Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of
the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in
the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-
intervenors.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos
Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a
summary execution and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review
board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against twenty-six respondents including herein
petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories.
After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of
R.A. 7975.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section
4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides
that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in
any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the
provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction
over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered
as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the
alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused
PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s
or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.
Held: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that
Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to
equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing
argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is
presumed reasonable and the party who
challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must
rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class; all
of which are present in this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply
“to all cases involving” certain public officials and
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all
cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors’ argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases. The transitory provision does not only cover
cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in
“any court.”
There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post
facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of
penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define
crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but
clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes
rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249
cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is
said to have been committed in relation to the office
if it is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by
the said principal accused was intimately related to
the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does
not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter
while in their custody. The stringent requirement
that the charge set forth with such particularity as
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to
his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan.
Ynot v IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited
the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which
not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of
carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated
his right to be heard or his right to due process. He
said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of
police power in order to promote general welfare so
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it
indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the
executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be
given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There
is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
 Dimatulac v. Villon
Facts:
§ In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of
Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges
(who handled the case) committed serious
procedural flaws resulting in the impairment of due
process (prejudicial to both the offended party and
the accused).
§ Procedural irregularities in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor:
o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with
no bail recommended, but the Yabuts were not
arrested or were never brought unto the custody of
the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted
a reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may
disagree with the findings of the judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation (and
conduct his own), the circumstance that the
accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits
left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to sustain
the MCTC findings—which she did not do. And
later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file
their counter-affidavits without first demanding that
they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of
arrest.
o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the
Yabuts despite the fact that they were charged of
homicide and that they were fugitives from justice
(having avoided service of warrant of arrest).
o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private
prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her
resolution. (The subsequent resolution of the DOJ
Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite
the pending appeal, she filed the Information. It
would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ
resolution.
o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the
trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ
Secretary.
§ Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:
o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold
departure order until “such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned”
o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the
reason that “private prosecution has not shown any
indication that the appeal was given due course by
DOJ”
§ Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:
o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer
proceedings; a ten-day period with which the
complainants can file petition with the CA;
resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to
comment on the complainants’ action; pending
appeal with the DOJ.
Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be
sustained despite procedural defects?
Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to
Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The
order of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the
subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and
set aside. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is
ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s
resolution.
Prosecutors are the representatives not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win every case but that justice be done. They
are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that
guilt shall not escape and innocence shall not
suffer.
The judge “should always be imbued with a high
sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
his obligation to promptly and properly administer
justice”. The judge’s action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of
the State and offended party.
When the State is deprived of due process in a
criminal case by reason of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal
of the accused or dismissal of the case is void.
Harden vs Dir. Of Prisons
FACTS:
Petitioner was confined in prison for contempt of
court for failure to comply with a court order arising
from a civil case between him and his wife.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s detention violates
constitutional right against cruel and unusual
punishment.
RULING:
NO. The penalty complained of is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. Punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of
life. Petition is DENIED
 Liang v. People G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001
Lesson: Criminal acts not immune
Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention
FACTS:
· 2 criminal informations for for grave oral
defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a
Chinese national who was employed as an
Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB),
by Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of
ADB
· MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang
enjoyed immunity from legal processes
· RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines
annulled and set aside the order of MTC
· SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that
the immunity granted to officers and staff of the
ADB is not absolute and is limited on the official
capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the
commission of a crime such as slander or oral
defamation in the name of official duty
· A motion of reconsideration is filed
ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys
immunity
HELD: NO
· slander, in general, cannot be considered as an
act performed in an official capacity
· issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court
to determine
PUNO, J., concurring:
· the nature and degree of immunities vary
depending on who the recipient is
· Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for all
acts, whether private or official, and hence he
cannot be arrested, prosecuted and punished for
any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic
immunity is waived. On the other hand, officials of
international organizations enjoy "functional"
immunities, that is, only those necessary for the
exercise of the functions of the organization and the
fulfillment of its purposes.
o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to
the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private
acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of
immunity
o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to
certify by the DFA
FACTS:
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by
Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his
country. Extradition proceedings were filed against
him which ordered the deportation of petitioner.
Said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals; hence, petitioner came herein by way of
review on certiorari, to set aside the order of
deportation, contending that the provision of the
Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition
treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which
violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE:Can extradition treaty be applied
retroactively?
RULING:NO. Early commentators understood ex
post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective
application, whether civil or criminal. However,
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone,
The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull concluded that the
concept was limited only to penal and criminal
statutes.
As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto
laws are
1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime
when such act was not an offense when committed;
2) laws which, while not creating new offenses,
aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes
which prescribes greater punishment for a crime
already committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules
of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to
convict a defendant.
“Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court)
has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the
accused.” This being so, there is no absolutely no
merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the
lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive
application with respect to offenses committed prior
to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates
the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation
nor a criminal procedural statute. “It merely
provides for the extradition of persons wanted for
prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense
or crime was already committed or consummated
at the time the treaty was ratified.”
Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who
was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru
falsification of Public documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his
alleged involvement as a government auditor of the
commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of
education and culture, with some other employees
from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and
the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the
preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA
checks for the nom-existent obligations of the
teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the
government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases
were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for
municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was
elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting
the accused together with his other co-accused in
all but one of the thirty two cases filed against
them.
On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was
passed amending RA 3019.
Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of
the constitutionalguarantee against an ex
post facto law.
Held: The court finds no merit in the
petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the
crime of estafa through falsification of Public
Documents as among crimes subjecting the public
officer charged therewith with suspension from
public office pending action in court, is a penal
provision which violates theconstitutional prohibition
against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg
to the RPC suspension from employment and
public office during trial shall not be considered as
a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a
result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted
the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension. And does
not violate theconstitutional provision against ex
post facto law.
The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be
suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he
is chargedis untenable. The amendatory provision
clearly states that any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under RA 3019 for any offense
involving fraud upon the government or public
funds or property or whatever stage
of executionand mode of participation shall be
suspended from office. The use of the word “office”
applies to any office which the officer charged may
be holding and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.
People V. Dionisio
22 SCRA 1299
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962,
in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is
not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games
and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did
then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arrange
and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race
being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club
at Makati and for that purpose has in possession
the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing
Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets,
one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double
receipt. He was thereby charged in violation of
Republic Act No. 3063.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his
offense infringes the Constitutional provision that
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1 clause
19, of the Constitution of the Phils)
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute
in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for
the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhumane and
barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines
or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
“The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped
out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to
the limit.” (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac
trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,
dismissing the information of subversion against
the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by
a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.)
Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine
Government. Attended by Aggravating
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and
Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The
Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a
judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of
organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membership therein,
and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear
and presentdanger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with
full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation
by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of
Justice be made prior to filing of information in
court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing
false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses
in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation
of membership to the CCP through writing under
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the
statute and its valid exercise under freedom if
thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex
post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-
Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It
punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be
measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies
persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the
CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow
of the Government for purposes of example of
SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to
the CPP but also to other organizations having the
same purpose and their successors. The Act’s
focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be
UNLAWFUL, it must be shown
thatmembership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts.
This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a member’s direct participation.
Why is membership punished. Membership renders
aid and encouragement to the
organization. Membership makes himself party to
its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in
nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive
organizations before the passing of this Act is given
an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section
8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having
been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government
should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is
only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the
limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression
and Association” in this matter. Before the
enactment of the statute and statements in the
preamble, careful investigations by the Congress
were done. The court further stresses that whatever
interest in freedom of speech and association is
excluded in the prohibition ofmembership in the
CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY
and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the

prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the
following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it

must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the
Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membershipis willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose.Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes

of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court
set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.