MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, XI (1986)

Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles

THOMAS J. McKAY

1: discussions of possible worlds and essential properties, several principles of

‘constitutional sufficiency” have played an important role. These are principles
that say that the having of certain properties is sufficient to “secure the identity” of an
individual. In other words, only that particular individual could have those properties.
An example would be this:
If, at possible world w , ,a certain table b, is made from a chunk of wood m,then
if a table b2 is made in the same way from m at w2,then b, = b,.
(This is a principle that Saul Kripke appeals to in “Naming and Necessity.”’) This
principle makes the very strong essentialist claim that every table x other than b, ful-
fills this condition:
x could not have been made from m in just the way that b, was made from m.
More general principles of constitutional sufficiency might have this form:
(CO) for any object .r that had a beginning in time, ifx’s origin had features F,,
...,F, ,then in any possible situation (or world), anything with an origin
with features F , , ...,F, would be x .
F,,...,F, might be filled out in various ways.
(a) For sexually reproducing creatures, coming from a particular pair of
gametes (without twin division or with twin divisions, as the case may be)
is often thought to be a constituting feature.’
(b) for nonliving things, being constituted from a particular bit of matter with
a particular shape is often thought to be a constituting origin.3
And a more general schema for such principles might not require an appeal to consid-
erations of origin.
(C) for any objectx, ifx has features G,,...,G,, then in any possible situation
...,G, would b x .
(or world), anything with features GI,

295
296 THOMAS J. McKAY

A more global constitutional sufficiency principle is appealed to even more often.

(CW) If w ,and w 2are possible worlds consisting of exactly the same matter in
exactly the same patterns of configuration throughout their history, then
5
WI = w2.

The essentialist claim associated with (CW) is in some ways more limited.
If o2 # ol, and if o2exists in w ,then: for any history of o1or its possible worlds,
there is something different in the history of o2or in the history of w.
For this to be nontrivial, we must keep such properties as “being identical to 0,’’ out
of the histories. This principle formulates the idea that the facts about what objects
there are should be somehow based on more primitive qualitative facts about the possi-
ble world.The idea here is that the object o2cannot have the same qualitative history as
ofand yet be a distinct object: “bare [irreducible] distinctness across worlds does not
arise.’’6
I will suggest that the general constitutional sufficiencyprinciples are false, or at
least groundless. Their appeal seems based solely on the erroneous “Jules-Veme-0-
Scope” attitude to modal semantics.’ More particular principles might have some ap-
peal, but it is very difficult to see how to argue for them, just as it is difficult to see how
to argue for almost any nontrivial essentialism. I will go on to discuss how denying
these constitutional sufficiency principles allows us to resolve some modal sorites-
style paradoxes. In addition, I will offer a conception of modal ontology that accords
well with the denial of such constitutional sufficiency principles.

AGAINST JULES-VERNE-O-SCOPES
Philosophers have often argued as though modal judgments require a certain special
feat of perceptual or pseudoperceptuai identification-cross-world identification.
Given apossible situation, its (in-principle)perceptible qualities, or at least its qualita-
tive physical properties, determine whether a particular individual o1is there.
Such a view seems quite untenable. The most extreme forms of it run into diffi-
culty simply from the possibility of twins. If Bobby and Billy are genetically identical
twins and Bobby goes into a store, it is still possible that Billy might have gone into
that store in just the same way (wearingjust the same clothes, and so on). The percep-
tible features of the situation might not distinguish them.But there are clearly two dis-
tinct possible situations, Bobby’s going in and Billy’s going in, that might occur. The
distinction in these situations is based on the distinctness of Bobby and Billy. Bobby
and Billy’s distinctness need not be determined by the purely perceptible properties of
the situation. Nor can it be based solely on the purely physical properties of the situa-
tion. If Bobby and Billy had had different histories of ingestion, there might even be a
particle-for-particle match between Bobby’s entering in one possible situation and
Billy’s entering in the other situation. It might be true that “Billy might have come to
be constituted by all of the same particles that in fact constitute Bobby.”
Of course, there is something that makes Bobby and Billy different. (The partic-
ular products of cell division they originated from, perhaps.) Even though there is
 AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES 297

