space w h o s e various parts are mutually rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. T h e widest
complementary and maintain m o r e exchanges field of study w a s that of m e s o - a n d m a c r o -
Regional science: evolution over thirty years 703

the United K i n g d o m , the Federal Republic even values, motives and social goals. It inter-
of G e r m a n y , Hungary and Latin America, laces all these systems via interregional systems
and, m o r e recently, o n other continents. of interindustry (interactivity) linkage, of com-
Initially this n e w science was taught in modity flows and money flows, of population
movements, and of communications, and, in
traditional departments such as those of
general, of socio-cultural interaction inclusive of
economics and geography; then specific
decision-making processes.
courses in regional science as such began
to be offered, especially at the higher edu- Research to clarify the concept of the region
cational level. M o r e than thirty specialized goes back a very long w a y . In the nineteenth
journals and various collections on regional and early twentieth centuries, the geographers
science topics appear every year. in particular displayed great curiosity about
T h e research worker practising this disci- this problem; from the 1950s onwards, the
pline is not an active planner but an analyst economists and political scientists ventured to
w h o makes a critical approach to present-day define the concept of the region and to m a k e
problems, formulates hypotheses and verifies it operational. A n initial stage witnessed a
them, drawing conclusions and submitting gradual shift away from the notion of the
recommendations; he thus plays a key role in natural region to that of the economic region;
the decision-making process. T h e second then c a m e a renewal of ideas inspired by
phase of regional action is in the hands the spatial economists and impelled by the
of decision-makers, w h o usher in the stage of ' n e w geography', which sought to explain
'town-and-country planning' or 'regional plan- regional p h e n o m e n a . T h e first essays in defi-
ning', which is k n o w n as aménagement du nition were of a piecemeal nature (Brocard,
territoire or planification régionale in French, Lösch, Leontief, etc.); then Isard, the foun-
as Raumordnung in G e r m a n and as piani- der of regional science, held that the concept
ficazione territoriale in Italian. T h e purpose ofof region was deceptive and n o m o r e than an
town-and-country planning is to define the abstract generalization. H e therefore attached
operational concepts and major political great importance to a sound analysis of the
options through which the organization of structures and flows characterizing the portion
land use and of national space becomes a of space under consideration. A t the third
reality. stage of this fundamental research, Perroux,
Boudeville and Richardson complemented
one another in economic space analysis ap-
The main schools of thought plied to the region, distinguished between: (a)
the homogeneous region (la région homo-
After the concept of space was introduced gène), which is essentially agricultural and
into economic theory at the turn of the whose touchstone is that the characteristics of •
century, regional science—that concerted syn- each elementary unit vary very little from the
thesis—gave fresh impetus to studies working general average; (b) the nodal region {la
this vein. They were spurred by a shared région polarisée), which is essentially indus-
interest in 'the spatial dimension of life' and trial and corresponds to the concept of space
were conducted in a n e w spirit whose first as afieldof force; and (c) the planning region
discoveries lay in the maze-like interdepen- {la région-plan ou de programme), which is
dence of regions (Isard, 1960):
essentially forward-looking, an operational
r concept designed for action in the service of
This maze interlaces interregional systems of business and the public authorities. In the
populations, resource patterns, industrial lo- light of previous studies, Lajugie (1979) for-
cations, local economies, social accounts, balance mulated a synoptic definition:
of payments positions, markets, central places
and urban-metropolitan areas, administrative
and political structures and institutions, and The region is a geographical area constituting an
706
economics: afieldinfluenced by neo-classical
theory, which held it essential not only to
define a geometry of space but also tò meet
certain immediate imperatives regarding lo-
cation. T h e researchers tried to discover uni-
versal principles and apply them to regional
planning. B y way of illustration w e shall
mention a few methods that have helped the
experts to grasp regional realities.
A variety of analytical instruments were
used to determine the number and nature of
industries that could be established and de-
veloped in a region. Thus the comparative
cost method, a very convenient technique for
regional planning, was conceived. T h e object
is to identify the region where a particular
industry could produce and distribute its
product at lowest total cost; so as to justify
the establishment of that industry in the area.
This technique makes no allowance for non-
economic factors such as cultural models; as a
result, m a n y attempts at industrial develop-
ment have failed. In addition several econ-
ometric models and locational coefficients
have been used to measure the advantages
and then describe and rank the regions ac-
cording to their location quotient.
Input-output tables, a very important
technique for the formalization and interpret-
ation of data, have been the subject of study
and have revealed certain processes underly-
ing the links between the regions of a territory
and between various aspects of their econ-
omies. W . Leontief (1953), winner of the
1973 Nobel Prize in economics, in collab-
oration with A . Strout, broke n e w ground
with his work in this field. Researchers like
Miernyk (1965), Isard (1971) and Gerking
m a d e advances in the application of this
method.
The technique of interregional linear
programming emphasizes the general interde-
pendence of activities; it is applied to the
study of an interindustry linkage system, and
proceeds by optimization. This method pro-
vides an efficiency model while tackling
the problem of different types of regional
scarcities.
Other quantitative approaches, such as
G. B. Benko
gravity models, highlight significant aspects of
social mobility, particularly—among other
factors—interregional migratory movements.
Gravity models are also used to measure the
hinterland of towns or, as in their first
application by Reilly (1931), to study com-
petition in thefieldof retail trade! The model
is built by analogy with physics (phenomenon
of magnetism or universal gravity).
The concept of entropy employed in
the social sciences also has its origin in
physics, and particularly in the second law of
thermodynamics; as a result of Shannon's
research it became the principal measure of
information theory. Its use has been the sub-
ject of m a n y articles, especially in the English-
speaking countries, represented by Wilson,
M e d v e k n o w and Semple, and in France,
represented by B . Marchand.
The dividing-line between meso-econ-
omics and micro-economics is difficult to draw
because the criteria are inevitably arbitrary,
but a fundamental distinction emerges from
the analyses. In meso-economics the indi-
vidual is not the basic decision-making unit,
whereas in micro-economics he is.
The foundations of spatial micro-econ-
omics also go back to Isard and, in France, to
Ponsard. Next, the functionnal and h u m a n
organization of space was studied using, on
the one hand, quantitative methods like graph
theory and, on the other, the perception of
space—which is at the stage of fundamental
research into the epistemology of the h u m a n
sciences—and the cycle of information and
decision. A behaviourist approach to de-
cision-making by firms is developing among
researchers influenced by the thinking of
H . Simon (Nobel Prize in economics, 1978),
Cyert and March. Hamilton and his co-
authors analyse the logic of organizations'
behaviour in space by highlighting such
factors as information or the environment,
which influence the decision-makers.
The neo-classical and neo-positivist ap-
proach of contemporary geography is charac-
terized by the development of quantitative
methods; marked progress has been m a d e in
the formulation of spatial programming
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708
models, spatial econometrics, data analysis
and classification, which are employed in
explaining the spatial organization and
dynamics applied to urban systems and in-
dustrial structures.
G a m e theory explains the logic of de-
cisions taken in a situation of uncertainty
about partners' intentions. Cyberne'tics—
under the impetus of Norbert Wiener, its
founder, in the 1950s—afforded a n e w angle
from which to view the problem of social
regulation, and also prompted the first in-
quiries into systems.
T h e third major trend in research—the
critical approach to space—is Marxist in
inspiration. This critical school of thought
came into being in France, Italy and the Latin
American countries in the 1950s and 1960s,
and since the 1970s has gained an increasing
foothold in the United States and the United
K i n g d o m . T h e great debate on the ideological
role of space in modern society hinges on such
vital questions as spatial justice, equality,
environmental balance and the strategies of
dominant groups.
These Marxist and neo-Marxist studies
are contributing to economic analyses by
making a systematic inquiry into real property
markets, the economic theory of residential
rent and the housing question, as d e m o n -
strated by Lipietz (1974), Topalov (1973)
and Castells (1972) a m o n g others. This de-
bate—as yet epistemológica! rather than truly
operational—extends also, with the con-
tribution of Y . Lacoste, to questions of
strategy and geopolitics at the international
level. T h e efforts of the economists and socio-
logists are supplemented by socio-geography,
as represented by D . Harvey and K . C o x ,
w h o deal with the problems of modern cities;
phenomena of segregation and, in general,
the impact of the capitalist system on the
modern city.
F r o m this rapid review, it will be clear
that regional science research began with the.
development of analytical methods, the better
to grasp spatial reality by recourse to such
varied means as spatial models, econometrics
and quantitative methods based on the latest
G. B. Benko
theories. S o m e models have become oper-
ational and have been applied to regional
policy.
The theoretical hypotheses have been
continuously revised and renewed, and the
contribution of the ' n e w geography' and of
sociology is increasingly apparent. It has
made possible a more thorough analysis of
social behaviour in space: a field in which
theoretical, epistemological and philosophical
debate between different schools of thought
has recently intensified without, however,
losing sight of the fundamental objectives of
revealing and explaining the role of space in
social practices, society being wholly com-
mitted to the task of giving shape to space.
N e w prospects for spatial
analysis
The whole controversy surrounding the re-
gional idea makes a pluridisciplinary approach
essential. Hence economists, geographers,
sociologists and others have m u c h to gain by
banding together; for a region can be ex-
plained as m u c h by its economic character-
istics as by its geographical, socio-cultural and
historical attributes. People can be seen cling-
ing to a scrap of space for reasons that have
nothing to do with economics. T h e important
role played by such space in the social science
was discovered rather late in the day. Analy-
ses and research in this area have been given a
structure only in the last thirty years. T h e
studies carried out have revealed to us, on the
one hand, the spatial framework of the
economy and, on the other, the ideological
role of space in modern society. Regional
science, as w e have seen, is the case-study of
phenomena of economic, social and political
behaviour from the standpoint of a spatial
dimension; with the discovery of the distinc-
tive features of space, it has become an
independent branch of knowledge.
Regional policies do not always conform
smoothly to the analyses and recommen-
dations of regional theory, with the result
that researchers are increasingly to be found
in an academic setting. H o w will regional re-
ality evolve? T h e Industrial Revolution shook
Regional science: evolution over thirty years 709

