Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on Elections
Aguirre
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees
from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These
two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more
of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision
which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well
as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They
have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so
that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes
may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null
and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable
and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of
the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65
years old may also be good elective local officials.
Pimentel vs.
Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at
least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On
10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of
IRA to be withheld from LGU.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S
fiscal autonomy 2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10
percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's
power of general supervision over local governments
Held: 1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local
fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs,
fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the
President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic
policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies,
various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot
do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the
allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year
x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in
local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue
taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites
before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least,
they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from
an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having
conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments.
Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less
to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It
is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR# 183591, October 14, 2008
Facts: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality.
This document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties
and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue
of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by
the Court?
Held: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into
effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be
the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore,
and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer
present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete
dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A
justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the
great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and
not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and
existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on
supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is
not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.
Arturo Tolentino vs Commission on Elections (1971)
41 SCRA 702 – Political Law – Amendment to the Constitution – Doctrine of Proper
Submission
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning
only the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest
of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Arturo
Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.
HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper
submission to the people. Such is not allowed.
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election
here is singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for
PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT
MANGGAGAWA SA NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), etc. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, etc.
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain
presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era and under the
incumbency of Pres. Estrada relating to the raising and use of coco-levy funds,
particularly: Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b)Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468, (c)
E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313.
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut Investment
Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry through capital financing.
Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut
Investment Company (CIC) whose objective was, among others, to advance the
coconut farmers interests.For this purpose, the law imposed a levy ofP0.55on the
coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of copra, or its equivalent,
for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible into CIC shares of stock.
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of a
commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmersto enable such bank to promptly
and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy.Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the
shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.Dueto changes in its
corporate identity and purpose, the banks articles of incorporation were amended in
July 1975, resulting in a change in the banks name from First United Bank United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.) 312,
establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide immediate income
supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation of a sustainable local
market demand for coconut oil and other coconut products.The Executive Order
sought to establish aP1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy
funds or assets of entities supported by those funds.A committee was created to
manage the fund under this program.A majority vote of its members could engage the
services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an
irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).This aimed to
provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut industry, and to other
agri-related programs.The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Funds
initial capital.These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted
approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC.E.O. 313 designated
UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Funds trustee bank.The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund.
The Committee would designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often
as needed but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government agencies to
exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the
Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then pending before the
Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those shares.
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the
suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313. This notwithstanding, on March 1, 2001 petitioner
organizations and individuals brought the present action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare
E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.On
funds.The BIR treated them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut
levies recognize their public character.
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of
taxes and can only be used for public purpose.Taxes are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty
for the support of the government and for all itspublic needs. Here, the coco-levy funds
were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276.The funds were
collected and managed by the PCA,an independent government corporation directly
under the President.And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, thepertinent
laws used the termlevy, which meansto tax, in describing the exaction.
R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the governments general funds
butto provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the
coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police
power of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry,one of the main
economic backbones of the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut
farmers and farm workers.
Lastly, the coco-levy funds are evidently special funds. Its character as such fund was
made clear by the fact that they were deposited in the PNB (then a wholly owned
government bank) and not in the Philippine Treasury.
***
The Court has already passed upon this question in Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic of the Philippines. It held as unconstitutional
Section 2 of P.D. 755 for effectively authorizing the PCA to utilize portions of theCCS
Fundto pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit
portions of the CCS Fund levies with UCPB interest free. And as there also provided,
the CCS Fund, CID Fund and like levies that PCA is authorized to collect shall be
considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of
the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
In any event, such declaration is void.There is ownership when a thing pertaining to a
person is completely subjected to his will in everything that is not prohibited by law or
the concurrence with the rights of another. An owner is free to exercise all attributes
ofownership: the right, among others, to possess, use and enjoy, abuse or consume,
and dispose or alienate the thing owned. The owner is free to waive all or some of
these rights in favor of others.But in the case of the coconut farmers, they could not,
individually or collectively, waive what have not been and could not be legally imparted
to them.
Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III,Section 5of P.D. 961, and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are public funds raised through
taxation.And since taxes could be exacted only for a public purpose, they cannot be
declared private properties of individuals although such individuals fall within a distinct
group of persons.
These assailed provisions,which removed the coco-levy funds from the general funds
of the government and declared them private properties of coconut farmers,do not
appear to have a color of social justice for their purpose.The levy on copra that farmers
produce appears, in the first place, to be a business tax judging by its tax base.The
concept of farmers-businessmen is incompatible with the idea that coconut farmers are
victims of social injustice and so should be beneficiaries of the taxes raised from their
earnings.