nothing in the situations of going into the store that differentiates them, there is some-
thing in the history of the world that differentiates Bobby and Billy. So even if we can
conclude that a local Jules-Verne-0-Scope will not work for identifying individuals,
perhaps a total-history Jules-Verne-0-Scope could distinguish Bobby and Billy.
There might be nothing qualitative within certain situations that differentiates them in
all possible worlds. But there is something outside those situations that differentiates
Bobby and Billy and thereby constitutes the difference between the two distinct possi-
ble situations (Bobby’s going in and Billy’s going in).
Perhaps this very limiting view about cross-world identification (i.e., the view
that the local Jules-Verne-0-Scope works) is a sqaw man. Perhaps almost everyone
will agree that there can be distinct situations differing only in what objects exist
within those situations. Many would say that distinguishing objects requires a look at
their origins, not just their temporary qualities within some situation that involves
them after their identities are established.
But even when origins are taken into account, there seem to be possibilities that
are distinguished only by the objects that exist in them.
It seems that two distinct individuals could originate at different times from the
same matter configured in exactly the same way. (I am not suggesting that this is
likely, merely that it is possible.) Individual 0,might cease to exist, its matter become
disorganized, and then its originating matter rn might, by chance, come together in
exactly the same configuration at tz. A new object 0, would then come into existence
at t,.
Now find a time t halfway between t , and r,. Object 0,could have originated at
t . Object O1could have originated at t . These might be facts about the potentialities of
0, and 0, that ought to be respected by a modal system. But the possible situations,
0,’s coming into existence at t (without O2existing at all) and 0,’s coming into exis-
tence at t (without Oi existing at all) are qualitatively indistinguishable. No features of
origin distinguish these two, even though they are clearly distinct objects.
It is easy enough to imagine “ship-of-Theseus” cases fulfilling these condi-
tions. If the first ship s, is made from set of planksp at t , , and if the planks are replaced
gradually but saved and put together into a new ship s2at t2. it will be true that s,could
have been made later (at t ) and also true that s2 could have been made earlier (at t ) .
(Although, not both can happen at the same possible world.) The situations of si’s be-
ing made at t and s2’s being made at t might be alike in all of their physical characteris-
tics and yet be distinct situations because they involve distinct objects.
I see no reason why such a situation could not occur with organisms (at least
simple organisms) as well. Suppose that some organism o , originates from certain ge-
netic material arranged in a certain way. The atoms constituting 0 , ’ s genetic material
might become independent of oi (after 0 , ’ s death, if not sooner) and by chance be re-
constituted in the same configuration, originating0,at t,. (This is bizarre and unlikely,
but not logically impossible.) Yet it also seems that o1could originate later (at f2), mak-
ing these two possible situations of origin just alike. (If oils parents outlive o , , then o,
and o2 might even have the same parents.)
298 THOMAS J. McKAY

The attractiveness of denying some principles of the type (CO) can be seen in the
response to some sorites-like puzzles.
It is sometimes contended that the following view is incoherent.’
I made table 61 from a chunk of wood m , . If I had cut a chunk of wood m, over-
lapping 98% with m,, then I could still have made table b,. But if I had cut a
chunk of wood m overlapping less than 5% with m , , then I could not have made
table 6 , . If I had made a table, it would have been a table distinct from b,, be-
cause it would not have had enough of its matter of origin in common with m, .
The argument to show incoherence is familiar: weaet up a chain of possible worlds in
which tables are made from chunks of wood differing only 2% from the chunk in the
preceding world of the chain. By the 48th link, the chunk has less than 5% in common
with the starting point. Thus, according to the view here espoused, the table in w48is
not b,. But, by transitivity of identity, it is 6,.Thus the incoherence.
But this argument for the incoherence need not be correct if the principle (CO) is
denied. I could have made b, from m2 instead of m,. It does not follow that I could
make 61 from m3,where m, is some chunk overlapping 98% with m2. The explicitly
stated principle is this:
Mb,m, + Vy(Sym, 4O M b , y ) .
‘Mxy ’ means x is madefrom y ; ‘Sxy ’ means x overlaps 98%or more with y . The argu-
ment for incoherence requires a generalization of this:
OVz(Mb,z-* Vy(Syz + OMb,y)).
But to establish this generalization, we seem to need to appeal to a principle like (CO).
Suppose that a table b, were made from a hunk of wood z , and suppose that hunk
y overlaps 98% or more with z . Then the table 6, could have been made fromy (just as
b, could have been made from mz).But the thought-experimentshows only that we can
imagine a table made from z (or m2)that might have been made from y (or m3). It does
not show that because 6 , might have been made from a chunk m2,then 61 might also
have been made from m3.It shows at most that there could have been u tu6Ze made
from m2 that might also have been made from m,. But b, need not be one of the tables
with this feature.
Let me make the connection with (CO) more explicit. If we deny (CO), then
imagining a world in which a table is made from m, is not the same as imagining a
world in which bi is made from m,. There might be qualitatively similar worlds in
which tables are made from m2,the only difference being that in some, b, is made from
m2,and in others, some other table is made from m2. Because of this, our thought-ex-
periment yields only a weaker principle:
OVz(Mb,z-* VY(SYZ* O ~ V ( M V&Z0 M ~ y ) ) ) .
But such a principle will not suffice to show the incoherence of the commonsense view
sketched earlier.
 AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALSUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES 299

