THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and

LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut
and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, [2] as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,[3] the Land Bank of
the Philippines[4] (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
==========
P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents were the
DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for
both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2)
it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the provisional
compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.[5]
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[6]
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is
beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest
at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and
Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum of SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS
(P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of riceland the sum
of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the
proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE

THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al.), using the following
formula:

For the coconut land

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) = Net Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula under Republic Act
No. 3844[8])

For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH (using the formula
under Executive Order No. 228[9])

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to DAR AO No.
13, Series of 1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision[10] affirming in toto the judgment of the
trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
 To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for
agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement For its part, the
DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Landbank.[12]
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. [13] If the
landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes
and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.[14] In case
the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator [15] conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the
Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land.[16] These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of
R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

x x x.

A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court[17] for final determination of just compensation.[18]
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court [19] and, on its own
initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a
written report thereof x x x.[20] In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several
factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to
the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DARs
rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.[21]
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered
the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination
of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A.
6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property; and

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the
said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature
of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian
Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is P703,137.00, merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent
of the parties, thus:

x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants determined the
average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs.
DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for
coconut lands and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-
entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the
present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low
considering that farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average production
per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of Basud,
Camarines Norte.We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average
gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at
3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production
in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.

xxxxxxxxx

As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land taken under CARP
is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per
hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos
when the coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling
this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the coconut land in
this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for
this case.

The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net income of the
coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare. Applying the capitalization formula
of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00
per hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.

The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600
hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross production of 3000 kilos or 60
cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland
therefore in this case is 46 cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.[22]

PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted interest on the
compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is
199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00.[23] (emphasis
added)

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge.[24] They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing
party,[25] which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the
necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case. (emphasis added)
 The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No.
228[26] and R.A. No. 3844,[27] as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting
compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.[28] It must be stressed
that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844
governs agricultural leasehold relation between the person who furnishes the landholding, either as
owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
same.[29] Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold
relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree
No. 27[30] and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the
property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however,
such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded
R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the
parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the
trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned
earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the
land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties, the trial court may
appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to
the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is
directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the
subject property.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS

FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @
Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
 MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE
KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE
DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The
Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous
with life imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed[1] before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming,[2] Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam[3] Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom,
which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring
and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of
FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060][4] and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said
Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario,[5] a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being ambushed by the
herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix
Rosario[6] to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was
detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was released
only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim;
there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid
of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of
person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain
the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065][7] a male public officer of
the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating circumstance in
that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina
Hassan and Freddie Manuel.[8]
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court renders its judgment,
ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless detained for some other
offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and

HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed men who insured
impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and pursuant to Art. 267,
Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon
Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their kidnapping not
having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the same four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years
of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10065 and 10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of [k]idnapping and
she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5) imprisonments, ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de
Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore,
ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges for
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors, they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve five imprisonments
ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders convicted of an offense
punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced further to return the
following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in
money, their liability being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00

One Calculator P 295.00

Eyeglasses P 500.00

One Steel Tape P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez
 One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00

Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara

One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be extended to those
sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon a.k.a. Commander Kamlon
Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and Jane Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.[10] In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same appellants,
except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for amnesty. In our March 19,
1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration
of this Court.[11]

The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:

On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized
themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on
Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez, representing the City
Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the
driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check on two of its
classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able
to reach the place because on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns
at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings. They
were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as
Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops which caused their
group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men
joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their captivity, the victims
were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers
performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a ransom
of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were informed that they would be
released. They started walking until around 7:00 o clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o
clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom
money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several
negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)

x x x.[12]

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco, and
Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:[13]

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in Sinaburan,
Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place
where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In the
afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the
battalion station and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported
to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha
Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the captivity of Carlos
Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains. Against their will,
she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for
everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-
treatment of Falcasantos other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not
looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen years old at the
time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by
Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than
a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his
men. She made good her escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops.
She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in going back to her
mothers house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o clock in the
afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men picked
her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought
to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for
the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del
Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm,
soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they
shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no other
civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the
building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused
Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya
Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and,
finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights. On the
seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-
11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife
the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that
followed in the wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count
of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of life
imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their version of what had
happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to
[p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who
saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and
29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were
keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the captivity of the five
kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon
Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and Imam Taruk Alah. These
two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as conspirators as charged in
the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to
which the seven accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established communities, lived in
the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these
armed band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral
support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting
them.

xxxxxxxxx

II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin. The Court holds
these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these
male accused were armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military
and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages.
Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men who had
kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is supported by the rulings of
our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy. It may be
shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances which may vary according to the
purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera,
43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the
sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).)[14]

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

I
 The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly
captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right
to cross-examine him.