up the regional structure which until then
could b e explained b y criteria of homogeneity.
Notions of operationality a n d functionality
had to b e a d d e d , the better to grasp that
structure a n d m a n a g e it. A t the d a w n of a
technological revolution that is witnessing a
speed-up a n d territorial expansion of
exchanges (goods a n d services, capital, infor-
mation, etc.), are w e to see 'our space', o u r
territorial organizations, b l o w u p in our faces?
O n e thing is certain: it will not stand still.
A n enlightened pluridisciplinary approach is
m o r e essential than ever before. T h e contra-
dictions b e t w e e n analysis a n d action can b e
o v e r c o m e , to enable us to m e e t the interests
of m a n k i n d , to harmonize o u r space a n d
attain a better 'spatial setting' for our lives.
[Translated from French]

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London, Pion, 1977.
S A L L E Z , A . Polarisation et sous-
traitance. Paris, Eyrolles, 1972.
S A M U E L S O N , P. A . The Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure,
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pp. 387-9.
. L'économique. Paris,
A . Colin, 1957.
S C H U M A C H E R , E . F. Small is
beautiful; une société à la mesure
de l'homme. Paris, É d .
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V O N THÜNEN, J. H . Der
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V I R I L I O , P . L'insécurité du
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W E B E R , A . Über den Standort
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The teaching of anthropology:
a comparative study

