RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

95. Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals (6-June-2001)

FACTS: Luis Miguel Aboitiz, then employed at DLPC, initiated a covert operation with the objectives to ascertain how
DLPC material were being stolen, the frequency of thefts, who were perpetrating such and to catch at least one DLPC
employee that may be involved. He sought the assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robbery Section of the San
Pedro Patrol Station, Davao METRODISCOM. He also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation and a Civilian
Home Defense Forces member, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym ‘Canuto Duran’, an ‘electrician from
Kabakan, Cotabato. Canuto struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician at the Miguel Store.
He told Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials. Ricardo offered to supply Canuto with electrical
materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same. Canuto purchased small electrical wires
which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga. Ricardo introduced Canuto to Jonathan at Miguel
Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of DLPC Service Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'.
It turned out that the supplies were being pilfered from the truck, and properties of DLPC. The prosecution was unable to
present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife he was
in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain.

RTC rendered judgment based on prosecution’s evidence, with the statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo
Cariaga implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the
accused. CA affirmed the decision on appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga.

HELD: Yes. Court emphasized that "the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony
given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in
the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those
prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an
accused person "to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. CA, it was ruled that "'unable to testify' or
for that matter 'unavailability', does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer
to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power
of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses." The threshold question then is the admissibility of the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga
against it for illegal dismissal. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not
appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the
Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and previously, his wife
informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against
this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to
testify.

It must be emphasized that Sec. 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence is strictly complied with in criminal cases,
hence, "mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must
exercise its coercive power to arrest." In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a
remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score
alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we
shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule.

The trial judge who sees and hears witnesses testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the
degree of credit which should be accorded their testimonies. The rule has also always been that the contradictions
between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always militate against the
witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often
incomplete and inaccurate. Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony
given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross-examination.

There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant
from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial.

96. People vs Ong G.R. No. 137348 (June 21, 2004)

Facts: Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a
confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector
Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu.
As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the
meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic
bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by
SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.
The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were
prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, the appellants denied the story of the prosecution. Accused William Ong, a Chinese citizen from the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), claimed that he came to the Philippines in 1997 to look for a job. Initially, he worked in a pancit
factory in Quezon City, but later hunted for another job, was referred by his friend Kian Ling to Ong Sin for a possible job
as a technician in a bihon factory owned by Sin. Subsequently, without any knowledge of his new job, William Ong was
later taken to the police station and there he met the other accused Ching De Ming for the first time. He maintained
innocence to the crime charged.

On his part, accused Ching De Ming testified that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in the RTW business. On that
same date of the commission of the crime, while waiting for his girlfriend and her mother, whose mother Avenlina Cardoz,
testified in De Ming’s favor and corroborated with his story, that he was approached by persons unknown to him. He was
misidentified as one of the accused and dragged him out of his car and brought to the other car, took his clutch bag, then
after a few hours, at Camp Crame, they removed his blindfold. He denied knowing Ong and the charge of conspiring with
him to deliver shabu in New Manila, Quezon City.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It
likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants
insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment of appellants violates Rule 116, Section (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure?

Held: The aforementioned provision on Arraignment and Plea provides that (a) The accused must be arraigned before the
court where the complaint or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by
the judge of clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language
or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The trial court held that the arraignment of appellants violated the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their
Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does not, however, indicate
whether the information was read in the language or dialect known to them.

Both accused Ong and De Ming were arraigned, assisted by counsel de parte, and both entered a plea of not guilty. From
the records, it was clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language, however the appellants were arraigned on an
information written in the English language. The requirement that the information should be read in a language or dialect
known to the accused is mandatory. It must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause the of the accusation against him. The constitutional protection is part
of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment. After the arraignment and in the course
of the trial, the lower court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise the one who closed the
deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of
the offer to purchase shabu, the court held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the “poseur-buyer” but merely the
deliveryman. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the
basis of the conviction of the appellants.

The buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. However, to determine whether there was valid entrapment or whether proper
procedures were undertaken by the police officers, in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to
make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The confidential information who
had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a
witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same and not part of
the buy-bust operation.

Although, the court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why confidential informants are usually not
presented by the prosecution. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have
cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to
disclosure of the identity of an informer. The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing
the state interest in protecting the people from crimes against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. The balance
must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among others: (1) the crime charged, (2) the possible
defenses, (3) the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and (4) other relevant factors.

In the present case, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the imposition of the
death penalty. The prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-
bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is indispensable. It should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a
person enjoy high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance.
Moreover, the mishandling and transfer of custody of the alleged confiscated methyl amphetamine hydrochloride further
shattered the case of the prosecution. There is no crime of illegal sale of regulated drug when there is a nagging doubt on
whether the substance confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be regulated drug.

The court decided to reverse and set aside its former decision. Appellants Ong and De Ming @ Tiu are acquitted of the
crime of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and are ordered immediately released from
custody unless held for some other lawful cause.

97. People vs Ricardo Bohol (28-June-2008)

FACTS: On August 2, 2002, at around 8:30 p.m., a confidential informant came to the police station and tipped P/Sr. Insp.
Jessie Nitullano that a certain Ricardo Bohol is engaged in illegal drug trade in Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. Nitullano
then formed a team of six police operatives to verify the informant’s tip, and, if found positive, to launch then and there a
buy-bust entrapment of Bohol.

The team proceeded to the site of the operation and then PO2 Estrada, the poseur-buyer, and the informant told Bohol of
their purpose. Estrada handed the former a Php100 marked bill and then Bohol handed him a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline granules which the latter suspected to be shabu. Estrada then gave the signal and PO2 Luisito Gutierrez
and his companions arrested Bohol. Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered from him the buy-bust money and three plastic
sachets containing similar white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu.

On August 7, 2002, two Informations were filed against Bohol before the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, for violations of Rep.
Act No. 9165. One charge for unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control three (3)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance commonly known as "shabu" and another
charge for selling, administering, delivering, transporting or distributing any dangerous drug,

Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges and hence trial ensued. During trial, the
confidential informants were not presented as witnesses. The accused was convicted on both charges, with the penalty of
life imprisonment imposed upon him for the charge of selling shabu. Because of this, the case was forwarded for
automatic review. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification on
the penalty only. Thus, Bohol filed a notice of appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

HELD: No, the trial court did not gravely err in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Bohol contends that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He faults the trial court for
giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He raised the failure of the prosecution to
present the confidential informant as a witness during the trial, thereby preventing him from confronting said witness
directly.

The Office of the Solicitor General counters that the prosecution established Bohol’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt given
that the police officers who testified against Bohol were not shown to have been actuated by improper motives, nor were
they shown not properly performing their duty.

With regard to his argument that the confidential informant was not presented thus preventing him from confronting the
witness directly, the appellate court correctly ruled that Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant in the
case. During trial, the informant’s presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases.

Police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and
informers since their usefulness will be over the moment they are presented in court.

The SC held that what is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti and both requirements were
sufficiently proven in this case.

The police officers were able to testify positively and categorically that the transaction or sale actually took place. The
subject shabu was likewise positively identified by the prosecution when presented in court. Hence, we agree that Bohol’s
guilt has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
 RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS

98. People v. Chua ( April 4, 2001)

FACTS: Chua was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale for recruiting and
promising work in Taiwan to 9 people, without a license. According to Chua, she received a call from Taiwan informing her
that some people were needed so she called several people and collected money but the placement in Taiwan never
materialized. The POEA issued a certification that Chua was not licensed to recruit persons/ workers for overseas
employment. Chua argues that she had an approved application for a service contractor’s authority. But the records show
that she failed to comply with post –licensing requirements.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chua was licensed to recruit workers for overseas work.

HELD: The SC held that Chua wasn’t licensed to perform recruiting activities. The records show that the license was not
issued due to her failure to comply with post-licensing requirements. It is the issuance of the license which makes the
holder thereof authorized to perform recruitment activates. The law specifically provides that “every license shall be valid
for at least 2 years from the date of issuance unless sooner canceled or revoked by the Secretary. Chua admitted herself
that she wasn’t licensed when she replied to the Taiwan Company.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

99. People v Malimit

DOCTRINE: The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the
occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to get
involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.

FACTS: At 8 pm, Onofre Malaki(victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, was busy cooking
supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store. Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. to
purchase chemical for his rice farm. Batin had just finished cooking, he proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if
supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused Ercarnacion “Manolo” Malimit coming out of
the store with a bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor struggling for his life. Rondon,
who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw accused Malimit rushing out through the front
door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo . Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp inside the store,
Rondon clearly recognized Malimi . Both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio
Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside,
they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's
drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket

TC: Convicted accused for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. One of the contentions of accused Malimit
in this appeal is that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Rondon and Batin. He questions the
credibility of the 2 witnesses because they only revealed that they have knowledge of the crime and identified the accused
as the perpetrator, 5 months after the incident.

Date of the crime: April 15, 1991

Witnesses pointed at accused: September 17, 1991

ISSUE: WON the testimonies of the witnesses may be appreciated by the court? YES

HELD: Accused haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only on
September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was merely the date when Rondon and Batin executed their
respective affidavits, narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood
and rushing out of Malaki's store. As to his claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample
testimonial evidence negating his assertion, to wit: After having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and
Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the only person
they saw running away from the crime scene; Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their
barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; and Batin again made a
similar statement later at the Silago Police Station. Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the
appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does
not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact the natural reticence of
most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice. At
any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court. This is the established rule of
evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court
which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And although the
rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by
the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we found none in this case.

Additional info:

The non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if accused was indeed implicated right
away by Batin to the crime was not necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence. Entries in the police blotter are
merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator
of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if appellant
believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and
utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach Batin's credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant
cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.

100. People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999]

Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his 9-
year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts. Realizing that
Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to
search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also
requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around
1:00 a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even
returned to the school and inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way
home. When he was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin
Rondero pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing
his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however,
revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but
after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for
her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary
School where they found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was
raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right
hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the
other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot
investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo
led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that
the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their
headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw Rondero washing
his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero.
Some policemen took the newly washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen
brought Rondero's wife, Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on
her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which
were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from the victim
and Rondero, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination. Meanwhile, on 30 March
1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at
his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative micro-physical examination on the specimens
showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-
appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. On
13 October 1995, the trial court rendered judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to
death. Rondero moved for reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier
decision, convicting Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when
the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed.

Issue: Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as evidence.

Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from Rondero and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

101. Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief,
Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those
mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters
Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi
of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the
group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office. On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin
dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day.
Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.
They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while
two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep,
driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. The passengers of the
postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the
jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between
Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag
to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the
mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle.
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and
started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.
At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware of the arrest of Romero and
Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the
postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their
headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail
found in their possession. On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office, intending
to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there. The unsorted mail seized
from Marcelo Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 36 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The
names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Many
of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and
Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members
of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According
to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated
from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo y Cruz were charged with infidelity in
the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime of qualified theft. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8 years, 8
months, and 1 day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
Romero and Marcelo, the penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years,
6 months, and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to the exclusion
from evidence of the letters themselves.

Held: The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the envelopes as
the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from Marcelo were those given to him and Romero,
undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from
Marcelo and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should
be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under
custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of a
person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice
and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one. However, the letters are
themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a
valid arrest. A ruling that Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion
on 17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.
The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were
the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of
Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found
on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.