There is nothing obviously incoherent about this new position. We are required
to deny the simple modal generalization
OVz (Mb,z+ Vy (Syz --* OMb,y)).
This in itself might seem unfortunate. After all, if we had made b, from m2,couldn’t
we have made it (b,)from a slightIy different chunk, m,? Thus, it appears that there is
a possibility of its being made from m3.The need to deny that we could do this (at some
point in the chain) might seem like too much to swallow. But I do not believe that it is
too much to swallow. Certain possibilities exist for this table. It could have been made
from m2, for example. The fact that it could not have been made from m3(or from m48)
shows thet the general principle above is wrong. As long as we are sure that it could
have been made from m 2but not from m3 (or ma),then we can be sure that the above
principle is wrong. The pull of the simple generalization is based solely on the
thought-experiment together with the principle (CO). Without (CO), imagination
cannot be relied upon for information about particular individuals, since the image
alone cannot determine what individuals exist in situations of the imagined type.
We should not ground our modal judgments in constitutional sufficiency princi-
ples if the constitutional sufficiency principles conflict with firmly held modal judg-
ments. Modal semantics is a systemization of modal judgments. When the semantics
(including such auxiliary principles as (CO)) leads to the conclusion that the judg-
ments are wrong, then there are two possibilities. Perhaps the judgments are wrong,
but perhaps the modal semantics is an incorrect (or even incoherent) systematization.
There seems to be every reason to think that the modal semantics without the constitu-
tional sufficiency principles would give us a more adequate systematization of modal
judgments, for it would allow us to preserve pretheoreticaljudgments about possible
differences of constitution.
These problems for (CO) seem to apply equally to (CW). Distinct possible
worlds might be particle-for-particle alike if these possible worlds include different
individuals. Two possibilities exist: oI’scoming into existence out of m at f and 02’s
coming into existrence out of m at t (or b,’s being made from m2and some other table’s
being made from mz).These two possibilities are not physically distinguished, and it
seems that they can be embedded in largercontexts in which there is no physical differ-
ence. There is no evident limit to this embedding. Two possible worlds might differ
only in that one has o, at t (and after t ) and the other has o2at t (and after t ) . One is a
possible way for o1to be, the other a possible way for o2to be. But certainly oI’sbeing
that way and oz’s being that way are distinct possibilities.
Nathan Salmon has presented a nice simple version of the problem (though my
solution differs from his). His “four-worlds paradox” is based on a ship-of-Theseus
story. Suppose that the ship u has one hundred planks (PI, ...,p,,), that u could have
had up to two of its planks replaced, but that any replacementof more than two planks
would have constituted a distinct ship. Consider a ship b that could have been built
of p1, ...,p97,plol,ploz.plO3.Ship b could also have varied by up to two planks, so it
could have been constitutedofp, ,p2, ...,p97,p98,pIo2,p103by use 0fp98 in place ofp,,.
300 THOMAS J. McKAY

Ship a could have been constituted ofp,, p 2 , ...,p V , p98,p I O 2pi03

, (by replacement of
pw andp,,). This produces the f~llowing:~
WI W2
<<PI.P2. ...,P97rP987PW,P100>> <<PI,P2, ~..~P97,PlOlrPlO2IP103~~
fl # b
II II
U # b
<<PI*PZ* *..,P97,P98,PlO2IPl03’> <cp,,p2, ...,p97,p98,p1,2,p,,3>>
w3 w4

