The Failure of The Constitutional Monarchy in Iran: The Socio - and Psycho-Genesis of Reza Khan's Rise To Power

The Failure of the Constitutional Monarchy in Iran: The Socio… 159
Behrouz Alikhani
University of Münster
THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

MONARCHY IN IRAN: THE SOCIO-
AND PSYCHO-GENESIS OF REZA KHAN’S
RISE TO POWER
SUMMARY
A more realistic explanation of Reza Khan’s seizure of power can be achieved by

examining the long-term social and political developments preceding and following
the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Special attention should be paid not only to the in-
creasing ‘power chances’ of Reza Khan as a single person in Iranian society, but also
to the increasing ‘power chances’ of his position in a hierarchical structured society.
In particular, more light should be shed on the contribution of the ‘Constitutionalists’
themselves to this seizure of power and accordingly to the ‘failure’ of their own ‘Consti-
tutional Monarchy. ’A theoretical model can be developed by using this example, which
can provide insight into institutional de-democratisation processes in different structured
societies. Similar de-democratisation processes are already worked out based on social
and political developments in France (1848–1852) and Germany (1918–1933).1
INTRODUCTION
The process of Reza Khan’s rise to power in 1921 is not independent of

the events leading up to and the aftermath of the 1906 ‘Constitutional Revolu-
tion’ in Iran. If this process is only to be explained in terms of the extraordinary
capabilities of Reza Khan as a person or because of ‘the British conspiracy’,
it corresponds little to the complex reality of social and political processes at
1
See Alikhani 2012.
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160 Behrouz Alikhani
this development stage of the Iranian society. Only by utilizing a theoretical-

empirical study of a longer-term perspective, is one able to come closer to
the real structure of these processes. In the absence of a proper understanding
of the events before and after the Constitutional Revolution, one is liable to
succumb to voluntaristic and conspiratorial explanations of Reza Khan’s rise
to power. The more important question concerning the personality structure
of a large number of people, especially the political actors, who contributed
to these institutional de-democratisation processes is thereby neglected. This
study suggests that the prevailing idealised image of the Constitutionalists as
true democrats in literature about that period of Iranian history corresponds
little to the reality of that time. A realistic consideration of the structure of these
processes will support a more accurate depiction of the ‘Constitutional Era’ and
later developments. A rather artificial, but still dominant, separation between
the research of that which is known as ‘failure of Constitutional Monarchy’ and
the research of the reasons for ‘Reza Khan’s rise to power’ is avoided.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: FROM

INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATISATION TO
INSTITUTIONAL DE-DEMOCRATISATION
In particular, the traumatic experiences of the ‘lost wars’ in the mid 19th century
to other nationally organized states, such as Russia and the Great Britain, led
to a strong desire for reforms.2 While reforms were first aimed at the military,
gradually they found their way to the political and economic sectors.3 The main
aim was to establish a ‘strong central government’ which should have been
able to offer protection to its citizens. But, the ruling Qajar dynasty suffered
from structural weaknesses. Not only the corruption in the court prevented
serious and lasting reforms, but also the lack of a relatively permanent and
2
Iran lost a relatively large part of its Northern territory in the First (1804–1813) and Sec-
ond War (1826–1828) against Russia. The First War led to the ‘Treaty of Gulistan’ and the Second
War to the ‘Treaty of Turkmenchay’, both to the disadvantage of Iran. The war between Great
Britain and Iran, known as the ‘Anglo-Persian War’ took place from November 1856 to April
1857. The war resulted in Iran’s withdrawal from the city of Herat (in today’s Afghanistan) and
the signing of the ‘Treaty of Paris’ which surrendered Iran’s claim to Herat. Great Britain consid-
ered the region around Herat a buffer zone against Russian expansion towards India.
3
See Adamiyat 2006, p. 162.
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stable monopoly of violence and taxation in the country. Iran’s ‘semi-colonial