103. People vs. Gallarde [GR 133025, 17 February 2000]

Facts: In the evening of 26 May 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchera, Tayug,
Pangasinan, their neighbors converged. Among them were Radel Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed
Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was
Editha, 10 year old daughter of spouses Talan. After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and Gallarde to dine in the
kitchen. As they partook of the meal, Gallarde suddenly left. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the
house, he chanced upon Gallarde and Editha talking to each other. Jaime whistled at Gallarde but instead of minding him,
the latter sprinted towards the road leading to his house. Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a
kerosene lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha answered that she would look for Gallarde.
Soon Editha left enroute to where Gallarde fled. By 10:00 p.m., the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and informed
them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to help look for her. Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-
kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and
nephew Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields to look for the
missing child. When Jaime mentioned that Gallarde was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the searchers went back
to the house of Gallarde. The searchers found Gallarde squatting with his short pants at the toilet about 6 meters away
from Gallarde's house; his hands and knees covered with soil. Asked where Editha was, Gallarde replied: "I do not know, I
did not do anything to her." To the question, "where did you come from since a while ago you were not yet in this toilet?"
Gallarde answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and
countered that Gallarde's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him drinking. After the confrontation at the
toilet, Exkagawad Fernandez brought Gallarde to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that Gallarde
was the last person seen talking with the missing child. Fernandez then rejoined the searchers. Back in the field, Virginia
Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses, and a wide hole among the
disheveled grass. When Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Editha's hand pitted out.
Fernandez screamed in terror. Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is here, she is now here
already dead!" Mindful of Gallarde's safety, Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring Gallarde to the municipal building.
On their way though, they met policemen on board a vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of
Gallarde, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to
you." The policemen together with Gallarde proceeded to where the people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved
more soil aside. The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered. A picture of Gallarde was taken
without any counsel present. On 24 June 1997, Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, Gallarde, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pretrial conference. On 12 February
1998, the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha Talan in the
negotiated sum of P70,000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28
February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether The taking of pictures of an accused violates of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.

Held: The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a
violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The
essence of the right against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself
through a testimonial act. Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to
physical examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from gonorrhea
which was contracted by his victim; to expel morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine
its identity with bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or
to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.

102. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion
to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue
Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to
Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony
in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of
their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation”
because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

104. COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL. GR No.s 148948 & 148951, February 17, 2003

Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a complaint against
Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-
selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in
Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling
against said witnesses. On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99
were exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as “The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who voluntarily give
information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The Law Department of the COMELEC
moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.

Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those committing it is
the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes
with the following paragraph: The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator
referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals: Provided,
that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies on any
violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for the
offenses with reference to which his information and testimony were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall
exempt such person from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony.

2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents, Congress saw it
fit to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for perjury or false testimony should they
not tell the truth.

3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling by virtue
of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the complaint for vote-selling was filed with
the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt
practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying
case. In fact, they willingly testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99.

4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Prosecutors, or their
respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or
withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever, in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the
integrity of the COMELEC and to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the
case can be done by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect
withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

105. Republic Act 9745

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.

AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Ad shall be known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009".

Section 2. Statement of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

(a) To value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights;

(b) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including suspects, detainees and prisoners are respected at all times;
and that no person placed under investigation or held in custody of any person in authority or, agent of a person authority
shall be subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs
his/her free wi11 or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity;

(c) To ensure that secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may
be carried out with impunity, are prohibited; and

(d) To fully adhere to the principles and standards on the absolute condemnation and prohibition of torture as provided for
in the 1987 Philippine Constitution; various international instruments to which the Philippines is a State party such as, but
not limited to, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and all other relevant
international human rights instruments to which the Philippines is a signatory.

Section 3. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an
act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a
third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not
include pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

(b) "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or
debasement to the latter.

(c) "Victim" refers to the person subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as
defined above and any individual who has suffered harm as a result of any act(s) of torture, or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment.

(d) "Order of Battle" refers to any document or determination made by the military, police or any law enforcement agency
of the government, listing the names of persons and organizations that it perceives to be enemies of the State and that it
considers as legitimate targets as combatants that it could deal with, through the use of means allowed by domestic and
international law.

Section 4. Acts of Torture. - For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the
body, such as:

(1) Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and
jumping on the stomach;
(2) Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not
normally eaten;
(3) Electric shock;
(4) Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical
substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s);
(5) The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of
suffocation;
(6) Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;
(7) Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of
the genitals;
(8) Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;
(9) Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;
(10) Pulling out of fingernails;
(11) Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;
(12) The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation;
(13) The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory. alertness or will of a person, such as:
(i) The administration or drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or
(ii) The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and
(14) Other analogous acts of physical torture; and
(b) "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which
are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:
(1) Blindfolding;
(2) Threatening a person(s) or his/fher relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts;
(3) Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;
(4) Prolonged interrogation;
(5) Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;
(6) Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she
shall be summarily executed;
(7) Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;
(8) Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third party;
(9) Denial of sleep/rest;
(10) Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or
putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;
(11) Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and
(12) Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.
Section 5. Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. - Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act,
inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against another person in custody, which attains a level
of severity sufficient to cause suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. The assessment of the level of
severity shall depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment or punishment, its
physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, religion, age and state of health of the victim.

Section 6. Freedom from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, An Absolute
Bight. - Torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to all
circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, or a document
or any determination comprising an "order of battle" shall not and can never be invoked as a justification for torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

Section 7. Prohibited Detention. - Secret detention places, solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention, where torture may be carried out with impunity. Are hereby prohibited.

In which case, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law
enforcement. agencies concerned shall make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their respective
jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or detained therein such as, among
others, names, date of arrest and incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. This list shall be made available to
the public at all times, with a copy of the complete list available at the respective national headquarters of the PNP and
AFP. A copy of the complete list shall likewise be submitted by the PNP, AFP and all other law enforcement agencies to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), such list to be periodically updated, by the same agencies, within the first five
(5) days of every month at the minimum. Every regional office of the PNP, AFP and other law enforcement agencies shall
also maintain a similar list far all detainees and detention facilities within their respective areas, and shall make the sam e
available to the public at all times at their respective regional headquarters, and submit a copy. updated in the same
manner provided above, to the respective regional offices of the CHR.

Section 8. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule; Exception. - Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result
of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person
or persons accused of committing torture.

Section 9. Institutional Protection of Torture Victims and Other Persons Involved. - A victim of torture shall have the
following rights in the institution of a criminal complaint for torture:

(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and by agencies of government concerned such as the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for
torture is filed within which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made available. An appeal
whenever available shall be resolved within the same period prescribed herein,

(b) To have sufficient government protection against all forms of harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence
of the filing of said complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State through its appropriate
agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and
prosecution such as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and

(c) To be accorded sufficient protection in the manner by which he/she testifies and presents evidence in any fora in order
to avoid further trauma.

Section 10. Disposition of Writs of Habeas Corpus, Amparo and Habeas Data Proceedings and Compliance with a
Judicial 07'der. - A writ of habeas corpus or writ of amparo or writ of habeas data proceeding, if any, filed on behalf of the
victim of torture or other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment shall be disposed of expeditiously and
any order of release by virtue thereof, or other appropriate order of a court relative thereto, shall be executed or complied
with immediately.

Section 11. Assistance in Filing a Complaint. - The CHR and the PAO shall render legal assistance in the investigation
and monitoring and/or filing of the complaint for a person who suffers torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment, or for any interested party thereto.

The victim or interested party may also seek legal assistance from the Barangay Human Rights Action Center (BRRAC)
nearest him/her as well as from human rights nongovernment organizations (NGOs).

Section 12. Right to' Physical, Medical and Psychological Examination. - Before and after interrogation, every person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to he informed of his/her right to demand physical
examination by an independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of
his/her own doctor, he/she shall he provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical
examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological evaluation if available under the
circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore,
any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to
immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment. The physical examination and/or psychological evaluation
of the victim shall be contained in a medical report, duly signed by the attending physician, which shall include in detail
his/her medical history and findings, and which shall he attached to the custodial investigation report. Such report shall be
considered a public document.

Following applicable protocol agreed upon by agencies tasked to conduct physical, psychological and mental
examinations, the medical reports shall, among others, include:

(a) The name, age and address of the patient or victim;

(b) The name and address of the nearest kin of the patient or victim;
(c) The name and address of the person who brought the patient or victim for physical, psychological and mental
examination, and/or medical treatment;
(d) The nature and probable cause of the patient or victim's injury, pain and disease and/or trauma;
(e) The approximate time and date when the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(f) The place where the injury, pain, disease and/or trauma was/were sustained;
(g) The time, date and nature of treatment necessary; and
(h) The diagnosis, the prognosis and/or disposition of the patient.
Any person who does not wish to avail of the rights under this pr<;lvision may knowingly and voluntarily waive such rights
in writing, executed in the presence and assistance of his/her counsel.

Section 13. Who are Criminally Liable. - Any person who actually participated Or induced another in the commission of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of
torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as
principal

Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower
ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals.

The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP
and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led,
assisted, abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has
knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her
subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or
investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or
investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.

Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and without having participated therein, either as principal or
accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:

(a) By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the
effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or(c) By harboring, concealing or assisting m the escape of
the principal/s in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the
accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public functions.

Section 14. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become insane,
imbecile, impotent, blind or maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.

(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who commit any act of mental/psychological torture
resulting in insanity, complete or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim due to guilt,
worthlessness or shame.

(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological,
mental and emotional harm other than those described 1n paragraph (b) of this section. '

(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have lost the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an
arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.

(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the
victim shall have become deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for a period of more than ninety (90) days.

(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in
consequence of torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than thirty (30) days but not more
than ninety (90) days.

(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture,
the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.

(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment as defined in Section 5 of this Act.

(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those who establish, operate and maintain secret detention
places and/or effect or cause to effect solitary confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of prohibited detention
as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be carried out with impunity.

(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the responsible officers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and
other law enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or make available to the public an
updated list of detention centers and facilities with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or
detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.

Section 15. Torture as a Separate and Independent Crime. - Torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed
by any other crime or felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which
case, torture shall be treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without
prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws.

Section 16. Exclusion from the Coverage of Special Amnesty Law. - In order not to depreciate the crime of torture,
persons who have committed any act of torture shall not benefit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that
will have the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings and sanctions.

Section 17. Applicability of Refouler. - No person shall be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there
are substantial grounds to believe that such person shall be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purposes of
determining whether such grounds exist, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Secretary of
the DOJ, in coordination with the Chairperson of the CHR, shall take into account all relevant considerations including,
where applicable and not limited to, the existence in the requesting State of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.

Section 18. Compensation to Victims of Torture. - Any person who has suffered torture shall have the right to claim for
compensation as provided for under Republic Act No. 7309: Provided, That in no case shall compensation be any lower
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00). Victims of torture shall also have the right to claim for compensation from such
other financial relief programs that may be made available to him/her under existing law and rules and regulations.

Section 19. Formulation of a Rehabilitation Program. - Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the DOJ and the Department of Health (DOH) and such other concerned
government agencies, and human rights organizations shall formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation program for victims
of torture and their families. The DSWD, the DOJ and thc DOH shall also call on human rights nongovernment
organizations duly recognized by the government to actively participate in the formulation of such program that shall
provide for the physical, mental, social, psychological healing and development of victims of torture and their families.
Toward the attainment of restorative justice, a parallel rehabilitation program for persons who have committed torture and
other cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment shall likewise be formulated by the same agencies.

Section 20. Monitoring of Compliance with this Act. - An Oversight Committee is hereby created to periodically oversee
the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall be headed by a Commissioner of the CRR, with the following as
members: the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, the respective Chairpersons of the
House of Representatives' Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and the Minority Leaders of both houses or their
respective representatives in the minority.

Section 21. Education and Information Campaign. - The CHR, the DOJ, the Department of National Defense (DND), the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and such other concerned parties in both the public and private
sectors shall ensure that education and information regarding prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment shall be fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military,
medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of
any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. The Department of Education (DepED) and the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) shall also ensure the integration of human rights education courses in all
primary, secondary and tertiary level academic institutions nationwide.

Section 22. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code insofar as they are
applicable shall be suppletory to this Act. Moreover, if the commission of any crime punishable under Title Eight (Crimes
Against Persons) and Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of the Revised Penal Code is attended by
any of the acts constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein,
the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period.

Section 23. Appropriations. - The amount of Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated to the CHR for
the initial implementation of tills Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this
Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 24. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOJ and the CHR, with the active participation of human rights
nongovernmental organizations, shall promulgate the rules and regulations for the effective implementation of tills Act.
They shall also ensure the full dissemination of such rules and regulations to all officers and members of various law
enforcement agencies.

Section 25. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions
not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders or rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 27. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least
two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

106. People v Echegaray G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997

Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably
meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused
on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against
the accused. This was dismissed. On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.
Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines. A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters
relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3)
purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

Ratio:

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant
to this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by
its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in
accordance with these laws.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty
is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments.
Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions,"

Munoz- A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the
legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-
step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the
vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate
has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished by
the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the
propitious time.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by
reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The
proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on
a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court
meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime
for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that,
while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome
about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it
the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress,
for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or
describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with
each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the
human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing,
debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes
must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill
to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically
proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the
same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and
rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."

