— C O N S T I T UT I O N A L L AW —

VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA

G.R. No. 83988 September 29,
1989 Right against Searches
and/or Seizures
J U LY 5 , 2 0 1 8

FACTS:

As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the

residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order.

ISSUES:

1. What constitutes a reasonable search?

2. Whether checkpoints violate the right against
searches and/or seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the Constitution.

RULING:
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed,
or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a
judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect that he had been

stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful
search and seizure.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be

considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse

by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power
is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
 — C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW , R E M E D I A L L AW —

CORTES vs. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos.
187896-97 June 10, 2013
Remedies- Office of the
Omudsman
J U LY 2 , 2 0 1 8

FACTS:

Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 3(c) of

Republic Act No. 3019. or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. and
Misconduct. Petitioner alleged that during the period of 29 March 2006
to 1 April 2006, respondents utilized a heavy equipment grader owned
by the Province of Aklan in levelling a portion of his land and several
fruit trees were destroyed.

The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) recommended the dismissal of

the cases due to the fact that two (2) other cases involving the same
parties and issues had already been filed by petitioner.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, petitioner
takes the appeal directly to the Supreme Court, via a petition for review
on certiorari, pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing
the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the OMB.

Petitioner stresses that respondents’ actions violated his constitutional

right to due process and that his property was taken without just
compensation.

In their Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks the dismissal
of the petition because petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.
Moreover, the OSG supports the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint due
to identity of issues and respondents in the previous and the present
complaint.

ISSUE:

What is the proper remedy from the Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions

in criminal cases?

RULING:
Petitioner, in filing this petition for review, committed a procedural
misstep which warrants an outright dismissal.

Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the

Ombudsman Act of 1989 and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence.
Section 27 provides, in part, that:

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule

45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases, had been declared unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the
case of Fabian v. Desierto.

We ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the

Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a
criminal case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. We made the
pronouncement in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon6 that the
remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the
Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.

Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative

and a criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a
petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly
file a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before this Court. Neither of these
two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.

By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal.

— C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW , R E M E D I A L L AW —

VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 199042 November
17, 2014 Warrantless Arrests
JUNE 4, 2018

A waiver of an illegal arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search.

FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A Complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for

allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After
recording the incident in the police blotter, four police officers, together
with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed
Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him and invited him to
the police station where he was subjected to a body search and, in the
process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered from the left pocket of
his pants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search was legal.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays

down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace
officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the

arresting officer show none of the above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-
appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively
participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who
had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.

The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.

A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal

search. Records have established that both the arrest and the search were
made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right
to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to have equally
waived his right to contest the legality of the search.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless

search can be conducted.

These searches include:

(1) search of a moving vehicle;

(2) seizure in plain view;

(3) customs search;

(4) waiver or consented search;

(5) stop-and-frisk situation;

(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstance.

The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it
was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the
seized item was allegedly found inside the left pocket of accused-
appellant’s pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While
thistype may seemingly fall under the consented search exception, we
reiterate that “[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence.”

Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal

search; that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

— C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW , C R IM I N A L L AW —

Malana vs. People G.R. No.

173612 March 26, 2008
Equipoise Rule
M AY 2 , 2 0 1 8

FACTS:
The petitioners Dominador and Rodel, together with their acquitted co-
accused Elenito, were charged with the crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder before the RTC. The charges stemmed from an
incident that left Betty dead, and her daughter Suzette and granddaughter
injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
Vicente, the husband of deceased Betty, testified that appellants had been
threatening to liquidate him and his family, due to their belief that he
was in the practice of witchcraft by which he had caused the deaths of
Rodels parents-in-law.

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC found
Dominador and Rodel guilty of two (2) separate crimes of murder and
frustrated murder, and acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and
Suzette who positively identified the appellants as two of the three
perpetrators of the crime. However, the trial court acquitted Elenito as he
was not positively identified by Suzette as the third man and his physical
appearance does not fit the description of the tall fat man seen by
Suzette. The CA affirmed the guilt of appellants.

ISSUE:

What is the “Equipoise” rule? When can this be invoked?

RULING:
This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal
case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence
should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no
equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said rule is not
applicable in the case before us because the evidence here presented is
not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution,
appellants could only offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It is
elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification
that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of
the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at
another place when the felony was committed, and that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. This they failed to prove.