situation’ also impeded the development of a ‘strong central government.’4
Nevertheless, under the rule of the Qajar dynasty, especially during Naser al-
Din Shah’s long reign, a small ever-growing middle class had emerged which
later played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution.5
The most important demand of the Constitutional revolutionaries under
the leadership of the clerics, the bazaaris, and the merchants was to estab-
lish a ‘House of Justice’ (‘edâlat khâneh). However, gradually the intellectu-
ally-oriented members of the revolution were demanding the establishment
of a ‘parliament.’6 Within a relatively short period of time a ‘Constitutional
Monarchy’ was established. The ‘failure’ of this monarchy and the return to
a dictatorship led by Reza Khan after only 19 years can not be understood
properly without considering the kind of conflict resolution extant among ‘Con-
stitutionalists’ from the first to the fifth parliament. From a process-sociological
perspective, this ‘institutional de-democratization’7 must be justified as a func-
tion of a ‘drag effect of the social habitus’8 by the majority of Constitutionalists
in that time. While a strong ‘spurt of democratization’ can be seen on the in-
stitutional and functional levels after the Constitutional Revolution, there can
also be simultaneously observed a further existence of the familiar patterns of
feeling and behavior by the majority of Constitutionalists who were anything
but parliamentary.
With the reduction of ‘democracy’ to its institutional aspects, as is now
common in the dominant research on democracy, those habitual constraints
can hardly be grasped which can impel all societies, at whatever development
stage, toward the domination of ‘counter-processes’ in the direction of insti-
tutional de-democratization.9 Below I try to show briefly how the ‘democrats’
themselves, due to their social habitus, can contribute to a process of institu-
tional de-democratization. According to the process-sociological approach,
4
See Ashraf 1980, p. 46.
5
See Foran 2007, p. 195.
6
See Ettehadieh 2002, pp. 43–45.
7
See Gholamasad 1997, p. 370.
8
See Elias 2003, p. 283.
9
See Gholamasad 2007, p. 58. In another study, I have already dealt through a detailed
comparative study with similar processes in Germany during the Weimar Republic (1918–1933)
and France during the Second Republic (1848–1852), (See Alikhani 2012). In this context, there
are also other similar examples. The latest institutional de-democratization processes seem to
be taking place currently in the Hungarian society after the victory of Viktor Orbán with his
two-thirds majority in parliament in 2010. In which direction the strong democratization pro-
cesses of some Arab societies will go, is also highly dependent on such ‘habitus constraints’ by
the majority of the members of each society.
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Reza Khan is seen, like many other charismatic personalities, as a product of

the societal needs of the majority of the society’s members who are emotion-
ally longing for a strong man, after a period of disorder and uncertainty under
a parliamentary form of government. Such a strong man had to come and
regulate everything from the top again as soon as possible.10
In Iranian society during the Constitutional Monarchy (1906–1925) there
was ample opportunity for the development of such a position that could give
a satisfactory response to the needs of the majority of Iranians. Reza Khan
individually fulfilled this position effectively in comparison to his rivals. To
understand the reasons for the increase in the power of this position and not
only the person, attention must be paid to the dynamics which within a 19-year
time span after the Constitutional Revolution led to the ‘failure of the Consti-
tutional Monarchy.’
THE CONFLICTS IN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND

PARLIAMENT
If one examines the debates of the Constitutionalists from the first Parliament, it
is noted, in short, that rather than a parliamentary way of feeling and behaving
there exists a feeling of glorification of physical violence. During the exercise of
power and the elimination struggles by some of the Constitutionalists counter-
violence is often observed. The speech of Taqizadeh, the leader of one group of
Constitutionalists during the first Parliament, refers for instance to this attitude:
We should not compare this Parliament with the two- or three-hundred year
old parliaments of constitutional countries in which the government requires
the Parliaments only control and election (...). This Parliament can not start through
conventional ways but must reform the country by an extraordinary force and an
iron fist.11
Thinking and acting in an ‘either-or categories’ inevitably forced many