107. People vs. Mercado G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000

FACTS: The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them
the punishment of death.

The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case
resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment."

2. Whether or not the trial court’s haste in deciding the case resulted to grave and serious errors to the prejudice of the
defendants.

RULING:

1. No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and
actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.

2. No, the contention of the defendants that the speed the trial court decided their case resulted in grave and serious
errors to their prejudice. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case
and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case
cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case
only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a
case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing
of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments
and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in
favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due
dispatch. The trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some modification, its
decision should be affirmed.

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

108. Cuizon vs. CA 289 SCRA 159

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The constitutional proscription of double jeopardy is not violated by a Court of Appeals order requiring the trial court to
promulgate a decision sentencing the accused to imprisonment even if, earlier, the same decision has been promulgated
in regard only to the payment of the modified civil indemnity arising from the same criminal act. Otherwise stated, the
promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the liability for civil indemnity, is not a bar to the subsequent
promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability.

The Case

This is the gist of this Courts resolution of the petition for review on certiorari, assailing the November 5, 1996 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 41096. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, which set aside the April 12,
1996 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated April 12, 1996 of the respondent Judge is hereby SET
ASIDE and he is ordered to set anew the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
conviction and sentencing the accused to serve imprisonment for the duration stated in the decision of the said
respondent Court dated February 7, 1989. The order for the payment of the civil liabilities has been promulgated earlier.

SO ORDERED.
The RTC Resolution, set aside by the Court of Appeals, disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the Urgent Motion to Set Aside Promulgation
filed by the accused thru counsel, is meritorious and accordingly, the same is hereby granted.

The Facts

The undisputed facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are reproduced below:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint
Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide,
beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of [p]rision
[m]ayor as [m]inimum to 12 years and 1 day of [r]eclusion [t]emporal as [m]aximum, for each offense, with the accessories
provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount
of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the civil indemnity was
increased to P50,000.00. The dispositive portion of said Decision of this Court dated July 30, 1991 reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the joint decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by ordering accused Eduardo Cuison
to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount
of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but the Supreme Court
denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of the decision. However,
respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified
civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.

Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and requested that a motion for
clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision dated July 30, 1991. On July 7, 1995, the Solicitor General filed a
Motion to Clarify Decision. On August 17, 1995, [the Court of Appeals] rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent
portions thereof:

In the dispositive portion of this Courts decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of the court a quo in one
respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in Our decision, People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646.

In view of the foregoing, it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court was not touched on at all by this
Court especially in the light of [o]ur [o]bservation in the said decision, as follows:

After a careful review of the evidence on records, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-
appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The court a quo has expressed the following findings in its decision,
to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy . . . was proven by the following circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode or manner in which the offenses were
perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the same
aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21) (CA Decision, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 127-129)

Acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision, this Court hereby declares that this Court had affirmed the decision of
the court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial courts decision.

Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside
Promulgation on the following grounds:

1. That the judgment in said case was already promulgated on 4 April 1995 and therefore there is nothing to promulgate
anymore.

2. To pursue with [sic] the scheduled promulgation will violate the accuseds constitutional right against jeopardy.

In a Resolution dated April 12, 1996, the respondent Judge granted the aforestated motion holding:
Now, the question is: May the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals promulgated on 17 August 1995 which
clarified the dispositive portion of its original decision, be considered as an amendment, alteration or modification of the
decision? Here, we must not forget the basic rule that in the execution of the judgment, it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which controls. We cannot also forget that, as already mentioned above, we have already promulgated the said
decision by reading to the accused the dispositive portion, and that to the best of our knowledge, he had already complied
therewith by paying the damages which were awarded. It may be relevant at this point in time, to cite the decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Heirs of George Bofill vs. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 393 that

Had the Court of Appeals been more accurate and precise in quoting data from the records, it would have arrived at the
right conclusion

The Honorable Court of Appeals cited the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Partola-Jo vs. CA, 216
SCRA 692, that:

Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the decision, the Supreme
Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final. (emphasis supplied)

The above decision is in consonance with the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Buan vs. Court of
Appeal, et al., 235 SCRA 424 wherein the Supreme Court said:

x x x Thus the respondent Court stated, it is undisputed that the Decision of the Court of Appeals x x x had become final
and executory. Taken in this light the respondent court apparently did not err in leaving the issue unresolved, a final
decision being unreviewable and conclusive.

But judging from the facts presented by this case, it is beyond doubt that serious injustice will be committed if strict
adherence to procedural rules were to be followed. It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend its operation. (emphasis supplied)

It would seem from the above pronouncements of the Honorable Supreme Court therefore, that it may suspend the
operation of the rules of procedure by virtue of its rule-making power. Certainly if the Honorable Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate the Rules of Court, then it has the power to suspend its operation in order to promote substantial
justice. Unquestionably, however, the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have that rule[-] making authority. Therefore it
may not suspend the operation of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the above discussion refers to civil cases. Will the same doctrines apply to criminal cases as in the cases
before us? The accused thru his counsels raised the issues of the effect of a promulgation already once made arguing in
the process that another promulgation can no longer be legally feasible if the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy will not be violated.

We are not unmindful of the injunction upon lower courts, which the Honorable Supreme Court has imposed, i.e., to
accept with modesty the orders and decisions of the appellate courts. However, we feel that we must equate this with
another injunction, that trial judges must keep abreast with the jurisprudence or run the risk of being found to be grossly
ignorant of the law. In short, this Court finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Since the very jurisprudential authority relied
upon by the Honorable [Court] of Appeals refers to the power of the Supreme Court to clarify an ambiguity, may not this
Court therefore conclude that the Honorable Court of Appeals does not have the power to clarify the dispositive portion of
the decision which has not only become final, but has already been previously promulgated?

Finally, it appears to this Court that there is validity to the observation made by counsel for the accused in paragraph 4 of
their motion which we quote:

4. It appears, therefore, that there is nothing to promulgate as the same had already been promulgated on April 4,
1995. Besides, there is, likewise, nothing to promulgate in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February 2, 1996 and
much less in the alluded August 17, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Indeed, the said Resolution did not authorize nor did it direct this Court to re-promulgate the Decision.

On June 28, 1996, the Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, filed [before the Court of Appeals a]
petition for certiorari and mandamus contending that the respondent Judge seriously erred and gravely abused his
discretion in refusing to execute the penalty of imprisonment in spite [the Court of Appeals] Decision of July 30, 1991 and
Resolution of August 17, 1995. He prays that the Order dated April 12, 1996 of respondent Judge be nullified and the
penalty of imprisonment rendered against the accused be enforced.[6]

Ruling of the Appellate Court

In ruling for the People, the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this way:

Obviously, respondent Judge was of the belief that the penalty of imprisonment was not affirmed by [the Court of Appeals]
although it increased the civil liability from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. He failed to recognize the fact that the only
modification made by [the Court of Appeals] on the decision [was] to increase the civil liability, which would not have been
imposed if the accused was not found guilty of the charge. Had he looked carefully into the text of the decision he would
have found that [the Court of Appeals] affirmed the decision of conviction, as borne out by the following portions of said
decision:

After a careful review of the evidence on record, this Court entertains no doubt as to the participation of the accused-
appellant in the shooting of Sapigao and Rulo Castro. The Court a quo has expressed the following findings in its
decision, to which findings this Court accords the great weight and respect such findings of the trial court are entitled to:

Conspiracy ... was proven by the following circumstances:

1. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen together occupying the same table with Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro drinking
beer at the terrace upon the arrival of Leo Petete and his companions;

2. They left the terrace of the Tropical Hut about 10 to 15 minutes after the arrival of Rulo Castro, Rafael Sapigao, Leo
Petete and Agardo Reyes and boarded the same yellow car owned and driven by accused Eduardo Cuison.

3. Accused Eduardo Cuison was seen by Ronald Ligayo, a resident of Poblacion, Bugallon, Pangasinan, a disinterested
witness in the evening of May 27, 1986 infront (sic) of the house of said accused Eduardo Cuison in Poblacion, Bugallon,
Pangasinan. Accused Eduardo Cuison alighted from his car, proceeded to his house and after coming out of his house
was seen holding a 45 (sic) caliber and a carbine pistol.Eduardo Cuison called for his brother Warling to whom he handed
the carbine pistol and received by the latter.

Eduardo Cuison sent Domy Cuison to call for Bot Cuison. When Bot Cuison arrived, he, Warling, Domy, Eduardo Cuison
and two others inside the car proceeded towards the north. Obviously, these two were Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde.

4. Upon arrival of accused Eduardo Cuison, Bot Cuison, Warling Cuison, Domy Cuison, Sgt. Bustarde and Sgt. Castro at
the driveway of the Tropical Hut on board the car of accused Eduardo Cuison, each of them with the use of their
respective firearms simultaneously fired several shots in the air;

5. Sgt. Castro and Sgt. Bustarde pulled and poked their guns to [sic] Sapigao. Then Sgt. Castro fired the fatal shot to [sic]
Sapigao;

6. After Sapigao fell down, Sgt. Castro, Warling Cuison, Eduardo Cuison, Bot and Domy Cuison turned at [sic] Sapigao
obviously to see to it and make sure Sapigao was already dead;

7. After ascertaining that Sapigao was shot dead, accused Eduardo Cuison called for Rulo Castro to come outside the
restaurant and when Rulo Castro emerged at the door, accused Eduardo Cuison, Warling Cuison, Bot Cuison, Domy
Cuison and Sgt. Bustarde simultaneously pointed their guns and shot at Rulo Castro hitting the latter;

8. Accused Eduardo Cuison and Warling Cuison are brothers and uncles of Bot and Domy Cuison. Eduardo Cuison being
a kagawad enjoyed moral influence upon his brother Warling and his two nephews Bot and Domy;

9. Sgts. Bustarde and Castro and Kagawad Cuison knew each other before the incident;

10.After shooting the victims to death, the accused Cuisons went away from the scene of the crime on board the same
car.

The following circumstances showing the sequence of events, the mode o[r] manner in which the offenses were
perpetrated taken together indicated that the assailants cooperated and helped each other in the attainment of the same
aim. (Memorandum, pp. 20-21)

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Colman, et al. 55 O.G. 2392 (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 88 ed., Vol. 2, p. 560),

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing
a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among
them for concerted means is proved (People vs. Colman, et. al., 55 O.G. 2393).

In the appealed decision, the trial court had ordered the accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao [in]
the amount of P30,000.00 and to [sic] the heirs of Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 (Decision, p. 24). In
accordance with the new policy of the Supreme Court on this matter, the above-specified amount of P30,000.00 should be
increased to P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 646).
It is absurd to conclude that [the Court of Appeals] increased the civil liability in accordance with new rulings of the
Supreme Court without finding that the accused [was] guilty of the offense of homicide. Thus, the promulgation of the civil
liability only and omission of the criminal liability is an error.

Furthermore, [the Court of Appeals] has clarified the ambiguity in the dispositive portion through its Resolution dated
August 17, 1995 which categorically stated that the court affirmed the decision of the respondent court with respect to the
penalty of imprisonment imposed upon the accused.

This clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision. It is conceded that
such cannot be done anymore. The Court of Appeals simply stated in categorical terms what it obviously meant in its
decision - - that the conviction of the accused is affirmed with the modification that the civil liability is increased. The
dispositive portion of the decision may not have used the exact words but a reading of the decision can lead to no other
conclusion.

It certainly would be ridiculous to allow the accused to go scot-free after paying the heirs the civil indemnity imposed by
the Court for his participation in the act of killing the two (2) victims in these cases, because of a wrong interpretation of a
decision.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issues

In this appeal, Petitioner Eduardo Cuison raises the following assignment of errors:

I. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed to
establish the requisites for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari .

II. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the Solicitor General failed
to show the existence of the elements for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus.

III. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the promulgation of April 4,
1995 cannot be modified, over objection of the accused.

IV. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in not holding that the filing of the Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus dated June 28, 1995 by the Solicitor General violates the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy.

