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1967
Recommended Citation
Maxwell Bloomfield, Frederick Grimke and American Civilization, 76 OH. HIST. 5 (1967).
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b y M AXW ELL BLOOM FIELD
The three decades preceding the American Civil War appear in retrospect
as an era of intellectual as well as political turbulence. Everywhere the forces
of romantic subjectivism were gaining ground at the expense of long-
established modes of thought and behavior. In religion the revivalist spirit
placed the heart above the head and swept away the discipline imposed by
ecclesiastical formalism; in philosophy the mechanistic sensationalism of
Locke yielded to more intuitive approaches to the problem of human con
sciousness; legal concepts of guilt and responsibility trembled before a
mounting pressure to redefine the limits of rational activity; novelists and
poets extolled the solitary hero who enforced his own set of values against a
latest trends in constitutional law. One of the essays made a strong impression
throughout the state and served as a basis for all his later speculations. It
dealt with the relative merits of ancient and modern literature, or the role
of the past in the shaping of contemporary culture:
It is a subject on which it appears to me nothing effectual, nothing
worthy of the age of thought in which we live has been written. The mind
seems to have been fearful and timid in approaching it. And yet there
are few subjects within the compass of human reasoning, which are
philosophically and practically of greater interest and importance. For
without apprehending it correctly it is impossible for us to understand
the true history of the human mind; and at the same time the right
determination of the question it suggests must necessarily exercise over
education, and therefore over human happiness a decisive and a per
manent influence.2
In this perennial quarrel between the “Ancients” and the “Moderns,”
Grimké proved himself decidedly a child of the nineteenth century. He found
little to admire in the classic writers of Greece and Rome. Their stock of
information was scanty; their philosophy superficial; their imagery trite and
uninspired; and their powers of reflection and synthesis much overrated.
Their alleged superiority to modern authors was a “delusion” fostered by
pedantic scholars with elitist pretensions and romantics who confused prim
itivism with freshness and originality.
In fact, the m odem world — the bustling bourgeois world of the nineteenth
century — was a fresher and more exciting place than antiquity could pos
sibly have been. The “materials of thought” existed in greater abundance
than ever before; scientific discoveries, moral speculations, even the
heightened sensibilities of such poets as Scott and Byron had changed the
very aspect of Nature and added new dimensions to human understanding.
For the first time society was becoming enlightened at every level, thanks to
the spread of literacy. The great men of the present age were springing
“from the lower walks of life” — a theme on which Grimké would later rear
a vast superstructure of ideas. And what need had such leaders for the
abstruse learning of the traditional “gentleman”? Already the public mind
was accommodating itself to the realities of the situation: educational re
formers with their insistence upon the modernization of the curriculum were
paving the way for the inevitable “total demolition” of the classical ideal
in education.
To substantiate the superior claims of modern culture, Grimké pointed
to such figures as Hume and Adam Smith, Cousin and Constant, Sismondi
and Niebuhr. Significantly, he failed to include a single American intellectual
in his list. The U nited States, in his view, had been too busy exploiting the
material resources of a continent to pay sufficient attention to the life of
the mind:
The thoughts of every one have been perpetually o c c u p i e d with the
animating and ever shifting scene without, and the mind has been
rendered unwilling, and consequently unable, to give itself up to any
pursuit which demanded the intense concentration of its faculties, r or
the same reason th at you do not generally expect the greatest mental
exertion from those individuals who have been bred up m affluence, you
OHIO HISTORY
8
CONSIDERATIONS
UPON T HE
OK
FREE INSTITUTIONS.
HY F R E D E R I C K GRIMKE.
CINCINNATI:
H. W. DERBY & CO. , PUBLISHERS.
jV E VV - Y O R K -
A. S. BARNES & CO.
1848.
ertyless voters, given a chance to participate in politics, would soon feel the
attraction of a legal system designed to enable all comers to acquire property
on an equal basis. Spurred by envy and a desire for self-improvement, the
lower classes were more apt to become the defenders than the destroyers of
the democratic state.