Constitutionalists to label their political opponents as an absolute enemy.
Subsequently, any form of mediation, compromise, consensus or reconcili-
ation with this ‘enemy’ was considered ‘treason.’ The term ‘compromise’
10
See Elias 1990, p. 49.
11
Adamiyat 1985, pp. 366–367.
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(sâzesh) belongs to a structural characteristic of each parliamentary form

of government; this term was used quite often in the language of the people
in connection with the term ‘treason’, regardless of whether or not it was
about the compromise with other Constitutionalists, or with the Shah and
his allies.12
The assassination of Prime Minister Amin al-Soltan in August 1907,
the bomb attack on Mohammad Ali Shah in February 1908 and the subsequent
events are among the most important events of this time. Without including
these events, Mohammad Ali Shah’s military attack on the Parliament and
its eighteen-month closing are difficult to explain. In this paper the focus of
attention is not about the customary recriminations, but rather the comprehen-
sion of the dynamics that could only arise from the relationships of the groups
involved. While it may give the people a satisfactory feeling, it is less reality
congruent to declare Mohammad Ali Shah as ‘guilty’ for these events which is
often the case throughout the dominant historiography.
It was not the bomb attack on Mohammad Ali Shah, but the position of Par-
liament regarding the prosecution of its perpetrators that played an important
role in stoking the Shah’s further enmity for the Constitutionalists. Accord-
ing to Mansoureh Ettehadieh, after the bombing, the Shah felt abandoned by
the Majles.13 In a letter to Parliament nine days later, the Shah complained of
the slowness of the investigations and said he hoped to see results in the near
future.14 However, after the arrest of some people who were close to one part
of the Constitutionalists, known as ‘Radical Constitutionalists’, different po-
litical associations and like-minded Constitutionalists protested. They explic-
itly called for the immediate release of the accused before any processing.15
Under pressure, the Shah finally agreed to release the suspects of the bomb-
ing. However, his letter betrays his deep dissatisfaction and humiliation about
the incident:
If the people do not want that I follow those who wanted to kill me, I renounce
their persecution.16
In the three months between this bombing attack on him and his own at-
tack on the Parliament, Mohammad Ali Shah encountered a new round of
threats, allegations and insults. An article in the newspaper Ruh al-qodos, for
12
See Ettehadieh 2002, pp. 212–216.
13
Ibid., p. 258.
14
See Adamiyat 1992, p. 274.
15
Ibid.: p. 280.
16
Reisnia 1981, p. 62.
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example, threatened Mohammad Ali Shah a fate similar to that of Louis XVI
and to that of his assassinated former Prime Minister, Amin al-Soltan.17 An
article in the same newspaper equated Aqa Abbas, the murderer of the Prime
Minister, to Imam Ali, the first Imam of the Shiites.18
Perhaps the most problematic for the Shah was an article published in
the newspaper Mosâvât (Justice). This led to one of the last tensions be-
tween the ‘Radical Constitutionalists’ and him before his attack on the Parlia-
ment. This article was questioning the ‘propriety’ of the Mother of Shah and
accordingly his succession.19 Even as Shah wanted to press charges against
the director of this ‘liberal’ newspaper, he not only did not take part in the trial
but also mocked it in the next issue on the court.20 Signatures were also col-
lected in the public on a long piece of cloth, supposedly to bear witness that
Mohammad Ali Shah was not his father’s son!21
After the death of Amin al-Soltan no one succeeded to fill his interme-
diary role; this exasperated the already fragile trust between the Shah and
the many members of the parliament such that their relationship became further
strained.22 If this group of Constitutionalists had possessed the parliamentary
ability of being longsighted, they would have realized the negative potential
consequences of Amin al-Soltan’s assassination. Adamiyat, one of the histori-
ographers of this time criticized the ‘violence of the Radical Constitutionalists.’
He claimed the violence ultimately hurt the ‘Constitution’ with the killing of
this ‘pragmatic and capable mediator.’ He refers explicitly to the lack of ability
of being longsighted by this group of the Constitutionalists and highlights in
a process-sociological language habitual conditions of a parliamentary form
of government:
But the ‘Radicals’ were too radical and too short-sighted in the reflection of this
very important and nuanced issue in order to pursue a method that would have
served the Parliament and the practical reason.23
17
Ruh al-qodos, no. 13, Saturday, November 5th, 1907, pp. 1–3. quoted from: Abadian 2006,
p. 90. Louis XVI was deposed by revolutionaries in the French Revolution. Although largely
considered incompetent and powerless, the king was nonetheless imprisoned and executed in
1793. His execution was a symbolic act, intended to signify the end of the monarchical system
that Louis XVI represented. See David Beetham 1991, p. 41.
18
See Saidi Sirjani 2004, p. 150.
19
See Dolatabadi 2008b, p. 664.
20
See Katouzian 2000, p. 73f.
21
See Abadian 2006, p. 91.
22
Sheikholeslami 1988, p. 24.
23
Adamiyat 1992, p. 183.
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The dangers of this attitude for this governmental form can also be read
from Talebof Tabrizi’s letters. Nominated by the ‘Radicals’ from Tabriz as
a candidate for the new Parliament, he rejected this proposal and wrote in a let-
ter to Dehkhoda, his ‘Radical’ friend:
It is astounding that while in Iran the fight for freedom of opinion is going on, at
the same time the opinion of others is not only being ignored but also there are
those who are being condemned to death for expressing their opinions.24
In another letter to the newspaper Anjoman (Association), Talebof warned