Jacques Lombard

A t the Second World Congress on Anthro- teacher should remain master of his teaching.
pology, held in Copenhagen in 1938, the For this reason, a group of anthropol-
Standing Committee o n Research stressed the ogists from a variety of countries, involved
value of making a study of the teaching of with both teaching and research, decided that
anthropology and ethnology in the countries it would be a good idea to meet o n the
represented at the Congress, and of the occasion of the Eleventh International C o n -
obstacles to the introduction of such teaching. gress of the Anthropological Sciences, held in
Today, more than forty-five years later, this Quebec City in August 1983, to exchange
project is still unrealized, and it is sad to see views o n the current situation of anthropology
h o w little attention is devoted by scholarly teaching, so very different n o w from what it
meetings to the most el- was in 1938 w h e n the
ementary aspects of the value of conducting a
perpetuation of research Jacques Lombard is Professor of study o n the subject
and improvement of the Anthropology at the Université des was first emphasized.
Sciences et Techniques in Lille,
transmission of knowl- France. H e is a former president Anthropologists from
edge. of that university and is the author of Belgium, France, the
Nevertheless, the various works, including Structures Federal Republic of
de type féodal en Afrique Noire, G e r m a n y , the Nether-
addition of a discipline and l'Anthropologie britannique lands, Portugal, South
to a system of educ- contemporaine.
ation is one of the most Africa, the United King-
reliable means of making dom a n d Yugoslavia
it grow and ensuring took part and an initial
that it reaches a situation report was pre-
' broader public. Curi- pared o n the basis of five
1
ously enough, the inves- countries. T h e report
tigation of the methods dealt for the most part
used to teach either the techniques of research with what is termed 'social and cultural'
in the discipline or the body of general anthropology, and referred only in passing to
knowledge pertaining to it is something that is teaching in related areas such as physical and
rarely discussed at scientific gatherings of biological anthropology, anthropolinguistics
researchers or academic specialists. In and prehistory. Transcending the differences
France, in particular, it is left to the initiative that can be seen a m o n g teaching systems,
of a few specialists associated with the Minis- each of which has its o w n traditions, deep-
try of Education, and these in turn, in the rooted similarities are observable, especially
n a m e of the academic freedom of universities as regards current developments in teaching
¡and examination boards, consider that the which has been deeply affected by the econ-
714
omic crisis. This crisis has had a severe impact
on European universities and on n e w trends
in anthropology, which is itself frequently said
to be experiencing an internal crisis.
Anthropology or ethnology?
Terminology provides one initial point of
convergence, with the term 'anthropology'
becoming more popular than 'ethnology'. A s
everyone knows, in the United Kingdom,
where social anthropology originated, and in
the United States, the h o m e of cultural
anthropology, the term 'ethnology' w a s
dropped very early on since the word is as-
sociated in English-speaking countries with
evolutionary theories and the conjectural
historical approach. 'History of contemporary
archaic peoples, I a m prepared to let that
discipline g o to ruin,' said Kroeber, w h o
shared the view of his British colleagues that
it had become too concerned with the enu-
merative investigation of cultural character-
istics or attempts to achieve the historical—
and ultimately unscientific—reconstruction of
races and cultures. This preference for the
term 'anthropology' has been imitated in
m a n y other countries, like the Netherlands'
and nowadays France as well. In France,
anthropologie is increasingly coming to be
regarded as synonymous with ethnologie, even
though it had- traditionally been associated
with the study of races and h u m a n physical
characteristics, in contrast to ethnologie, and
despite the fact that, o n occasion, anthro-
pologie assumes a broader connotation than
ethnologie, denoting a general study of m a n -
kind in space and time, as in the writings of
Lévi-Strauss. However, 'ethnologie' continues
to be used in the administrative nomenclature
of the disciplines taught at university level. In
the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y , the term
'Ethnologie' can still be found in scientific
writing, as is apparent from the titles of a
number of recent articles. Ethnologie c o m -
prises the twofieldsk n o w n traditionally in
that country as Völkerkunde, the anthro-
pology of non-European peoples, and Völks-
•Jacques Lombard
kunde, the branch of anthropology that is
concerned with local, i.e. European, folklore
and traditions. However, it is not u n c o m m o n
nowadays to find the term 'Sozial und Kultu-
ranthropologie' used in certain publications,
and this, here again, indicates the growing
influence of Anglo-American usage. Even so,
anthropologists in the Völkerkundler tradition
tend to be wary of these terms, as in France
anthropology has always been strongly as-
sociated with physical and biological anthro-
pology.
However, this general trend in favour of
the term 'anthropology' is mirrored by a
nearly identical development in the relations
of anthropology with its neighbouring sci-
ences. Within a few decades, the close re-
lationships that used to exist between pre-
history and linguistics on the one hand and
social and cultural anthropology o n the other,
especially with respect to the teaching of
physical and biological anthropology, have
been progressively displaced by a closer
association with sociology, particularly in the
United Kingdom, France and, to some
extent, the Netherlands.
Early in this century, a British anthro-
pologist would also be a specialist in archae-
ology and physical anthropology, and C a m -
bridge had a Faculty of Archaeology and
Anthropology, Oxford a Department of
Ethnology and Prehistory. Since the 1960s,
the options open to a Cambridge student
have been m o r e or less restricted to anthro-
pology, sociology or social psychology,
rather than archaeology or physical anthro-
pology. T h e same thing can be seen in
France. Until 1968, the Musée de l ' H o m m e in
Paris offered a course that included social and
cultural anthropology, linguistics, prehistory
and physical and biological anthropology.
After the reform of higher education, the
establishment of growing numbers of chairs
of ethnology in the universities and the
general tendency to attach them to the former
faculties of literature and social science
caused anthropology in the broad sense to
break up, leaving it with only its ethnological
aspect. Ethnology became an ancillary subject
The anthropologist and her objects: Margaret Mead. Rapho.
in sociology and the social sciences generally.
In the specialized institutes, with the possible
exception of the Institut des Langues et
Civilisations Orientales, anthropology is
taught either as a separate discipline or with
reference to a cultural area, as is the case with
the École des Hautes Études en Sciences
Sociales. In the Netherlands, departments of
anthropology are still part of Faculties of
Social Science, and the subject is taught in
close association with non-Western sociology.
A similar but less systematic situation is also
occasionally found in France and the United
K i n g d o m as well. T h e same is also true of
Belgium, anthropology being associated with
sociology at one university, psychology at
another, and so on. In the Federal Republic
of G e r m a n y , by contrast, ethnology is taught
as a specific subject which has come to be
distinct both from archaeology and prehistory
on the one hand and from the empirical
sciences of culture (Empirische Kulturwis-
senschaften) on the other. Only linguistics,
and to a lesser extent the history of civiliz-
ations, are incorporated into the curriculum,
and this tends to isolate anthropologists from
archaeologists, sociologists and biologists, and
to m a k e interdisciplinary work difficult in
practice.
The historical background to the
teaching of anthropology
These similarities, which, with variations, are
to be found in allfivecountries can probably
be accounted for to some extent by fairly
similar historical circumstances. In Western
Europe more than elsewhere, anthropology
was 'the daughter of colonialism', and this
inevitably influenced the nature and content
of the subject.
T h e anthropology of far-away, alien
lands flourished primarily in France, T h e
United K i n g d o m , Portugal, Spain, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. M u c h
less attention w a s paid to it in the Central
European nations, where research tended
rather to concentrate on the study of regional
customs and folklore in an effort to reinvig-
716
orate the local cultures of peoples in search of
their national identities (Poland, Hungary,
and so on). Then in some countries an
intermediate situation prevailed, the study of
'exotic' communities being prompted by the
need to build an integrated pluralistic nation
in response to domestic political concerns.
Anthropology in the United States concerned
itself initially with Indian reservations, ex-
tending its purview further afield as time went
on. T h e situation was similar in Australia and
South Africa. These diffèrent historical back-
grounds had a decisive influence even on the
basic approach to the teaching of anthro-
pology. In this connection, the example of
France is highly instructive. T h e French col-
onial empire and the political wish for French
cultural unity, one and indivisible, naturally
resulted in a lower level of interest in folklore
and regional peculiarities and correspondingly
greater interest in countries overseas, particu-
larly African countries. However, while col-
onialism gave a particular direction to scien-
tific activity, different approaches to colonial-
ism itself m a y also have played a role in the
development of research, and hence of teach-
ing. It has been observed, for example, that
anthropological studies began earlier in Bri-
tish territories than they did in French terri-
tories, largely because the British used a
system of indirect rule so that it was more
important to k n o w something about local
customs, whereas the assimilationist policy
followed in French colonies m a d e the study of
social organizations and cultures a less urgent
matter.
O n the other hand, the end of the
colonial era produced the opposite effect, and
both in the United Kingdom and in France
there w a s a noteworthy revival of interest in
regional customs and provincial character-
istics. For political and alsofinancialreasons,
access to 'thefield',in newly independent
countries, had become m o r e difficult for
investigators. Another factor, in the case of
France, was the wish to support a broad
decentralization m o v e m e n t matching the
wishes of a people suffering more and more
from imposed uniformity and urban pressures.
Jacques Lombard
Beginning in the 1960s, w e find an increasing
number of ethnological studies on France and
to some extent a shift,in curriculum content,
particularly in provincial universities. A simi-
lar development occurred in the United King-
d o m . Whereas earlier generations of research
workers and teachers had devoted the bulk
of their efforts to the countries of Africa,
Oceania and India, anthropological research
nowadays extends to other parts of the
world, including the British Isles themselves.
T h e crisis in anthropology and
the crisis in the universities
The growing success enjoyed by anthropology
after the 1960s, and the growing numbers of
students from all backgrounds w h o have
turned to it cannot conceal the depth of the
crisis besetting it. Before the war, there were
only six universities in the United Kingdom
with anthropology departments, whereas the
subject is n o w taught in over thirty univer-
sities, not counting those in which sociology
and anthropology are lumped together. T h e
teaching of anthropology has also taken root
and grown in unrelated departments, such as
education or psychiatry. T h e same thing has
happened in France where n e w courses were
introduced after 1960 in the universities, and
departments were set up in specialized insti-
tutes such as the École des Hautes Études
en Sciences Sociales. Concurrently, there was
substantial growth in the number of investi-
gators engaged in research at the C N R S
(Centre National de la Recherche Scienti-
fique) until 1976 or thereabouts. In the Nether-
lands, out of eight major universities, six offer
a complete training in anthropology in their
Faculties of Social Science to over 2,000
students (anthropology and sociology of the
Third World). In the Federal Republic of
Germany, the number of students increased
fourfold between 1974 and 1983, with 8,300
registered in all, over 4,000 of w h o m were
concentrating o n sociology. T h e reasons ;
for success o n this scale are unclear, and
The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study
A . Doutreloux, of the Catholic University of
Louvain, has expressed curiosity about w h y
there has been such a strong demand from
students of psychology, law, literature or
architecture n o less than from students of the
social sciences. Conceivably the explanation
is not so m u c h the students' desire for ex-
plicit knowledge about anthropology as their
vaguely felt wish to dissociate themselves
from their o w n society and to look for cultural
enrichment and a source of humanistic values
in cultures that are remote and less anony-
m o u s than our o w n .
It seems clear, at all events, that this
success has caused anthropology to develop
into a discipline aimed at cultural enrichment
and supplementing a large number of other
fields, while at the same time it has lost the
specific character and professional, training
function that it formerly had. Accordingly, it
offers the student m o r e in the way of 'culture'
and 'ideas' than of 'technique' or ' k n o w - h o w ' .
This is the price that has had to be paid for the
striking growth in universities of newfieldsof
science and technology associated with occu-
pations calling for training that is both precise
and specialized. T h e result has been the
development of a considerable degree of
opposition between teaching which is special-
ized and technical but geared to occupational
purposes, and teaching which is general and
'cultural' but offering no assurance of employ-
ment. All observers agree that there is vir-
tually no recruitment either to the ranks of
teachers or to those of investigators, and this
is due not only to the crisis in anthropology or
in the universities generally, but also, and
indeed primarily, to the economic crisis as
such.
F . Valjavec showed that in the Federal
Republic of G e r m a n y , ethnology benefited
very little from the expansion of higher edu-
cation during the years of economic growth.
Surveys at the universities have shown that
the teacher/student ratio in ethnology was 1 to
85 in 1983, whereas the average for all fields
was only 1 to 4 7 . Similar figures would
doubtless b e found in the case of other
countries.
717
This crisis in anthropology is evident
everywhere. There isfirstlya crisis in its sub-
ject-matter with the disappearance of what are
termed 'traditional' societies and the shift of
its specific focus from a vanished subject to a
research method and research techniques that
are less dominated by quantitative tools than
are those of sociology. There is a crisis in its
boundaries as a discipline, which are some-
what unclear; and above all there is a crisis in
the use to which anthropologists can be put,
since there are too m a n y of them for the few
employment opportunities still available.
In s o m e universities, themselves with
reduced staff andfinancialresources, anthro-
pology for a time was able to gain a n e w lease
of life with the upsurge of research on the
development of Third World countries.
Experience has shown, however, that in this
field, the natural sciences, such as the earth
sciences, marine biology, and so o n , have
attacted m o r e researchers than the social
sciences. E v e n a m o n g the social sciences,
economics and demography have fared better
than anthropology or even sociology.
T h e current situation of the universities
does not offer m a n y grounds for optimism,
either. J. S . Eades has pointed out that in the
United K i n g d o m , n o w that the government
has decided to put a stop to the growth of the
university sector and m a n y professors are
being offered early retirement, the ranks of
eminent anthropologists will doubtless not be
replenished by n e w appointments, and this
will jeopardize the renewal of the teaching
body and h a r m the promotion prospects of
the most outstanding lecturers. Increases in
university fees also seem likely to inhibit entry
to universities, especially for Third World
students. This has already been observed in
Belgium in respect of Zairian students w h o
are transferring to universities in northern
France where lower fees are charged.
T h e fact remains, however, that this crisis
has not yet brought growth in the teaching of
anthropology to a halt, even though its
purpose and subject have changed somewhat,
losing part of their former specific focus.
718
The organization of teaching
T w o important things mentioned above are
going to exercise a considerable influence on
the w a y the teaching of anthropology is
organized: (a) the progressively and steadily
closer relationship between anthropology and
sociology (whether Western-oriented or
Third-World-oriented) at the expense of the
former type of training, which was more
broadly interdisciplinary, incorporating as it
did prehistory, ethnolinguistics and physical
anthropology; and (b) the general trend for
anthropology to be the teaching of 'culture',
open to an ever-growing extent to students
from otherfields,and compelled as a result to
provide a progressively less specialized form
of instruction for students w h o are less di-
rectly committed to the discipline than was
formerly the case.
These two trends, c o m m o n to all five
countries, are accompanied by a divergence in
those countries' respective traditional views of
the teaching of anthropology. In France, in
particular, this subject has rarely been re-
garded as the goal of a long course of study
extending over the number of years required
to earn a university degree or maîtrise. Until
1968, ethnology was a specialfieldof univer-
sity study which a student could choose after
two years of higher education, i.e. specialized
subject open to advanced students only. A t
s o m e institutions, indeed, such as the Ecole
Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris and the
M u s é e d e l ' H o m m e , it was intended for
postgraduates wishing to learn something
about research. After 1968, degrees and
maîtrises in ethnology were awarded by some
universities, but it was not taught as a subject
in its o w n right until the third year (eight
universities out of seventeen offering anthro-
pology, according to a recent survey con-
ducted by the Association Française des
Anthropologues). Elsewere, the subjects of
ethnology and sociology are associated, lead-
ing to degrees and maîtrises in sociology, with
compulsory or in some cases optional courses
in anthropology. In other countries, by con-
trast, the discipline has traditionally enjoyed a
Jacques Lombard
greater degree of independence,, with longer
courses of study. T h e United Kingdom, in
particular, has universities (eight or nine) with
separate departments of anthropology, offer-
ing courses up to the postgraduate level,
universities in which the departments of soci-
ology and anthropology are associated, others
in which anthropology is more widely taught
in the social science departments, and still
others in which the subject is even more
interdisciplinary and is spread over a number
of different faculties. T h e situation is similar
in the Netherlands, where there are six
universities with departments of anthropology
offering afive-yeardegree course, and also in
Belgium, where there are full courses in
anthropology at the Free University of Brus-
sels and the Flemish Catholic University of
Louvain. Lastly, in the Federal Republic of
Germany ethnology is taught as a major
subject in s o m efifteenuniversities, the largest
of which, in terms of enrolment, are West
Berlin, Munich, Göttingen, Cologne, Frank-
furt, Mainz and H a m b u r g . T h e curriculum
for a Master's degree extends over a period of
four to five years, during which anthropology
is a required subject.
H o w e v e r , the traditional organization of
anthropology as a subject can vary. In ad-
dition to the independence or specific nature
of the subject in relation to others, the inde-
pendence and specific nature of the university
with respect to the kind of teaching and the
curricula are also a factor. F r o m this stand-
point, British and Netherlands universities
m a y conveniently be set in opposition to
universities in France and the Federal Repub-
lic of G e r m a n y . In the United Kingdom,
departments of anthropology have remained
faithful to the traditions of certain professors
and heads of department, whose names are
associated with various universities. These
include Evans-Pritchard at Oxford, Fortes
and Leach at Cambridge and Gluckman at
Manchester, each of these universities being
marked by a particular approach to anthro-
pology and by concentration on particular
fields. Each university was linked to a
'school', and consequently somewhat inward-
The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study 719