Besides, a knowledge of political affairs, like other kinds of learning, was
partly intuitive. Did a munitions manufacturer have to understand the
philosophy of chemistry, or a laborer the nature of the mechanical power he
used, in order to do a competent job? Politics involved basic moral issues
which humble folk often perceived more clearly than the sophisticated. Even
by failing to understand the exaggerated importance which party leaders
attached to certain pet measures, the masses might help to “moderate the
ultra views of politicians of all parties.” 11
Grimké thus denied that any irrepressible conflict between numbers and
intelligence lay ahead for America. The lower classes, he maintained, were
more jealous of each other than of their intellectual superiors, to whose
opinions they generally deferred. While self-seeking demagogues might win
mass support for a time, in the end they became unwitting agents of public
improvement. Speaking the language of the people, they aroused popular
interest in political affairs, a condition which led to greater reflection and
inquiry among the masses. More enlightened politicians could then win a
hearing for their views, and the evils of demagoguery would be removed by
the same robust democracy which gave them birth.
A free electorate could be trusted to handle any problem, even the selec
tion of judges. Having spent half a lifetime on the bench, Grimké entertained
no exalted opinion of judicial integrity, especially at the state level. “Some
times on peeping into our courts, and seeing who preside there,” he noted
privately in 1846, “I am reminded of the expression of Shakespeare, ‘Handy
dandy, where is the judge, where is the thief.’ ” 12
A judiciary independent of private control safeguarded the workings of
democratic institutions; but judges could not free themselves from the
surveillance of the community they served. Turning the customary conserva
tive arguments upside down, Grimké charged that a system of indirect
appointment and life tenure for judges encouraged political play from the
bench and perpetuated in office a number of partisan hacks and time-servers.
Popular election for a term of years (ideally between five and ten) might
weaken narrow party loyalties among prospective candidates and make them
better representatives of the public will.
The usefulness of popular opinion as a stabilizing force in American life
extended far beyond politics to influence every corner of society. News
papers disseminated the most radical views without hindrance, since they
were certain to be checked by the “voluntary censorship” of competing
organs; religious sects, denied government patronage, appealed to the public
for support, a policy which led to majority rule in church affairs and pre
ven e ® grow o a priestly caste; professional groups were widely
dispersed through the population and enjoyed no special privileges or cen
tralized organization to set them apart from the untrained majority.
fRBDBBlC K GRIM KE 13
pendent confederacies at some future date. Cultural ties would then super
sede narrower political loyalties, with studies such as his helping to link the
several republics in a nexus of common institutions, manners, and ideas. “It
is the maintenance of one civilization, not the maintenance of one union,
which we are m ost deeply interested in,” he declared, underscoring the
broader implications of his work.18
On its first appearance in 1848 the Considerations scored a modest success.
Western reviewers generally praised it; those in the East tended to be cool!
While Grimké had never expected to attract a wide popular audience, he
expressed disappointment at what he considered the provincialism of East
Coast critics. I verily believe if the work had appeared as from the pen of
Webster or Calhoun, it would have had an unlimited circulation,” he com
plained. “Its being written in a small town, in the heart of a western State,
sheds a damper over the minds of the dull; and they are Legion, and an
author has no more chance of justice, than an angel would have in Pande
monium.” 1:1
Francis Lieber, the noted political scientist and educator, however,
regarded the book with unqualified admiration. It was adopted by the
University of Virginia as the standard text in political philosophy courses;
and as late as 1854 Grimké reported “constantly receiving testimonials” from
readers, some of whom found the Considerations superior even to Tocque-
ville’s classic study of American democracy.20 Encouraged by these marks
of favor and by the gradual disappearance of the 1100 copies already printed,
the judge brought out a “corrected and enlarged” edition of his work in 1856,
though by that time the state of popular opinion in most parts of the country
scarcely justified his reiterated faith in the moderation of middle-class
Americans.