the ‘Radicals’ about the ‘immaturity of Constitutionalists’ and ‘the dangers of
a breakout of anarchy’:
Iranians were up to now caught by a two-horned cow of despotism, but soon, when
they are unable to lead themselves, they will be confronted with a thousand-horned
cow of the mobs. Then despots would laugh at our immaturity and our enemies
would rejoice.25
Similar to the First Parliament, the Constitutionalists once again han-

dled their conflicts in the same way as they entered into the second Majles.
The manners in which they handled these conflicts led to a weakened central
government. The formation of a functioning government during this Parliament
was almost impossible due to the disputes. The arguments between different
camps of Constitutionalists had always a direct negative influence on the Par-
liamentary assembled cabinets.26 The conflict with Russia and the subsequent
three-year closure of the Majles over the course of the invasion of Iran by
the Russian troops could have also been prevented by a compromise, if ha-
bitual constraints had been aligned more strongly with a parliamentary type of
orientation by an influential part of the parliamentarians. In 1911, the Ameri-
can financial advisor William Morgan Shuster was hired by the government
to reform the financial system. After the ‘Anglo-Russian Treaty’ of 1907,
the Russians considered Northern Iran their zone of influence and opposed
Shuster’s decision to establish a Gendarmerie led by English officers. The al-
location of high positions to the anti-Russian ‘Democrats’ in this new armed
force strengthened the reluctance of the Russians against Shuster.27 Another
incident provoked the Russian occupation force as well. Sho’a’ al-Saltaneh,
the brother of the exiled Mohammad Ali Shah, was one of the richest people
24
Aryanpour 1972, p. 291.
25
Ibid., p. 291.
26
See Ettehadieh 2002, p. 483.
27
Vgl. Malekzadeh 1984, S. 1375ff.
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in the country and an ardent supporter of Russia’s political objectives in Iran.

