action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents.
No. L-24294. May 3, 1974.*
DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval
Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales,
petitioner, vs.HON. TITO V. TIZON, as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO
GENER, respondents.
Political law; State immunity from
suit; A foreign government acting through its
naval commanding officer is immune from
suit relative to the performance of an
important public Junction of any
government, the defense and security of its
naval base in the Philippines granted under
a treaty.—The invocation of the doctrine of
immunity from suit of a foreign state without
its consent is appropriate. More specifically,
insofar as alien armed forces is concerned,
the starting point in Raquiza v. Bradford, a
1945 decision. x x x The solidity of the stand
of petitioner is therefore evident. What was
sought by private respondent and what was
granted by respondent Judge amounted to
an interference with the performance of the
duties of petitioner in the base area in
accordance with the powers possessed by
him under the Philippine-American Military
Bases Agreement. This point was made clear
in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of
argument, that the Philippine Government,
through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses
the 'authority to issue a Timber License to
cut logs' inside a military base, the Bases
Agreement subjects the exercise of rights
under a timber license issued by the
Philippine Government to the exercise by the
United States of its rights, powers and
authority of control within the bases; and the
findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an
agency of both the Philippine and United
States Governments, that 'continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the
boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not
be consistent with the security and
operations of the Base,' is conclusive upon
the respondent Judge. * * * The doctrine of
state immunity is not limited to cases which
would result in a pecuniary charge against
the sovereign or would require the doing of
an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a
sovereign from doing an affirmative act
pertaining directly and immediately to the
most important public function of any
government—the defense of the state—is
equally as untenable as requiring it to do an
affirmative act." That such an appraisal is
not opposed to the interpretation of the
relevant treaty provision by our government
is made clear in the aforesaid manifestation
and memorandum as amicus curiae,wherein
it joined petitioner for the grant of the
remedy prayed for.
Same; Same; A naval commander
may, however, be sued in his
personal capacity.—There should be no
misinterpretation of the scope of the decision
reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the
Commander of the United States Naval Base
in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded
against in his personal capacity, or when the
cases coming from this Tribunal starting
from a 1945 decision, Raquiza v.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Preliminary
injunction; Trial court has no authority to
grant a writ of preliminary injunction
against U.S. naval authorities in the
Philippines in favor of a timber licensee
whose license already expired.—
The infirmity of the actuation of the
respondent Judge becomes even more
glaring when it is considered that private
respondent had ceased to have any right of
entering within the base area. This is made
clear in the petition in these words: "In 1962,
respondent Gener was issued by the Bureau
of Forestry an ordinary timber license to cut
logs in Barrio Mabayo, Morong, Bataan. The
license was renewed on July 10, 1963. In
1963, he commenced logging operation inside
the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay,
but in November, 1963 he was apprehended
and stopped by the Base authorities from
logging inside the Base. The renewal of his
license expired on July 30, 1964, and to date
his license has not been renewed by the
Bureau of Forestry. * * * In July 1964, the
Mutual Defense Board, a joint Philippines-
United States agency established pursuant
to an exchange of diplomatic notes between
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Ambassador to provide 'direct
liaison and consultation between
appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities on military matters of mutual
concern,' advised the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in writing that The enclosed map
shows that the area in which Mr. Gener was
logging definitely falls within the boundaries
of the base. This map also depicts certain
contiguous and overlapping areas whose
functional usage would be interfered with by
the logging operations.'" Nowhere in the
answer of respondents, nor in their
memorandum, was this point met. It
remained unrefuted.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari with preliminary injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna Manalo & Feliciano for
petitioner.
A. E. Dacanay for private respondent.
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason as
amicus curiae.
FERNANDO, J.:
There is nothing novel about the question
raised in this certiorari proceeding against
the then Judge Tito V. Tizon, f filed by
petitioner Donald Baer, then Commander of
the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay,
Olongapo, Zambales, seeking to nullify the
orders of respondent Judge denying his
motion to dismiss a complaint filed against
him by the private respondent, Edgardo
Gener, on the ground of sovereign immunity
of a foreign power, his contention being that
it was in effect a suit against the United
States, which had not given its consent. The
answer given is supplied by a number of
Bradford1 to Johnson v.
Turner,2promulgated in 1954. The doctrine
of immunity from suit is of undoubted
applicability in this jurisdiction. It cannot be
otherwise, for under the 1935 Constitution,
as now, it is expressly made clear that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the
law of the Nation."3 As will subsequently be
shown, there was a failure on the part of the
lower court to accord deference and respect
to such a basic doctrine, a failure
compounded by its refusal to take note of the
absence of any legal right on the part of
petitioner. Hence, certiorari is the proper
remedy.
The facts are not in dispute. On
November 17, 1964, respondent Edgardo
Gener, as plaintiff, filed acomplaint for
injunction with the Court of First Instance of
Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer,
Commander of the United States Naval Base
in Olongapo. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2984 of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan. He alleged that he was engaged in
the business of logging in an area situated in
Barrio Mabayo, Municipality of Morong,
Bataan and that the American Naval Base
authorities stopped his logging operations.
He prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner from
interfering with his logging operations. A
restraining order was issued by respondent
Judge on November 23, 1964.4 Counsel for
petitioner, upon instructions of the American
Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their
appearance for the purpose of contesting the
jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the
ground that the suit was one against a
foreign sovereign without its consent.5 Then,
on December 12, 1964, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss, wherein such ground was
reiterated. It was therein pointed out that he
is the chief or head of an agency or
instrumentality of the United States of
America, with the subject matter of the
action being official acts done by him for and
in behalf of the United States of America. It
was added that in directing the cessation of
logging operations by respondent Gener
within the Naval Base, petitioner was
entirely within the scope of his authority and
official duty, the maintenance of the security
of the Naval Base and of the installations
therein being the first concern and most
important duty of the Commander of the
Base.6 There was, on December 14, 1964, an
opposition and reply to petitioner's motion to
dismiss by respondent Gener, relying on the
principle that "a private citizen claiming title
and right of possession of certain property
may, to recover possession of said property,
sue as individuals, officers and agents of the
Government, who are said to be illegally
withholding the same from him, though in
doing so, said officers and agents claim that
they are acting for the Government." That
was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction
of respondent Judge.7 Petitioner, thereafter,
on January 12, 1965, made a written offer of
documentary evidence, including certified
copies of telegrams of the Forestry Director
to Forestry personnel in Balanga, Bataan
dated January 8, and January 11, 1965,
directing immediate investigation of illegal
timber cutting in Bataan and calling
attention to the fact that the records of the
office show no new renewal of timber license
or temporary extension permits.8 The above
notwithstanding, respondent Judge, on
January 12, 1965, issued an order granting
respondent Gener's application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
the opposition to the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.9
A motion for reconsideration having
proved futile, this petition for certiorari was
filed with this Court. The prayer was for the
nullification and setting aside of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent
Judge in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 2984 of
the Court of First Instance of Bataan. A
resolution of March 17, 1965 was issued by
this Court requiring respondents to file an
answer and upon petitioner's posting a bond
of P5,000.00 enjoining them from enforcing
such writ of preliminary injunction. The
answer was duly forthcoming. It sought to
meet the judicial question raised by the legal
proposition that a private citizen claiming
title and right of possession of a certain
property may, to recover the same, sue as
individuals officers and agents of the
government alleged to be illegally
withholding such property even if there is an
assertion on their part that they are acting
for the government. Support for such a view
is found in the American Supreme Court
decisions of United States v. Lee10 and Land
v. Dollar.11 Thus the issue is squarely joined
as to whether or not the doctrine of immunity
from suit without consent is applicable.
Thereafter, extensive memoranda were filed
both by petitioner and respondents. In
addition, there was a manifestation and
memorandum of the Republic of the
Philippines as amicus curiae where, after a
citation of American Supreme Court
decisions going back to Schooner Exchange
v. M'faddon,12 an 1812 decision, to United
States v. Belmont,13 decided in 1937, the plea
was made that the petition for certiorari be
granted.
A careful study of the crucial issue posed
in this dispute yields the conclusion, as
already announced, that petitioner should
prevail.
1. The invocation of the doctrine of
immunity from suit of a foreign state without
its consent is appropriate. More specifically,
insofar as alien armed forces is concerned,
the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a
1945 decision.14 In dismissing a habeas
corpus petition for the release of petitioners
confined by American army authorities,
Justice Hilado, speaking for the Court, cited
from Coleman v. Tennessee,15 where it was
explicitly declared: "It is well settled that a
foreign army, permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place."16Two years later, in
Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess,17 this Court
relied on the ruling in Raquiza v.
Bradford and cited in support thereof
excerpts from the works of the following
authoritative writers: Vattel, Wheaton, Hall,
Lawrence, Oppenhein, Westlake, Hyde, and
McNair and Lauterpacht.18 Accuracy
demands the clarification that after the
conclusion of the Philippine-American
Military Bases Agreement, the treaty
provisions should control on such matter, the
assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power
whenever appropriate.19More to the point is
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,20 where plaintiffs
as lessors sued the Commanding General of
the United States Army in the Philippines,
seeking the restoration to them of the
apartment buildings they owned leased to
United States armed forces stationed in the
Manila area. A motion to dismiss on the
ground of non-suability was filed and upheld
by respondent Judge. The matter was taken
to this Court in a mandamus proceeding. It
failed. It was the ruling that respondent
Judge acted correctly considering that the
"action must be considered as one against the
U.S. Government."21 The opinion of Justice
Montemayor continued:
"It is clear that the courts of the
Philippines including the Municipal Court of
Manila have no jurisdiction over the present
case for unlawful detainer. The question of
lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed
at the very beginning of the action. The U.S.
Government has not given its consent to the
filing of this suit which is essentially against
her, though not in name. Moreover, this is
not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the
latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a foreign government without
said government's. consent, which renders
more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of his country. The principles of law
behind this rule are so elementary and of
such general acceptance that we deem it
unnecessary to cite authorities in support
thereof."22 Then came Marvel Building
Corporation v. Philippine War Damage
Commission,23 where respondent, a United
States agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during
World War II was held as falling within the
above doctrine as the suit against it "would
eventually be a charge against or financial
liability of the United States Government
because * * *, the Commission has no funds
of its own for the purpose of paying money
judgments."24The Syquia ruling was again
explicitly relied upon in Marquez Lim v.
Nelson,25involving a complaint for the
recovery of a motor launch, plus damages,
the special defense interposed being "that
the vessel belonged to the United States
Government, that the defendants merely
acted as agents of said Government, and that
the United States Government is therefore
the real party in interest."26 So it was
in Philippine Alien Property Administration
v. Castelo,27 where it was held that a suit
against the Alien Property Custodian and
the Attorney General of the United States
involving vested property under the Trading
with the Enemy Act is in substance a suit
against the United States. To the same effect
is Parreño v. McGranery,28 as the following
excerpt from the opinion of Justice Tuason
clearly shows: "It is a widely accepted
principle of international law, which is made
a part of the law of the land (Article II,
Section 3 of the Constitution), that a foreign
state may not be brought to suit before the
courts of another state or its own courts
without its cohsent."29 Finally, there
is Johnson v. Turner,30 an appeal by the
defendant, then Commanding General,
Philippine Command (Air Force, with office
at Clark Field) from a decision ordering the
return to plaintiff of the confiscated military
payment certificates known as scrip money.
In reversing the lower court decision, this
Tribunal, through Justice Montemayor,
relied on Syquia v. Almeda
Lopez,31explaining why it could not be
sustained.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is
therefore evident. What was sought by
private respondent and what was granted by
respondent Judge amounted to an
interference with the performance of the
duties of petitioner in the base area in
accordance with the powers possessed by
him under the Philippine-American Military
Bases Agreement. This point was made clear
in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of
argument, that the Philippine Government,
through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses
the 'authority to issue a Timber License to
cut logs' inside a military base, the Bases
Agreement subjects the exercise of rights
under a timber license issued by the
Philippine Government to the exercise by the
United States of its rights, power and
authority of control. within the bases; and.
the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an
agency of both the Philippine and United
States Governments, that 'continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the
boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not
be consistent with the security and operation
of the Base,' is conclusive upon the
respondent Judge. * * * The doctrine of state
immunity is not limited to cases which would
result in a pecuniary charge against the
sovereign or would require the doing of an
affirmative act by it. Prevention of a
sovereign from doing an affirmative act
pertaining directly and immediately to the
most important public function of any
government—the defense of the state—is
equally as untenable as requiring it to do an
affirmative act."32 That such an appraisal is
not opposed to the interpretation of the
relevant treaty provision by our government
is made clear in the aforesaid manifestation
and memorandum as amicus
curiae, wherein it joined petitioner for the
grant of the remedy prayed for.
2. There should be no misinterpretation
of the scope of the decision reached by this
Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the
United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does
not possess diplomatic immunity. He may
therefore be proceeded against in his
personal capacity, or when the action taken
by him cannot be imputed to the government
which he represents. Thus, after the Military
Bases Agreement, in Miquiabas v.
Commanding General33 and Dizon v. The
Commanding General of the Philippine-
Ryukus Command,34 both of them
being habeas corpuspetitions, there was no
question as to the submission to jurisdiction
of the respondents. As a matter of fact,
in Miquiabas v. Commanding General,35 the
immediate release of the petitioner was
ordered, it being apparent that the general
court martial appointed by respondent
Commanding General was without
jurisdiction to try petitioner. Thereafter, in
the cited cases of Syquia, Marquez Lim, and
Johnson, the parties proceeded against were
American army commanding officers
stationed in the Philippines. The insuperable
obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent
Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its
consent is haled into court in connection with
acts performed by it pursuant to treaty
provisions and thus impressed with a
governmental character.
3. The infirmity of the actuation of
respondent Judge becomes even more
glaring when it is considered that private
respondent had ceased to have any right of
entering within the base area. This is made
clear in the petition in these words: "In 1962,
respondent Gener was issued by the Bureau
of Forestry an ordinary timber license to cut
logs in Barrio Mabayo, Moring, Bataan. The
license was renewed on July 10, 1963. In
1963, he commenced logging operation inside
the United States Naval Base, Subic Bay,
but in November 1963 he was apprehended
and stopped by the Base authorities from
logging inside the Base. The renewal of his
license expired on July 30, 1964, and to date
his license has not been renewed by the
Bureau of Forestry. * * * In July 1964, the
Mutual Defense Board, a joint Philippines-
United States agency established pursuant
to an exchange of diplomatic notes between
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Ambassador to provide 'direct
liaison and consultation between
appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities on military matters of mutual
concern,' advised the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in writing that: The enclosed map
shows that the area in which Mr. Gener was
logging definitely falls within the boundaries
of the base. This map also depicts certain
contiguous and overlapping areas whose
functional usage would be interfered with by
the logging operations.'"36Nowhere in the
answer of respondents, nor in their
memorandum, was this point met. It
remained unrefuted.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari
prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting
aside the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No.
2984 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan.
The injunction issued by this Court on March
18, 1965 enjoining the enforcement of the
aforesaid writ of preliminary injunction of
respondent Judge is hereby made
permanent. Costs against private
respondent Edgardo Gener.
Zaldivar, Antonio, Fernandez and
Aquino, JJ.,concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Certiorari granted, writ of preliminary
injunction nullified and set aside.
Notes.—Statutory provisions waiving
State immunity from suits are strictly
construed and waiver of immunity, being in
derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred (Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc.
vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA
1120). The immunity of the State from suit
cannot be invoked where the action is
instituted by a person who is neither an
enemy nor an ally of an enemy for the
purpose of establishing his right, title or
interest in a vested property, and of
recovering his ownership and possession
thereof (Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of
Printing Employees Ass'n., 1 SCRA
340; Philippine Resources Development
Corporation vs. Republic, 13 SCRA
697; Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs.
Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA
1120; American Ins. Co. vs. Macondray &
Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 1103; Equitable Ins. &
Casualty Co., Inc. vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 20
SCRA 1121; Insurance Company of North
America vs. Republic, 20 SCRA
1159; Champion Auto Supply Co., Inc. vs.
Bureau of Customs, 21 SCRA 460; Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. vs. Customs Arrastre Service, 21
SCRA 461; Insurance Company of North
America vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 463; Union
Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. vs.
Republic, 27 SCRA 445; Insurance Company
of North America vs. Osaka Shosen
Kaisha, 27 SCRA 780; Providence
Washington Ins. Co. vs. Republic, 29 SCRA
598).
It is the duty of the party to allege in his
complaint the State's consent to be
sued (Insurance Company of North America
vs. Republic,20 SCRA 627, 20 SCRA
648; North British & Mercantile Ins. Co.,
Ltd. vs. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 20 SCRA
629; Shell Refinery Company (Phil), Inc. vs.
Manila Port Service, 20 SCRA
919; Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co.,
Inc. vs. Smith, Bell & Co. (Phil.),Inc., 20
SCRA 1121).
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, Volume One,
page 375 on Constitutional Law; and page
501 on Courts.
See also SCRA Quick Index-
Digest, Volume two, page 1114 on
Jurisdiction; and page 1739 on Preliminary
Injunction.
———o0o———
G.R. Nos. 97468-70. September 2, 1993.*
SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, represented
by its Chief, DR. FLOR J. LACANILAO,
petitioner, vs. DANILO ACOSTA in his
capacity as Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Arbitration, Branch VI,
CORAZON CANTO, DAN BALIAO,
ELIZABETH SUPETRAN, CARMELITA
FERRER, CATHRYN CONTRADOR, and
DORIC VELOSO, respondents.
International Law; Jurisdiction; It is
beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is
an international agency enjoying diplomatic
immunity.—It is beyond question that
petitioner SEAFDEC is an international
agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. This,
we have already held in Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture
Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA
283/1992/; see also Lacanilao v. de Leon, G.R.
No. 76532, 147 SCRA 286/1987, where we
said—“Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction
of public respondent NLRC.
Same; Same; Same; Section 2 of PD
No. 292 had provided for the autonomous
character of SEAFDEC.—Furthermore,
Section 2 of the same decree had provided for
the autonomous character of SEAFDEC,
thus: “x x x All funds received by the
Department shall be receipted and disbursed
in accordance with the Agreement
establishing the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center and pertinent
resolutions duly approved by the SEAFDEC
Council.”
Same; Same; Same; Anent the issue of
waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the
moment that the petitioner has timely raised
the issue of jurisdiction.—Anent the issue of
waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the
moment that the petitioner has timely raised
the issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner
did not question the public respondent’s lack
of jurisdiction at the early stages of the
proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it
rested its case and certainly well before the
proceedings thereat had terminated.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and
prohibition.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the
Court.
Hector P. Teodosio for petitioner.
Cirilo Ganzon, Jr. for private
respondents.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order, to set aside the order of
respondent labor arbiter, dated 20
September 1990, denying herein petitioner’s
motion to dismiss the cases subject matter of
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Two labor cases, docketed as RAB Case
No. VI-0156-86and RAB Case No. VI—0214-
86, were filed by the herein private
respondents against the petitioner,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In
these cases, the private respondents claim
having been wrongfully terminated from
their employment by the petitioner.
 On 22 August 1990, the petitioner,
contending to be an international inter-
government organization, composed of
various Southeast Asian countries, filed a
Motion to Dismiss, challenging the
jurisdiction of the public respondent in
taking cognizance of the above cases.
On 20 September 1990, the public
respondent issued the assailed order denying
the Motion to Dismiss. In due course, a
Motion for Reconsideration was interposed
but the same, in an order, dated 07 January
1991, was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant petition. This Court,
on 20 March 1991, issued the temporary
restraining order prayed for.
The private respondents, as well as
respondent labor arbiter, allege that the
petitioner is not immune from suit and
assuming that if, indeed, it is an
international organization, it has, however,
impliedly, if not expressly, waived its
immunity by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction.
The Solicitor (General, on his part, filed
a Manifestation and Motion, which the Court
granted, praying that he be excused from
filing his comment for respondent Labor
Arbiter, he not being in agreement with the
latter’s position on this matter.
On 30 March 1992, this Court dismissed
the instant petition in a resolution which
reads:
“x x x—Considering the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the petition for
certiorari as well as the separate comments
thereon of the public and private
respondents, and the consolidated reply
thereto of the petitioner, the Court
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for
failure to sufficiently show that the
questioned judgment is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The temporary
restraining order issued on March 20, 1991
is hereby LIFTED effective immediately.”
In time, the petitioner moved for a
reconsideration, arguing that the ground for
its seeking the allowance of the petition is
the labor arbiter’s lack of jurisdiction over
the dispute.
The court is now asked to rule upon the
motion for reconsideration.
We rule for the petitioner.
It is beyond question that petitioner
SEAFDEC is an international agency
enjoying diplomatic immunity. This, we have
already held in Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development CenterAquaculture
Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA
283 [1992]; see also Lacanilao v. de
Leon, G.R. No. 76532, 147 SCRA 286 [1987],
where we said—
“Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture
Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction
of public respondent NLRC.
“It was established by the Governments
of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of
Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos,
Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines,
Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand
and Republic of Vietnam x x x.
“The Republic of the Philippines became
a signatory to the Agreement establishing
SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968. Its purpose
is as follows:
The purpose of the Center is to contribute to
the promotion of the fisheries development in
Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation
among the member governments of the
Center, hereinafter called the ‘Members’,
and through collaboration with international
organizations and governments external to
the Center. (Agreement Establishing the
SEAFDEC, Art. 1; x x x).
“SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during
the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on
July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as
one of the principal departments of
SEAFDEC x x x to be established in Iloilo for
the promotion of research in aquaculture.
Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement
establishing SEAFDEC mandates:
1. ‘1.The Council shall be the
supreme organ of the Center and
all powers of the Center shall be
vested in the Council.’
“Being an intergovernmental
organization, SEAFDEC including its
Department (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of
the state in whose territory its office is
located.
“As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and
Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in
their book, Public International Law (p. 83,
1956 ed.):
‘Permanent international commissions and
administrative bodies have been created by
the agreement of a considerable number of
States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-
political. Among the notable instances are
the International Labor Organization, the
International Institute of Agriculture, the
International Danube Commission. In so far
as they are autonomous and beyond the
control of any one State, they have a distinct
juridical personality independent of the
municipal law of the State where they are
situated. As such, according to one leading
authority (t)hey must be deemed to possess a
species of international personality of their
own. (Salonga and Yap, Public International
Law, 83 [1956 ed.]’
“Pursuant to its being a signatory to the
Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines
agreed to be represented by one Director in
the governing SEAFDEC Council
(Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5,
Par. 1, x x x), and that its national laws and
regulations shall apply only insofar as its
contributions to SEAFDEC of “an agreed
amount of money, movable and immovable
property and services necessary for the
establishment and operation of the Center”
are concerned (Art. 11, ibid).It expressly
waived the application of the Philippines
laws on the disbursement of funds of
petitioner SEAFDECAQD (Section 2, P.D.
No. 292).
“The then Minister of Justice likewise
opined that Philippine Courts have no
jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion
No. 139, Series of 1984—
‘4. One of the basic immunities of an
international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from
the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found.
(See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such
an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions
of the organization; besides, such subjection
to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states. In the case at bar, for
instance, the entertainment by the National
Labor Relations Commission of Mr.
Madamba’s reinstatement cases would
amount to interference by the Philippine
Government in the management decisions of
the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it
could compromise the desired impartiality of
the organization since it will have to suit its
actuations to the requirements of Philippine
law, which may not necessarily coincide with
the interests of the other member-states. It
is precisely to forestall these possibilities
that in cases where the extent of the
immunity is specified in the enabling
instruments of international organizations,
(jurisdictional immunity, is specified in the
enabling instruments of international
organizations) jurisdictional immunity from
the host country is invariably among the first
accorded.’ (See Jenks, Id.; See Bowett. The
Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-
285).”
At its Sixth Meeting held at Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, on 3 to 7 July 1973, the SEAFDEC
Council approved the formal establishment
of its Aquaculture Department in the
province of Iloilo, Philippines, to promote
research in Aquaculture as so expressed in
the ‘Whereas” Clauses of Presidential Decree
No. 292 issued on 13 September
1973.1 Furthermore, Section 2 of the same
decree had provided for the autonomous
character of SEAFDEC, thus:
“x x x All funds received by the Department
shall be receipted and disbursed in
accordance with the Agreement establishing
the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center and pertinent resolutions duly
approved by the SEAFDEC Council.”
As aptly pointed out by Associate Justice
Isagani Cruz of this Court—
“Certain administrative bodies created by
agreement among states may be vested with
international personality when two
conditions concur, to wit:, that their purposes
are mainly non-political and that they are
autonomous, i.e., not subject to the control of
any state.”2
Anent the issue of waiver of immunity,
suffice it to say at the moment that the
petitioner has timely raised the issue of
jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not
question the public respondent’s lack of
jurisdiction at the early stages of the
proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it
rested its case and certainly well before the
proceedings thereat had terminated.
WHEREFORE, our resolution, dated 30
March 1992, dismissing the petition for
certiorari, is hereby reconsidered, and
another is entered (a) granting due course to
the petition; (b) setting aside the order dated
20 September 1990, of the public respondent;
and (c) enjoining the public respondent from
further proceeding with RAB Case No. VI-
0156-86 and RAB Case No. VI-0214-86. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo
, JJ.,concur.
Petition given due course. Questioned
order set aside.
Note.—A party who voluntarily
participates in the trial cannot later on raise
the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction
(Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency
(Filipinas) Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 646).
——o0o——
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.*
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City,
respondents.
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the
factual antecedents satisfactorily establish
the existence of a foreign element, the problem
could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the
factual antecedents satisfactorily establish
the existence of a foreign element, we agree
with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation
that cuts across territorial lines and is
affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a “foreign element.”
The presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their
birth or conception.
Same; Same; The forms in which a
foreign element may appear are many, such
as the fact that one party is a resident
Philippine national, and that the other is a
resident foreign corporation.—The forms in
which this foreign element may appear are
many. The foreign element may simply
consist in the fact that one of the parties to a
contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile,
or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another
State. In other cases, the foreign element
may assume a complex form. In the instant
case, the foreign element consisted in the fact
that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation.
Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada
with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her
many occasions of travel across national
borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation
to arise.
Same; Same; Damages; While Article
19 of the Civil Code merely declares a
principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions; Violations of Articles 19 and 21
are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.—Although
Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,
Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus,
we agree with private respondent’s assertion
that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are
actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum. Based on
the allegations in the Amended Complaint,
read in the light of the Rules of Court on
jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is
provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 7691.
Same; Same; Forum Non
Conveniens; Forum Shopping; Plaintiff may
not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’
‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by
inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance, but unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.—Pragmatic considerations,
including the convenience of the parties, also
weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon
City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Enforceability
of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles
to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff
may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the
defendant, e.g.by inflicting upon him
needless expense or disturbance. But unless
the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.
Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek
remedial action in a place where she no
longer maintains substantial connections
would cause a fundamental unfairness to
her.—Weighing the relative claims of the
parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to
take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to
seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Same; Same; A party effectively
submits to the trial court’s jurisdiction by
praying for the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.—The
records show that petitioner SAUDIA has
filed several motions praying for the
dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint.
SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20,
1995. What is very patent and explicit from
the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for
other reliefs under the premises.
Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court’s
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.—As to the choice of applicable law,
we note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.
Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-
law theories should intrinsically advance
both notions of justice and predictability, they
do not always do so, in which case the forum
is then faced with the problem of deciding
which of these two important values should
be stressed.—Several theories have been
propounded in order to identify the legal
system that should ultimately control.
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories
should intrinsically advance both notions of
justice and predictability, they do not always
do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed.
Same; Characterization or Doctrine of
Qualification; Words and
Phrases; Characterization is the “process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the
kind of question specified in a conflicts
rule.”—Before a choice can be made, it is
necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as “characterization,”
or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the
“process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a
conflicts rule.” The purpose of
“characterization” is to enable the forum to
select the proper law.
Same; Same; An essential element of
conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or
“connecting factor” or “point of contact.”—
Our starting point of analysis here is not a
legal relation, but a factual situation, event,
or operative fact. An essential element of
conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or
“connecting factor” or “point of contact.”
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res,
the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Same; Same; “Test Factors” or “Points
of Contact” or “Connecting Factors.”—Note
that one or more circumstances may be
present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These
“test factors” or “points of contact” or
“connecting factors” could be any of the
following: “(1) the nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn,
or his origin; (2) the seat of a legal or juridical
person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of
a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or
is deemed to be situated. In particular,
the lex situs is decisive when real rights are
involved; (4) the place where an act has been
done, the locus actus, such as the place where
a contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
The lex loci actus is particularly important in
contracts and torts; (5) the place where an act
is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place
of performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised; (6) the intention of the contracting
parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the
place where judicial or administrative
proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
fori—the law of the forum—is particularly
important because, as we have seen earlier,
matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed
by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that
it falls under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and (8) the flag of
a ship, which in many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of the ship
and of its master or owner as such. It also
covers contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment.” (Italics ours.)
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Where the
action is one involving torts, the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place
or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred; The Philippines is the situs of
the tort where it is in the Philippines where
the defendant allegedly deceived the plaintiff,
a citizen residing and working here, and the
fact that certain acts or parts of the injury
occurred in another country is of no moment,
for what is important is the place where the
over-all harm or the totality of the injury to
the person, reputation, social standing and
human rights of the plaintiff had lodged.—
Considering that the complaint in the court a
quo is one involving torts, the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place
or places where the tortious conduct or lex
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort
(the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly
deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice,
give her her due and observe honesty and
good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to
protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in
another country is of no moment. For in our
view what is important here is the place
where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent).
All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “State of
the Most Significant Relationship” Rule; The
“State of the most significant relationship”
rule is the appropriate modern theory on tort
liability to apply in the instant case.—With
the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern
theories and rules on tort liability have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to
arrive at just results. In keeping abreast
with the modern theories on tort liability, we
find here an occasion to apply the “State of
the most significant relationship” rule, which
in our view should be appropriate to apply
now, given the factual context of this case. In
applying said principle to determine the
State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be
taken into account and evaluated according
to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the
parties; and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Wh
ere the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place “having the most
interest in the problem,” the Philippine law
on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of
the legal issues arising therein.—As already
discussed, there is basis for the claim that
over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question
that private respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a resident
foreign corporation engaged here in the
business of international air carriage. Thus,
the “relationship” between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed
that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that
the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute,
raised by private respondent as plaintiff
below against defendant (herein petitioner),
in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the
Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
of and the place “having the most interest in
the problem,” we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on
tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of
the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter of the
complaint; the appropriate venue is in
Quezon City, which could properly apply
Philippine law.
Same; Pleadings and
Practice; Evidence; A party whose cause of
action is based on a Philippine law has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of
another State.—We find untenable
petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the
burden of pleading and proving the
applicable Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly
said by private respondent, she has “no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of
action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law
should govern this case. And as correctly
held by the respondent appellate court,
“considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of
Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it
[petitioner] to plead and to establish what
the law of Saudi Arabia is.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo &
Ongsiako for petitioner.
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law
Offices for private respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and
set aside the Resolution1 dated September
27, 1995 and the Decision2 dated April 10,
1996 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 36533,4 and the Orders5 dated August
29, 19946 and February 2, 19957 that were
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which
gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in
the questioned Decision,9 are as follows:
“On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA
hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer
AlGazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels,
they agreed to have breakfast together at the
room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly
after he did, Thamer attempted to rape
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help
and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-
Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few
days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident.
They then requested her to go back to
Jakarta to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager
Baharini negotiated with the police for the
immediate release of the detained crew
members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid
that she might be tricked into something she
did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also
declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect.
Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to
return to Jeddah but barred her from the
Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two
weeks of detention. Eventually, they were
again put in service by defendant SAUDIA
(sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested
her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
When she saw him, he brought her to the
police station where the police took her
passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as
the police put pressure on her to make a
statement dropping the case against Thamer
and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did
the police return her passport and allowed
her to catch the afternoon flight out of
Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16,
1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes
before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane
and instead ordered to take a later flight to
Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain
Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her
that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so after
receiving assurance from SAUDIA’s Manila
manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed
no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer
brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on
June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but
on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport,
however, just as her plane was about to take
off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline
had forbidden her to take flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told to
go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took
away her passport and told her to remain in
Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further
orders.
On July 3, 1993, a SAUDIA legal officer
again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to her
in English, sentencing her to five months
imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then
did she realize that the Saudi court had tried
her, together with Thamer and Allah, for
what happened in Jakarta. The court found
plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing
with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.”10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought
the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her
case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of
SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued
to serve in the international flights.11
Because she was wrongfully convicted,
the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case
against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila,12she was terminated from the
service by SAUDIA, without her being
informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a
Complaint13 for damages against SAUDIA,
and Khaled Al-Balawi (“Al-Balawi”), its
country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an
Omnibus Motion To Dismiss14 which raised
the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action against
SAUDIA; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not
a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been
waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has
no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her
Opposition (To Motion to
Dismiss).15 SAUDIA filed a reply16 thereto on
March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an
Amended Complaint17 wherein Al-Balawi
was dropped as party defendant. On August
11, 1994, SAUDIA filed its Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint.18
The trial court issued an Order19 dated
August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by
SAUDIA.
From the Order of respondent
Judge20 denying the Motion to Dismiss,
SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its
Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Order
dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the
trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try
the case on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code, since the proper law applicable is the
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
October 14, 1994, Morada filed her
Opposition22 (To Defendant’s Motion for
Reconsideration).
In the Reply23 filed with the trial court
on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that
since its Motion for Reconsideration raised
lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the
Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if
that ground is raised for the first time on
appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that
the Philippines does not have any
substantial interest in the prosecution of the
instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction
to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued
another Order24dated February 2, 1995,
denying SAUDIA’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the
assailed Order reads as follows:
“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of
defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru
counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru
counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the
Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24,
1994, considering that a perusal of the
plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which is one
for the recovery of actual, moral and
exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees,
upon the basis of the applicable Philippine
law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, clearly, within the
jurisdiction of this Court as regards the
subject matter, and there being nothing new
of substance which might cause the reversal
or modification of the order sought to be
reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration
of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995,
SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order26 with the Court of
Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated a Resolution with Temporary
Restraining Order27 dated February 23,
1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from
further conducting any proceeding, unless
otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution28 promulgated on
September 27, 1995, now assailed, the
appellate court denied SAUDIA’s Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
“The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,
after considering the Answer, with Prayer to
Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo,
p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing
that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled
thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100335,
April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.”
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this
Honorable Court the instant Petition29 for
Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the
instant Petition, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision30 dated April
10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the
Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaint’s
basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further
held that certiorari is not the proper remedy
in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch
as the petitioner should have proceeded to
trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find
recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its
Supplemental Petition for Review with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order31dated April 30, 1996, given due
course by this Court. After both parties
submitted their Memoranda,32 the instant
case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following
issues:
“I.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear
and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on
Article 21 of the New Civil Code since the
proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this
case involves what is known in private
international law as a ‘conflicts problem.’
Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines
will sit in judgment of the acts done by
another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a
supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to
absence of leave of court is now moot and
academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on
petitioner’s April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A
Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten
(10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the
Revised Rules of Court should be construed
with liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1
thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the
April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
36533 entitled ‘Saudi Arabian Airlines v.
Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al.’ and filed its
April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29
a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary
period as provided for under Section 1, Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore,
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533has not
yet become final and executory and this
Honorable Court can take cognizance of this
case.”33
From the foregoing factual and procedural
antecedents, the following issues emerge for
our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-
18394 ENTITLED “MILAGROS P.
MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.”
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW
SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a
conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset. It maintains that private
respondent’s claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It
alleges that the existence of a foreign
element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule.34
On the other hand, private respondent
contends that since her Amended Complaint
is based on Articles 1935 and 2136 of the Civil
Code, then the instant case is properly a
matter of domestic law.37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining
in this case, there is no dispute that the
interplay of events occurred in two states,
the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her
Amended Complaint38 dated June 23, 1994:
1. “2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a
foreign airlines corporation doing
business in the Philippines. It
may be served with summons and
other court processes at Travel
Wide Associated Sales (Phils.),
Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building,
114 Valero St., Salcedo Village,
Makati, Metro Manila.x x x x SAUDIA officer told her that the
xx xxx
2. 6.Plaintiff learned that, through
the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to
deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention.
Eventually, they were again put
in service by defendant
SAUDIA. In September 1990,
defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.
3. 7.On January 14, 1992, just when
plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her,
her superiors requested her to see
Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw
him, he brought her to the police
station where the police took her
passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy simply stood by as the
police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah.
Not until she agreed to do so did
the police return her passport
and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
4. 8.One year and a half later or on
June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to
see Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she
did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked
to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this
was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, plaintiff signed a
notice to her to appear before the
court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.
1. 9.Shortly afterwards, defendant
SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff
did so after receiving assurance
from SAUDIA’s Manila manager,
Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
2. 10.In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal
officer brought plaintiff to the
same Saudi court on June 27,
1993. Nothing happened then but
on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta
incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At
the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a
airline had forbidden her to take
that flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go,
the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport
and told her to remain in Jeddah,
at the crew quarters, until
further orders.
3. 11.On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal
officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge,
to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to
a disco, dancing, and listening to
the music in violation of Islamic
laws; (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
4. 12.Because SAUDIA refused to
lend her a hand in the case,
plaintiff sought the help of the
Philippine Embassy in Jeddah.
The latter helped her pursue an
appeal from the decision of the
court. To pay for her upkeep, she
worked on the domestic flights of
defendant SAUDIA while,
ironically, Thamer and Allah
 freely served the international
flights.”39
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily
establish the existence of a foreign element,
we agree with petitioner that the problem
herein could present a “conflicts” case.
A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain
a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign
element is inevitable since social and
economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or
conception.40
The forms in which this foreign element
may appear are many.41 The foreign element
may simply consist in the fact that one of the
parties to a contract is an alien or has a
foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties
situated in another State. In other cases, the
foreign element may assume a complex
form.42
In the instant case, the foreign element
consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national,
and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident
foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner
SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, particularly
from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
“conflicts” situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent’s
assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself
here, and the question of
jurisdiction43confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private
respondent’s Amended Complaint,44 and the
Comment thereon, we note that she aptly
predicated her cause of action on Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil
Code provides:
“Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.”
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New
Civil Code provides:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.”
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs.
Court of Appeals,45 this Court held that:
“The aforecited provisions on human
relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically
provide in the statutes.”
Although Article 19 merely declares a
principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private
respondent’s assertion that violations of
Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum.
Based on the allegations46 in the
Amended Complaint, read in the light of the
Rules of Court on jurisdiction47 we find that
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City possesses jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit.48Its authority to try and
hear the case is provided for under Section 1
of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
“Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,” is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and cost or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
And following Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court—the venue, Quezon
City, is appropriate:
“SEC. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—
[Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions.—All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of
the plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.”
Pragmatic considerations, including the
convenience of the parties, also weigh
heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the
private interest of the litigant. Enforceability
of a judgment if one is obtained is quite
obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles
to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff
may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g.
by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance.
But unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.49
Weighing the relative claims of the
parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to
take cognizance of the case, it would be
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to
seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the
Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of
the parties. The choice of forum of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be
upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses
jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and
Amended Complaint with the trial court,
private respondent has voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
court.
The records show that petitioner
SAUDIA has filed several motions50 praying
for the dismissal of Morada’s Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer
In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February
20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit
from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA
prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court’s
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and
Company, Ltd.:51
“We observe that the motion to dismiss filed
on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the
lower court’s jurisdiction over defendant’s
person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that plaintiff’s cause of action
has prescribed. By interposing such second
ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co.,
Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the
basis of which it prayed the court to resolve
controversy in its favor. For the court to
validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker
& Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latter’s person, who,
being the proponent of the affirmative
defense, should be deemed to have
abandoned its special appearance and
voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court.”
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs.
Ferandos, held that:
“When the appearance is by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole
and separate purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for
any other purpose than to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, he
thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. A special appearance by motion
made for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person will
be held to be a general appearance, if the
party in said motion should, for example, ask
for a dismissal of the action upon the further
ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.”52
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the case and that
its exercise thereof, justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we
note that choice-of-law problems seek to
answer two important questions: (1) What
legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.53
Several theories have been propounded
in order to identify the legal system that
should ultimately control. Although ideally,
all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically
advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The
forum is then faced with the problem of
deciding which of these two important values
should be stressed.54
Before a choice can be made, it is
necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall.
This process is known as “characterization,”
or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the
“process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a
conflicts rule.”55 The purpose of
“characterization” is to enable the forum to
select the proper law.56
Our starting point of analysis here is not
a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact.57An essential
element of conflict rules is the indication of a
“test” or “connecting factor” or “point of
contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as
the situs of the res, the place of celebration,
the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.58
Note that one or more circumstances
may be present to serve as the possible test
for the determination of the applicable
law.59 These “test factors” or “points of
contact” or “connecting factors” could be any
of the following:
1. “(1)the nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place
of sojourn, or his origin;
2. (2)the seat of a legal or juridical
person, such as a corporation;
3. (3)the situs of a thing, that is, the
place where a thing is, or is
deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is
decisive when real rights are
involved;
4. (4)the place where an act has been
done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a
will signed or a tort committed.
The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
5. (5)the place where an act is
intended to come into effect, e.g.,
the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place
where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
6. (6)the intention of the contracting
parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex
loci intentionis;
7. (7)the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori—
the law of the forum—is
particularly important because,
as we have seen earlier, matters
of ‘procedure’ not going to the Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
substance of the claim involved claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
are governed by it; and because injury allegedly occurred in another country
the lex foriapplies whenever the is of no moment. For in our view what is
content of the otherwise important here is the place where the over-
applicable foreign law is excluded all harm or the totality of the alleged injury
from application in a given case to the person, reputation, social standing and
for the reason that it falls under human rights of complainant, had lodged,
one of the exceptions to the according to the plaintiff below (herein
applications of foreign law; and private respondent). All told, it is not without
8. (8)the flag of a ship, which in many basis to identify the Philippines as the situs
cases is decisive of practically all of the alleged tort.
legal relationships of the ship Moreover, with the widespread criticism
and of its master or owner as of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti
such. It also covers contractual commissi, modern theories and rules on tort
relationships particularly liability61 have been advanced to offer fresh
contracts of judicial approaches to arrive at just results.
affreightment.”60 (Italics ours.) In keeping abreast with the modern theories
on tort liability, we find here an occasion to
apply the “State of the most significant
After a careful study of the pleadings on
relationship” rule, which in our view should
record, including allegations in the Amended
be appropriate to apply now, given the
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of
factual context of this case.
the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
In applying said principle to determine
there is reasonable basis for private
the State which has the most significant
respondent’s assertion that although she was
relationship, the following contacts are to be
already working in Manila, petitioner
taken into account and evaluated according
brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that
to their relative importance with respect to
she would merely testify in an investigation
the particular issue: (a) the place where the
of the charges she made against the two
injury occurred; (b) the place where the
SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
person while they were in Jakarta. As it
domicile, residence, nationality, place of
turned out, she was the one made to face trial
incorporation and place of business of the
for very serious charges, including adultery
parties; and (d) the place where the
and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
relationship, if any, between the parties is
There is likewise logical basis on record
centered.62
for the claim that the “handing over” or
As already discussed, there is basis for
“turning over” of the person of private
the claim that overall injury occurred and
respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner
lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise
may have acted beyond its duties as
no question that private respondent is a
employer. Petitioner’s purported act
resident Filipina national, working with
contributed to and amplified or even
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
proximately caused additional humiliation,
engaged here in the business of international
misery and suffering of private respondent.
air carriage. Thus, the “relationship”
Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the
between the parties was centered here,
arrest, detention and prosecution of private
although it should be stressed that this suit
respondent under the guise of petitioner’s
is not based on mere labor law violations.
authority as employer, taking advantage of
From the record, the claim that the
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed
Philippines has the most significant contact
upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince
with the matter in this dispute,63 raised by
of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
private respondent as plaintiff below against
imprisonment of private respondent was
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view,
wrongful. But these capped the injury or
has been properly established.
harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and
Prescinding from this premise that the
reputation, for which petitioner could be
Philippines is the situs of the tort complained
liable as claimed, to provide compensation or
of and the place “having the most interest in
redress for the wrongs done, once duly
the problem,” we find, by way of
proven.
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on
Considering that the complaint in the
tort liability should have paramount
court a quo is one involving torts, the
application to and control in the resolution of
“connecting factor” or “point of contact” could
the legal issues arising out of this case.
be the place or places where the tortious
Further, we hold that the respondent
conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
applying the torts principle in a conflicts
the parties and the subject matter of the
case, we find that the Philippines could be
complaint; the appropriate venue is in
said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
Quezon City, which could properly apply
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
Philip-pine law. Moreover, we find untenable
because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner’s insistence that “[s]ince private
petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the
respondent, a Filipina residing and working
burden of pleading and proving the
here. According to her, she had honestly
applicable Saudi law on the matter.”64 As
believed that petitioner would, in the
aptly said by private respondent, she has “no
exercise of its rights and in the performance
obligation to plead and prove the law of the
of its duties, “act with justice, give her her
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of
due and observe honesty and good faith.”
action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law
should govern this case.65 And as correctly
held by the respondent appellate court,
“considering that it was the petitioner who
was invoking the applicability of the law of
Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it
[petitioner] to plead and to establish what
the law of Saudi Arabia is.”66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the
respondent appellate court in upholding the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s (herein
petitioner’s) motion to dismiss the case. Not
only was jurisdiction in order and venue
properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and expeditious trial
itself indicated by the nature of the case at
hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the
state intimately concerned with the ultimate
outcome of the case below, not just for the
benefit of all the litigants, but also for the
vindication of the country’s system of law
and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the
light of relevant Philippine law, with due
consideration of the foreign element or
elements involved. Nothing said herein, of
course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby DISMISSED Civil Case
No. Q-93-18394 entitled “Milagros P. Morada
vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines” is hereby
REMANDED to Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Panga
niban, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed, Civil Case No. Q-93-

18394 remanded to lower court.
Notes.—Forum-shopping originated as
a concept in private international law, where
non-resident litigants are given the option to
choose the forum or place wherein to bring
their suit for various reasons or excuses,
including to secure procedural advantages,
to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. (First Philippine
International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 252
SCRA 259 [1996])
After having acquired jurisdiction over a
plaintiff foreign corporation by virtue of the
filing of the original complaint, the
Philippine court now has the discretion,
based on the facts of the case, to either give
due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the
principle of forum non conveniens.
(Communication Materials and Design, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 673 [1996])