Perhaps this outward display of confidence in the future was a case of
whistling in the dark where the public was concerned, for in private Grimké
was deeply alarmed over the growing violence of the national temper. “I
think our country is now passing through a more trying and critical period
than has occurred since the foundation of the government,” he informed
Greene in September 1856:
The Union m ay be dissevered, and if it is, feuds and animosities will
as certainly grow up in the parts dismembered. They may disclose
themselves very gradually at first, but in the end they will be equally
violent. An extensive country is favorable to reflexion, and is one of the
cures for those intestine animosities, which will always exist, but
which burn more fiercely the narrower the bounds within which they
are confined. Let us keep together, until nature points to a separa-
tion.21 .
Sadly he watched as the political crisis worsened and as one projected
compromise after another failed to satisfy the emotional demands of a hope
lessly divided population. Secession, when at last it came, left him in a state
of shock from which he sought relief through abandoning for a time all serious
interest in political affairs. But he could not remain indifferent to the con
stitutional problems raised by a civil war, and soon found better therapy in
writing a series of “reflections” on current events for the Chillicothe papers.
16 OHIO HISTORY
T H E A U T H O R : M axwell Bloomfield is
A ssistant Professor of History at The
Catholic U niversity of America.
NOTES í f n
FREDERICK GRIMKE AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: A
JACKSONIAN JURIST’S APPRAISAL
1. Frederick Grimké to William Greene, February 28, 1828. Greene Papers, The
Cincinnati Historical Society. William Greene (1797-1883) came from a Rhode Island
family which had been prominent in state politics for three generations. Following his
graduation from Brown University in 1817, he studied law at Judge Tapping R eeve’s
famous Litchfield Law School, Litchfield, Connecticut. From the early 1820’s, when
he moved to Ohio to pursue his legal career, until his return to Rhode Island in 1862,
he played an active role in the civic and cultural life of Cincinnati. H is Whig- Republican
political orientation, while inimical to th e Democratic views of Grimké, did not
lessen their friendship. John Howard Brown, ed., L am b’s Biographical D ictionary of
the United S tates (Boston, 1900-1903), III, 399.
2. Grimke to Greene, August 16, 1827, Greene Papers.
3. Frederick Grimké, A n Essay on th e A ncients and M oderns (privately printed,
n.d.), [205],
4. Grjmké to Greene, September 12, 1844, Greene Papers.
5. Grimké to Greene, M ay 8, 1848, Greene Papers.
6. Frederick Grimké, Considerations upon the N ature and T endency of Free In
stitutions (Cincinnati, 1848), 312.
7. Ibid., 268.
8. Ibid., 168.
9. Ibid., 115.
10. Frederick Grimké, Considerations upon the N ature and T endency of Free In
stitutions (2d printing, N ew York and Cincinnati, 1856), 79; 81-82. This “corrected
and enlarged” edition incorporated much new material, including an entire chapter
on the right of secession and another on the “ultimate destiny” of free institutions.
11. Grimké, Considerations (1st printing), 277.
12. Grimké to Greene, January 12, 1846, Greene Papers.
13. Grimké, Considerations (2d printing), 667.
14. Grimké, Considerations (ls t printing), 327.
15. Grimké to Greene, December 10, 1850, Greene Papers.
16. Grimké to Greene, February 19, 1856, Greene Papers. Grimké was mistaken,
of course, in suggesting that “Republican” and “abolitionist” were synonymous terms.
In fact the radical abolitionists, such as Garrison and Phillips, opposed political action at
this time and took no part in the organization of the Republican party.
17. Grimké, Considerations (2d p rin ting), 485.
18. Grimké, Considerations ( ls t printing), 263.
19. Grimké to Greene, November 30, 1849, Greene Papers.
20. Grimké to Greene, M ay 1, 1854, Greene Papers.
21. Grimké to Greene, September 27, 1856, Greene Papers.
22. Grimké to Greene, March 30, 1862, Greene Papers.
23. Henry Howe, H istorical Collections of Ohio (Columbus, 1891), III, 189.