Amateur ethnology: an Easter Island scene sent by the nineteenth-century French author of'exotic'
novels, Pierre Loti, to the famous actress, Sarah Bernhardt. Edimagcs.
720 Jacques Lombard

looking. In the Netherlands, specialization countries—the 1960s were years of m o n o -

has occurred mainly in relation to particular graph studies dealing typically with a single
regions or cultural areas, or else around ethnic group from a rural area in a colon-
specialfieldswithin anthropology, e.g. Black ized country. T h e study of traditional activi-
Africa and Indonesia at Leiden; Europe and ties was seen in an ethnographic present. In
the Mediterranean, South-East Asia and 1970, Gluckman's dynamic approach and
linguistics at Amsterdam; Latin America at Marxist influence progressively pushed investi-
Utrecht; the Pacific Ocean and economic gators in the direction of the study of social
anthropology at Nijmegen. change, complex societies and work-related
This tendency for universities to special- migrations. In 1980,finally,the Marxist con-
ize is not found in France or the Federal tribution increased even further, while the
Republic of G e r m a n y , where teaching tends outlines of an anthropology that was m u c h
to be more interchangeable and specialization more closely associated with the problems of
depends on the personalities and experience development began to take shape, within the
of different professors, each of w h o m organ- context of a m u c h greater degree of inter-
izes his lectures and research in accordance disciplinarity (involving economics, history,
with his o w n concepts. O n the other hand, in political science, and so on). O n the other
s o m e institutes in the Federal Republic of hand, some countries, notably the Federal
Republic of G e r m a n y and Austria, were sub-
G e r m a n y and in France (including the Institut
des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, the ject for years to the influence of the dif-
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales fusionist school (Kulturkreislehre, Kulturmor-
phologie), and that influence was widely felt
and the M u s é e de l ' H o m m e in Paris), teach-
ing m a y be quite specialized, especially since in the approach to teaching at all univer-
it is aimed at advanced students. It is another sities. T h e long-continued popularity of
distinctive feature of the French system that it diffusionism (the ethnohistorical. school)
has to some extent dissociated general edu- crowded out the other trends.
cation, which is provided essentially in univer- While the teaching of anthropology is
sities, from practical teaching arid research determined by the approach characteristic of
training, which are concentrated mainly in a particular university (as is the case in the
Paris and in specialized institutions. United K i n g d o m to some extent) or even of
an entire country (as was formerly the case in
Teaching and the students the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y ) , it is also
determined by the nature of the teaching
Approaches to teaching and educational material itself—in this instance, the anthro-
methods have changed over time as have the pological literature that the students can be
foci of interest in anthropological research. provided with.
T h e attention devoted to various societies or In France, for example, some publishers
continents is itself influenced by fashion, as have brought out translations of a great many
m a d e k n o w n by the press and other media. works by Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard or the
In France, for example, Africa was very American anthropologists. T h e publication of '
m u c h in vogue between 1950 and 1965, but these works in paperback editions has helped
shortly thereafter began to lose ground in to generate wider awareness of the ideas and
favour of the South American Indian and, interests of these authors a m o n g beginners or
subsequently, in the 1970s or thereabouts, non-specialist students, even though sub-
there was a wave of enthusiasm for the sequently more advanced study m a y lead
regions of France. them to adopt a more critical attitude
T h e same applies to teaching methods. towards this initial basic information. Only
Eades emphasizes that in the United King- later, in the context of work at a higher level,
d o m — a n d doubtless the same is true of other is it possible for the teacher to abandon this
The leaching of anthropology: a comparative study 721