II

On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of, the trial
court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and
contradictory.

III

The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as
accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.

IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits
of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were minors at the time of
the commission of the offense.[15]

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt with.
Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of
other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition,
the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts.[16] Because he was allegedly deprived of
his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the
latters testimony should not be used against him.[17]
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge.[18] This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has
the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
 Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on the
positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro
and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by
appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a
decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced
Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to know first
our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?
A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A To lla Abdurasa.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else did you
come to know?
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander Falcasantos -
Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon,
Tira.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to know them.
Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
A Yes, maam.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are here?
A Yes, they are here.
Q Some of them are here?
 A Some of them are here.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men who took
us from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name as
JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what else was
he doing while you were in their captivity?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong.
x x x x x x x x x[19]
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what happened then?
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he looks like?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are here?
A Yes, maam.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as Jailon
Kulais.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those
who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he [was]
one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x[20]
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself as Jailon
Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from [the] Licomo
to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated
[that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
 Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself as Jailon
Kulais.)
xxxxxxxxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another will be on
duty guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
x x x x x x x x x[21]
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from December
12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed
men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire
period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a
conspirator.

Kidnapping
for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent
from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the
circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for possible
negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were you supposed to
negotiate?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms.[22]
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to write the
letter, the ransom letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you were
asked to write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will make you
remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario,
Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed this
one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature above the
same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
xxxxxxxxx
 Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here which says the
terms? ...
A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000
baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).[23]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange
[for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. [24] Now, could
you please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and the other one Enero 31, 1989 or
January 31, 1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, maam.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7 colors marine
type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.[25]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type
not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your
companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the City
Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to write, we
were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive.[26] [sic]
Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro[27] and Edilberto
Perez.[28] The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the
release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano
Agan[29] and Teddy Mejia.[30]
 The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code,[31] having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly
identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five
counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of
Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three testified to the fact of kidnapping;
however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the
kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra
and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours[32] does not matter. In People
vs. Domasian,[33] the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents
received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as
no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.[34] Convicting appellants
of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found
that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going
home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty.[35] Likewise,
in People vs. Santos,[36] the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article
267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers[37] -- Gara was a fiscal analyst for the
City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers Office, and Francisco was a barangay
councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,[38] which held that the crime committed was
not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had
tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were
foiled, when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the
victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain her,
or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the victims
were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place,
and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi

The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the prosecution
witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of
prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.[39] Between positive and categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former
generally prevails.[40] Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material points. Moreover,
no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent
days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988
to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of
their kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty
for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous
with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties
provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is invariably
imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in
accordance with the Revised Penal Code.[41]
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping
for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his
five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary
value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000
representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000]

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE

AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated
February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

"Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of

Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of
two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978, Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period,
plaintiff's appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five
(5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C",
p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
apologized. (Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days
until he was investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. Scjuris

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion
training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at defendant's expense. Having successfully
completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300
fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E"
and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.

Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its
expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance
leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.).

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate
its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately
terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the
B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified.
Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve. Jurissc

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November

1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice
(Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short
notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible
avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice
and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
 Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion
was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo
(Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the
complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the
course of plaintiff's employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was
employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents
executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and
courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Misjuris

In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded
in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and
not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question
that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is
grounded not on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-
73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84,
Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in
its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and
estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action. (pp. 102-
115)"[1]

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano

and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
amounts of -

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange

at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid; Jjlex

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange

at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages
with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
 Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED."[2]

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,

"...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity
date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED."[3] Newmiso

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES

IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF
WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE

RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS

TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT,
INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine
law, thus: Acctmis

"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under
the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of
Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the
burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should
be applied."[4]
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. [5] On
this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising further
the issue of jurisdiction.[6]

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of
the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was based
on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 years as
provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where
prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal
dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn, then filed
again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 1144[7] nor Article 1146[8] of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from employee-employer
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

x x x" Misact

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In
illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.[9]

More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals,[10] where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to
'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims
arising from an employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). ...

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails
over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that 'where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one designed therefore should prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant."[11]

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's
action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years
after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed.

"In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity
 date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already
prescribed."