1987 Constitution.Section 2(1) vests in the COA the power and authority to examine
uses of government money and property.The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene
Section 2 of P.D. 898 (Providing for the Restructuring of the Commission on Audit),
which has the force of a statute.And there is no legitimate reason why such funds
should be shielded from COA review and audit.The PCA, which implements the coco-
levy laws and collects the coco-levy funds, is a government-owned and controlled
corporation subject to COA review and audit.
E.O. 313 suffers from an additional infirmity.Apparently, it intends to create a trust fund
out of the coco-levy funds to provide economic assistance to the coconut farmers and,
ultimately, benefit the coconut industry.But on closer look, E.O. 313 strays from the
special purpose for which the law raises coco-levy funds in that it permits the use of
coco-levy funds for improving productivity in other food areas.
Clearly, E.O.313 above runs counter to the constitutional provision which directs thatall
money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only.Assisting other agriculturally-related programs
is way off the coco-funds objective of promoting the general interests of the coconut
industry and its farmers.
A final point,the E.O.s also transgress P.D. 1445,Section 84(2),the first part by the
previously mentioned sections of E.O. 313 and the second part by Section 4 of E.O.
312 and Sections 6 and 7 of E.O. 313.E.O. 313 vests the power to administer,
manage, and supervise the operations and disbursements of the Trust Fund it
established (capitalized with SMC shares bought out of coco-levy funds) in a Coconut
Trust Fund Committee.
Section 4 ofE.O. 312 does essentially the same thing.It vests the management and
disposition of the assistance fund generated from the sale of coco-levy fund-acquired
assets into a Committee of five members.
In effect, the provision transfers the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy
funds that P.D. 232 vested in the PCA and transferred the same, without legislative
authorization and in violation of P.D. 232, to the Committees mentioned above.An
executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a
statute enacted by Congress.
***
The Court has to uphold petitioners right to institute these petitions.The petitioner
organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden of the
coco-levies attaches.It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were imposed.
The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers.The Court
recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.This so-called taxpayers suit is based on
the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.
The petition in G.R.147036-37 is granted; The petition in G.R. 147811 is partially
granted; the following are declared void: a) E.O. 312; and b)E.O. 313.
Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 have been
previously unconstitutional.

Philippine Coconut v. Republic- 663 SCRA 514 [2012]
FACTS: The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance
of several presidential decrees (“P.Ds.”) purportedly designed to improve the
coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund
particularly P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468. Charged with the duty of collecting
and administering the Fund was PCA. Later, PCA entered into an Agreement
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers of the Philippines. Under paragraph 8 of the second agreement,
PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute the FUB (First United Bank) shares
purchased to such “coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND
receipts” on equitable basis.
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President
Corazon C. Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their
nominees and associates. The PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a
recovery suit against petitioners. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA
appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase. Petitioners
COCOFED et al. and Ursua uniformly scored the Sandiganbayan for abusing
its power of judicial review and wrongly encroaching into the exclusive
domain of Congress when it declared certain provisions of the coconut levy
laws and PCA administrative issuances as unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the coconut farmers may own the coconut levy fund which
was reclassified into private fund through P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468.
HELD: NO. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can
only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to
purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by judicial fiat the
conversion of special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private
individuals.
To recapitulate, Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a
general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in
accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance,
if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government.
If only to stress the point, P.D. No. 1234 expressly stated that coconut levies
are special funds to be remitted to the Treasury in the General Fund of the
State, but treated as Special Accounts.
aw on Public Officers – Career Service Appointees Must Be Removed for
Valid Reasons
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of the Excise Tax Service. In
1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin for grave misconduct. His
conviction was reported to the Office of the President, at the same time, an
administrative complaint was filed with the same office. The President then,
based on the Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee to investigate
Larin. Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended. The President
dismissed Larin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.
HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the career
service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general rule that the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such power to remove I with
limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation can be found in the fact that Larin
is a career service officer and under the Administrative Code of 1987, such
officers who fall under career service are characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose
tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose the employment was made. As a career
service officer, Larin enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be
removed from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code
of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his conviction in the
Sandiganbayan – this is not one of those grounds enumerated in the
Administrative Code. Further, the Supreme Court notes that when Larin’s
conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court actually
absolved Larin.