general, 'cultural' aspect of his teaching and even longer in the case of a student w h o
turn instead to what he considers to be more wishes to obtain a doctorate. In such cases the
fundamental, namely transmission of 'field' programme m a y be as long as five or seven .
experience, which was formerly regarded as years.
the key ingredient in the ethnologist's training In the United Kingdom, the first year of
and k n o w - h o w . A n additional factor is con- studies is highly multidisciplinary, with so-
centration on a particular, more specialized ciology, law, economics and political science
field of anthropological research (kinship, alternating with anthropology (University of
economy, ritual, political life, and so on). T h e Kent). In the second year the student is
fact remains, none the less, that in France a introduced to the various specialfieldswithin
specialized field cannot be taught to the anthropology, and in the third year,
majority until cheap paperback editions, of- specialization by cultural area or themes of
fering in one volume articles by various application to development are introduced.
authors on a single theme, become c o m m o n . In the Netherlands, where anthropology
Generally speaking, interdisciplinarity is is still a clearly defined subject in its o w n right
coming to be an increasingly prominent fea- and is not taught as a form of 'culture' to the
ture of the teaching of anthropology, except same extent as in France and Belgium, the
perhaps in the Federal Republic of Germany work of the first and second years also
where the pace of change is slower. In the includes a substantial multidisciplinary
United Kingdom, some courses are given by component which includes sociology, political
groups of lecturers from different disciplines. science, philosophy and the economics of
In the Netherlands, anthropology is taught in development, anthropology being taught in
combination with other social sciences, es- combination with the sociology of the Third
pecially those that are of use in research on World (Free University of Amsterdam).
development in the Third World. In France, a Specialization begins in the third year, both
tradition going back to Durkheim and Mauss in anthropology and in a related discipline,
is used as a theoretical basis for the increas- the choice of which is left to the student.
ingly close association between sociology and For example, a student w h o intends to work
anthropology, which is also justified on the in Latin America m a y decide to specialize in
grounds of the small number of professional political anthropology with religious anthro-
opportunities available in anthropology. In pology as his second subject, choosing Spa-
Belgium, as A . Doutreloux emphasized, the nish-language subjects as an option. Research
anthropologist tends through force of circum- training really begins in the fourth and fifth
stances to become a 'sort of general prac- years w h e n the student is preparing for his
titioner of the social sciences', and anthro- doctorate. T h e doctorate is based on the fields
pology 'the art of interdisciplinarity' in that of specialization selected in the student's third
its function has become not so m u c h to year.
answer to a theory as to be able to take into
In France, o n the other hand, anthro-
consideration, w h e n confronted with an
pology is not really taught until the third
actual phenomenon, the various levels or
year, and then only at universities that offer
orders of reality constituting that phenomenon.
undergraduate degrees and maîtrises in eth-
The curriculum itself varies not only from nology. In some instances, however, courses
country to country, but also from university to m a y be given in the second year, or even the
university and hence, a fortiori, from one first, as part of the sociology programme.
specialized institution to another. Except in Training in specialist anthropology does
France, where the course of study is not so not really begin until the fifth year {diplôme
long, even in universities that offer a Master's d'études approfondies), at the doctoral level
degree in ethnology, the general rule is a and in seminars given in specialized institutes
three- or four-year course, which of course is such as the Musée de l ' H o m m e and the École
722
des Hautes Études. Such training m a y also
occasionally be available at a few universities
offering different fields of specialization at
this level.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, a,
Master's degree is awarded after the fourth
year, study beyond that level leading to the
doctorate. T h e teaching of the subject, some-
what as in France, is related to the personality
of the professor concerned rather than to the
nature of the university as in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. Consequently, it is
less susceptible of overall organization as it is
neither homogeneous (same training in all
universities) nor specialized (each university
having its o w n area of specialization defined
in relation to an overall structure). According
to F . Valjavec, there is n o course planning
and no course differentiation, apart from the
formal distinctions between undergraduate,
Master's and doctoral studies. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium and to a
considerable extent in France as well, the
complaint is that excessive emphasis has been
placed on theory, which is frequently divorced
from field experience. A . Doutreloux stresses
that students frequently find it difficult
to 'perceive a practical fact as it actually
is—ordinary, diversified or even disparate',
even though in m a n y instances they are
cramed . with concepts and theories
and well armed with reading matrices and
methods.
This trend is also observable in France,
where the Marxist school of anthropology
has developed a formidable body of theory on
pre-capitalist formations and forms of tran-
sition between production systems, in m a n y
instances on the basis of formerly fashionable
concepts such as the 'Asian m o d e of pro-
duction'. O n the other hand, the swing back
tó local ethnology and the study of regional
customs has led to a renewal of interest in the
descriptive approach and in ethnography,
formerly used in monographs about the exotic
'field'.
T h e students, discouraged by the lack of
any professional opportunities, look less for
training than for 'culture' and are increasingly
Jacques Lombard
interested in events in the non-European
world. They have filled the lecture halls of
Western universities and displayed consider-
able interest in anthropology since the years
1965-70. Those were the years of the great
debates about ideas and the reassessment of
Western society. This interest in other
peoples and different cultures also arose out
of the success of great theories such as Lévi-
Strauss's structuralism which have gone well
beyond the bounds of the academic world. In
France, in particular, books on anthro-
pology were widely read in secondary schools
and were extensively used by teachers at
that level.
At present, the economic crisis and the
rise of unemployment, along with the decline
of the traditional general disciplines in favour
of technological subjects that lead on to
employment, have changed the attitudes and
expectations of students, w h o are more
interested in acquiring k n o w - h o w than knowl-
edge. T h e n e w aids in education (such as
statistics and computers) are being progress-,
ively introduced into social science curricula
and are a contributing factor in the choices
m a d e by students. Those w h o learn to
handle these techniques best will tend to
prefer economics to sociology, and at a later
stage, will prefer sociology to anthropology.
In France, where there is no selection for uni-
versity entrance, a survey taken in October
1983 at the University of Lille I showed
that 75 per cent of the students entering the
first year of sociology were girls, whereas
boys tended to choose that subject as their
subsidiary field of study. In the Federal
Republic of Germany as well, increasing
numbers of w o m e n students are going in for
ethnology.
Doubtless there is a cause-and-effect
relationship between the lack of opportunities
for employment and the trend of anthro-
pology towards a general 'cultural' approach.
This trend can only grow stronger if the
number of students from related fields in-
creases, or if, in addition to their degrees
and jobs, they display an increasing tendency
to regard a degree in anthropology as a 'cul-
The teaching of anthropology: a comparative study 723

tural passport' for any intelligently prepared tation, associated with the problems of
stay in a distant country. today's world, but this would lead to a frag-
mentation of the discipline in view of the
W h a t can be done about these various crises need for genuinely interdisciplinary research.
in education, the universities, and anthro- Anthropologists would have to affiliate,
pology? This is what J. S. Eades asks with themselves, both theoretically and empiri-
respect to the United Kingdom in wondering cally, with specialists in the other social
what the short- and long-term prospects are sciences, working with them in closer collab-
for anthropology as an academic discipline. oration than they worked in the past with
In the short term, he thinks that it would their former colleagues in other special fields
be desirable to continue to meet the demand of anthropology.
of a minority of students by preserving Anthropology has already given the other
anthropology education in its entirety. T h e social sciences its specific techniques such as
departments of anthropology exist, and participant observation and small-group
they must continue to meet the demand of a analysis and it has already turned to the
public that is still attracted by the exotic. For study of complex societies, even though the
the longer term, there are two possible techniques just referred to have sometimes
courses. In thefirstplace, anthropology edu- proved to be less appropriate there than in
cation could be given a m o r e historical orien- the study of rural societies. Furthermore, in
tation, concentrating on vanishing cultures interdisciplinary debate, anthropology has
and demanding a m o r e searching study of the always been able to emphasize the reality
substantial quantity of material accumulated and complexity of any socio-cultural situation.
by earlier scholars. This approach might be It still faces the task of adapting m o r e fully to
of interest to a small number of students, the contemporary world, even if in so
even though it has no institutional basis in the doing it must lose some part of what its
academic system. Alternatively, anthropology 'substance' originally was.
could be given a more contemporary orien- [Translated from French]