V. The Respondent Court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in deciding as it did and in denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Simply put, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the writs of certiorari and mandamus were properly issued
by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

First Issue: Certiorari and Mandamus Justified

A petition for certiorari is allowed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provided the following requisites are present: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Grave abuse of discretion x x x implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Petitioner points out that the solicitor generals petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals failed to
show grave abuse of discretion in the assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution of the trial court. In the said Resolution, the trial
court declined to order the incarceration of petitioner and, thus, effectively refused to promulgate the August 17, 1995 CA
Decision which, in turn, clarified that the CAs earlier Decision dated July 30, 1991 merely increased the amount of
indemnity but did not delete the penalty of imprisonment. In justifying its said Order, the trial court insisted that it had
already promulgated the July 30, 1991 CA Decision when it ordered petitioner to pay the increased amount of
indemnity. Petitioner argues that the trial courts Order, far from being whimsical, capricious or malevolent, [was] valid and
substantial, to say the least, and the impugned [R]esolution was issued after a careful deliberation and weighing of the
facts, issues and points of applicable law.
We disagree. While its language may have been a little faulty, it is still quite obvious that the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts Decision convicting Petitioner Eduardo Cuison of double homicide. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision,
therefore, cannot be construed to mean that the appellate court merely imposed an indemnity and deleted the penalty of
imprisonment. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision in no way communicated that the appealed
Decision of the trial court was modified only in regard to the amount of indemnity. Nowhere could it be gleaned that the
penalty of imprisonment was deleted. In fact, the CA Decision and the entire records of this case contain no legal or
factual basis for acquitting petitioner or dismissing the criminal cases against him.

In granting petitioners motion, the trial court judge capriciously and arbitrarily decided not to promulgate the Court of
Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision.He had no discretion to refuse; his refusal was thus a glaring transgression of his
jurisdiction.

We must also emphasize that we dismissed the petition questioning the Court of Appeals July 30, 1991 Decision, thereby
affirming the conviction of petitioner. The trial courts assailed April 12, 1996 Resolution was therefore tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court of the land affirming the judgment of conviction of respondent
Court and unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.

Manifestly erroneous then is the trial judges justification that he has previously promulgated the Court of Appeals Decision
on April 4, 1995. As already stated, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was imprisonment plus a higher amount
of civil indemnity. In ordering only the payment of the indemnity, the trial court failed to execute the CA Decision in its
entirety. Notwithstanding the subsequent CA Decision clarifying -- and this Courts dismissal of the petition questioning --
the said earlier CA Decision, the trial court still adamantly refused to do so. The persistent refusal of the trial court is a
clear display of grave abuse of discretion.

We find misleading the claim of petitioner that the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that the latters July 30, 1991
Decision was ambiguous and obscure. Such claim is bereft of factual basis. Nowhere in its Resolution did the CA so
describe its previous Decision. It merely restated the import of its July 30, 1991 Decision. Evidently, this was either
misunderstood or distorted by the trial court, which stated that it is ineluctable that the penalty imposed by the lower court
was not touched on at all by [the Court of Appeals] x x x.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for issuing a writ of mandamus, in view of the trial courts refusal to
perform its ministerial duty of promulgating the appellate courts Decision in its entirety. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus is warranted [w]hen any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x
x. Obedience to a superior courts order is a ministerial duty of lower courts.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals was improper, because the
People had not filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order.This contention is bereft of merit. A
motion for reconsideration need not precede a petition for certiorari where the questioned resolution was a patent nullity,
as in this case.

Second Issue: Promulgation of Conviction

Not Barred by Double Jeopardy

Petitioner submits that the trial courts promulgation of the CA Decision on April 4, 1995 cannot be set aside and a second
promulgation be ordered because to do so would contravene the prohibition against double jeopardy. He contends that
the judgment as promulgated on April 4, 1995 has become final and that courts have thus lost jurisdiction over the case.

To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven:

x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof
(citations omitted).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (citation omitted).[25]

Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1995 of the Respondent Courts decision of June
30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x x.[26] In
other words, petitioner claims that the first jeopardy attached at that point.

The Court is not persuaded. As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity.[27] Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an
accused.Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not
merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse
of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void.[28] Since the criminal cases have not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.[29]

We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It
merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed
on petitioner.

109. Almario vs. CA 355 SCRA 1

This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 1996[1] and of
January 7, 1997,[2] in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, which denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon. Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and the People of
the Philippines.[3] Involved in said petition were the orders of Judge Jaime D. Discaya and Judge Tuason dated October
25, 1995[4] and April 11, 1996,[5] respectively, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62 which petitioner claimed were
violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy but which respondent appellate court upheld.

The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public document, and
Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended party in both cases.

The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held,
which was terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994,
and in January and February 1995, but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was
elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto.

The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel. The
hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel,
postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing
set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s
counsel, respondent court issued the following order:

When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for
accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering
that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby dismissed. With respect to accused Spouses
Susencio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao, 1st warrant be issued for their arrest.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order dated
October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:

In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme Court held that the right of the accused
to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried. At least this right is relative,
taking into (the) account the circumstances of each case.

There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements of the trial, or a long time is
allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case, violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was
ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the
proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused
did not interpose objection to private prosecutor’s motion to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the
trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused were not present. There were
only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence and the same were
postponed with valid reasons.

The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the right of the
accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there
is no double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1995 dismissing the charge/case against the
accused Roberto Almario is reconsidered and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 9,
1995, respondent Judge issued his assailed Order of April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 November 1995 is hereby denied for lack of
merit considering that, based on the foregoing facts, the proceedings in this case have not been prolonged unreasonably
nor were there oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in violation of the Accused’s constitutional right to
speedy trial.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
RCBC and the People of the Philippines. In a resolution dated November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied
the petition due course and dismissed it for lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion to reconsider it was likewise denied for lack
of merit in a resolution dated January 7, 1997.

Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in turn, had gravely abused
its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the order which dismissed the criminal cases against
him. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were
initially dismissed for an alleged violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.[7]

The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioner’s cases, double jeopardy had set in so that petitioner’s constitutional right
against such jeopardy had been violated.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

xxx

Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a
valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[8]

In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made upon motion by
counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his
express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9] Double jeopardy may attach when
the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial.[10]

Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the right to
speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled that in the application of the constitutional
guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.[11] Both the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioner’s case was
terminated on October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and February of
1995. The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was promoted to the Court of
Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not immediately appointed, nor another judge detailed to his sala.

Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the accused and their counsel.
The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the private prosecutor without objection from petitioner’s
counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset, despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack
of proof of service of notice to co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.[12]
As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties
and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were clearly justified on the ground of lack of notice to accused,
co-accused, and/or counsel. Another was made without objection from petitioner’s counsel. However, on September 8,
1995, counsel for petitioner moved for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private prosecutor due to a
severe attack of gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the court.[13] All in all, there
were only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive events, the trial court
realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the trial court set aside its initial order
and reinstated the cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate court later sustained.

That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the hearings with the
reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the appellate court’s findings that petitioner’s
right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there
was no unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioner’s right to
speedy trial as there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of
time.[15]

There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur with the
conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s right to speedy trial had not been infringed. Where the right
of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered
seasonably.[16] For as petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double
jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused – was not met. The trial court’s initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner’s
counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said
order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202)
reiterated in People vs. Leviste,[17] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to
speedy trial –

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute
is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not
applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed reinstatement of the cases against
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated November 21, 1996 and January
7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62,
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

110. Manantan vs Court of Appeals 350 SCRA 387

FACTS: When Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home with his friends(Ambrocio, Tabangin, Nicolas), there was
a jeepney suddenly came from the opposite direction hit the driver side of the car. Consequently, Nicolas,Manantan’s
friend, died. Trial followed.

The Lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The respondents filed
their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal
liability, the appellate court held him civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of Nicolas

ISSUE: Whether or not Manantan was placed on double jeopardy

HELD: Manantan claimed that he was placed on double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this contention. The
following elements must be present for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) The first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his discharge. When the case was elevated to
the Court of Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.

111. People vs. Feliciano

From being the subject of moral condemnation, the "Kiss of Judas" appears to attain a different dimension in criminal
procedure. Indeed, by entering into a "unholy" contract with an accused, so that the latter might betray his partner in crime
in exchange for an acquittal, the State demonstrates how far its efforts could go to vindicate crime. That the State should
agree to become a party to setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should reward conduct from which an
honorable man would ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived necessity of such kind of an
arrangement in criminal procedure.1 It is this doggedness of purpose on the part of the State which herein accused-
appellant, in one of his assignment of errors, decries —

"The trial court [has] erred in discharging accused Rodel de la Cruz to be the state witness against co-accused Carlos
Feliciano despite strong objections from the defense."2

The accused-appellant, Carlos Feliciano, was a security guard detailed by the Atlantic Security Agency at the Kingsmen
building, also popularly known in the small community as the hub of four disco pubs located on four floors of the edifice, in
Kalibo, Aklan. He was assigned to the "Superstar" disco pub and his duties ranged from refusing entry to dubious
characters to making certain that no customer would leave without first paying his bill. Rodel de la Cruz, a security guard
from another agency, the Rheaza Security Agency, was stationed at the parking lot of the same building. In keeping with
the nocturnal business hours of the establishments at Kingsmen, the two security guards would report for duty at 7:00 in
the evening until the wee hours of the next morning or when the last customer would have by then left the premises. In the
early morning of 05 June 1995, Feliciano and de la Cruz centrally figured in the investigation over the grisly death of an
unidentified woman whose body was found sprawled in Barangay New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan.

Finding a dead body at 5:30 in the morning in nearby Barangay Buswang was big news to the small community of Kalibo
The radio news about an unidentified lifeless female lying in the Sampaton Funeral Parlor caught the curiosity of Rosalie
Ricarto. The dead woman, so described as wearing a red jacket emblazoned with the words "El-Hassan, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia" and maong pants, fit the description of Teresita Fuentes. Rosalie, a rice retailer, shared a stall with
Teresita, a vendor of spices, condiments and fruits, at the Yambing Building. Rosalie last saw Teresita on the afternoon of
04 June 1995. Teresita, who regularly went to twice a week to buy goods to sell, was scheduled to leave the following
morning of 05 June 1995. According to Rosalie, Teresita, who normally would take the 2:00 a.m. trip to Iloilo, should
already be back at Kalibo by about 4:00 p.m. of the same day. But Teresita did not return that afternoon. Rosalie said that
Teresita wore pieces of jewelry — a necklace, a pair of earrings, a bracelet, four rings and a Seiko wristwatch — all of
which, except for the timepiece, were eventually recovered. Anna Liza Pronton Fuentes, the daughter of Teresita, was
able to identify the bag recovered by Myca Banson from the crime scene, as well as all its t contents, to be those
belonging to her mother. Likewise, recovered at the crime scene were twelve P100.00 bills, seven P5.00 bills and the
broken windshield of the tricycle owned by Ruben Barte. Turned over to the police by the manager of the Superstar Disco
Club was the sum of P1,000.00.

The autopsy report showed that whoever bludgeoned the hapless Teresita Fuentes to death had used a blunt instrument,
inflicting twelve different wounds on her head and face. The cause of death was noted to be severe hemorrhage
secondary to lacerated wounds and skull fracture.

On 02 August 1995, an Information was filed against Rodel de la Cruz and Carlos Feliciano —

'That on or about the 5th day of June 1995, in the early morning, in Barangay New Buswang, Municipality of Kalibo,
Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, while armed with a handgun, by
means of force and violence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away cash money in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), Philippine currency, more or less, belonging to TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner in the aforesaid amount; that by reason or in the occasion of said robbery, and for the purpose of
enabling the accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid amount, the above-named accused with intent to kill and
conspiring with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation and
under the cover of darkness, treacherously attack, assault and wound TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO, thereby inflicting
upon her mortal wounds, to wit:

1. Lacerated wound about 1¼ inches in length left chin.

2. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left lower lip.
3. Fracture of the left mandible.
4. Fracture of the left upper lateral incisor and the left upper canine.
5. Lacerated wound about 1¼ inches in length and about 1½ in depth left face.
6. Punctured wound ½ in diameter and about 1½ inches in depth mid-portion base nose bridge left.
7. Lacerated wound about 2 inches in length and about 1½ inches in depth left cheek.
8. Lacerated wound about 1 inch in length left ear medially.
9. Lacerated wound about ½ inch in length left face near the left ear.
10. Lacerated wound about 1½ in length below the left eyebrow.
11. Punctured wound about 1 inch in diameter and about 5 inches in depth left parietal.
12. Skull fracture occiput right.

