DEATH PENALTY
supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied
PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY
G.R. No. 117472 (Feb. 7, 1997)
People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo
Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant Appellant
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting
collectively & anonymously.
Facts:
The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter.
The crime having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the
supreme penalty of death.
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The
motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial
arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by
the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the
reversal of the death sentence.
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is
unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration &
for lack of merit.
Ratio:
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per
se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court,
in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty
itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures
by which the death penalty was imposed on the
accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature
of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the
discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is
given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty.
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty
because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the
U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death
penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial
judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards
intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the
intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and
sentencing juries.
accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not
involve the taking of life.
In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely
relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving
of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public, it
does not compare with murder, which does involve
the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may
be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition
does not include the death of or even the serious
injury to another person. The murderer kills; the
rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for
the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and
normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in
its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive
 penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life"
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on
two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of
the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the
state legislatures to include rape in their new
death penalty statutes in the aftermath of
Furman;
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to
see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of
our own culture.
second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a
crime warrants the death penalty or not, is
the attendance of the circumstance of death
on the part of the victim. Such a premise is
in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth".
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated,
provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for
the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy
during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use
of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in
death.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the
form of a constitutional question of whether or not the
death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty
complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of
people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty
is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains
in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law
provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions,"
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply
states that congress, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, may re-impose the death
penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a
positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of
crime should first be perceived and statistically proven
following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society
what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in
the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and
the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling
reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the
flagrantly violent manner in which the same was
committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery
of the law, public peace and order, or public
morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the
moral self of a people.
The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality
life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to
respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and
the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value
he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
material and social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the
death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors
or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of
 other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than three days
or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by
their very nature.
SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes
because:
the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a
person or criminal acts with severely destructive
effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry
they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury
to both their victim and the society and a repetition of
their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government, they must
be permanently prevented from doing so
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the
sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice
and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom,
and physical and moral integrity to which every person has
a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage
upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but
the society itself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al.,
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
FACTS:
On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, FelicianoMuñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas
Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified
men, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who
had complained of having been victimized by cattle
rustlers. Having found their supposed quarry, they
proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood
without further ado and without mercy. Mauro Bulatao was
shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and
daughter looked on in horror. Alejandro Bulatao was
forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also
in the head, before his terrified wife and son. Aquilino
Bulatao, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the
head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out.
The four identified accused were convicted for the crime of
murder qualified by treachery. The penalty for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this
was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987
Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. It further provides that neither shall death penalty
be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
WON Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
abolish the death penalty.
HELD:
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show
that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision
merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes
the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward is still plain enough. And it
is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. Thus,
Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua.
The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains
unchanged.

PEOPLE vs ALFREDO BON Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period
21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon
against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with
the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of his older
brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several
instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB
testified against appellant, their uncle and both identified
him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of
rape. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of
minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims
and appellant, the latter being the former’s relative by
consanguinity within the third degree.
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. The
sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of R.A.9346 which ended the imposition of
death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant
is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which
under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that
of consummated rape, should be computed from death or
reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes
convicted?
HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court
of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act
No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the
death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold
the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if
the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when
appropriate.
Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code establishes that the penalty to be imposed upon the
principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower
by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.
The penalty “lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law” for attempted rape is the prescribed penalty for the
consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have
beenvunder eighteen years of age and to have been
raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two
degrees lower than the death penalty entails the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the
penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion
temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer
the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty
within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or
prision mayor. If Rep. Act 9346 had not been enacted,
the Court would have affirmed such sentence withoutcomp
lication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise
to the problem concerning the imposable penalty.
Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within
reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees
lower than death. With the elimination of death as a
penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be
sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua, the highest remaining penalty
with the enactment of Rep. Act No.
9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to
prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death
would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the
same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized
one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It
does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having
downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason
of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that
manner will a
clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of p
enalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for
accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall
be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death,
but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion
temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,
prision mayor.