Worlds w3and w4consist of the same matter’arranged in the same way, yet they
aredistinct worlds because w, includesa’s being made ofp,,p2,. . . , p 9 7 , p 9 8 . p l ~ ~ , p 1 0 3
and doesno not include this. (Itincludes b’sbeingmadeofp,,p,, ...,p97,p98,p102, and
pi03 instead).
Although Salmon regards this conclusion as initially paradoxical, he concludes,
as I have, that distinct worlds w, and w, are acceptable. He points out that w3is possible
relative to w , and that w4is possible relative to w2,and he concludes that this difference
in accessibility relations constitutes the distinction between these worlds. On this
view, some modal system other thanS5 orS4 must be the correct representation of the
relative possibilities among possible worlds. (Salmon suggests that the relation is B -
like). l o
But there are two difficulties with such an approach. First, there are consider-
ations in favor of S5 that should be addressed. Second, this approach does not solve
the difficulty, for there is not always an appropriate difference in accessibility rela-
tions whenever two worlds are particle-for-particle alike. Thus, this does not solve the
“paradox” of individuation.
Salmon’s approach requires the existence of possible worlds that are not acces-
sible from the actual world. Assume that the actual world is Iike w , . Ship a is made
fromp,, ...,p,,. The possibility of b’s being composed ofp,, ...,p98,plO2, andp,,, is
not accessible. If we make a ship fromp,, ...,pmrpIo2, andp,,,, it will bea. The con-
stitutional sufficiency principle is saved. Every possible way of making a is such that
nothing else can originate in that way. World w, represents a way of making a, and w,
is inaccessible.
But what should we say about the possibility of b ’s being made fromp,, ...,p98r
plO2,andp,,,? Does such a possibility exist or not? If we are considering modal seman-
tics from a superglobal perspective, it might seem that this is simply another possible
world, not accessible from the world in which u is made from p , , ...,plw.But if we
assume that a is some actual ship made from p i , ...,p l W .and we recognize that we
ourselves are in some possible situation, Iike w t,what do we then say about the possi-
bility of b ’s being made fromp,, ...,pS8,pIo2,andp,,,? It is not a possibility that exists.
The notion of an inaccessible possibility (a possibility that is not possible from here) is
very puzzling once we put ourselves into the picture rather than above it. Such consid-
erations favor S 5 , because S5 requires no differential accessibility relations. A possi-
bility exists or not; there are no possibilities that exist but are inaccessible. These
 AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALSUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES 301

considerations certainly do not constitute a conclusive argument against the coherence

of such ideas as modal accessibility relations, but they do suggest a need for clarifica-
tion before such accessibility relations can be taken as elements of a solution to apara-
dox .
But there is a more serious objection to Salmon’s proposal. It does not seem to
avoid the problem. The proposal is intended to preserve the following version of a con-
stitutional sufficiency principle:
Consider any ship S,,.Any way that S,,might have originated from a certain set of
planks is such that no other ship could originate in that way from that set of
planks.
This is intended to hold from the standpoint of any selected world. But there is no ap-
parent reason to believe that this is true. Earlier we considered a ship-of-Theseus ex-
ample that would falsify it. If S, is constructed at c, from p i ,..., p i m ,and S, is
constructed on the same plan at t2from p , , ...,plw,it still seems that each had the fol-
lowing potentiality: it could have been constructed at t ( t , < t < 2,) from p i , .. .,plm.
(We suggested that similar cases exist for organisms as well.)
The constitutional sufficiency principles in general entail an essentialist claim:
(ECO) Consider any objects o , , 02,where 0 , # 02. Any possible way that 0,
might originate (with respect to, for example, the planks that constitute
it and their configuration)fulfills this condition: it is an essential prop-
erty of o2that o2did not originate in that way.
That claim seems false. It is at least in need of substantial support in the case of the
four-worlds paradox to which it leads. Salmon’s attempt to resolve the paradox in a
way that maintains (ECO) is misguided because (ECO)is itself suspect.
It should also be noted here that similar considerations apply even if origins are
not taken to be the sufficiency factors. Thus, (CW) had this essentialist consquence:
(ECW) Consider objects ol,02,where 0,# 02.There is some set of qualitative
or physical properties P such that it is an essential property of 0,that it
has some property in that set and it is an essential property of o2that it
does not have any property in that set.
If such properties as being idenricul to 0, are ruled out of consideration, this is nontriv-
ial essentialism in need of defense. I see no reason to believe that it is true.