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of the Labor Code,
which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However, this
claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the
statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties
in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all."[12]

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate
court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of employment. We
agree with the Court of Appeals when it said, Sdjad

"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee
accepted the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in
the contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months
written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily
understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation."

xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the
said agreement or any proviso contained therein."[13]

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:

"When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline
industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional
operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost
cutting measures, such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and
reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-
18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-
appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed."[14]

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination
from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to
be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to
respondent appellate court. Sppedsc
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV
No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013 and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has
already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While the
relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will
either affirm the validity of Arnado’s election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public
office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Court’s Decision
dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship
and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having
the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on
April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was
divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after
executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which must be presented as public documents2 of a
foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."3 Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a
person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."4

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is
the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnado’s disqualification
to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."5 This policy pertains to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)6 requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who
seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code7 which disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any
elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport – which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as
its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete
disregard of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes
the person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship
by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that
after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnado’s renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has
sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do
so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".1âwphi1 On the
contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say
that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another
citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.8 They are accorded not only great
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body
had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary
conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S.
Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the
COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed
with Arnado’s claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used
his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31
March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines
using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-
American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration
showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon
arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these
incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."10 This conclusion, however, is not supported by
the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that
he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnado’s
travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and
on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the
U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnado’s continued use of
his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are exclusively Filipinos
are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to
renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a
special privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188314
Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. Present:

BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO
TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL CARPIO MORALES, J.,
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, Chairperson,
JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, BRION,
ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or BERSAMIN,
Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Accused,

GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay,

ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, Promulgated:
and ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu
Jackie or Zaky, January 10, 2011
Accused-Appellants.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June
2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-
476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants
namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence
to reclusion perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).

Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus
terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to
7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the
bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men,
because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat away from each other one sat two seats behind
the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the
bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near
the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the
question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more
concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales
said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the
bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be
slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if
he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him.
Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men
insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off
the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops.
Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off
the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire
quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to
where the bus was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few
hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the whole incident.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that
shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over
radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive
interview some time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day bombing
incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan
and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening
of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo
Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other
John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only
Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and
Baharan pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:

1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted
knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
 3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal
which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.

4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he
claims taught him how to make explosive devices.

5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14
bombing incident.

6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb
explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and more or less
forty persons injured.

7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March
20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news network admitting
their participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.

8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these
crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a child in the
first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a
television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the explosive
devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted
in the filing of these charges.

10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members
of the Abu Sayyaf.[1]

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad
were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple frustrated
murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained
to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested
their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled
guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.[2]

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the
Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make
bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the
city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other
parts of Metro Manila.

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership,
specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder,
a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that
sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that is, 2
kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT
from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in
December 2004, but neither one of them exploded.
 Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got
another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu
Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan
and Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating
the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused Rohmat,
congratulating the former on the success of the mission.[3] According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically
said, Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

Assignment of Errors

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt

despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for
the crimes charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[4]

First Assignment of Error

Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry
after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The transcript of stenographic notes during the
18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that
were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to address this matter of
pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the
two accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will
recall they entered pleas of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but
then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple
murder charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial pretrial of this
case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb
explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of
about forty other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea,
have you discussed this matter with your clients?

ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent conferred
with them about this with regard to the multiple murder case.

COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused because
if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I want to hear it
from your lips.

ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their
pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to the murder case and
 plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are
inconsistent with their pleas.

COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?

ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the
murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your Honor,
from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor,
for re-arraignment.

INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in
Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their pleas
are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.

COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas of
guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any
matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I
will terminate pretrial and accommodate[5]

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain
from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. [6] Thus,
trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v.
Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's original plea was not guilty, the trial court should
have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case
involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave no room for
doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.[8]

Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which
it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in
this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the
guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty
of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.[9]
 We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty
of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under
coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted
or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against the accused. The Court observes that
accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the
same act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the
change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during
pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this
instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not
the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.[12]

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the plea of guilt is madeloses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the
person accused of the offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is
the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.[14](Emphasis supplied.)

In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali
as to the conspiracy was insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of
the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali.
Andales positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously
while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who
had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified
that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City.
The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial
confessions (exclusive television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed
the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt
made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-
turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the transcript of stenographic notes on the state
prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train
you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive,
sir.

Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two
weeks.

Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr.
Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect
to that mission?

A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro
Manila, sir.[16]

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.

Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2
kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?

A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by
Trinidad?

A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date,
December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate
a bomb

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect
to the taking of the explosives from you?

A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

A : He told me that this is your first mission.

Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to?

A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb
explode?

A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me
until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that
interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a
bus, which also did not explode.

Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad
and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

A : No, sir.

Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which
were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not
to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay
and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
 Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he
took exploded already, sir.

Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at
Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?

A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the
bombing in General Santos.

A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime
in February 2005.

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing
exploded in Makati, any other call?

A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky
called you up the following day, that was February 15, and
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to
you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation of that mission,
wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which
have been indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr.
witness?

A : They are connected, sir.

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should
not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city.

