Contoh Grafik Safety PDF

Annual Safety
Performance Report
A reference guide to safety trends
on GB railways
2015/16
Copyright
© Rail Safety and Standards Board Limited, 2016. All rights reserved.
This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal
circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately
and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright of
Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any other
use of the material please apply to RSSB's Director of System Safety for permission. Any additional
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audiences, via the RSSB website: www.rssb.co.uk
Published: July 2016
If you would like to give feedback on any of the material contained in this report, of if you have any
suggestions for future editions, please contact:
Liz Davies
Head of Safety Performance
020 3142 5475
E: liz.davies@rssb.co.uk
Contents
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Contents
Executive summary ....................................................................................................... v
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1
2 Safety overview ...................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Risk in context ............................................................................................... 6
2.2 Trend in overall harm ..................................................................................... 8
2.3 Passenger safety ............................................................................................ 9
2.4 Workforce safety ......................................................................................... 11
2.5 Members of the public ................................................................................. 12
2.6 Long-term historical trends .......................................................................... 14
2.7 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality risk .............. 18
2.8 Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values ............................... 19
2.8.1 Comparing rail safety within the EU .................................................................. 25
2.9 Industry collaboration in safety management .............................................. 26
2.9.1 Rail health and safety strategy .......................................................................... 26
2.9.2 The current industry framework for working together..................................... 27
2.9.3 Where industry groups target risk .................................................................... 30
2.10 Key safety statistics: safety overview ........................................................... 33
3 People on trains and in stations............................................................................. 35
3.1 Passengers and public .................................................................................. 36
3.1.1 Risk profile by accident type ............................................................................. 36
3.1.2 Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2015/16 .......................................... 37
3.1.3 Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree ............................................ 38
3.1.4 Passenger/public slips, trips and falls in stations .............................................. 42
3.1.5 Passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface ............................. 43
3.1.6 Passenger/public assaults.................................................................................. 46
3.1.7 On-board injuries............................................................................................... 48
3.1.8 Contact with object/person in stations ............................................................. 49
3.1.9 Other injuries on trains or in stations................................................................ 50
3.2 Workforce ................................................................................................... 51
3.2.1 Risk profile by accident type ............................................................................. 51
3.2.2 Workforce injuries in 2015/16 .......................................................................... 52
3.2.3 Trend in workforce harm by injury degree........................................................ 53
3.2.4 Workforce slips, trips and falls in stations......................................................... 57
3.2.5 Workforce accidents at the platform-train interface ........................................ 58
3.2.6 Worker injuries due to contact with object ...................................................... 60
3.2.7 Worker injuries due to manual handling ........................................................... 61
3.2.8 Workforce on-board injuries ............................................................................. 62
3.2.9 Workforce assaults ............................................................................................ 63
3.3 Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations ................................... 64
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16 i
Contents
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4 Working on or about the running line .................................................................... 67

4.1 Risk profile by accident type ........................................................................ 68
4.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2015/16.................................................................. 69
4.3 Trend in harm by injury degree .................................................................... 70
4.4 Trends in running line harm by accident type ............................................... 74
4.5 Injuries to infrastructure workers away from the running line ...................... 78
4.6 Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line ........................... 79
5 Road driving risk ................................................................................................... 81
5.1 Required scope of road driving risk .............................................................. 82
5.2 Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries ............................. 83
5.2.1 Fatalities and injuries in 2015/16 ...................................................................... 83
5.3 Trends in workforce injuries from road driving ............................................. 84
5.3.1 Trend in injuries by type of worker ................................................................... 85
5.3.2 Trend in injuries by industry sector ................................................................... 86
5.4 Key safety statistics: road driving risk ........................................................... 88
6 Train operations .................................................................................................... 89
6.1 Train accidents ............................................................................................. 90
6.2 Train accident risk profile ............................................................................. 91
6.3 Train accident fatalities and injuries ............................................................. 92
6.4 PHRTA categories: train accidents during 2015/16 ........................................ 93
6.5 Trend in the number of train accidents within PHRTA categories .................. 94
6.5.1 Derailments ....................................................................................................... 96
6.5.2 Collisions between trains .................................................................................. 97
6.5.3 Collisions between trains and road vehicles ..................................................... 98
6.5.4 Buffer stop collisions ....................................................................................... 101
6.5.5 Large falling objects and train explosions ....................................................... 101
6.6 Trend in the types of train accident in non-PHRTA categories ..................... 102
6.7 The Precursor Indicator Model ................................................................... 103
6.7.1 Trend in the PIM .............................................................................................. 106
6.7.2 Trend in the PIM for passengers ..................................................................... 107
6.7.3 SPADs ............................................................................................................... 108
6.7.4 Changes in other PIM groupings ..................................................................... 109
6.8 Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train operations ........... 111
6.8.1 Risk profile ....................................................................................................... 111
6.8.2 Injuries during 2015/16 ................................................................................... 111
6.8.3 Trend in workforce harm related to train operations ..................................... 112
6.9 Key safety statistics: train operations ......................................................... 113
7 Level crossings .................................................................................................... 115
7.1 Level crossing risk profile ........................................................................... 116
7.2 Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2015/16.................. 117
7.3 Types of level crossings .............................................................................. 119
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ii Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16
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7.4 Trend in harm at level crossings ................................................................. 120

7.5 Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings.............................. 122
7.6 Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians ......................................... 123
7.6.1 Near misses with road vehicles by crossing type ............................................ 123
7.6.2 Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists by crossing type ........................... 124
7.6.3 Near misses by time of day ............................................................................. 125
7.7 Factors affecting the risk at level crossings ................................................. 126
7.8 Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings ............................................ 128
7.9 Key safety statistics: level crossings ............................................................ 131
8 Trespass .............................................................................................................. 133
8.1 Trespass risk profile by event type ............................................................. 134
8.2 Trend in harm to trespassers ...................................................................... 135
8.3 Vandalism .................................................................................................. 137
8.3.1 Cable theft ....................................................................................................... 138
8.4 Key safety statistics: trespass ..................................................................... 140
9 Suicide ................................................................................................................ 141
9.1 Classification of fatalities ........................................................................... 142
9.2 Trend in suicide fatalities ........................................................................... 143
9.2.1 Suicide attempts and workforce harm ............................................................ 144
9.2.2 Trends in suicide by location ........................................................................... 145
9.3 Suicide prevention initiatives ..................................................................... 146
9.4 Railway suicides in the wider context ......................................................... 147
9.5 Key safety statistics: suicide ....................................................................... 148
10 Yards, depots and sidings .................................................................................... 149
10.1 YDS risk profile by accident category .......................................................... 150
10.2 Workforce fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2015/16 .................................... 151
10.2.1 Trend in workforce harm in YDS...................................................................... 151
10.3 Injuries to passengers and members of the public in YDS............................ 154
10.3.1 Trend in harm to passenger and members of the public in YDS ..................... 154
10.4 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings ........................................... 155
11 Freight operations ............................................................................................... 157
11.1 Trend in harm to the workforce ................................................................. 158
11.2 Trend in harm to passengers and public ..................................................... 159
11.3 Trend in train accidents involving freight trains .......................................... 160
11.3.1 Potentially higher-risk train accident categories ............................................. 160
11.3.2 Other train accidents ....................................................................................... 161
11.3.3 Trend in freight SPADs ..................................................................................... 162
11.4 Key safety statistics: freight operations ...................................................... 163
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Contents
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Appendix 1. Key safety statistics............................................................................. 165

Appendix 2. Fatalities in 2015/16 ........................................................................... 181
Appendix 3. Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting and risk modelling .......... 182
Appendix 4. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways ........................................ 184
Appendix 5. Level crossing types ............................................................................ 185
Appendix 6. Accident groups used within the ASPR ................................................ 188
Appendix 7. Definitions .......................................................................................... 190
Appendix 8. Glossary.............................................................................................. 198
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iv Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16
Executive summary
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Executive summary
Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2015/16.
The ASPR provides a wide range of safety-related information for our Members, to support the rail
industry in its aim of reducing risk so far as is reasonably practicable, which is embodied in the
Railway Safety Directive and UK legislation.
The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public
bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the
railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.
Headline statistics for 2015/16

• There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents. This is the ninth year in
succession with no such fatalities: the longest period on record. The average rate of train
accidents with on-board fatalities over the last 10 years remains at its lowest level of 0.1 per
year.
• The number of train accidents occurring in the Potentially Higher-Risk Train Accident categories
was 25, which is the same number as in 2014/15. There were 277 SPADs in 2015/16, compared
with 298 during the previous year. At the end of 2015/16, SPAD risk stood at 54% of the
September 2006 baseline level, compared with 64% at the end of 2014/15.
• In total, there were 45 accidental fatalities, 483 major injuries, 12,603 minor injuries and 958
cases of shock/trauma. The total level of harm (excluding suicide) was 116.4 FWI, compared with
121.6 FWI recorded in 2014/15.
• Of the 45 fatalities, eight were passengers and 37 were members of the public, of whom 30 were
engaged in acts of trespass. There were no workforce fatalities during the year; this is for the
first financial year on record.
• Passenger harm stands at 48.8 FWI overall. This is an increase on the 45.0 FWI for 2014/15.
There were 1.69 billion passenger journeys in 2015/16, which is a 2% increase from 2014/15; the
normalised rate of harm increased by 6%.
• Workforce harm stands at 26.2 FWI. This is a decrease on the 32.3 FWI for 2014/15. There were
219 million workforce hours carried out in 2015/16, which is a 3% increase from 2014/15; the
normalised rate of harm decreased by 21%.
• Harm to members of the public stands at 41.4 FWI. This is a decrease on the 44.3 FWI for
2014/15.
• In addition to the injuries above, which were accidental in nature, a further 252 people died as a
result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the 287 fatalities recorded for
2014/15.
Public Public
Passengers Workforce Suicide
(non-trespass) (trespass)
2014/15 2015/16 2014/15 2015/16 2014/15 2015/16 2014/15 2015/16 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 3 8 3 0 12 7 27 30 287 252
Major injuries 298 288 182 157 30 16 19 22 38 33
Minor injuries 6880 6690 6136 5694 154 180 26 39 19 38
Shock/trauma 253 205 833 746 3 5 0 2 1 0
FWI 45.0 48.8 32.3 26.2 15.3 9.0 29.0 32.3 290.9 255.5
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16 v
Executive summary
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Train accidents
There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents. This is the ninth year in
succession with no such fatalities, the longest such period on record. There were no fatalities
involving members of the public, arising from train collisions with road vehicles. This is the first such
year since 2010/11. The total harm from train accidents in 2015/16 was 0.4 FWI, which was the
lowest level of harm from train accidents over the past ten years.
Many types of train accident typically carry little risk. The types of train accidents occurring on or
affecting the running line, and with the most potential to result in serious consequences, are known
as potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories. There were 25 train accidents occurring
in PHRTA categories; the same number as in 2014/15. Eleven of the events were train derailments,
three of which involved passenger trains. Six of the events were collisions between trains, all of
which involved passenger trains. Four of these collisions occurred at low speed during permissive
working in stations. The remaining two occurred in running. One involved an engineering trolley on
the line, and the other involved a freight train foul of the line.
The Precursor Indicator Model (PIM) measures the underlying risk from the PHRTA categories of train
accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of their accident precursors. At the end of 2015/16,
the PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was 6.0 FWI per year, compared
with 6.6 FWI per year at the end of 2014/15. The reduction was due to decreases in the PIM
contributions related to level crossings, infrastructure operations and SPADs.
There were 277 SPADs in 2015/16, compared with 298 during the previous year. At the end of
2015/16, SPAD risk stood at 54% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared with 64% at the
end of 2014/15.
People in stations
There were ten fatalities in stations: eight passengers and two members of the public. Six of the
fatalities occurred at the platform edge, although none were related to getting on or off trains. In
the past ten years, there has been one fatality that occurred during boarding or alighting, compared
with a total of 40 fatalities at the platform edge that did not occur while getting on or off trains.
Three fatalities involved assaults. The assault category used by RSSB covers all types of assault,
verbal abuse and threat, as well as any incidents where the verdict of an inquest was unlawful killing,
murder, manslaughter, or lawful killing in self-defence. The tenth fatality was a person who died
after being struck by a station sign that fell from its mountings in high winds.
When the number of non-fatal injuries is taken into account, the total level of harm occurring to
passengers and the public in stations was 45.3 FWI, compared with 41.8 FWI (four fatalities) for the
previous year. The main cause of non-fatal injuries in stations are slips, trips and falls. In 2015/16,
there were 179 major injuries in stations due to slips, trips and falls, compared with 201 events in
2014/15.
Assaults on passengers and members of the public

Assaults occur on the railway as in any public environment. RSSB uses data from the British
Transport Police to analyse trends in assault. The number of passenger and public assaults in
stations or on trains rose in 2015/16 to 3,737, compared with 3,004 for 2014/15. This is an increase
of 24% in absolute terms, and 22% on a normalised basis.
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vi Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16
Executive summary
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The overall increase in number was driven by increases in the less serious categories of crime. The
more serious categories of GBH and more serious cases of violence and Actual bodily harm both
reduced slightly. In contrast the recorded incidence of Common assault increased by 21%, from
1,508 events to 1,832 events. Cases of Harassment increased by 67%, from 620 events in 2014/15 to
1,037 events in 2015/16. However, this is partly due to improvements in the recording of these
offences over the past year.
Workforce injuries
For the first financial year on record, there were no workforce fatalities recorded. The overall level
of workforce harm for 2015/16 was 26.2 FWI, which is 19% lower than the 32.3 FWI (three fatalities)
recorded for 2014/15. When the increase in workforce hours is taken into account, the rate of harm
was 21% lower.
The absence of fatality accounts for nearly half of the reduction. The rest of the improvement was
driven mainly by reductions in major injuries occurring to workforce on the running line and in yards,
depots and sidings.
Level crossings
There were three fatalities at level crossings during 2015/16, all were pedestrian users. This is the
lowest number of level crossing fatalities recorded since 1996/97. The overall level of harm at level
crossings was 3.7 FWI, compared with 11.8 FWI for 2014/15.
At four, the number of train collisions with vehicles at level crossings was the lowest over the past
ten years. The number of such accidents is relatively low, and shows quite some variability, but the
generally lower numbers since the start of Control Period 4 are reflective of an improvement in level
crossing risk. This is supported by a reducing trend in the recorded number of near misses with road
vehicles at level crossings, and by the outputs from Network Rail’s Level Crossing Risk Indicator
Model (LCRIM), which it uses to track changes in the aggregate risk at level crossings. Network Rail
has further substantial safety improvements planned for CP5, which runs from April 2014 to March
2019.
Trespass and suicide

There were 30 trespass fatalities recorded in 2015/16 compared with 27 recorded in 2014/15. Since
2009/10, when improvements in classification of suicide and trespass fatalities occurred, the average
number of trespass fatalities per year has been 31.6.
Over the past ten years, around 40% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the
approximately 60% that have occurred in other locations, the majority of these have occurred on the
running line. The proportion of trespass fatalities in stations for 2015/16 was notably lower, at 17%
(five fatalities).
There were 252 incidents of suicide or suspected suicide recorded for 2015/16, compared with 287
recorded for 2014/15 and 276 recorded for 2013/14. Around 20% of suicidal acts do not result in
fatality. In 2015/16, a further 71 people carried out non-completed suicidal acts. In these cases,
many people are left with life-changing injuries.
Nearly all suicide-related events result in shock or trauma for members of the workforce who are
directly involved in the event. Each member of the workforce will react differently to being involved
in a suicide-related event; for all it will be upsetting, but for some it may result in severe post-
traumatic stress and affect their ability to return to their former role. Rail Industry partners -
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16 vii
Executive summary
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including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions, BTP, Samaritans, and RSSB -
have been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the railway and to support anyone
involved in a railway suicide after an incident. In 2015 the contractual partnership agreement
between Samaritans and Network Rail was renewed for another five years. By the end of 2015/16,
over 10,000 frontline railway personnel had been trained on how to intervene in suicide attempts. In
addition, around 1,575 personnel have had Trauma Support Training.
Benchmarking the rail industry

The Railway Safety Directive states the requirement for Member States to ensure that safety is
generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved. The European
Railway Agency (ERA) is mandated to monitor the performance of Member States in this area. It
does this based on statistics related to injuries involving moving trains. The latest assessment by
ERA, which was based on data for the five-year period 2010-2014, shows the UK to have the best
safety record of the ten largest European railways.
In addition, at the national level, rail is shown to be the safest form of land transport. On a per
traveller kilometre basis, it is more than 20 times safer than car travel and around four times safer
than travel by bus or coach.
Summary
2015/16 saw improvements in many of the main measures used to assess safety performance.
Reductions in harm were recorded for the workforce and members of the public, with notable
achievements taking place for some specific measures such as workforce fatalities, level crossing
injuries and train accidents.
Nevertheless, there are clear challenges that the industry is facing in other areas, such as managing
risk at the platform edge, and managing assaults on trains and in stations.
The rail health and safety strategy, Leading Health and Safety on
Britain’s Railway, was launched in 2015/16, and has been
developed by leaders of the rail industry to provide a framework
for the collaborative improvement of health and safety
performance on the railway. The strategy focuses on a number
of priority risk areas, including station operations, and also
identifies a number of areas where industry capability in
managing health and safety can be developed.
Industry commitment to the development and improvement of
the ways in which the industry works together to address risk is
high, and it is expected that this will result in tangible safety
improvement in the areas of challenge.
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viii Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16
Introduction
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1 Introduction
Welcome to RSSB’s Annual Safety Performance Report (ASPR) for 2015/16.
The ASPR provides a wide range of safety-related information for our Members, to assist in the
management of safety.
The information contained in the report is also of use and interest to others, such as those public
bodies that are involved in our industry’s funding and regulation, as well as those who use the
railway, or who are employed by the rail industry.
The overriding purpose of the ASPR is to support the rail industry in its aim of reducing risk so far as
is reasonably practicable. This aim is a requirement of legislation, embodied in the Railway Safety
Directive.
RSSB is the main source of mainline rail safety statistics in Great Britain, and its figures are
reproduced in the Office of Rail and Road’s (ORR) publication National Rail Trends and the
Department for Transport’s (DfT) Transport Statistics Great Britain.
In addition to the ASPR, we also produce a ‘sister publication’, the Learning from Operational
Experience Annual Report (LOEAR), which summarises some of the learning points arising from
accident investigations and other sources of information that have arisen during the year.
Scope of the report

The scope is predominantly focused on incidents connected with the operation of the mainline
railway in Great Britain, but is extended to include fatalities and injuries to the workforce occurring in
road traffic accidents while driving on duty, and fatalities and injuries in yards, depots and sidings
(YDS). Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into the industry’s Safety Management Information
System (SMIS) on a long-standing basis. There is no mandatory requirement to report non-fatal
injuries in YDS, but the collection of such data to support safety analysis of YDS sites has been carried
out on a voluntary basis since April 2010, when, through agreement of the industry, it was formalised
in a railway group standard.
A more detailed outline of the scope can be found in Appendix 3.
Where the data comes from

Most of the analyses in the ASPR is based on data from SMIS. It is supplemented where appropriate
with data from other sources, such as British Transport Police (BTP), the ORR and Network Rail.
Charts or tables that are based on sources in addition to SMIS will have this noted, either under the
chart or in a footnote.
How safety is analysed in the report

The rail industry collects a vast amount of safety-related information during each year: more than
75,000 records were entered into SMIS during 2015/16, around 15,000 of which related to injuries
ranging from the very minor to the very serious. Each injury record contains information on what
happened and where, and who was involved. This allows detailed analysis to be carried out, looking
at the causes of risk from a number of different ways.
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Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16 1
Introduction
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Because of the range in severity of injuries, it is useful to have a way of combining the range of
different consequences that can occur from a particular activity or event, so that a decision can be
made on how important it is to address. For example, a small number of events with more serious
consequences can be weighed against a large number of events with less serious consequences, to
inform at a systematic decision of where resource should be spent.
The agreed industry approach to combining injuries of differing levels of seriousness into one
composite measure is based on ‘weighting’ a multiple number of less serious events as being ‘equal’
to one fatality. The following table shows the weightings that are currently in use within the industry.
They were derived following extensive research and consultation using public focus groups.
The composite measure is termed ‘fatalities and weighted injuries’ or FWI, for short.
Number of injuries weighted

Injury degree 1 Weighting
as equal to a fatality
Fatality 1 1
Major injury 0.1 10
Minor injury 0.005 (Class 1) 200

(Class depends on seriousness of
injury) 0.001 (Class 2) 1000
Shock/trauma 0.005 (Class 1) 200

(Class depends on seriousness of
0.001 (Class 2) 1000
event resulting in shock/trauma)
Modelled risk versus recorded harm

It is important to understand the distinction between modelled risk and recorded harm. Many of the
analyses in this report are based on actual data recorded over the past 10 years, and so they present
the observed level of harm that was recorded during that time. Recorded levels of harm can provide
an indication of what the underlying level of safety is, but how good an indication they provide is
influenced by a number of factors. ‘Statistical fluctuation’ is one such factor. This is a normally
occurring phenomenon, which reflects the amount of variability you might reasonably expect to see,
if you pick two different samples of data (eg from two different years). For some types of risk, where
the typical event occurs less frequently and with generally more serious consequences, you would
expect to get a high level of statistical fluctuation. On the other hand, for other types of risk, which
happen frequently and generally with less serious consequences, the level of statistical fluctuation
would be expected to be lower.
This is an important point because often what we want to know as an industry is ‘Are things getting
better or worse?’. And this is normally a more complicated question to answer than just looking at
how recorded levels of harm have changed from one year to the next. Train accidents offer the most
ready example of this effect; a year without a train accident does not necessarily indicate an
improvement in safety, and a year with such an accident does not necessarily imply a rise in risk.
Answering the ‘better/worse’ question normally needs to involve looking at trends averaged over a
1 Fuller descriptions of the different classes of injury are provided in Appendix 7.
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2 Annual Safety Performance Report 2015/16
Introduction
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longer period (moving averages), considering how harm has changed in relation to other system
factors such as usage (normalisation), and risk modelling.
RSSB’s Safety Risk Model (SRM) is the primary means of carrying out risk modelling for GB rail. The
SRM is based on a mathematical representation of all the events that could lead directly to an injury
or fatality, and provides a comprehensive snapshot of the underlying level of risk on the mainline
railway. The SRM is updated periodically, and is based on a combination of observed data,
mathematical modelling and expert judgement. The current version of the SRM is version 8.1, and
was published in June 2014.
Within the SRM, each injury is categorised by the hazardous event that caused it, and the major
precursor to that event. The ASPR uses the same set of hazardous events and precursors as the SRM,
so that both sides of the ‘risk coin’ can be presented – an estimate of the underlying level of safety
and information on how trends are varying.
There are around 133 hazardous events within the SRM, ranging from slips, trips and falls to
collisions between trains. In ASPR analyses, hazardous events of a similar type are often grouped
together; Appendix 6 provides a list of groupings that are commonly used through the report.
Report structure
The Safety overview chapter immediately follows this introduction. It sets the overall context by
presenting the current industry risk profile, as based on SRMv8.1, together with an overview of the
high-level trends in passenger, public and workforce safety performance during 2015/16. The
chapter contains information on the long-term changes in railway usage and performance, and how
the rail industry compares with other modes of transport. It also provides an update of how GB rail
is meeting the requirements set out by the legislation related to Common Safety Methods for
Monitoring.
The chapters following the Safety overview are divided into the main risk areas where industry works
together in support of safety management:
The People on trains and in stations chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured
while travelling on trains or using stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents
and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass or suicide. We have separated the analysis in
the chapter to look at members of the workforce separately from passengers and members of the
public. This is because the types of activities that the workforce carry out on trains and in stations are
different from those of passengers and the public. Passengers and the public are grouped together,
because they use the railway in similar ways and are exposed to the same types of risk.
The Working on or about the running line chapter examines the risk from the types of accident that
affect infrastructure workers while working on or about the running line.
The Road driving risk chapter reviews the risk to members of the workforce travelling by road vehicle
while on duty. The chapter investigates the impact of this activity on the wide variety of railway
roles, from station staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.
The Train operations chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable and potentially higher-risk train accidents,
focussing on those that occur away from level crossings, which are covered in a separate chapter.
The chapter also presents information on the risk presented to shunters, train crew or other staff
when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities to do with the movement of trains.
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Introduction
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The Level crossings chapter looks at the risk arising from train accidents at level crossings, and also
examines the risk experienced by pedestrian users.
The Trespass chapter looks at incidents that involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are
as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. The trespass category is limited to events where the
person involved did not intend to cause harm to themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried
risk, and so it excludes people who access the railway to take their life. The chapter also looks at
some types of railway crime that frequently involve trespass on the railway.
The Suicide chapter presents trends and analysis of events that have been categorised as suicide or
suspected suicide, occurring on railway infrastructure.
The Yards, depots and sidings chapter looks at injuries to the workforce that occur in these locations,
and have been reported into SMIS.
The Freight operations chapter provides information and analysis across a range of risk areas directly
or indirectly affecting the freight community.
In addition, there are a number of appendices, which include statistical summaries, definitions of key
terms and supporting information for the chapters.
Data cut-off
RSSB bases the analyses in the ASPR on the latest and most accurate information available at the
time of production. We also continually update and revise previous years’ data in the light of any
new information. The data cut-off date for the 2015/16 ASPR was 26 April 2016 for SMIS data.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2 Safety overview
Over the past decade, industry initiatives have brought about improvements in many areas of
passenger and workforce safety. Over the same period of time, passenger journeys and passenger
kilometres have risen by 48% and 40% respectively, and train kilometres by 10%.
The industry continues to satisfy the safety requirement placed on it by the Railway Safety Directive,
which is to maintain safety and improve it where practicable.
2015/16 Headlines
succession with no such fatalities: the longest period on record. The average rate of train
accidents with on-board fatalities over the last 10 years remains at its lowest level of 0.1 per
year.
• In total, there were 45 accidental fatalities, 483 major injuries, 12,603 minor injuries and 958
cases of shock/trauma. The total level of harm (excluding suicide) was 116.4 FWI, compared with
121.6 FWI recorded in 2014/15.
• Of the 45 fatalities, eight were passengers and 37 were members of the public, 30 of whom were
engaged in acts of trespass. There were no workforce fatalities during the year; this is for the
first financial year on record.
• Passenger harm stands at 48.8 FWI overall. This is an increase on the 45.0 FWI for 2014/15.
There were 1.69 billion passenger journeys in 2015/16, a 2% increase from 2014/15; the
normalised rate of harm increased by 6%.
• Workforce harm stands at 26.2 FWI. This is a decrease on the 32.3 FWI for 2014/15. There were
219 million workforce hours carried out in 2015/16, a 3% increase from 2014/15; the normalised
rate of harm decreased by 21%.
• In addition to the injuries above, which were accidental in nature, a further 252 people died as a
result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the 287 fatalities recorded for
2014/15.
System safety at a glance
Weighted injuries Fatalities

66.0
65.0
61.2
60.4
51.6
48.8
48.7
46.4
45.0
44.3
43.6
43.4
42.8
42.5
41.4
38.7
38.6
38.4
37.0
36.1
33.5
32.5
32.5
32.3
31.3
31.0
29.8
29.0
26.7
26.2
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Passengers Workforce Public

Note: The trend in workforce harm includes fatalities and injuries recorded for yards, depots and sidings, from 2007/08
onwards
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.1 Risk in context

Understanding the overall profile of risk on the railway helps with its management, by enabling focus
to be given to areas that are identified as priority. The SRM is a useful tool for this, as it provides a
stable estimate of the underlying level of risk from different sources.
The SRM risk information can be cut in a number of ways. For example, the information can be split
up to show the risk from train accidents separately to the risk from personal accidents (such as slips,
trips and falls). It can also be broken down by location, accident type, or the type of person the risk
affects.
The following chart shows the risk split by whether or not the injured person was intentionally trying
to harm themselves (take their life). The remaining risk, which is termed ‘accidental risk’ is broken
down by person type and location.
Chart 1. Risk in context (SRMv8.1)

Injuries in yards,
depots and sidings,
7.6 FWI/year
Passenger injuries on
the mainline railway,
58.4 FWI/year
Suicide,
244.1 FWI/year
Workforce injuries on
the mainline,
26.1 FWI/year
Public injuries on the

mainline railway,
47.5 FWI/year
Note: For harm in yards, depots and sidings, 96% involves the workforce with nearly all of the remaining 4% being members of the
public
• The total level of accidental risk on the mainline railway is 132.0 FWI per year, of which 44%
occurs to passengers, 20% occurs to the workforce, and 36% occurs to members of the public.
• A further 7.6 FWI per year occurs in yards, depots and sidings (YDS). Most of this risk (96%)
affects the workforce, with nearly all of the remainder involving members of the public
trespassing. More on this topic is included in Chapter 8 Trespass.
• The largest proportion of risk on the railway comes from people committing, or attempting to
commit, suicide. A substantial number of people a year decide to end their lives this way, and the
industry puts much effort into preventing these tragic events from occurring. More on this topic
is included in Chapter 9 Suicide.
In any given year, the observed levels of harm may differ from the SRM modelled risk. One reason for
this is statistical variation of frequently occurring events. Another is that the SRM provides an
estimate of the risk from low-frequency, high-consequence events that may not have occurred
during the year, such as train accidents with on-board injuries.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
The railway’s risk profile

The next chart uses information from the SRM to show the types of accident that result in harm. The
information is shown for different person types separately. The scope of the risk is all accidental risk
on the mainline railway or in YDS.
Information like this is useful for making decisions about where to focus effort, taking into account
that a number of factors will influence these decisions. Considering business or reputational risk may
lead you to focus on the risk from train accidents. Looking at how people are most likely to be fatally
injured would lead you to focus on accidents at the interface between the platform and trains or
track, whereas looking at the total level of risk would lead to a focus on slips, trips and falls in
stations.
The industry needs to take into account these factors, as well as the costs and benefits of potential
ways of reducing risk, when making decisions about its management.
Chart 2. SRMv8.1 accidental risk profile (139.6 FWI per year): mainline and YDS combined
Slips, trips and falls 27.2

Platform-train interface 12.1
Passengers
Assault and abuse 9.6 Fatalities

On-board injuries 4.0 Major injuries
Train accidents 2.8 Minor injuries
Other accidents 2.6 Shock and trauma

Contact with object 5.4
On-board injuries 2.8
Workforce
Struck by train 1.9

Assault and abuse 1.8
Road traffic accident 1.3
Train accidents 1.1
Falls from height 0.6
Electric shock 0.5
Other accidents 5.3
Trespass 33.5
Struck by train 6.5
Public
Train accidents 4.0

Other accidents 2.1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
SRM modelled risk (FWI per year)
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.2 Trend in overall harm

Chart 3 shows the trend in accidental FWI since 2006/07. Since 2009/10, there has been a better
classification of fatalities to members of the public; more information from BTP has enabled more
accuracy in distinguishing between suspected cases of trespass and suspected cases of suicide.
Chart 3. Accidental fatalities and weighted injuries
Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities

160
Improved classification of
fatalities to members of the public
137.1 136.8
140 131.4 130.4
125.1 124.9
121.6
19.9 20.1 116.4
120 19.1 20.2 113.1
108.0 21.8
22.2 21.3
21.0
100 21.7
44.3 21.1
47.1
43.4 43.6
FWI
80
47.1 51.6
52.9 48.3
44.3 49.7
60
40
66 70 67 64
53 49
20 40 45 45
39
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• There were no passenger or workforce fatalities in train accidents during 2015/16. There were no
workforce fatalities recorded during the year from any cause.
• Forty-five people died as a result of other accidents. Eight were passengers and 37 were
members of the public, 30 of whom were engaged in acts of trespass. When non-fatal injuries
are taken into account, the total harm occurring during the year was 116.4 FWI, compared with
121.6 FWI for 2014/15.
• A further 252 people died as a result of suicide or suspected suicide. This is a reduction on the
287 recorded for 2014/15.
Fatalities and major injuries due to suicide or suspected suicide
Improved classification of suicide/trespass figures

2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 225 207 219 243 208 250 245 276 287 252
Major injuries 34 28 34 26 36 23 35 54 38 33
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.3 Passenger safety

Around 1.69 billion passenger journeys were made in 2015/16. The following section summarises the
fatalities and injuries that were recorded:
Fatalities
• There were no passenger fatalities in train accidents during 2015/16. This is the ninth financial
year in succession with no such fatalities.
• There were eight passenger fatalities in incidents at stations.
Passenger fatalities in 2015/16
Date Location Accident type Territory Description of incident

A passenger who had alighted at the station,
Bodmin
Platform-train interface subsequently ran alongside the train as it was departing,
25/04/15 Parkway Western
(not boarding/alighting) and fell between the train and platform. Alcohol was
station
reported as a potential factor in the incident.
Milton Keynes London A passenger stumbled and fell from the platform edge,
Platform-train interface
21/07/15 Central North and was subsequently hit by a through train. Alcohol
(not boarding/alighting)
station Western was reported as a potential factor in the incident.
Victoria A passenger was fatally injured after initiating an
01/08/15 Assault South East
station altercation with a fellow passenger.
Stratford A passenger received fatal injuries following an assault
station by a group of teenage boys.
Sittingbourne Platform-train interface A passenger stumbled and fell from the platform, coming
02/11/15 South East
station (not boarding/alighting) into contact with the conductor rail.
London
Berwick-upon- A passenger suffered fatal injuries after being struck by a
05/12/15 Contact with object North
Tweed station station sign that fell from its mountings.
Eastern
A passenger sustained fatal injuries following a fall
Battersea Park Platform-train interface between the platform and a train departing the station.
05/12/15 South East
station (not boarding/alighting) Alcohol was reported as a potential factor in the
incident.
Richmond Platform-train interface A passenger stumbled on the platform and fell onto the
26/02/16 South East
station (not boarding/alighting) track, sustaining fatal injuries.
Major injuries
• There were 288 passenger major injuries in 2015/16.
Minor injuries
• There were 6,690 recorded minor injuries, 1,281 (19%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
went straight to hospital).
Shock and trauma

• There were 205 recorded cases of passenger shock or trauma, four of which were Class 1: three
occurred in a train accident and one was an incident at the platform-train interface.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in accidental harm to passengers

The last 10 years have seen an average level of harm of 42.8 FWI per year. This is somewhat lower
than the SRM risk estimate of 58.4 FWI per year, but the SRM risk value includes estimates for
passenger risk arising from train accidents and passenger risk arising from assaults. Over the past
decade, the actual level of passenger harm from train accidents has been much lower than the
estimate, but because train accidents are low-frequency high-consequence events, this is not
unusual. With regard to passenger assaults, these injuries are mainly recorded by BTP rather than
SMIS.
Chart 4. Passenger harm by injury degree
Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Value

70 70
60 60
FWI per billion passenger journeys

48.8
50 46.4 50
45.0
43.4 42.8 42.5 43.6
38.6 38.7 11.8
40 38.4 12.0 40
9.4 11.9
10.6 11.5 11.9
FWI
9.6 9.9 10.2

30 30
24.7 28.8
20 25.0 20
21.6 25.8 31.2 27.4 29.8
23.2 23.3
10 10
9 7 7 8
5 5 5 3 4 3
0 0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The level of passenger harm recorded for 2015/16 was 48.8 FWI. This was higher than the level
recorded for 2014/15; when normalised by passenger journeys there was a 6% increase in the
rate of FWI.
• There were eight passenger fatalities in 2015/16, all occurred at stations. This is the highest
number of fatalities since 2006/07.
• Weighted major injuries dominate total passenger harm. The number of major injuries recorded
in 2015/16 was 288; this is a reduction of 10 on the previous year.
• The trend in passenger harm should be seen against the context of rising passenger usage. Over
the decade as a whole, there has been a reduction of around one quarter in the rate of harm,
normalised by passenger journeys.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.4 Workforce safety

More than 200 million hours of work were performed throughout the railway during the year. The
following injuries were recorded:
Fatalities
There were no workforce fatalities recorded during the year.
Major injuries
There were 157 recorded major injuries in 2015/16.
Minor injuries
There were 5,694 recorded minor injuries, 745 (13%) of which were Class 1.
Shock and trauma

There were 746 reports of shock or trauma of which 274 (37%) were Class 1.
Trend in accidental harm to the workforce

