Case 1: G.R. No.

91649 May 14, 1991

197 SCRA 52 (1991)

FACTS: The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D.
1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977
"to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine
Tourist." Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted
by law, under the following declared policy. To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial
jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

POLICE POWER DEFINED: "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487)

ISSUE: WON P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy.

RULING: Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Thus,
"the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot
assume it". Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having
been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973]
Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18,
1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore,
has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950).
And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as
1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other
local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish
horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks,
jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application
and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks
are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it
also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange
Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited
to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure,
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D.
1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government. (emphasis supplied)
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

Case 2
Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local
Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority
and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to
suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority
because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because that
the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan,
found little difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a
legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power oppressively,
and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon
is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

Case 3

Case 4
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Case 5:

Case 6:
Pelaez vs Auditor General

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

Facts:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Issue: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have
the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

Held:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include
the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Case 7:
CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005 (ARTICLE X Section 10:
Creation, Abolition, Change of boundaries)

FACTS: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur.
This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President
Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to undue
delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. The
petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer). Camid
contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since
there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own high
school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 barangays with chairman; (3) he noted agencies and
private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population
of Andong. In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f
the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal
treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of
San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation.
San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation

HELD: SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.chan Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown
that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by
prescription. The Certification has no power or it does not bear any authority to create or revalidate a
municipality.

Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons: (A)
There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive
Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30 years
before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was
included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment. (B) Andong did not meet
the requisites set by Local Government Code of 1991 Sec.42 par. d regarding municipalities created by
executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
(C) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are
eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality. (D) The
Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Representatives
to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed
in the various districts) did not include Andong.

Case 8:

Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio
Quirino, pursuant to 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

ISSUE: First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exist,
then it has standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the
ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative
matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of
Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases[9] later decided. However, we
have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized
and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San
Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,[10] this Court considered the following factors as having validated the
creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallity of Sinacaban, was created by executive
order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years
the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the
ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such
municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality,
organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there
might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the
local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no. 7160), 442 (d) of which provides that municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on
December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in
1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an
area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16
of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the
contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans corporate
existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the
judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had
earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of
the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of san Narciso,
Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal district organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

ISSUE 2: Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new
municipalities.

Ruling: This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the
plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under
the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the
previous Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal
corporations created before, such as the municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

Case 9:
G.R. No. 176951 : February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treñas;
CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS, in his personal
capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY
OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN
SAMAR; AND MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON,Respondents.

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the
sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal
protection clause.

In another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional.

On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, resolved the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills violate Article X, Section 6 and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cityhood Laws

First issue:

The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power
is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as
the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised
when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for
quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population,
and land area.

However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed
modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for
these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.

R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption
clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.

Second Issue:

Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity
and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth
and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the
pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to
the present.

The Resolution dated August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.

Case 10:

Case 11:
 Case 12:

Case 13:
Facts: On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.

Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on
December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification.

Issue: Whether the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon
City is valid or not.

Held: Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its
creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the
present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval of
this Act. x x x. (Emphasis ours)

The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims,
the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day
period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being
conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on
December 16, 2000.

In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based on the
date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states:

Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general and local circulation.

The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of general circulation.
Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to
the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct
the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing
the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect.
Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period from
the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.

The COMELEC is correct.