Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 39

#7 Punzalan vs Dela Pena 

Dencio Dela Pena, a boader of the Plata Family, was assaulted by the group of Rainier Punzalan. When 
he had the chance to escape, he encountered Robert Cagara, the Plata Family's driver, grabbed the gun 
for  the  purpose  of  scaring  away  the  group  who  was  chasing  him.  Michael  Plata,  however,  intervened 
and wrestled the gun from Dela Pena, causing to accidentally hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Due to 
the  said  incident,  Dela  Pena,  Cagara  and  Plata  locked  themselves  in  the  latter's  house,  to  which  the 
group of Punzalan shouted "Lumabas kayo d'yan, putang ina ninyo! Papatayin naming kayo!" The three 
then was able to escape through the back door and proceeded to the Police Station for assistance. 
Attempted  Homicide  and  Illegal  Possession  of  Firearm  was  filed  against  Plata  and  Cagara,  while  Dela 
Pena was investigated for Attempted Homicide as per the directions of Department of Justice. Dela Pena 
filed counter charges against Punzalan, including Grave threats and Attempted Murder.  Subsequently, 
Cagara  filed  Grave  Oral  Defamation  against  Rosalinda  Punzalan,  mother  of  Rainier,  after  its  remark 
during a meeting at the Office of the Prosecutor. 
The  Prosecutor  dismissed  the  complaints  in  regards  to  the  Attempted  Murder  and  Grave  Oral 
Defamation.  It  was  appealed  at  Department  of  Justice,  to  which  it  only  reduced  the  charges  to 
Attempted  Homicide  and  Slight  Oral  Defamation.  However,  upon  a  motion  for  reconsideration,  it 
directed to withdraw all the information of the above‐mentioned complaints. It was appealed by Dela 
Pena at Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari, where in the Petition was granted, reinstating 
the charges against the Punzalans. 
(1) Whether  or  not  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  a  finding  of  probable  cause  against 
petitioner  Rosalinda  Punzalan  for  Slight  Oral  Defamation  and  against  petitioners  Randall  and 
Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide. 
(1) No,  there  is  no  sufficient  evidence  to  sustain  a  finding  of  probable  cause.  Since  the  alleged 
defamatory statement was uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor, the City Prosecutor 
is  the  best  person  to  observe  the  demeanor  and  conduct  of  the  parties  and  witnesses  to 
determine probable cause. Since the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Rosalinda 
Punzalan,  it  shall  be  deemed  that  it  properly  observed  the  conduct  of  the  party  and  properly 
decided that there is no probable cause to file said charge. 
On the charge of Attempted Homicide, it was held that it was a nature of counter charge that is 
not necessary to be pursued. It is because it can be threshed out in proceedings relating to the 
Attempted Homicide charge filed by Rainier Punzalan. 
# 8 People vs Dimaano 
Maricar Dimaano filed two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape against her father, 
Edgardo Dimaano that commenced on September 1993, December 1995 and January 1996 respectively. 
She and her mother went to Camp Crame to file the complaint, to which the Medico‐Legal of PNP Crime 
Lab that Maricar have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non‐virgin state. Edgardo 
denied the accusations contending that he was at the office from 7pm to 9pm and if so, Maricar could 
have  reported  the  sexual  abuses  to  the  authorities  when  he  accompanied  her  to  Paranaque  Police 
Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio. The trial court however found Maricar’s Testimony credible 
and  spontaneous  and    disregarded  the  compromise  agreement  and  the  Salaysay  sa  Pag‐uurong  ng 
Sumbong  since  Maricar  was  not  assisted  by  a  lawyer  when  she  signed  the  same.  CA  affirmed  with 
(1) Whether  or  not  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution  has  overcome  the  presumption  of 
innocence of the accused. 
(2) Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance should have been 
duly  considered  as  a  factor  which  put  to  doubt  the  reasons  behind  the  filing  of  the  criminal 
charges of rape 
(1) Yes, the evidence adduced by the prosecution has overcome the presumption of innocence of 
the accused. The credibility given by the Trial Court to the rape victim is an important aspect of 
evidence. The trial court and CA gave due credence to the testimony of Maricar who was only 12 
years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person. Maricar’s credibility was 
not  diminished  by  her  failure  to  report  the  sexual  abuses  to  the  authorities  and  her  relatives 
despite  opportunities  to  do  so.  Delay  in  reporting  rape  incidents,  in  the  face  of  threats  and 
violence cannot be taken against the victim, more so if the lecherous attacker is her father.  
(2) No,  the  voluntary  and  due  execution  of  the  affidavit  of  desistance  should  cannot  be  duly 
considered as a factor. The unreliable character of the desistance is shown by the fact that it is 
quite incredible that after the victim goes through all the trouble, will suddenly withdraw or turn 
around and declare that she is no longer interest. Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance 
in  open  court  by  stating  that  no  lawyer  assisted  her  when  she  signed  the  desistance.  Close 
scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance shows that Maricar never retracted her allegation that she 
was raped by her father and neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts 
about the rape. 
#9 Saladuga vs Sandiganbayan 
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers 
without  conducting  a  competitive  public  bidding  as  required  by  law,  which  caused  damage  and 
prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing 
undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage, 
hence  a  new  information  was  filed,  now  for  violation  of  Sec.  3  (e)  of  RA  3019  by  giving  unwarranted 
benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on 
the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information. 
Whether  or  not  there  is  substitution  and/or  substantial  amendment  of  the  information  that  would 
warrant a new preliminary investigation. 
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would warrant a new 
preliminary investigation. Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the 
first  Information,  and  conferring  unwarranted  benefits,  alleged  in  the  second  Information,  are  two 
distinct  violations  of  Section  3  (e)  of  RA  3019.  The  shift  from  giving  undue  injury  to  conferring 
unwarranted  benefit  do  not  constitute  a  substantial  amendment.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, which pertains to the plan of 
entering  into  a  Pakyaw  Contract  for  the  construction  of  day  care  centers  for  barangays  Mac‐Arthur, 
Urdaneta,  and  Lavezares,  Northern  Samar.  These  two  (2)  different  modes  of  committing  the  offense 
may  be  charged  under  either  mode  or  under  both.  Considering  the  case  at  bar,  the  evidentiary 
requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same, hence, a new preliminary investigation 
is unnecessary. 
10. Bonifacio v. RTC Makati 

Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed in behalf of Yuchenco Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC)
and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to
Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of
discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the Yuchengco’s, for they previously
purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits of
such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of

That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains:
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. Gimenez
alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he red various article containing highly derogatory
statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.

Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC
as amended by RA 4363.

How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of
the case provided by law specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?

Art. 360 of the RPC provides:

“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the oofense. xxxx”

That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to:

1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the
action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and
first publication. TO give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer,
blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.

The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

11. Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines

GR Nos 172476-99 September 15, 2010

Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS approved the
acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as
represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a
bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After
the payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed)
over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd Deed was presented
by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the Certificate of Title of the said property.

Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a supplemental motion
dated May 28, 1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. With this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to
review the records of the case, they found out that Ramiscal Jr., indeed participated in an affixed his signature
on the contracts and found probable cause. The Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor
and scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for petitioner on
the ground that there is a pending resolution of his second Motion for Reconsideration.

Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his arraignment.

Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and falsification of public documents.

No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation
shall not bar the filling of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause
in the resolution subject of the motion.

The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are: unsoundness of mind,
prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which
the suspension shall not exceed 60 days. Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a
valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.

With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr.,
failed to establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable cause in the
filing of the case.
12. Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008


Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C.
Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all
three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March
1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26
June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation,
only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several
criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced
checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which
were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse
claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against
Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated
11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had
deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution.
In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the
same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his
favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's
office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration
filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the
three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the
DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive
period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of
the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code
which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution
of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a
proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the
Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the
petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-
compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period,
offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.


Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC,
on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?


It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time
petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time
the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay
was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as
24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication
of Act No. 3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should
not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit
before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings
for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the
debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and
21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August
2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the
information against the petitioner. No costs.

502 SCRA 446 (2006)

The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor
or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules.

Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal
case to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time
undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City.

On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two
defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in
his absence were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine
the two defense witnesses.

Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for
“Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”


Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to present
evidence in the absence of a prosecutor


As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public
prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no
public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution
Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court.
Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the
person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the
presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests,
foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter
how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the

Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings or
to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his
Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not
absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.

(3) 37. People Vs Sandiganbayan 
(G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009) 
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the 
time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 
under a   disbursement   voucher   in   order   to   defray   seminar   expenses   of   the   Committee   on   
Health   and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two years since she obtained the 
said cash advance, no liquidation was made.  As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a 
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 
seventy‐two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, submitted an 
investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB‐Visayas), with the 
recommendation that respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate 
charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The 
Auditing Code of the Philippines.  Thereafter, the  OMB‐Visayas, issued a  Resolution recommending the 
filing of an Information  for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the 
Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB‐Visayas' Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding 
probable cause to indict respondent Amante.  The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan 
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. The case was raffled to the Third 
Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER 
ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION and was opposed by The OSP. The Sandiganbayan, 
in its Resolution dismissed the case against Amante. Hence, the present petition. 
Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged 
with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.  
Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 
No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 
8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 
19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a 
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the 
commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it 
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations 
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal 
Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing 
Code of the Philippines. 
- versus -
The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa
(respondent) with forum shopping.
Vicente Balboa filed 2 cases against Caroline Shiok Ting Cheng. First, A civil case for collection of sum of
money on Feb. 24,1997 based on the postdated checks issued by Caroline filed before the RTC. The RTC
ruled in favor of Balboa and affirmed by CA upon appeal. Second, the criminal case of violation of BP 22
on July 21, 1997. The MTC acquitted her but held her civil liability.
Issue: Whether or not it constitute forum shopping?
Held: No. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually
resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari.[10]