Over the past decade, the average level of harm to members of the workforce has been 30.5 FWI per
year.
Chart 5. Workforce harm by injury degree
Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate
50 50
45 45
40 40
FWI per 200 million workforce hours
35 32.5 33.5 32.5 35
31.3 32.3
2.4 31.0
2.4 29.0 29.8 2.5 2.0
30 2.3 2.6 30
26.7 2.3 26.2
2.4
2.6 9.8 9.0
FWI
25 10.0 9.3 1.8 25

9.6 10.2 9.3
10.0
20 9.3 8.7 20
15 15
18.3 16.4 17.7 18.2
10 18.1 16.2 10
15.7 17.2
12.9 15.7
5 5
2 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 3
0 0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The level of workforce harm for 2015/16 was 26.2 FWI. This was notably lower than the level for
2014/15 on both an absolute basis and normalised basis.
• There were reductions in all categories of injury severity; for the first financial year on record,
there was no fatality recorded for a member of the workforce.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.5 Members of the public

Fatalities
• There were 37 fatalities to members of the public from accidental causes
• Thirty people were engaged in trespass at the time of the accident
• Three people were pedestrian users of level crossings
• Four people died as a result of other causes:
Public fatalities in 2015/16 not due to suicide, trespass or level crossings
Date Location Accident type Territory Description of incident

Ealing A teenage girl was struck by a train during an
23/06/15 Broadway Assault and abuse Western incident where her mother is believed to have
station accessed the track to end her own life.
Brighton wall A body was found with injuries consistent with
22/07/15 Fall from height South East
sidings falling from height into the sidings.
Smethwick London
A person was fatally injured after apparently falling
10/09/15 West station Fall from height North
from a road-over-rail bridge onto the platform.
(disused) Western
Platform-train A person fell from the platform onto the track and
Coulsdon
05/12/15 interface (not South East was struck by a through train. Alcohol was reported
South station
boarding/alighting) as a potential factor in the incident.
Non-fatal injuries
Very few non-fatal injuries to members of the public are recorded. Many types of accidents that
occur to members of the public have a high likelihood of fatality. In addition, injuries occurring during
acts of prohibited behaviour such as trespass are not likely to be reported.
• Thirty-eight major injuries were recorded in 2015/16, of which 22 were to trespassers. There
were 219 minor injuries (39 to trespassers), as well as seven cases of shock or trauma (one to a
trespasser).
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in accidental harm to members of the public

From 2009/10 the classification of trespass has been based on an improved data set; the overall
levels of harm to members of the public before and after this date are not directly comparable. The
average level of harm to members of the public over the period 2009/10 to 2015/16 was 45.5 FWI
per year.
Chart 6. Trend in public harm by accident type

Weighted injuries (all types) Level crossing fatalities
Other fatalities (not trespass or LC) Trespass fatalities
100
Improved classification of
90 public fatalities
80
70 66.0 65.0
61.2 60.4
60
FWI
8 51.6
12 48.7
50 9 13 44.3
3 4 41.4
40 36.1 3 37.0
9
3
11 4
30 6 8
52
43 46
20 42 40
34
27 30
24 24
10
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At 41.4 FWI, the harm to members of the public recorded in 2015/16 was a reduction on the
level for 2014/15.
• The number of level crossing fatalities for 2015/16 was three, all of whom were pedestrian users.
This is the lowest financial year total since 1996/97.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.6 Long-term historical trends

Train accidents
Over the past 50 years, there have been many improvements in rail operations and management,
such as multi-aspect signalling and increased application of the Automatic Warning System (AWS). In
more recent years, there have been developments in the areas of signals passed at danger (SPAD)
risk, including the implementation of the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS),
improvements in track quality, and increased crashworthiness of rolling stock. These have all led to
further reductions in train accident risk.
Chart 7. Fifty-year trend in train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
10
Train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
Average number over preceding 10 years

8
Fatal train accidents
0
1963/64
1965/66
1967/68
1969/70
1971/72
1973/74
1975/76
1977/78
1979/80
1981/82
1983/84
1985/86
1987/88
1989/90
1991/92
1993/94
1995/96
1997/98
1999/00
2001/02
2003/04
2005/06
2007/08
2009/10
2011/12
2013/14
2015/16
• There were no train accidents resulting in passenger or workforce fatalities during 2015/16. This
is the ninth year in succession with no such fatalities. In the past decade, there has been one year
that had a train accident with on-board fatalities; the current ten-year rate for this type of fatal
train accident is now 0.1 per year. This is the lowest level ever achieved.
• The chart does not show train accidents that result solely in fatalities to members of the public,
for example as might result from a train collision with a road vehicle at a level crossing.
Data source: ORR for historical data; SMIS for recent statistics.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Causes of historic train accidents

Historically, SPADs and train operations (a category that covers a wide range of workforce errors and
misjudgements) have accounted for most of the fatal accidents.
The expected time interval between multi-fatality events is increasing. The first version of the SRM
calculated in 2001 that a train accident with at least 10 fatalities would be expected about once
every three years. The latest version (SRMv8.1, 2014) shows that such a serious accident is now
expected only once in 21 years. This reflects the industry’s success in tackling train accident risk,
including the system improvements that have taken place over the past decade such as TPWS, the
removal of Mark I rolling stock, and improvements in train crashworthiness and track quality.
The risk from train accidents is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 Train operations and Chapter 7 Level
crossings.
Chart 8. Trend in the causes of train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities
5.0
Fatal accidents per billion train km
4.5
Decade to 1976 to 1986 to 1996 to 2006 to 2016
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
crossings
on the line
Train operations
and adhesion
operations
Objects
Level
and failures
failures
SPADs
Data source: ORR for historical data; SMIS for recent data.
• There have been steady reductions in the frequency of train accidents with on-board fatalities
over the past 50 years. These reductions have been caused by a number of the factors that are
largely within the industry’s control, namely SPADs, infrastructure operations, and train
operations and failures. A reduction in accidents due to infrastructure failures has been notable
in the last two decades.
• The trend is less clear for causes over which the industry can exert some influence, but which are
often not under its direct control, particularly level crossing risk. The chart above lists only those
level crossing collisions that have resulted in on-board fatalities, but members of the public bear
the brunt of train accidents at level crossings; there are a notable additional number of level
crossing collisions that have resulted in fatality to members of the public only.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Fatalities
Chart 9. Trends in fatalities over the past 50 years
400
350
300
250
Fatalities
200
Passenger
Workforce
150 Public (mainline railway)
Public (all railways)
100
50
0
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990/91
1992/93
1994/95
1996/97
1998/99
2000/01
2002/03
2004/05
2006/07
2008/09
2010/11
2012/13
2014/15
• The trend in fatalities for both passengers and workforce has shown marked long-term
improvement.
• The greatest improvement over the past 50 years has been in the number of workforce fatalities,
which exceeded 100 per year in the mid-1960s, but is now typically lower than five per year. The
amount of maintenance work being performed in the early 1960s, as well as the more labour-
intensive methods used, contributed to the higher-risk environment. Subsequent technological
and operational improvements not only reduced the railway’s maintenance requirement, but
also helped create better working conditions.
• The trend in public fatalities (mainly trespass, suicide and suspected suicide) is shown for the
whole railway system (ie including London Underground and other non-mainline railways) up to
2001/02 and for the mainline railway only from 1990/91 onwards. The ten-year period of overlap
indicates that the shape of the trend is similar, with or without the inclusion of non-mainline
data.
• In contrast to trends for passengers and workforce, there has been no sustained reduction in the
number of public trespass and suicide fatalities. Causes of trespass and suicide are not directly
influenced by technological or methodological advancements in railway operations.
Data source: Passengers and workforce – ORR data for mainline railway up to 1993/94, RSSB data from 1994/95 onwards.
Public (all railways) – ORR data. Public (mainline railway) – ORR up to 1993/94, RSSB data from 1994/95 onwards.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Rail usage
In 2015/16, there were 1.69 billion passenger journeys (2% increase on 2014/15), 64.4 billion
passenger kilometres (2% increase), and 40.5 million freight train kilometres (14% decrease).
Chart 10. Trends in rail usage over the past 50 years

250%
Passenger km
Passenger journeys
Freight moved (tonne km)
200%
Total passenger & freight train km
Index (base year 1965/66 = 100)
150%
100%
50%
0%
1965/66
1967/68
1969/70
1971/72
1973/74
1975/76
1977/78
1979/80
1981/82
1983/84
1985/86
1987/88
1989/90
1991/92
1993/94
1995/96
1997/98
1999/00
2001/02
2003/04
2005/06
2007/08
2009/10
2011/12
2013/14
2015/16
Data source: ORR National Rail Trends and DfT Transport Statistics Great Britain. Passenger journeys include both franchised and non-
franchised passenger services.
• Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, passenger journeys and passenger kilometres
showed decreasing or flat trends, largely as a result of the increasing ownership of road vehicles.
• Since privatisation began in 1994/95, there has been a general growth in passenger kilometres
and journeys, reflecting changes in society, transport policy and the economic climate.
• In 2009/10, the economic recession led to a slowing down in the growth in rail usage; passenger
journeys briefly showed a small decrease. However, figures since then indicate that this was a
temporary effect, with usage again showing rising trends.
• Up until around 2006/07, freight usage showed a similar trend to passenger usage, although it
has never regained the volumes seen in the early 1960s and earlier. From 2006/07, the trend has
been less stable, with the most recent years showing reductions in freight volume.
• Compared with ten years ago:
− Passenger journeys have increased by 48%
− Passenger kilometres have increased by 40%
− Train kilometres have increased by 10%
− Freight tonne kilometres have decreased by 19%
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.7 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality

risk
From the user’s perspective, the risk from using a mode of transport can be assessed on the basis of
fatalities per traveller kilometre. In theory, this allows him or her to compare the risk from
undertaking the same journey using different modes.
Chart 11. Traveller fatality risk for different transport modes (relative to rail)
1400
1284
1200
Fatality risk per traveller km
1000
as a multiple of rail
800
600
430
395
400
200
1 4 22
0
Mainline railway Bus or coach Car Pedal cycle Pedestrian Motorcycle
• Rail transport has the lowest traveller fatality risk per traveller kilometre:
− The motorcycle is by far the highest risk mode of popular transport, with a fatality risk per
kilometre three orders of magnitude greater than rail.
− Car travel is around 20 times less safe, on average, than making a rail journey of the same
length.
− Bus and coach travel is around five times safer than making the same journey by car, but
around four times less safe than rail.
• While a measure such as fatalities per kilometre is the best metric for comparing the risk from
making the same journey using different
modes, fatalities per hour is useful for Traveller fatality risk – other metrics
comparing travel with other activities. Fatality risk per billion traveller…
Table 4 shows that rail has a similar level ..km ..hours
Mainline railway 0.05 3
of risk per hour to bus and coach travel,
Bus or coach 0.22 4
and maintains its strong advantage over Car 1.23 49
other forms of travel. Pedal cycle 21.63 286
Pedestrian 23.59 101
Motorcycle 70.38 2437
Data source: SRMv8.1 for rail (based on data to September 2014), DfT for other modes (Transport Statistics Great Britain
2014 for headline rates and Reported Road Casualties Great Britain 2014 for casualties to other road users, normalised by
data obtained from the National Travel Survey). A three-year average (2012-2014) was used to estimate casualty rates for
bus and coach occupants, a single year (2014) was used for other forms of road transport. In 2014, there were 1,775 road
accident fatalities: 446 pedestrians, 113 pedal cyclists, 339 motorcyclists (including 14 passengers), 797 car occupants
(including 226 passengers), 7 bus and coach passengers and 73 other road users (mostly occupants of goods vehicles).
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.8 Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values

The Railway Safety Directive states the requirement for Member States to ensure that safety is
generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable, continuously improved. The European
Railway Agency (ERA) is mandated to develop Common Safety Targets (CSTs) and National Reference
Values (NRVs) to monitor the performance of Member States in this area.
The NRVs are designed to reflect observed baseline levels of safety in each Member State. NRVs are
calculated based on a form of weighted average performance over a period of time; this reduces the
effect of ‘outliers’, in recognition of the potentially distorting effect of a single multi-fatality event.
The current (second) set of NRVs are based on the six-year period 2004 to 2009; the first set were
based on the four years from 2004 to 2007.
The ERA is monitoring each Member State’s performance against its NRVs to determine whether
levels of safety are at least being maintained in each category. The level of performance is assessed
using the Common Safety Indicators (CSIs) that National Safety Authorities submit to the ERA as part
of their annual safety reports. 2
While the rest of the ASPR presents statistics on data for GB mainline railway, the analysis in this
section covers UK as a whole, as it is at this level that the CSIs, CSTs and NRVs are set.
RSSB co-ordinates the collation of GB CSIs by identifying potentially relevant events from SMIS and
validating them with the transport operators involved. It provides CSI data to the ORR on behalf of
the industry, which satisfies the requirements set out in the Railways and Other Guided Transport
Systems (ROGS) Regulation 20(1)(c) for transport operators to produce an annual set of safety data.
The CSTs apply to all Member States. The CST in each category is equal to the lower of (i) the highest
NRV value and (ii) 10 times the average NRV for all Member States. Meeting the second set of CSTs is
unlikely to be of concern to countries with relatively strong safety performance, such as the UK. In
the longer term, the ERA is likely to set more challenging CSTs that apply to all Member States and
are targeted to the higher-risk parts of the rail system.
The second set of NRVs

NRVs and CSTs are defined in terms of fatalities and weighted serious injuries (FWSI), divided by a
suitable normaliser, and specified for six categories, pertaining to different groups of people. A
serious injury, which occurs if the victim is hospitalised for a period of longer than 24 hours, is given
one-tenth the weighting of a fatality.
The person type categories align with those used by RSSB, with the exception of passengers. The ERA
defines a person as a passenger only if he or she is on, or in the act of boarding or alighting from, a
train; this is more restrictive than the RSSB/RIDDOR definition. The ERA category others covers other
(RSSB) passengers – such as a person who falls from a platform and is struck by a train – as well as
members of the public who are neither trespassing nor using a level crossing.
2 Because CSIs are available only from 2006, and because of concerns about the quality of the CSI data being provided by
some Member States, the ERA based its NRV calculations on data supplied to Eurostat under European Commission (EC)
Regulations No 91/2003 and 1192/2003. Prior to 2006, UK data submitted to Eurostat aligns with that published by the ORR
(ie only confirmed suicides are omitted), whereas from 2006 onwards the data are based on an application of the
Ovenstone criteria. This resulted in an inflated number of reported trespasser fatalities for 2004 and 2005, relative to
subsequent years. RSSB and ORR work together to ensure the consistency of the annual ERA and Eurostat submissions.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
It is important to note that the NRVs, CSTs and accident-related CSIs only cover significant accidents
that involve railway vehicles in motion (collisions, derailments, persons struck by trains etc). The CSIs
therefore only represent a subset of the accidents that take place on the railway, and measuring
against the NRVs does not provide a complete assessment of overall safety performance.
Table 5 shows the second set of NRVs and CSTs, as they apply to the UK. The column NRV rank shows
where the UK’s NRV ranks among the EU-25 countries. 3
For the UK, the second set of NRVs present much more challenging targets than the first set,
especially in the area of passenger safety. The level of harm specified by NRVs 1.1 and 1.2 is now less
than the SRMv8.1 estimate of the risk to passengers from accidents that are within the scope of
European reporting.
NRV and CST definitions and values 4
UK NRV NRV
NRV rank
NRV Category Definition Second First CST
number in
set set
EU-25
Number of passenger FWSI per billion
NRV 1.1 2.73 6.22 1 207
passenger train kilometres.
Passengers
Number of passenger FWSI per billion
NRV 1.2 0.028 0.0623 1 1.91
passenger kilometres.
Number of employee FWSI per billion
Employees NRV 2 5.17 8.33 3 77.9
train kilometres.
Number of road vehicle occupant and
NRV 3.1 pedestrian FWSI per billion train 23.0 23.0 1 710
kilometres.
Level crossing users
Number of road vehicle occupant and
NRV 3.2 pedestrian FWSI per billion train n/a n/a n/a n/a
traverses over a crossing.
Number of other person FWSI per
Others NRV 4 7.00 6.98 n/a 35.5
billion train kilometres.
Unauthorised Number of unauthorised person FWSI
persons on railway NRV 5 per billion train kilometres. Note: This 84.5 94.7 5 2045
premises excludes suicides.
Total number of passengers,
employee level crossing user, other
Whole society NRV 6 120.0 131.0 2 2587
and unauthorised person FWSI per
billion train kilometres.
3 Norway, which sits outside the EU but collaborates with the ERA and EU Member States on matters of railway safety, has
NRVs that are lower than the UK’s in the categories of employees, level crossing users and whole society.
4 NRV 3.2 has been omitted from the assessments of the first and second set of NRVs because of concerns about the quality
and consistency of normalising data across the Member States. For NRV 4, assessment was first published in the 2013
report. It is not appropriate to rank the UK on this NRV because the data behind its calculation was not based on the UK
(there being insufficient events for the UK over the period of its calculation). The NRV for Ireland is based on the UK, as
insufficient data for Ireland was available.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Assessing performance against the NRVs

The ERA assesses performance against each NRV on the basis of the latest available calendar year’s
performance and a moving weighted average (MWA) over a defined period. The periods used for the
calculation of the NRVs/CSTs and MWAs are shown in the diagram below. The assessment for 2016,
as presented in the charts in this section, is provisional; ERA will publish the official report on this
data in 2017.
ERA assessment schedule & scope
2010 assessment 2011 assessment 2012 assessment 2013 assessment 2014 assessment 2015 assessment 2016 assessment
Second set of NRVs/CSTs

2004
First set of
First set of
NRVs/ CSTs
NRVs/ CSTs
2005
MWA (4 yrs)
(amended)
(amended)
(amended)
2006
MWA (4 yrs)
MWA (5 yrs)
2007
MWA (5 yrs)
2008
MWA (5 yrs)
2009
MWA (5 yrs)
2010
MWA (5 yrs)
2011
2012
2013
2014
To make allowance for statistical uncertainty, the ERA will only consider flagging up concerns about
safety to a Member State if its level of performance falls outside the NRV plus a 20% tolerance limit,
and if this apparent deterioration cannot be attributed to a single high-consequence accident.
In such cases, and in relation to the NRV in question, the ERA will then ask whether this is the first
time that the State has been in this position in the last three years, and whether the number of CSI-
reportable events has remained stable or decreased.
• If the answer to both questions is yes, the ERA will still conclude that performance is acceptable,
and the Member State will not be required to take specific action.
• If the answer to both questions is no, then the ERA will conclude that there has been a probable
deterioration of safety performance. The Member State will be required to provide a written
statement explaining the likely causes and – where needed – submit a safety enhancement plan
to the European Commission (EC).
• In the remaining cases, the ERA will conclude that there has been a possible deterioration of
safety performance, and the Member State will be required to provide a written explanatory
statement.
The DfT is accountable to the EC for the UK’s performance. If there were to be a genuine
deterioration in safety, then the DfT would initially look to ORR, as the safety regulator, to ensure
that the industry was taking remedial action. ORR would aim to work in co-operation with the
industry to understand the cause of the poor performance, and to ensure that the appropriate action
was taken. However, if enforcement action were needed, the relevant legislative tools would be:
• Health and safety enforcement powers, which might be applicable if safety levels were
deteriorating to an unacceptable level.
• ROGS regulations, which require each transport operator to have a safety management system
that ensures the mainline railway can achieve its CSTs.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Current performance against the NRVs

The second set of NRVs are based on the six years of data from 2004 to 2009. The ERA’s results of the
fifth assessment of the second set of NRVs, published in March 2016 was based on the five-year
period 2009 to 2013, and showed that all States met their NRVs in all categories, apart from:
Possible deterioration of safety performance: Probable deterioration of safety performance:
• Bulgaria (level crossing users) • Slovakia (employees; whole society)
• France (unauthorised persons)
• Hungary (employees; others)
• Italy (unauthorised persons)
• Romania (employees)
• Sweden (employees)
UK data for 2015 has not yet been submitted to the ERA (it will feature in the ERA’s 2017
assessment), but the following charts present provisional performance estimates based on the data
that has been collated by RSSB on behalf of transport operators. If the green line (the weighted
moving average of normalised FWSI) lies below the dashed red line (the NRV plus a 20% tolerance
limit) then safety performance is judged to be at an acceptable level. The provisional estimates
indicate that UK’s safety performance continues to be at an acceptable level in all measured NRV
categories.
NRVs for passenger safety Chart 12. Passenger safety: NRV 1.1
• The UK has the lowest NRVs for passenger 18
Normalised FWSI (actual)
safety of all EU States.
FWSI per billion passenger train km
16 Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)

NRV
14 NRV plus 20% tolerance
• The NRVs relating to passenger safety cover 12
passenger FWSI from train accidents and 10
from other accidents involving railway 8

6
vehicles in motion (for example, a fall on
4
board a train caused by sudden braking). 2
There were no passenger fatalities within 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
scope of CSI reporting during 2015.
• The highest FWSI values for passengers were
recorded in 2004 and 2007. These reflect the Chart 13. Passenger safety: NRV 1.2
injuries that occurred in the train accidents at 0.18
FWSI per billion passenger km
0.16
Ufton and Grayrigg respectively. Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
0.14 NRV plus 20% tolerance
• The second set of NRVs represent a level of 0.12
passenger risk that is substantially lower than 0.10

0.08
the SRMv8.1 estimate. Consistently meeting
0.06
these NRVs will therefore be a considerable 0.04
challenge for the UK railway. Nevertheless, 0.02
performance since 2008 has been within the 0.00

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NRVs.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
NRV for employee safety

• Most FWSI in this category arises from infrastructure workers being struck by trains.
• There were no workforce fatalities during
Chart 14. Employee safety: NRV 2
2015 that were within scope of CSI reporting.
20
• In 2004, there were particularly high 18 Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
16 NRV
numbers of both fatalities and serious
FWSI per billion train km

NRV plus 20% tolerance
14
injuries to infrastructure workers. 12
10
• When compared to estimates from SRMv8.1, 8
the employee NRV is a good estimate of the 6
underlying level of risk to employees from 4

2
accidents within the scope of European 0
reporting. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NRV for level crossing safety 5

• The UK has the lowest NRV for level crossing Chart 15. Level crossing safety: NRV 3.1
safety of all EU Member States. 35
30
• This NRV covers both pedestrians and road
25
vehicle occupants involved in collisions with
trains on level crossings (but not train 20
occupants). 15
10
• There was a notably lower number of level Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
5
crossing user fatalities in 2015, and the NRV
0
weighted moving average measure 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
continued its downward trend. In some
previous years, the weighted moving average
of normalised FWSI had exceeded the NRV but fallen within the 20% tolerance limit.
• When compared to estimates from SRMv8.1, the values of the level crossing NRVs are a
reasonable estimate of the underlying level of risk to level crossing users from accidents within
the scope of European reporting.
• The ERA has not set values for NRV 3.2 because of concerns about the quality of normalising
data. NRV 3.2 will measure FWSI at level crossings normalised by the number of times that trains
are estimated to traverse level crossings during the year. There are currently no plans in place to
normalise by the volume of road traffic and the number of pedestrians using level crossings.
5 Although ERA notes that data quality is improving, because of on-going concerns about the quality of information being
supplied by some Member States, it continues to use Eurostat data to assess performance against the NRVs. The
classifications used by Eurostat do not differentiate between level crossing users, unauthorised persons and others. ERA
analyses are based on the assumption that anyone in this combined category who is injured in an accident at a level
crossing is a level crossing user, anyone injured in a rolling stock in motion accident is an unauthorised person, and anyone
else is classed as other. This results in a number of casualties being misclassified (for example, people who are struck by
trains at, or after falling from, the platform edge will feature as unauthorised persons in the ERA statistics and in the charts
in this section). ERA will begin using CSI data once they have sufficient confidence in its quality. See also the footnote 2 on
page 18.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
NRV for other persons 6

• This NRV covers the risk to people who do not fall into any other category. This includes people
who are struck by trains in stations (when not trespassing or boarding or alighting from trains)
and members of the public who are not trespassing or using level crossings. However, because of
the limitations on the data classifications of the Eurostat data used by ERA (see footnote 5 on
page 23), the ERA data does not accurately reflect the numbers falling into this category.
• The NRV of 7.0 FWSI per year was not based on UK data because there were too few incidents
for its calculation.
NRV for unauthorised persons 7

• This NRV covers the risk from trespassers being struck by trains, and from ‘train surfers’.
• Performance since 2012 has been within
Chart 16. Safety of unauthorised persons: NRV 5
the NRV. This follows 2011 where
160
performance was above the NRV, but Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were
140 treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of
within the 20% tolerance limit: the number suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities
compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were
120
used.
of trespass fatalities in that year was 100
relatively high. The weighted moving 80
average has consistently been within the 60
NRV since 2008. 40 Normalised FWSI (actual)
Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
• Some of the Eurostat data used to set the 20 NRV

0
NRV was based on a different suicide 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
classification than is being applied to CSI
data (see footnote 2 in Section 2.8).
NRV for the whole of society

• The UK NRV value in this category is the second lowest of all Member States.
• This NRV represents the overall impact of Chart 17. Whole society safety: NRV 6
the railway on its passengers, staff and 250
members of the public (excluding suicides Prior to 2006, in the data supplied to Eurostat, fatalities were
treated as accidental in the absence of a coroner's verdict of
suicide. This led to an inflated number of trespasser fatalities
but including trespassers). 200 compared with later years, when the Ovenstone criteria were
used.
• Performance in 2015 was within the NRV. 150
• Unauthorised persons (that is, trespassers) 100

are the dominant contributor to this risk
50 Normalised FWSI (actual)
category. Changes in the risk to passengers, Normalised FWSI (weighted moving average)
NRV
staff, level crossing users and others are 0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
likely to have relatively little impact.
6 See footnote 5. The analysis of performance against this NRV is insufficiently meaningful for review, given the limitations
on the data behind it.
7 See footnote 5.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.8.1 Comparing rail safety within the EU

Chart 18. Passenger and workforce fatality rates on European Union railways 2010-2014
140
Normalised workforce fatalities
Normalised passenger fatalities
109.7
120
EU average
100
Fatalities per billion train km
72.2
80
62.9
55.0
52.7
60
46.6
42.0
32.3
30.6
40
22.4
21.4
21.4
26.8
16.2
15.7
13.8
13.4
11.4
11.3
11.0
20
4.0
2.5
1.4
0.7
0
0
0
Spain
Latvia
Greece
Slovenia
France
Germany
Finland
Netherlands
Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Portugal
Denmark
Romania
Italy
Austria
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Ireland
Estonia
Belgium
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Lithuania
Sweden
• The ERA uses data from a rolling five-year period to assess performance against the NRVs and
CSTs. Passenger and workforce fatality rates in the UK were well below the EU average over the
five-year period 2010-2014. There have been no passenger fatalities in train accidents on the UK
mainline since 2007.
• In general, countries in northern and western parts of Europe have safer railways than those
further south and east.
• A single multi-fatality accident can have a significant effect on the fatality rate. This is especially
noticeable for Spain, where a derailment occurred at Santiago de Compostela in July 2013, killing
79 people.
• Countries with lower levels of train kilometres Chart 19. Rates for the ten largest railways
are more prone to showing greater variability 140
Normalised workforce fatalities
in the observed rate than those with higher Normalised passenger fatalities
109.7
120
EU-25 average (26.8)
levels of usage. Neither Ireland nor
Fatalities per billion train km
100
Luxembourg recorded fatalities in the period 80

62.9
covered by the chart above. Chart 19 shows 60

30.6
that the UK ranked highest among the ten

40
21.4
13.4
11.4
11.3
11.0
20
largest EU-25 railways.
1.4
0.7
0
Poland
Spain
Republic
Italy
Austria
France
Germany
Kingdom
Sweden
Netherlands
United
Czech
Data source: Eurostat. The data covers the five-year period 2010-2014. Figures are normalised by train kilometres. Only
accidents relating to railway vehicles in motion are included, and the ERA definition of a passenger differs from that used
for the UK so the UK figures do not match those presented elsewhere in this report. There are issues with data quality for
some states, for example as a result of the different Member States’ interpretations of scope and definitions. ERA is
currently working with Member States to ensure that the data they submit is as complete as possible. The chart covers 25
members of the EU; the other two Member States, Malta and Cyprus, no longer have railways.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.9 Industry collaboration in safety management

2.9.1 Rail health and safety strategy
Britain's railway system is one of the safest and most intensively used rail networks in the world. Our
good safety performance has been achieved by highly competent people, by close co-operation
between teams and companies, the adoption of advanced health and safety management systems,
and the effective application of technology. We have accomplished this at the same time as record
numbers of passengers are using the rail system, and an increasing number of major investment
programmes are being implemented.
However the rate of safety improvement has slowed over the
past few years, and there are increasing challenges ahead.
Growth in rail usage is expected to continue, and there are
increasing expectations to demonstrate value for money. At the
same time, our awareness of the importance of managing the
health and wellbeing of all rail colleagues is growing.
The rail health and safety strategy, Leading Health and Safety
on Britain’s Railway, has been developed by leaders of the rail
industry to provide a framework for the collaborative
improvement of health and safety performance on the railway.
The strategy focuses on those elements of health and safety
risk management that can be improved by companies working
together, within and beyond legislative requirements, to
achieve greater gains in health and safety performance.
The strategy highlights 12 priority risk areas
that provide a focus for collaborative effort.
These areas have been selected by the
industry, by adopting a maturity and risk-
based approach, from extensive data and
professional judgement. The areas have the
greatest potential to reduce health and
safety risk through industry collaboration.
The rail industry’s capability in managing health and

safety is determined by the combination of extensive
processes, systems, equipment, plant and assets, and
the people that plan, design, build, maintain, operate,
monitor and review our activities. The strategy
identifies nine areas in which industry capability in
managing health and safety can be developed. At the
heart of developing our collective capability is a
willingness of industry leaders to collaborate for the
benefit of rail as a whole, and to develop our culture
and behaviours across the rail industry.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.9.2 The current industry framework for working together

A wide variety of groups, forums and arrangements have been established both nationally and
regionally between train operators, freight operators, Network Rail, infrastructure contractors and
RSSB to help understand system safety risk, review performance and sponsor improvement actions.
These meetings all play a part in delivering the legal ‘duty of co-operation’ obligation on rail
companies under ROGS.
System Safety Risk Group (SSRG)

The purpose of SSRG is to have sight of how system safety is being managed within the industry and
through this, to identify areas for improvement, including the sharing of good practice and the
identification of potential threats and opportunities through horizon scanning. The group has
representation from across the rail industry, including Network Rail, train operating companies
(TOCs) and freight operating companies (FOCs), infrastructure companies and ROSCOs. The group is
facilitated by RSSB, and has observer membership from BTP, ORR and trade unions.
SSRG reports to the RSSB Board and has a number of subgroups that report to it, described briefly
below. In addition, it works co-operatively with the wider industry, through other existing groups.
Data and Risk Strategy Group (DRSG)

The purpose of DRSG is to develop and oversee the delivery of the industry-wide strategy for the
collection, analysis and reporting of safety related data, and the development and use of risk tools
and models.
People on Trains and in Stations Risk Group (PTSRG)

The purpose of PTSRG is to consider risks to the workforce, passengers and public in stations and on
board trains on Network Rail controlled infrastructure, resulting from assault and other crime and
anti-social behaviour, train despatch and the PTI, on-board injuries, and slips, trips and falls. The part
of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 3 People on trains and in stations.
Train Operations Risk Group (TORG)

The purpose of TORG is to understand and review the proportion of total system risk relevant to its
scope. The group is required to: monitor the effectiveness of current control arrangements, identify
and sponsor improvement opportunities including research and RSSB-facilitated products and
services; learn from and promote good practice; facilitate co-operation; respond to requests from
SSRG and other co-operative forums; and consider future developments that may impact its risk. The
part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 6 Train operations.
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG)

The LCSG meets on an eight-weekly basis and is attended by Network Rail, train operators, BTP, DfT,
railway unions and ADEPT (The Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and
Transport). Its terms of reference include reviewing the risk to users of level crossings and train
occupants. Some of the group’s objectives include; reviewing current control arrangements and risk
mitigations in place, to sponsor and govern research, learning and promotion of good practice/co-
operation and responding to SSRG. The part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 7
Level crossings.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass Risk Group (TRG)

The TRG is a new cross-industry group that covers trespass of the mainline railway and of YDS. It will
monitor the effectiveness of current control arrangements, identify and sponsor improvement
opportunities, including research and relevant products and services; learn from and promote good
practice; facilitate co-operation; and consider future developments that may impact its risk (horizon
scanning).
An event is considered to be trespass if it involves access to prohibited areas of the railway and
involves deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. Such behaviour includes deliberately alighting a train in
running in circumstances other than as part of a controlled evacuation procedure, and getting down
from the platform to the tracks to retrieve an item that has been dropped. Events involving incorrect
usage of level crossings are not categorised as trespass, unless the person goes on to access the
running line via the crossing. The part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group is Chapter 8
Trespass.
Road Risk Group (RRG)

Over recent years, there has been growing acknowledgment of the significant risk that road driving
holds for the rail industry. Following a rail industry conference in Mar 2015 on Work-Related Road
Driving and the publication of road driving risk section in the previous edition of the ASPR, the rail
industry formed the RRG, to support the industry in its work in this risk area and help it deliver on the
aims of the Rail Industry Health & Safety Strategy. The main part of the ASPR of interest to this
group is Chapter 5 Road driving risk.
In addition to SSRG and its subgroups, there are a large number of other industry bodies that work
together in support of current and future GB rail operations. Two of those most relevant to risk
management are described below; the reader is referred to the RSSB website for a more detailed
overview: http://www.rssb.co.uk/groups-and-committees.
Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group

Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group (ISLG) is a leading forum for GB railway contractors to work
together and with the wider industry to improve health, safety and environmental performance,
share experiences, good practice and knowledge. ISLG specifically aims to: review health, safety, and
environmental performance; review legislation and standards; clarify and prioritise risk issues;
Identify good practice and wider intelligence; facilitate solutions; influence and lobby industry; and
sponsor RSSB research, projects, and initiatives.
Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group

The overarching purpose of Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group (SPDHG) is to address and reduce
the impact that the complex societal issue of suicide brings to the railway, by providing direction and
governance to its suicide prevention programme. It meets on an eight weekly basis, with
membership comprising of those companies and organisations that have a statutory duty to manage
safety risk on the railway: Network Rail, train operators (in their own right and through their trade
association ATOC) and British Transport Police. The part of the ASPR of most relevance to this group
is Chapter 9 Suicide.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Health and Wellbeing Policy Group

Cross-industry health and wellbeing activities are driven by the industry publication Leading Health
and Wellbeing on Britain’s Railway. A health and wellbeing roadmap is identified within the strategy
and it is this that identifies and drives the activities that are being developed to meet industry’s
capability requirements. The roadmap activities were identified through extensive stakeholder
engagement with rail professionals and health experts. The Health and Wellbeing Policy Group
(HWPG) provides a focus point for industry discussion and horizon scanning about railway health and
wellbeing and coordinates and steers the RSSB Workforce Health and Wellbeing Programme.
The Workforce Health and Wellbeing Programme supports industry work to proactively improve
health and wellbeing management within rail companies. The programme works to support
development of products identified within the health and wellbeing roadmap in line with five
strategic themes that guide the programmes activities. These themes are: Industry Leadership,
Health and Engagement, Health Knowledge, Monitoring and Reporting, and Behavioural Change.
Current projects include
• Exploring health data user requirements - To gain some common agreements about the type and
use of health data at the cross-industry level that can support business and industry goals
• Expert scientific investigation into common rail health hazards - Expert support, acquired and
shared across industry to tackle complex health hazards
• Scoping health and wellbeing company standards - This work will draw out gaps, good practices
and unwanted inconsistencies to improve health management practices
• Mapping training requirements - This work shall map out a company competency matrix for the
health training requirements of line managers. It will then link up training syllabuses that support
companies and managers to gain the identified skills.
Details about the Health and Wellbeing Programme can be found at:
http://www.rssb.co.uk/improving-industry-performance/workforce-passenger-and-the-
public/workforce-health-and-wellbeing.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.9.3 Where industry groups target risk

By addressing key areas of risk on the railway, each industry stakeholder group helps in the
management of the risk to people using or working on the railway. The current stakeholder group
structure, at a national level, is outlined in the diagram below:
People on Trains and in Stations Risk Group (PTSRG): Personal
injuries to passengers, workforce and members of the public on 67.8 FWI
Subgroups of System Safety Risk Group (SSRG)
trains and in stations (incl. assaults, excl. trespass)