SOME ELEMENTS OF A NEW VIEW

There is a view about possibilities and possibilities for objects that accords with the
denial of constitutional sufficiency principles. We will allow that two distinct possi-
bilities can differ solely with respect to the identities of the objects existing in them. At
the level of basic particles and their motions, there might be a perfect match between
these possible situations (or worlds).
I want to raise questions about the relationships among possible worlds and
about the relationship between possibilities for objects and physical possibilities
302 THOMAS J. McKAY

within this framework. Such a discussion might help to make all of this more compre-
hensible and, thus, more acceptable.
Salmon argues against S5 on the basis of (ECO).Although I have questioned
that argument by challenging (ECO)and have even questioned the clarity of its con-
clusion, I want to argue on a different basis that some such conclusion is needed. It is
needed because of certain fairly clear modal and counterfactual judgments.
If ship a had been made fromp,, ...,pss, ploz,and ~103,then a would have had
different potentialities than it now has. In particular, if a had been made in that way,
then it would have been possible for a to have been made fromp,, ....p 9 7 , ~ I O I ~. 1 0 2 ,
and plo3.Of course, that is not a possibility for a, but it would have been a possibility
for a if things had been different.
There are three modal claims here:
It is not possible for a to be made that way. -0Ma.
If things had been different, then it would have been
possible (and things could have been different). OD & (DO+ OMa).
Thus, it might have been possible for a to be made that way. OOMa.
This means that S5 and S4 are inadequate, because in those systems, ‘-OMa ’ and
‘OOMa’ are contradictories. It seems like a mistake to conclude ‘OMa’ from
‘OOMa’; thus, the S 4 and S5 accounts of modality seem wrong after all.
We are left, then, to interpret these reiterated modal operators. There seem to be
two possibilities. The usual way would be to introduce a nontransitive accessibility
relation, as Salmon does. There are. possibilities that exist but are not accessible given
this approach.
Alternatively, we might take seriously the arguments given earlier-that for
something to be possible is for a certain possibility to exist. Thus, we would have to
say that thepossibilityofa’s beingmadefromp,, ...,p9,,pIOlrpI02, andplo3doesnot
exist, but would haveexistedifa hadbeenmadefromp,, ...,p97,p98rp102, andp,,.
The second way has the advantage of doing away with the puzzling relationship
of modal accessibility. It has the disadvantage of making it unclear how a modal se-
mantics is to be given. So I will outline one way to consider.
We could give a semantics by directly linking the possibilities for an individual
with the properties it has. For example, we could say that ‘OOFa’ is true under the
following circumstances:
There is a property G such that
(i) OGa.
(ii) If a were G, then a would have the potential to be F.
(ii’) If a were G, then the possibility of a’s being F would exist.
We assume here that (ii‘) is a paraphrase of (ii). More generally, we would say this
(where ‘On’ stands for a sequence of n occurrences of ‘O’--e.g., 0, = 00000):
‘O,,A-’ is true if and only if there is some sentence B containing all of the indi-
vidual constants and free variables of A such that
(i) ‘On-, B-I is true.
(ii) If B were true, then ‘0A-I would be true.
(ii‘) If B were hue, then the possibility of A ‘s being true would exist.
 AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALSUFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES 303