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the
parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed
for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration
or will constitute litis pendentia.

n Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997,
which provides:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth noting that Civil Case was filed
on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court
Circular on September 16, 1997. Thus, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of
Court, to wit:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal

Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is
necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal
complaint.[14] Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No.
97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum
shopping to speak of.
Represented by OLGA M. SAMSON, Present:
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Regional Trial Court (Branch 28), Promulgated:
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija,

Community Rural Bank (Bank) filed a complaint with the prosecutor’s office of Cabanatuan charging
several persons (the accused) with Estafa. After preliminary investigation, 6 informations for estafa were
filed, 2 of which were raffled to the branch where respondent, Judge Talavera, presided.

The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal to the DOJ, which the latter denied, so Judge
Talavera issued a warrant of arrest with no bail against the accused.

Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of arrest.
Bank was not notified of this motion. Judge granted the motion without any hearing thereon. When the
reinvestigation was conducted, the Bank was still not notified.

The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation reversed the earlier findings of the
fiscal. On the same day, a motion to dismiss was filed with Judge, which he granted, and he also ordered
the release of the accused. The Bank was never notified of any of these proceedings. Bank then filed an MR
arguing it was deprived of due process. It also asked that the criminal information be reinstated. Judge
denied this. Hence, Bank filed the present case charging Judge Talavera with (1) serious misconduct and/or
gross inefficiency and (2) violation of Rules 1.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.


Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance and violation of simple legal precepts.


Yes. Respondent judge's gross ignorance and violation of simple legal precepts is clearly shown by his
issuance of the Orders granting the Motion for Reinvestigation of the accused and the prosecutor’s Motion
to Dismiss.

Motion for Reinvestigation

First, judge should not have entertained the motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ Secretary Serafin Cuevas
already denied with finality the appeal of the accused, finding that there was prima facie evidence against
the accused. The secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting
officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and the
respondents should be believed. The provincial or city prosecutor has neither the personality nor the legal
authority to review or overrule the decision of the secretary.

Section 7 of Department Order No. 223 (the rules governing appeals from resolutions in preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations) provides:
Sec. 7. Motion for Reinvestigation. – At any time after the appeal has been perfected and before the
resolution thereof, the appellant may file a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that new and material
evidence has been discovered which appellant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered during
the preliminary investigation and which if produced and admitted would probably change the resolution.
Here, the motion for reinvestigation was filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary already denied their appeal
with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge Talavera was wrong in granting the motion. In granting the Motion
for Reinvestigation, respondent effectively demolished the DOJ’s power of control and supervision over

Newly discovered evidence

Also, there was no newly discovered evidence. The one-page Affidavit executed by Ms Gloria Sacramento,
one of the co-accused in the criminal case.was clearly not newly discovered; it was already known to the
accused even during the preliminary investigation. There was no explanation whatsoever as to why this
piece of evidence was never presented during the preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, respondent
hastily granted the Motion.

Preliminary investigation

It must be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed, and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to
be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

Motion to Dismiss

Second, it was also error for the Judge to grant the Motion to Dismiss by relying merely on the resolution
of the prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In his Order, he merely stated that the motion to
dismiss is meritorious, and nothing more. The Order failed to demonstrate an independent evaluation or
assessment of the evidence against the accused.

The Judge acted with undue haste when he granted the Motion only a day after the reinvestigation was
concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the judge did not personally evaluate the parties’
evidence before acting on the Motion.The discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests solely with the
court. However, mere approval of the position taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the discretion
required. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court, the judge -- not the prosecutor -- assumes full
control of the controversy. A grant of the motion to dismiss is equivalent to a disposition of the case itself,
which is a subject clearly within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.

When Judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against all the accused, it is presumed that he had
studied the Information and the Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of
probable cause. Thus, the grant of the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged
insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction of the earlier finding of probable cause.

Pro forma motions

Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions despite the obvious lack of notice to the Bank and lack of
hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court.

The Rules of Court require that, with the exception of motions that the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion should be set for hearing by the
movant. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court explicitly require that notices be sent at least
three days before the hearing and directed at the parties concerned; and that they state the time and place of
hearing of the motion, with proper proof of notice thereof. Without such proof, the motion is considered
pro forma; thus, the court cannot act upon it.
The purpose of the notice is to enable the adverse party to appear for its own protection and to contest the
motion. Elementary due process mandates that the other party be notified of the adverse action of the
opposing party, so as to avoid a capricious change of mind and to ensure impartiality of the trial. Here, the
Motions for Reinvestigation and to Dismiss were fatally defective, as neither contained any proper notice
of hearing. Respondent thus grossly erred in taking cognizance of these Motions.