Train Operations Risk Group (TORG): Train accidents due to any
cause (excl. at LC); personal injuries on the running line during train 5.1 FWI
operation
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG): All harm from train accidents
11.4 FWI
and from personal accidents occurring at LC
Trespass Risk Group (TRG): All accidental harm arising from trespass
33.6 FWI
at all locations
Mainline
Road Risk Group (RRG): Injuries to workforce while travelling in road

1.2 FWI
vehicles for work-related purposes
Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group (SPDHG) 8: Injuries to
suicidal persons, and personal injuries to third parties (eg witnesses 245.3 FWI
to the suicidal act)
Network Rail / Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group (ISLG): Injuries

Other industry
to infrastructure workers on the running line or elsewhere on 10.1 FWI

mainline railway property (excl. trains, stations, LC and RTAs)
Network Rail / single duty holder: Injuries that occur on mainline
1.7 FWI
railway, not covered by any other group
Yards, depots Network Rail / single duty holder: Accidents and injuries to the
7.3 FWI 9
and sidings workforce in yards, depots and sidings
The following charts show which industry groups are involved in managing the risk affecting
passengers, public and workforce.
8The risk under the remit of SPDHG also includes the indirect (accidental) risk from suicides eg workforce shock/trauma.
9The figure of 7.3 FWI excludes 0.3 FWI which arises from public trespass, and which is included in the figure of 33.6 FWI
under the Trespass Risk Group.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Passengers
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to passengers is 58.4
FWI per year. Chart 20. Industry groups working in the
areas of passenger risk
The majority of this risk (55.0 FWI per year) falls
within the remit of PTSRG. Analysis of this risk area
is shown in Chapter 3 Passengers and public. People on Trains
and Stations Risk
A further 2.6 FWI per year occurs in train accidents Group, Train Operations
55.0 FWI/year Risk Group,
such as train collisions or derailments. This risk is 2.6 FWI/year
under the remit of TORG, and is analysed in Level Crossing
Chapter 6 Train operations. Strategy Group,
0.8 FWI/year
The remaining 0.8 FWI per year occurs at level

crossings. Of this, 0.2 FWI per year occurs to
passengers on trains, from collisions with road
vehicles and 0.6 FWI per year occurs to passengers on station crossings, struck by trains. This area of
risk is discussed further in Chapter 7 Level crossings.
Members of the public

Chart 21. Industry groups working in the
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to members of the areas of risk to the public
public is 47.5 FWI per year (excluding suicide).
Network Rail /
The majority of this risk (33.6 FWI per year) falls single duty
holder,
within the remit of TRG. Most of this (33.3 FWI per 0.8 FWI/year
year) occurs as trespass on the mainline. Analysis Trespass Risk People on Trains
Group,
of this risk area is shown in Chapter 8 Trespass. The 33.6 FWI/year
and Stations Risk
Group,
remaining 0.3 FWI per year being trespass in YDS. 2.4 FWI/year
Level Crossing
Train Operations
A notable proportion (10.3 FWI per year) occurs at Strategy Group, Risk Group,
10.3 FWI/year
level crossings. Of this, 3.3 FWI per year are injuries 0.7 FWI/year
to road vehicle occupants as a result of collisions

with trains, and 7.0 FWI per year are injuries to
pedestrian users, mostly from accidents involving
being hit by trains. This risk is under the remit of LCSG, and is analysed in Chapter 7 Level crossings.
A small proportion of risk to members of the public arises from train accidents away from level
crossings. This mostly comprises train collisions with road vehicle incursions from bridges or
embankments. Train accident risk is discussed in Chapter 6 Train operations.
Around 2.4 FWI per year occurs in accidents in stations, and falls under the scope of PTSRG. These
accidents are very similar in nature to those occurring to passengers in stations, and are covered in
Chapter 3 People on trains and in stations.
The remaining 0.8 FWI per year comprises the relatively small risk from accidents elsewhere on
railway property, such as people who fall from bridges onto railway property (but not as a result of
trespass) or third parties who are affected by fires or other hazards within railway bounds. These
accidents do not fall within the scope of an SSRG group, but remain the responsibility of the duty
holder.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce
The SRMv8.1 estimate of risk to the workforce is 33.4 FWI per year, with 26.1 FWI per year occurring
on the mainline railway, and 7.3 FWI per year occurring in YDS. This is considered in Chapter 10.
Of the mainline risk:
• 10.4 FWI per year falls under
Chart 22. Industry groups working in the areas of
the scope of PTSRG. This
workforce risk
comprises accidents such as
slips, trips and falls in stations,
workforce assaults, and on- Yards, depots and
People on Trains
board injuries; these risk areas sidings,
7.3 FWI/year
and Stations Risk
Group,
are also discussed in Chapter 3 10.4 FWI/year
People on trains and in Network Rail /
Train Operations
single duty holder,
stations. 0.9 FWI/year Risk Group,
1.8 FWI/year
• 1.8 FWI per year falls under
Level Crossing
the scope of TORG. This Strategy Group,
0.3 FWI/year
comprises injuries as a result Network Rail /
Infrastructure
of train accidents such as Safety Liaison Suicide Prevention Road Risk Group,
Trespass Risk
Group,
Group, Duty Holders 1.2 FWI/year
derailments and train 10.1 FWI/year Group,
0.1 FWI/year
1.2 FWI/year
collisions; train accident risk is
discussed in Chapter 6 Train operations.
• 0.3 FWI falls within the scope of LCSG, and arises mainly from train collisions with road vehicles
at level crossings. This is covered in Chapter 7 Level crossings.
• Road driving risk is an area that has rightly received increased attention lately, and has resulted
in the establishment of the RRG, a new subgroup of SSRG. SRMv8.1 estimates 1.2 FWI per year
from this cause; more information is presented in Chapter 5 Road driving risk.
• Members of the workforce, particularly train drivers, are at risk of shock/trauma from incidents
where members of the public take their life, or are injured while trespassing. Amounting to 1.3
FWI per year in total, this source of risk is mainly being considered by SPDHG, and in discussed in
Chapters 8 Trespass and 9 Suicide.
• A notable proportion of risk to the workforce on the mainline involves infrastructure work.
Around 10.1 FWI per year is estimated to affect infrastructure workers involved on track work.
Although not covered by a subgroup of SSRG, both Network Rail and ISLG are focused on this
area of risk, which is discussed further in Chapter 4.
• A much smaller proportion of work on the mainline has no specific focus group, as it relates to
causes of risk falling within the remit of single duty holders, such as slips, trips and falls in signal
boxes.
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
2.10 Key safety statistics: safety overview

Safety Overview 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 53 49 39 45 45
Passenger 5 3 4 3 8
Workforce 1 2 3 3 0
Public 47 44 32 39 37
Major injuries 471 516 497 529 483
Passenger 258 312 274 298 288
Workforce 172 162 177 182 157
Public 41 42 46 49 38
Minor injuries 12965 12776 12785 13195 12603
Passenger 5954 6383 6388 6880 6690
Workforce 6824 6213 6234 6136 5694
Public 187 180 163 179 219
Incidents of shock 1512 1217 1264 1089 958
Passenger 262 238 236 253 205
Workforce 1247 973 1026 833 746
Public 3 6 2 3 7
Fatalities and weighted injuries 125.11 124.93 113.13 121.56 116.42
Passenger 42.54 46.45 43.60 44.95 48.84
Workforce 30.98 29.79 32.48 32.28 26.22
Public 51.59 48.70 37.05 44.33 41.37
Harm from suicides and attempted
252.39 248.57 281.52 290.89 255.47
suicides
Suicides 250 245 276 287 252
_________________________________________________________________
Safety overview
_________________________________________________________________
Page intentionally blank
_________________________________________________________________
People on trains and in stations
_________________________________________________________________
3 People on trains and in stations

This chapter focuses on the ways in which people could be injured while travelling on trains or using
stations. It excludes both the risk to people from train accidents (which is covered in Chapter 6 Train
operations) and the risk from people who commit acts of trespass (which is covered in Chapter 8
Trespass).
We have separated the analysis to look at members of the workforce separately from passengers and
members of the public, which we have grouped together. This is because the types of activities that
the workforce carry out on trains and in stations are different from those of passengers and the
public. Passengers and the public are grouped together because they use the railway in similar ways
and are exposed to the same types of risk.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were ten fatalities in stations: eight passengers and two members of the public. When the
number of non-fatal injuries is taken into account, the total level of harm occurring to passengers
and the public in stations was 45.3 FWI, compared with 41.8 FWI for the previous year.
• There were no fatal accidents to passengers or public on board trains. The total level of
passenger and public harm on board trains was 6.8 FWI compared with 6.3 FWI for 2014/15.
• There were no fatalities to members of the workforce in stations or on board trains. The total
level of workforce harm recorded in stations in 2015/16 was 6.3 FWI, compared with 5.7 FWI for
the previous year. The total level of workforce harm on board trains was 3.5 FWI, compared with
3.2 FWI 2014/15.
• Injuries in stations and on board trains account for nearly half of the accidental risk profile, as
estimated by SRMv8.1.
Train and station safety at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trends in harm
Workforce in 90
Workforce on Weighted injuries
stations 80
trains 70 Fatalities
(6.3 FWI; 5%)
(4.1 FWI; 3%)
52.1
48.5
60
48.1
47.2
45.7
44.9
41.3
39.6
39.5
38.8
50
FWI
40
Other 30
12.6
12.1
12.0
11.9
11.2
10.1
accidental Passengers and 20

9.8
9.4
9.3
8.8
risk 10
public in stations
(71.7 FWI; 0
(48.6 FWI; 35%)
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
51%)
Passengers
and public on Passsengers/public Workforce
trains
(8.8 FWI; 6%)
_________________________________________________________________
People on trains and in stations: passengers and public
_________________________________________________________________
3.1 Passengers and public

3.1.1 Risk profile by accident type
Chart 23 shows the breakdown of risk to passengers and the public on trains and in stations. It is
based on information from SRMv8.1 and represents the modelled estimate of the underlying risk.
The purpose of the chart is to give some context about how the risk from different sources differs in
magnitude. In the remainder of this section, the charts are based on recorded levels of harm and will
therefore differ year to year from the SRM modelled values. The types of events that are included in
each category are shown in Chart 23 are described in Appendix 6.
Chart 23. Risk to passengers/public on trains and in stations, by accident type: 57.4 FWI per year

In stations
Contact with object or person 1.6
Other accidents 0.3
Assault and abuse 4.5 Fatalities

On trains
Major injuries
Minor injuries
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Source: SRMv8.1
• Slips, trips and falls to passengers/public in stations account for around 28.4 FWI per year on
average. Most of this risk arises in the form of major injuries.
• Accidents at the platform-train interface (PTI) equate to less than half of the FWI risk from slips,
trips and falls. This category includes injuries during boarding and alighting, but also injuries
when no train is present, such as falls from the platform edge. Accidents at the PTI contribute a
relatively high level of fatality risk, but it is important to note that boarding or alighting is very
rarely the cause of a fatal injury. A fatality is much more likely to happen as a result of someone
falling from the platform edge for other reasons.
• The SRM estimates assaults to passengers/public at 10.0 FWI per year. Unlike most other SRM
estimates, this is not based on data from SMIS, as SMIS is not the primary system for recording
assaults to passengers or the public. The primary source for these events is BTP data, and the
SRM estimate is based on this. The assault figure of 10.0 FWI per year covers both assaults on
trains and in stations, and is roughly evenly split between the two site types.
• The on-board injuries category consists of a range of different types of events, such as people
tripping over, bumping into objects and getting scalded by hot drinks, and amounts to 4.0 FWI
per year. People bumping into objects or other people in stations amounts to 1.6 FWI per year.
The remaining category or other injury includes events such as those arising from falls from
height, manual handling injuries and station fires, which are generally either rare in nature, or
lower in consequence.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.2 Passenger/public fatalities and injuries in 2015/16

Fatalities
• There were ten fatalities within the scope of this chapter, all occurring in stations:
− Six people fell from the platform edge: one passenger died from injuries resulting from the
fall, one passenger was subsequently electrocuted, one passenger and one member of the
public were subsequently struck by through trains, and two passengers fell between the
platform and trains departing the station.
− One passenger died after being struck by a station sign that fell from its mountings in high
winds.
− One passenger was fatally injured as a result of an assault involving a group of teenage
boys.
− One passenger was fatally injured after initiating an altercation with a fellow passenger.
− The tenth fatality involved a teenage member of the public, who died along with her
mother, who is believed to have deliberately accessed the track in a station to take her own
life. In this case, the death of the daughter is classed under the category of assault and
abuse, while the death of the mother is classed as suspected suicide.
Major injuries
• There were 298 passenger/public major injuries in 2015/16.
• 83% occurred at stations, and nearly three-quarters of these were slips, trips and falls.
Minor injuries
• There were 6,795 passenger/public minor injuries, 1,322 (19%) of which were Class 1 (ie the
injured party went straight to hospital).
• Of the Class 1 minor injuries, more than 90% occurred at stations, with more than three-quarters
of these again being due to slips, trips and falls.
Shock and trauma

• There were 204 recorded cases of passenger/public shock or trauma. One of the events was
Class 1, and involved a lady who lost her balance while standing at the platform edge, and fell
against the side of the train as it was entering the platform. This is give a Class 1 categorisation,
because it is associated with a type of event that has a higher potential for a serious outcome.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.3 Trend in passenger/public harm by injury degree

The average level of passenger/public harm in stations or on board trains over the last 10 years has
been 44.6 FWI per year, of which 6.4 FWI per year relates to fatalities. As SMIS data does not contain
complete information on passenger/public assault, it is likely that the level of harm is somewhat
higher than this. The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from assault to passenger and public is 10.0 FWI per
year, and is based on data obtained from BTP; trends in BTP assault data are analysed in Section
3.1.6.
Chart 24. Trend in harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations, by injury degree
Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate
60 6
52.1
47.2 48.5 48.1
50 45.7 44.9 5
12.1
FWI per 100m journeys

41.3 39.6 39.5
38.8 12.2 12.1
40 10.8 11.7 4
12.1
9.5
9.7 10.1 10.3
FWI
30 3
29.8
20 22.5 25.6 27.2 32.0 2
28.5 31.8
22.8 24.3 24.0
10 1
9 9 8 10
6 5 5 4 4 4
0 0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The total level of harm to passengers/public on trains and in stations for 2015/16 was 52.1 FWI.
The most readily available normaliser for the trends is passenger journeys. It is not perfect, as it
does not cover members of the public visiting stations for the purposes of shopping, eating or
other activities, but this data is not available. When normalised by passenger journeys, the rate
of passenger/public harm in 2015/16 increased by 6% on the rate for the previous year, but
remains lower than the level for years prior to 2013/14.
• The amount of harm occurring on trains is around a tenth of that occurring in stations. Chart 25
shows that the increase in FWI over the past two years shown in Chart 24 is due to an increase in
harm both on trains and on stations; the rate of harm in both locations has shown an increase
compared with last year.
Chart 25. Passenger/public harm by injury degree and location
Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Normalised rate
60 12
50 45.3 10
41.0 43.1 43.5 40.4 41.8
35.5 35.0 35.7 35.0
10.5
40 8
Station FWI
10.7
10.2
6.3 6.8
10.5
Train FWI
10.5
9.4
5.8
19.4 7.9
8.7
4.5 4.7 4.1 5.0 4.5

8.4
8.9
30 6
1.5
1.6
3.8 3.9
3.1 1.6
24.6
24.7
22.5
3.4 1.5
20 4
28.6
3.1 1.5
27.2
1.4
25.7
2.8 1.6
20.4
21.9
21.0
2.5 1.5
2.4 1.4
2.4 1.3
5.2
4.6
10 2
3
8 6 5 5 9 8 10
0 4 4 4 0 0
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
In stations On trains
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in passenger/public fatalities

There has been an average of 6.4 passenger/public fatalities per year on trains and in stations over
the last 10 years.
Chart 26. Passenger/public fatalities in stations or on trains, by accident type

12
Assault and abuse
Contact with object or person
Slips, trips and falls 10
10
9 9 Platform-train interface
1 1 8 3
8
2 2
Fatalities
6 3 1
6
1 5 5
1 1 4 4 4
4 2
1
6 6 2 6
5 1
2 4 4 4
3 1
2
1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Scope: Accidental injuries in stations or on board trains. Excludes train accidents; trespass
• Most fatalities over the last 10 years have been at the platform-train interface, with slips, trips
and falls being the next highest category. There have been nine fatalities in the category of
assault and abuse 10; SMIS is more likely to have records of this level of consequence than it is to
have records of less serious events, which will be held by BTP.
• Over the past 10 years, there have been no fatalities as a result of accidentally falling from
moving trains. 11 The risk associated with falls from moving trains has reduced significantly since
the removal of Mark 1 (slam door) rolling stock and the use of central door locking on any
remaining manually operated doors.
10 The category of assault and abuse also includes any incidence of unlawful killing, murder or manslaughter and any
incidence of lawful killing in self-defence.
11 Passengers who deliberately decide to exit a train in running are classed as engaging in trespass; these events are
therefore covered under Chapter 8 Trespass.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in passenger/public major injuries

There has been an average of 268 passenger/public major injuries in stations or on trains over the
past 10 years.
Chart 27. Passenger/ public major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type
400 40
Other injury
Assault and abuse
350 Contact with object or person 35
On-board injuries 320 318
Slips, trips and falls
Platform-train interface 298
300 285 30
Normalised rate
Major injuries per 100m journeys

272 24
256 35
250 243 240 26 45 25
225 228 20
Major injuries
23 23
25
200 21 20
28
210
150 193 201 15
182 179
166 163
147 154
140
100 10
50 5
65 53
38 41 41 43 46 48 51 50
0 0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Over the past 10 years, the number of passenger/public major injuries on trains and in stations
has been generally increasing. However, this has been in line with generally increasing usage of
the railway, as can be seen by the flatter shape of the normalised number of major injuries.
• The most notable recent variation in the generally flat rate occurred in 2012/13, which was the
year of the London Olympics. The increase in number and rate was analysed at the time that it
occurred, and found not to be specific to the time of the event itself, but it is possible that there
was some contributory effect during the year as a whole.
• The majority of major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls in stations. There were 179 major
injuries due to slips, trips and falls in 2015/16, an 11% decrease from 2014/15.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trends in passenger/public minor injuries

Minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if the person is taken to hospital from the scene of the
accident, and as Class 2 otherwise. Minor injuries that are Class 2 are generally of a less serious
nature than those that are Class 1, and are consequently given a lesser weighting when calculating
weighted injuries.
Chart 28. Passenger/public minor injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type

7000 700
Other injury
Assault and abuse
5698
6000 600
5473
On-board injuries
5038
5035
4645
5000 500
4425
Minor injuries per 100m journeys

4171
4163
3974
Normalised rate
3771
Minor injuries
4000 400
3000 300
2000 200
1439
1419
1413
1322
1280
1276
1229
1181
1147
1137
1000 100
0 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Class 1 Class 2
• The 1,322 Class 1 minor injuries occurring in 2015/16 represent an increase of 4% compared with
2014/15. When normalised by passenger journeys, the Class 1 minor injury rate increased by 2%,
but represents the second lowest level in the ten-year period.
• The number of Class 2 minor injuries had been showing a fairly consistent increasing trend over
the past 10 years. At 5,473, the number recorded for 2015/16 represents a 4% decrease on an
absolute basis, and a 6% decrease on a normalised basis.
• In total over the past ten years, 22% of minor injuries have been Class 1, but the proportion
differs for different types of accident. For some types of accident there appears to be a greater
propensity for minor injuries to be more severe. However, there may also be a difference in the
propensity for reporting different types of accident, which would affect the observed ratios.
Examples of differences are on-board injuries, where 10% of minor injuries since 2006/07 have
been Class 1, and slips, trips and falls, where 29% have been Class 1.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.4 Passenger/public slips, trips and falls in stations

The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations over the last 10 years has been 25.2
FWI per year, which is over half the average total harm to passengers/public in stations and on trains
over this period. Of the 25.2 FWI per year, 9.2 FWI per year has occurred on stairs, 7.1 FWI per year
on the platform, 3.8 FWI per year on the concourse, 3.1 FWI per year on escalators, with the other
areas of the station making up the remaining 2.0 FWI per year.
Chart 29. Trends in harm from passenger/public slips, trips and falls, by location
14
12.6 Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
12 Major injuries
10.5 10.2 Fatalities
10 9.3 9.1
7.7 7.9
8 7.6
7.2
FWI
6.3
6
4.8
4.3 4.3 4.4 4.2
4.0 3.8
4 3.3 3.1
2.7
2.4 2.2 2.0 2.1
2 1.6
0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Stairs Platform Concourse Escalator Other
• Over the last five years, the greatest proportion of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations
occurred on stairs (38%), with platforms being the next most common location (27%).
• Escalators typically contribute a lower level of harm, although this is not normalised by usage;
there are fewer escalators than stairs on the rail system. However fatalities can occur; there has
been one fatality resulting from a slip, trip or fall on an escalator in the last five years.
• The location other covers ramps and benches. The flat sections of subways and footbridges are
included in the platform category.
Chart 30. Slips, trips and falls FWI
• Both the absolute level of harm from 50 5
Shock and trauma Minor injuries
slips, trips and falls and normalised rate Major injuries Fatalities
40 Normalised rate 4
decreased in 2015/16, by 11% and 13%
FWI per 100m journeys
30 28.0 29.5 26.5 28.4 3

respectively. 24.6
22.3
24.5 25.2
FWI
21.5 21.6
20 2
10 1
0 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.5 Passenger/public accidents at the platform-train interface

An accident is considered to have occurred at the PTI if the incident resulted in the person wholly or
partially crossing the boundary between the platform and the track, or the platform and the train (if
present). The PTI presents a number of potential hazards for station users, which can be exacerbated
by their own behaviour, such as rushing, or being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Risk at the
PTI is the focus of a dedicated industry stakeholder group, the PTI Strategy Group, which is chaired
by Network Rail. The strategy was launched in January 2015, and the group of cross-industry
representatives selected to generate the strategy will continue to oversee its deployment and
champion its implementation. This is in order to maintain the momentum of the strategy to ensure it
delivers capabilities and benefits to industry that reduces the risk at the PTI for many years.
RSSB, supported by industry stakeholders, has developed a risk assessment tool for assessing the PTI,
which reflects the principles set out in Industry Standards
Chart 31. Passenger/public harm at the platform-train interface

15 15
Shock and trauma 13.6
12.9
Minor injuries 12.3
12 Major injuries 11.5 11.5 12
Fatalities 10.5
10.0 9.8
Normalised rate
9.1 9.2
FWI per billion passenger journeys

9 9
7.7
7.1
FWI
6.9
6.3 6.5
5.8 6.0 5.9 5.7 6.0
6 5.3 5.5 5.5 6
5.0 5.2
4.7
4.3 4.4
3.7
3.0
3 3
0 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Platform edge incidents Platform edge incidents (not All platform edge incidents
(boarding/alighting) boarding/alighting)
• The overall level of harm at the PTI increased by 48% in 2015/16 compared with the previous
year. This is due to the relatively high number of fatalities that occurred during the year.
• When considered separately, the level of harm for boarding/alighting events increased slightly,
while the level of harm for other accidents at the PTI more than doubled.
• While the levels of harm from boarding and alighting events and from other events at the PTI are
broadly similar in terms of overall FWI, the injury profile is very different. Fatalities while
boarding or alighting are extremely rare (there has been one such event during the past 10 years)
while fatalities due to other accidents at the PTI have occurred each year. Over the period as a
whole, there have been 40 fatalities at the PTI, not related to boarding or alighting trains.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Accidents during boarding and alighting trains

Over the past 10 years, there has been an average of 5.5 FWI per year to people while boarding or
alighting trains. While most of these will be passengers, a small number of members of the public
will board or alight trains while assisting passengers.
The following chart looks in more detail at boarding and alighting accidents during the past five
years.
Chart 32. Passenger/public harm at the PTI related to boarding or alighting trains
4
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
3.1 Fatalities
3
2.5
2.2 2.2 2.3
1.9
FWI
2
1.7 1.7
1.6
1.4 1.4 1.5
1.2 1.2
1.0 1.0
1
0.7 0.7 0.7
0.6
0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Fall between train and Caught in train doors Other alighting accident Other boarding accident
platform
• The categories fall between train and platform and caught in train doors include both boarding
and alighting injuries.
• The events within the other alighting accident and other boarding accident categories are largely
falls from the train onto the platform, or trips while getting onto the train.
• Although falls between the train and platform, or being caught in train doors, have not resulted
in fatalities over the past five year, it is these types of events that typically carry a greater
potential for harm, particularly if the train subsequently moves. One such incident during the
year is being looked into by RAIB:
− On 25 July 2016, at Hayes & Harlington station, a passenger trapped her hand in the last
door of the three-coach train, and was dragged for a distance of approximately 8 to 10
metres before falling to the ground; during the fall her hand became free. The passenger
sustained bruises to her hand and head during the fall.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Other accidents at the PTI

Over the past 10 years, other accidents at the PTI (ie those not related to boarding or alighting trains)
have accounted for an average of 5.5 FWI per year. While this is the same level of FWI harm as that
arising from accidents related to boarding and alighting, unlike boarding and alighting the majority of
the harm has been fatalities (73% over the period as a whole).
The following chart looks in more detail at accidents at the PTI not related to boarding or alighting
trains, over the past five years.
Chart 33. Passenger/public harm at the PTI not related to boarding or alighting trains
5
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries
4
Fatalities
3.0
3
FWI
2.2 2.1 2.2

2.1 2.1
2
1.4
1.3 1.2 1.2
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
1
0.5 0.5
0.4
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.0 0.0
0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Electric shock from Struck by train after Struck by train at Fall between train and Fall from platform
traction supplies fall from platform platform edge platform with no train present
and no contact with
conductor rail
• Since 2011/12, there have been three occasions where a person falling from the platform has
subsequently come into contact with the conductor rail. Two of these events, both in the last
two years, have been fatal; the likelihood of fatality is comparatively high when this type of
accident occurs.
• A similarly high likelihood of fatality exists when someone falls from the platform edge and is
subsequently struck by a train. Of the 14 occasions occurring since 2011/12, seven have been
fatalities.
• A number of fatalities result from being too close to the edge of the platform such that contact
with a train entering or exiting the station occurs. 12 When the contact is sufficiently serious, or
the person subsequently loses balance and falls between the train and platform, the likelihood of
fatality is again comparatively high.
12 This category includes people standing, walking, running, or otherwise being too close to the platform edge.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.6 Passenger/public assaults

Assaults occur on the railway, as they can in any public environment. The modelled risk from assaults
to passengers/public on trains and in stations is estimated by SRMv8.1 to be 10.0 FWI per year, of
which 0.6 FWI per year relates to fatalities. While SMIS is a good source of information on workforce
assaults, the BTP is the primary source for non-workforce assaults.
Chart 34. Overall trend in assault and harassment to passengers/public

Other violence Harassment
Common assaults Actual bodily harm
GBH and more serious cases of violence Normalised rate
4000 4.0
3737
3047 3004 1037

3000 3.0
Assaults per million passenger journeys

383 2638 2688
2524 2493 2512 620
2433
357 2214 495
Assaults
322 381 399

397
2000 1320 309 2.0
1093 1832
1072 1508
1094 1192 1261 1320
966
1000 1.0
1206
1082 1022
831 818 817 756 769 750 739
0 106 76 77 68 85 73 62 79 101 90 0.0

2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Source: BTP data
• The number of passenger and public assaults (including harassment) rose in 2015/16 to 3,737,
compared with 3,004 for 2014/15. This is an increase of 24% in absolute terms, and 22% on a
normalised basis.
• The overall increase in number was driven by increases in the less serious categories of crime.
The more serious categories of GBH and more serious cases of violence and Actual bodily harm
both reduced slightly. In contrast the recorded incidence of Common assault increased by 21%.
Cases of Harassment increased by 67%, but this is partly due to improvements in the recording of
these offences over the past year.
• During the year, BTP changed its records management system (RMS) to a new software base.
The analysis in this section is based on data from the new system. Every effort has been taken to
achieve consistency of analysis between this ASPR and previous editions.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Chart 35. Passenger/public assault and abuse by location

Other violence Harassment
Common assaults Actual bodily harm
GBH and more serious cases of violence Normalised rate
2500 2.5
2018
2000 2.0
Assaults per million passenger journeys

1826
1719
200
1486 1504 1500 684
1500 1398 1378 353 1.5
1326 1283 1309 1310
Assaults
173 236 1221 1210 1203

169 1159 183 1152 1126 384
761 182 141 149 1055 1107 312
183 240 250
1000 141 184 153 1.0
579 168 215
550 900
602 611 681 702 784 932
491 559 514 522 724
475 492 581 580 618
500 776 0.5
671 610
459 469 462 420 434 403 386 430 411 412
372 349 355 336 335 347 353
0 0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Source: BTP data
• The number of assaults is roughly evenly split between those occurring on trains and in stations,
with around 53% of assaults having occurred in stations over the past decade.
• The total number of assaults in stations rose by 14%, to 1,719, compared with 1,504 in 2014/15.
The total number of assaults on trains rose by 35% to 2,018, compared with 1,500 in 2014/15.
For the first time over the period as a whole, the number of assaults on trains exceeded the
number in stations.
• The increase in overall number for each location was driven by increases in the recorded
incidence of less serious events. The number of Common assaults rose in stations and on trains
by 15% and 29% respectively. The incidence of Harassment in stations and on trains rose by 50%
and 78% respectively, but this is partly due to improvements in the recording of these offences
over the past year.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.7 On-board injuries

The category of on-board injuries does not include train accidents, falls from trains, or assaults,
which are considered under separate categories. On-board injuries have accounted for an average of
4.0 FWI per year over the last 10 years, none of which have been fatalities.
Chart 36. Trend in FWI from on-board injuries

8 8
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
Major injuries 5.9
6 Fatalities 6
FWI per billion journeys

Normalised rate 5.0
4.2 4.0
3.7 3.8
FWI
4 3.6 3.5 4
3.3 3.3
2 2
0 0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• There have been increases in harm from on-board injuries for the past four years, and the level
of harm is now at its highest in the ten-year period.
• When normalised by passenger journeys, the rate is variable, due to the relatively low level of
harm, but is currently showing an increasing trend.
Chart 37. On-board injuries and train movement

Other on-
Other on-
board Scald or Scald or
board
Fainting injury burn burn
injury
(due to
conditions
on train) Other accidents
86% Accidents due to
sudden train
Falls and movement
contact with 14%
Caught by Falls and contact
objects
internal with objects
doors
• Injuries attributed to sudden movements of the train (for example due to lurching or braking)
have accounted for around 14% of on-board harm since 2006/07. However, as it is not always
straightforward to determine whether train movement was a causal factor in an accident, it is
possible that the true proportion is higher.
• On average, over the past 10 years, falls and contact with objects within the train have
accounted for 64% of harm on board trains (excluding injuries from train accidents, falls from
trains and assault). Fainting accounts for a relatively large proportion of on-board FWI, as loss of
consciousness (which includes fainting) is categorised as a major injury.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.8 Contact with object/person in stations

During their time in a station, passengers and members of the public can be injured by coming into
contact with the many types of object that exist within stations, and with other people. This type of
accident has accounted for an average of just over 1.6 FWI per year over the last 10 years.
Although it is rare for this category of accident to result in fatality, it is possible:
On 5 December 2015, a passenger received fatal injuries after being struck by a station sign that had
come loose from its mounting, at Berwick-on-Tweed station.
Chart 38. Trend in passenger/public injuries from contact with objects in stations
3.0 3.0
Minor injuries
2.5 Major injuries 2.5
2.3
Fatalities
0.8
Normalised rate
2.0 2.0
FWI per billion journeys

0.9
1.5 1.5 1.5
FWI
1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5

0.9
0.6 1.1
0.5 0.8 0.8
1.0 0.7 0.8 1.0
0.8
0.7 1.4
0.5 0.9 1 0.5
0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
0.4
0.0 0.0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Around half of the harm over the last 10 years has been from major injuries.
• The level of harm in 2015/16 is at its highest level in the ten-year period. The rate of harm (at
1.6 FWI per billion passenger journeys) is also at
its highest level in the ten-year period. This is Chart 39. Passenger/public injuries from
due to the occurrence of the fatality during the contact with objects in stations
year. (2006/07 to 2015/16)
• Chart 39 shows a breakdown of this type of
accident. Contact with other objects includes Trapped/
Struck by moving Contact with
instances where people have walked into an objects while on injured in ticket other object
platform gates on railway
object, such as station sign. Moving objects 22% premises
5%
include closing lift doors, objects thrown up by 32%
passing trains, and objects thrown by other Struck

accidentally by
people. other people in
Struck by moving
objects not on station
platform 28%
13%
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.1.9 Other injuries on trains or in stations

Types of injuries occurring to passengers/public in stations or on trains, not already covered in this
chapter, are included in this section. The Other category contains a wide variety of relatively rare
incidents such as animal/insect bites, exposure to hazardous substances, burns, and electric shocks
that do not involve traction supplies.
Harm from other injuries on trains or in stations
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major injuries 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 2 6 3
Minor injuries 24 26 20 16 29 29 27 40 31 3
Shock/trauma 2 0 1 3 4 7 8 10 12 9
FWI total 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4
• There have been no fatalities of this type over

Chart 40. Passenger/public injuries from
the past 10 years.
other injuries on trains or in
• This type of accident has accounted for an
stations (2006/07 to 2015/16)
average of around 0.3 FWI per year over the last
10 years. Most of these accidents recorded in
Falls from
the table above have been either falls from height
4%
height or manual handling/awkward movement Other
11% Lean or fall
injuries, with a small number of people getting from train in
running
injured while leaning or falling from trains. 13%
Manual
handling/awkward
movement
72%
_________________________________________________________________
People on trains and in stations: workforce
_________________________________________________________________
3.2 Workforce
3.2.1 Risk profile by accident type
The breakdown of workforce risk in Chart 41 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore represents the
modelled estimate of the underlying risk to the workforce. In the remainder of this chapter, the
charts are based on the levels of harm reported into SMIS, which, in any given year, may differ from
SRM modelled values. One reason for this is statistical variation; another is that the SRM includes an
estimate of the risk from events that may not have occurred during the year, such as train accidents
involving workforce injuries. Descriptions of the types of event that are included in each accident
type grouping are shown in Appendix 6.
Chart 41. Risk to workforce on trains and in stations, by accident type: 10.4 FWI per year

In stations
Manual handling/awkward movement 0.3
Other accidents 0.2

On trains
Fatalities
Major injuries
Lean or fall from train in running 0.1 Minor injuries
Other accidents Shock and trauma

0.1
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

Source: SRMv8.1
• The majority of workforce risk on trains and in stations is made up of minor injuries (46%) and
major injuries (44%). Fatality risk in these locations is relatively low.
• On-board injuries account for around 2.8 FWI per year on average. These are the largest
contributors to minor injury risk, but do not contribute to fatality risk.
• At 1.9 FWI per year, slips, trips and falls comprise the largest source of workforce risk in stations.
Most of the risk arises from major injuries.
• Risk at the PTI accounts for 1.5 FWI per year. More than 90% of this risk occurs during
boarding/alighting, rather than falls from the platform edge.
• Assault and abuse accounts for 1.7 FWI per year in total, with more harm typically occurring in
stations rather than on trains. Assault and abuse contributes the greatest proportion of minor
injury risk.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.2 Workforce injuries in 2015/16

Fatalities
• There were no workforce fatalities in stations or on trains in 2015/16.
Major injuries
• There were 52 workforce major injuries recorded in 2015/16.
• 78% occurred at stations.
Minor injuries
• There were 2,909 recorded minor injuries, 299 (10%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
Shock and trauma

• There were 444 recorded cases of workforce shock or trauma, 6 of which were Class 1 (ie
involved witnessing a fatality).
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.3 Trend in workforce harm by injury degree