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A : The government, sir.[17]

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to
sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their anger towards the Christians.[18] It can also be
seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day
bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and
explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their mission was to plant bombs in malls,
the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004
to confirm that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence their
first mission.[19] They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The
day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On
Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb exploded, the
Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call
from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.[20]

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat.
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled
with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding
that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the crime. [21] Such
command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.[22]

Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act
would not have been performed.[23] In People v. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the
fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all
the resulting crimes.[24] The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan,
Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from the collective acts of the accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in
its Omnibus Decision:

Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major
points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other
accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched between and among
the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and
mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by
utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly
admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with
respect to the latters participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
 been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the
existence of the conspiracy itself and the indispensable participation of accused Rohmat
in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the

accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the
perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).[25]

In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the
defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to
the attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[26]

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are
admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People
v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.[27] Thus, in People v. Palijon, the
Court held the following:

[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An

extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against
his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded
opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where
the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Mercenes admission implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is
admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are
tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-
accused is competent evidence against the latter.[28]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as
affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112710. May 30, 2001]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and
LUCIO TAN, ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS (represented By IMELDA R.
MARCOS, IMEE M. MANOTOC, IRENE M. ARANETA and FERDINAND MARCOS,
JR.), IMELDA R. MARCOS, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG
LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH
KHOO, CELSO C. RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T.
ALBACITA, DON FERRY, WILLY CO, FEDERICO MORENO, PANFILO O.
DOMINGO, ESTATE/ HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS, CESAR ZALAMEA,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., ALLIED BANKING CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC.,
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP. MARANAW HOTELS & RESORT CORP., VIRGINIA
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., ALLIED LEASING & FINANCE
CORPORATION, JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., POLO NOMINEES LTD.,
LIMITED SERVICES, LTD., RED SEAL LTD., COMMONS SEAL LTD., SPLENDID
NOMINEES LTD., YOUNG TAI LTD., YOUNG JIN LTD., CO FINANCE NOMINEES
LTD., CORPORATE FINANCES (D.C.T.) LTD., HARRIS SECRETARIES, ALLIED
PACIFIC CORP., B & MCKAY NOMINEES LTD., ZANITH ESTABLISHMENT,
ARINSI, S.A., COTTON CORP. (B.V.I.) LTD., BARTONDALE LTD., HONGKONG,
OCEANIC BANK, SAN FRANCISCO, THE STERLING CARPET MAN LTD., THE
STERLING CARPET SALES LTD., THE STERLING CARPET DISTRIBUTORS LTD.,
MERCURY DRUG STORES LTD., CALGARY, ALBERTA, MERCURY ENERGY
RESOURCES LTD., respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Resolutions dated
August 23, 1993 and October 22, 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in SB Civil Case No. 0005 denying
petitioners Motion for Leave To Take the Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud Upon Oral Examination In the
Crown Colony of Hongkong.
On July 17, 1987, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine Commission
for Good Government, filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 0005, was filed against
26 individuals and was entitled Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff v. Lucio C. Tan, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua,
Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong (represented by Tarciana C. Tan),
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chuan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo,
Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso C. Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Don Ferry, Willy Co, Federico Moreno, Defendants.[1] The complaint alleged that
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and his wife Imelda, in violation of
the Constitution and in fraud of the Filipino people, embarked on a systematic plan accumulating wealth
during their term as President and First Lady of the Republic; that part of this plan was an agreement with
herein private respondent Lucio C. Tan whereby Mr. Marcos would own sixty per cent (60%) of
Shareholdings, Inc., a holding company which beneficially held and controlled substantial shares in