In criminal proceedings, the word “party” is held to mean not only the government and the accused, but
also other persons who may be affected by the orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein.

Due process

Undoubtedly, complainant had an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution. Its right to
intervene therein was practically beyond question, as it neither instituted a separate civil action nor
reserved or waived the right to do so. Thus, as the party injured by the crime, it had the right to be heard on
a motion that was derogatory to its interest in the civil aspect of the case. Due process necessitates that it be
afforded this opportunity, especially because of a conflict between the positions of the public prosecutor
and of the offended party.

All told, respondent showed his lack of understanding, not only of the basic and established superior-
subordinate relationship between the secretary of justice and the provincial prosecutors, but also of the
functions and duties of the trial court in “the proper scheme of things” in our criminal justice system.
Serag v. Court of appeals
In the wee hours of May 11, 2001, Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin, Iloilo
during the 2001 elections, was shot to death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto Salamat III, was
also wounded. The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Iloilo City filed a criminal complaint for
murder and attempted murder against LinoNapao, then incumbent mayor of San Joaquin, and Sebastian
Serag.[1] In a Joint Resolution dated May 26, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo: (1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms,
and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and seven
unidentified persons. Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed on August 16, 2002, a
petition for review of the July 26, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department
of Justice (DOJ).
The trial court found probable cause for murder and attempted murder against the accused. Consequently,
the court issued an Order[7] on September 27, 2001, for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused who were still at large. Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said petition for
review, the proceedings were suspended.
The Secretary of Justice had issued Resolution No. 258 affirming with modification, the Joint Resolution of
the Provincial Prosecutor, downgrading the charges from Murder to Homicide, and from Attempted Murder
to Attempted Homicide, The Provincial Prosecutor was likewise ordered to amend the Amended
Informations accordingly. Amended Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases,
and for the court to admit the said second Amended Informations.
However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and admitted the Second
Amended Information for Homicide. Motion for reconsideration. The court forthwith arraigned the accused
for homicide, who pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On November 22, 2002, the CA issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 925 and 926

In the meantime, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution[17] on November 18, 2002, granting the
motion for reconsideration of the private complainant, setting aside Resolution No. 258.

Whether he RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it granted the Provincial Prosecutors
motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide?

As the appellate court correctly pointed out in its November 10, 2003 Resolution.the pendency of
an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any proceedings in the trial court
and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the admission
of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It should be considered
that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the appearance
of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.Where the civil action for recovery of
civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Besides the oral recitation in open court by the private prosecutors of the grounds cited in the
motion to defer the admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted
homicide, which the public respondent found unprocedural, petitioner was not really given the
opportunity to oppose the motion to admit the same informations.
All these facts taken together, there appears to be an undue haste on the part of the public
respondent in admitting the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide
and ordering the arraignment of the private respondents to the said informations. This is
considering that no word of protestation was heard from the petitioner when she waited for nine
(9) months for the DOJ to resolve the private respondents petition for review.
#18 Lee vs KBC Bank gr. 164673

Facts: Midas Diversified Export Corp (mdec) obtained a loan from kbc bank. Samuel lee executed a
promisory note in favor of kbc bank and deed of assignment. Mdec obtained another loan. Maybelle lim
executed aother promisory note and deed of assignment in favor of kbc bank. Mdec defaulted in paying
the loan. Kbc bank sent a letter to Otto Versand to verify the validity of the two purchase orders, the
subject deed of attachments. Otto V. sent a facsimile message to kbc bank stating that (1) it did not issue
purchase orders, (2) it did not order or receive the items covered bybthe purchase order, and (3) it would
not pay mdec any amount. Kbc bank charged Lee and Lim of estafa. State prosec Subia found existence
of probable cause. Two counts of estafa were filed agiants the petitioners. Lee and lim filed a petition for
review with the DOJ. Sec. Perez directed the withdrawal of information filed against lee and lim. He held
that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence. Assitant city prosec. Sibucao prayed for the
withdrawal of the infos filed againts lee and lim. Rtc granted the motion to withdraw. CA set aside the
decision of rtc.

Issue: whether the trial court did not abdicatr its duty to determine the sufficiency of the prosecution's
reason for withdrawing the informations

Held: the court is not impressed. When confronted with a motion to withdraw an info, trial court is not
bound by the resolutio of the secretary of justice but required to evaluate it before proceeding further with
the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposinh the motion. Whether the facsimile
message is admissibke in evidence and whetger the elemnt of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are
matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation.