After the failed coup of his brother, he was ordered by the Iranian government
to cede his property as compensation to the government for the damage caused
by the coup. Shuster was commissioned to carry out the seizure. The Russians
felt obliged to support their allies and immediately sent troops to Bandar-e
Anzali in the north of Iran to express their demand for compensation as well
as to demand an apology to Sho’a’ al-Saltaneh by the Iranian government.28
Finally, the hiring of two British citizens in the Russians zone of influence and
the intransigence of a large faction of Constitutionalists toward the Russians
led to a Russian ultimatum. The Russians demanded the immediate dismissal
of Shuster and an official apology on the part of the Iranian government. In
the case of non-fulfillment of their demands, they threatened an invasion
of their troops towards Tehran. Though the majority of the members of Parlia-
ment remained intransigent, the Cabinet took the threat seriously and called
for the dismissal of Shuster.29
Some ‘Moderate Constitutionalists’ were also of the opinion that the coun-
try was too weak to stand up to the Russians. They pleaded in favor of a more
pragmatic policy of rapprochement and friendship over confrontation with
the mighty neighbor.30 However, the majority of MPs, especially the ‘Demo-
crats’, insisted on resisting and finally succeeded in gaining the upper hand
in decision making in the Majles. The slogan ‘either death or independence’
express their political attitude.31
During the invasion of Russian troops to Tehran, members of the various
parties and factions in Parliament formed a committee intended to propose
possible solutions and make immediate decisions. One of the members of this
committee reported the agreed-upon solution as the following:
(...) after long talks, arguments and discussions, we decided to act after the com-
mand of the excellent national poet Ferdowsi who says: My body should not exist
without Iran. Because we knew that the Russian government was not pursuing a dif-
ferent objective and purpose, except for the conquest of Iran and the destruction of
its independence. [We made this decision] despite our knowledge that we are not
able to fight against strong Russian forces and to throw them out of the country.
We have preferred the death with honor to the life with shame. We decided to pay
28
Vgl. Mostofi 2007, pp. 1285–1291.
29
Vgl. Ettehadieh 1996, p. 128.
30
31
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the price of resistance against oppression and injustice with our lives. Even when
we fail to save the country, we can at least sacrifice our lives to it.32
This intransigent position of some of the Constitutionalists and even their

willingness to put their life on the line is also reflected in the manner in which
they addressed attempts to make compromise. They deemed individuals who
supported Naser al-Molk and tried to make peace with the Russians ‘traitors.’
One of these Constitutionalists gave a speech in front of ‘thousands of listen-
ers’ as follows:
With the assurance that the war will lead to the victory of the enemy and our
failure, we considered it as better to let destroy the country with resistance and
sacrifice of its members. Thus, it will not be written in the history that the people
of a nation of few thousand years old history with dishonour and humiliation was
not willing to let shed their blood for their honor and country. [It will not also be
written that] they unmanly surrendered to the enemy and gave away the country
to them for nothing.33
From Taqizadeh’s letter to the Parliament can be read his strong concern
for their ‘intransigence’ as well:34
32
Malekzadeh 1984, p. 1460 (emphasis mine). They employed a similar strategy for dealing
with conflicts a few years later. During the First World War, for example, they issued a statement
in the journal Kâveh which called on the Iranian government to take a clear position against
Russians and the British. They did this despite the fact that the Iranian government was in no
position to back such a stance against these major military powers. The same journal included
the following remarks in January 1916:
‘Even if the old glorious Iran perished and died out, should it not die honorably? Is it
worth to fall with shame and humiliation in the hands of wild Russians? Does it not cause
shame for an Islamic government if it would idly capitulate to an eternal imprisonment of
their religion’s enemies? And finally, will other nations of the world pity and respect us in
the slightest, in the event of such an idly decline of Iran?’ (Ghahari 2001, p. 94).
33
Malekzadeh 1984, p. 1512, (emphasis mine). The same speaker changed his mind decades
later as follows:
‘That was what the radical and fanatical liberals and youths thought at that time. But today,
after forty years, where the experience has replaced the emotions and I have a lot more in-
formation about the events of that time, I believe it is inappropriate to refer to the decision
makers of that time as traitors and enemies of the country. The majority of them were, like
me and you, the reader of this story, saddened by the events and they could not do anything at
the same time. Would they have followed the passionate ideas of radical groups, the country
would probably have been lost completely. So, it would have not been anything remained
from the untrue reputation of an independent and autonomous Iran with a functioning gov-
ernment.’ (ibid.: p. 1512).
34
Taqizadeh was forced to flee the country as a consequence of the shooting of one of
the opposing parliamentary leaders, Ayatollah Behbahani. He was perceived by followers of
Behbahani as the real mastermind behind this assassination. Taqizadeh is one of the most con-
troversial political figures in Iranian history. He radically changed his political ideology during
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After much deliberations and investigations I am amazed that you are dealing with
the powerful enemy in these dangerous times so obstinate that the country is led
into the abyss. What changes a little apology; do you not know about the history
of the decline in other states or are not the ministers and the Parliament aware of
their responsibility that they are working on the distraction of the country? They
sacrifice the independence of the nation because of their personal ambition and
intentions. In the name of our nation and its independence, I beg you, convey my
massage to the Parliament.35
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEED FOR

A ‘STRONG MAN’
From late 1911 until the coup by Reza Khan in February 1921 the monopoly of
violence and taxation in Iran was mostly abolished. The government was un-
stable and the disputes between the Constitutionalists in Parliament continued.
The existing structural weakness of the central government during the fourth
Parliament in 1918 led to a more regional autonomy movement and rebel-
lions. The indebted central government was even no longer financially able
to pay the wages of the civil servants and soldiers.36 The continuing unrest
and disorder in the country over time resulted in the desire for a strong central
government by many Iranians. The idea of a central government was meant to
restore order, stability and security. Referring to this social desire, Bahar, who
was an active member of the ‘Democrats’ in parliament, wrote the following:
In this time, we realized that the central government should be given more power
and that the government needs a foothold and for the country there should be
found a resting point. In those days, we realized that the strong central government
is more just than any rebellion and movement that are coming into existence for
the reforms in the regions. The central government should be helped.37
his exile in Europe and USA. In exile he became more moderate and critical towards his former
party comrades. Homa Katouziyan divides the political life of Taqizadeh into three periods,
which were very different from each other. According to him the first period ended in the age
of 33/34, with his exile in 1911. The second period began with his exile and lasted until the age
of 56 in 1934 and the third period ended with his death at the age of 92 in 1970. See: Katouzian
and Homa 2003.
35
Afshar 1993, p. 463.
36
See Bahar 2007a, p. 28.
37
Bahar 2007a, pp. VIII–IX.
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Bahar also cites the lack of ability of being longsighted by an important

part of Constitutionalists as being responsible for the development of a desire
for a ‘strong central government’:
This was the idea of intelligent and perceptive stratum which had the insight into
the situation at that time. All wanted this. There was no other choice. We were our-
selves, because of the rivalries, animosities and the shortsightedness of our friends,
not able to form such a government.38
Some intellectuals propagated even a ‘just and enlightened despotism’ as

an alternative to the ‘Parliamentary Monarchy.’ ‘The inability of the people to
understand the Constitution’ was mentioned as a reason for the appropriateness
of this alternative.39
Hence, ‘the idea’ of the coup was not a spontaneous idea of some politi-
cians, which has often been suggested as an explanation. The coup in 1921
was not an isolated act; it was closely related to the social and political events
before and during the Constitutional Monarchy. Even for many Constitutional-
ists a ‘quick military solution’ to the problems won the upper hand. According
to Hossein Makki, this idea appeared in the minds of many statesmen at that
time.40 Modarres as a cleric, Seyed Zia as a journalist, Sardar Asad as a tribal
leader, Nosrat al-Doule as a Qajar prince and Staroselski as a Cossack officer
also believed in a ‘quick military solution’:
In those days, the majority of the people were desperate about the change of disas-
trous conditions. There was a severe hopelessness in the hearts of sensitive people.
The endless chaos and disorder, financial problems, feelings of humiliation and
weak leadership continued. The situation forced the few people who kept their cour-
age to search for solutions. A change through normal and legal channels seemed
impossible; as an alternative they considered sudden and radical changes. The eyes
were fixed on the horizon, in the hope that suddenly an invisible hand tears off at
a single blow the rotten roots of that weak state and incompetent governments.
And even if it does not want to bring wonder, guarantees at least the security and
keeps away the hand of the bandits and rebels from property, life and honor of
the people.41
Reza Kahn, as indicated, due to his personal and military strengths com-
pared to his rivals, was able to give an appropriate response to the societal
needs and desires. From the beginning of the coup in February 1921 until his
38
Bahar 2007b, p. 101.
39
See Hedayat 2006, p. 210.
40
See Makki 1995a, p. 146.
41
Ibid., pp. 145–146.
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nomination as prime minister in October 1923, he acted as ‘war minister’ in

different unstable cabinets. From this moment forward, he bore the military
title of ‘commander-in-chief’ (sardâr-sepâh). Within a short period of time he
formed the unification of the Iranian armed forces under his leadership.
The conflicts between different groups in the fourth Parliament continued
to play an important role in the weakening of the cabinets and so also in the in-
creasing ‘power chances’ of Reza Khan as a person and his position amongst
other social and political positions in the Iranian society at that time.42 Within
a span of 17 years, from the Constitutional Revolution until Reza Khan became
prime minister (1923), 30 unstable governments were formed.43
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPUBLIC
Reza Khan’s power chances expanded as prime minister. He was able to

overcome all others in the struggle for power and was gradually able to defy
the Qajar dynasty. Through the abolition of the monarchy and the proclama-
tion of a republic, Reza Khan wanted to overcome another obstacle at the po-
litical level following his control over Parliament. He saw himself as the pres-
ident of a republic much stronger than a prime minister under the command
of a constitutional monarch.44 However, the so-called ‘Republic-Plan’ failed,
among other things, because of the poor organization of Reza Khan’s sup-
porters in parliament in regards to its implementation. Reza Khan quickly
rescinded the plan out of fear of continued protests led by some of the clerics
who felt threatened by similar processes of secularization in Turkey, and left
Teheran in protest.45 This event was published in the renowned newspaper
Shafaq-e sorkh (Red twilight) titled: ‘The Father of the Homeland is gone.’ In
this editorial, Reza Khan’s departure was equated with the return of the ‘dif-
ference in opinions’ (ekhtelâf-e kalameh), the appearance of rebels, the col-
lapse of Iranian loans and domestic unrest and erasure of reform plans:
The ‘commander-in-chief’ [Reza Khan] is the father of homeland. He is the model

of manly spirit. He is the successor of the Iranian king, Ardeshir Babakan. He is
42
See Makki 1995b, pp. 336–337.
43
See Ettehadieh 1996, p. 28.
44
See Dolatabadi 2008d, pp. 1585, 1591.
45
See Sadr 1985, p. 282; Keddie 2008, p. 148.
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Nader Shah Afshar. He is the strong leader of the patriots. This person should not
go, even if the price means much bloodshed. He should return. Since the Iranian
people love him. The eye of the 25 centuries of the Iran’s past history is looking
at him. He should return. That is the nation’s spirit that demands through the pen
of Red Twilight his return. Anyone who thinks otherwise is a nation’s traitor. What
can be done? Today is the commander-in-chief [Reza Khan] the center of greatness,
pride, independence and security of Iran. If he goes, all these will go with him.46
THE FINAL STEP TO AUTOCRATIC RULE:

MONARCHY CHANGE
Reza Khan’s departure, however, was a political game; he was brought back
in full honor by prestigious members of Parliament because there was no other
alternative. After the failure of the ‘Republic-Plan’ Reza Khan and his sup-
porters considered the ‘Monarchy-Change’ as the only alternative to reach
complete centralization of all power and status positions in the country. Clerics
saw this change as more Sharia-conforming than the implementation of a re-
public and, therefore, offered little resistance.47 The majority of parliamentar-
ians and intellectuals like Forughi, Davar and Aref sympathized with Reza
Khan and remained silent about the open violations of law by him and his
followers. After the abolition of the Qajar dynasty, Reza Khan was able to put
all of his potential rivals out of commission. Many old friends and follow-
ers who had stood up for the monarchy-change were forced to resign from
their positions.48 Some were murdered; others were imprisoned or placed un-
der house arrest.49 Besides the military power, Reza Khan’s court also gained
a decisive position within a hierarchical structured political system. The court
minister in the newly created court ministry was able to intervene in any po-
litical decisions because other ministers were put under the direct control of
this ministry.50 The functions of the Majles and the cabinets were reduced to
carrying out the Shah’s commands. In further elections it was ensured that only
46
‘Ayn-ol Saltaneh 2000, p. 6916.
47
See Ghahari 2001, p. 209; Dolatabadi 2008d, pp. 1605–1606.
48
See Hedayat 2006, p. 403.
49
See Sadr 1985, pp. 363–383.
50
See Dolatabadi 2008, p. 1647.
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obedient people were let into Parliament.51 From the seventh Majles, the can-
didates for Parliament had to obtain the consent of the court before they could
apply for this position. Thus, the elections in Iran have been known as ‘ordered
elections’ (entekhâbât-e farmâyeshi).52
In summary it can be said from a process-sociological perspective that

the parliamentary forms of government belong to a later phase of the ‘process
of the state-formation’53 in a society. These processes are very closely associ-
ated with specific developments in the personality structures of members of
this society.54 Using the example of developments of the Iranian society during
the Constitutional Monarchy (1906–1925) to Reza Khan’s seizure of power,
light could be shed on problems that could arise from an asynchrony of devel-
opments between institutional and habitual levels in the course of processes of
democratization in a society. This could lead, after a short phase of institutional
democratization, in the direction of ‘counter-processes’, namely institutional
de-democratisation.55
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The Failure of the Constitutional Monarchy in Iran: The Socio… 159

THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

A more realistic explanation of Reza Khan’s seizure of power can be achieved by

The process of Reza Khan’s rise to power in 1921 is not independent of

this development stage of the Iranian society. Only by utilizing a theoretical-

CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: FROM

stable monopoly of violence and taxation in the country. Iran’s ‘semi-colonial

Reza Khan is seen, like many other charismatic personalities, as a product of

THE CONFLICTS IN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND

Thinking and acting in an ‘either-or categories’ inevitably forced many

(sâzesh) belongs to a structural characteristic of each parliamentary form

In another letter to the newspaper Anjoman (Association), Talebof warned

Similar to the First Parliament, the Constitutionalists once again han-

in the country and an ardent supporter of Russia’s political objectives in Iran.

This intransigent position of some of the Constitutionalists and even their

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEED FOR

Bahar also cites the lack of ability of being longsighted by an important

Some intellectuals propagated even a ‘just and enlightened despotism’ as

nomination as prime minister in October 1923, he acted as ‘war minister’ in

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPUBLIC

Reza Khan’s power chances expanded as prime minister. He was able to

The ‘commander-in-chief’ [Reza Khan] is the father of homeland. He is the model

THE FINAL STEP TO AUTOCRATIC RULE:

In summary it can be said from a process-sociological perspective that

Aryanpour, Y. (1972). Az sabâ tâ nimâ (From Saba to Nima). Vol. 1. Tehran.

0D CAD69:9 FDB E , 86B7F 9 : DF 8DF: 5C :F M 36C9: 7 7A D : 4 :C :F DC EF 6 , , 7 :8 D :

0D CAD69:9 FDB E , 86B7F 9 : DF 8DF: 5C :F M 36C9: 7 7A D : 4 :C :F DC EF 6 , , 7 :8 D :

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