"as per autopsy report of Dr. Agrelita D. Fernandez, of the Rural Health Unit, Kalibo, Aklan, hereto attached and forming
an integral part hereof which wounds directly caused the death of said TERESITA FUENTES Y OSORIO.

"That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim suffered actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS."3
The prosecution sought the discharge of accused Rodel de la Cruz so that the latter could testify against his co-accused
Carlos Feliciano. Pending resolution by the trial court on the motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were
arraigned on 08 February 1996. The two accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a quo granted
the motion of the prosecution and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith stricken
off from the Information.4

A detailed account of the incident presented at the trial by the prosecution was narrated by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

"In the early morning of June 5, 1995, before 2 o'clock, appellant went to the guard post of Dela Cruz to tell the latter to
assist him in going after a customer who did not pay the bill. It was not the first time that they had to run after a non-paying
customer. Dela Cruz thus accompanied appellant who rented for the purpose a tricycle from its driver, Ruben Barte, who
stayed behind. Appellant initially drove but about twenty meters past Kingsmen Building, he asked Dela Cruz to take over
while he stayed inside the passenger sidecar of the tricycle. Somewhere between the Ceres and Libacao terminals,
appellant alighted from the tricycle after instructing Dela Cruz to stop and wait for him. Appellant subsequently informed
Dela Cruz that they shall wait there for the customer they were after. About a half hour later, however, appellant decided
to leave the place, apparently because the person he was looking for was nowhere in sight. As they passed Banga, New
Washington crossing, they saw a woman walking alone. Appellant waved at her, giving Dela Cruz the impression that they
knew each other. Dela Cruz stopped the vehicle, as he was told by appellant, who then jumped out. Drawing his service
gun, appellant suddenly held the woman by the neck and at the same time poked his gun at her face. He dragged her
towards the tricycle and ordered her to board it. The woman would later be identified as Teresita Fuentes. Dela Cruz was
shocked with what appellant did and was at a loss on what to do. Still stricken with panic, Dela Cruz asked appellant what
was going on and said he was leaving as he did not want to be part of whatever plans appellant had. Appellant retorted
that Dela Cruz was already involved. Dela Cruz was about to alight from the tricycle when appellant poked his gun at him
and ordered him to drive. Thinking that appellant was in a position to easily shoot him, Dela Cruz did as he was ordered.

"Appellant then instructed Dela Cruz to drive back to the public market. When they reached the junction of Toting Reyes
and Roxas Avenues, appellant told Dela Cruz to turn right at Rizal Memorial College of Arts and Trade (RMCAT) They
noticed at this point that another tricycle, which came from the direction of Kingsmen Building, was following them. This
prompted appellant to order Dela Cruz to turn left at Magdalena Village instead and to drive faster. During the ride,
appellant held Fuentes, who was crouching, by her hair, pressing her head down. He also kicked her and struck her head
with the butt of his gun whenever she struggled. Dela Cruz asked appellant to stop hurting Fuentes and to have pity but
his entreaties fell on deaf ears. Appellant even threatened to shoot Dela Cruz if he does not stop complaining.

'When they reached New Buswang, they noticed that the other tricycle they saw earlier was still trailing them by about 15
meters. As they approached Magdalena Village after passing Camp Martelino, Fuentes struggled so appellant hit her
again. Dela Cruz told appellant to desist from striking her. Appellant did not take kindly to the unsolicited advice and fired
his gun in the air. Seeing an opportunity for escape, Dela Cruz suddenly swerved the tricycle towards Magdalena Village
until the vehicle toppled over. When the tricycle was lifted from its fallen state, Dela Cruz immediately jumped out of it and
ran towards a feeder road leading to the Cooperative Rural Bank. He was resting at the back of the bank for a few
minutes when appellant also arrived. Enraged, Dela Cruz this time drew his service firearm and aimed it at appellant,
demanding from the latter an explanation why he had to involve him (Dela Cruz). With an assurance that he would own up
the responsibility for everything that had happened, appellant was able to calm Dela Cruz down. After returning his
service gun to the holster, Dela Cruz headed back to the road. Behind him following was appellant. Then, they saw Barte,
from whom appellant rented the tricycle earlier, trying to start the engine thereof. It turned out that it was Barte who was in
the other tricycle, driven by Ramon Yael. Appellant assured Barte that he will pay for all the damages of the rented
tricycle.

"Meanwhile, Dela Cruz went back to Kingsmen Building aboard Yael's tricycle to look for his dancer girlfriend, Myka (or
Mika) Banzon (or Vanson), but she was not there. Dela Cruz, with Yael in his tricycle, were about to go to Banzon's
boarding house when appellant approached them, insisting that Yael take him first to Magdalena Village. Afraid of
appellant, Yael agreed. When they got there, particularly where Barte's tricycle turned over earlier, appellant walked
towards a mango tree. Curious, Dela Cruz followed him. Dela Cruz saw appellant hitting Fuentes on the head with his
gun. She was lying down face up, groaning. Dela Cruz admonished and pushed appellant away, telling him to have pity
on Fuentes. Since he did not want to get involved further nor did he want to. see any more of what appellant was up to,
Dela Cruz walked back to the tricycle He took a last look back and saw appellant getting something from the pocket of
Fuentes and putting it inside the pocket of his chaleco. Soon enough, appellant caught up with Dela Cruz and Yael as
they were about to leave and they all went back to Kingsmen Building.

"Dela Cruz finally found Banzon at the third floor of the building and informed her that he was going to bring her home
already. She passed by the ladies' room while he stood watch outside. Appellant arrived and told Dela Cruz and Banzon
that they had to talk inside the ladies' room. He was giving Dela Cruz and Banzon P600.00 each, but they declined to
accept the money. Appellant threatened Dela Cruz not to squeal whatever he knows or appellant will kill him and his
family. When appellant insisted in giving the money, Dela Cruz took it only to place it on the sink, then, he and Banzon
left.
"Dela Cruz and Banzon were leaving for her boarding house aboard Yael's tricycle when appellant caught up with them
again and ordered Yael to first take him to Ceres terminal. As they passed the Tumbokan Memorial Hospital, they came
across Barte driving his tricycle. After signaling for Barte to stop, appellant gave him money. Dela Cruz and Banzon
quickly transferred to Barte's tricycle since Yael still had to take appellant to the terminal. In the course of the transfer to
the other tricycle, appellant placed something inside the pocket of Dela Cruz who thought nothing of it as he was in a
hurry to go home. In Banzon's boarding house, Dela Cruz found out that what appellant had put in his pocket was a
blood-stained necklace wrapped in a piece of paper. Banzon also showed him a bag she found at the place where Barte's
tricycle turned turtle. Dela Cruz planned to return the necklace and the bag the next day.

"In the evening of June 5, 1995, Dela Cruz reported for work. Appellant asked him for the necklace so that he could pawn
it. Dela Cruz, however, was unable to give the necklace back because in the morning of June 6, 1995, the police raided
the boarding house of Banzon. Among those confiscated by the police was his wallet where he placed the necklace. The
police invited Dela Cruz to the police station to shed light on what he knew about a murder committed in Magdalena
Village. The police had earlier confirmed an anonymous call that a dead woman was found at New Buswang. Twelve 100-
peso bills were found at the scene, as well as a broken windshield that was traced to the tricycle rented by Barte to
appellant. The dead person was identified as Fuentes by her daughter, Analiza Fuentes Pronton. Thus, Dela Cruz
revealed everything that appellant had done. The police asked Dela Cruz to go with them to Lalab, Bataan where
appellant was arrested. Appellant was then brought to the Kalibo Police Station for investigation."5

Carlos Feliciano, in his testimony, denied the asseverations of state witness de la Cruz. He claimed that the accusations
were motivated out of pure spite and revenge borne of the hostility between them due to work-related differences. An
altercation arose between him and de la Cruz two months before the incident, on 06 April 1995, when a customer had
complained to the Kingsmen Building manager that the toolbox of his tricycle, parked near the building, was missing. The
manager then ordered Feliciano to go to the parking lot and summon de la Cruz. Feliciano r reported back to say that he
did not find de la Cruz in his designated post, a fact that de la Cruz later resented. The next incident happened the
following month. On the evening of 01 May 1995, Myca Banson, the live-in girlfriend of de la Cruz, was to be "taken out"
by a customer. Feliciano upon orders of the management, refused de la Cruz entry within the premises of the pub house,
in order to avoid any possible trouble, which culminated in a physical tussle between the two men and ended with de la
Cruz aiming his gun at Feliciano. The third incident occurred when a motorcycle parked at the Kingsmen parking lot could
not be located and de la Cruz again was not at his post. Feliciano reported the matter to the manager and, two days later,
de la Cruz was fired from work. Feliciano admitted having seen de la Cruz at about 9:30 on the evening of 04 June 1995
escorting Myca Banson to the pubhouse. De la Cruz stayed at the billiard house fronting Kingsmen, while waiting for Myca
to finish work, often at 4:00 in the early morning of the next day. Feliciano said that he knew Ramon Barte, the driver,
being a habitue of the Kingsmen premises. It was Barte who would often fetch Rodel de la Cruz and Myca Banson from
work during early mornings.

The defense placed at the stand two additional witnesses. Eduardo Magsangya, a cigarette vendor at the Ceres terminal,
testified that on the late evening of 04 June 1995, de la Cruz went to see him at the Ceres Terminal to inquire whether
Teresita Fuentes had already arrived. Magsangya responded in the negative. De la Cruz returned to the terminal looking
for Teresita four times that night. Magsangya knew Teresita as being a biweekly passenger of the 2:00 a.m. bus for Iloilo
and de la Cruz as a security guard at Kingsmen where he would at times sell his wares. Jefferson Arafol, a pahinante of
Ideal Trucking, testified that at approximately 2:30 on the early morning of 05 June 1995, he and truck driver "Oca"," were
transporting coconut lumber to Iloilo, when, at the vicinity of Magdalena Village, they spotted a tricycle running at high
speed, eventually overtaking them. Its fast pace caused the vehicle to turn turtle. When Arafol approached, the tricycle
diver, Rodel de la Cruz, pointed a gun at him and told him not to come any closer. Arafol was acquainted with Rodel de la
Cruz and Carlos Feliciano because he frequented Kingsmen on Sundays after getting his salary. The pahinante saw two
more persons with de la Cruz, one male and the other female Arafol was certain that the male companion of de la Cruz
was not Carlos Feliciano. While de la Cruz was pointing his gun at him, his male companion was dragging an unidentified
woman towards the nearby mango tree.

When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, found for the prosecution and pronounced accused
Carlos, Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and r sentenced him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death —

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused CARLOS FELICIANO Y MARCELINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by
direct participation of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 x x x,
with three aggravating circumstances, the court hereby imposes upon the said accused the supreme penalty of DEATH
and to indemnify the heirs of Teresita Fuentes the sum of P50,000.00.

"The caliber .38 revolver Squires Bingham with SN #14223 (Exhibit J) used by Feliciano is hereby forfeited and
confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with law.

"Costs against the accused."6

In an automatic review before this tribunal, appellant Carlos Feliciano raised the following assignment of errors —
"I. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE ACCUSED RODEL DE LA CRUZ TO BE THE STATE
WITNESS AGAINST CO-ACCUSED CARLOS FELICIANO DESPITE STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM THE DEFENSE.

"II. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE WELL-REHEARSED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.

"III 'THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CARLOS FELICIANO FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM."7

The Court is inclined to agree with appellant that state witness Rodel de la Cruz appears to be far from being the
inculpable young man who has simply been an unwitting and reluctant accomplice to a gruesome crime. Several incidents
militate against his innocence. The events, related by him, make tenuous the purported threat and intimidation exerted by
appellant over him.