#19 Okabe vs Gutierrez

FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal
Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted
Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business
of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver
the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only
US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the
affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation,
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then
issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond
in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s
permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1,
2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte
motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the
petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counter-
affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the
petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or
allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying
on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause
during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the
filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner
refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for
Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable
cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter’s documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides that: SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or
complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-
affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required
under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
G.R. No. 128587
March 16, 2007

Petitioner, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review to nullify and set aside the resolution of RTC in
criminal case, granting private respondent, Lawrence Wang Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of 3 charges
filed against him. The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search,
and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and
all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court
dismissed the case for lack of evidence. Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits
that in as much as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accused possession had been validly made upon probable cause and under exigent
circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been
made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful. In effect, the People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the
warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a
valid search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open the trunk of his
BMW car to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.

Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.

NO. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part
of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely
walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was
later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there
can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5.

It is settled that reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence
and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the information
that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were
caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning
of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa
Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted surveillance operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck
and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on personal
knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
G.R. No. 170180
November 23, 2007

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 after dried
marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him during a
routine patrol.

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods
approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods
to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, aside from some
pair of jeans, 18 pieces eggplants, they also found dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper and cellophane.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was
effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Was the warrantless arrest as well as the warrantless search and seizure lawful?

No. The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted on reasonable

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

The Supreme Court held that none of the circumstances to effect a warrantless arrest was present. The suspicion of
the tanods cannot be equated with probable cause based on personal knowledge of the commission of an offense.
Accused was simply looking around and he was not committing an offense. The alleged attempt of accused to flee
cannot be an indication of guilt for flight per se is not always synonymous with guilt, where, as in this case, it was
reasonable to expect a person to run away if he was being followed at nighttime. Hence, the arrest without warrant
was not lawful.

Further, when Valdez was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime
nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless
search conducted on Valdez was incidental to a lawful arrest, hence the marijuana seized cannot be admitted in
evidence. The inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves is not the lone cause that militates against
the case of the prosecution, it also failed to convincingly established the chain of custody over the seize marijuana.

The Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish
the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the
prosecution witnesses. Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus
acquitted. The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837,
February 11, 1992

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted
from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules
and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days
after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just
committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an
eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in
respect of petitioner.

1. Whether or not by the San Juan Police effected a lawful warrantless arrest;
2. Whether petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation when he posted bail

1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when
the shooting had in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).

Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting which does not constitute “personal knowledge.”
Hence, there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived
his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to
trial “without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”

In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release
on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the
part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a
legitimate one.


The case involves two admin complaints against Judge Perello by Supt. Mabutas and City Prosec. Togononon
regarding Judge’s gross ignorance of the law in granting bail in dangerous drugs cases.

In Admin Case 1, Mabutas complains about the granting of bail to accused Omadan who was charged with possession
of 57.78 g of shabu, with no bail recommended. However, Judge Perello, in her order, stated that evidence of guilt was
not strong for her to deny bail. Additionally, there may have been lapses in carrying out the arrest and preliminary
investigation of Omadan (no witness during search of Omadan’s illegal activities). Thus, Judge Perello, allowed bail in
the amount of P1M.

In Admin Case 2, the Prosecutor likewise complains of Judge Perello’s granting of bail to 4 drug cases. These were
done without hearing. Judge Perello reasons out that since the shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled
precursor and that the amounts of Shabu involved were less than 1 gram which is not punishable by capital offense
and thus bail should be a matter of right without need for hearing.


Whether the judge can be administratively liable for granting the bail in the drug cases.


Admin Case 1. No, the Judge cannot be held liable administratively. This case has been dismissed by SC as they
found that Judge Perello has complied with her duty. The Dangerous Drugs Act punishes possession of 50 grams or
more of shabu with life imprisonment to death. Hence, a capital offense. As such, bail is a matter of discretion pursuant
to Rule 114, Sec 7 which states that “No person charged with capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.”

A hearing on application of bail is mandatory. In case one is filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following:

(a) In all cases, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application of bail and require him to submit his
(b) Where bail is matter of discretion, conduct a hearing regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence;
(c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
(d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of bail bond. Otherwise, bail
should be denied.

In the case at bar, Judge Perello has complied with all the foregoing duties. She conducted hearing; the prosecution
has presented their evidence; she based her decision based on the evidence presented; and since it was her conclusion
that the evidence of guilt is not strong, the petition for bail was granted.

Admin Case 2. Yes, Judge Perello should be held liable. Respondent Judge explains that she did not conduct any
hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases subject of the complaint because the crimes charged
are not capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein was minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082,
and 03-288 all involve selling of less than 5 grams of shabu. Respondent Judge believes that under R.A. No.
9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is
punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains that bail
is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. The SC ruled, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application
for bail, we hold respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the severest
disciplinary sanction on her.


Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending
appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only
for strong reasons.  Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of
discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.


The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the
trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?


Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance
before any court as may be required, is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be
done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the dubious interval, often years long, between arrest
and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial
liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless,
on application, he is admitted to bail. An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms
that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a
debt to society he has never owed. Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in
bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison. On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison
time. Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of
the accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of
delay in punishment. Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance
between the interests of society and those of the accused.


In a letter-complaint dated December 7, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, Commissioner Andrea D.
Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case No. R-
5075 for Estafa, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M. Peaflorida.

Complainant alleged: On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC) issued
Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Ernesto M. Peaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying
and undocumented alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands indicted in the United States
for health care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal
was filed with the Office of the President. The SDO became final and executory on October 15, 2001. On the same
date, respondent issued a Notice of Arraignment requiring the production of Peaflorida on November 19 and 20, 2001.
On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail recommended by the
Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the ground that the crime Peaflorida was charged
with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable offense. Respondent ordered the commitment of Peaflorida to the
Provincial Jail in Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information
that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peaflorida, who is an alien federal fugitive, without the
interdepartmental courtesy of affording prior notice to the BOI of such action.


Whether or not respondent Judge should be administratively liable for not conducting hearing on bail.


The Court ruled, under the present rules, a hearing is required before granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion. The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time, all the evidence
that it may desire to introduce before the Court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions.

Moreover, since the accused was accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau of Immigration when brought to the
RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, for his arraignment in Criminal Case No. R-5075 respondent Judge
could have easily verified from his escort if the former was being detained for other crimes aside from the one where
he was being arraigned in respondent’s sala. Had he done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the
B.I. personnel escort that the accused had already been the subject of a Summary Deportation Order and, thus, he
could have deferred action on the latter’s (accused) Motion to Fix Bail and afforded the Bureau of Immigration the
chance and opportunity to interpose their objection to the grant thereof.

A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for
the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the


In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged Rosabella M Tormis of the
Municipal Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV, with abuse of authority.

On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused that she was
released from confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm. Complainant inquired from the police station if an
order of release was issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released
because of the phone call the respondent judge made telling the desk officer that the accused
already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked the case records but the expediente contained
no copies of the order of release. She was only shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was only
on 430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found.

The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by the police. Only a
notation that there was a posting of the cash bail bond was entered therein.

Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as
the function belonged exclusively to the office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said
judge committed an act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the
release of the accused.

Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order of release at 7pm after
accused posted the cash bond. She claimed that such accused was released because of the order
of release and not because of the phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report
recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000 or suspended for 3
months. OCA agreed with the findings and recommended the suspension of 3 months.


WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally receiving the cash bail
bond for the accused.


Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that:
“The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by
the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case…….”

Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive such bail bond. A
judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be
kept in the office of the judge.

Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she
personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately misleading the court by
making false representations. She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary and other
benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be dealt more seriously.


GR Numbers 148468, 148769, and 149116
January 28, 2003

The case is a consolidation of 3 petitions filed by Edward Serapio which assailed
resolutions of the 3rd Division of the Sandiganbayan in denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus in relation to a plunder case
against him.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. He received a Php200 million donation from Chavit Singson. He received the
donation and turned it over to the treasurer of the Foundation and it was deposited to the account
with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In 2000, Singson publicly accused Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal
activities triggering the filing with the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against Estrada.
Petitioner was among the persons included in the criminal charges.
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations against Estrada and other
persons and no bail was recommended for the provisional released of the accused. Ombudsman
found probable cause for plunder and petitioner filed an MR. It was denied because the
information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of
warrants of arrests for the accused, including petitioner. Petitioner was detained at Camp Crame
for the said charge. Arraignment was set and petitioner filed a petition for Bail. Several other bail
meetings did not push through.
Even before the Sandiganbayan can resolve the issues, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari praying that the issued Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be declared void because he was denied due process.
Whether the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner of his right to due process of the law.
No. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but it is a
right conferred by a statute. Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to answer the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence dictates that the Court do not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in its conduct of preliminary investigations. It
was enunciated in Raro v. Sandiganbayan that in the performance of the task to determine
probable cause, the Ombudsman’s discretion is paramount. The lack of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed before the court.
The denial of his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus does not deny him of his right to due
process because there is no basis for the issuance of the writ in favor of the petitioner. Petitioner
has voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities. Habeas corpus does not lie because there
was no deprivation of liberty. Also, the delay in the hearing of the bail cannot be solely pinned
upon the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is also to be blamed. Habeas corpus is not the appropriate
remedy for asserting one's right to bail.
29. Salta vs. CA

Facts: On 1970, Almario T. Salta was charged by the Philippine National Bank before the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Salta filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan against Patrocinio Dayrit,
Renato Tayag and others. In support of his complaint and as part of his defense in Salta submitted
his affidavit .