The average level of workforce harm in stations or on board trains over the past 10 years has been
10.7 FWI per year; there have been no fatalities. The average level of harm in stations has been 6.7
FWI per year, with 4.0 FWI per year occurring on trains.
Chart 42. Trend in harm to workforce on trains and in stations, by injury degree
16
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
14
12.6 Major injuries
11.9 12.1 12.0 Fatalities
12 1.2 11.2
1.2 1.1 0.9
0.9 10.1 9.8
10 9.4 9.3
0.8 8.9 0.5
0.7 0.6
5.7 5.4 0.5
5.7
FWI
8
6.5 5.5 4.1
5.5 4.6 4.4 4.3
6
4
5.6 5.3 5.7 5.2
4.2 4.8 4.3
2 3.7 4.1 4.0
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The level of harm recorded for 2015/16 was 9.8 FWI, which is an increase on the level of 8.9 FWI
for 2014/15. The main cause of the increase was a rise in the number of major injuries.
• The amount of harm occurring in stations is greater than on trains (an approximately 60:40 split
over the period as a whole). The injury profile in each location differs, with 78% of major injuries
occurring in stations.
Chart 43. Workforce harm by injury degree and location

10
9 8.2 Shock and trauma Minor injuries
8 7.5 7.3
6.9 7.1 Major injuries Fatalities
7 6.0 6.1 6.3
5.8 5.7
3.1
6 5.0 5.0
2.9
2.7
4.6
2.9
FWI
5
2.1
4.1 4.1
3.4
3.9
2.2
3.6 3.5
2.4
2.3
2.8
4 3.2 3.2
3
2.8
2.7
3.1
2.6
4.6
2.7
2015/16 1.2 2.0

4.2
2012/13 1.0 2.2

4.1
2
4.0
2008/09 0.7 2.6
2014/15 0.9 2.0

3.8
3.6
2013/14 0.7 2.1

3.1
3.1
3.1
2.8
1
2007/08 1.5
2011/12 1.4
2006/07 1.1
2009/10 1.0
2010/11 0.9
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trends in workforce harm by worker type

Different types of work on the railway expose personnel to different levels of risk. This is partly due
to the nature of the roles, but also due to the different environments where the work takes place.
Chart 44. Trends in workforce harm on trains and in stations, by worker type
6
Shock and trauma
5.0 Minor injuries
5 Major injuries
Fatalities
4.0 4.0
4 3.7
3.3
FWI
3
2.5
2.2 2.2
2.0 2.0
2 1.8 1.7
1.5 1.6
1.5
1.1 1.1
0.9 0.9 0.9
1 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.5 0.6 0.4
0.5
0.1
0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Infrastructure Train drivers Other on-board Station staff Revenue Other workforce
workers train crew protection staff
• Other on-board train crew suffer the greatest proportion of harm, with 40% of the total
workforce harm over the period shown. Harm rose by 0.3 FWI in 2015/16, but remains lower
than in 2011/12. Minor injuries make up a much larger proportion of harm to this sector of the
workforce than others.
• Harm to station staff increased by 0.8 FWI in 2015/16 and is at the highest level over the past five
years.
• Infrastructure workers have accounted for 8% of harm over the period shown in the chart. Their
injury profile is dominated by major injuries, and comprises injuries while carrying out repair and
maintenance work around stations.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trend in workforce major injuries

Workforce major injuries comprise a set of injuries originally listed in RIDDOR, and include losing
consciousness (as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations
and hospital stays of 24 hours or more. 13
Chart 45. Workforce major injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type

80
On-board injuries Falls from height
Other accidents Assault and abuse
70 Manual handling/awkward movement Contact with object or person
Slips, trips, and falls Platform-train interface
60 56 57
53 52
9
50 12 4 48
7
Major injuries
42 5 43
41 40
7 5
40 7 37 5
7
10 8 8
9 10 4
30 7 9 4
5 9 6
4 6
3
10 3
20 5 15 18
19 8
13 16 11
17
10 14 8 18
12 10 11
8 9 8
4 6 6
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At 52, the number of workforce major injuries in 2015/16 increased by 12 compared with
2014/15, and is above the average of 46.9 for the period as a whole.
• Since 2006/07, 30% of major injuries have been caused by slips, trips and falls. At 18, the figure
for 2015/16 was the second highest in the past 10 years.
• On-board incidents have the next highest contribution to major injuries, accounting for 16% over
the period shown.
13
These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version
of RIDDOR, published in 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to
refer to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety
performance analysis, the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trends in workforce minor injuries

Workforce minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if they are not major injuries but result in the
staff member being incapacitated for their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar
days, not including the day of the injury.
Chart 46. Workforce minor injuries in stations or on trains, by accident type

4500
On-board injuries
4000 Falls from height 3895
Lean or fall from train in running 3613 3570
3411 3440 3391
3500 Other accidents
Assault and abuse
3000 Manual handling/awkward movement 2815 2866 2789
Contact with object or person 2610
Minor injuries
2500 Slips, trips, and falls

2000
1500
1000
523
421 425 425 419 407 362
500 305 309 299
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Class 1 Class 2
• The number of Class 1 minor injuries has seen a generally reducing trend since 2009/10, due
mainly to a fall in the number of on-board injuries. Class 1 minor injuries are now at the lowest
level in the reporting period.
• The number of Class 2 minor injuries also stands at its lowest level over the reporting period. The
past four years have seen notably lower numbers of Class 2 injuries being recorded for the
majority of accident types.
• The decrease appears to coincide with a change to RIDDOR reporting guidelines specifying that
an injury is reportable if it results in more than seven days lost time, rather than three, as well as
if the injury was during a work related activity. This is being investigated further and will
continue to be monitored.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.4 Workforce slips, trips and falls in stations

The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls over the last 10 years has been 2.0 FWI per year.
Chart 47. Workforce harm from slips, trips and falls, by location
1.8
Shock and trauma
1.48
1.6 Minor injuries

Major injuries
1.4
1.18 Fatalities
1.13
1.2
1.0
FWI
0.73
0.8
0.66
0.63
0.62
0.52
0.49
0.6
0.36
0.34
0.28
0.4
0.26
0.24
0.23
0.17
0.16
0.14
0.2
0.07
0.03
0.0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
on platform stairs or escalator on station concourse Other
• Over the last five years, the greatest proportion of harm from slips, trips and falls in stations
occurred on the platform (52%), with stairs/escalators being the next most common location
(25%).
• There was a 39% increase in harm from Chart 48. Slips, trips and falls FWI
workforce slips, trips and falls in 2015/16 4.0
Fatalities Major injuries
3.5
compared to 2014/15. Minor injuries Shock and trauma
3.0
2.6
• Slips, trips and falls to the workforce have 2.5
2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
1.9
FWI
fluctuated over the reporting period. Harm is 2.0

1.4 1.5 1.6
1.5
dominated by major injuries, which have driven 1.0
the fluctuations seen in Chart 48. 0.5
0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.5 Workforce accidents at the platform-train interface

An accident is considered to have occurred at the PTI if the incident resulted in the person wholly or
partially crossing the boundary between the platform and the track, or the platform and the train (if
present).
Chart 49. Workforce harm at the platform-train interface

3.0
Shock and trauma
2.5 2.4 Minor injuries
Major injuries
2.0 0.5 Fatalities
1.7
1.5 1.6
1.5 1.4
FWI
1.5 0.5 1.4

1.2 0.4
1.0 1.1 0.4
0.7 0.6
1.0 0.5
0.5 1.8 0.5
0.6
1.2 1.1
0.5 0.9 1
0.8 0.8
0.6 0.6
0.4
0.0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The overall level of harm at the PTI increased

Chart 50. Workforce harm at the PTI
slightly, by 0.2 FWI, in 2015/16 compared with the
Infrastructure
previous year. workers
<1% Train drivers
• Harm to train drivers and other on-board train Other 24%
crew accounts for 85% of workforce harm at the workforce
Other on-
3%
PTI. Revenue Station staff
board train
crew
protection
• Most of the harm to workforce at the PTI occurs staff
9% 61%
during boarding and alighting trains, rather than 3%
from other causes such as falls from the platform

edge.
Chart 51. Workforce harm at the platform-train interface

2.5
Shock and trauma
2.02
Minor injuries
2.0
Major injuries
1.51
1.48
1.45
Fatalities
1.31
1.30
1.27
1.5
FWI
0.97
0.90
0.86
1.0
0.36
0.30
0.26
0.24
0.5
0.17
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Boarding/alighting Not boarding/alighting
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Accidents during boarding and alighting trains

Over the past 10 years, there has been an average of 1.3 FWI per year to staff while boarding or
alighting a train.
Chart 52. Workforce harm from boarding and alighting accidents

1.4
Shock and trauma
1.2 Minor injuries
1.2
Major injuries
Fatalities
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.7
FWI
0.6
0.6 0.5
0.4 0.4 0.4

0.4 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1 0.1
0.0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Fall between train and Caught in train doors Other alighting accident Other boarding accident
platform
• The level of harm from boarding and alighting increased by 15% in 2015/16 compared with the
previous year. This is the second highest value during the five year time period covered in the
chart.
• The categories fall between train and platform and caught in train doors include both boarding
and alighting injuries.
• Although the level of FWI increased in 2015/16 the number of minor injuries is now at its lowest
value within the five year period.
• In contrast to passengers and the public, the level of workforce harm from other accidents at the
PTI is relatively low. For the workforce, around 90% of harm at the PTI arises during boarding or
alighting.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.6 Worker injuries due to contact with object

The category contact with object includes injuries while lifting, moving or carrying objects (eg
dropping or striking injuries) but does not include manual handling injuries (eg strains or sprains),
which are categorised separately.
Chart 53. Workforce harm due to contact with object

2.0
Shock and trauma
1.6 Major injuries

1.6 1.6
Fatalities
1.5
1.4
1.4
0.7
1.1 0.7 0.7 1.2

1.2
0.7
0.7
FWI
1.0 0.9 0.9

0.9
0.6
0.8 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.6 0.6
1.0
0.9 0.9
0.4 0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.2 0.4 0.4
0.3
0.0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The level of FWI for 2015/16 remains at a relatively low level, due to a below average number of
major injuries. The level of harm from minor injuries has stayed reasonably constant over the
period shown.
• The injury profile for contact with object injuries is Chart 54. Contact with object injury
shown in Chart 54. Areas with darker shading profile (2006/07 to 2015/16)
represent the most commonly injured parts of the
body; in this case these are fingers, hands and the
head.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.7 Worker injuries due to manual handling

Manual handling injuries include sprains and strains while lifting or carrying objects.
Chart 55. Worker FWI due to manual handling

1.2
Minor injuries
1.0
Major injuries
1.0 Fatalities
0.9 0.9
0.8 0.8 0.6
0.8 0.7
0.7
0.6 0.7
FWI
0.6 0.6
0.6
0.7
0.6 0.6
0.5
0.4 0.6
0.6
0.6 0.6
0.2 0.4
0.3
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0.0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The number of major injuries due to manual handling in 2015/16 is at its highest seen in the last
10 years, with six major injuries being incurred.
• Minor injuries have remained at a fairly consistent level over the last 10 years, with annual
fluctuations being largely driven by major injuries.
• Over the reporting period, the injuries have come from a variety of sources, including assisting
passengers on and off the train, lifting ramps for train access, lifting luggage for passengers,
rubbish clearance and closing gates.
• The injury profile for manual handling injuries is Chart 56. Manual handling injury
shown in Chart 56. Areas with darker shading profile (2006/07 to 2015/16)
body. As might be expected in this case, the most
commonly injured parts are shoulders and the back.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.8 Workforce on-board injuries

The category of on-board injuries does not include train accidents, falls from trains, or assaults,
which are considered under separate categories. On-board injuries have accounted for an average of
2.8 FWI per year over the last 10 years.
Chart 57. Trend in workforce harm from on-board injuries

6
Shock and trauma
5 Minor injuries
Major injuries
4 Fatalities
3.4 3.4
3.2 3.0
FWI
3 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3

2.2
2.4 2.2
2 2.2 2.1
2.2 1.7 1.6
2.2 1.7 1.6
1
1 1.2 0.9 0.9
0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.7
0.4
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• While there have been fluctuations in the overall level of FWI from on-board accidents over the
ten-year period, the level for recent years has been consistently lower.
• Chart 58 looks at on-board injuries, broken down by whether or not sudden train movement was
identified as a causal factor. Injuries attributed to sudden movements of the train due to lurching
or braking have accounted for around 25% of on-board workforce harm since 2006/07. However,
it is not always straightforward to determine whether train movement was a causal factor in an
accident.
• On average, over the past 10 years, slips, trips and falls and contact with objects within the train
have accounted for the majority of the harm from workforce on-board injuries.
Chart 58. On-board injuries and train movement (2006/07 to 2015/16)
Scald
or burn
Other on-board
injury
Other Other on-
Accidents due
Scald or accidents board
to sudden train
burn Falls and 75% injury
movement
contact with 25% Falls and contact
Caught by objects with objects
internal
doors
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.2.9 Workforce assaults

Our industry’s workforce is exposed to risk from assault, as are many outward-facing industries. The
risk from assault to workforce in stations or on trains, as modelled by SRMv8.1, is 1.7 FWI per year, of
which 0.02 FWI per year relates to fatalities.
Chart 59. Workforce assaults leading to injury or shock/trauma, by location and worker type
1400
Assaults leading to injury or shock/trauma
Other workforce
1200 Revenue protection staff
1033 1032
Station staff
1000 946
881 Other on-board train crew
774 810
800 Train drivers
699 704 701
Infrastructure workers
600 530 508 530
473 483 471 490
400 332 368 313

278
200
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
• The reported number of assaults to workforce on trains and in stations have shown notably
decreasing trends over the reporting period. In 2015/16 the number of assaults leading to injury
or shock were at 54% of the level seen in 2006/07.
• Over the last 10 years, around 60% of
assaults have occurred in stations. Chart 60. Harm from assaults
• Harm from assaults has also seen a generally 5
Shock and trauma
reducing trend over the last 10 years. 4
Minor injuries
Major injuries
Fatalities
Weighted injuries
2.9 2.9
3 2.6
2.2 2.3
2 1.7 1.6
1.5 1.4 1.4
1
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
3.3 Key safety statistics: people on trains and in stations

Passengers and public on trains and in 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
stations
Train accidents 0 0 0 0 0
On-board injuries 0 0 0 0 0
Assault and abuse 0 2 0 1 3
Platform-train interface 5 1 4 2 6
Slips, trips and falls 3 1 0 1 0
Contact with object 0 0 0 0 1
Other injury 0 0 0 0 0
Major injuries 272 320 285 318 298
Minor injuries 6058 6477 6454 6974 6795
Class 1 1413 1439 1419 1276 1322
Class 2 4645 5038 5035 5698 5473
Class 1 0 0 1 0 1
Class 2 255 235 229 245 203
Train accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
On-board injuries 3.32 3.79 3.98 4.97 5.90
Assault and abuse 1.99 3.61 1.07 2.60 4.28
Platform-train interface 12.28 9.83 11.53 9.18 13.63
Slips, trips and falls 27.99 29.49 26.53 28.39 25.18
Contact with object 1.52 1.38 1.49 2.33 2.73
Other injury 0.05 0.37 0.27 0.65 0.36
Passenger kms (billions) 57.11 58.23 60.18 62.97 64.39
Passenger journeys (millions) 1461.51 1502.63 1588.32 1656.73 1693.32
Passenger and public assaults on trains 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16
and in stations (BTP data)
Total 2493 2512 2688 3004 3737
GBH and more serious cases of violence 73 62 79 101 90
Actual bodily harm 817 756 769 750 739
Other violence 30 34 25 25 39
Common assaults 1192 1261 1320 1508 1832
Harassment 381 399 495 620 1037
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce in stations and on trains 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Major injuries 57 41 43 40 52
Electric shock 0 0 0 0 0
Falls from height 0 0 3 2 1
Struck by train 0 0 0 0 0
Minor injuries 3798 3177 3171 3098 2909
Class 1 407 362 305 309 299
Class 2 3391 2815 2866 2789 2610
Class 1 7 10 5 2 6
Class 2 848 607 614 506 438
Electric shock 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Falls from height 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.21 0.10
Struck by train 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other injury 1.07 0.86 0.96 0.70 1.32
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Working on or about the running line
_________________________________________________________________
4 Working on or about the running line

This chapter investigates the types of accident that affect infrastructure workers while working on or
about the running line.
A detailed breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key
safety statistics table at the end of this chapter.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were no workforce fatalities involving infrastructure staff working on or about the running
line. The total level of harm arising from running line work during 2015/16 was 8.0 FWI, which is
a decrease of 21% compared with 10.1 FWI occurring in 2014/15. The total harm comprised 58
major injuries, 1,323 minor injuries and seven cases of shock/trauma.
• Slips, trips and falls account for the largest proportion of harm. At 3.6 FWI, the level of harm for
2015/16 was a reduction on the 4.5 FWI occurring during 2014/15.
• Contact with objects is the next largest contributor to running line harm. The recorded level for
2015/16 was 2.5 FWI, which is lower than the 3.0 FWI occurring during 2014/15.
• Although this chapter focuses on injuries to infrastructure workers on and about the running line,
infrastructure workers also carry out work in other locations, such as stations, and are also
subject to risk while travelling between sites. The level of harm from areas away from the
running line shows a variable trend and is influenced by the occurrence, or not, of fatal events.
Working on the running line at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in harm
16
Weighted injuries
14 Fatalities
12 11.4 10.9 10.9
10.4 10.1
Working on or 10 9.2 9.0 9.3
Other accidental about the 8.1 8.0
FWI
8
risk running line
(129.4 FWI; (10.1 FWI; 6
92.8%) 7.2%) 4
2
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.1 Risk profile by accident type

The breakdown of infrastructure worker risk in Chart 61 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore
represents the modelled estimate of the underlying risk to the workforce working on the running
line. In the remainder of this chapter, the charts are based on the levels of harm reported into SMIS,
which, in any given year, may differ from SRM modelled values. One reason for this is statistical
variation; another is that the SRM includes an estimate of the risk from events that may not have
occurred during the year. Descriptions of the types of event that are included in each accident type
grouping are shown in Appendix 6.
Chart 61. Infrastructure worker risk on the running line by accident type: 10.1 FWI per year
Slips, trips, and falls 3.8
Struck by train 1.6
Machinery/tool operation 0.8
Other accidents 0.5
Workforce electric shock 0.4 Fatalities

Major injuries
Minor injuries
Manual handling/awkward movement 0.3 Shock and trauma
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
FWI modelled risk (FWI per year)
Source: SRMv8.1
• At 3.8 FWI per year, slips, trips and falls on or about the running line pose the greatest risk to
infrastructure workers in this environment. Around 38% of the total running line risk is from this
source, although the contribution to the fatality risk is relatively low, at below 1%.
• The greatest source of fatality risk is being struck by a train, which accounts for 70% of the
fatality risk profile on the running line. The estimated total harm to infrastructure workers is 1.6
FWI per year, but nearly all of this is fatality risk.
• Electric shock risk amounts to 0.4 FWI per year. Infrastructure workers are exposed to electrical
sources of varying power, such as the third rail, overhead lines, non-traction supplies and
machinery. Overall, it accounts for 4% of the FWI risk profile on the running line, but 12% of the
fatality risk profile.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.2 Fatalities and injuries in 2015/16

Fatalities
• There were no fatalities on or about the running line in 2015/16.
Major injuries
• There were 58 infrastructure worker major injuries recorded in 2015/16.
• Just under half of these were slips, trips and falls, while one third were contact with objects.
Minor injuries
• There were 1,323 recorded minor injuries, 207 (16%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party
was off work for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
Shock and trauma

• There were seven recorded cases of shock or trauma, all of which were Class 1 (ie involved
witnessing a fatality, or an incident likely to lead to a fatality).
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.3 Trend in harm by injury degree

Over the past decade, the average level of harm to infrastructure workers engaged in track work has
been 9.7 FWI per year, of which 1.1 FWI per year have been fatalities.
Chart 62. Working on the running line: FWI by injury degree
16
14
12 11.4
10.9 10.9
10.4 10.1
1.5
10 1.4 9.3
9.2 9.0 2.4
1.6
8.1 2.1
8.0
2.0 1.6 1.9
FWI
8
2.0 2.2
6.9 6.5
6
6.7
7.5
4 6.4 6.3 8.0
7.2
6.1 5.8
2
3 3
2
1 1 1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• There were no infrastructure worker fatalities during work on the running line in 2015/16.
• The level of harm recorded for 2015/16 was 8.0 FWI. This was lower than the 10.1 FWI recorded
for 2014/15, due to a reduction in major injuries. It is also the lowest level of harm to
infrastructure workers recorded over the 10-year period as a whole.
• The number of major injuries recorded in 2015/16 was 58. This is the lowest number recorded
over the decade. Major injuries predominate in the injury profile for running line work,
accounting for 69% of the harm since 2006/07.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Fatalities
The broad category of ‘infrastructure worker’ encompasses those whose work involves inspecting,
maintaining and renewing the track, signalling and telecommunications equipment, and other
railway infrastructure, such as earthworks and bridges. The majority of workforce fatalities occur to
those involved in work on the infrastructure, reflecting the higher-risk environments in which this
work takes place.
Chart 63. Working on or about the running line: fatalities by accident type, 2006/07 – 2015/16
Other accidents, 2
Contact with object or

person, 1
Struck by train, 6
Falls from height, 2
• Since 2006/07 there has been a total of 11 fatalities to infrastructure workers on or about the
running line.
• Most fatalities have resulted from workers being struck by trains. Six workers have been killed in
this way since 2006/07. The last fatality due to this cause was in 2013/14, and involved a
member of a gang working on the track near Newark Northgate station.
• The Contact with object fatality was a worker who received fatal crush injuries when becoming
trapped between non-rail vehicles.
• In the past ten years, there have been two fatalities in the Falls from height category: one worker
was working on a bridge and another was working on a ‘cherry picker’ that toppled over. A third
fatality during the period also involved a fall: a worker fell from a road-rail vehicle when the
crane basket failed. However, as this vehicle was operating on the running line at the time of the
accident, it is classed as a train for reporting purposes, and categorised differently in the chart,
under the Other accidents category.
• The remaining fatality in the Other accidents category was a worker who died after becoming
overcome by fumes while engaged on bridge maintenance work near the running line.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Major injuries
Workforce major injuries are defined in RIDDOR 1995 Schedule 1, and include losing consciousness
(as a result of the injury), fractures (other than fingers and toes), major dislocations and hospital
stays of 24 hours or more. 14
Chart 64. Working on the running line: major injuries by accident type
Struck by train Falls from height
Workforce electric shock Machinery/tool operation
Manual handling/awkward movement Contact with object or person
Slips, trips, and falls Other accidents
Train accidents
90
80
80 75
72
69
70 67
65 64 9 4
5 63
61
60 58
2
6
Major injuries
6 6 7 15
4 5
50 24
28
29 12 15
26 19 18
40
19
30
42
20 35 32 37
31 24 29 29
27 28
10
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Following two years with higher than average numbers of major injuries occurring during
working on the running line, the number for 2015/16 is the lowest recorded over the past 10
years.
• Since 2006/07, 47% of major injuries have resulted from slips, trips and falls.
• Contact with object has the next highest proportion of major injuries, accounting for 30% of all
major injuries over the period shown.
• The injuries in the category Train accidents refer to cases such as those where infrastructure
workers at the trackside have been struck by small pieces of debris thrown up by trains that have
hit objects on the track, or where rail vehicles that have derailed in possessions and have
subsequently come into contact with workers at the site.
14These regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and updated several times. In the latest version
of RIDDOR, published in 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to
refer to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as major. For consistency in industry safety
performance analysis, the term ‘major injury’ has been maintained, along with the associated definition from RIDDOR 1995.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Minor injuries
Workforce minor injuries are categorised as Class 1 if they are not major injuries but result in the
staff member being incapacitated for their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar
days, not including the day of the injury.
Chart 65. Working on the running line: minor injuries by accident type
1400
Struck by train 1303
1264
Falls from height 1214
1185
1200 Workforce electric shock 1120 1103 1116
Machinery/tool operation 1060 1076 1065
1000 Manual handling/awkward movement

Minor injuries
Slips, trips, and falls

800 Other accidents
Train accidents
600
400
216 207
174 169 173
200 139
84 79 103
67
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Class 1 Class 2
• Class 1 minor injuries have fluctuated over the reporting period, with the higher levels in recent
years being driven by slips, trips and falls, contact with object or person, and manual
handling/awkward movement.
• The number of Class 2 injuries decreased compared with 2014/15. The majority of Class 2 minor
injuries on the running line involve contact with object or person, and slips trips and falls
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.4 Trends in running line harm by accident type

The average level of harm from slips, trips and falls over the last 10 years has been 3.8 FWI per year,
which is just over a third of the average total harm to infrastructure workers on the running line, over
this period.
Chart 66. Slips, trips and falls on the running line

6
5.1
5
0.9 4.5
4.2
4.0
4 3.7 0.8
0.7 3.6
3.4 3.5
3.3 0.8
0.6
2.9 0.5 0.6 0.8
FWI
3 0.6
0.5
2 4.2
3.5 3.7
3.1 3.2
2.7 2.9 2.9 2.8
2.4
1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Over the period 2007/08 to 2014/15, there was

an increasing trend in harm from slips, trips and Chart 67. Slips, trips and falls injury profile
falls. The level for 2015/16 shows a return to (2006/07 to 2015/16)
lower levels of harm.
• The injury profile for slip, trip or fall injuries is
shown in Chart 67. Areas with darker shading
represent the most commonly injured parts of
the body; in this case these are ankles, legs and
arms.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Contact with object

The category contact with object includes injuries while lifting, moving or carrying objects (eg
dropping or striking injuries), but does not include manual handling injuries (eg strains or sprains),
which are categorised separately.
Chart 68. Contact with objects while working on the running line

5
4.1
4
3.6 0.5
3.5
0.8 0.6 3.0

3
0.6 2.5
2.4
FWI
2.3 2.3
2.6 2.0 0.6
0.5 0.5
2 1.8
0.8
0.5
2.8 2.9 0.6
2.4
1 1.9 1.9
1.8
1.5 1.5
1 1.2
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Although major injuries form the largest part of the injury profile, there has been one fatality
from this cause over the period shown: an infrastructure worker suffered fatal crush injuries as a
result of becoming trapped between two non-rail vehicles.
• The injury profile for contact with object injuries is
Chart 69. Contact with object injury
shown in Chart 69. Areas with darker shading
profile (2006/07 to 2015/16)
body; in this case these are fingers, hands and feet.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Machinery/tool operation and manual handling/awkward movement

As well as the risk from contact with objects, carrying, moving or otherwise interacting with
equipment carries the potential for musculoskeletal injury. Where the equipment is a machine or
works tool, then other risk may be introduced by its operation, such as cuts, bruises, fractures and
amputations.
Chart 70. Running line injuries involving machinery/tool operation or manual

handling/awkward movement
1.2 1.1
Shock and trauma
0.9 Major injuries
0.8
0.8 0.7 0.8 Fatalities
0.2 0.7
0.7 0.2 0.7
0.1 0.2 0.6
0.6 0.6
FWI
0.6 0.2 0.2

0.5
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
0.4 0.9 0.3
0.4 0.3 0.3
0.7 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4
0.5 0.5 0.3
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Machinery/tool operation Manual handling/awkward movement
• Machinery/tool operation harm is dominated by major injuries, which contributed 75% of harm
to this injury category over the past 10 years. Manual handling/awkward movement harm is
dominated by minor injuries. Minor injuries have contributed 89% of harm to this injury category
over the past 10 years.
• The trend in either category is quite variable, and is influenced by the number of major injuries
that have occurred.
Struck by train
Running line injuries as a result of being struck by train
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Major injuries 1 2 6 1 3 1 3 0 1 1
Minor injuries 2 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
Shock/trauma 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total FWI 0.11 2.21 1.60 1.10 0.31 0.10 1.30 1.00 0.10 0.11
• Being struck by a train is a low-occurrence event, but with a high likelihood of a fatal injury. Over
the past ten years, this category has accounted for less than 0.5% of injuries, 8% of harm, and
46% of fatalities on the running line.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Falls from height

Running line injuries as a result of falls from height
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Major injuries 2 2 2 2 5 1 2 2 3 2
Minor injuries 9 15 6 5 4 8 3 1 3 2
Shock/trauma 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total FWI 0.22 0.23 0.21 1.21 1.50 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.20
• Falls from height are another low-occurrence event with the potential for serious outcome.
There have been two fatalities due to falls from height since 2006/07.
• There are a wide range of locations and equipment that involves working at height, including
scaffolding, gantries, cherry pickers and bridges. The most common falls over the last 10 years
have been from scaffolding and into holes and pits.
Electric shock
Running line injuries as a result of electric shock
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major injuries 1 2 0 5 1 1 0 1 6 0
Minor injuries 12 4 2 3 18 11 14 20 22 15
Shock and trauma 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 3 1
Total FWI 0.11 0.21 0.01 0.51 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.02
• There are various electrical hazards for infrastructure workers, including the third rail and
overhead lines. The majority of electric shock incidents (63%) have involved non-traction
supplies, which are less likely to result in fatality or major injury than contact with the third rail or
overhead line equipment (OLE).
Other accidents on or about the running line

Running line injuries as a result of other causes
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Major injuries 3 5 2 0 2 4 4 5 2 0
Minor injuries 67 68 68 65 62 98 115 111 84 96
Shock and trauma 0 1 2 0 2 2 5 2 4 4
Total FWI 0.39 0.58 1.31 1.08 0.27 0.54 0.57 0.66 0.34 0.10
• The types of injuries covered under ‘other causes’ include infrastructure workers falling from rail
vehicles or on-track plant in running, being injured while getting on or off these vehicles when
they are stationary, and exposure to hazardous substances. The two fatalities during the period
shown were one worker who died after being overcome by fumes while engaged on bridge
maintenance work near the running line, and one worker who fell from a road-rail vehicle (which
is classed as a train for reporting purposes) when the crane basket failed.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.5 Injuries to infrastructure workers away from the running line

The topic of this chapter has been injuries to infrastructure workers on the running line. However,
infrastructure workers also carry out work in other locations, such as stations, and are also subject to
risk while traveling between sites. For completeness, the following chart presents the additional
injuries that have occurred to infrastructure workers away from the running line.
Chart 71. Trend in infrastructure worker injuries away from the running line
6
5 Minor injuries 0.7

Major injuries 4.4
Fatalities 4.0
4 3.6 3.5 0.8 3.6
0.8
0.5 2.7
0.8 0.8
FWI
3 2.5 2.6
2.3
0.5 0.6 2.6
2 2.2
1.7
3.1
2.7
1 0.8 2.0 1.9 2
1.8
1 1 1
0.6
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The level of harm from areas away from the running line is higher in recent years than in the first
half of the decade. This corresponds with initiatives to improve incident reporting in yards,
depots and sidings (YDS) and road driving incidents. Reporting in YDS locations was introduced
as a voluntary procedure by TOCs around 2007. More information is available in Chapter 10. The
fatalities shown above occurred in road driving incidents. More information is available in the
road driving chapter.
• Chart 72 presents the trend in the total level of harm to infrastructure workers, from all causes
and at all locations. For the first time since 2006/07, there were no infrastructure worker
fatalities, and the overall level of harm for 2015/16 was below average.
Chart 72. All infrastructure worker harm Chart 73. FWI by location
25 Other location
Shock and trauma Minor injuries 7%
Major injuries Fatalities Yards, depots and
20
16.3 sidings
15.0 14.5 13%
15 12.6 13.5 12.8
11.5 12.1 11.6
FWI
9.9
10 In stations and
on trains
5 6%
Running line
Road driving 68%
0
6%
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
4.6 Key safety statistics: working on or about the running line

Infrastructure work 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Machinery/tool operation 0 0 0 0 0
Manual handling/awkward movement 0 0 0 0 0
Other accidents 0 0 0 0 0
Minor injuries 1294 1272 1519 1358 1323
Class 1 174 169 216 173 207
Class 2 1120 1103 1303 1185 1116
Class 1 2 3 1 7 0
Class 2 4 3 6 1 7
Struck by train 0.10 1.30 1.00 0.10 0.11
Machinery/tool operation 0.83 0.87 1.12 0.61 0.69
Electric shock 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.02
Manual handling/awkward movement 0.47 0.33 0.43 0.62 0.67
Other accidents 0.54 0.57 0.66 0.34 0.10
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5 Road driving risk

Within this report, road driving refers to any member of the workforce travelling by means of a
motorised vehicle between sites while on duty, or travelling to and from their home to a non-regular
place of work, including door-to-door taxi provision.
This chapter investigates the impact of this activity on the wide variety of railway roles, from station
staff to infrastructure worker sub-contractors.
A breakdown of statistics related to workforce fatalities and injuries is presented in the key safety
statistics table at the end of this chapter.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were no workforce fatalities in road traffic accidents in 2015/16 15. There were seven major
injuries, 113 minor injuries and 22 cases of shock/trauma reported. This equates to 1.1 FWI,
compared with the 2.7 FWI (two fatalities) occurring in 2014/15.
• There is a notably higher level of reported harm from road driving incidents over the latter half of
the past 10 years: this is likely to reflect increased awareness and reporting rather than increased
risk.
• Although road driving risk has come under focus within the industry, with a consequent
improvement in reporting levels, there is still work to be done to ensure that all injuries not
currently covered by the Railway Group Standard, but covered by HSE guidance are recorded.
Since 2006/07, there have been six fatalities recorded in SMIS as being work-related, but a
number of other fatalities are known to have occurred, which have not been reported.
• The Road Risk Group (RRG) was formed in December 2015 to encourage the rail industry to work
together on road risk issues. The RRG is a strategic group where cross-industry work takes place
at the highest level. The RRG outputs are ‘co-operation framework programmes’ directed to and
owned jointly by the respective industry groups.
Road driving risk at a glance

3.5
Weighted injuries
3.0 2.8 2.7
Fatalities
2.5
Risk to the 2.0
Other
FWI
workforce 1.4
accidental risk 1.5 1.3
from driving 1.1
(138.4 FWI; whilst on duty 1.0
0.6
99%) (1.2 FWI; 1%) 0.5 0.3 0.3
<0.1 <0.1
0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
15As of the ASPR completion date of end June, there has been one within-scope workforce fatality in a road traffic accident
during the 2016/17 financial year.
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.1 Required scope of road driving risk

Within this report, the scope of road driving risk covers accidents to any member of the workforce
travelling for work purposes. This is defined as travelling from their home to somewhere else that is
not their usual place of work, and from their usual place of work to somewhere that is not their usual
place of work. It does not include commuting, which is defined as being from their home to their
usual place of work. This is explained in the RSSB leaflet Towards Better Reporting of Road Traffic
Collisions (RTCs) which may be located on the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk.
The Road Risk Group (RRG) was formed in
December 2015 reporting to SSRG. The
purpose of the group is to encourage the rail
industry to work together on road risk issues.
The RRG is a strategic group where cross-
industry work takes place at the highest level.
The RRG outputs are ‘co-operation framework
programmes’ directed to and owned jointly by
the respective industry groups. Success will
ultimately be measured by how each Industry
group’s member companies implements these
programmes.
The strategic objectives for the RRG are set out in the industry strategy Leading Health &
Safety on Britain’s Railway, and are shown below.
The particular areas of focus
include:
• Developing reliable
arrangements for reporting
and analysing road traffic
accidents
• Increasing awareness and
understanding of road risk
issues
• Develop decision making
processes around work
planning
• Build consistent approach
across supply chain
• Embed industry wide work
planning code of practice
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.2 Recording data about road driving accidents and injuries

SMIS was created for building commonality in incident reporting among rail companies, and has
identified a number of key safety concerns across the industry since its implementation, but we have
not benefitted to the same extent in understanding road driving risk.
The industry is required by the relevant Railway Group Standard to record in SMIS any incidence of
fatalities or injuries to the workforce occurring as a result of a road traffic accident while driving on
duty between sites, to carry out work in association with the maintenance or working of the
operational railway. Companies have tended to develop their own databases, recording these
incidents at various levels of detail, but we are now seeing a concerted effort throughout the
industry to collate these reports centrally in SMIS to enable increased analysis and understanding. As
such, reporting of injuries from road driving is improving.
5.2.1 Fatalities and injuries in 2015/16

Fatalities
There were no workforce fatalities recorded in 2015/16.
Major injuries
• There were seven major injuries from road driving recorded in 2015/16.
Minor injuries
• There were 113 recorded minor injuries, 39 (35%) of which were Class 1 (ie the injured party was
incapacitated from normal duties for more than three days, not including the day of the injury).
Shock and trauma

• There were 22 recorded cases of shock or trauma, all of which were Class 1 (ie occurred in an
accident that had a notable risk for a fatal outcome).
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.3 Trends in workforce injuries from road driving