People v. Sarcia
G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
FACTS: Sometime in 1996, five year old AAA together
with her cousin and two other playmates were playing in
the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree. Appellant
Richard Sarcia, 18 or 19years old at the time appeared
and invited AAA to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo’s house, whereupon appellant removed AAA’s
shorts and underwear, made her lie on her back and after
removing his own trousers and brief laid on top of AAA
and made up-and-down movements which caused AAA to
feel pain in her genital area and in her stomach. Unknown
to appellant, AAA’s cousin followed them and watched the
whole incident from ad istance. AAA’s cousin reported
such AAA’s mother but was rebuffed. AAA’s father was
working in Manila at the time.
On July 7, 2000, AAA’s father filed a complaint for acts of
lasciviousness which upon review of evidence was
upgraded to rape by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Ligao, Albay. Medico-legal findings reported
absence of introital vulval laceration nor scars but with
perforated hymen.On January 17, 2003, the RTC Branch
13 of Ligao City found accused-appellant guilty of rape
and fined PHP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 50,000 as
moral damages and cost of suit. The CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision but modified the penalty to death
and increased fines of civil indemnity to PHP 75,000, PHP
25,000 as exemplary damages and PHP 50,000 as moral
damages.
ISSUE: Is the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape?
RULING: Yes, the Court ruled that inconsistencies in
testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details
do not affect the veracity of their testimonies when the
principal occurrence and positive identification of accused
is made and indeed proves that such inconsistencies
speaks of spontaneity and the unrehearsed nature of such
undertaking. Inability of the victim, AA, to recall the exact
date of the incident cannot discredit credibility of victim
since it is not an essential element of the crime. Neither is
the delay in filing the crime a stain on the credibility of
witnesses since it is common for rape victims to prefer
silence for fear and lack of courage. Furthermore, the
employment of force, threat, intimidation are not elements
of statutory rape, only “carnal knowledge” must be proven
to have taken place. Alibi or denial is the weakest defense
as it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.
The Court affirms the decision of the CA with the following
modifications: (1) death penalty is reduced to reclusion
perpetua, (2) PHP 75,000 as moral damages, PHP 30,000
as exemplary damages, and PHP 75,000 as civil
indemnity and remanded to the court a quo for disposition
in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344
ENRILE vs SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990)
186 SCRA 217 – Political Law – Separation of Powers –
SC Cannot Change Law
Statutory Construction – The Court Can Only Interpret
Laws
Criminal Law – Complex Crimes – Compound Crimes –
Rebellion Absorbs Common Crimes
Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure – Bail; When
available
Constitutional Law – Warrant of Arrest – Judge Should
Personally Determine Probable Cause
FACTS:
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by
Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed
coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino.
There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of
the crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to
Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas
corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the
crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists
that there is no such crime asrebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the
landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled
that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should
have been charged against him issimple rebellion – which
is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took
Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the
raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile
claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible
for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous
record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that
being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only
issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the
existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that
the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it
should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimeslike murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined
probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court
also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D.
942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine.
The said law provided that graver crimes may not be
complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon
Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted
to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the
Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under
the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot
change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only
Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC
suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as
it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as
rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder
are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion –
which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge
Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the
warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite
the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a
voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it
conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to
comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he
had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
PEOPLE VS SALVILLA
April 26, 1990
Melencho – Herrera, J
Facts:
-Petitioner: Bienvenido Salvilla
-April 12, 1986, at about noon time – Petitioner, together
with Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio (all surnamed
Canasares), staged a robbery at the New Iloilo Lumber
Yard
-They were armed with homemade guns and a hand
grenade
-On their way inside the establishment, they met Rodita
Habiero, an employee there who was on her way out for
her meal break, and informed her that it was a hold-up.
-They went inside the office and the petitioner pointed his
gun at Severino Choco, the owner, and his two daughters,
Mary and Mimmie. They informed Severino that all they
needed was money.
-Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein he
placed P20,000 cash (P5000 acc to the defense) and
handed it to the petitioner.
-Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino after which the latter, his 2 daughters and Rodita
were kept inside the office.
-According to the appellant, he stopped Severino from
getting the wallet and watches.
-At about 2:00 of the same day, the appellant told
Severino to produce P100,000 so he and the other
hostages can be released. Severino told him it would be
hard to do that since banks are closed because it was a
Saturday
-The police and military authorities had surrounded the
lumber yard. Major Melquiades Sequio, Station
Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the
accused and appealed to them to surrender. The accused
refused to surrender and release the hostages.
-Rosa Caram, OIC Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the
negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a coaster,
and some raincoats. Caram offered P50,000
instead. Later, the accused agreed to receive the same
and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary in going
the
out of the office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor
Caram and with the key,Mayor Caram unlocked the door
and handed to Rodita P50,000, which Rodita gave to one
of the accused.
-Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the
office.
-The police and military authorities decided to assault the
place when the accused still wouldn’t budge after more
ultimatums. This resulted to injuries to the girls, as well as
to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary’sr
ight leg had to be amputated due to her injuries.
-The appellant maintained that the money, wallet and
watches were all left on the counter and were never
touched by them. He also claimed that they never fired on
the military because they intended to surrender.
Issues:
-WON the crime of robbery was consummated
-WON there was a mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
Ratio:
-Yes. The robbery shall be deemed consummated if
the unlawful “taking” is complete.
Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an
essential part of the crime of robbery. The respondent
claimed that none of the items (money, watches and
wallet) were recovered from them. However, based
on the evidence, the money demanded, the wallet
and the wristwatch were within the dominion and
control of the appellant and his co-accused and
thus the taking was completed.
It is not necessary that the property be taken into the
hands of the robber or that he should have actually
carriedthe property away, out of the physical
presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should
have made his escapewith it.
-No. The “surrender” of the appellant and his co-accused
cannot be considered in their favour to mitigate their
liability.
To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following
requisites: that the offender had not been
actuallyarrested, that the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority or to his agent, and
that the surrender wasvoluntary. The “surrender” by
the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these
requirements. There is novoluntary surrender to
speak of.
Note: The nature of the linked offenses (robbery with
serious physical injuries and serious illegal detention) was
also discussed. The detention in the case at bar was not
only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means
to commit the same so the nature of the offense was
affirmed.
Held: Judgment appealed is AFFIRMED
ARTURO A. MEJORADA
petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
CORTES, J.
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987
Subject Matter: Application and Computation of Penalties:
Service of Sentence (Specific Rules)
FACTS: Arturo Mejorada was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section3(E) of RA. 3019,
aka Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a
right-away agent whose duty was to process the claims for
compensation of
damagesof property owners affected by highway construct
ion and improvements. He required the claimants to sign
blank copies of Sworn Statements and Agreements to
Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the
claimants have higher values than the actual value being
claimed by them. However, the claimants didnot bother
reading through the paper because they very much
interested in the compensation of damages. After
processing the claims, instead of giving to the claimants
the proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000
and the rest, Php 1,000 each, saying that there are many
who would share in said amounts. The claimants weren’t
able to complain because they were afraid of the accused
and his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan
sentenced Mejorada 56 years and8 years of imprisonment
which is equivalent to the eight (8) penalties for the eight
(8) informations filed against him.
Contention of the State: Section 3 of RA 3019 states that
Mejorada should be punished with “imprisonment for not
less than 1 year nor more than 10 years” asstated in Sec 9
of the same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against
him and each charge should be served with the penalty
prescribed by the law. Contention of the Accused:
Mejorada states that the penalty imposed upon him is
contrary to the three-fold rule and states that the duration
should not exceed 40years. This is in accordance to
Article 70 of the RPC.
ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed upon him violates the
three-fold rule under Article 70 of the RPC.
RULING: The Court favors the State. Article 70 of the RPC
does not state anything about the “imposition of penalty”. It
only explains the “service” of sentence, “duration” of
penalty and penalty “to be inflicted”. It should be
interpreted that the accused
cannot be made to serve more than three times the most s
evere of these penalties the maximum of which is forty
(40) years. As stated in a previous case, “The courts can
still impose as many penalties as there are separate and
distinct offenses committed, since for every individual
crime committed, a corresponding
penalty is prescribed by law.” With these reasons, Mejorad
a cannot correctly contend that his penalty is excessive.
There are eight charges against him and each has an
equivalent penalty as prescribed by RA 3019, thus,
Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
ROSA LIM, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000.
FACTS:
Petitioner bought various jewelries worth P300,000.00 and
P241,668.00 on separate
dates from Maria Antonia Seguan’s store. She issued a
two separate checks for the payment of these.
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable
human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order. There, we
deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We
imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the
check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners
brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no
violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they
would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court
and applied for probation to evade prison term."
We do the same here. We believe such would best serve
the ends of criminal justice

When Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank,

they were returned with a notice of dishonor because
petitioner’s account was closed.

Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the

amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.

Both the RTC and CA found petitioner guilty of violating

BP 22 and was sentenced to one year imprisonment for
each of the two violations and ordered to pay two fines,
each amounting to P200,000.00

Petitioner’s defense was that the checks were never

issued to Seguan and that they had
no pre-existing transaction. The checks were issued to
Aurelia Nadera as mereguarantee and as a security
arrangement to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell
onconsignment basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not both the RTC and CA rendered the

appropriate penalty to Rosa Lim?
YES but with slight modifications

HELD: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the

decision of the Court of Appeals. We find petitioner Rosa
Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE
the sentence of imprisonment and hereby sentence her
only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-
payment not to exceed six (6) months. We DELETE the
award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The rest of
the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals shall stand. Costs against petitioner.

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining

the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the