On 1973, Salta filed a complaint against Patrocinio Dayrit, Renato Tayag, Adoracion Tayag and
Montano Bundad directly with Judge Ancheta for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. The complaint,
docketed, alleged the same grounds and issues raised by Salta in the earlier complaint against
Dayrit, Tayag and the others filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan. The complaint had been
dismissed by both the Provincial Fiscal and District State Prosecutor Kliatchko.

On the other hand, the Philippine National Bank charged Salta before the Provincial Fiscal in
Pampanga for alleged violations of the Anti-Graft Act committed by Salta in the PNB Guagua Branch
where he was transferred after his Malolos assignment. After an investigation, the Provincial Fiscal
of Pampanga found a prima facie case against Salta and filed the corresponding information with the
Circuit Criminal Court presided by Judge Ancheta.

Judge Ancheta issued an order ruling that "unless otherwise restrained by higher courts, the
requisite preliminary investigation thereon on Salta's complaint shall be conducted. Judge Ancheta
further held that "until such time when the preliminary investigation shall have been terminated, the
hearings on the merits of the criminal case is hereby suspended."

The scheduled preliminary investigation was postponed upon motions of respondents Adoracion S.
Tayag, Renato D. Tayag, Montano Bundad and Patrocinio Dayrit. Subsequently, these respondents
filed their respective motions to dismiss, premised on the principle that under Section 13, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Court, the judge may take cognizance of and conduct preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed directly with him only if there has been no "... previous preliminary
examination and investigation conducted by fiscal ... ."

Judge Ancheta denied the motion to dismiss. A joint motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondents was likewise denied. The judge then reset the preliminary investigation.

The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court presided by Judge Ancheta to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by Salta against Tayag, Dayrit and others
when the previous Identical complaint filed by Salta with the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan had already
been dismissed by the fiscal and, later, by the district state prosecutor for insufficiency of evidence.

Judge Ancheta acquitted Salta in Criminal Cases.

On March 22, 1974, Judge Ancheta issued a resolution in connection with the preliminary
investigation he conducted.

The Dayrit petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the Tayag petition was
granted and the resolutions and orders complained of were set aside and declared as null and void.

A motion for reconsideration filed by Dayrit was denied. Likewise, a motion for reconsideration filed
by Salta was denied. Hence, both Dayrit and Salta filed the present petitions for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Ancheta had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation over
Salta's complaint against petitioner Dayrit and Renato Tayag, the respondent

Ruling: We have in the past viewed with disfavor the unseemly interest of Judges of Circuit Criminal
Courts to conduct preliminary investigations in cases they will later try. We stated in Collector of
Customs v. Villaluz (71 SCRA 357) that the authority given to regular Courts of First Instance to
conduct preliminary investigations is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. However, we
made it clear that even as said courts may have such authority, they must concentrate on hearing
and deciding criminal cases filed before them instead of discharging a function that could very well
be handled by the provincial or city fiscal.

A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and
burden of defending himself in a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has first been
ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the
State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. (Section 1, Rule 112 of the present Rules
of Court states that it is conducted for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The preliminary investigation
proper is, therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the

Wherever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are
counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them. The fact that a certain power is
granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.

Cognizant of the above, Section 37 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reiterates the removal from Judges
of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations. There are enough fiscals and prosecutors in the region to do the job. Similarly,
Section 2 of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes Regional Trial
Judges to conduct preliminary investigations.

The respondent Judge conducted the questioned preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Even if we assume that there had been no prior investigations and granting that Judge Ancheta had
jurisdiction to conduct another preliminary investigation, the record shows that he behaved in such a
manner that the respondents, among them Tayag and Dayrit, were virtually deprived of due process
of law.

The death of Renato D. Tayag has rendered the said petition moot and academic. This however,
does not preclude this Court from cautioning trial judges on their obligation to observe "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" at all times to satisfy the requirements of due process.

The petition is granted. The questioned decision of CA is reversed and set aside

#30 Yapdiangco v. Buencamino 
Facts: On February 1, 1965, the fiscal diled information  for slight physical injuries allegedly committed 
by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the prescribed 60‐day 
period petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription. Respondent 
denied the motion contended that it was filed within the prescriptive period since the last day fell on a 
Sunday or legal holiday, therefore should not be counted.  

Issue: Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays. 