There is an evident disadvantage here. The semantics employs subjunctive con-

ditionals (perhaps even counterpossibles) in giving the truth-conditions. This means
that our semantical metalanguage is less well understood than the standard metalan-
guage for modal logic. Clause (ii) is best understood as resting on a connection be-
tween situations of the type of which B is true and the possibility of A ’ s being true.
That connection should be a general fact about possibilities, not particular to the indi-
viduals referred to in A (and B ) .
In developing this idea, there is a metaphysical principle that we should con-
sider. Let Fx be any sentence with no free variables other thanx and with no individual
constants, and let ‘y ’ stand for some variable not pccumng in Fx.
3 x 9 , 3 y ( y = x & F y ) + 03xFx
If “being F” is a “remote possibility” for some actual object, it should be “immedi-
ately possible” that something is F.Every configuration of basic particles that could
be even a “remotely” possible configuration for some individual is an “immedi-
ately” possible configuration. The picture engendered here is this. There are a number
of physically possible configurations of matter. Some of those constitute situations
involving a, others do not. Of the situations that do not involve a, we can say the fol-
lowing about some of them: if a had been different in certain ways, a would have been
involved in a situation just like that (OFa). Still others are situations that a does not
have the potential to be part of, but if a had been different, it would have had that po-
tential ( O O F a ) . Perhaps there are others (situations in which hydrogen is the only
matter, for example) in which a could never have had the potential to exist (-OOFa).
If we break the link between 0 and 0, (n # 1) as applied to sentences with
names or free variables, essentialist questions become even richer than they were be-
fore. Not only is there the question of which properties an individual a has essentially
( - 0 - F a ) , but there is also the question of which properties (if any) it has superessen-
tially (‘-0” -Fa ’ is true for all n ) . (Tliere is even the question of which properties it
has 37-essentially (-O,,-Fa), plus a few others if we start to go that route.)
This might be the right set of metaphysical questions to be asking. Given the set
of qualitatively possible situations, which are possible situations for Jones to be in?
Which are possible for Smith? How do the essential natures of Jones and Smith pro-
duce differences in the possible situations they can appear in? If Jones had been differ-
ent in a certain way, would that have changed the range of qualitative possibilities for
him?
The view proposed here has an affinity with some versions of counterpart the-
ory. There one recognizes a basic set of possibilities and imposes a set of counterpart
relations producing transworld pseudoidentities. A single possibility, for example
“Squrk’s being F” (where Squrk is some otherworldlyfellow), might represent a po-
tentiality for both Smith and Jones, if one counterpart relation makes Squrk a counter-
part of Smith and another counterpart relation makes him a counterpart of Jones. The
picture we are considering wouId also recognize a basic set of qualitatively possible
situations, in effect “multiplied” by the number of sets of individuals that have the
potential to jointly fill the individual roles in those situations. But the view I suggest
allows that I could have failed to finish this paper, whereas the counterpart view says
only that there could have been someone a lot like me who did not finish it.”
304 THOMAS J. McKAY

Notes
I . In Semunrics of Nurural Languuge. edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman (Dordrecht, 1972).
350-51.
2 . This version of (CO) is employed by Colin McGinn. “On The Necessity of Origin,’’ Journal of
Philosophy 7 3 (1976):127-35, for example.
3 . For example, Nathan Salmon calls this “exceedingly plausible’’ in Reference and Essence
(Princeton, I981), 21 1. (Salmon g a s on to question this, 228-29, however.)
4. Appeal to (C)but not to (CO) seems to be unusual, but such an appeal seems to be required for the
argument of Robert Elliot and An& Gallois, “Would It Have Been Me?,” AusnalusiunJournul offhilos-
ophy 62 ( 1984):292-93. They assume that being made of certain elementary particles in a particularconfig-
uration is sufficient for identity.
5 . For example, Harold Noonan, “The Necessity of Origin,” Mind 92 (1983):1-20, calls the denial
of (CW) “a very mysterious view indeed” (p. 3). Among the few philosophers denying (CW) are Hugh
Chandler, “RigidDesignation.” The JournalofPhifosophy72(1975):363-69.andNathan Salmon, Refer-
ence and Essence, app. I ( 219-52). I will argue that they do not go far enough. Arthur Prior has some inter-
esting remarks in opposition to (CW) in “Identifiable Individuals,” chapter VII of Papers on Time and
Tense (Oxford, 1968), 66-72.
6 . This is Graeme Forbes’s formulation in “On the Philosophical Basis of Essentialist Theories,”
Journal ofPhilosophical Logic 10 (1981):73-99.He uses the term ‘C-principle’ (T’ for ‘constitutive’)for
the principle that modal statements arc not barely [irreduciblyJm e or false.
7. The term ‘Jules-Verne-0-Scope’ is due, I believe, to David Kaplan.
8. For example, Graeme Forbes says that “if we agree that necessarily,any object made of parts could
have been made of slightly different parts but not completely different parts. we contradict ourselves.”
From his review of Nathan Salmon’s Reference and Essence, (Mind 93 [1984]:305-6).See also William
Randolph Carter, “Salmon on Artifact Origins and Lost Possibilities.” Philosophical Review 92
(1983):223-3 1.
9 . Nathan Salmon, Reference und Essence, 23 1.
10. This approach was first suggested by Hugh Chandler, “Rigid Designation.”
I I . The writing of this paper has been supported by a grant from the Syracuse University Senate Re-
search Committee. I thank Jonathan Bennett and Mark Heller for their useful commens on a draft.