The behavior of Rodel de la Cruz during and immediately after the crime could not be that of a threatened, frightened
man. If he indeed wanted to escape, he had in his possession his own service gun, and he was in control of the tricycle.
He had enough advantage and chances to escape, if he really wanted to, from Feliciano who was at that time engrossed
at restraining a struggling victim. In fact, it was de la Cruz who was caught in the possession of the dead woman's
necklace. Another damning evidence against de la Cruz was the letter introduced by police inspector Winnie Jereza, Chief
of Intelligence of the Philippine National Police of Kalibo, Aklan, who, after taking the witness stand for the prosecution,
testified for the defense. The letter, dated 02 June 1995, came from one Roger R. Zaradulla, proprietor of the Rheaza
Security Agency, addressed to SPO3 Gregorio F. Ingenerio of the Kalibo Police Station, to the effect that the detail order
of Rodel de la Cruz to the Kingsmen Disco pub had expired as of 31 May 1995. According to Zaradulla, de la Cruz was
nowhere to be found and his whereabouts were unknown. Apprehensive that de la Cruz had gone on AWOL without first
surrendering to the agency the firearm issued to him, Zaradulla sought the arrest of de la Cruz by the police.

The evident attempt, nevertheless, of the accused turned state witness to mitigate his own culpability did not adversely
affect his discharge nor did it render completely weightless the evidentiary value of his testimony.

The rules of procedure allowing the discharge of an accused to instead be a witness for the state8 is not a home grown
innovation but is one with a long and interesting history. It has its origins in the common law of ancient England where
faithful performance of such an agreement with the Crown could entitle a criminal offender to an equitable right to a
recommendation for executive clemency. The practice, soon recognized through widespread statutory enactments in offer
jurisdictions, finally has found its way to our own criminal procedure in a short and compact military General Order No. 58
issued in 1900. Its adoption highlights the emphasis placed by the new system on the presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused, on the requirement that the State must first establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt before an
accused can be called upon to defend himself, and on the proscription against compelling an accused to be a witness
against himself as well as against drawing inferences of guilt from his silence.9 Underlying the rule is the deep-lying intent
of the State not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished by allowing an accused who appears not to be the
most guilty to testify, in exchange for an outright acquittal, against a more guilty co accused. It is aimed at achieving the
greater purpose of securing the conviction of the most guilty and the greatest number among the accused for an offense
committed.10

In this jurisdiction, it is the trial court judge who has the exclusive responsibility of ensuring that the conditions prescribed
by the rules exist.11 This grant is not one of arbitrary discretion but rather a sound judicial prerogative to be exercised with
due regard to the proper and correct dispensation of criminal justice.12 But that there would be the possibility of error on
the part of the judge is understandable. A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the outset of the trial as to everything which may develop in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint.13 If that were possible, the judge
would conveniently rely on large part upon the suggestion and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in
coming to the conclusion as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, as to the
"availability of other direct or corroborative evidence," and as to who among the accused is the "most guilty," and so the
like.14 Then, there would be little need for the formality of a trial.15 Thus, here, even while one might be convinced that
state witness Rodel de la Cruz would, on the basis of evidence ultimately submitted, appear to be equally as, and not less
than, guilty in conspiracy with appellant Carlos Feliciano, the hands of the State are now stayed and the Court must
assure the exemption of the witness from punishment.

It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The
impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have
the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution.16 A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy
has already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the state
reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in doubt jeopardy. The rule, of
course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and
refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted
for the same offense.
In US vs. de Guzman,17 one of the earlier cases discussing this issue, Justice Carson had occasion to briefly touch on
the immunity clauses in the Acts of the United States Congress and some States. In Wisconsin, the immunity clause
contained a proviso providing that persons committing perjury when called upon to testify could be punished
therefor.18 Oklahoma law suffered from the absence of any reservation; thus observed Justice Carson —

"x x x We have no such reservation in our constitutional provision; and, as before said, if we should follow the precedents,
when the witness does not speak the truth, the State would be left without redress, although the witness had violated the
purpose and spirit of the constitution. We cannot believe that it was the purpose of the intelligent and justice-loving people
of Oklahoma, when they voted for the adoption of the constitution, to grant immunity to any man, based upon a lie, or, in
other words, that they intended that the commission of perjury should atone for an offense already committed. It is a
familiar rule of common law, common sense, and common justice that a legal right cannot be based upon fraud. We
therefore hold that the witness who claims immunity on account of self-incriminatory testimony which he had been
compelled to give must act in good faith with the State, and must make truthful replies to the questions which are
propounded to him, and which he had been compelled to answer, and that any material concealment or suppression of
the truth on his part will deprive him of the immunity provided by the constitution; and the witness must testify to
something which, if true, would tend to criminate him. This immunity is only granted to those who earn it by testifying in
good faith. In our judgment any other construction would be an insult to and a libel upon the intelligence of the people of
Oklahoma, an outrage on law, and a prostitution of justice."19

Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did
not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime, enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his
co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court. On significant points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz
against appellant was corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael. On the night of the incident, Feliciano hired his
vehicle and drove it himself while De la Cruz was seated on its passenger seat. When the two did not return at the
appointed time, Barte asked Ramon Yael, another tricycle driver who happened to be at the Kingsmen parking area, to
accompany him to look for them. Myca Banson decided to come with them. After a while, the trio spotted Barte's tricycle
being driven by de la Cruz, and followed it. Barte testified how the first tricycle turned turtle at the junction towards
Magdalena Village. When the tricycle tilted, he saw a person in red falling from the vehicle, while another person who was
in white, lifted the first person. When the first tricycle precariously lurched, its occupants hurriedly abandoned the vehicle.
The obfuscating foliage, however, blocked his view so Barte was not able to identify who was with appellant and de la
Cruz nor ascertain where the two men were later headed. When the three of them approached the overturned tricycle
they found no one. Near the vehicle, they saw an abandoned bag which Myca Banson hastily retrieved. While Barte
struggled to turn his vehicle upright, Myca left with Ramon Yael. Later, while riding his vehicle on his way back, Ruben
Barte was forced to stop because its engine stalled. While inspecting the tricycle engine, appellant and de la Cruz
approached him, and the former told him not to worry as he would pay for the damages. After a while, at the parking lot of
the Kingsmen Building, appellant told him to take his vehicle to a dark place where he wiped off the blood from the
tricycle's seats. When they met again several hours later, appellant gave him P450.00 for the damages sustained by the
vehicle. Much later, Yael handed him another P250.00 given by appellant as additional payment. Ruben Barte kept quiet
about the incident because appellant warned him against reporting the matter to anyone. Ramon Yael corroborated the
testimony of Barte, adding that while they were chasing appellant and de la Cruz, one of the two fired a gun in the air,
constraining them to decrease their speed. Militating against the unbiased nature of the testimony of these two witnesses
was their admission of having willingly accepted the blood money which appellant gave them that could well qualify them
as being themselves accessories to the crime.20

Appellant Carlos Feliciano was not able to sufficiently dispute his participation therein. Neither his blanket denial nor
his alibi, both inherently weak defenses, was amply proved.

Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides —

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death [shall be imposed], when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson." (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the evidence in this case, heretofore narrated, the Court is not convinced that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing beyond reasonable doubt any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information that can warrant
the imposition of the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law. Evidence is wanting that appellant has especially sought
nighttime to perpetrate the crime or that the criminal act has been preceded, required in evident premeditation, by cool
thought and reflection. Not only is treachery an aggravating circumstance merely applicable to crimes against persons but
neither also has the mode of attack on the victim of the robbery been shown to have been consciously adopted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED except insofar as it imposed on appellant Carlos Feliciano
the penalty of death which is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. Costs de oficio.

112. Merciales vs. CA 379 SCRA 345

Merciales v. Court of Appeals,59 the prosecution deliberately refused to present the sole eyewitness who had availed of
the Witness Protection Program, but who was not discharged by the court as one of the accused. This resulted to the
acquittal of all the accused. The Court ruled that the acquittal was without regard to due process of law and was,
therefore, null and void. Thus, the private complainant could bring an action questioning the judgment of acquittal without
placing the accused in double jeopardy. Criminal cases for rape with homicide in connection of the death of Maritess
Merciales were filed against private respondents/accused. During the trial, the public prosecuter filed a motion for the
discharge of accused Nuada so that he could be a state witness but the prosecution contended that it was not required to
present evidence to warrant the discharge of Nuada because he was already under the Witness Protection Program of
the DOJ. But this was motion was denied for failure of prosecutor to present evidence provided in Sec 9, Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure . Prosecution then filed petition for certiorari [GR. No. 113273-78, another case] before
the SC question such denial. The private respondents then filed a motion to set the case for hearing based on their
constitutional right to speedy trial which was granted and the hearing was set on July 29, 1994

On that date, the prosecution filed an MR, instead of presenting of further evidence. The hearing was postponed and set
for another hearing (Aug 9). On that said date, prosecutor again filed for MR and invoked its pending petition for certiorari
with the SC but the respondents objected to reset the hearing again. The judge called for recess to allow the prosecution
to present the NBI agent would be presented to prove the extrajudicial confession of the accused Nuada. But after the
recess, the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI agent and manifested that it would not anymore present further
evidence. The defense then moved that the cases be deemed submitted for decision and asked leave of court to file a
DEMURRER to evidence. The SG filed in the case before the SC a motion for issuance of a TRO to enjoin the judge but
was denied by the SC

RTC: dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on demurrer to evidence filed by private respondents/accused;
hence, the accused were ACQUITTED and the criminal cases against them were DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
evidence to prove the guild of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Petitioner argued: reopening of the criminal case will not violate the accused’s right to double jeopardy. There was judicial
misconduct due to the prosecutions’ premature resting and trial court’s grant of the demurrer to evidence even if the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has not been completed (violation of due process)

Respondent’s argument: No extrinsic fraud, abuse of discretion and jurisdiction defect to warrant the annulment or
Reopening of the case will violate the accused’s right against double jeopardy

ISSUE: Could there be an acquittal by demurrer in this case? NO. There was grave abuse of discretion by the trial court.

HELD: PETITION GRANTED, case remanded, RTC judge order to complete presentation of all available witness for the
prosecution. Nonfeasance on the party of the public prosecutor: The trial court required the public prosecutor to present
evidence to justify Nuada’s discharge as state witness but it insisted there was no need to do so because Nuada was
already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. Due to this refusal to present the required evidence it
prompted the trial court to deny the motion to discharge Nuada. Again, the trial court the directed public prosecutor to
present Atty. Caabay, the NBI agent who took Nuada’s extrajudicial confession but the prosecutor declared that he was
resting the prosecutions case, knowing fully well that the evidence he previously presented was not sufficient to convict
the accused. And due to that, a demurrer to evidence was filed by the accused and was granted by the trial court It was
then clear that the public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. It was his duty to take all steps to protect the
rights of the people in trial. He should have exhausted all available proof to establish the guilt of the accused.

Grave abuse of discretion on the part of trial court: Due to the nature of the testimonies of the 7 prosecution witness and
and nature of the circumstances, the trial court (motu proprio) should have called additional witnesses to question such
them to satisfy his mind to the issues of the case. The petitioner was deprived of her day in court. It is not only the State
but also the offended party that is entitled to due process in criminal cases. With regard the acquittal of the accused by
the trial was done without regard to due process of law, it is null and void as if there was no acquittal at all. It cannot be
double jeopardy. HENCE, it was very apparent that the public prosecutor violated the due process rights of the private
complainant owing to its blatant disregard of procedural rules and the failure to present available crucial evidence, which
would tend to prove the guilt or innocence of the accused therein. Moreover, we likewise found that the trial court was
gravely remiss in its duty to ferret out the truth and, instead, just “passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the
case.”

Doctrine in this case: When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
dismissing the criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the judgment of the TC is considered VOID.

NOTES: “The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on
the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.”

As to effect, “the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place
the accused in double jeopardy.

The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.”

When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
The accused cannot be in double jeopardy because the lower court acted without jurisdiction (the trial judge in this case
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or
lack of jurisdiction

“The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because not only the
rights of the accused – but those of the offended party and the public interest as well – are involved.”

“Demurrer to the evidence is “an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:

(a) the commission of the crime, and

(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.”

Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough
to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

113 Potot vs People 383 SCRA 449

FACTS: Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the
trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner filed a manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the
Decision. However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside
and that the case be heard again because “there were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused
miscarriage of justice.” The trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its Decision and ordered that the
records of the case be remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor “for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file
the corresponding charge”. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
issue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the said order “would place the accused in double jeopardy.”
This was denied for the reason that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting officers, hence,
jeopardy does not attach.”

Issue: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double jeopardy will be violated upon
re-trial of the same case.

HELD: Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes
final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the
accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. Only the accused may ask for a
modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or
before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is
seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)when
he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when
the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial
court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke it. In this case, petitioner filed
a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to
become final and unalterable.

Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside its Decision which had attained finalit y.
A judgment which has acquired the status of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the
judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. The assailed orders would
violate the constitutional right of the petitioner against double jeopardy.

Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. To invoke the
defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has
jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

114. People vs. Astudillo

Effects of Aggravating or Mitigating Circumstances on Felonies by Indivisible Penalties

FACTS: Brothers Clarence, Crisanto and Hilario Astudillo, went to house of Alberto Damian who was celebrating the eve
of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and thereafter asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, who was one of the visitors, to
go with him. Silvestre acceded and the two walked towards Floras' Store, where they were later joined by Crisanto and
Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument.

Prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were selling balut in
front of Floras' Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the wrists.
Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell to the ground.
Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle. Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued,
Abra, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

RULING: The trial court correctly rejected the appellants' self-defense theory. It is evident that appellants' collective and
individual act of holding the victim's wrists and delivering several stab blows demonstrated the existence of their common
design to kill the victim. Direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it
is not necessary. Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be inferred from the acts of the three appellants which clearly
manifest a concurrence of wills and a common intent or design to commit a crime. As regards the generic aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the trial court erred in appreciating the same inasmuch as the prosecution failed to
show that the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime
could not have been committed without it. The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use thereof was merely
incidental. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was correctly appreciated in favor of appellants. To benefit
an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary
must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture., In the case at bar, appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of the incident
when they learned that the authorities were looking for them. What matters is that they spontaneously, voluntarily and
unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law indicates a moral
disposition favorable to their reform.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance with Article 63 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, should
be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.

RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

115. Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification
of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government
auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the
said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of
fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of
several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and
was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together
with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg
195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which
includes the crime ofestafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the
constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension
from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a
result of ajudicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision
against ex post facto law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a
position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
any incumbentpublic officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word“office” applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

116. People vs. Ferrer December 27, 1972

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.)Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a
political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliationwith full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for
acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing
under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly
and association.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It
punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt.
In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies
persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex
post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a member’sdirect participation. Why is membership punished. Membership
renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The
members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the
basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies
the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/
evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly
done by overt acts

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

117. Alejandro Katigbak vs. Epifanio Villegas

These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since the central issue
involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any
Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
Therefor. 2As posed by the referral resolution, 3 the question is whether or not said statute.

The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes Katigbak. In their
complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of
property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2) said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes
forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed
against Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak when he was out of
the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor
(Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.

The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the
properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were
allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of
the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.

The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No. 31080, ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak)
enumerated in this decision as acquired in 1953,1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the
sum of P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor" during the
preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No. 1379 did not amount to such
arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the proceedings since, after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of
the case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a penal
liability but the recovery of property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things acquired through delicts,
prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may not be deemed to have been compelled
to testify against his will since he took the witness stand voluntarily. 10 The Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or
new trial. The Trial Court refused to grant a new trial but modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in
the dispositive portion ... to P80,000.00." 11

Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as earlier stated, was certified
to this Court.

No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern mainly the character of
R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or
employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been
enacted. 13

Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in 1961, the fact is
that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v.
Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a
public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a penalty"; and that
"proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the
exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable
thereto. 15The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling
of the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a
written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of said law cannot be given retro active effect."

The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic
that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture
prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul of the
Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is precisely what has been done in
the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under
R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the Government in
the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable for damages
because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080, resulted from a preliminary investigation which was
allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found
no proof of any intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court
further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956,
Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio
Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does
not necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's factual
conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and consequently no award
of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any showing of the existence of
some recognized exception thereto.

The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of property by the appellants
illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of
P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to
costs.

118. Wright vs. CA

FACTS: To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the
7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a
Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each
other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. The Treaty
adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the
2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes
committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting
State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or
enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires, if the
person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the
warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be
extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by
imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the purpose of the definition, the Treaty
states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense within
the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into
account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department
of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the Department of
Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen for:

a. 1 count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because
he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors, secured by a
mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a Rodney
and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by
Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b. 13 counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon o
the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an insurance
agent

c. 1 count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the
name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society based on an
inexistent policy-holder

d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's signed and
swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act (1958), a
Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and
containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated on April 6,
1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993 granted the petition for
extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted irrespective of
when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was
sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a review on certiorari to set
aside the order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty
amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the
trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in
his country.

ISSUES: a. Whether or NOT the Regional Trial Court committed an order in granting the extradition proceeding.

b. Whether or NOT enforcement of Article 18 of the Treaty states a prohibition for the retroactive application of
offenses committed prior to the date of its effectivity

c. whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law

HELD: AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit. Complying with
Article 2, Section 2 of the Treaty, the crimes for which the Mr. Wright was charged and for which warrants for his arrest
were issued in Australia were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were alleged to have been
committed. The trial court correctly determined the offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the
Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively.

The provisions of the Treaty was properly complied with. The signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of
Australia were sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including
the statement itself. The last requirement was accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer
in Canberra, Australia.

The relevant provisions merely requires "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person
sought to be extradited.” It does not limited the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to a person charged with an information
or a criminal complaint as it will render the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading
arrest and prosecution. Moreover, the “Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets” shows that he is not only wanted for
prosecution but has absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or information under the Treaty
is required only when appropriate such as in cases where an individual charged before a competent court in the
Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not required if the offender
has already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed.

ii. YES. Article 18 states: “ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30)
days after the date on which the Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements
for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.

Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease to be in force on the
one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.”

The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity and the second paragraph pertains to its
termination. There is no prohibition for its retroactive effect.

Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that: “4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions
of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:

(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the offense; and

(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested State at the time of the
making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.”

iii. NO. Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal
and criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the
Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of
persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated
at the time the treaty was ratified."

119. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in
bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found
the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

1.) RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED.

Petitioner and intervenors’ contention that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

2.) NOT EX POST FACTO LAW.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of
the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

3.) RTC HAS JURISDICTION.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
 CITIZENSHIP : LAWS AND CASES

1. Commonwealth Act 63
2.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age or more: Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any
manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country;

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service
to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in,
the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country,
he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen;

(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and

(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband's country, she
acquires his nationality.1

The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen from one of
the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries or from the United Kingdom shall not produce loss or
forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired.2

Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be reacquired:

(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's prescribed in section two of Act
Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,3

(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason
of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the
marital status;4 and

(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.

Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. – The procedure prescribed for naturalization
under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding section: Provided, That the qualifications and special
qualifications prescribed in section three and four of said Act shall not be required: And provided, further,

(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months
before he applies for naturalization;

(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence
in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living; and
(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to
the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.

Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth6of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry.

Section 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of this Act.
Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished
by the Solicitor General, subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 21, 1936.

2. Commonwealth Act 473

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO

REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND
FORTY-EIGHT.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."

Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following qualifications may become
a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must
have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages; and

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of the last
preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following qualifications:

Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;

Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines;

Being married to a Filipino woman;

Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the
exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or
industry for a period of not less than two years;

Having been born in the Philippines.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:

Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;

Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas;

Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;

Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States 3whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship, the
applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the Bureau of Justice4 a declaration under oath that it is bona fide his
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines. Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation, personal
description, place of birth, last foreign residence and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel or aircraft, if
any, in which he came to the Philippines, and the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the
declaration. No declaration shall be valid until lawful entry for permanent residence has been established and a certificate
showing the date, place, and manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must also state that he has enrolled his
minor children, if any, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education5 of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum,
during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two photographs of himself.

Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and
have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years or
more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon complying
with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with respect to the widow
and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is
actually naturalized.6

Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent
court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname; his
present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and the
father of children, the name, age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of
his or her arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the name of the ship on
which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of
this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and be supported
by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the
petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the
names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case.
The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made part of the petition.

Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least one
year immediately preceding the filing of the petition shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the petition.

Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the
court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in
one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said
petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where
said office is located, setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place
of his arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his
petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of the
last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the
naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of Justice,8 the
Provincial Inspector9 of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace10 of the municipality
wherein the petitioner resides.

Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be heard within the thirty days preceding any election. The hearing
shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned, shall
appear on behalf of the Commonwealth11 of the Philippines at all the proceedings and at the hearing. If, after the hearing,
the court believes, in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the
disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied with all requisites herein established, it shall order the proper
naturalization certificate to be issued and the registration of the said naturalization certificate in the proper civil registry as
required in section ten of Act Numbered Three thousand seven hundred and fifty-three.12

Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the Supreme
Court.13

Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.—If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after the date on which
the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal has been filed, or if, upon appeal, the decision of the court has been
confirmed by the Supreme Court,14 and the said decision has become final, the clerk of the court which heard the petition
shall issue to the petitioner a naturalization certificate which shall, among other things, state the following: The file number
of the petition, the number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence
of the clerk of the court, the personal circumstances of the person naturalized, the dates on which his declaration of
intention and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the
decision. A photograph of the petitioner with the dry seal affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, must be
affixed to the certificate.

Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath:

"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly swear that I renounce absolutely and for ever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of which at this
time I am a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and that I will obey the laws,
legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Commonwealth15 of the Philippines; [and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America in the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;16 and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.

"So help me God."

Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall keep two books; one in which the petition and declarations of
intention shall be recorded in chronological order, noting all proceedings thereof from the filing of the petition to the final
issuance of the naturalization certificate; and another, which shall be a record of naturalization certificates each page of
which shall have a duplicate which shall be duly attested by the clerk of the court and delivered to the petitioner.

Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First Instance shall charge as fees for recording a petition for naturalization
and for the proceedings in connection therewith, including the issuance of the certificate, the sum of thirty pesos.

The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each appeal and for the services rendered by him in connection
therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.

Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.—Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless
one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the fault of their parents
either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree
canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Department of the Interior20 and
the Bureau of Justice.21

(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the Constitutional or
legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.

Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or
cause or aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying,
changing or altering a naturalization certificate for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same may be
used by another person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and in the case that the person convicted is a naturalized
citizen his certificate of naturalization and the registration of the same in the proper civil registry shall be ordered
cancelled.

Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense implying a violation of the
provisions of this Act, unless the information or complaint is filed within five years from the detection or discovery of the
commission of said offense.

Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the proper
enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the provisions of this
Act shall be prepared and furnished by the Solicitor-General, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice.

Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by Act Numbered
Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled "The Naturalization Law", is repealed: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall
be construed to affect any prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal,
done or existing before the taking effect of this Act, but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts,
things, or matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended by this Act are continued in force and effect.

Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, June 17, 1939.

3. Republic Act 2630

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 18, 1960

4. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 June 5, 1975

PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS

WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;

WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship
unless by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her Philippine citizenship, such provision
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said Constitution took effect;

WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their
citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital
status; and

WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by
the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: 1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may require Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they
shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.

The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate
forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.

5. Republic Act 8171

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.

Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon for the
predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurablecontagious diseases.

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel
the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.

Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.

Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Signed: October 23, 1995

6. Republic Act 9139 Approved: June 8 – 2001

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control and regulate the admission and integration of aliens into its
territory and body politic including the grant of citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens born and residing in the
Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated
by national security and interest.

Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits
of this Act must meet the following qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must
have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;

(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private educational
institution dully recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar
schools;

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she derives income
sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession
because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.

Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:

(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success or predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have
not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.

Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall file with
the Special Committee on Naturalization created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5) copies legibly typed and
signed, thumbmarked and verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized photograph attached to each copy of the
petition, and setting forth the following:

(a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;

(b) The petitioner's present and former places of residence;

(c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and citizenship of his/her parents and their residences;

(d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;

(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the date and
place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of his/her spouse; and if his
marriage is annulled, the date of decree of annulment of marriage and the court which granted the same;

(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and birthplace and residences of his/her children ;

(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act;

(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public charge; and

(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce
absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or sovereign, and particularly the country of which the applicant is a
citizen or subject.

(2) The application shall be accompanied by:

(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's birth certificate;

(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native born certificate of
residence;

(c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death certificate of his
spouse, if widowed, or the court decree annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;

(d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth certificates, alien certificate of registration or native born certificate of
residence if any, of petitioner's minor children, wherever applicable;

(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and sworn statements on the good moral character of the petitioner by
at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good reputation in his/her place of residence stating that they have personally known
the petitioner for at least a period of ten (10) years and that said petitioner has in their own opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act;
(f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and that he/she is
not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS);

(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the petitioner in the schools he attended in the Philippines. Should the
petitioner have minor children, a certification that his children are enrolled in a school where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and are part of the curriculum; and

(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past three (3) years.

Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There shall be constituted a Special Committee on Naturalization herein
referred to as the "Committee", with the Solicitor General as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or his
representative, and the National Security Adviser, as members, with the power to approve, deny or reject applications for
naturalization as provided in this Act.

The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to consider applications for naturalization. For this purpose, the
chairman and members shall receive an honorarium of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and One thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting attended.

Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may file an application for naturalization with the secretariat of the Special
Committee on Naturalization, and a processing fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). Thereafter, the petition shall be
stamped to indicate the date of filing and a corresponding docket number. Within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
petition, the Committee shall determine whether the petition is complete in substance and in form. If such petition is
complete, the Committee shall immediately publish pertinent portions of the petition indicating the name, qualifications
and other personal circumstances of the applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, and have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area. The Committee shall
immediately furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the civil registrar of the
petitioner's place of residence and tile National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the petition and its supporting
documents. These agencies shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or conspicuous area in their buildings,
offices and premises, and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the petition, submit to the Committee a report
stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information which
might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.

If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed without
prejudice.

Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. - Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the agencies which
were furnished a copy of the petition or the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever comes in later, the
Committee shall consider and review all relevant and material information it has received pertaining to the petition, and
may, for the purpose call the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the authenticity of the petition and its
annexes, and to determine the truthfulness of the statements and declarations made in the petition and its annexes.

If the Committee shall have received any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to
answer, explain or refute the information.

Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts before it, that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required for Philippine citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and henceforth, notif y
the petitioner of the fact of such approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the same.

Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
notice of the approval of his/her petition, the applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee of One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the approval of the petition
and Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
forthwith, a certificate of naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from the issuance of the certificate, the
petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of payment of the required naturalization
processing fee and certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to take the abovementioned oath of allegiance
within said period of time, the approval of the petition shall be deemed abandoned.

Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within five (5) days after the applicant has taken his oath of allegiance as
required in the preceding section, the BI shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to the proper local civil registrar.
Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien certificates of registration of the applicant.

Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. - After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization in
cancellation of applicant's alien certificate of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may file a petition
for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the Committee subject to the payment of the filing fee of
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows:
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon
the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition
for administrative naturalization will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children may file a petition for cancellation
of their alien certificates of registration with the BI subject to the requirements of existing laws.

Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel certificates of
naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:

(a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or
misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the petition for naturalization,
or if he otherwise obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled;

(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor children who acquire Filipino citizenship by virtue of his
naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent residence in
a foreign country, that individual's certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of origin, or two (2)
years in any foreign country, shall be considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside therein;

(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be used as a dummy
in violation of any constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for the exercise, use or
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege, the certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or
revoked; and

(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security, the
certificate of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.

In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make an express
renunciation of his title or membership in this order of nobility before the Special Committee or its duly authorized
representative, and such renunciation shall be included in the records of his application for citizenship.

Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause or aid any person
to do the same, or who shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing or altering a
naturalization certificate issued under this proceeding for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the same
may be used by another person or persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in obtaining a
naturalization certificate in violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,OOO.OO) and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and in the case that the person convicted is a
naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered
cancelled.

Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar may, within
two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a petition for the acquisition of the Philippine citizenship: Provided, That
the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this Act and subject to the
requirements of existing laws.

Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the filing fee to be
paid by the applicants pursuant to Section 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the Philippines Law Center and
another twenty-five percent (25%) shall be allotted for the publication of the Journal of the House of Representatives. Said
amount shall be treated as receipts automatically appropriated.

Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby authorized to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be needed for the proper implementation of the provisions of this Act.

Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations contrary to or
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
part, section or provision not affected thereby shall continue to be in force and effect.

Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

7. Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section
or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

8. Reyes vs. Comelec

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division. Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction
over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and
having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are
outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction. The averred proclamation is the
critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be
proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling petitioner
certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10,
2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14, 2013
COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification
from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law
because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her
case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be
heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing
that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did
she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

9. Japzon vs. Comelec

Facts: Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office
of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. Japzon
instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a
Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been
residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely
represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year
before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied
for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Inspite of having reacquisition in his
Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting
until 20 January 2007. Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport
himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as
required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or
related laws. Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public
office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy. Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who
went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for
the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA;
(3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26
October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6,
Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct
0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007
again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty
executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had reacquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's
Petition in SPA No. 07-568. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. The COMELEC First
Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his
Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of
Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on
October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.]
9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen Ty did not commit material
misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has
lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of
candidacy. The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution
from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition. Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the
Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to
issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the
duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty sought the dismissal of the present
Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot
evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the
COMELEC are binding on the Court. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed
to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his
American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship. The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the
COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for
election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

ISSUE: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions.

RULING: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position. It bears to point out that
Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A
close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born
Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for
dual citizenship. There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be
considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute
loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May
2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence
therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish
residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of
this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the
one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.
COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective
post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election
law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial
evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May
2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the
Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes. To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must
clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding
such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is dismiss.

10. Maquiling vs. Comelec April 16, 2013

Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on 10
July 2008. On the same day an order of approval of his citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his favour. In
2009, Aarnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte. Respondent
Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and presented a record indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. COMELEC issued an order requiring
the respondent to personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default. In 2010 election, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning
candidate for Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his answer. COMELEC first division ruled for his
disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the second highest
number of votes, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration claiming
that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, him, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest lawful votes should be proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it shall continue with
the trial and hearing. However, it reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and granted Arnado’s MR. Maquiling
filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued
use of a US passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race.

Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for
public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued
to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009.
The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective
position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the
same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of

votes from among the qualified candidates

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot
produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even
more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign
voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are
allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

11. Bengzon vs. HRET

12.
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,
Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the
Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in
the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No.
63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship
will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

13. Tabasa vs. CA

FACTS: When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his father became a
naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was
arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID
that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.

ISSUE: Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore, is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING: No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The only person entitled to
repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a
natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in his case
because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to
children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for repatriation.

14. Loida Nicholas - Lewis vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought registration and certification as
“overseas absentee voters” however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC
letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-
year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution. When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on
said requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution. Faced with the
prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus.

On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the
petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating that“all qualified overseas Filipinos,
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,” observing, however, that the conclusion of
the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic.

Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that under the circumstances the same has already
been rendered moot and academic?

Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but only insofar as
petitioners’ participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered in the
petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which
however, remains unresolved.

The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained
and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.

[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.]

15. Valles vs. Comelec

Principle of jus sanguinis
How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and
has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an
Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte....
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By
virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

16. Maria Jeanette Tecson vs. Comelec

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA
04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only
a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or
on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for
a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR
161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section
4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term
"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did
not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
(3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was
Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.

17. Balgamelo Cabiling vs. Fernandez

FACTS: Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi
Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and
Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole
lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the
Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled
abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents
registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in
which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen) .It was
only on27 July 2005or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did
so. On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement.

Individual certifications all dated3 January 2005issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections,
SurigaoCity, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997,
and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten
(10) years.Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads
in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.

On16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral),
alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens.Mr. Catral, however,
did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint against them was
politically motivated because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local
Elections.

On9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7)
and 45(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of
Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment
dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and
45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and22 August 2001, respectively.

In its Resolution of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005.They were
convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g). However, they denied the Motion
for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his children.

On3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals.

On29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after finding that the petitioners failed to comply with the
exacting standards of the law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either
as aliens or as its nationals.

On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners herein are Filipino Citizens.

HELD: The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.The mandate states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of thePhilippines:

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of thePhilippinesand, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted.It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1.The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of thePhilippines.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of thePhilippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of
the oath with the nearest civil registry.

In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of
election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years
upon reaching the age of majority.

The instant case presents a different factual setting.Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon
reaching the age of majority.It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they
should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.

Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re: Florencio Mallare,
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente
D. Ching.

In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause, pointing
out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to confer on him
the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen, and that Esteban was born in 1929 prior to the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625.

In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in
thePhilippines.Again, such circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was
ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself
had already elected Philippine citizenship for him as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to his father.

In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the
requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government
of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were
complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority.Ching offered no reason for the late election of
Philippine citizenship.

In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith and informal election unacceptable and held:

Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was
decided on1 October 1999], is obviously flawed.It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the
doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that the
special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted
stay in thePhilippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of
citizenship.What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the
frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been
done.The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:
To register is to record or annotate.American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term to
register as to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list. In general, registration refers
to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes.In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records
solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose
of notification. Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge
thereof.Thus, [i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or
instrument to others. As pertinent is the holding that registration neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties.It lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.

Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to thePhilippines.This was a serious undertaking.It was
commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance to any other
state.This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos.Their present status having been formed by
their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of
reason.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented by the
petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not
properly documented. On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be
inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others,
their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since
birth.The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners election of Philippine citizenship.

The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone by the
jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship.

The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision on Philippine
citizenship.

Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their
age of majority,upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos and need not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.The 1973 provision reads:

Section 1.The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1)xxx.

(2)Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-born citizens upon
election of Philippine citizenship.Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935
Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express
classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the
omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration
of the right to Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent.It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.Petitioners
elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance.The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not
defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.The lacking requirements
may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.The documents they
submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should
be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration.Other
requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals inCA-
G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005of the Bureau of
Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma.Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from
notice within which to COMPLYwith the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its Judgment of2
February 2005.The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial
obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
fines;REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; andACTthereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.

18. People vs. Azucena Saavedra Batuigas

Azucena was born to Chinese parents in Zamboanga in 1941. She had never departed the Philippines since birth. She
can speak several Philippine languages and dialects, and studied in Philippine schools, graduating with a degree in
Bachelor of Science in education. She practiced teaching for five years. In 1968, she married Santiago, a Filipino citizen.
They have five children, who studied in Philippine schools and are now professionals, two working abroad. She then
helped her husband in their business of rice milling, retail business and rice and corn distribution. As proof of income, she
submitted their joint income tax return. On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a petition for naturalisation before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur, alleging that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required under CA
473. The Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that she did not posses the lawful income or occupation
required for naturalization. Ruling that the matter is evidentiary, the RTC denied the same. After compliance with
jurisdictional requisites, where no representatives from the OSG or the Provincial Prosecutor appeared, the RTC on
motion of Azucena’s counsel, allowed her to present evidence ex-parts before the Clerk of Court. After completion of the
testimony, the RTC granted Azucena’s petition and declared her eligible for Filipino citizenship, which the OSG contested,
citing as grounds the lack of a public hearing when the fourt allowed ex-parts presentation of evidence, and the lack of
proof of lawful income/occupation by Azucena. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC, hence,
the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court:

“Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or
administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15
of CA 473, which provides that:

“[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens
and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States
which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to
confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.

Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:

Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15
of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.[39]
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino citizenship is as
follows:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and
that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the
cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705[41] by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the
CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial naturalization based
on CA 473. While this would have been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing
that prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings available to
all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the
applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her
application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking
judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because
she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on
other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact
grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.

As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial
proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also
submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. He has
always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15
of CA 473. On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications under
Section 4 of the same Act.

However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15 of CA 473 which was
denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications
and absence of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA.
We will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented
during the hearings on the Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena’s testimony and deportment during the
hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of
Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the
nature of a public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during the initial hearing
scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing,
prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The
OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had raised this
same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings of
the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born
and lived all her life, in the Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than
demonstrated, under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the
findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a
person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied with the
public hearing requirement under CA 473.

No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:

4. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching job to
assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family.
Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become
professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative
trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her, and this is
more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she has known since birth.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to
maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be
that the husband’s interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of
the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers
from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.

We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or by the Rules of
Court, for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. “Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be
decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding.”
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition for judicial
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or
confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial
approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. Azucena
has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not
stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.”

19. Poe vs. Comelec

Facts: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24
May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however,
and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American
citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement
. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that
she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of
them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three
justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates.

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the
SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is
silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a
candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a
circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile.

Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under
RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the country cannot
be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such
cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her
actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace
Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her
COC

Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or
the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.