corporations owned by Mr. Tan such as Fortune Tobacco, Asia Brewery, Allied Banking Corporation and
Foremost Farms; that in addition to this agreement, Mr. Tan, from 1980 to 1986, paid Mr. Marcos sums
of money as bribes and commissions in consideration of the governments continued support for Mr. Tans
diversified business ventures; that to prevent disclosure of these transactions, Mr. Marcos and Mr. Tan
used the other defendants named in the complaint as their incorporators, directors, board members and/or
stockholders of corporations held and/or controlled by the two; that Mr. Tan, without sufficient collateral
and consideration but through the assistance of then Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, acquired
control of the General Bank and Trust Company which eventually became Allied Banking Corporation;
that the Marcos spouses and Mr. Tan caused losses in millions of pesos to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) by unlawfully selling DBPs controlling interest in Century Park Sheraton Hotel Manila
to a company grossly undercapitalized but beneficially held and controlled by Mr. Tan, and that this
transaction was facilitated by defendant Don Ferry, then Vice-Chairman of DBP, and defendant Harry
Tan. Petitioner prayed for reconveyance of all funds and property or payment of the value of such funds
and property, for accounting and damages.[2]
In December 1987, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for leave to expand or
otherwise make more specific certain allegations in the Complaint. This was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in an order dated December 11, 1987. Petitioner filed an Expanded Complaint on January
25, 1988.
In June 1988, herein respondent Don M. Ferry, one of the defendants therein, filed his answer. In
March 1990, herein respondent Lucio Tan filed his answer. A separate answer was filed by the twenty-
one (21) defendants other than Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Don M. Ferry, Federico Moreno and
Lucio Tan.
On August 19, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend and for Admission of Second
Amended Complaint and attached thereto a Second Amended Complaint. Petitioner sought to substitute
defendant Ferdinand Marcos with his estate, President Marcos having died pendente lite, and include as
additional defendants three (3) individuals who allegedly participated in the Marcoses accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth, namely, Panfilo O. Domingo, then President of the Philippine National Bank which,
together with the Central Bank, assisted Mr. Tans acquisition of the General Bank and Trust Company;
the Estate of Central Bank Governor Licaros, Governor Licaros having likewise died pendente lite; and
Cesar Zalamea, then Chairman of the Board of the Development Bank of the Philippines, who
recommended the approval of and facilitated the acquisition by Mr. Tan of the DBP shares in Century
Park Sheraton Hotel.[3] Also named as additional defendants were forty-two (42) corporations believed to
be beneficially owned or controlled by the Lucio Tan group of business associates of the former
President.
The Motion was duly opposed by herein respondent Tan and defendants other than Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Don Ferry and Federico Moreno.
On April 2, 1992, a Resolution was issued by the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion for Leave to
Amend and for Admission of the Second Amended Complaint and admitted the Second Amended
Complaint. The court ordered the issuance of summonses to the newly-impleaded defendants except the
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos which merely substituted the deceased Ferdinand E. Marcos, an original
defendant.[4]
On May 25, 1992, the 42 corporate defendants filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement or Bill
of Particulars. This motion was adopted by the rest of the additional defendants in a motion dated June
18, 1992.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1992, respondent Panfilo Domingo received summons from respondent court
together with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint. On June 2, 1992, respondent Domingo filed an
Omnibus Motion praying for a copy of Annex A of the complaint, i.e., a list of corporations allegedly
held by Mr. Tan; the production of actionable documents, and submission of a Bill of Particulars.
In June 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave To Take the Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud Upon
Oral Examination in the Crown Colony of Hongkong. Petitioner alleged that Mr. Rolando C. Gapud,
former financial adviser of President Marcos and his wife, was willing to testify on matters relevant to the
subject of the case; that Mr. Gapud executed three (3) sworn statements in Hongkong in 1987 setting forth
the various business activities of the former President, the manner in which these businesses were
conducted and managed, and identifying respondent Lucio Tan and thirty (30) other principal business
associates of the former President; that these affidavits were used by petitioner in filing civil and criminal
cases against the defendants; that Mr. Gapuds testimony is indispensable to establish the intricate
unlawful business activities of the Marcoses and their principal business associates or cronies, including
Mr. Tan; that in view of the nature of his testimony and the personal risks Mr. Gapud was facing in
assisting the government in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, his testimony would be given only by
deposition upon oral examination. Petitioner prayed that the court allow the taking of the testimony by
deposition upon oral examination of Mr. Gapud before the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong, or in any
other Philippine Foreign Office, and on such dates and time as may be agreed upon by the parties.[5]
The individual defendants (except for the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Don
Ferry, Federico Moreno, Panfilo O. Domingo, Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros, and Cesar Zalamea) filed
their Opposition, to which petitioner replied.
In a Resolution dated August 23, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion for
Leave to Take Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud Upon Oral Examination in the Crown Colony of
Hongkong. Respondent court held that the taking of deposition is premature because not all defendants
have been summoned or have filed their answers to the complaint, and no special circumstances existed
that warranted the taking of the deposition before service of answers. Reconsideration of the resolution
was likewise denied on October 22, 1993. Hence this petition.
Petitioner claims that:

A. Respondent Sandiganbayan seriously erred in denying the petitioners Motion for Leave to Take the
Deposition of Rolando C. Gapud on the ground that summons have not yet been served upon all the
respondents and all the respondents have not yet filed their answer to the complaint.

B. Respondent Sandiganbayan erred in declaring that there is no showing of any special or unusual
circumstances to warrant the necessity of taking the deposition of Rolando C. Gapud.

C. Respondent Sandiganbayan erred in stating that the petitioner (plaintiff-movant) did not allege that
Rolando C. Gapud will be unavailable as witness to testify during the trial.[6]

Respondent Lucio Tan alleges that (1) the subject motion is premature because not all defendants in
SB Civil Case No. 0005 have been served with summons, the issues in the case have not been joined, the
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint are insufficient; (2) the taking of the proposed deposition
at this time would be highly prejudicial to the defendants; and (3) petitioner has not shown special
circumstances or unusual circumstances demonstrating a necessity to take the deposition in question.[7]
Respondent Panfilo Domingo, joined by respondent Cesar Zalamea,[8] alleges that: (1) the taking of
the deposition at this time is premature; (2) respondent Domingo was not given an opportunity to oppose
petitioners Motion for Leave to Take Deposition; (3) petitioner failed to show the existence of special
circumstances warranting the taking of deposition at this time; (4) respondent Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition.[9]
 First of all, a deposition, in its technical and appropriate sense, is the written testimony of a witness
given in the course of a judicial proceeding, in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination or in
response to written interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination.[10] A
deposition may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient.[11] Pending action, it is governed by Rule 24, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in
Rule 23. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.[12]

Depositions pending action may be conducted by oral examination or written interrogatories, and may be
taken at the instance of any party, with or without leave of court. Leave of court is not necessary to take a
deposition after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been
filed (but jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action) that
prior leave of court is required. The reason for this is that before filing of the answer, the issues are not
yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.[13]
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that not all defendants have filed their respective answers to the
complaint. Petitioner claims, however, that the taking of Mr. Gapuds deposition does not require prior
leave of court because Section 1, Rule 24 states that a deposition may be taken after jurisdiction has been
obtained over ANY defendant. The provision does not state that jurisdiction should first be acquired over
ALL the defendants. And since summons has been served on most of the defendants and some,
particularly principal respondent Lucio Tan, have already filed their answers to the complaint, jurisdiction
has already been acquired by respondent Sandiganbayan, and there is no need for leave to take Mr.
Gapuds deposition.
The case at bar involves two (2) sets of defendantsthe first set named in the original complaint and
the second set in the Second Amended Complaint. The first names individual defendants while the second
set includes both individual and corporate defendants. Defendants Lucio Tan, Don Ferry and the 21 other
individual defendants (except Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and Federico Moreno) filed answers
to the original complaint. To the Second Amended Complaint, no answer has been filed by the additional
defendants, namely, the Estate of Gregorio Licaros, Panfilo Domingo, Cesar Zalamea and the 42
corporations. Respondent court ordered the issuance of summonses in the Resolution of April 2, 1992
admitting the Second Amended Complaint.[14] Respondent Panfilo Domingo received summons and a
copy of the Second Amended Complaint on May 8, 1992.[15] Respondent Lucio Tan has stated, without
dispute from petitioner, that only two (2) of the 29 individual defendants have filed their answers to the
Second Amended Complaint. And not all of the 42 corporate defendants have been served with summons,
this petitioner admits.[16] Those corporate defendants who received summons merely filed a Motion for a
More Definite Statement or Bill of Particulars, not an answer.
Petitioner argues that the 42 corporations are owned and controlled by Mr. Tan. Following the ruling
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),[17] the corporations are the res, the objects in the action
for the recovery of Mr. Tans illegally acquired wealth, hence, there is no cause of action against them and
no ground to implead them as defendants. Their inclusion in the Second Amended Complaint was
unnecessary and superfluous.[18]
Assuming that these corporations are merely the res in SB Civil Case No. 0005, they were not the
only defendants added in the Second Amended Complaint. Three (3) individual defendants, herein
respondents Panfilo Domingo, Estate of Gregorio Licaros and Cesar Zalamea, were added as well. A
careful reading of the Second Amended Complaint shows that the allegations against these three
individual defendants, although involving principal respondent Lucio Tan and his companies, rest mainly
on entirely different facts, were made on entirely different occasions and are separate and distinct from
the other. They are also different from the acts committed by the 22 other individual defendants in the
original complaint. The allegations against the additional defendants do not arise from their having acted
as dummies or alter-egos of the principal respondents, but as government officials who facilitated Mr.
Tans acquisition of private corporations despite non-compliance with legal requirements. It appears that
the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint against these three defendants are not clear for they
have adopted the corporate defendants Motion for a More Definite Statement or Bill of Particulars, and
respondent Domingo prayed for a bill of particulars in his Omnibus Motion. The additional defendants
should, at the very least, be given the opportunity to respond to the allegations against them and clarify
the disputed facts before discovery procedures may be resorted to.
Petitioner claims, however, that despite nonjoinder of issues, there exist special circumstances that
warrant the taking of Mr. Gapuds deposition.
Rule 24 entitled Depositions and Discovery was taken almost verbatim from Section V, Rule 26 (a)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States which has the same
heading.[19] Rule 26 (a) is likewise contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the United
States. Rule 26 (a) was however amended in 1948,[20] but prior to this amendment, the provision read:

(a) When Depositions May be Taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject of the action or without such leave after an answer
has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance
of any party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of
discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may
be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of
court on such terms as the court prescribes.[21]

In Moores Federal Practice, it is stated that:

As originally promulgated, Rule 26 (a) provided (1) that depositions might be taken after jurisdiction had
been obtained over any defendant or over property which was the subject of the action and before an
answer was served, only upon leave of court; and (2) that after an answer had been served depositions
might be taken without leave of court.

x x x.