Note

1. Eleventh International J. S. Eades, University of Kent (France), 'L'enseignement de

Congress of the Anthropological
and Ethnological Sciences.
Phase I—Quebec City, 14-17
August 1983, symposium A-208:
'The teaching of anthropology'.
A . Doutreloux, University of
Louvain (Belgium), 'Enseigner
l'anthropologie en 1983'
[Teaching Anthropology in
1983].
(United Kingdom), 'The
teaching of social anthropology
in the United Kingdom'.
A . Koster, Free University of
Amsterdam (Netherlands),
'L'enseignement de
l'anthropologie aux Pays-Bas'
[The Teaching of Anthropology
in the Netherlands],
J. Lombard, University of Lille I
l'anthropologie en France' [The
Teaching of Anthropology in
France].
F. Valjavec, University of
Tübingen (Federal Republic of
Germany), 'L'ethnologie en
Allemagne fédérale'
[Anthropology in the Federal
Republic of Germany].
Books received
Generalities, documentation
Roberts, Stephen A . (ed.). Aca-
demic Research in the United
Kingdom. Its Organisation and
Effectiveness: Proceedings of a
Symposium of the Association
of Researchers in Medicine and
Science. London, Taylor Gra-
h a m , 1984. 112 p p . , figs.,
tables. £12.
Cronin, Blaise. The Citation
Process: The Role of Signifi-
cance of Citations in Scientificsocial. [Alicante], Humanitas,
Communication. L o n d o n , Tay-
lor G r a h a m , 1984. 103 p p . ,
bibliog. £10.
Marien, Michael (ed.); with
Lane Jennings. Future Survey
Annual, 1983: A Guide to Re- vey and Questionnaire Design.
cent Literature of Trends, Fore- London/Sydney, C r o o m H e l m ;
casts, and Policy Proposals.
Bethseda, World Future Society,
1984. 240 p p . , index. £25.
Tedd, Lucy A . An Introduction Energy and Science Authority.
to Computer-based Library Sys-
tems, 2nd ed. Chichester/New
York/Brisbane, John Wiley &
Sons, 1984. 262 p p . , figs.,
tables, index.
Psychology
Guéguen, Cécile; Leveau, H é -
lène T . Rendez-vous à la crèche.
Toulouse, Privat, 1984. 164 p p . ,
illus. (Mésopé.) 65 francs.
Martino, Joël de. Formation pa-
radoxale et paradoxes de la for-
mation. Toulouse, Privat, 1984.
228 p p . , figs., bibliog. (Histoire
contemporaine des sciences h u -
maines.) 98 francs.
M o z n y , Ivo. Rodina vysokoSkol-
sky vzdèlanych manzelû. Brnë,
Universita J. E . Purkynë, 1983.
189 pp., graphs, tables, bibliog.
Social sciences
Ander-Egg, Ezequiel. Metodolo-
gía del trabajo social. Instituto
de Ciencies Sociales Aplicadas,
1982. 244 p p . , figs., illus., tables.
. Técnicas de investigación
1983. 500 p p . , figs., graphs, illus.
Bilsborrow, R . E . ; Obérai,
A . S.; Standing, G . (eds.). Mi-
gration Surveys in Low Income
Countries: Guidelines for Sur-
1984. 552 p p . , tables., bibliog.
£14.95.
Sri Lanka. Natural Resources,
Social Science Research Meth-
odology, Seminar, Peradeniya,
24 Aug.-13 Sept.1980: Seminar
Report. C o l o m b o , Natural R e -
sources, Energy and Science
Authority, 1983. 268 p p . , tables.
Sociology
Grenier, Philippe. Chiloé et les
Chilotes: Marginalités et dépen-
dance en Patagonie chilienne.
L a Calade, Aix-en-Provence,
E D I S U D , 1984. 585 p p . , figs.,
maps, illus., tables, bibliog.,
index. 240 francs.
Kwasniewski, Jerzy. Society and
Deviance in Communist Poland:
Attitudes Towards Social Con-
trol. Leamington S p a , Berg
Publishers, 1984. 209 pp'.
Sternberg, Ghitta. Stefanesti:
Portrait of a Romanian Shtetl.
Oxford/New York/Toronto, Per-
g a m o n Press, 1984. 289 p p . ,
figs., illus., tables, bibliog. £20.
Trappe, Paul. Entwicklungsso-
ziologie. Basle, Social Strategies
Publishers Co-operative Society,
1984. 711 p p . , index. (Social
Strategies: Monographs o n So-
ciology and Social Policy, 12.)
60 Swiss francs.
Demography
Franco Biffi (ed.). International
Federation of Catholic Univer-
sities. Centre for Coordination
of Research. Demographic Poli-
cies from a Christian View Point,
Symposium, Rio de Janeiro,
27-30 Sept. 1982: Proceedings.
R o m e , Herder, 1984. 587 p p . ,
figs., tables.
Nations Unies. Département des
Affaires Economiques et Sociales
Internationales. Tables types de
mortalité pour les pays en déve-
loppement. N e w York, United
Nations, 1984. 351 p p . , tables.
(ST/ESA/SER. A/77.)
United Nations. Department of
International Economie and
Social Affairs. The World Popu-
lation Situation in 1983: Concise
Report. N e w York, United
Nations, 1984. 108 p p . , tables.
(ST/SEA/SER.A/85.)
Political science
International Federation of
Catholic Universities. The Peace
Movements/Les mouvements de
la paixlFriedensbewegungen—
Analysis and Evaluation; Mo-
726
tivations and Aspects, Sym-
posium, Salzburg, 18-21 Feb.
1983: Proceedings. R o m e , R e -
search Centre of the I F C U ,
1984. 333 pp., tables, bibliog.
Whitaker, Ben (ed.). Minorities: Rose, José. En quête d'emploi:
A Question of Human Rights?
Oxford/New York/Toronto, Per-
g a m o n Press, 1984. 131 pp.
Economics
A g h , Attila. National Develop-
ment in the Third World. Buda-
pest, Institute for World Econ-
o m y of the Hungarian Acad-
e m y of Sciences, 1984. 68 pp.
(Studies on Developing
Countries, 115.)
Australia. Department of
Foreign Affairs. The Develop-
ment Crisis and the North-South
Dialogue: An Australian Per-
spective. Canberra, Australian
Government Publishing Service,
1984. 93 pp., tables.
Inter-Regional Coordinating
Committee of Development
Associations. Third Inter-Re-
gional Meeting on Development
Research, Communication and
Education, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, 7-9 June 1983:
Beyond the North-South Dia-
logue/Au-delà du dialogue Nord-
Sud. Kuala Lumpur, Asian and
Pacific Development Centre,
1983. 130 pp. (English/French.)
Jennings, Anthony (ed.) Our
Response to the Poorest of
the Third World. Oxford/New
York/Toronto, Pergamon Press,
1984. 64 pp., index.
Mikkelsen, Arne; Vartia, Pentti;
Eliasson, Gunnar; Selvik, Arne
(eds.). Economic Growth in a
Nordic Perspective. Stockholm,
The Industrial Institute for
Economic and Social Research,
1984. 373 p p . , figs., tables.
( S E K 223.)
formation, chômage, emploi. Pa-
ris, Económica, 1984. 196 pp.,
tables., index, bibliog. 98 francs.
Tolnai, György. The Role of the
Peasant Small-Scale Commodity
Producing Sector in the Third
World. Budapest, Institute for
World Economy of the Hunga-
rian Academy of Sciences, 1984.
51 pp. (Studies on Developing
Countries; 114.)
United Nations. The Voluntary
Fund for the U . N . Decade for
W o m e n . A Guide to Community
Revolving Loan Funds. N e w
York, United Nations, 1984.
158 pp., illus., tables.
Law
Université de Paix. Les droits des
humains: textes fondamentaux
pour l'éducation et l'action. H u y , Literature
Belgium, Georges Malempré,
[1984]. 143 pp. (Critères pour
l'action.) 25 francs.
Public administration
Kleczkowski, B . M . ; Roemer,
M . I.; V a n der Werff, A . Les
systèmes de santé nationaux: ré-
orientation sur la voie de la santé
pour tous. Geneva, World
Health Organization, 1984. 136
pp., bibliog. (Cahiers de santé
publique, 77.)
Social relief and welfare
International Labour Office.
Financing Social Security—The
Options: An International Analy-
sis. Geneva, International Labour
Office, 1984. 145 pp., $14.25;
25 Swiss francs.
World Health Organization. Re-
gional Office for Europe. Family
Planning and Sex Education of
Young People. Copenhagen,
W H O Regional Office for Euro-
pe, 1984. 41 pp. ( E U R O Re-
ports and Studies, 89.)
Social anthropology
Koenig, Jean-Paul. Malagasy
Customs and Proverbs. Mont-
real, Sherbrooke, 1984. 50 pp.,
illus., bibliog.
Polo, Jaime B . The Binalayan
Fishing Ritual-Drama: A Fellow-
ship at Sea. Tacloban City,
Divine W o r d University Publi-
cations, 1983. 110 pp., illus.,
bibliog.
Collet, Paulette. Les romanciers
français et le Canada, 1842-
1981: Anthropologie. Sher-
brooke/Paris. Editions N a a m a n
Agence de Coopération Cultu-
relle et Technique, 1984. 163
pp., gloss., index.
History
Pichardo, Hortensia. Biografía
del Colegio de San Cristobal de
la Habana. Havana, Editorial de
la Academia de Ciencias de
Cuba, 1979. 292 pp., bibliog.
Recent Unesco publications
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on the Status of Women: Devel- General History of Africa: ary African History: Report and
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man Needs: Trends, Methods
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Unesco/Pergamon Press, 1984.
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728

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Austria: Buchhandlung Gerold und C o . , Graben laire, B.P. 577, B R A Z Z A V I L L E (branches in Pointe
31, A-1011 W I E N . Noire, Loubomo, Nkayi, Makabana, Owendo,
Bahamas: Nassau Stationers Ltd, P . O . Box N - Ouesso and Impfondo).
3138, NASSAU.
Costa Rica: Librería Cooperativa Universitaria,
Bangladesh: Bangladesh Books International Ltd., Ciudad Universitaria 'Rodrigo Fació', S A N JOSÉ.
Ittefaq Building, 1, R . K . Mission Road, Hatkhola,
Cuba: Ediciones Cubanas, O'Reilly N ° 407, L A
DACCA 3.
H A B A N A . For the 'Unesco Courier' only: Empresa
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Benin: Librairie nationale, B . P . 294, P O R T O N O V O ; Czechoslovakia: S N T L , Spalena 51, P R A H A 1 (Per-

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fogo 188, Rio D E J A N E I R O ( G B ) .
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6, SOFIJA.
manent display); Zahranicni literatura, 11 Souke-
nicka, P R A H A 1. For Slovakia only: Alfa Verlag,
Publishers, Hurbanovo nam. 6, 89331 B R A T I S L A V A .
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correos, 3542, G U A Y A Q U I L ; Casa de la Cultura
Ecuatoriana, avenida 6 de Diciembre n.° 794,
730
casilla 74, Q U I T O ; Nueva Imagen, 12 de Octubre
959 y Roca, Edificio Mariano de Jesús. Q U I T O .
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noy, 75700 PARIS. C C P Paris 12598-48.
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mation Services, Publication Section, Baskerville
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Box
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201,
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2942, K U W A I T .
 731

Lesotho: Mazenod Book Centre, P . O . M A Z E N O D . Netherlands Antilles: Van Dorp-Eddine N . V . , P . O .

Liberia: Code & Yancy Bookshops Ltd., P . O . Box
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que démocratique de Madagascar pour l'Unesco,
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sity of Malaya Co-operative Bookshop, K U A L A
L U M P U R 22-11.
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BAMAKO.
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ricana, Apartado 69, M A N A G U A .
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versity Bookshop, Ibadan, P . O . Box 286, I B A D A N ;
sity Bookshop, L A G O S ; The Ahmadu Bello Univer-
sity Bookshop, Z A R I A .
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Monaco: Brjtish Library, 30, boulevard des M o u - Apartado 7571, Zona 5, P A N A M Á .
lins, MONTE-CARLO. Paraguay: Agencia de Diarios y Revistas, Sra.
Morocco: Librairie 'Aux belles images', 282, ave- Nelly de García Astillero, Pte. Franco no. 580,
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(C.C.P. 324-45); Librairie des écoles, 12, avenue Philippines: National Book Store Inc., 701 Rizal
Hassan-II, C A S A B L A N C A ; Société chérifienne de Avenue, M A N I L A .
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scie 7, 00-068, W A R S Z A W A ; ORPAN-Import, Palac
Mozambique: Instituto Nacional do Livro e do Kultury, 00-901, W A R S Z A W A .
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andar, M A P U T O . Portugal: Diaz & Andra de Ltda., Livraria Portu-
gal, rua do Carmo 70, L I S B O A .
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Netherlands: Publications: Keesing Boeken B . V . , Río Piedras, P U E R T O R I C O 00925.
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732

. Saudi Arabia: Dar Al-Watan for Publishing and Trinidad and Tobago: National Commission for
Information, Olaya Main Street, Ibrahim Bin Unesco, 18 Alexandra Street, St Clair, P O R T O F
Sulaym Building, P . O . Box 3310, R I Y A D H . SPAIN.

Senegal: Librairie Clairafrique, B . P . 2005, D A K A R ; Tunisia: Société tunisienne de diffusion, 5, avenue

Librairie des 4 vents, 91, rue Blanchot, B . P . 1820, de Carthage, T U N I S .
DAKAR.
Turkey: Haset Kitapevi A . S . Istiklâl Caddesi,
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P . O . Box 131, M A H É ; National Bookshop, P . O .
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Box 48, MAHÉ.
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sity and Sierra Leone Diocesan Bookshops, F R E E - Box 276, L O N D O N S W 8 5 D T ; Government Book-
TOWN. shops: London, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol,
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Times Jurong, 2 Jurong Port Road, S I N G A P O R E 151 Stratford Road, B I R M I N G H A M B U 1 R D . For
2261. scientific maps only: McCarta Ltd, 122 King's
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ral de la Commission nationale de la République-
Spain: Mundi-Prensa Libros S . A . , Castelló 37, Unie du Cameroun pour l'Unesco, B . P . 1600,
M A D R I D 1; Ediciones Liber, apartado 17, Magda- Y A O U N D E ; Librairie des éditions Clé, B . P . 1501,
lena 8, O N D Á R R O A (Vizcaya); Donaire, Ronda de Y A O U N D E ; Librairie St Paul, B . P . 763, Y A O U N D E ;
Outeiro, 20, apartado de correos, 341, L A C O - Librairie aux Messageries, Avenue de la Liberté,
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L A 4 ; Librería Castells, Ronda Universidad 13, B . P . 5346, D O U A L A ; Centre de diffusion du livre
BARCELONA 7. camerounais, B . P . 338, D O U A L A .