Held:  No.  A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the prescriptive period 
as a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is the offender’s  
physical absence and no other cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription. The Court ruled that 
where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty‐day period 
cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has automatically set in.” The fiscal cannot 
file the information on the next following working day as it would tantamount to extending the 
prescriptive period fixed by law. Criminal Statutes are to be strictly construed. Statutes of limitations in 
criminal suits is essentially different from statute of limitations in civil suits.  Therefore, the motion to 
quash the criminal prosecution was granted on the valid ground on the valid ground of prescription. 

#31 Gozo vs Tac-An

In a school party in Batangas, Gilbert Dyogi was killed while he an a member of PNP grappled for
the possession of his gun. The PNP members were charged with murder but files a motion to quash
which was granted by the judge who ruled that there is a probable cause to hold Blanco to stand in
trial for homicide only while co-accused were discharged for insufficiency of evidence. He then
directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file an Ammended information as a matter of convenience.

Issue: W/N a judge can conduct a preliminary investigation

Held: No. Rule 112 of Rules of Court enumerated the officers authorized to conduct PI.
Judges of RTCs is not one among those mentioned. They nno longer have authority that was once
given under 1964 Rles of Court. 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure did not eestore such athority. Art.
3 sec. 1 is dfferent from PI by Prosecutors. The purpose of PI is whether a crime has been commited
and w/ntheres a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof
PI is not a trial of a case on merits, it is only inquisitorial. It is not an occation for the full and
exhaustive display of evidence

#32 People vs Pareja

Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and one attempted rape. He is the stepfather of four
including the victim who was 13 years old at the time the three abuses took place. On the first
incident, she never told anyone about it for fear after respondent threatened to kill her. In Feb, she
was molested again and in March it was her mother who saw the act of lifting the skirt of her
daughter while the latter was asleep. Her mother filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City
Police Station.

Issue: W/N Pareja can be found guilty of rape

Held: No, even though it was proven during the trial since the charge in the information for the
December 2003 incident was rape through carnal knowledge.Article 266 A is different from Article
266 B. It is important to note that there is a material difference and substantial distinctions between
the two modes of rape, thus the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice versa.
To convict Pareja of rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his conatitutional rigjt to be
informed of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation againts him. 
Case no. 33

Leviste v. Almeda, GR No. 182677, August 3, 2010

Facts: Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide.
He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA and filed an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his
advanced age and health condition, claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. This was
denied on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility.

Leviste contends that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court would justify CA’s denial. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA is justified in denying the application for bail of Leviste?

Ruling: Yes, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty imposed is more than
6 years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to
the accused, of the following or other circumstances:

1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration; 2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; 3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon; 4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or 5. that
there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. That bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After
conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

Case no. 34

Facts: Ricarze was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, was arraigned and pleaded
not guilty to both charges. However, after arraignment and pretrial and after the private prosecutor filed a Formal
Offer of Evidence, the prosecution presented its witnesses and changed the name of the offended party from Caltex
to PCIB. Petitioner contends that the amendments of the Information to substitute PCIB as the offended party for
Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or not allowing the substitution of the private complainant after the arraignment and after the
prosecution has terminated is violative of Rule 110 Section 14?
Ruling: No, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information
may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave
of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged
in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged. In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a
substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Information, nor did it result in
any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all
such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
Case 35

Facts: On October 29, 2009, the trial court has acquitted the accused from the crime of estafa on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On 29 November 1999, petitioner, who
is the offended party filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment and
considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29 November
1999, a Monday. Such motion was denied being filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was
counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.
Issue: Whether or not the period within which a private offended party may appeal from, or move for a
reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge, the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal action should be reckoned from
the date of promulgation?
Ruling: No, civil actions are allowed to proceed separately from criminal ones. the Rule on the promulgation of
judgment refers to the accused, not to the private offended party, who is not even required to be present during the
proceedings. Since the judgment may be promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will be inequitable to count from
that date the period of appeal for the said party. It is but logical to begin tolling such period only upon service of the
notice of judgment upon the offended party, and not from its promulgation to the accused. Rule 122 Section 6 does
not apply to civil case appealed by the offended party. In civil cases, it is required that motions be filed 15 days from
the actual knowledge or notice.
36. Foz vs People (2009) G.R. 167764


Petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr and Danny Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel. Upon
arraignment, they were assisted by counsel de parte and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Trial thereafter ensued, finding both of them guilty. Petitioners moved for recon but was denied.
Dissatisfied, they appealed to CA who affirmed in toto the RTC decision. They then filed a motion
for recon which CA denied. In their petition to the SC, petitioners raise for the first time the issue
that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction
in the RTC of Iloilo City.

Issue: WON the RTC of Iloilo City had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged.

Held: SC ruled on the negative. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of
the RTC’s jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds
that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases
of written defamation: The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:

The allegations in the Information that “Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region” only showed that Iloilo was the place
where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication
was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Considering that the Information
failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the
RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of
the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the
court of competent jurisdiction.