The expression an answer in original Rule 26 (a) was used in its generic sense as signifying a responsive
pleading to a pleading asserting a claim for relief. This follows of necessity from the principle upon which
the rule was drafted, namely, that the parties should be required to wait until the issues raised by a claim
of relief had been settled by the service of a responsive pleading to the claim of relief. Thus if the
defendant served an answer which contained a counterclaim against the plaintiff, both parties had to wait
until a reply containing an answer to the counterclaim had been served before they could proceed to take
depositions as of right with respect to the counterclaim. x x x[22]

Under the original Rule 26 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party desiring to take
depositions before answer was served was required to obtain leave of court. While the Rule did not
indicate in what situations the court should grant such leave, the applicable principles are found in
jurisprudence.[23]
The general rule is that a plaintiff may not be permitted to take depositions before answer is served.
Plaintiff must await joinder of issues because if the discovery is to deal with matters relevant to the case,
it is difficult to know exactly what is relevant until some progress has been made toward developing the
issues.[24] Ordinarily, the issues are made up before the need for discovery arises, hence, prior to the time
of delineation of the issues, the matter is in the control of the court.[25]
There are instances, however, when a deposition is allowed to be taken before service of answer
once jurisdiction has been acquired over the person or thing. Leave of court may be granted only in
exceptional or unusual cases,[26] and the decision is entirely within the discretion of the court.[27] It should
be granted only under special circumstances where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong
case for allowance of the motion.[28] There must be some necessity or good reason for taking the
testimony immediately[29] or that it would be prejudicial to the party seeking the order to be compelled to
await joinder of issue.[30] If the witness is aged or infirm, or about to leave the courts jurisdiction, or is
only temporarily in the jurisdiction, leave may be granted.[31] A general examination by deposition before
answer however is premature and ordinarily not allowed,[32] neither is mere avoidance of delay a
sufficient reason.[33]
In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the taking of Mr. Gapuds deposition in lieu of his testimony
is necessary because the allegations in the complaint are based mainly on his disclosures regarding the
business activities of President Marcos and Lucio Tan; that although Mr. Gapud was granted immunity by
President Aquino from criminal, civil and administrative suits, he has been out of the country since 1987
and has no intention of returning, fearing for his safety; that this fear arose from his damaging disclosures
on the illicit activities of the cronies and business associates of former President Marcos which therefore
renders him unable to testify at the trial.
Petitioner has not cited any fact other than Mr. Gapuds cooperation with the Philippine government
in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth that would support the deponents claim of fear for his safety. No
proof, much less any allegation, has been presented to show that there exists a real threat to Mr. Gapuds
life once he returns to the Philippines and that adequate security cannot be provided by petitioner for such
a vital witness.
There is no question that the trial court has the power to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition
shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so ruling.[34] Petitioners reasons do not amount to an
exceptional or unusual case for us to grant leave and reverse respondent court. Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown the necessity for taking Mr. Gapuds deposition at this point in time before the other
defendants, particularly the individual defendants, have served their answers. Petitioner has not alleged
that Mr. Gapud is old, sick or infirm as to necessitate the taking of his deposition. Indeed, no urgency has
been cited and no ground given that would make it prejudicial for petitioner to await joinder of issues.
Finally, the Court notes that petitioner waited all these years for a ruling on this case instead of
working for the rest of the defendants to be summoned and their answers be filed. Petitioner can, as a
matter of course, take Mr. Gapuds deposition after the individual defendants have at least filed their
answers.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED, the Resolutions dated August 23, 1993 and
October 22, 1993 of respondent court in SB Civil Case No. 0005 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
 G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso
ko na ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa
akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"

Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya
sa labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.

"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong
saka?"

Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat,
ay! ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that Monico
Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the
harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of theft.6

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.7 The Information
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod,
Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate,
and once inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000
kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner,
Anecita Pacate, to her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos
(Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres
(Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at
Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's
administrator, and several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita
Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas
threatened that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the
incident to Anecita Pacate and the police.11

On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition
of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by
Ligtas.12

On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police
Station.13Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner.14

The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas,
his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres
Pacate since 1993.16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in
the criminal case.17

Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the
harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo
Palo were workers in another land, around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he
cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the
land.22

Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was
with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
when the alleged harvesting happened.23

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21,
2000.24 On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide
tenant of the land.26

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the
trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court 27 and Court
of Appeals28 and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to
prove the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial
evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by prosecution
witnesses."32

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft,
this court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:

1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days as
minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum;cralawlawlibrary
 2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n];cralawlawlibrary

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;cralawlawlibrary

c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the burden to prove the
existence of the tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential
elements of a tenancy agreement.36

The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide
tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at bar":37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence
of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are
not binding upon the courts.["]38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken conflicting positions.
While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under
Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time
of the commencement of the tenancy relation.39

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership. "He claims that the
parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such
assertion was based merely on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to
identify parcels of land."40

More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by harvesting abaca from
Anecita Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the
owner's consent.42 "The subject of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land
in order to consummate the crime of theft."43

Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal property under the meaning of
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the
abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were
already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were
sufficiently established by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from criminal liability.47 His
alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives
and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show that the case was
initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from
the land.50

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . .
August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No.
R-225, finding accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54

II

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.55 This
court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court;cralawlawlibrary

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by
private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern
Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of
petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Petition is meritorious.