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lam Gardiner Mawata, P . O . Box 244, C O L O M B O 2. Bookshop, P . O . Box 9030, D A R E S S A L A A M .

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and periodicals: U N I P U B , Box 433, Murray Hill
Suriname: Suriname National Commission for Station, N E W Y O R K , N Y 10157.
Unesco, P . O . Box 2943, P A R A M A R I B O .
Upper Volta: Librairie Attie, B . P . 64, O U A G A D O U -
Sweden: All publications: A / B C E Fritzes Kungl. G O U ; Librairie catholique 'Jeunesse D'Afrique',
Hovbokhandel, Regerinsgatan 12, Box 16356,. OUAGADOUGOU.
, S-103 27 S T O C K H O L M . For 'The Courier': Svenska
FN-Förbundet, Skolgränd 2 , Box 150 50, S-104 65 Uruguay: Edilyr Uruguaya, S . A . , Maldonado 1092,
S T O C K H O L M . (Postgiro 18 46 92.) Subscriptions: M O N T E V I D E O .
Wennergren-Williams A B , Box 30004, S-10425 USSR: Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga, M O S K V A G-200.
STOCKHOLM.
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Z Ü R I C H ; Librairies Payot (Genève, Lausanne, CARACAS; DILAE C A . (Distribuidora Latino-
Bâle, Berne, Vevey, Montreux, Neuchâtel, americana de Ediciones C A . ) , Calle San Antonio
Zurich). entre A v . Lincoln y A v . Casanova, Edificio Hotel
Royal—Local 2 , Apartado 50.304, Sabana Grande, •
Syrian Arab Republic: Librairie Sayedh, Immeuble
CARACAS.
Diab, rue du Parlement, B . P . 704, D A M A S .
Thailand: Nibondh and C o . Ltd., 40-42 Charoen Yugoslavia: Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Trg Republike
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1715 R a m a IV Road, B A N G K O K .
Zaire: Librairie du C I D E P , B . P . 2307, K I N S H A S A ;
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Librairie du Bon Pasteur, B . P . 1164, LOMÉ; Commissariat d'État chargé de l'Education natio-
Librairie universitaire, B . P . 3481, L O M É . nale, B . P . 32, K I N S H A S A .
 733

Zambia: National Educational Distribution Co. of Zimbabwe: Textbook Sales (PTV) Ltd. 67 Union
Zambia Ltd., P . O . Box 2664, L U S A K A . Avenue, H A R A R E .

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Past topics1

From 1949 to the end of 1958, this Journal appeared under the n a m e of International Social Science
Bulletin, not all issues of which were devoted to a main topic.
Microfilms and microcards are available from University Microfilms Inc., 300 N . Zeeb R o a d , A n n
Arbor, M I 48106 (United States of America). Reprint series are available from Kraus Reprint
Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, N e w York, N Y 10017 (United States of America).

Vol. XI, 1959 Vol. XVII, 1965

No. 1. Social aspects of mental health*
N o . 2. Teaching of the social sciences in the U S S R *
N o . 3. The study and practice of planning*
No. 4. Nomads and nomadism in the arid zone*
Vol. XII, 1960
N o . 1. Citizen participation in political life*
N o . 2. The social sciences and peaceful
co-operation*
N o . 3. Technical change and political decision*
N o . 4. Sociological aspects of leisure*
Vol. XIII, 1961
No. 1. Post-war democratization in Japan*
No. 2. Recent research on racial relations
No. 3. T h e Yugoslav c o m m u n e
No. 4. T h e parliamentary profession
Vol. XIV, 1962
No. 1. Images of women in society*
N o . 2. Communication and information
No. 3. Changes in the family*
N o . 4. Economics of education*
Vol. XV, 1963
N o . 1. Opinion surveys in developing countries
N o . 2. Compromise and conflict resolution
N o . 3. Old age
N o . 4. Sociology of development in Latin America
Vol. XVI, 1964
No. 1. Data in comparative research*
No. 2. Leadership and economic growth
No. 3. Social aspects of African resource
development
N o . 4. Problems of surveying the social sciences
and humanities
N o . 1. M a x W e b e r today/Biological aspects of
race*
N o . 2. Population studies
N o . 3. Peace research*
N o . 4. History and social science
Vol. XVIII, 1966
N o . 1. H u m a n rights in perspective*
No. 2. M o d e r n methods in criminology*
N o . 3. Science and technology as development
factors*
No. 4. Social science in physical planning*
Vol. XIX, 1967
N o . 1 Linguistics and communication*
N o . 2, The social science press
N o . 3 Social functions of education*
N o . 4. Sociology of literary creativity*
Vol. XX, 1968
N o . 1. Theory, training and practice in
management*
N o . 2. Multi-disciplinary problem-focused
research*
N o . 3. Motivational patterns for modernization
N o . 4. T h e arts in society*
Vol. XXI, 1969
N o . 1. Innovation in public administration*
N o . 2. Approaches to rural problems*
N o . 3. Social science in the Third World*
N o . 4. Futurology*
Vol. XXII, 1970
N o . 1. Sociology of science*
N o . 2. Towards a policy for social research
N o . 3. Trends in legal learning
N o . 4. Controlling the human environment

1. The asterisk denotes issues out of print.

736

Vol. XXIII, 1971 Vol.XXX, 1978

N o . 1. Understanding aggression
N o . 2. Computers and documentation in the social
sciences
N o . 3. Regional variations in nation-building
N o . 4. Dimensions of the racial situation
No. 1. The politics of territoriality
No. 2. Exploring global interdependence
No. 3. H u m a n habitats: from tradition to
modernism
No. 4. Violence

Vol. XXIV, 1972 Vol. XXXI, 1979

No. 1. Development studies N o . 1. Pedagogics of social science: some
No. 2. Youth: a social force? experiences
No. 3. The protection of privacy No. 2. Rural-urban articulations
No. 4. Ethics and institutionalization in social No. 3. Patterns of child socialization
science N o . 4. In search of rational organization
Vol. XXV, 1973
Vol. XXXII, 1980
N o . 1/2. Autobiographical portraits
N o . 3. The social assessment of technology No. 1. The anatomy of tourism
N o . 4. Psychology and psychiatry at the cross-roads N o . 2. Dilemmas of communication: technology
versus comunities?
Vol. XXVI, 1974 No. 3. Work
N o . 4. O n the state
N o . 1. Challenged paradigms in international
relations
N o . 2. Contributions to population policy Vol. XXXIII, 1981
N o . 3. Communicating and diffusing social science No. 1. Socio-economic information: systems, uses
N o . 4. The sciences of life and of society and needs
N o . 2. At the frontiers of sociology
Vol. XXVII, 1975 N o . 3. Technology and cultural values
N o . 1. Socio-economic indicators: theories and N o . 4. Modern historiography
applications
N o . 2. The uses of geography Vol. XXXIV, 1982
N o . 3. Quantified analyses of social phenomena
N o . 4. Professionalism in flux No. 91. Images of world society
No. 92. Sporting life
Vol. XXVIII, 1976 No. 93. M a n in ecosystems
No. 1. Science in policy and policy for science* No. 94. Makings of music
No. 2. The infernal cycle of armament
No. 3. Economics of information and information Vol. XXXV, 1983
for economists No. 95. Burdens of militarization
N o . 4. Towards a new international economic and No. 96. Political dimensions of psychology
social order No. 97. The World economy: theory and reality
No. 98. W o m e n in power spheres
Vol. XXIX, 1977
N o . 1. Approaches to the study of international
organizations Vol. XXXVI, 1984
N o . 2. Social dimensions of religion No. 99. Interaction through language '
N o . 3. The health of nations N o . 100. Industrial democracy
N o . 4. Facets of interdisciplinarity N o . 101. Migration

Back numbers may be purchased from your Unesco publications national distributor at current single-copy
rates.
French edition: Revue Internationale
des Sciences Sociales . .
(ISSN 0304-3037), Unesco,
Paris (France).
Spanish edition: Revista Internacional
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