Ultimately, the Court also said that there is no merit in appellants

assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise
rule in view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt.

— C I V I L L AW , C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW , P O L IT I C A L
L AW —

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10,
 2005 Separation of Church and
State.
A P R I L 11 , 2 0 1 8

FACTS:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church

(PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz
and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of
the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc,
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de
la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family
of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner
Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano
being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la Cruz,
however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to
another parish.Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication,
petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction
against Bishop de la Cruz before the RTC.They contended that their
expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating
their right to due process of law.

ISSUE: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of
religious intramurals?

RULING:
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization.

It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for
the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations.

“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious

organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
possession of church property.”

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

— C O N S T I T UT I O N A L L AW —

Doctrine of Stare Decisis

JANUARY 30, 2018

The following are cases which explain the Doctrine of Stare Decisis

PESCA vs. PESCA

G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001

The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law
as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.

TAÑADA vs. GUINGONA

G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution

shall from a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The Court’s interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of
its enactment since the court’s interpretation merely establishes the
contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the
Supreme Court assume the same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex
Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).

COLUMBIA PICTURES ENTERTAINMENT, INC vs. CA

G.R. No. 111267 September 20, 1996

In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. case

which resolved the same issue involving the same petitioners but with
different respondents, the Court en banc held:

Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare

decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it its our considered view that
the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant
case to justify the quashal of Search case to justify the quashal of Search
Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners’ consistent position that the order
of the lower court of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants’
motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there
having been satisfactory compliance with the then prevailing standards
under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken.
The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from
petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the
law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required
with respect to the finding of probable cause.

xxx xxx xxx

It is consequently clear that judicial interpretation becomes a part of the

law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the
qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is over-ruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (People v.
Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607; Unciano
Paramedical College, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No.
100335, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada, et al. v. Guingona, Jr.,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 113888, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 507). To hold
otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there if no recognition of what had transpired prior to
such adjudication. (De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, et al. L-
23127, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 429).

People vs. Jabinal

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are

nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code “Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system … .” The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate.

The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of

legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was
found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by
the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case
in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
 — C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW , R E M E D I A L L AW —

Garcia vs. Drilon G.R. No.

179267 June 25, 2013
Jurisdiction of Family Courts
JANUARY 29, 2018

FACTS:

Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf

of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She
claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of

violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty (30) days.

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support;

failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.

The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.

Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of

R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case
for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the

constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil
case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262

before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court
has limited authority and jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of

constitutionality of a statute.

RULING:

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the

constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of
the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts
at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court

shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant.

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City

remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction
to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid
and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law.” The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, “plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of
final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of

constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest
opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before
the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court.

— C I V I L L AW , C O N S T IT U T I O N A L L AW —

Republic vs. Cagandahan G.R.

No. 166676 September 12, 2008
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth

Certificate[In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she
has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,

2005.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female
to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING:

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or

naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but
he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course
in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the
Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in
order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit
of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent
is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that
classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society
who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of

nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held
that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion,
to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine
name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

— C O N S T I T UT I O N A L L AW , P O L I T I C A L L AW —

Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R.

No. 157013. July 10, 2003
Suffrage, Overseas Absentee
Voting
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that
he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a
green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution

does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the
legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon
which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to
qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage
should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does
not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.

ISSUE:

Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid &

constitutional?

RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas
absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee
voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.

The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No.
9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

17. a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first

paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;”
18. b) The portion of the last paragraph of
Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;”
19. c) The second sentence of the first paragraph
of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules
and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and
20. d) The second sentence in the second
paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission” of the same law;

for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution

mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of
said law continues to be in full force and effect.
— C O N S T I T UT I O N A L L AW , P O L I T I C A L L AW —

AASJS vs. DatumanongG.R.

No. 160869 May 11, 2007
Citizenship, Dual Allegiance
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

This is a petition filed by petitioner ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS

OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED
WORKERS against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing
citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop
respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled “An Act
Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act
No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner avers that Rep.
Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

ISSUE:

By recognizing and allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9925

unconstitutional?
RULING:

It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No.
9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance
to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship
was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

The OSG pointed that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987

Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law
on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court is without
any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.

Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and

it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for
the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining
to dual allegiance.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.