III

Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for
being "conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence
of evidence on the claim of petitioner [as] tenant."57

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual
findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.60 This court has differentiated between a question of law and question of
fact:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.61 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule
he seeks redress from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the
subject of a petition for review under Rule 45:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion,
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting,
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by
the trial court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based, (9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.63 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material
facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter
the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal."64

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of
fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.66

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the essential
elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having been
pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the
case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

IV

Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and
revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as
tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000,
while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70

Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's tenant.71 The
DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to
tenancy relationship.72

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove
tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the
witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74

Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did not
file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB
Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB
Decision:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge.77(Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca
hemp.78Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest
between the parties.81

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on
courts if supported by substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled
in a number of cases that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to
an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is
the criminal liability for the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should
not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may
not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts
involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and
administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there
exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted
Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences
were not controverted by any evidence submitted by the respondent.

In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is entitled to a
security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except for
any of the causes provided by law and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession
is authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a
bonafide tenant of the land subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint,
and ordering as follows, to wit:
 1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the
peaceful possession of the land in dispute;cralawlawlibrary

2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR
Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the
land in dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance
with the legal mandate.

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses
incurred in this litigation.

Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.

No cost.

SO DECIDED.84ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to
respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of
evidence."86

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a
tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a
DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes
under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over
agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB
Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled
that administrative res judicata exists in that case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in
DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res
judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy
of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within
their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that
whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication
may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine
of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is
to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by
agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
proceedings:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of
the parties.95 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness
of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this
court discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by
prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not
identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties.99 As in this case,
the DARAB Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the
Decision.101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its
adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and
controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof
provides that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal
was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no
appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano
as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled
and no longer open to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation
patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an
action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner.
Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No.
512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior
case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated
anew.

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant
in the case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal
before the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the
doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in
a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the
doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same
issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case
and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can
no longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by
the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in
criminal cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the absence of an
employer-employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This court held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public
policy. ... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious
principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises,
the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the
course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot
be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time
and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy
relationship must be duly proven:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.109 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy
relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support
petitioner's claim as tenant of the land.111 In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which
consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres
Pacate sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
harvest.114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the
landowner's share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his
cultivation of the land on June 29, 2000.116

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to heed the
Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its
Decision the reason offered by private complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her intention not
to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her;cralawlawlibrary

That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in
the proceedings of the case;cralawlawlibrary

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he is now
withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled casef.]118ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even
records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.119 In
declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et al. v.
Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121

In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally
devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate
Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that
when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Oma�a, sold the land to respondents, respondents
were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Oma�a.122

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their
tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply with
their obligations under the terms of the compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of
Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial
Adjudicator.124

The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that]
existed between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere
hired laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation
package.126

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an
implied tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years.
They were entitled to security of tenure.127

The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's
Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy
relationship existed. However, despite the lack of tenancy relationship, the compensation package
agreement must be upheld.128

This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the
burden of proving the existence of a tenancy relationship:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there
was personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what
was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for
more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's
grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must
be adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the
shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to
discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of
proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which
he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context
of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA.
Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the claimed
sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the
testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the
basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-
serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of
sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.

We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the
testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding
was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no
reliance may be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent
ruling of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding
upon the courts. This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners,
as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of
tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional
and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the
testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted.
Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it
is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that private
complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the
existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review the
DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.

VI

According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not
established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a
legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from
[private complainant's land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.

As to the existence of another element of theft�that the taking was done without the consent of the
owner�petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's
tenant:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is
misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting
the produce of the landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right
entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until his
eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory.135 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be
upheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow.
Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law."136 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. � Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

 1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;cralawlawlibrary

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the
taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

persons who � in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households �
cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system.138 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's
share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the
tenant is with the landowner's consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of
reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed
to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to whether the plants taken by
petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants
adjacent to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private
complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her
own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent."144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is
with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person."146Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of
innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which
is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and
should be acquitted."148

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the
other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and
the Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by
way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary