Abunado Vs People Civil Law – Family Code – Article 35 – Bigamy –
Prejudicial Question - Remedial Law – Criminal Procedure – Prejudicial Question
In 1967, Narcisa Arceño married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceño left for
Japan to work there. She returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be
found as he left the family home. Arceño was able to locate Abunado but
when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else.
Further, Arceño also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain
Zenaida Biñas.
In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceño. In May
1995, Arceño filed a bigamy case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded
simultaneously and independently in different courts.
In 1999, the marriage between Arceño and Abunado was annulled. In 2001,
Abunado was convicted by the trial court for bigamy.
Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he
alleged that the annulment case he filed against Arceño was a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceño. Hence, the
proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the
pendency of the annulment case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.
HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case,
even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was
void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of
bigamy were present – the nullity of the prior marriage is immaterial.
Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon - Article 40
In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. They’ve had 4 children
since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of
the nullity of their marriage due to Felix’s PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the
conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of
concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against
Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue
conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets
resolved. The lower court denied Beltran’s petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the
RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a
prejudicial question in the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides: “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.”
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other
than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltran’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of
concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even
a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
Kenneth Ngo Te vs Rowena Yu Te (G.R. No. 161793)
Quimiguing vs Icao
 TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They
met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage
to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate
court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to
prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by
petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short
of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the
SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared
the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is
no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.
ISSUE: Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the
parties is null and void?
HELD: The petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was
reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties
afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of
marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were
neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite
the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with
plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent.
As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant
and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for
support at P120 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of
cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no
amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of
action”.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages. HELD:
Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The
conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man
forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for
the damage caused.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity,

the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the
sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological
disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.

Geluz vs CA
 TITLE: Geluz vs CA CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio
Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita
became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again
on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s
daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at
this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the
abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her
abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at
P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus
that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals
predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral
damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of
Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the
beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since
he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves
as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
De Jesus vs Syquia TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a
barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia,
the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On
February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his
and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he
continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s”
sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another
woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written
by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity
and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of
the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's
resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages
to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has
no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could
be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order
as to the amount of pension.
Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante
TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San
Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is
a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial
judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality
because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered
as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution
of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante
which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the
pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion,
both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”.
Dumlao vs Quality Plastics
FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering
defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958
before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's
land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of
nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction
on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics
was not aware on Oria’s death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally
served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged
and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products,
Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be
annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned
that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos’
agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Oria’s
death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity. Lower court’s judgment against Oria in T-662 is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had
no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the
judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim
attorney’s fees against the corporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack
of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732
is also void.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
 Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she
was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the
case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections 174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country
or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of
authorized representative might properly allow.
the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up
1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was
to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim
forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but that
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
nature of a quo warranto which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten
she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
days after his proclamation.
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak
either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in- law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to
appealed.
the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his being
a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon
Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At
her marriage to a Filipino citizen. best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance
to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not
HELD:
 Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required
to go through a

naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it

should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature
intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization
proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her
own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is

UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC Case Digest UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC
 95
P.R. 890
Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and
secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to
1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California.
In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months
vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for
naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took
a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational
institution. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the
Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as
used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with
domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another
domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying
in the United States, at that time, being, merely to study therein.
Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after
the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first
date set for the hearing thereof.
Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the
same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes
domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time for
business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an
intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his
petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first
date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under
oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of
the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in
his favor.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy
from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College
now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by
adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are
in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence”
in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home
and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
 Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA
 GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her
gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male
characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines- Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before
the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth
certificate be changed.
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held
that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme
Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact
that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement
made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition
and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first
night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have
their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives
went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant
avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at
the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the
same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of
this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in
Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the
medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming
Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country. Gina
does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage
declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves
her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can
still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another
physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his
wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the
mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the
marriage.
Duncan Association v. Glaxo welcome,
Facts: Petitioner, Pedro Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo as medical
representative, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. He signed a
contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by existing company rules. Another stipulation which is also found of Glaxo’s
Employee Code of Conduct provides the duty to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses
a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
 Tecson was initially
assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. He, subsequently entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, branch
coordinator of Astra in Albay, a competitor of Glaxo. She supervised the district
managers and medical representatives of her company and prepared marketing
strategies for Astra in that area. The two married even with the several reminders
given by the District Manager to Tecson. In January 1999, Tecson’s superiors
informed him that his marriage to Bettsy gave rise to a conflict of interest. Despite
several reminders and time allowances, Tecson was not able to resolve the issue on
conflicting interest. This situation eventually led to his alleged constructive dismissal.
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing CA’s decision and resolution.
Issue: Is Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from marrying an employee
of a competitor company is valid?
Held: Yes. No reversible error can be ascribed to the Court of Appeals when
it ruled that Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship
with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra
are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of
competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo
possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and
enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to
the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does
not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The
law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
 Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to
return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Issue:(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence;
Held:(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is
a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Star Paper Corporation vs. Ronaldo reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that
FACTS: Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a
employee and they eventually had a relationship and got married. Prior to the
regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on
marriage, the manager advise the couple that should they decide to get marr
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ied, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy: 1) new applica
nt will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to
consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2) if the two employees go
terminate the services of an employee.
t married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated first. Simb
ol resigned.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female
ISSUE:Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from worki
employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and
ng in the same company, a valid exercise of management prerogative.
employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
RULING:No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violate
provided by law.
s the rights of employees under the constitution. The case at bar involves Arti
cle 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employe
PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker
r to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that
who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to
a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly t
all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record
hat upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or s
discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
eparated , or to actually dismiss, discharge , discriminate or otherwise prejudi
because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for
ce a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.” The company poli
employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts
cy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement of reas
of dishonesty.
onableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business necessity.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machi
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by
ne Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, co
PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
uld be detrimental to its business operations. The questioned policy may not
facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an
effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judici
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
al scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”
PT&T vs. NLRC

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the

FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de
Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation
Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from
November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on
against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is
maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom
Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes
at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary
institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy
employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion
must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order
contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the
marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
but also imperatively required.
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr.,
a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered
into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is
not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the
judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses
and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal
arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After
ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation. Such
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified
and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan,
Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by
the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by
maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and
decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so
compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious
freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to
present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government
which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government
be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks
to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free
exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct
where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling
state interest” test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case
where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and
centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present
evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's
religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts
in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office
of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252
FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before
petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
outside the conjugal home.
HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband,
who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying
her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is
driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the
case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home.
Eugenio vs Velez Case Digest
Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death
on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27,
1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ
of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already
obtained a burial permit. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband,
he has legal custody of her body.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
Held:
The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters. Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man
or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon
the nearest kin of the deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case
law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.(Eugenio vs Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990).
Cosca vs. Palaypayon 237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
 The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1),
Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora
(Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge,
and Nelia B. Esmeralda- Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac,
Camarines Sur.
marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed
a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6
years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only
18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years
already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must
have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to
believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the order to avoid the marriage license requirement.

requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the
just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an
Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato
irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya &
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did
administratively liable.
not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he
Wassmer vs Velez - Breach of Promise to Marry
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that they have to postpone their
him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the wedding because his mother opposed it. And on the next day he sent her the
marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do following telegram “Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon
so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage
apologize mama papa love Paking”. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was
by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
he heard from again, sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer
was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
and was declared in default. The record reveals that on August 23, 1954,
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date
and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was

contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo &
Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated
by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite
license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests
which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
subsequently issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride- to-be’s trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before the
wedding he never returned and was never heard from again.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents. ISSUE:
promise to marry.
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As

along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation
their marriage. Bocaya declared and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
that they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as husband
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The lower court’s judgment is hereby
and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge
explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
affirmed.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony
up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is
hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between
Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the
ARTICLE 7
 Navarro vs Domagtoy - presumptive death - family code
Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has
submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he
merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that
Tagadan’s wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was
alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged
that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27,
1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his
jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross
ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the
law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second
issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was
only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the
elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to
the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.
Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Arañes vs. Judge Occiano 
 A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the
marriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among
others.
 Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s
death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized.
Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for his illegal
acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the
Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the
respondent to comment on the complaint.
 Respondent averred, among
others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents
submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the
marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization,
respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license to him,
but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner
suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without
a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court
held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is
void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is
the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when
he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
ARTICLE 22 
 Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of
Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio
Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere
employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint
against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan
and the other spouses- petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng
Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active
management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in
the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with
whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born
in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as
a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all
given to his legitimate wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter
sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as
investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the
above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the
import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI
sheets and under huge profits. Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are
that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were
childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from
the company of the latter’s share.
HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties
that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the
marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy
of the marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract
or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court.
In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto,
Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent
evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage
contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat
allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law,
since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did
not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received
P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law
marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs since they are
incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this
document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also
settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in
respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of
October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex- parte
proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent
court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal
of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy
Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby
permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except
as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Vda. De Chua vs. CA
 G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two
illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City
a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of
the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole
surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of
Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper
forum to settle said matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia,
and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at
Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax
Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was
stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his
residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity
of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate
court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the
validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are
correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that
she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract
which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence
Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially
so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge
alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged
marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage
certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule,
together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract
would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to
present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious. marriage of Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.

ARTICLE 25

Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September
12, 1994

Facts: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing
of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the
procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971,
when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth.
The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented

by private
 respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license

was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the
marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a

marriage license first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence to the parties is not adequate to
prove its non- issuance. The above rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
being found in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars
are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage license,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.

The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar
of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and inability to
find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the