The increasing trend in the reported number of road driving injuries is striking, but it is likely to
reflect an improvement in reporting rather than an increase in risk. We can see evidence for an
improvement in reporting when we look at how the recorded number of injuries has changed for
lesser degrees of injury, particularly minor injuries.
Chart 74. Road driving injuries by injury degree

25
Shock and trauma
20 Shock and trauma

15
10 22
5 9 11 11
6 7 6
0 2
120
Minor injuries
Minor injuries
80
97 107 113
40 69 67 74
45 51
19 6
0
10
Major injuries
8 Major injuries
6
4 7
2 4 5 4
2 2 2 1
0
4
Fatalities
Fatalities
3
2
1 2 2
1 1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At 142, the number of road driving injuries in

2015/16 was higher than the 124 recorded in Chart 75. Trend in road driving harm by injury
2014/15. Half of the recorded road driving degree
injuries have been in the last three years, in 3.5
Shock and trauma
line with the increasing focus this area is 3 Minor injuries 2.8 2.7
receiving. 2.5
Major injuries
Fatalities
• Since 2006/07 there have been a total of six 2

FWI
1.4
fatalities recorded in SMIS. 1.5 1.3
1.1
• The SRMv8.1 estimate for the risk to the

1
0.6
0.5 0.3 0.3
workforce from road driving is 1.2 FWI per <0.1 <0.1
0
year, but this was averaged over a four-year
period up to September 2013, and later years
have been notably in excess of this. There is a
clearly increasing level of reported harm from road driving incidents over the last 10 years: this is
likely to reflect increased awareness and reporting rather than increased risk. Work is ongoing to
ensure that all injuries not currently covered by the Railway Group Standard, but covered by HSE
guidance (see section 5.1) are reported.
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.3.1 Trend in injuries by type of worker

• The next chart shows the trend in harm for each type of worker.
Chart 76. Harm from road driving injuries by type of worker

3.0
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
2.5 2.4 Major injuries
Fatalities
2.0
FWI
1.5 1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.5 0.4
0.2 0.3
0.1 <0.1<0.1 <0.1 <0.1<0.1 <0.1<0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1<0.1
0.0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Infrastructure workers Train crew Station staff Revenue protection Other workforce
staff
• All but one of the recorded fatalities were infrastructure workers. The other fatality, which
happened in 2014/15, was an office-worker, travelling to a non-regular place of employment.
This is shown in the Other workforce category, which also covers people delivering to site,
signallers, mobile operations managers (MOMs), as well as non-operational staff.
• The nature of infrastructure work involves a relatively large amount of driving to or from
different sites of work, which may be some distance away. Although there are rules and
guidelines which are there to avoid fatigue, there are challenges to managing such risks out in
the field. Even with good practice in this area, the risk from road driving cannot be eliminated.
• Train crew and station staff are also exposed to road driving risk, but will travel less frequently by
road between sites, and their transport will more generally be provided by external companies,
so they are not as likely to be exposed to the risk from fatigue.
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.3.2 Trend in injuries by industry sector

The chart below shows the number of road driving injuries over the last 10 years, this time broken
down by industry sectors.
Chart 77. Road driving injuries by industry sector
30
20
Other
10 24
16
0 7 5 4 4
10
8
FOC
6
4
2 4 4 3
0 2 2
30
20
TOC
10 19 25
13 17 16 13 15
5 4 8
0
15
Contractors
12
9
6 14
3 6 8
4 3
0
100
80
Network Rail
60
40 95
79 75
56 48 62
20 34 40
0 12
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Over the past 10 years, the greatest proportion of road driving incidents has involved staff
working for Network Rail (67%). The majority of these events have involved infrastructure
workers; the nature of infrastructure work requires travel to, from and between work sites. The
Contractors category also comprises infrastructure workers, and has accounted for 6% of
reported injuries.
• The categories TOC, FOC and Other account for around one quarter of reported injuries. A
number of these events involve train drivers, station staff and other members of the workforce
travelling by taxi to work locations.
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
The following chart shows the trends in harm for each industry sector.
Chart 78. Harm from road driving injuries by industry sector

2.5
Shock and trauma
2.2
Minor injuries
Major injuries
2.0 Fatalities
1.5
1.3 1.3
1.2
FWI
1.0
1.0
0.7
0.5 0.4
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1
0.0
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Network Rail TOC Contractors Other FOC
• The groups most prominent in the charts are Network Rail and the Contractor sector. These
groups have the highest number of staff engaged in road driving as part of carrying out their
work, and are therefore more exposed to this area of risk.
• While TOCs and FOCs also have staff driving on duty, the numbers are much lower for these
groups. These staff are more likely to be sent via taxi than to drive the vehicles themselves, while
on duty.
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving risk
_________________________________________________________________
5.4 Key safety statistics: road driving risk

Road driving 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Network Rail 1 1 0 1 0
Contractors 0 0 2 1 0
FOC 0 0 0 0 0
TOC 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0
FOC 0 0 0 2 0
TOC 0 0 1 0 0
Unknown 0 0 0 1 1
Minor injuries 67 74 97 107 113
Class 1 23 15 30 24 39
Class 2 44 59 67 83 74
Class 1 7 6 11 11 22
Class 2 0 0 0 0 0
Network Rail 1.31 1.23 0.40 1.27 0.66
Contractors 0.00 0.01 2.22 1.01 0.21
FOC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01
TOC 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.05
Other 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.16
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6 Train operations
This chapter looks at RIDDOR-reportable train accidents. The term ‘train accident’ covers a very wide
range of event types, from potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories such as
passenger train derailments to those with typically less serious consequences, such as trains being
struck by stones. Train accidents are reportable under RIDDOR if they affect or occur on the running
line. Additional criteria apply to different types of accident and these are summarised in Appendix 7.
The chapter also presents information on the risk presented to shunters, train crew or other staff
when they are on or about the track and engaged in activities related to the movement of trains.
2015/16 Headlines
succession with no such fatalities, the longest such period on record.
• There were no fatalities involving members of the public, arising from train collisions with road
vehicles. This is the first such year since 2010/11.
• The total harm from train accidents in 2015/16 comprised two major injuries recorded, 41
reports of minor injuries and 16 reports of shock/trauma. This equates to 0.4 FWI, which was the
lowest level of harm from train accidents over the past ten years.
• There were 25 train accidents occurring in PHRTA categories; the same number as in 2014/15.
Eleven of the events were train derailments; three of which involved passenger trains. Six of the
events were collisions between trains, all involved passenger trains. Four of these collisions
occurred at low speed during permissive working in stations. The remaining two occurred in
running: one involved an engineering trolley on the line, and the other involved a freight train
foul of the line.
• At the end of 2015/16, the PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was
6.0 FWI per year, compared with 6.6 FWI per year at the end of 2014/15. The reduction was due
to decreases in the PIM contributions related to level crossings, infrastructure operations and
SPADs.
• There were 277 SPADs in 2015/16, compared with 298 during the previous year. At the end of
2015/16, SPAD risk stood at 54% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared with 64% at
the end of 2014/15.
Train accident risk at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in PIM indicator
12
PIM modelled risk (FWI per year)
Level crossings
10 9.6 Not level crossings
9.2
8.5
8.0 7.6
8 7.4 7.2 7.1
6.6
6.0
Other 6
accidental risk Train
4
(131.6 FWI; accidents
94%) (8.0 FWI; 6%) 2
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.1 Train accidents

Accidents are usually categorised by their initial event. For example, a derailment that resulted in a
collision between trains would be classed as a derailment, even if it was the subsequent collision that
caused most of the harm.
Train accidents occurring within YDS sites or within possessions are not reportable under RIDDOR
unless they result in injury or they affect the running line. Train accidents occurring wholly within YDS
or possessions, and which do not result in injury, are not included in the statistics in this chapter.
Measuring the risk from train accidents
The SRM models all sources of risk on the railway, including the risk from train accidents. The SRM
contains models of the causes and consequences of train accidents, encompassing 23 hazardous
events and more than 1,700 separate accident precursors. It provides an estimate of the underlying
level of risk associated with accident types that have not occurred for many years, or have never
occurred.
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from train accidents is 8.0 FWI per year, which is 6% of the total
accidental risk profile. This includes an estimate of the harm from train accidents in possessions and
on YDS sites.
Potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories

Many train accident categories typically carry little risk. The types of train accidents occurring on or
affecting the running line, and with the most potential to result in serious consequences, are known
as potentially higher-risk train accident (PHRTA) categories. All PHRTA categories are reportable
under RIDDOR.
The PHRTA categories are:
• derailments on the running line (other than whilst shunting), or which affect an unprotected
running line
• collisions between trains on the running line (excluding roll backs and open doors)
• buffer stop collisions which cause any damage
• trains striking road vehicles
• large objects falling onto trains
• train explosions
Tracking the risk from PHRTA categories
The PIM provides a measure of underlying train accident risk by tracking changes in the occurrence
of accident precursors. It uses risk weightings derived from the SRM and enables risk to be
monitored on an on-going basis. The PIM and its outputs are discussed in more detail in Section 6.7.
Other train accidents (non-PHRTA categories)

The majority of train accident categories carry a typically lower potential for serious consequences.
This group includes train fires; trains that strike objects on the line without subsequently derailing;
roll-back collisions and open door collisions. Notwithstanding their non-PHRTA categorisation, it is
still possible for specific events to be serious. This is discussed further in section 6.6.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.2 Train accident risk profile

The SRM models the overall risk from train accidents by modelling each type of train accident
separately, taking into account the characteristics of all possible potential precursors. Chart 79 shows
the categories of train accidents covered in this chapter, and the risk associated with each, broken
down by injury degree. It indicates which types of accident constitute PHRTA categories (and are thus
modelled by the PIM).
Chart 79. Train accident risk by accident type and injury degree
Train striking road vehicle at LX 3.61

PHRTA train accident categories
Collisions between trains 1.15 Fatalities

Train struck by large falling object 0.06 Major injuries
Minor injuries
Train striking buffer stops 0.14
Shock and trauma
Train striking road vehicle not at LX and no derailment 0.34
Train explosion 0.07
Train derailment 1.91
Non-PHRTA train accident categories 0.69
0 1 2 3 4
Source: SRMv8.1
• At 7.3 FWI, the PHRTA categories comprise 91% of train accident risk (including possessions and
YDS).
• Most of the risk from train accidents occurs at level crossings; this is discussed more fully in
Chapter 7 Level crossings. The next largest contributions to risk come from derailments and train
collisions. Chart 80 looks at the types of people exposed to these risks, and shows that, while
accidents at level crossings affect members of the public, collisions and derailments result in the
greatest risk exposure to passengers and workforce. Most of the risk to passengers arises from
train derailments, which are estimated to account for 1.5 FWI to passengers per year, on
average.
Chart 80. Train accident risk by accident type and person type affected
Train striking road vehicle at LX 3.61

PHRTA train accident categories
Collisions between trains 1.15 Passenger

Train struck by large falling object 0.06 Public
Train striking buffer stops 0.14 Workforce
Train striking road vehicle not at LX and no derailment 0.34

Train explosion 0.07
Train derailment 1.91
Non-PHRTA train accident categories 0.69
0 1 2 3 4
Source: SRMv8.1
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.3 Train accident fatalities and injuries

Trends in the harm from train accidents is variable. The majority of events classed as train accidents
result in little or no harm, but the potential for more serious consequences exists.
Chart 81. Fatalities and weighted injuries in train accidents (excluding suicides)
10
9.0 Workforce Weighted injuries
9 Public Weighted injuries
8.2 Passenger Weighted injuries
8 Public Fatalities
Passenger Fatalities
7
6.4
6
FWI
4
7
3 4 2.6 6 2.6
2.1
1.8
2
1.4
1.0
1 2 2 2
0.4
1 1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• There were no fatalities in train accidents during 2015/16. There were two major injuries
recorded, 41 reports of minor injuries and 16 reports of shock/trauma. At 0.4 FWI, the level of
harm from train accidents was below the ten-year average of 3.5 FWI.
• The level of harm to passengers from train accidents varies considerably from year to year, and a
single major accident can dominate that year’s figures. The single passenger fatality during the
period covered by the chart
Chart 82. FWI in train accidents, by location
occurred in 2006/07, in the
Grayrigg derailment, which also Workforce Weighted injuries Public Weighted injuries
Passenger Weighted injuries Public Fatalities
resulted in 29 major injuries. Passenger Fatalities
6
• The remaining fatalities on this
5
chart are members of the public 4
FWI
in road vehicles which were 3

2
struck, either on a level crossing, 1
or (much more rarely) after their 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
vehicle strayed onto the line at

another location.
At a level crossing Not at a level crossing
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.4 PHRTA categories: train accidents during 2015/16

Table 11 lists the 25 events within the PHRTA categories that occurred in 2015/16 (except those
involving level crossings, which are detailed in Chapter 7 Level crossings). The events in italics are
those that the RAIB is investigating or has investigated.
PHRTA category train accidents in 2015/16
Derailments (excluding at level crossings) 11

Passenger 3
Date Location Territory Train Operator Description
Passenger train derailed as an immediate result of striking cows on the
26/07/15 Godmersham South East Southeastern
line.
London North
07/11/15 Knaresborough Northern Rail Passenger train derailed on points.
Eastern
Passenger train struck cows on the line. After being brought to a
28/11/15 Dalreoch Scotland ScotRail standstill, the train subsequently derailed while manoeuvring over
the line debris.
Non-Passenger 8
Date Location Territory Train Operator Description
Cardiff Canton
27/04/15 Western Arriva Trains Wales An ECS train derailed following a SPAD at a position light.
Depot (Pass)
03/06/15 Angerstein Wharf South East GB Railfreight Freight loco and wagons derailed on points.
Welton Oil London North
30/06/15 DB Schenker Freight train derailed due to track buckle.
Terminal Eastern
London North
27/07/15 Ellesmere Port DB Schenker Freight train became derailed when travelling over moving points.
Western
London North
07/08/15 Scunthorpe DB Schenker Freight loco and wagons derailed on trap points following a SPAD.
Eastern
Freight loco and wagons derailed on points during propelling
11/08/15 Panteg Western DB Schenker
manoeuvres.
London North The rear wagon of a freight train became derailed when travelling
29/08/15 Eastfield GB Railfreight
Eastern over moving points.
Wymondham
20/10/15 South East Direct Rail Services A track maintenance train derailed due to track gauge problems.
South Junction
Collisions between trains 6
Passenger 6
Date Location Territory Train Operators Description
London North An ECS train being uncoupled during permissive working, collided at
24/04/15 Nottingham East Midlands Trains
Eastern low speed with a passenger train at the same platform.
London North A low speed collision occurred between two passenger trains, during
14/05/15 Kings Cross Govia Thameslink Railway
Eastern permissive working at a platform.
A low speed collision occurred between two passenger trains, during
30/05/15 Cambridge South East Govia Thameslink Railway
permissive working at a platform.
Edinburgh A low speed collision occurred between two passenger trains, during
18/09/15 Scotland ScotRail
Waverley permissive working at a platform.
Passenger train collided with engineering trolley that had been left
03/12/15 Redruth Western Great Western Railway
foul of the line.
Mountsorrel London North A passenger train collided with a second train's discharge chute, which
14/02/16 East Midlands Trains
Redland Eastern was foul of the line.
Buffer stop collisions 1
Passenger 1
London North A passenger train arriving at the station collided at low speed with the
17/09/15 Kings Cross Govia Thameslink Railway
Eastern buffer stops at the platform.
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossing (excl derailments) 3

Passenger 2
London North A passenger train struck a road vehicle that had been intentionally left
20/07/15 Clay Mills LC CrossCountry
Eastern foul of the line.
A passenger train struck a road vehicle that had been intentionally left
14/10/15 Uphall Scotland ScotRail
foul of the line.
Non-passenger 1
A freight train was struck by a vehicle operating in a yard, when it was
24/11/15 Pangbourne Western DB Schenker
reversing and unintentionally became foul of the line.
Trains struck by large falling objects 0
Collisions with road vehicles on level crossings 4
Passenger 3
Non Passenger 1
Total number of train accidents in PHRTA categories 25
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.5 Trend in the number of train accidents within PHRTA

categories
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from the PHRTA categories of train accident is 7.3 FWI per year. While
PHRTA categories comprise the types of train accident that typically have the greatest potential to
result in higher numbers of casualties, the majority result in few or no injuries. Conversely, a train
accident from a non-PHRTA category may have a serious consequence (albeit more rarely).
Chart 83. Trend in the numbers of PHRTAs

80
Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings
Train struck by large falling object
70 Trains striking buffer stops
Trains running into road vehicles not at level crossings & no derailment
60 Train derailments (excludes striking road vehicles on level crossings)
Collisions between trains (excluding roll backs)
49
50 45
42 42
Accidents
40 35
13 8 21
14 33 32
30 10 25 25
8 9 10
4 4
2 18 3 4 7 4
20 2 4 1
1 3
26 20 16 20 5
13 16 11 11
10 2 16
8
4 6 4 6 5 6 6
0 2 2 2
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• In 2015/16, there were 25 events falling within the PHRTA categories of train accident. This
matches the number seen in 2014/15, and maintains the improvement seen last year.
• At 11, the number of derailments is a reduction on the previous year’s total of 16. For the first
time since 2012/13, some of the derailments involved passenger trains. There were three such
events: two involved collisions with cows on the line, while the third was a derailment over
points.
• There were six collisions between trains, all of which involved passenger trains. Four occurred at
low speed, in stations. One occurred in running, and involved an engineering trolley that was
obstructing the line. The sixth collision occurred when a passenger train collided with part of a
freight train that was being operated in a siding but became foul of the line.
• There were four collisions with road vehicles at level crossings, and three away from level
crossings. There was one RIDDOR-reportable buffer stop collision.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
PHRTAs by type of train and type of accident

The breakdown of PHRTA category events by train type shows that, away from level crossings, non-
passenger trains predominate.
Chart 84. Trend in PHRTA category events by train type

35 0.70
31
Level crossings
Accidents per million train km

30 0.60
26
24 Not Level crossings
25 0.50
20 Normalised rate
19 18 18
Accidents
20 17 0.40
14 15 15
15 13 12 0.30
10 11 12
10 7 8 8 8 7 0.20
5 6 6 4 3 3
5 2 2 2 0.10
0 0.00
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Passenger trains Freight trains Other trains
• When the number of train accidents is normalised by train kilometres, there is a notable
difference in rate, with accident rates for non-passenger trains being an order of magnitude
higher. In addition, while the rate for passenger trains shows a broadly reducing trend over the
past decade, the rate for freight trains had been increasing. The rate for 2015/16 shows the first
reduction since 2010/11.
• Although the overall number of passenger train PHRTAs and non-passenger train PHRTAs is not
dissimilar, the profile of PHRTAs that occur differs. Accidents at level crossings figure more
prominently in the passenger train category than for non-passenger trains. For freight and
passenger services, this is most likely due to the different time bands that the trains run in, with
most passenger trains running during the day, and much of the freight traffic taking place at
night. Some of the trains in Other trains (which comprise empty coaching stock, on-track plant
and road-rail vehicles) are less likely to operate over level crossings.
Chart 85. PHRTA categories by train type and accident type (2006/07 – 2015/16)
1% 2% 4% 0%
1%
7% 6% 8% 11%
8% 19%
11%
13%
21%
44%
80% 64%
Passenger trains Freight trains Other trains

Derailments (excluding collisions with road vehicles on level crossings)
Collisions with road vehicles at level crossings
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (without derailment)
Buffer stop collisions
Trains struck by large falling objects
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.5.1 Derailments
The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from derailments on or affecting the mainline is 1.9 FWI per year. When
the additional risk of derailments wholly within possessions and YDS sites is included, the risk rises to
2.2 FWI per year.16 The last train accident with a train occupant fatality was the derailment at
Grayrigg in 2007, which was caused by points failure.
Chart 86. Trends in derailments by train type

20
18 Level crossings 17
16
16 Not Level crossings 15
14 13 13
12
12 11 11
Accidents
10 9
8 8
8 7 7 17 16
15
6 1 13 12 13
11 11
4 3 3 8 3 3 9 8
6 2 7
2 3 3 3 3
2
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Passenger Non-passenger
• There were 11 derailments in 2015/16, which is five fewer than the previous year. Eight non-
passenger trains derailed: six were freight trains, one was empty coaching stock, and the
remaining one was a track maintenance train. For the first time since 2012/13, some of the
derailments involved passenger trains. There were three such events: two involved collisions
with cows on the line, while the third was a derailment over points.
• Chart 87 shows the primary causes of train derailments over the past 10 years. Whilst train
accidents have numerous causal factors, this basic approach remains useful for identifying
general trends.
• Track issues and operational Chart 87. Derailments by cause (2006/07–2015/16)
incidents have been the main
Passenger Trains Non-Passenger Trains
causes of freight derailment, Collision
Train runaway
with SPADs being the next Track
with object
Collision
Rolling stock
biggest cause. with object Track
Environment
• In contrast, for passenger train Operational
Incident
derailments the largest causes Rolling
stock SPAD
have been collision with SPAD
Operational
object, and environmental Environment
Incident
causes such as landslips.
16In this section the number of derailments includes derailments following collisions with road vehicles at level crossings or
trains being struck by large falling objects; these events are listed solely under the initial event in the key safety statistics
sheet.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.5.2 Collisions between trains

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from collisions between trains is 1.2 FWI per year. Roll back collisions and
open door collisions (each of which accounts for a risk of less than 0.01 FWI per year) are excluded
from this section and covered in Section 6.6. Although collisions between trains are reported every
year, but most carry little risk, either because they occur at low speed, or because the trains are on
adjacent lines and make contact via an out-of-gauge item.
Chart 88. Trends in collisions between trains by train type

7
6 6
6 Level crossings
5 5 Not Level crossings
Collisions (PHRTAs)
5
4 4
4
3
3
2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Passenger Non-passenger
• There were six collisions between trains in 2015/16, all of which involved passenger trains. Four
of the collisions were low-speed events during permissive working in stations. The remaining
two occurred in running: one involved an engineering trolley on the line, and the other involved a
freight train foul of the line.
• Of the 37 passenger train collisions in the past 10 years, 28 were collisions at low speed in
stations. The remaining nine, occurred in running on open track and comprised five instances of
passenger trains striking out-of-gauge parts of other trains, three occasions of collisions with
engineering trolleys foul of the line, and one incident of collision with a road-rail machine.
• Non-passenger train collisions in running on open track included one collision during shunting,
one collision with an out-of-gauge part of an approaching train, and one collision with a runaway
road-rail vehicle. The remaining three non-passenger train collisions occurred in possessions.
Chart 89. Collisions between trains by location (2006/07–2015/16)

Passenger Trains Non-Passenger Trains
In running In running
on open on open
track track
In station -
low speed In
possession
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.5.3 Collisions between trains and road vehicles

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from collisions between trains and road vehicles is 4.0 FWI per year. 17
Accidents at level crossings account for 91% of this, and Chapter 7 Level crossings contains discussion
of that risk.
Chart 90. Trend in collisions between trains and road vehicles

30
Darker shades represent derailments;
25 24 lighter shades where there was no derailment
trains and road vehicles
19
Collisions between
20
17
16
15 14
11 11
10
7 7
5
5
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Away from level crossings, there have been 30 collisions with encroaching road vehicles over the
past 10 years.
• The number of collisions with road vehicles away from level crossings has been lower in the
latter half of the last decade, providing some evidence that the underlying rate of collision with
encroaching vehicles has reduced.
Chart 91. Trends in collisions between trains and road vehicles, by location
25
21 Darker shades represent derailments;
20 lighter shades where there was no derailment
trains and road vehicles
14
Collisions between
15 13
10 10
10 9
8 8
7
5 5
5 4 4 4
3 3
2
1
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
At a level crossing Not at a level crossing
17This excludes the risk from derailments that result from trains striking road vehicles at locations other than level
crossings, which are covered under the derailment SRM category. It also excludes the risk from road vehicles falling onto
trains (as opposed to running into the side of them or being struck by them): these events are covered under the category
struck by large falling object.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Road vehicle incursions

Although most incursions result in little harm to people on board the train, they have the potential to
cause a serious train accident, and frequently result in serious harm to road vehicle occupants. The
accident at Great Heck in February 2001 occurred when a road vehicle towing a trailer came off the
M62 motorway near a road-over-rail bridge and ran down the embankment onto the East Coast
Main Line. The vehicle was struck by a high-speed passenger train, which derailed and collided with a
freight train travelling in the opposite direction. Ten people on board the trains, comprising four
members of staff and six passengers, lost their lives in the accident.
Chart 92. Vehicle incursions by entry point

50 47
Darker shades represent incursions that resulted in
45 contact between a train and the road vehicle
39 39
40
35 32
31 30 30
30
26 25
Incidents
23 24 23
25
21 21 21
19
20
15
15 12 12
11 10 11 10 11
9 9
10 7
5 4 6 4
5 2 3 3 1 2 1 1 1
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Access gate Road over rail bridge Boundary fence Level crossing (and did not
remain on it)
• There were 56 road vehicle incursions in 2015/16, which is below the average of 60.1 per year,
taken over the past 10 years, and a decrease on the previous year’s total of 60.
• Most of these vehicles accessed railway property via fences, often as a result of a road traffic
accident. Those incidents categorised with a level crossing as the access point relate to road
vehicles which have entered the track via a level crossing intentionally or in error, rather than
those incidents that occur or remain within the boundaries of the level crossing 18.
• Three of the incursions in 2015/16 resulted in a train accident. Two involved vehicles that had
been driven onto the line, and then abandoned. The remaining event involved a works vehicle in
a railway yard, that was reversed to a point foul of the line.
18 A train collision with a road vehicle, which resulted in the vehicle being pushed along the track outside of the level
crossing boundary, are classed as level crossing collisions and not road vehicle incursions for the purposes of this chart, and
are covered in the Level Crossing chapter.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Road vehicle incursions and track obstruction

Vehicles that enter the railway environment do not always obstruct the line. In some cases, the
vehicle may come to rest on the embankment, or may simply cause damage to the railway boundary
protection.
The categorisation below is based on the final resting point of the vehicle. In some cases, the vehicle
will have momentarily obstructed the line, in transit to its final resting point.
Chart 93. Consequence of vehicle incursions, by entry point (2006/07 to 2015/16)

Boundary fence Level crossing
Struck by train (with subsequent incursion of track)
Foul of the Not foul of

line (not the line
struck)
Struck by
train
Foul of the
Not foul of line (not
the line struck)
Access Gate Road over rail bridge

Struck by Struck by
train train
Not foul of Not foul of

the line the line
Foul of the
Foul of the line (not
line (not struck)
struck)
• Overall, 54% of vehicle incursions have resulted in the vehicle ending in a position foul of the line.
Of the total number of incursions, 5% have resulted in a train accident.
• Considering the vehicles within each entry-point group shows that those entering via the
boundary fence are less likely to reach the line than those entering by other means, and that
relatively few vehicles which go onto the line from a level crossing do so without remaining foul
of the line.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Trends in road vehicle incursions by cause

Vehicles can intrude onto the railway as a result of road traffic accidents, deliberate acts of vandalism
or trespass, and errors due to the in-car navigation equipment. Also, railway personnel sometimes
leave vehicles too close to the line, or not properly secured. Furthermore, there is also the small, but
present, risk from aircraft crashing onto the railway. 19 Most incursions are the result of road traffic
accidents. Since 2008/09, there has been a fairly stable rate of occurrence of this type of event.
Chart 94. Vehicle incursions by location and cause

70
Level crossing (and did not remain on it)
Boundary fence 61
60 58
Road over rail bridge
Access gate
50 46 47 47
45 45 44
40 36
34
Incidents
30
21
20
15
11 11
9 9
10 6 7 6
5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4
2 3
1
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Vandalism and other causes with Accidents involving rail owned Accidents involving public vehicles
harmful intention vehicles
6.5.4 Buffer stop collisions

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from buffer stop collisions is 0.1 FWI per year. Most buffer stop collisions
occur at very low speeds and carry little risk. The most common cause of buffer stop collisions in
recent years has been driver error, usually involving misjudgement of braking distance, loss of
concentration, or error using the couple/uncouple button. There was one RIDDOR-reportable buffer
stop collision in 2015/16.
6.5.5 Large falling objects and train explosions

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk estimates from large falling objects and from train explosions are both
lower than 0.1 FWI per year, and are both extremely low frequency events. There have been no train
explosions in the past 10 years. The sole event involving a large falling object occurred in 2010/11,
when a road vehicle fell from a road-over-rail bridge, onto a passenger train travelling on the line
below.
19Aircraft incursions are included in Chart 92 under the category Boundary fence. There was three such incidents during the
past 10 years, one involving a light aircraft, one involving a hot air balloon, and one involving an air ambulance helicopter.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.6 Trend in the types of train accident in non-PHRTA categories

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from types of train accident other than those in PHRTA categories is
relatively low, at 0.7 FWI per year. Of this, 0.3 FWI relates to RIDDOR-reportable train accidents on or
affecting the running line.
Chart 95. Trend in the number of RIDDOR-reportable non-PHRTAs on or affecting the running
line
1000
Striking animal Striking level crossing gate or barrier
Struck by missile Striking other object
Train fire Roll back collision
Open door collision
800 779
737
139 659
126 647
Accidents (non-PHRTAs)
604 609
600 580
129 535
502 512
284 346
285 160 294 325
190 301
400 187
245
163 67 72 55
200 98 57 59
200 218
179
127 139 199 184 214 184 169
146
95 81 74 62 51 51 36 37 45
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Over the past 10 years, there has been a generally decreasing trend in all types of non-PHRTA
categories of train accidents apart from train collisions with animals. In particular, the past four
years have seen notably high numbers recorded for these types of events. Despite the two train
derailments involving cattle during the current year (which are covered in the section on PHRTAs)
the risk from train strikes with animals remains relatively low.
• The risk from train fires has been lower in the second half of the decade, largely due to the
increased use of fire-resistant materials. The frequency of train fires is about a quarter of that
seen 10 years ago.
• Reports of trains struck by missiles have also shown a notable reduction in frequency in the
second half of the decade. This reflects a general reduction in vandalism (see Section 8.3) and the
laminated glass that is used on modern rolling stock. 20
• Open door collisions have been virtually eliminated by the removal of Mark I ‘slam door’ rolling
stock, which was completed in 2005.
20Missiles striking trains are reportable under RIDDOR if they result in damage that requires immediate repair.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.7 The Precursor Indicator Model

The PIM measures the underlying risk from the PHRTA categories of train accidents by tracking
changes in the occurrence of their accident precursors. It was first developed in 1999, and has since
been subject to a series of modelling improvements.
The PIM monitors train accident risk to passengers, workforce and members of the public such as
motorists on level crossings. The PIM value is an annual moving average, so it reflects precursors that
have occurred during the previous 12 months. It is also normalised by train kilometres, to account for
changes in the level of activity on the railway.
The PIM uses the basic equation risk = frequency x consequence to quantify the knowledge gained
from precursor events.
Frequency estimates are based on accident precursor data and consequence estimates are derived
from the SRM. The SRM provides an estimate of the risk at a particular point in time and is updated
every eighteen months or so. It is disaggregated and mapped onto the precursors that could lead to
each hazardous event’s occurrence. The shifting risk associated with each hazardous event is
estimated because of its varying precursor event frequency, and the results are presented in terms of
FWI per year.
To calculate the PIM, the number of occurrences each month of each accident precursor is multiplied
by the average consequence per event for that precursor (as estimated from the most recent version
of the SRM). This gives an estimate of the associated risk from that precursor, to be used in the PIM.
Hazard rankings, assigned to certain types of precursor events by technical specialists, are used to
understand the risk from them. The PIM uses risk rankings derived from these to lend weight to the
potentially most severe events. The risk from all precursors over the previous 12 months is then
summed and scaled to reflect the increased risk exposure due to increases in rail traffic. The results
are quoted as an estimate of FWI per year.
The PIM monitors the risk from PHRTAs: train derailments; train collisions, including those with other
trains, buffer stops and road vehicles (both at and not at level crossings); trains struck by large falling
objects; and train explosions.
The precursors covered by the PIM can be arranged into various grouping schemas, depending on
the use to which the model is being applied. Whichever grouping is used for examining the results,
the underlying contributions from the precursor event types are unchanged and provide the same
total risk estimate.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Comparing the PIM index with other measures of train accident risk
The different risk modelling tools should not be equated, even though FWI per year is the common
measurement unit. SRMv8.1 provides an estimate of 7.3 FWI per year for PHRTA category train
accidents (out of the 8.0 FWI per year for all categories of train accidents) based on long-term
monitoring of events and expert judgement. This includes some very rare scenarios which have a
chance of occurring but may not yet have done so, and hence the observed level of harm can often
be less than the modelled risk. The PIM uses understanding taken from the SRM as a baseline of its
risk knowledge and as such will give a closely aligned value at the points nominally at the completion
of each SRM version’s assessment period.
Changes in the total number of RIDDOR-reportable accidents are unlikely to accurately reflect
changes in train accident risk, because many of them are relatively low-risk events. Although PHRTA
categories form a subset of train accidents with a typically higher average consequence, it is also
unlikely that changes in their overall frequency will be proportional to changes in risk.
Year-on-year changes can be difficult to interpret because factors such as the weather and chance
play a role. The following points should be borne in mind when considering the different indicators of
train accident risk:
• The SRM provides the most thorough assessment of train accident risk, but the train accident
part of the model is updated only every 18 months to two years.
• The PIM aims to provide an indication of changes the risk from a particular set of train accidents,
by tracking frequently occurring precursors, and mapping frequencies to risk using information
on average consequences. Some components of the PIM are sensitive to a relatively small
number of incidents, and the available precursors may not always correlate directly with the risk
that they are being used to track. RSSB continues to examine the PIM precursors to ensure they
remain good indicators of underlying train accident risk.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
PIM grouping structure

The current grouping structure is based on that used by Network Rail and the Train Operations Risk
Group (TORG) to monitor train accident risk. It groups the precursors to PHRTA category train
accidents, based on the type of cause and management area that they fall into.
Chart 96. PIM structure
Train
Infrastructure Objects on the
Infrastructure failures SPADs Level crossings operations
operations line
and failures
Infrastructure
Structural Embankment Signalling Level crossing
Track faults SPADs operational Animals Train speeding
failures failures failures incidents
incidents
Cutting Low adhesion

Bridge strikes Trees Runaway trains
failures events
Brake
Vehicle
faults and
incursions
failures
Other train
Objects blown
faults and
onto the line
failures
Objects on the
line due to
vandalism
Flooding
Large falling
objects
Train accident risk broken down by PIM grouping structure

Chart 97 shows the modelled contribution to train accident risk from each PIM group, together with
the risk from non-PHRTA categories of train accidents, which are not covered by the PIM.
Chart 97. Train accident risk by PIM group and person type (SRMv8.1)
4.0
3.37 Public
Workforce
3.0
Passenger
2.0
0.93 0.82
1.0 0.74 0.79 0.69
0.64
0.0
Infrastructure SPADs Infrastructure Level crossings Objects on Train operations Not covered by
failures operations the line and failures the PIM
• While level crossings contribute most to overall risk, they have a relatively low impact on
passenger and workforce safety when compared to other PIM groups. Chapter 7 Level crossings
contains more detail on this risk area.
• The SRM shows that when grouping the risks in this way, the largest contribution to passenger
risk comes from events that are classed as infrastructure failures.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.7.1 Trend in the PIM

Due to improvements in PIM methodology, it is possible to show day-to-day estimates of the
underlying risk from PHRTA category train accidents, back to April 2010. Prior to this date, the data
sources driving the PIM are not sufficiently detailed. In the chart below, the period prior to April 2010
is shown for illustrative purposes; while the overall PIM value across this date is unchanged, there
will be discontinuities in some of the groupings, because of the limitations on data prior to April
2010.
Chart 98. Ten-year trend in the overall PIM
Infrastructure failures SPADs Infrastructure operations

Level crossings Objects on the line Train operations and failures
Historical PIM trend Current PIM trend

12
Previous version of New version of
modelling and grouping modelling and grouping
10
8
FWI per year
0
Mar 06
Mar 07
Mar 08
Mar 09
Mar 10
Mar 11
Mar 12
Mar 13
Mar 14
Mar 15
Mar 16
Sep 06
Sep 07
Sep 08
Sep 09
Sep 10
Sep 11
Sep 12
Sep 13
Sep 14
Sep 15
• At the end of 2015/16, the PIM estimate of the risk from PHRTA category train accidents was
6.0 FWI per year, compared with 6.6 FWI per year at the end of 2014/15.
• The PIM contribution related to level crossings reduced from 2.4 FWI to 2.1 FWI, due mainly to a
decrease in components associated with user behaviour.
• The PIM contribution related to infrastructure operations reduced from 1.1 FWI to 0.8 FWI, with
small decreases occurring across categories of operational irregularity considered by the PIM.
• The PIM contribution from SPADs and adhesion reduced from 1.0 FWI to 0.7 FWI. Although the
SPAD contribution in the PIM is based on a different methodology than the SPAD risk ranking
methodology, the improvement in SPAD risk is reflected in the SPAD risk chart.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.7.2 Trend in the PIM for passengers

The PIM can be split into layers describing the risk to passengers, the public, and workforce. The risk
to passengers is a key subset used when managing train accident risk, and is examined in more detail
here.
Chart 99 shows the trend in the overall PIM indicator (the topmost line), and trends in the
contribution of the PIM groups to passenger risk.
Chart 99. Ten-year trend in the PIM for passengers

Infrastructure failures SPADs Infrastructure operations
Level crossings Objects on the line Train operations and failures
Risk to the Public Risk to the Workforce
Historical PIM trend Current PIM trend

12 Previous version of New version of
modelling and grouping modelling and grouping
10
8
FWI per year
0
Mar 06
Mar 07
Mar 08
Mar 09
Mar 10
Mar 11
Mar 12
Mar 13
Mar 14
Mar 15
Mar 16
Sep 06
Sep 07
Sep 08
Sep 09
Sep 10
Sep 11
Sep 12
Sep 13
Sep 14
Sep 15
• At the end of 2015/16, the passenger proportion of the PIM stood at 2.6 FWI per year, compared
with 2.8 FWI at the end of 2014/15.
• The greatest share of the risk to passengers (0.7 FWI per year) is from the infrastructure failures
group of categories. SPADs and infrastructure operations each contribute around 0.5 FWI per
year.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.7.3 SPADs
Historically, SPADs have been the cause of some of the most serious train accidents. The last fatal
accident due to this cause occurred at Ladbroke Grove in 1999, where 31 people lost their lives. The
industry subsequently focused much effort on reducing the risk from SPADs. An important strand of
work was the TPWS fitment programme, completed at the end of 2003. This was supplemented by a
wide range of other initiatives aimed at addressing signalling issues and improving driver
performance, including better driver selection, training and management.
A SPAD strategy group has been established, reporting to TORG, in order to examine in detail, the
current underlying causes of SPADs, to model their risk more effectively, and ultimately to develop
further countermeasures against them.
The estimated risk, labelled Underlying risk in Chart 100, is based on the number and characteristics
of SPADs that have occurred during the previous 12 months.
Chart 100. Trend in SPADs and SPAD risk

200% 400
Underlying risk (annual moving average)
SPADs (annual moving total)

Risk (percentage of risk at Sep 2006)
298
150% 300
September 2006
baseline = 100% 277
SPADs
100% 200
64%
50% 100
54%
0% 0
Sep 2006
Sep 2007
Sep 2008
Sep 2009
Sep 2010
Sep 2011
Sep 2012
Sep 2013
Sep 2014
Sep 2015
Mar 2007
Mar 2008
Mar 2009
Mar 2010
Mar 2011
Mar 2012
Mar 2013
Mar 2014
Mar 2015
Mar 2016
• There were 277 SPADs in 2015/16, compared with 298 during the previous year.
• At the end of 2015/16, SPAD risk stood at 54% of the September 2006 baseline level, compared
with 64% at the end of 2014/15.
• There were 8 SPADs with a ‘potentially severe’ risk ranking, which is six fewer than in 2014/15;
this is the main reason behind the fall in SPAD risk, which is driven by the level of occurrence of
SPADs with the highest risk ranking.
• Since TPWS was introduced, there have been a number of events where the driver has reset
TPWS and continued forward without the signaller’s authority. Although such events are
relatively rare, they are potentially serious because they negate the safety benefits of TPWS.
There was one TPWS reset and continue incident following a SPAD in 2015/16, which occurred at
Smethwick Junction involving a passenger train.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.7.4 Changes in other PIM groupings

Table 12 presents information on changes in all groupings of the PIM over the past five years.
Infrastructure failures
The category of infrastructure failures comprises failures of the physical track environment: the track
itself; the earthworks supporting it; the tunnels through which it passes; the bridges and structures
spanning or supporting it; and the signalling system controlling train movements along it.
At 0.90 FWI per year, the contribution from this category has increased compared with the 2014/15
level of 0.77 FWI. The rise is due mostly to an increase in the number of earthworks failures; the year
again saw some periods of severe wet weather.
Infrastructure operations
The category of infrastructure operations comprises the human side of managing the infrastructure,
specifically errors with the potential to leave the infrastructure less safe than it should be. This could
result from either the maintenance, or the operation of the infrastructure.
At 0.84 FWI per year, the contribution from this category has decreased compared with the 2014/15
level of 1.06 FWI. Although there was an overall increase in the number of operating incidents, there
were reductions in the categories most influential on the risk level.
Level crossings
The category of level crossings comprises everything relating to this interface (except for anything
which falls under the infrastructure operations category). Typically, the precursor events here include
the public’s interaction with level crossings, and any failures of the crossing hardware.
In the current PIM groupings, this category represents the largest single slice of the modelled risk.
The 2015/16 contribution is 2.11 FWI, compared with 2.44 FWI at the end of 2014/15. There were
reductions in level crossing failures and in some categories of incorrect usage by level crossing users.
Objects on the line

The category of objects on the line comprises the incursion onto the line of animals, trees, non-rail
vehicles, large falling objects, flood waters, and any other objects which cause an obstruction (other
than anything placed there in error and identified within the infrastructure operations category).
At 0.87 FWI per year, the contribution from this category has increased slightly compared with the
2014/15 level of 0.84 FWI. The year saw small increases in a range of events within this PIM
category.
Train operations and failures

The category of train operations and failures comprises both failures of rolling stock and of the
human side of managing train operations. Failures of brakes and control systems fit here, along with
other defects and failures, as do any errors leading to trains speeding.
At 0.50 FWI per year, the contribution from this category has stayed reduced slightly compared with
the 2014/15 level of 0.54 FWI. This category typically comprises small numbers of incidents, and is
therefore quite variable.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
PIM precursors
PIM precursors 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Track 1087 1045 884 711 634
Broken fishplates 362 431 333 269 255
Broken rails 129 180 119 95 104
Buckled rails 12 10 19 14 9
Gauge faults 3 4 3 2 2
S&C faults 573 412 398 319 250
Twist and geometry faults 8 8 12 12 14
Structures 1583 1570 1775 1766 1670
Culvert failures 3 6 27 4 5
Overline bridge failures 10 14 31 26 23
Rail bridge failures 21 32 66 50 32
Retaining wall failures 4 5 7 6 4
Tunnel failures 5 8 11 7 3
Bridge strikes 1540 1505 1633 1673 1603
Earthworks 33 202 172 61 159
Embankment failures 3 52 41 21 41
Cutting failures 30 150 131 40 118
Signalling 9438 8840 9077 8465 7478
Signalling failures 9438 8840 9077 8465 7478
SPAD and adhesion 358 403 567 483 402
SPAD 276 248 287 298 272
Adhesion 82 155 280 185 130
Infrastructure operations 3045 2977 2860 3328 3411
Operating incidents - affecting level crossing 81 74 87 100 108
Operating incidents - objects foul of the line 332 305 273 699 681
Operating incidents - routing 2073 2057 1989 2019 2121
Operating incidents - signaller errors other than routing 21 19 18 24 29
Operating Incidents - track issues 172 157 128 121 106
Operating Incidents - Other issues 366 365 365 365 366
Level crossings 1475 2100 1880 1796 1232
LC failures (active automatic) 679 906 767 760 472
LC failures (passive) 659 1053 993 935 673
LC incidents due to weather (active automatic) 2 2 1 1 1
LC incidents due to weather (active manual) 4 4 5 4 1
LC incidents due to weather (passive) 0 1 1 0 2
Public behaviour (active automatic) 34 41 38 23 15
Public behaviour (active manual) 6 19 7 1 10
Public behaviour (passive) 91 74 68 72 58
Objects on the line 2055 2359 2645 1823 2264
Animals on the line 1543 1667 1622 1298 1509
Non-passenger trains running into trees 30 39 125 46 69
Passenger trains running into trees 242 232 551 237 334
Non rail vehicles on the line 62 53 43 59 56
Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions 19 21 18 14 11
Passenger trains running into other obstructions 83 97 129 83 101
Non-passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 7 7 3 2 2
Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 38 20 33 27 35
Flooding 31 223 121 57 147
Train operations and failures 260 236 233 212 222
Rolling stock failures (brake/control) 33 19 6 5 1
Runaway trains 6 2 5 3 2
Train speeding (any approaching bufferstops) 10 12 14 10 13
Train speeding (non-passenger) 60 42 40 30 25
Train speeding (passenger) 73 81 105 81 109
Displaced or insecure loads 29 19 27 32 16
Non-passenger rolling stock defects (other than
7 10 5 7 8
brake/control)
Passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 42 51 31 44 48
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.8 Injuries to the workforce from activities related to train

operations
The types of activities considered under this area include the shunting or preparation of trains, and
ad-hoc and planned access of the track by train crew, for example to investigate a problem with a
train in running, or to change ends of a train.
6.8.1 Risk profile

Workforce personal injuries, as a result of train operations, contribute 0.9 FWI per year to the risk
profile. The fatality risk is dominated by the risk from being struck by a train. Slips, trips and falls
contribute the greatest amount of harm overall. While none of this is fatality risk, such an occurrence
may lead to another event that can cause fatality, such as electric shock.
Chart 101. Train operations: workforce personal injury risk (SRMv8.1)
Struck/crushed by train 0.22

Slips, trips, and falls 0.31
Accidents
Personal
Other accident 0.03 Fatalities

Electric shock 0.04 Major injuries
Contact with object or person 0.09 Minor injuries
Boarding and alighting 0.19 Shock and trauma
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Source: SRMv8.1
6.8.2 Injuries during 2015/16

During 2015/16, there were:
• No workforce fatalities associated with train operations.
• One major injury: A driver carrying out shunting moves during train preparation, trapped his
finger, resulting in partial amputation.
• Fifty-five minor injuries: 38 were to drivers or other train crew, with 10 occurring to shunters,
and seven occurring to train maintenance staff. The most frequent events were slips, trips and
falls (24), but also boarding and alighting injuries (11), contact with objects (10) and manual
handling injuries (8). In addition, one worker struck his head while uncoupling his train, and
another received an electric shock from an incorrectly isolated hand rail.
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.8.3 Trend in workforce harm related to train operations

Chart 102 shows the trend in harm over the past 10 years. In that time, there has been one fatality,
which involved a train driver, who was electrocuted after coming into contact with the conductor rail
while investigating a problem with his train.
Chart 102. Workforce harm from personal accidents related to train operations
1.6 1.5
Shock and trauma
1.4 0.2
Minor injuries
1.2 Major injuries
0.3
1.0 Fatalities
0.8
FWI
0.8
0.2 0.6 0.6
0.6 0.5
0.5
1 0.2 0.4
0.4 0.2 0.1
0.4 0.2 0.3
0.1
0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3 0.1
0.2 0.2
0.0 0.1
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Chart 103 shows the types of accidents that have occurred to the workforce in relation to operating
trains, and the types of workforce involved.
Train drivers have experienced the highest amount of harm, with most of this arising from slips, trips
and falls. Slips, trips and falls have also formed the greatest contribution to harm for other workforce
types, such as train guards and shunters.
Chart 103. Workforce personal accidents related to train operations, by accident type, 2006/07
to 2015/16
3.5
Train maintenance staff
3.0 Train guards
2.7 Train drivers
0.2 Track maintainence
2.5
Station staff
Shunters
2.0
Other
FWI
Onboard train crew

1.5 2.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.2 1.1
0.5
0.3 0.2
0.5 0.1
0.2
0.0
Contact with Boarding, alighting Slips, trips and falls Struck by train Electric shock Other injury
object or person and platform edge
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
6.9 Key safety statistics: train operations

Train accidents 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Passenger 0 0 0 0 0
Workforce 0 0 0 0 0
Public 1 6 2 2 0
Passenger 1 0 1 0 1
Workforce 1 0 1 0 1
Public 3 1 0 0 0
Passenger 19 19 54 7 28
Workforce 31 31 22 15 11
Public 5 2 2 1 2
Passenger 5 3 5 1 3
Workforce 39 34 34 18 13
Public 0 2 0 0 0
Passenger 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.16
Workforce 0.37 0.23 0.32 0.11 0.19
Public 1.32 6.12 2.01 2.01 0.00
Workforce train operations 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Contact with object or person 0 0 0 0 0
Boarding and alighting 0 0 0 0 0
Other accident 0 0 0 0 0
Class 1 20 13 11 13 7
Class 2 56 69 57 54 48
Class 1 0 0 0 1 0
Class 2 2 1 1 0 0
Contact with object or person 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Boarding and alighting 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.12
Struck by train 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
Other accident 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations
__________________________________________________________________________
Train accidents 21 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Total train accidents 545 694 636 634 605
PHRTA categoriess 33 35 32 25 25
Involving passenger trains 18 20 17 7 15
Collisions between trains 5 4 5 2 6
Derailments 0 7 0 0 3
Collisions with RVs not at LC 2 2 1 0 2
Collisions with RVs at LC (not derailed) 7 7 8 5 3
Collisions with RVs at LC (derailed) 2 0 0 0 0
Striking buffer stops 2 0 3 0 1
Struck by large falling object 0 0 0 0 0
Not involving passenger trains 15 15 15 18 10
Non-PHRTA categories 512 659 604 609 580
Open door collisions 0 0 0 1 0
Roll back collisions 1 4 0 1 3
Striking animals 169 324 268 304 273
Struck by missiles 57 66 52 55 51
Train fires 43 40 31 34 38
Striking level crossing gates/barriers 2 1 5 3 3
Striking other objects 160 126 168 157 140
Train fires 8 11 5 3 7
PIM precursors 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Total 7.14 7.98 7.57 6.64 6.06
Infrastructure failures 1.00 1.57 1.52 0.77 0.90
SPAD and adhesion 0.72 0.74 0.86 1.00 0.74
Infrastructure operations 0.77 0.84 0.90 1.06 0.86
Level crossings 2.91 3.29 2.80 2.44 2.11
Objects on the line 1.02 0.85 0.79 0.84 0.87
Train operations and failures 0.73 0.68 0.71 0.54 0.58
Passengers 2.81 3.32 3.32 2.77 2.61
Level crossings 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.16
21The category collisions with road vehicles (not at LC) excludes accidents that result in a derailment; these incidents are
included in the derailments category. Similarly the derailments category excludes derailments resulting from collisions
between trains, collisions with road vehicles at level crossings and trains struck by large falling objects.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7 Level crossings
This chapter covers the risk related to level crossings. The SRM modelled risk of 11.4 FWI per year
falls within the remit of the Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG) and comprises 8% of the total
mainline system FWI risk. The majority of risk is borne by members of the public with most
casualties occurring to road vehicle 22 occupants and pedestrians. Network Rail has put significant
resource into reducing the risk at level crossings and successfully met their target of 25% reduction in
risk at the end of Control Period 4 (March 2014).
2015/16 Headlines
• There were three fatalities at level crossing during 2015/16, all were pedestrian users. This is the
lowest number of level crossing fatalities recorded since 1996/97. The overall level of harm at
level crossing was 3.7 FWI, compared with 11.8 FWI for 2014/15.
• At four, the number of train collisions with vehicles at level crossings was the lowest over the
past ten years. The number of such accidents is relatively low, and shows quite some variability,
but the generally lower numbers over the duration of CP4 are reflective of an improvement in
level crossing risk. This is supported by a reducing trend in the recorded number of near misses
with road vehicles at level crossings.
• Improving level crossing safety is a major focus for the industry. Network Rail has substantial
safety improvements planned for CP5, which runs from April 2014 to March 2019, and which
build upon the 31% reduction in level crossing risk achieved during the course of CP4. At the end
of 2015/16 Network Rails’s LCRIM model, which tracks changes in the aggregate risk at level
crossings, stood at 12.3 FWI, compared with 12.8 FWI at the end of 2014/15.
Level crossing performance at a glance

16
14.0 Weighted injuries
14 13.2
Fatalities 11.8
12 11.0 10.9
9.9
10 8.8
7.4
FWI
Level crossing 8
Other
risk (11.4 FWI; 6 5.2
accidental risk 3.7
(128.2 FWI; 8%) 4
92%) 2
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
22The term road vehicle is used in this report to describe a range of vehicles, including farm machinery, motorcycles and
off-road vehicles such as quad bikes. It does not include pedal cycles, whose users are grouped with pedestrians.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.1 Level crossing risk profile

The SRM modelled risk at level crossings is 11.4 FWI per year, and this accounts for 8% of the total
system FWI risk of 139.6 FWI (including YDS and excluding suicide). Level crossings are an open
interface between the road and the railway, so there is increased potential for pedestrian and road
user behaviour to affect train operations.
Collisions at level crossings are the largest single cause of train accident risk (see Chapter 6 Train
operations). However, level crossing safety in the UK compares favourably with that in other
European countries.
A considerable amount of research has been undertaken on level crossing safety, covering station
and footpath crossings, as well as road crossings. Details of the research carried out can be found on
the RSSB website at http://www.rssb.co.uk/research-development-and-innovation.
Chart 104. Level crossing risk by injury degree and accident type (11.4 FWI per year)
Public pedestrian struck by train 6.5
Road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains 3.3
Passenger pedestrian struck by train on station crossing 0.5
Train occupants 0.4
Fatalities
Struck or trapped by crossing equipment 0.1
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Other 0.1 Shock and trauma
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Source: SRMv8.1
• Most of the risk at level crossings (62%) is to pedestrians, with pedestrian members of the public
accounting for 57% and passenger pedestrians on station crossings accounting for the remaining
5%.
• Train collisions with road vehicles contribute 32% of the risk at level crossings, of which 29%
affects members of the public in road vehicles, and 3% affects people on board trains.
• Slips, trips and falls on level crossings account for around 4% of the total level crossing risk, and
accidents in which people are struck by level crossing equipment account for 1%.
• The remaining 1% of the risk arises from road traffic accidents that occur in relation to level
crossings, but do not result in train accidents (eg collisions with barriers) and members of the
workforce injured at level crossings.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.2 Level crossing fatalities, injuries and train accidents in 2015/16

Fatalities
Excluding suicides and suspected suicides, three people (all pedestrians) died in accidents at level
crossings in 2015/16. RAIB have initiated an investigation into the incident shown in italics.
Pedestrian fatalities at level crossings in 2015/16
Date Location Territory Type Description

A man was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing. He
Tide Mills
15/02/16 South East UWC-T was reported to be wearing a coat with the hood up, and
(East Sussex)
distraction was recorded as a potential factor.
Grimston Lane An elderly man was fatally struck by a train while on the
23/02/16 South East Footpath
(Suffolk) crossing.
A man was struck by a train after attempting to cross after
Shoreham Station
27/02/16 South East MCB-CCTV the barriers had been lowered. He was taken to hospital but
(West Sussex)
succumbed to his injuries.
Major injuries
There were five major injuries at level crossings in 2015/16. Three were slips, trips and falls, one was
a member of the public struck by a train, and one was a crossing keeper who was struck by a crossing
gate, after a car hit it while driving across as they were being lowered.
Minor injuries
There were 65 reported minor injuries, most of which resulted from falls or being struck by crossing
equipment.
Shock & trauma

There were 28 reports of shock or trauma, mostly affecting train drivers involved in accidents or near
misses.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Collisions between trains and road vehicles

There were four collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings during the year, none
of which resulted in fatality.
One of the events, shown in italics, is subject to a RAIB investigation.
Collisions between trains and road vehicles at level crossings in 2015/16
Date Location Territory Type Description

A passenger train struck a tractor. One member of the
London North workforce suffered shock and another received a minor injury.
14/05/15 Oakwood Farm UWC
Eastern Two passengers received minor injuries, as did the driver of the
tractor.
A freight train clipped the rear of a van, which failed to stop at
11/09/15 Raven Western AOCL the crossing after the warning lights illuminated. There were
no injuries reported.
A passenger train struck a glancing blow to a van which had
06/11/15 Princes Bridge South East AHB been driven through the barriers and then abandoned by its
occupants. There were no injuries reported.
A passenger train struck a road vehicle on the crossing. The
11/03/16 Beavers Hill Western OC
vehicle driver received minor injuries.
Trains striking level crossing gates or barriers

Usually, trains strike barriers only when a previous incident, such as a road traffic accident, has
caused the barrier to be foul of the line immediately prior to the train’s arrival. Crossing gates may be
struck when high winds cause them to blow open, either due to defective clasps or users failing to
close or secure them properly after passing.
There were three instances of trains striking level crossing gates in 2015/16, and no occasions where
barriers were struck. None of the collisions resulted in injury.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.3 Types of level crossings

Level crossings vary in the level of protection they offer. There are two broad groups:
• Passive crossings: where no warning of a train’s approach is given other than by the train driver
who may use the train horn. The onus is on the road user or pedestrian to determine whether or
not it is safe to cross the line. Instructions for proper use must be provided at each location,
along with other appropriate signage.
• Active crossings: where the road vehicle or pedestrian is warned of the approach of a train
through closure of gates or barriers and/or by warning lights and/or alarms. The operation of an
active crossing can either be automatic (eg barriers that are raised and lowered automatically) or
manual, where a rail operator will work the crossing protection.
An illustrated guide to the different level crossing types may be found in Appendix 5.
Level crossing categories by class and type (May 2016)

Crossing type Number
UWC-T User-worked crossing with telephone 1690
Passive
UWC User-worked crossing 475

OC Open crossing 47
FP Footpath crossing 2099
MCG Manually controlled gate 149
Manual
MCB Manually controlled barrier 173

MCB-OD Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection 81
MCB-CCTV MCB monitored by closed-circuit television 422
Active
AHB Automatic half-barrier 437

ABCL Automatic barrier locally monitored 57
Automatic
AOCL-B Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barrier 66

AOCL/R Automatic open crossing locally or remotely monitored 31
UWC-MWL User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights 97
FP-MWL Footpath crossing with miniature warning lights 124
Total 5948
Source: Network Rail, May 2016
• Generally, automatic barrier and manually controlled crossings (including those monitored by
CCTV) are installed on public roads with high levels of traffic.
• Automatic half-barrier crossings, which cause less disruption to road traffic for each train
traverse, also tend to be heavily used and, compared with manually controlled crossings, have a
relatively high average risk per crossing. Automatic open crossings, which have lights but no
barriers, have a higher average risk from collisions with road vehicles.
• Passive crossings for road vehicles are generally used in rural areas. These crossings tend to be
either on private roads, for example to provide access between a farm and fields, or on roads
that provide access to a farm. In general, user-worked crossings (UWCs) tend to be comparatively
high-risk relative to the volume of traffic passing over them.
• Crossings that are not designed for vehicles are grouped under the single category of footpath
crossings for the purposes of this report, because detailed information about them is not well
captured in incident reports. The category also includes bridleway crossings and barrow
crossings.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.4 Trend in harm at level crossings

Most of the harm at level crossings arises from pedestrians, cyclists and road vehicles being struck by
trains. Some people are also injured each year as a result of slips, trips and falls, or striking, or being
struck by, crossing barriers.
Chart 105. Harm at level crossings (excluding suicides)

16
Shock & trauma Minor injuries
14.0 Major injuries Fatalities
14 13.2
11.8
12
11.0 10.9
9.9
10
8.8
FWI
8 7.4
13
6 12 5.2
11
10 10
9 3.7
4 8
6
2 4
3
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The total level of harm at level crossings in 2015/16 showed a marked decrease compared with
the previous year, and was well below the ten-year average of 9.6 FWI per year. At three, the
number of level crossing fatalities was the lowest recorded since 1996/97.
• Level crossing harm tends to be dominated by a relatively small number of fatalities, so figures
from a single year should be interpreted with caution. The relatively small number of fatal events
makes it difficult to identify trends in harm. However, there is evidence of improvement in
safety: the average level of harm since 2010/11 has been notably lower than for previous years.
Other indicators, such as collisions and near misses with road vehicles, also point towards safety
improvement, as does the output of Network Rails Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model (LCRIM).
The other indicators are reviewed later in this chapter.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossing fatalities

The 10 years to March 2016 have seen 86 fatalities on level crossings, excluding suicides. This figure
comprises 66 pedestrians (including three passengers using station crossings) and 20 road vehicle
users.
The last level crossing accident resulting in train occupant fatalities occurred at Ufton in 2004, when
a passenger train derailed after striking a car that had been deliberately parked on the crossing by its
driver, as a suicidal act. The train driver and five passengers were killed, in addition to the car driver.
Chart 106. Fatalities at level crossings

20
Passenger pedestrian struck by train on station crossing
Road vehicle occupants in collisions with trains
16 Public pedestrian struck by train
13
12
12 11
Fatalities
10 10 2 5 9 2
1 2 8
8
3 6 2
5
10 4
4 8 8 9 3
6 6 1 6
3 4 3
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Chart 107. Fatalities at level crossings by crossing type (excluding suicides) (2006/07–2015/16)
UWC
UWC-T AOCL/R
Pedestrian MCB
77% Road vehicle
MCB-
CCTV Footpath occupant UWC-T
MCB
23% AHB
UWC- AHB
MWL
AOCL/R
SPC
• The three pedestrian fatalities in 2015/16 occurred on different types of crossing: a user worked
crossing with telephone, a footpath crossing and a manually (by signaller) controlled barrier
crossing protected by CCTV. Since 2005/06, more than half of pedestrian fatalities have occurred
on footpath level crossings. However, this does not take into account differences in usage levels
of different crossing types.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.5 Potentially higher-risk train accidents at level crossings

Historically, most collisions at level crossings have occurred on AHBs, AOCLs and UWCs. The
proportion of collisions that result in a fatality varies by crossing type, reflecting factors such as
differences in train speed. For example, many AHBs are situated on faster lines and, as a result,
collisions with road vehicles are more likely to result in fatalities to road vehicle occupants.
Chart 108. Train accidents at level crossings and other locations (proportion by crossing type)
60
UWC-T
20% UWC OC Other location
14% 5% Level crossing
49
50 AHB
45 MCB-CCTV 30%
2%
42 42 MCB
AOCL/R
2%
23%
40 ABCL
Number of incidents
35 1%
UWC-MWL
28 3% 33 32
30
32 28 25 25
34
25
20 18 24 22
18
21
21 13
10
13 14
8 9 10 10
5 7
4
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At four, the number of train collisions with vehicles at level crossings was the lowest over the
past ten years. The number of such accidents is relatively low, and shows quite some variability,
but the generally lower numbers over the duration of CP4 are reflective of an improvement in
level crossing risk.
• Most collisions involve cars or vans, as Chart 109. Road vehicles in collisions at level
shown in Chart 109. There has been no crossings (2006/07–2015/16)
significant trend in the types of vehicles
90
involved in collisions at level crossings. 80
Passive
72 Active - manual protection
70
• Of the 101 collisions in the 10 years from Active - automatic protection
60 24
April 2006, 23 (23%) occurred at AOCL
Incidents
50
crossings, 30 (30%) at AHB crossings and 34 40
30
(34%) at UWCs (with or without telephones). 20 45
13
The remaining types of crossing each 10 10
8 6
2
0
contributed between 1% and 5% of events. Cars and Tractors and Lorries and Motorcycles Other
vans trailers LGVs
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.6 Near misses with road vehicles and pedestrians

Due to the relatively small number of accidents at level crossings, it is hard to monitor trends and
identify patterns from accident data alone. The industry also collects data on near misses. Near
misses are typically reported by train drivers who feel that they have had to take action to avoid a
collision, or that they came close to striking a road vehicle or pedestrian. Near miss reporting is
necessarily subjective, and is likely to be influenced by factors such as the ease of making a report
and its perceived effect. It is also likely that many near misses go unobserved due to prevailing light
and visibility conditions.
7.6.1 Near misses with road vehicles by crossing type

Chart 110. Trend in reported near misses with road vehicles
90
Not recorded
80 Passive
Active - automatic protection
60 Annual moving average
Near misses
50
40
30
20
10
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The number of near miss reports in 2015/16 decreased from the previous year. There appears to
be a long-term downward trend in near misses with road vehicles.
• There is clear seasonality in near miss reporting, with a higher incidence in spring and summer.
This may be due to heavier traffic (particularly on farm crossings around the times of haymaking
and harvest), and train drivers may be more
likely to identify that a near miss has occurred Chart 111. Near misses with road vehicles
during daylight hours. (2006/07-2015/16) 23
• Other seasonal factors that affect level crossing Other Footpath OC UWC
UWC-T MCG MCB-CCTV MCB
risk include ice and snow and sunlight, which UWC-MWL AOCL/R ABCL AHB
100%
can make it harder for the motorist to see 90%
Percentage breakdown
80%
warning lights. 70%
60%
50%
• Chart 111 shows that the majority of near 40%
30%
misses occur on UWCs (with or without 20%
10%
telephones). The chart also shows that a 0%
Road vehicle near misses Road vehicle crossing
disproportionate number of near misses occur population
at AOCL crossings.
23 The incidents at footpath crossings include near misses with mopeds and other motorcycles.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.6.2 Near misses with pedestrians and cyclists by crossing type

Chart 112. Trend in reported near misses with pedestrians and cyclists
120
Not recorded
Passive
Active - automatic protection
Annual moving average
80
Near misses
60
40
20
0
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• After a period of increase up to 2011/12, there appears to be no clear trend up or downwards.

• As with road vehicle near misses, reporting is seasonal. It is likely that there are more pedestrians
and cyclists using level crossings during spring and summer when the weather tends to be better,
and, as with road vehicle near misses, train drivers are more likely to see crossing users during
daylight hours.
• Around 10% of the near misses shown in the chart involve cyclists.
• A qualitative review of accident data suggests that dog walkers may be particularly vulnerable to
accidents at level crossings. Around 12% of near misses over the past ten years have mentioned
a person walking a dog, and a number of fatal incidents during the same period have related to
dogs running onto the line. In July 2015, Network Rail launched a new campaign in partnership
with Dogs Trust, urging people to keep their dogs on a lead near level crossings.
• Auditory distractions, such as personal stereos, also have the potential to increase the risk to
level crossing users and have been mentioned in relation to a number of events over recent
years.
• UWCs (with or without telephones) account Chart 113. Near misses with pedestrians and
for a large proportion of near misses with both cyclists (2006/07-2015/16)
pedestrians and road vehicle users.
Not recorded Footpath OC
Telephones may be provided at crossings UWC UWC-T MCG
where there is a high number of near misses 100%
MCB-CCTV MCB UWC-MWL
reported or where sighting times are reduced. 90%

Percentage breakdown
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Pedestrian near misses Pedestrian crossing
population
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.6.3 Near misses by time of day

Chart 114 shows the proportion of accidents and near misses at level crossings reported in each hour
of the day over the period 2005/06 to 2015/16.
Chart 114. Accidents and near misses by time of day (2006/07 to 2015/16)
14%
Collision with a road vehicle
12% Person struck and killed by a train
Percentage of reported events
Near miss
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
00:00
02:00
04:00
06:00
08:00
10:00
12:00
14:00
16:00
18:00
20:00
22:00
00:00
02:00
04:00
06:00
08:00
10:00
12:00
14:00
16:00
18:00
20:00
22:00
Road vehicles Pedestrians and cyclists
Each block represents one event
• Accidents and reported near misses with road vehicles tend to peak in the late morning and early
afternoon. Accidents and near misses with pedestrians most often occur a little later in the day
and the peak hours for pedestrian fatalities over the past 10 years has been between 14:00-
15:00 and 18:00-19:00.
• Accidents and reported near misses tend to occur at broadly similar times of the day. The main
exception to this is that a higher proportion of pedestrian/cyclist fatalities occurs in the late
evening (21:00 to 23:00) than would be anticipated from near miss reporting. One explanation is
that near misses may go unseen (and therefore unreported) during hours of darkness.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.7 Factors affecting the risk at level crossings

Level crossing equipment failure
Equipment failure can range from minor component defects to more serious disruptions caused by
power cuts and technical faults. Damage to equipment is also caused by vandals, thieves, road traffic
accidents and the weather (particularly wind, floods and lightning).
Equipment failure accounts for a small proportion of the risk at level crossings, the risk being
mitigated by the fact that equipment is designed to ‘fail safe’. For example, if the equipment fails at
an automatic level crossing, the warning lights operate and the barriers lower.
The number of level crossing equipment failures reported into SMIS that are identified as RIDDOR-
reportable has increased over the past decade (from 616 in 2006/07 to 1,074 in 2015/16). This is due
to improved reporting and does not reflect a genuine increase in equipment failure rates. The trend
in all reported level crossing equipment failures, which includes those that are not reportable under
RIDDOR, reduced in 2015/16 compared with the previous year (see the Train accident PIM precursors
key safety statistics sheet in Table 12).
Railway crime
Crime at level crossings is a serious issue, which has the potential to cost lives, as well as cause delays
and cost to the industry. These incidents include the defacing of signs and criminal damage to gates,
barriers, and telephones. The number of recorded incidents of interference with crossing equipment
decreased in 2015/16, and is the lowest over the period.
Recorded instances of interference with crossing equipment

.
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
99 38 40 44 14 28 28 32 26 19
Suicide
Suicides are not included in the statistics in this chapter, but are covered in Chapter 9 Suicide; since
April 2006, around 10% of railway suicides have taken place at level crossings. The number of
suicides recorded at level crossings was the lowest seen in the last 10 years.
Suicides and suspected suicides at level crossings
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Pedestrian 21 20 22 32 26 25 25 36 29 12
Road vehicle occupant 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 22 20 23 33 26 25 25 36 29 12
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Actions by level crossings users

Although level crossings are usually used safely, each year there are a number of events where this is
not the case, and the crossing event does not take place safely. Reasons include:
• Deliberate action on the part of the user, who was aware the action was incorrect and carried
risk
• Deliberate action on the part of the user, who was not aware that the action was incorrect, or
was not aware of the risk-related consequences of the action
• Unintentional action of the part of the user, which was not compliant with the crossing rules.
The following chart looks at user action, but does not distinguish between underlying causes.
Chart 115. Trends in reported level crossing events by type of user action
2800
Other
User fails to contact signaller / Phone left off the hook
2228
2400 Gate/barrier left open/raised

Pedestrian / cyclist crosses when unsafe
RV crosses when unsafe
1795
2000
1761
1755
1687
1638
Reported events
1486
1600
1319
1290
1248
1225
1210
1208
1204
1109
1077
1200
836
829
825
765
649
800
606
585
563
538
529
503
472
439
435
400
0
2006/2007
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
2015/2016
2006/2007
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
2015/2016
2006/2007
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015
Manually protected User-worked Other 2015/2016
• Around 40% of reported events occur at UWCs. Overall the most commonly recorded type of
event is the user leaving the gates open. Additionally, for UWC-T, the most common occurrence
is the user failing to contact the signaller, either before using the crossing, or once they are clear
of the crossing.
• The number of reported events at UWCs in 2015/16 showed a small decrease compared to the
previous year. This is largely due to the number of pedestrians/cyclists reported to have crossed
unsafely reducing from 323 to 102.
• Around 43% of reported events occur at manually protected crossings. The majority of these
events relate to users crossing while it is unsafe to do so. Events at these crossings are more
likely to be observed (and therefore reported) by railway personnel.
• The period 2010/11 to 2014/15 saw a significant increase in the number of reported events at
manually protected crossings since 2010/11, which was driven by increased reports of users
crossing unsafely. In 2015/16 the trend somewhat reversed, with the number of reported road
vehicles crossing unsafely decreasing by 541, compared with the previous year.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.8 Initiatives to reduce the risk at level crossings

Improving level crossing safety is a major focus for the industry. Network Rail has substantial safety
improvements planned for CP5, which runs from April 2014 to March 2019, and which build upon the
31% reduction in level crossing risk achieved during the course of CP4. Investment in level crossing
safety will exceed more than £230m by the end of the current control period (CP).
Among the safety projects currently underway are:
• The 100+ dedicated Level Crossing Managers continue to support sustained improvement in level
crossing safety through engagement with users, asset inspection and risk assessment. Their
subject matter expertise, local knowledge and focus on stakeholder engagement, which includes
building relationships with authorised users and wider local communities, improves capability to
understand and target risks. The experience and maturity of the organisation, underpinned by
enhanced guidance and policy, has enabled a truly balanced qualitative and quantitative risk
management approach to level crossing safety.
• Continuous improvement is not limited to investment in people; it also extends to understanding
level crossing risk. Investment in camera technology for example, has led to improved
intelligence about users of level crossings (census data). Consequently, this knowledge has
generated increased accuracy within risk assessments and enabled better targeting of risk
reduction measures. Furthermore, the narrative risk assessment, which blends the quantitative
risk model output with the qualitative structured judgement of the Level Crossing Manager, has
succeeded as a catalyst for safety improvement.
• Network Rail is continually improving safety through design during asset renewals. Opportunities
to enhance level crossing safety further by embracing innovation and technology within the
Digital Railway programme are also being explored.
• With a secured CP5 risk reduction fund of £99m to support the delivery of a risk based closure
programme, 194 legal closures have been achieved during the first two years of CP5. A further 13
crossings were also downgraded in status, so reducing risk. This takes the total number of
crossings closed since the start of CP4 to 998.
• Network Rail has invested in improving the light output of all its 36W filament bulb road traffic
light signals by converting them to LED units. Enhancement of the road traffic light signals has
resulted in improved asset visibility at 494 level crossings across the network.
• Half-barrier overlay systems have now been installed at 66 automatic open level crossings locally
monitored by train drivers. The addition of half-barriers enhances user safety and the approach
enabled a modular design to be deployed at significantly lower cost than traditional alternatives.
• Significant work has been undertaken to assess the effectiveness of whistle board protected
crossings and to optimise whistle board positions, or as appropriate, provide additional controls
to help users decide when it is safe to cross. This programme of work impacted on some 1,600
level crossings across the network. The challenge now for Network Rail and the rail industry is to
manage safety where crossings are used during the hours which train drivers are instructed not
to sound train horns except in emergencies (23:00 and 07:00); known as the night-time quiet
period (NTQP). Network Rail is working with RSSB to review the NTQP duration and is investing in
technology to mitigate risks.
• Network Rail is making progress installing audible warning systems at passive footpath crossings
protected by whistle boards. The technology uses radar equipment to detect approaching trains
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
and wayside horns to provide a localised audible warning at the crossing. The system is the first
step in a three phase strategy towards eradicating whistle boards as a means of protection.
• Work to deliver additional red light safety equipment (RLSE) at public road level crossings is
progressing. RLSE is a camera system with number plate recognition technology which is
designed to deter users from traversing when they are not permitted to do so. RLSE has been
installed at 28 level crossings around the country. There are three suppliers, one of which is still
in the final stages of attaining Home Office Type Approval. Further installations in 2016 will
measure levels of deliberate misuse before and after installation to quantify the safety benefits
of RLSE. This intelligence will facilitate decision making about future investment in the
technology.
• The fleet of fifteen mobile safety vehicles staffed by BTP provides another means to raise
awareness and detect deliberate misuse. They have detected and prosecuted in excess of 1,500
motorists responsible for red light violations since 2012.
• Two new overlay miniature stop light (MSL) systems have recently been product approved for
use on the network. They provide an alternative to conventional but more expensive MSL
solutions, warning users of approaching trains by providing a red light and audible warning at
footpath and private vehicle crossings.
• Power operated gate openers (POGO) are installed at 80 private vehicle crossings around the
country. Commissioning of the equipment is now underway. The POGO system opens and closes
the vehicle gate via user operated push button mechanisms. This safety enhancement avoids the
need for users to leave their vehicles to open and close gates and eliminates the need to traverse
over a crossing on foot. Overall it reduces the traverse for a single user from five to one.
• Network Rail continues to be transparent in its management of level crossing safety, sharing risk
information through its Transparency website (www.networkrail.co.uk/transparency/).
• A level crossing safety strategy which sets Network Rail’s direction until 2040 has been
developed and is reflected in a level crossing asset policy for CP6. These documents establish the
medium and long term strategic direction and focus on level crossings for Network Rail. The
strategy has been endorsed by both Network Rail and stakeholder representatives through the
Level Crossing Strategy Group (LCSG).
• Network Rail is developing solutions to implement lessons from RSSB research as part of level
crossing safety improvements. Papers such as T756, T983 and T984 offer advice and opportunity
to improve.
• Network Rail and RSSB are investing in improvements to the All Level Crossing Risk Model
(ALCRM) based on the phase one findings of RSSB paper T936.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
Network Rail level crossing risk tools

Network Rail uses ALCRM within its wider level crossing risk management process to:
• Quantitatively calculate safety risks associated with individual level crossings, based on
characteristics such as usage, road speed and layout, train speed and frequency, and the level of
protection provided by the crossing, as well as factors such as the duration of warnings and
closures.
• Model the safety benefits of risk reduction schemes and support decision making regarding the
appropriateness of solutions.
• Support cost-benefit analyses of the options for reducing risk at level crossings.
In addition, Network Rail developed a Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model (LCRIM) to track changes in
the aggregate risk at level crossings.
Chart 116 shows the LCRIM and the progress made during CP4 (12.6 FWI) and the current figure of
12.3 FWI at the end of 2015/16.
Chart 116. Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model – FWI benefit
20
18.3 FWI
18
16
12.8 FWI
14
FWI benefit
12
12.6 FWI
12.3
10
6
ALCRIM FWI estimate
4
CP4 25% reduction target
2
0
Jun-10
Jun-11
Jun-12
Jun-13
Jun-14
Jun-15
Sep-09
Sep-10
Sep-11
Sep-12
Sep-13
Sep-14
Sep-15
Dec-09
Mar-10
Dec-10
Mar-11
Dec-11
Mar-12
Dec-12
Mar-13
Dec-13
Mar-14
Dec-14
Mar-15
Dec-15
Mar-16
Apr-09
Jul-09
Data source: Network Rail
• The LCRIM uses data from ALCRM and is updated every four weeks.
• The safety benefits associated with the delivery of level crossing risk reduction initiatives are
calculated within ALCRM and are reflected within the output of the LCRIM. There has been some
fluctuation in the overall risk as a result of improved intelligence about usage.
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
7.9 Key safety statistics: level crossings
2011/1 2012/1 2013/1 2014/1 2015/1

Level crossings 2 3 4 5 6
Fatalities at LC (level crossings) 4 9 8 11 3
Pedestrians 3 4 6 9 3
Passenger on station crossing 0 0 0 0 0
Member of public 3 4 6 9 3
Road vehicle occupants 1 5 2 2 0
Train occupants 0 0 0 0 0
Passenger on train 0 0 0 0 0
Workforce on train 0 0 0 0 0
Weighted injuries at LC 1.22 0.92 0.78 0.76 0.67
Pedestrians 0.58 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.62
Road vehicle occupants 0.32 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.00
Train occupants 0.32 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.06
Collisions with road vehicles at LC 9 10 10 7 4

Resulting in derailment 2 0 0 0 0
Collisions with gates or barriers at LC 4 2 5 4 3
Gates 3 2 2 4 3
Barriers 1 0 3 0 0
Reported near misses 470 440 410 379 385
With pedestrians 322 295 279 276 296
With road vehicles 148 145 131 103 89
Reported incidents of crossing events 3810 3492 3590 4086 3989
Suicide and attempted suicide 25.11 25.22 36.22 29.10 12.22

Suicide 25 25 36 29 12
Attempted suicide 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.22
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8 Trespass
We categorise incidents as trespass if they involve access of prohibited areas of the railway and are
as a result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. Such behaviour includes deliberately alighting a
train in running (other than as part of a controlled evacuation procedure), and getting down from the
platform to the tracks, for example to retrieve an item that has been dropped. An exception to the
rule of classing the deliberate access of a prohibited area as trespass is at level crossings. This is
because level crossings are areas of the railway that are legitimately accessible by people for most of
the time.
The trespass category is limited to events where the person involved did not intend to cause harm to
themselves, even if their behaviour clearly carried risk, and so it excludes people who access the
railway to take their life: these events are analysed in Chapter 9 Suicide.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were 30 trespass fatalities recorded in 2015/16 compared with 27 recorded in 2014/15.
Since 2009/10, when improvements in classification of suicide and trespass fatalities occurred,
the average number of trespass fatalities per year has been 31.6.
• Over the past ten years, around 40% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the
approximately 60% that have occurred in other locations, the majority of these have occurred on
the running line. The proportion of trespass fatalities in stations for 2015/16 was notably lower,
at 17% (five fatalities).
• Over the past 10 years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 62%. All types of vandalism
shown in the chart have seen reductions over this period, although the rate of decrease has been
different for different categories.
• A particular type of vandalism that has been an issue for the industry is cable theft. In carrying
out cable theft, individuals are typically also engaging in trespass, incurring risk to self, as well as
disruption and delay to rail services. Through an effective strategy of ‘target hardening’ of hot
spot locations, funding for additional BTP officers, national intelligence sharing, Network Rail and
the wider industry have reduced the incidence and performance consequences of cable theft
significantly over the past five years.
Trespass at a glance
70
Weighted injuries
60 54.9 Fatalities
46.9 49.5
50 44.0 41.6
Other 40 36.9
Risk from 32.3
FWI
accidental risk 30 25.9 26.7 29.0

trespass (33.4
(106.2 FWI;
FWI; 24%) 20
76%)
10
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8.1 Trespass risk profile by event type

The breakdown of trespasser risk in Chart 117 is taken from SRMv8.1, and therefore represents the
modelled estimate of the underlying risk to trespassers.
The risk to trespassers is dominated by fatality risk, with weighted injuries accounting for a very small
part of the FWI total. This is partly because non-fatal injuries to the trespassers are less likely to be
reported to rail companies, and partly because the hazards that account for most of the risk (in
particular, being struck by trains) are more likely to result in fatality than injury.
Chart 117. Trespass risk by accident type: 33.4 FWI per year
Struck by train 23.5
Electric shock 4.9
Fall from height 3.5
Jump from train in service 0.5
Train surfing 0.4

Fatalities
Major injuries
Minor injuries
Other 0.6 Shock and trauma
0 5 10 15 20 25
Source: SRMv8.1
• The main source of risk arising during trespass is being struck by a train, which accounts for
around 70% of the total risk from trespass.
• Electric shock accounts for 15% of total trespass risk and falls from height account for 10%.
• Around 3% of trespass risk involves people deliberately exiting a train in running or sustaining
injuries while ‘train-surfing’.
• The remaining category, Other, comprises around 2% of the total risk to the trespassers, and
covers events such as slips, trips and falls in areas of the railway, away from the running line.
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8.2 Trend in harm to trespassers

From 2014/15 onwards, a greater amount of information about fatalities related to trespass and
suicide has been made available by BTP to the industry through the enhanced co-operation taking
place across the industry. A specific team was established within BTP, and has worked with Network
Rail and RSSB to look at classification of fatalities. As part of this partnership, BTP have been able to
share more information on railway fatalities as far back as 2009/10. This enabled the industry to
review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdict has not yet been returned, or was recorded as
open or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria. An outcome of this increased
data sharing is that while trespass and suicide data should be more accurate over the past six years,
the analysis of separate trends in trespass and across the decade as a whole cannot be done on a
consistent basis. The same limitations apply to trends in suicide.
Chart 118. Trend in trespasser FWI by injury degree

70
Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities
60
54.9 Improved classification of trespass
fatalities
49.5
50 46.9
44.0
41.6
40 36.9
FWI
32.3
29.0
30 26.7
25.9
52
46
43 42
20 40
34
30
27
24 24
10
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At 30, the number of trespasser fatalities recorded in 2015/16 was higher than the numbers seen
for the past two years, but around average compared with the level of fatalities seen since
2009/10, when the improvements in classification occurred.
• The trend in reported trespass, which Chart 119. Trend in reported trespass
shows a clear seasonal variation, had been
5000
generally stable over the period 2010/11 to 4500 Events per quarter
Reported quarterly trespass
2013/14. From the middle of 2014/15 4000 Annual moving average

onwards, an increasing trend has been 3500
3000
seen. 2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
Trespasser fatalities by cause and location

Being struck by trains has accounted for 72% of all trespasser fatalities over the last 10 years.
Electrocution has accounted for a further 17%, with falls from height accounting for 7%. People
deliberately exiting trains during running, or falling from them while train-surfing, and other
accidents, account for the remaining 3%. The proportions based on actual data are very similar to
those estimated by the SRM (Chart 117).
Chart 120. Trespass fatalities by accident type and location

Other accidents Train surfing Jump from train in service
Fall (including from height) Electric shock Struck by train
35
Improved classification of Improved classification of
trespass fatalities trespass fatalities
30 29
28
25 25
25 24 2 24
22
21 21
5 1 3
20 19 5
18
Fatalities
17 4
2 16
6 3 15
14 2
15 13
1 4
11 24 4
5 8 3
10 9 21 20
19 18
2 17 17
14 15 6 15
5 13
5 10 2 10 11
9 1
7 7
4 4 5
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
In stations Not in stations
• Around 40% of trespass fatalities have occurred in stations. Of the approximately 60% that have
occurred in other locations, the majority of these have occurred on the running line.
• Trespassing along the running line is likely to involve those who have deliberately chosen to
enter a prohibited railway environment, but those that occur in stations may involve passengers
acting on the impulse of the moment. There have been a number of occasions where passengers
waiting for trains have dropped an item on the track and then got down to retrieve it, only to be
fatally injured by a train entering the station. Other examples include passengers taking short-
cuts between platforms, rather than using the footbridges or other provided means of access.
• A number of events have involved people deliberately jumping from moving trains. Passengers
on stationary trains, which have failed or are delayed due to problems on the line, may also put
themselves at risk by forcing the doors open, or using the emergency release handles to open the
doors and alight onto the track, for example to stretch their legs, smoke or simply out of
frustration against the necessary confinement of the train. No fatalities have yet resulted from
this type of event.
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8.3 Vandalism
Vandalism on the railway encompasses any kind of deliberate damage or defacement to the property
of the railway. ‘Superficial’ vandalism, like graffiti, may result in greater levels of passenger anxiety
about their safety and security on the railway. ‘Structural’ vandalism may include the real potential
to cause an accident.
With all kinds of vandalism, there is also the personal risk that the vandals may expose themselves to
when committing unsafe acts, or when trespassing on the track to commit vandalism.
Chart 121. Trends in reported vandalism

1400
Total
Annual moving average
1200 Other vandalism
Missiles thrown or fired
Obstruction on the line
Recorded incidents per month
1000 Arson
800
600
400
200
0
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
Apr
Aug
Dec
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• Over the past 10 years, the trend in reported vandalism has fallen by 62%. All types of vandalism
shown in the chart have seen reductions over this period, although the rate of decrease has been
different for different categories. During the first five years of the past ten, the incidence of
missile-throwing and line obstructions reduced greatly, with the Other vandalism category
remaining static. The last five years have seen a reversal of this situation: the reduction in risk
that has occurred over the past three years has been due to a fall in the number of incidents in
the Other vandalism category. The main contributor to this has been a fall in the number of
equipment thefts, including cable theft (see
section 8.3.1). Chart 122. Seasonal trend in vandalism
• A clear seasonal pattern is generally evident: 1200
Reported vandalism per month - 2015/16
reported vandalism usually peaks around April at 1000 Reported vandalism per month - 10 year average
over twice the number of incidents seen in 800

Reported vandalism
events per month
December. Chart 122 shows how the current

600
reporting year compares with the average variation 433 441
400 360 374 347 327 362
seen over the past decade. 319
244 224 215
286
200
0
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8.3.1 Cable theft

The theft of lineside cable causes significant operational delay, creates reinstatement cost and
necessitates criminal investigation. Where the cables that are cut or damaged are either live, or near
to other live sources of electricity, there is serious potential for injury or death.
In 2012 and 2013, legislation was introduced as a result of cross-industry lobbying highlighting the
need for changes to the law regarding scrap metal dealers. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment
of Offenders Act 2012 received Royal Assent on 1 May 2012 prohibiting scrap metal dealers from
paying for scrap metal in cash. The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 received Royal Assent on 28
February 2013; this comprised an update of the 1964 legislation.
Network Rail’s strategy for dealing with cable theft includes ‘target hardening’ of hot spot locations
to make thefts more difficult to commit and easier to detect, and funding for additional BTP officers.
Network Rail develops relationships with cross-industry stakeholders including the BTP and Highways
England as part of the national intelligence-sharing strategy.
Chart 123. Incidents of cable theft and trend in copper price

350 $14,000
Recorded thefts Price of copper
300 $12,000
250 $10,000
Price of copper per tonne (USD)

Recorded cable theft incidents
200 $8,000
150 $6,000
100 $4,000
50 $2,000
0 $0
.
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Source: BTP
• Up to around the middle of 2011/12, the incidence of cable theft showed a fairly close
correlation with the price of copper. After that point, copper prices stabilised before showing a
reducing trend, while still remaining relatively high. In contrast, there was a more notable
decreasing trend in the recorded incidence of theft, providing evidence for the effectiveness of
the national and industry-specific initiatives that have taken place. Table 18 shows the delay
minutes associated with cable-theft since 2011/12.
Total cable theft delay minutes
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Delay 293,156 321,610 365,395 344,685 160,124 68,497 37,687 49,959
Source: Network Rail
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
Cable theft by BTP area

As of March 2015, BTP is divided into three divisions which are made up of eight territorial areas,
seven covering mainline rail operations, and one covering London Underground and the Docklands
Light Railway. More than 4,000 police officers, special constables, police community support officers
and police staff provide a specialist policing service across these areas.
Chart 124. Incidents of cable theft by BTP mainline areas
350
BTP Scotland BTP Western BTP Wales BTP Pennine
300 BTP Midlands BTP TFL BTP South BTP East
Recorded cable theft incidents
250
200
150
100
50
.
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Source: BTP
• All BTP areas have recorded a reduction in incidents in the last financial year. BTP Pennine area
and BTP Midlands are the areas recording the highest number of thefts, but areas differ in their
size and operational characteristics, such as length and type of track, as well as other factors such
as population density and demographics. All of these factors are likely to influence the
occurrence of cable theft.
Chart 125. BTP mainline rail areas Chart 126. Cable theft by area (2008/09 –
2015/16)
BTP BTP
Western Scotland
7% BTP East
4% 9% BTP
South
BTP 12%
Wales
8% BTP TFL
3%
BTP BTP
Pennine Midlands
39% 18%
Source: BTP
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
_________________________________________________________________
8.4 Key safety statistics: trespass

Trespass 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fall (including from height) 3 1 2 3 2
Jump from train in service 1 0 2 0 0
Train surfing 1 0 0 0 0
Class 1 17 22 12 19 24
Class 2 8 10 9 7 15
Class 1 1 1 1 0 1
Class 2 0 0 0 0 1
Electric shock 5.22 5.01 3.61 6.41 3.43
Fall (including from height) 3.77 2.68 3.45 3.98 3.29
Jump from train in service 1.00 0.12 2.00 0.00 0.10
Struck by train 30.61 27.92 17.51 18.51 25.41
Train surfing 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10
Other accidents 0.00 1.10 0.10 0.00 0.01
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9 Suicide
When categorising fatalities, it is important to try to distinguish between suicides and accidental
deaths, because the means of addressing these issues will be different. The criteria that the railway
uses to differentiate between suicides and accidental fatalities are explained in Section 9.1 and
Appendix 4.
Any passengers, members of the public, or members of the workforce who take their life are
included in the analysis in this section.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were 252 incidents of suicide or suspected suicide recorded for 2015/16, compared with
287 recorded for 2014/15 and the 276 recorded for 2013/14.
• Around 20% of suicidal acts do not result in fatality. In 2015/16, a further 71 people carried out
non-completed suicidal acts. In these cases, many people are left with life-changing injuries.
• Nearly all suicide-related events result in shock or trauma for members of the workforce who are
directly involved in the event. Each member of the workforce will react differently to being
involved in a suicide-related event; for all it will be upsetting, but for some it may result in severe
post-traumatic stress and affect their ability to return to their former role.
• Rail Industry partners - including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions,
BTP, Samaritans, and RSSB - have been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the
railway and to support anyone involved in a railway suicide after an incident. In 2015 the
contractual partnership agreement between Samaritans and Network Rail was renewed for
another five years. By the end of 2015/16, over 10,000 frontline railway personnel had been
trained on how to intervene in suicide attempts and there have been outreach working meetings
taking place between priority locations and Samaritans branches across the country. In addition,
around 1,575 personnel have had Trauma Support Training.
Suicide at a glance
Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in suicide harm
450
Shock & trauma Minor injuries
400
Major injuries Fatalities
290.9
350
281.5
255.5
252.4
248.6
245.7
300
228.4
222.5
Other
211.7
209.8
accidental risk 250

FWI
(138.4 FWI; 200

99%)
150
287
276
252
250
Suicide (non-
245
243
225
219
208
207
accidental: 100
Third-party
244.1 FWI) 50
risk from
suicide 0
(accidental
risk: 1.2 FWI;
1% )
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.1 Classification of fatalities

For the rail industry, determining whether a fatality was accidental or suicide is straightforward
where a coroner’s inquest has been held, and a verdict reaching either of those two conclusions has
been returned. Where the coroner has yet to return a verdict, or returns an open or narrative
verdict, some judgement must be applied.
Most coroners’ reports take around six months to complete, and some verdicts are not returned until
several years after the event. A coroner will then only return a suicide verdict if there is evidence that
shows beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased intended to take his or her own life. If the cause
of death cannot be confirmed to this extent, an open or narrative verdict will be returned. In these
cases, and those where the inquest is still awaited, the industry applies rules known as the
Ovenstone criteria (see Appendix 4) to determine on the balance of probability, whether a fatality
was the result of an accident or suicide. The decision is based on all the information available, which
might include evidence gathered by the local Network Rail manager and/or BTP. This approach
enables the industry to develop, implement and monitor appropriate preventative measures
applicable to the separate issues of suicide and trespass. Fatalities that have been judged by the
industry to have been suicides, but have not been classed as such by the coroner, are referred to as
suspected suicides.
To ensure that statistics are as accurate as possible, the classification of suicide and accidental
fatalities is reviewed and reclassified on an on-going basis. Work is currently taking place to review
previous years’ open/narrative events, in the light of increased information from BTP, as well as the
availability of coroners’ reports.
Through enhanced co-operation taking place within the industry, BTP have been able to share more
information on railway fatalities, going back as far as 2009/10. This has enabled the industry to
review a number of cases where the Coroners’ verdicts are not yet returned, or are recorded as open
or narrative, and re-assess them against the Ovenstone criteria. An outcome of this increased data
sharing is that there is a discontinuity in the charts in this chapter, and also Chapter 8 Trespass;
classifications up to and including 2008/09 have been based on a reduced amount of information.
This means that trespass figures for years prior to 2009/10 may be overestimates of the true level,
while suicide figures may be underestimates. Caution must therefore be taken in comparing the last
seven years with the first three years of the last decade.
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.2 Trend in suicide fatalities

Chart 127 presents the trend in harm from suicide and suspected suicide for the past 10 years. The
dark bars represent the number of events with a coroner’s confirmed verdict. The light bars
represent the number of verdicts that were open, narrative, or not yet returned, which are currently
classed as suspected suicide, based on application of the Ovenstone criteria.
The discontinuity resulting from greater information being available from 2009/10 onwards is
reflected in the chart. Later years have greater proportions of unconfirmed categorisations, while
coroners’ inquests or verdicts are still awaited.
Chart 127. Trend in suicide fatalities and weighted injuries

350
Weighted injuries Improved classification of fatalities
Suspected Suicide
300 290.9
Confirmed Suicide 281.5
252.4 255.5
245.7 248.6
250
228.4 222.5
209.8 47 211.7
71 117
200 41 36 79 171
Fatlities
46 41
150
233
100 196
184 183 179
161 167 166 159
116
50
19
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Note: For 2009/10 onwards, the classification of open, narrative and unreturned coroners’ verdicts has based on an improved amount
of information.
• Given the proportion of cases that are

open, narrative or unreturned, which Chart 128. Trend in trespass and suicide fatalities
is where judgement needs to be 500
Confirmed Suicide Suspected Suicide
applied, it is useful to look at the trend Suspected Accidental Confirmed Accidental
400
in trespass and suicide fatalities as a 314
267 259 264 282 289 278 300 282
whole. 300
Fatlities
231
• Chart 128 shows that although over 200
the past decade there has been a 100
generally increasing trend in fatalities
0
due to trespass or suicide, there was a
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
reduction in 2015/16.
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.2.1 Suicide attempts and workforce harm

When a suicide attempt takes place on the railway, the effects are not limited to the person carrying
out the attempt. As well as the emotional effect on any family or friends of the person, people
witnessing the event may well be traumatised.
Chart 129. Trends in suicide and workforce shock/trauma

450
Non-fatal injuries from attempted suicide
400
Suicide fatalities 356 345
350 Workforce cases of shock/trauma arising from suicide/attempted suicide 323
294 296 80 58
300 283
268 271 259 71
245 44 51
Injuries
250 40
43 52
38 51
200
150 287
276
243 250 245 252
100 225 207 219 208
50
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• At 323, the number of suicides and attempted suicides during 2015/16 was a decrease on the
345 occurring last year, but still above average for the decade as a whole. Around 20% of suicide
attempts do not result in fatality; some people are left to face life with serious and debilitating
injury.
• Chart 129 also shows the associated trend in the number of shock or trauma events experienced
by the workforce in relation to suicide events; Chart 130 presents the information in FWI format.
Each member of the workforce will react differently to being involved in a suicide-related event;
for all it will be upsetting, but for some it may result in severe post-traumatic stress and affect
their ability to return to their former role. Chart 131 shows the time lost by the workforce who
have had the traumatic experience of being involved in a suicide incident. Around 50% of people
return within four weeks of the incident, and around 75% have returned within eight weeks.
Chart 130. Workforce harm caused by suicide- Chart 131. Workforce time lost due to suicide
related events
1.6 80
1.5
1.4 70
1.2 1.2
1.1 1.2
1.2 1.1 60
1.0
1.0 0.9
0.8 50
0.8
Persons
FWI
0.8
40
0.6
30
0.4
20
0.2
10
0.0
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
0 100 200 300 400 500

Days absent from work
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.2.2 Trends in suicide by location

Chart 132. Trend in suicide harm by location
180
Other
160
149
148
Running line
Stations
131
140
130
127
121
Level crossings
115
120
110
110
106
104
102
99
95
100
93
91
90
FWI
85
83
80
72
60
36
40
33
29
26
25
25
23
22
20
20
12
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Level crossings Stations Running line and other locations
• Since 2006/07, around 49% of suicides have occurred on the running line. In 2015/16, there was
a reduction in suicide events in these locations, following two years with above average
numbers.
• Around 39% of suicides have occurred in stations. The number of suicides in stations for 2015/16
was the joint highest recorded over the period.
• In contrast, the number of suicides at level crossings was the lowest. Over the past ten years,
around 10% of suicides have occurred at level crossings. The remaining small percentage of
events have occurred in other locations.
• The occurrence of suicide on the railway is likely to be influenced by wider societal trend, as well
as by initiatives taken by the railway to prevent suicide attempts. These factors are reviewed in
the following sections.
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.3 Suicide prevention initiatives

Rail Industry partners - including Network Rail, the train operating companies, trades unions, BTP,
Samaritans, and RSSB - have been working together since 2010 to reduce suicide on the railway and
to support anyone involved in a railway suicide after an incident. In 2015 the contractual partnership
agreement between Samaritans and Network Rail was renewed for another five years. The
programme involves the roll out of a number of prevention and post-incident support initiatives.
These include multi-agency partnership working at national and local level, bespoke training of
railway industry staff, a national public awareness poster campaign, the implementation of physical
mitigation measures at railway locations, post-incident support at railway stations provided by local
Samaritans volunteers, and work to encourage responsible media reporting of suicides. Table 19
presents a general overview of the national and local activities covered by the programme. The
programme communicates with the industry under the banner of the Rail Industry Suicide
Stakeholder Group (RISSG) in support of the rail industry taking collective ownership and working
together to reduce suicides on the railway.
By the end of 2015/16, over 10,000 frontline railway personnel had been trained on how to
intervene in suicide attempts and there have been outreach working meetings taking place between
priority locations and Samaritans branches across the country. In addition, around 1,575 personnel
have had Trauma Support Training.
During 2015/16, BTP recorded a total of 1,137 interventions on the mainline railway that had been
made in situations judged as having the potential to result in suicide. This compares against 847
during 2014/15, a rise of 34%.
Summary of programme activities
AT NATIONAL LEVEL AT LOCAL LEVEL

Partnership working
Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group and working groups Local engagement/development of local suicide prevention
Development of guidance and policies plans
Appointment of programme support teams and leads in key Station audits
organisations (Samaritans, Network Rail, TOCs) Third party engagement and community outreach activities
Collation and dissemination of data centrally (by Network Rail,
RSSB, BTP, Samaritans and ATOC)
Prevention activities
Design and delivery of public awareness campaigns and Priority location identification
information materials for stations and rail staff Recruitment of station staff to Managing Suicidal Contacts
Design and delivery of Managing Suicidal Contacts course training
Launch of the Suicide Prevention and Support on the Railway: Public awareness (poster) campaign roll out, Samaritans metal
Learning Tool signs and distribution of information for station and rail staff
ESOB (Emotional Support Outside Branch) training (for local Physical mitigation measures
Samaritan branches) Call-out of Samaritans on identification of a vulnerable person
Coordination of the ESOB service British Transport Police Suicide Prevention Hotline, for rail staff
Samaritans’ media monitoring and encouraging responsible to use to report any concerns they may have for the immediate
reporting of suicides safety of people on the railway
Post-event activities
Development and delivery of Trauma Support Training for Recruitment to Trauma Support Training
management and unions Post-incident visits to stations by Samaritans to support staff
Development of Trauma Support Training for frontline and and public who have witnessed or been involved in fatal and
operational rail staff non-fatal incidents
Development of guidance materials for frontline, operational
staff and drivers
Development of guidance to prevent copycat suicides (media
guidance, memorials policy)
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.4 Railway suicides in the wider context

Suicides on the railway represent by far the largest proportion of railway-related fatalities, but they
represent a relatively small percentage of suicides on a national level. National suicide figures are not
available as recently as railway figures, and are published on a calendar year basis; the chart shows
the latest available calendar year comparisons. The national figures used are based on the year when
the death was registered.
Chart 133. Railway suicide trend in the wider context

400 8,000
All suicides
On railway property
350 7,000
Railway suicides as % of national total
6,242 6,122
6,057 5,993
300 5,679 5,718 5,682 289 6,000
5,561 5,612
5,391 268 273
245
250 232 5,000
226
National suicides
221
Railway suicides
204 206 207

200 4,000
4.7%
150 4.4% 4.5% 4.4% 3,000
4.0% 4.1%
3.6% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6%
100 2,000
50 1,000
0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: SMIS and ONS
• Over the period shown in the chart, the average number of national suicides has been 5,806 per
year, but the latter years have all been notably higher than this. This increased number of
suicides at a national level is in line with the increased number seen on the railway in recent
years.
• The proportion of the national total occurring on railway property has been 4.1% over the
analysis period; the most recent available years for comparison have shown slightly higher
proportions.
• Chart 134 indicates that the age and Chart 134. Suicides by age and gender 2005 to 2014
gender demographics of railway 80%
suicides vary somewhat from national % of railway suicides within age group
70%
% of all suicides within age group
Railway suicides
suicides. Compared with the national 60%

45%
profile, a greater proportion of railway 50%

39%
33%
32%
suicides are male; this is particularly the 40%

30%
case in the 15-44 years age group. In
11%
20%
11%
10%
contrast, a smaller proportion of

2%
9%
5%
10%
2%
1%
railway suicides are female. The 0%

proportion of suicides within the 75+ 15-44 45-74 75+ yrs 15-44 45-74 75+ yrs
age group is lower than the national yrs yrs yrs yrs
average, for both genders. Male Female
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
_________________________________________________________________
9.5 Key safety statistics: suicide

Suicide 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 250 245 276 287 252
Struck by train 238 233 266 282 246
Not train related 12 12 10 5 6
Class 1 15 13 19 15 30
Class 2 5 3 4 4 8
Class 1 1 0 3 1 0
Class 2 0 0 0 0 0
Struck by train 239.75 235.46 269.97 284.43 248.27
Not train related 12.63 13.11 11.55 6.46 7.19
Injuries to others 237 249 293 244 214
Majors 0 0 0 0 0
Minors 1 0 0 1 0
Shock and trauma 236 249 293 243 214
_________________________________________________________________
Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________
10 Yards, depots and sidings

Railway companies are required to manage risk and carry out risk assessments on areas away
from the mainline operational railway, such as yards, depots and sidings (YDS).
Fatal injuries in YDS have been reported into SMIS on a long-standing basis. While there is no
mandatory requirement to report non-fatal injuries, the collection of data to support safety
analysis of YDS sites has been carried out on a voluntary basis, through agreement of the
industry; this was formalised as an appendix to a railway group standard (GE/RT8047 Standard
for Safety Information Reporting) in April 2010.
We now have sufficient data to incorporate YDS into the scope of reporting of safety
performance and risk estimation on an on-going basis.
2015/16 Headlines
• There were no workforce fatalities in YDS sites during 2015/16. The total level of workforce
harm was 5.2 FWI, which was a decrease compared with the 8.1 FWI (one fatality) occurring
during 2014/15. It also represented the lowest level of harm since consistent recording of
YDS harm started, in 2007/08.
• Since 2007/08, harm in YDS sites has accounted for around 21% of the total harm to the
workforce.
• Injuries to passengers and members of the public also occur in YDS sites, with lower
frequency, but often more serious consequences due to the nature of the event. There
were three fatalities to members of the public occurring in YDS sites during 2015/16. Two
events involved members of the public suspected of deliberately trespassing on railway
property, who were each electrocuted by the OLE. The third fatality was a member of the
public who is suspected of accidentally falling from height over a public wall, into railway
sidings. 24
YDS risk at a glance

Risk in context (SRMv8.1) Trend in YDS workforce harm
10
9 Weighted injuries
8.1
8 7.2 Fatalities
6.6 6.9 6.8
7 6.3 6.2 6.0
Other Risk in yards, 6 5.2
FWI
accidental risk 5
depots and
4
(132.0 FWI; sidings 3
95%) (7.6 FWI; 5%) 2
1
1
0
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
24 Each of these fatalities to members of the public is also recorded in the statistics of other relevant chapters of the
ASPR.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
10.1 YDS risk profile by accident category

The provision of this data has allowed RSSB to develop an extension to the SRM to cover YDS
sites. This was first published as version 7.2 of the Safety Risk Model (SRM) and is now fully
incorporated into the SRM from SRMv8 onwards. The project has achieved a detailed analysis of
the nature of risk on YDS sites. Based on the data collected, the modelled risk in YDS to
workforce is estimated to be 7.3 FWI per year. When the small amount of risk to other person
types (ie passengers and public) is taken into account, the total modelled YDS risk based on the
participating companies is estimated to be 7.6 FWI per year (these figures are from SRMv8.1 and
exclude direct suicide risk).
Chart 135. SRM modelled risk in YDS (Workforce: 7.3 FWI; Passengers and public: 0.3 FWI)
Contact with object 1.51
Boarding/alighting trains 0.68

Workforce
Electric shock 0.10
Struck/crushed by train 0.07
Train accidents 0.13
Other accidents 0.78

Passengers and
Trespass 0.25
Fatalities
public
Train accidents 0.04 Major injuries

Minor injuries
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Source: SRMv8.1
• Slips, trips and falls are the largest single contributor to workforce risk in YDS locations,
followed by contact with objects, injuries while getting on or off trains, and injuries due to
incorrect manual handling or awkward movement.
• Injuries from electric shock or being struck by train are rare, but carry the potential for
fatality.
• For the workforce, the group Other accidents includes exposure to fire or hazardous
substances, machinery and tool operation, and accidents involving non-rail vehicles.
• For members of the public and passengers, the greatest risk arises from trespass of YDS
locations. Injuries from this cause are covered in Chapter 8 Trespass.
• Train accidents in YDS account for around 0.2 FWI and mostly refers to the risk from train
fires and explosions.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
10.2 Workforce fatalities and injuries in YDS in 2015/16

The majority of injuries recorded on YDS sites are those suffered by members of the workforce.
Fatalities
There were no workforce fatalities in YDS sites during 2015/16.
Non-fatal injuries
In 2015/16, there were:
• Thirty-four major injuries
• 1,137 minor injuries, 163 (14%) of which were Class 1, and two reported cases of
shock/trauma.
10.2.1 Trend in workforce harm in YDS
Workforce fatalities in YDS have been reported for some years, and non-fatal injuries have been
reported by industry agreement more recently. Trends in non-fatal injuries can now be
measured from 2007/08 onwards, ie over the last nine years.
Chart 136. Trend in workforce harm in YDS

10
Only
fatalities 8.1
8 required 7.2
to be 6.9 6.8
6.3 6.6 2.1
reported 6.2 6.0
6 2.1 2.1 2.0 5.2
2.1 2.2
2.1
FWI
2.2
4 1.8
5.0
5.1 4.8 4.8
2 4.2 4.1 4.4
1.0 3.7 3.4
1 1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• The overall reduction in FWI in 2015/16 compared

with 2014/15 was driven by reductions in all categories Chart 137. Proportion of workforce
of harm. harm in YDS since 2007/08
• Since 2007/08, workforce harm in YDS has comprised Harm
around 21% of the total harm to the workforce. The in YDS
21%
proportion for 2015/16 was slightly lower, at 20%.
Other
workforce
harm
79%
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Major injuries
Chart 138. Trend in major injuries by accident type
70
Manual handling/awkward movement Electric shock
Contact with object or person Slips, trips and falls
60 Platform-train interface Other injury
51 50
50 48 48
8 44
42 41 5
9 11
Major injuries
40 3 37 7 8
8 34
9 4
30 7
32
30
23 33 27 30
20
26 21 26
10
6 5 3 6 3
4 4 4 3 5 5 2
0 2
2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
• There has been a 32% decrease in the number of major injuries in 2015/16 compared with
2014/15; this number was the lowest recorded over the period shown.
• The majority of major injuries are due to slips, trips and falls, with contact with objects
forming the next largest category.
Minor injuries
Chart 139. Trend in minor injuries by accident type
1400
1282 1285
Manual handling/awkward movement 1241 1264 1264
1207 1179
1200 Electric shock
1083
974
1000
Minor injuries
800
Other injury
Train accidents
600
400
196 190 173 174 180

200 165 162 164 163
0
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Class 1 Class 2
• There was a 9% reduction in Class 1 minor injuries between 2014/15 and 2015/16. There has
been more variability in the Class 2 minor injuries, however there has been a decreasing
trend, with 2015/16 recording the lowest number of injuries over the period.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce harm in YDS by worker type

Chart 140. Trend in harm by worker type
4.0
Minor injuries
3.0 Major injuries 2.7
2.5
Fatalities 2.3 2.32.22.2 2.32.3 2.3
2.22.0
1.8 1.8 1.8
FWI
2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7

1.5 1.4 1.5
1.2 1.31.41.4
1.1 1.1
0.90.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
1.0 0.7 0.7
0.5
0.0
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Other Infrastructure worker Engineering staff Drivers / Shunters
• Engineering staff have shown the highest proportion of injuries over the period as a whole,
although in recent years the level has been very similar to that for infrastructure workers.
Differences in hours worked in YDS will also be a factor in the number of injuries occurring.
• The injury profile for engineering staff has the greatest proportion of minor injuries (38%)
and the profile for infrastructure workers has the least proportion (23%). This may be due to
differences in activities, or may also indicate differences in reporting.
Workforce harm in YDS by industry sector

Chart 141. Trend in harm by industry sector
6
4.8 Shock and trauma
5 4.5 4.6
4.3 Minor injuries
4.1 4.0 3.9
4 3.7
Major injuries
2.8 Fatalities
FWI
3 2.3 2.5
2.1 2.1 2.1
1.8
2.4
2 1.4 1.6
1.3
3.1
0.9 0.7 0.7

2.8
2.8
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.8

2.6
2.5
2.5
2.4
0.6
2.1
1
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.3
1.3
0.1
1.1
1.1
1
2010/11 0.8
2012/13 0.7
2011/12 0.6
2008/09 0.5
2013/14 0.5
2014/15 0.5
2015/16 0.4
0
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2007/08
2009/10
2010/11
NR/Other TOC FOC
• Passenger train operating companies have shown the greatest proportion of harm over the
period shown. The freight sector has recorded comparatively low levels of harm, but this is
reflective of lower levels of reporting within the freight community, rather than lower levels
of risk.
• Network Rail shows increasing levels of reported harm over the past five years, driven by
the occurrence of major injuries, which have reduced in 2015/16 after a period of increases
over the four years prior to 2015/16.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
10.3 Injuries to passengers and members of the public in YDS

Injuries to passengers and members of the public also occur in YDS sites, with lower frequency.
Fatalities
There were three accidental fatalities in YDS sites during 2015/16:
• Two events involved members of the public suspected of deliberately trespassing on railway
property. Each case involved a person climbing on stabled wagons and being electrocuted
by the OLE. Both of these fatalities are included in the statistics and analysis of Chapter 8
Trespass.
• The third fatality was a member of the public who is suspected of accidentally falling from
height over a public wall, into railway sidings. This event is not suspected to be deliberate
trespass, and is listed in the fatalities described in Table 3 of Chapter 2 Safety overview.
Non-fatal injuries
In 2015/16, there were:
• Two major injuries. One was a trespasser who was injured jumping from height into a
siding, and the other was a delivery driver, who tripped in a depot.
• Five minor injuries. One was a trespasser, three were site visitors, and the fifth was an over-
carried passenger.
10.3.1 Trend in harm to passenger and members of the public in YDS

The following chart shows that injuries to members of the public in YDS sites are rare, but with a
notable likelihood of being extremely serious. The fatality in 2009/10 occurred to one of a
group of teenage boys, who were playing on top of a train in a depot, and came into contact
with the OLE.
Chart 142. Trend in passenger/public harm in YDS

4
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries 3.2
3 Major injuries
Fatalities
FWI
3.0
1.1
1
1.0 0.3
0.1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
10.4 Key safety statistics: yards, depots and sidings

Yards, depots and sidings (Workforce) 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Minor injuries 1397 1437 1257 1359 1137
Class 1 190 173 174 180 163
Class 2 1207 1264 1083 1179 974
Class 1 3 0 1 0 0
Class 2 3 7 6 1 2
Electric shock 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.01 0.02
Train accidents 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Other injury 0.48 0.56 0.74 0.71 0.37
Yards, depots and sidings (passenger/public) 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Shock and trauma 0 1 0 1 0
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11 Freight operations
Over the past 10 years, freight operations have contributed around 9% of the total train miles
on the network. In 2015/16, there were 40.5 million freight train miles, and 17.8 billion freight
tonne km was moved. There are currently six freight operators in Great Britain. They are DB
Schenker, Freightliner, Direct Rail Services, GB Railfreight, Colas, and Devon and Cornwall
Railways.
A good proportion of freight operations take place in YDS, and although some freight companies
have started using SMIS to record incidents of workforce injury in these sites, there is no
mandatory requirement to do so and some under-reporting appears likely.
2015/16 Headlines
• During 2015/16, there were no fatalities, 4 major injuries, 173 minor injuries and seven
cases of shock/trauma occurring to the workforce in relation to freight operations. The total
level of harm during the year was 0.7 FWI.
• During 2015/16, there were eight train accidents in PHRTA categories that involved freight
trains. This is lower than the ten-year average of 10.9, and notably lower than the number
occurring during 2014/15. Of the eight events, six were derailments and two were collisions
with a road vehicle, one at a level crossing and one not. Derailments dominate the freight
profile for PHRTA categories of train accident. A cross-industry working group has been
established to focus on this area.
• At 32%, the percentage of freight train PHRTAs over the past 10 years has been
disproportionately high when compared with the percentage of train miles (9%). In
contrast, at 8%, the percentage of non-PHRTA category train accidents over the past 10
years has been very similar to the percentage of train miles.
• In 2015/16, there were 70 SPADs which involved freight trains. When normalised by the
number of train miles, the rate of freight SPADs is consistently higher than for passenger and
other trains combined. In recent years, the normalised trend in freight SPADs has been
increasing for freight.
Freight operations at a glance

Harm in context (SMIS) Trends in freight-related harm
12
9.6
10 Fatalities
7.2
7.0
6.6
8 Weighted Injuries
Average harm 6
4.1
Other arising in
FWI
3.1
2.6
accidental 4
2.2
connection
1.6
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
harm,
0.8
1.3
with freight
0.7
0.7
0.6
2
96% operations,
4% 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Passenger & Public Workforce
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.1 Trend in harm to the workforce

This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving the workforce recorded in SMIS
over the last 10 years.
Chart 143 includes all workforce injuries recorded in SMIS where the train operator, responsible
organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. It is important to note that this
does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident rests with the companies identified in
this way.
Chart 143. Trend in harm to the workforce associated with freight operations
3.0
Shock and trauma
2.6 Minor injuries
0.1 Major injuries
2.5
Fatalities
0.5
2.0
1.6
FWI
1.5
1.3
1.2 0.3
0.3 1.0
1.0 2 0.9 0.3
0.7 0.8
0.3 0.7
0.2
0.6
0.1 0.3 1.2
0.5 1.0 0.3
0.4 0.9
0.6 0.7 0.7
0.5 0.4
0.2
0.0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a
freight company
• In total during 2015/16, there were no fatalities, 4 major injuries, 173 minor injuries and
seven cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of harm during the year was 0.7 FWI.
• Workforce fatalities are relatively rare, and the injury profile is typically dominated by major
injuries. There were two fatalities during the analysis period:
− On 17 July 2006, a shunter was fatally injured while ‘calling back’ a loco onto a rake of
wagons in a siding.
− On 29 July 2006, a freight train driver was electrocuted whilst investigating smoke
coming from a wagon of his train.
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.2 Trend in harm to passengers and public

This section provides some analysis of the incidents involving passengers or public recorded in
SMIS over the last 10 years.
Chart 144 includes all passenger and public injuries recorded in SMIS where the train operator,
responsible organisation or event owner is identified as a freight company. As with workforce
injuries, it is important to note that this does not necessarily imply that the cause of the accident
rests with the companies identified in this way.
Chart 144. Trend in harm to passengers or public associated with freight operations
12
Shock and trauma
Minor injuries
10 9.6 Major injuries
Fatalities
8
7.0 7.2
6.6
FWI
9 4.1
4
3.1 7 7
6
2.2
2 4
1.3
1.0 3 1.0
2
1 1 1
0
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Note: The chart includes all injuries where the train operator, responsible organisation or event owner is identified in SMIS as a
freight company
• In total during 2015/16, there was one fatality, no major injuries, two minor injuries and no
cases of shock/trauma reported. The total level of passenger/public harm during the year
was 1.0 FWI.
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.3 Trend in train accidents involving freight trains

Chapter 6 Train operations covers the risk from all types of train accident and gives an update on
safety performance of train accidents in the last 10 years. This section looks at train accident
safety performance in the freight sector. A detailed list of freight train accidents in PHRTA
categories occurring in 2015/16 can be found in Chapter 6.
11.3.1 Potentially higher-risk train accident categories

Chart 145. Trend in the number of PHRTA category train accidents, broken down by train
type
Trains striking road vehicles at level crossings
Trains struck by large falling objects
Buffer stop collisions
Collisions with road vehicles not at level crossings (without derailment)
Derailments (excluding collisions with road vehicles on level crossings)
50
40
37
32
32
30
PHRTAs
25
24
24
20
18
20
17
16
15
13
12
12
11
10
10
10
8
8
2
0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Freight Passenger trains and other trains 2015/16
• During 2015/16, there were eight train accidents in PHRTA categories that involved freight
trains. This is lower than the ten-year average of 10.9, and notably lower than the number
occurring during 2014/15.
• Of the eight events, six were derailments and two Chart 146. PHRTA category train
were collisions with a road vehicle, one at a level accidents by train type
crossing and one not. Derailments dominate the
freight profile for PHRTA categories of train
accident. A cross-industry working group has been
established to focus on this area. Freight
32%
• At 32%, the percentage of freight train PHRTAs
over the past 10 years has been disproportionately
high when compared with the percentage of train Non-freight
miles (9%). 68%
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.3.2 Other train accidents

The chart below shows the number of non-PHRTA category train accidents involving freight
trains.
Chart 147. Trend in the number of non-PHRTA category train accidents, broken down by
train type
Striking level crossing gate or barrier Struck by missile
Striking other object Striking animal
Train fire Roll back collision
Open door collision
100 1000
86
89
80 800
Non-PRHTAs (Freight trains)
Non-PHRTAs (Other trains)

690
651
619
590
588
573
59
549
60 600
495
476
470
40
40
40 400
36
32
31
31
19
20 200
0 0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Freight Passenger trains and other trains
• During 2015/16, there were 31 non-PHRTA category train accidents involving freight trains.
This is higher than for 2014/15, but still
historically low. Chart 148. Non-PHRTA category train
• The latter half of the last ten years has seen a accidents by train type
step change in the number of non-PHRTA
Freight
category train accidents involving freight trains,
8%
due solely to a fall in the recorded number of
incidents of trains being struck by missiles. A
similar (but smaller) reduction in this category of
train accident is also observed for other types of
train (mostly passenger).
Non-freight
• At 8%, the percentage of non-PHRTA category 92%
train accidents over the past 10 years has been
very similar to the percentage of train miles (9%).
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.3.3 Trend in freight SPADs

The SRMv8.1 modelled risk from non-passenger train SPADs is 0.33 FWI per year 25.
Chart 149. Trend in the number of SPADs, broken down by train type
300 2.4
270
258
250 239 2.0
230
218 220 223 226
207
SPADs per million train km

200 188 1.6
SPADs
150 1.2
100 0.8
74 79
72 70
62 61 64
54 57 56
50 0.4
0 0.0
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
2015/16
Freight trains Passenger trains and other trains
• In 2015/16, there were 277 SPADs in total, 70 of which involved freight trains. Of the 70
freight SPADs, one was risk-ranked ‘potentially severe’ (ie 20 or higher) and 10 were risk-
ranked ‘potentially significant’ (ie between 16 and 19).
• When normalised by the number of train miles, the rate of freight SPADs is consistently
higher than for passenger and other trains combined. In recent years, the normalised trend
in freight SPADs has been increasing for freight.
25The figure is calculated from SRMv8.1 and this modelling includes the potential consequences of a SPAD involving a
non-passenger train; for example, a potential collision involving a passenger train and a freight train. It is not possible
to disaggregate freight-only SPAD risk due to the current definition of precursors.
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
11.4 Key safety statistics: freight operations

Workforce injuries involving freight
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
operations
Minor injuries 193 195 177 199 173
Class 1 23 27 32 34 27
Class 2 170 168 145 165 146
Class 1 5 7 6 3 2
Class 2 5 4 5 3 5
Electric shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Train accidents 0.02 1.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
Struck by train 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other injury 7.18 2.39 6.38 2.68 1.11
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
_________________________________________________________________
Freight train accidents 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Total freight train accidents 44 51 43 34 39
PHRTAs 8 11 12 15 8
Collisions with road vehicles not at LC 0 3 2 1 1
Collisions with road vehicles at LC (not 0 1 0 0 1
derailed)
(derailed)
Non-PHRTAs 36 40 31 19 31
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: key safety statistics
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 1. Key safety statistics

Safety overview
Safety overview 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Passenger 5 3 4 3 8
Workforce 1 2 3 3 0
Public 47 44 32 39 37
Major injuries 471 516 497 529 483
Passenger 258 312 274 298 288
Workforce 172 162 177 182 157
Public 41 42 46 49 38
Minor injuries 12965 12776 12785 13195 12603
Passenger 5954 6383 6388 6880 6690
Workforce 6824 6213 6234 6136 5694
Public 187 180 163 179 219
Passenger 262 238 236 253 205
Workforce 1247 973 1026 833 746
Public 3 6 2 3 7
Passenger 42.54 46.45 43.60 44.95 48.84
Workforce 30.98 29.79 32.48 32.28 26.22
Public 51.59 48.70 37.05 44.33 41.37
Harm from suicides and attempted
252.39 248.57 281.52 290.89 255.47
suicides
Suicides 250 245 276 287 252
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Passengers and public on trains and in 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
stations
Major injuries 272 320 285 318 298
Minor injuries 6058 6477 6454 6974 6795
Class 1 1413 1439 1419 1276 1322
Class 2 4645 5038 5035 5698 5473
Class 1 0 0 1 0 1
Class 2 255 235 229 245 203
Train accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Passenger kms (billions) 57.11 58.23 60.18 62.97 64.39
Passenger journeys (millions) 1461.51 1502.63 1588.32 1656.73 1693.32
Passenger and public assaults on trains 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16
and in stations (BTP data)
Total 2493 2512 2688 3004 3737
GBH and more serious cases of violence 73 62 79 101 90
Actual bodily harm 817 756 769 750 739
Other violence 30 34 25 25 39
Common assaults 1192 1261 1320 1508 1832
Harassment 381 399 495 620 1037
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Workforce in stations and on trains 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Minor injuries 3798 3177 3171 3098 2909
Class 1 407 362 305 309 299
Class 2 3391 2815 2866 2789 2610
Class 1 7 10 5 2 6
Class 2 848 607 614 506 438
Electric shock 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Struck by train 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other injury 1.07 0.86 0.96 0.70 1.32
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Infrastructure work 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Minor injuries 1294 1272 1519 1358 1323
Class 1 174 169 216 173 207
Class 2 1120 1103 1303 1185 1116
Class 1 2 3 1 7 0
Class 2 4 3 6 1 7
Struck by train 0.10 1.30 1.00 0.10 0.11
Machinery/tool operation 0.83 0.87 1.12 0.61 0.69
Electric shock 0.12 0.01 0.14 0.65 0.02
Other accidents 0.54 0.57 0.66 0.34 0.10
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Road driving
Road driving 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
FOC 0 0 0 0 0
TOC 0 0 0 0 0
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0
FOC 0 0 0 2 0
TOC 0 0 1 0 0
Unknown 0 0 0 1 1
Class 1 23 15 30 24 39
Class 2 44 59 67 83 74
Class 1 7 6 11 11 22
Class 2 0 0 0 0 0
Network Rail 1.31 1.23 0.40 1.27 0.66
Contractors 0.00 0.01 2.22 1.01 0.21
FOC 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.01
TOC 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.05
Unknown 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.16
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Train operations: train accidents
Train accidents 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Passenger 0 0 0 0 0
Workforce 0 0 0 0 0
Public 1 6 2 2 0
Passenger 1 0 1 0 1
Workforce 1 0 1 0 1
Public 3 1 0 0 0
Passenger 19 19 54 7 28
Workforce 31 31 22 15 11
Public 5 2 2 1 2
Passenger 5 3 5 1 3
Workforce 39 34 34 18 13
Public 0 2 0 0 0
Passenger 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.16
Workforce 0.37 0.23 0.32 0.11 0.19
Public 1.32 6.12 2.01 2.01 0.00
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Train accidents 26 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Total train accidents 545 694 636 634 605
PHRTAs 33 35 32 25 25
Non-PHRTAs 512 659 604 609 580
Train fires 43 40 31 34 38
26The category collisions with road vehicles (not at LC) excludes accidents that result in a derailment; these incidents
are included in the derailments category. Similarly the derailments category excludes derailments resulting from
collisions between trains, collisions with road vehicles at level crossings and trains struck by large falling objects.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
PIM precursors 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Track 1087 1045 884 711 634
Broken fishplates 362 431 333 269 255
Broken rails 129 180 119 95 104
Buckled rails 12 10 19 14 9
Gauge faults 3 4 3 2 2
S&C faults 573 412 398 319 250
Twist and geometry faults 8 8 12 12 14
Structures 1583 1570 1775 1766 1670
Culvert failures 3 6 27 4 5
Overline bridge failures 10 14 31 26 23
Rail bridge failures 21 32 66 50 32
Retaining wall failures 4 5 7 6 4
Tunnel failures 5 8 11 7 3
Bridge strikes 1540 1505 1633 1673 1603
Earthworks 33 202 172 61 159
Embankment failures 3 52 41 21 41
Cutting failures 30 150 131 40 118
Signalling 9438 8840 9077 8465 7478
Signalling failures 9438 8840 9077 8465 7478
SPAD and adhesion 358 403 567 483 402
SPAD 276 248 287 298 272
Adhesion 82 155 280 185 130
Infrastructure operations 3045 2977 2860 3328 3411
Operating incidents - affecting level crossing 81 74 87 100 108
Operating incidents - objects foul of the line 332 305 273 699 681
Operating incidents - routing 2073 2057 1989 2019 2121
Operating incidents - signaller errors other than routing 21 19 18 24 29
Operating Incidents - track issues 172 157 128 121 106
Operating Incidents - Other issues 366 365 365 365 366
Level crossings 1475 2100 1880 1796 1232
LC failures (active automatic) 679 906 767 760 472
LC failures (passive) 659 1053 993 935 673
LC incidents due to weather (active automatic) 2 2 1 1 1
LC incidents due to weather (active manual) 4 4 5 4 1
LC incidents due to weather (passive) 0 1 1 0 2
Public behaviour (active automatic) 34 41 38 23 15
Public behaviour (active manual) 6 19 7 1 10
Public behaviour (passive) 91 74 68 72 58
Objects on the line 2055 2359 2645 1823 2264
Animals on the line 1543 1667 1622 1298 1509
Non-passenger trains running into trees 30 39 125 46 69
Passenger trains running into trees 242 232 551 237 334
Non rail vehicles on the line 62 53 43 59 56
Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions 19 21 18 14 11
Passenger trains running into other obstructions 83 97 129 83 101
Non-passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 7 7 3 2 2
Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 38 20 33 27 35
Flooding 31 223 121 57 147
Train operations and failures 260 236 233 212 222
Rolling stock failures (brake/control) 33 19 6 5 1
Runaway trains 6 2 5 3 2
Train speeding (any approaching bufferstops) 10 12 14 10 13
Train speeding (non-passenger) 60 42 40 30 25
Train speeding (passenger) 73 81 105 81 109
Displaced or insecure loads 29 19 27 32 16
7 10 5 7 8
brake/control)
Passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 42 51 31 44 48
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
PIM precursors (FWI/year) 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Track 0.544 0.462 0.521 0.301 0.314
Broken fishplates 0.032 0.033 0.019 0.015 0.014
Broken rails 0.043 0.049 0.030 0.022 0.022
Buckled rails 0.038 0.046 0.192 0.026 0.017
Gauge faults 0.116 0.071 0.012 0.013 0.010
S&C faults 0.241 0.190 0.130 0.057 0.051
Twist and geometry faults 0.074 0.074 0.138 0.168 0.199
Structures 0.115 0.127 0.218 0.153 0.125
Culvert failures 0.007 0.007 0.025 0.001 0.006
Overline bridge failures 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.012
Rail bridge failures 0.038 0.062 0.142 0.102 0.075
Retaining wall failures 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.004
Tunnel failures 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001
Bridge strikes 0.052 0.038 0.025 0.027 0.026
Earthworks 0.199 0.848 0.622 0.171 0.331
Embankment failures 0.019 0.163 0.067 0.020 0.044
Cutting failures 0.180 0.685 0.555 0.151 0.287
Signalling 0.139 0.133 0.154 0.142 0.132
Signalling failures 0.139 0.133 0.154 0.142 0.132
SPAD 0.696 0.702 0.794 0.954 0.707
Adhesion 0.024 0.038 0.063 0.042 0.029
Operating incidents - affecting level crossing 0.357 0.413 0.434 0.335 0.323
Operating incidents - objects foul of the line 0.025 0.052 0.044 0.267 0.128
Operating incidents - routing 0.032 0.028 0.080 0.139 0.132
Operating incidents - signaller errors other than routing 0.038 0.028 0.028 0.045 0.007
Operating Incidents - track issues 0.080 0.083 0.076 0.040 0.018
Operating Incidents - Other issues 0.234 0.237 0.232 0.231 0.232
Level crossings 2.912 3.292 2.797 2.445 2.114
LC failures (active automatic) 0.025 0.042 0.034 0.027 0.018
LC failures (passive) 0.014 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.010
LC incidents due to weather (active automatic) 0.102 0.104 0.066 0.066 0.067
LC incidents due to weather (active manual) 0.042 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.002
LC incidents due to weather (passive) 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.027
Public behaviour (active automatic) 1.054 1.436 1.482 0.924 0.606
Public behaviour (active manual) 0.084 0.257 0.075 0.009 0.094
Public behaviour (passive) 1.592 1.392 1.111 1.397 1.289
Animals on the line 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.022 0.026
Non-passenger trains running into trees 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
Passenger trains running into trees 0.152 0.125 0.154 0.065 0.091
Non rail vehicles on the line 0.671 0.545 0.421 0.593 0.577
Non-passenger trains running into other obstructions 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Passenger trains running into other obstructions 0.088 0.084 0.103 0.070 0.085
Non-passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Passenger trains striking objects due to vandalism 0.023 0.013 0.027 0.024 0.032
Flooding 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Large Falling Objects 0.052 0.052 0.056 0.060 0.061
Rolling stock failures (brake/control) 0.068 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.002
Runaway trains 0.290 0.195 0.408 0.216 0.145
Train speeding (any approaching bufferstops) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Train speeding (non-passenger) 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
Train speeding (passenger) 0.018 0.022 0.035 0.027 0.038
Displaced or insecure loads 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.010
0.063 0.091 0.039 0.040 0.046
brake/control)
Passenger rolling stock defects (other than brake/control) 0.210 0.264 0.128 0.153 0.179
Train Explosions 0.073 0.074 0.073 0.074 0.075
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
PIM precursors 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

Total 7.14 7.98 7.57 6.64 6.06
Level crossings 2.91 3.29 2.80 2.44 2.11
Passengers 2.81 3.32 3.32 2.77 2.61
Level crossings 0.22 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.16
Train operations: workforce personal injuries

Workforce train operations 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Class 1 20 13 11 13 7
Class 2 56 69 57 54 48
Class 1 0 0 0 1 0
Class 2 2 1 1 0 0
Contact with object or person 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Boarding and alighting 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.12
Struck by train 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00
Other accident 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Level crossings
Level crossings 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities at LC (level crossings) 4 9 8 11 3
Pedestrians 3 4 6 9 3
Passenger on station crossing 0 0 0 0 0
Member of public 3 4 6 9 3
Road vehicle occupants 1 5 2 2 0
Train occupants 0 0 0 0 0
Passenger on train 0 0 0 0 0
Workforce on train 0 0 0 0 0
Weighted injuries at LC 1.22 0.92 0.78 0.76 0.67
Pedestrians 0.58 0.70 0.66 0.69 0.62
Road vehicle occupants 0.32 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.00
Train occupants 0.32 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.06

Resulting in derailment 2 0 0 0 0
Collisions with gates or barriers at LC 4 2 5 4 3
Gates 3 2 2 4 3
Barriers 1 0 3 0 0
Reported near misses 470 440 410 379 385
Reported incidents of crossing events 3810 3492 3590 4086 3989
Suicide and attempted suicide 25.11 25.22 36.22 29.10 12.22

Suicide 25 25 36 29 12
Attempted suicide 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.22
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Trespass
Trespass 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Class 1 17 22 12 19 24
Class 2 8 10 9 7 15
Class 1 1 1 1 0 1
Class 2 0 0 0 0 1
Electric shock 5.22 5.01 3.61 6.41 3.43
Fall (including from height) 3.77 2.68 3.45 3.98 3.29
Jump from train in service 1.00 0.12 2.00 0.00 0.10
Struck by train 30.61 27.92 17.51 18.51 25.41
Train surfing 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10
Other accidents 0.00 1.10 0.10 0.00 0.01
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Suicide
Suicide 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Fatalities 250 245 276 287 252
Struck by train 238 233 266 282 246
Class 1 15 13 19 15 30
Class 2 5 3 4 4 8
Class 1 1 0 3 1 0
Class 2 0 0 0 0 0
Struck by train 239.75 235.46 269.97 284.43 248.27
Not train related 12.63 13.11 11.55 6.46 7.19
Injuries to others 237 249 293 244 214
Majors 0 0 0 0 0
Minors 1 0 0 1 0
Shock and trauma 236 249 293 243 214
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Yards, depots and sidings (workforce) 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Minor injuries 1397 1437 1257 1359 1137
Class 1 190 173 174 180 163
Class 2 1207 1264 1083 1179 974
Class 1 3 0 1 0 0
Class 2 3 7 6 1 2
Electric shock 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.01 0.02
Train accidents 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Other injury 0.48 0.56 0.74 0.71 0.37
Yards, depots and sidings (passenger/public) 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Shock and trauma 0 1 0 1 0
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Freight operations
Freight injuries 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Minor injuries 193 195 177 199 173
Class 1 23 27 32 34 27
Class 2 170 168 145 165 146
Class 1 5 7 6 3 2
Class 2 5 4 5 3 5
Electric shock 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Train accidents 0.02 1.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
Struck by train 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other injury 7.18 2.39 6.38 2.68 1.11
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Freight train accidents 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Total freight train accidents 44 51 43 34 39
PHRTAs 8 11 12 15 8
Collisions with road vehicles not at LC 0 3 2 1 1
Collisions with RV at LC (not derailed) 0 1 0 0 1
Collisions with RV at LC (derailed) 0 0 0 0 0
Non-PHRTAs 36 40 31 19 31
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Fatalities
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 2. Fatalities in 2015/16

Passenger 8
Date Location Event type Territory Event description
A passenger who had alighted at the station, subsequently
Bodmin PTI (not
ran alongside the train as it was departing, and fell between
25/04/15 Parkway boarding / Western
the train and platform. Alcohol was reported as a potential
station alighting)
factor in the incident.
Milton
PTI (not London A passenger stumbled and fell from the platform edge, and
Keynes
21/07/15 boarding / North was subsequently hit by a through train. Alcohol was
Central
alighting) Western reported as a potential factor in the incident.
station
Victoria A passenger was fatally injured after initiating an altercation
station with a fellow passenger.
Stratford A passenger received fatal injuries following an assault by a
station group of teenage boys.
PTI (not
Sittingbourne A passenger stumbled and fell from the platform, coming
02/11/15 boarding / South East
station into contact with the conductor rail.
alighting)
Berwick- Contact London
A passenger suffered fatal injuries after being struck by a
05/12/15 upon-Tweed with North
station sign that fell from its mountings.
station object Eastern
PTI (not A passenger sustained fatal injuries following a fall between
Battersea
05/12/15 boarding / South East the platform and a train departing the station. Alcohol was
Park station
alighting) reported as a potential factor in the incident.
PTI (not
Richmond A passenger stumbled on the platform and fell onto the
26/02/16 boarding / South East
station track, sustaining fatal injuries.
alighting)
Public (not including trespass or suicide) 7
Date Location Event type Territory Event description
Ealing A teenage girl was struck by a train during an incident where
Assault
23/06/15 Broadway Western her mother is believed to have accessed the track to end her
and abuse
station life.
Brighton Fall from South A body was found with injuries consistent with falling from
22/07/15
wall sidings height East height into the sidings.
Smethwick
London
West Fall from A person was fatally injured after apparently falling from a
10/09/15 North
station height road over rail bridge onto the platform.
Western
(disused)
Coulsdon PTI (not A person fell from the platform onto the track and was struck
South
05/12/15 South boarding / by a through train. Alcohol was reported as a potential factor
East
station alighting) in the incident.
Pedestrian A man was fatally struck by a train while on the crossing. He
Tide Mills South
15/02/16 struck by was reported to be wearing a coat with the hood up, and
UWC-T East
train at LX distraction was recorded as a potential factor.
Grimston
Pedestrian
Lane South An elderly man was fatally struck by a train while one the
23/02/16 struck by
footpath East crossing.
train at LX
crossing
Shoreham Pedestrian A man was struck by a train after attempting to cross after
South
27/02/2016 Station struck by the barriers had been lowered. He was taken to hospital but
East
MCB-CCTV train at LX succumbed to his injuries.
Public (trespass) 30
In stations 5
Not in stations 25
Public (suicide) 252
Coroner’s confirmed verdict 19
Application of Ovenstone criteria 233
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 3. Scope of RSSB safety performance reporting

and risk modelling
Railway Group Standard GE/RT8047: Reporting of Safety Related Information lays out the
requirements on mainline infrastructure managers and railway undertakings for reporting safety
related information via the Safety Management Information System (SMIS). It covers
requirements related to injuries and events such as train accidents, irregular working and SPADs.
This appendix describes the scope of RSSB’s safety performance reporting and safety risk
modelling, based on the information reported to SMIS, and other sources.
General:
All events listed in Table A of GE/RT8047, occurring at sites within scope, with the exception of:
• incidents due to occupational health issues and terrorist actions.
Injuries and incidents of shock/trauma:
Workforce:
All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to members of the workforce whilst on duty and:
• involved in the operation or maintenance of the railway at sites within scope, or
• travelling to or from sites within scope while involved in the operation or maintenance of
the railway, or
• directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.
Passengers and public:
All injuries and incidents of shock/trauma to passengers and public who are:
• at a site within scope, or
• directly affected by incidents occurring at sites within scope.
Sites within scope and outside scope for all person types for safety performance reporting:
Within scope Outside scope
Railway infrastructure and trains on sections of operational • Station car parks
railway under the management of Network Rail, or where • Offices (except areas normally accessible by
Network Rail is responsible for the operation of the signalling. members of the public)
• Mess rooms
The operational railway comprises all lines for which the
infrastructure manager and railway undertaking have been • Training centres
granted a safety authorisation and safety certificate (respectively) • Integrated Electronic Control Centres and
by the ORR (under Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC). The Signalling Control Centres
table on the following page details which railway lines this applies • Outside the entrance to stations
to. Railway infrastructure includes all associated railway assets, • Station toilets
structures and public areas at stations. • Retail units and concessions in stations
• Construction sites at stations which are
Yards, depots and sidings managed by Network Rail or third completely segregated from the public areas
parties. The reporting of non-fatal injuries and incidents in third • Track sections closed for long-term
party yards, depots and sidings is undertaken on a voluntary construction, maintenance, renewal or upgrade
basis. • Public areas away from the platform-train
interface (PTI) at non-Network Rail stations 27
The platform-train interface is in scope at non-Network Rail stations on NRMI lines, for example on London
27
Underground and Nexus. See the following page for details.

_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Scope
_________________________________________________________________
Railway lines in scope:
In / Out of
Criteria
Scope
On or about the
Line / Section Notes
NR operate the
Owned by NR?
track/at PTI
signalling?
In stations
The entire line, including St Pancras, is
High Speed 1 28 managed, operated and maintained by   In In
NR.
Heathrow Express:
Paddington to Heathrow NR-owned infrastructure.   In In
Central
Heathrow Express:
Owned by BAA but maintained on their   In In
Heathrow Central to
behalf by NR.
Terminals 4 and 5
Nexus – Tyne and Wear
Owned and managed by NR, but stations   Out In
Metro:
served only by metro trains.
Fellgate to South Hylton
Nexus – Tyne and Wear
Metro: Neither managed by NR, nor is the   Out Out
All sections apart from signalling controlled by NR.
Fellgate to South Hylton
LUL Metropolitan Line:
Chiltern services between This section is owned and operated by   Out Out 29
Harrow-on-the-Hill and LUL and its subsidiaries / operators.
Amersham
This section was a joint operation with
LUL District Line:   Out In
Silverlink Metro, for which NR is now
Gunnersbury to Richmond
responsible.
LUL owns the infrastructure. NR owns the
LUL District Line:   Out Out
signals, but the signalling is operated by
East Putney to Southfields
LUL.
LUL Bakerloo Line:
Track managed by NR, who also operates   Out In
Services north of Queens
the signalling.
Park
The service is wholly operated and
Island Line on the Isle of   Out Out
managed under a franchise to South
Wight
West Trains.
TfL owns and maintains the track, but NR   In In
East London Line
operates the signalling.
All other NR owned stations   In In
28 The risk from High Speed 1 train operations is modelled in the same way as all other lines, ie as an average railway,
rather than explicit modelling of High Speed 1 characteristics. The contribution of Eurostar services to HEM/HEN risk
is included.
29 PTI and on-board injuries on these Chiltern services are in scope, injuries on or about the track are out of scope.
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Ovenstone criteria
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 4. Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways

Every railway fatality in Great Britain (including Scotland) is classified as:
• Accidental, or
• Suicide (that is, in accordance with the coroner’s verdict – or Scottish equivalent), or
• Suspected suicide
The classification of suspected suicide is only used when a coroner’s report into the fatality has
not recorded a confirmed verdict of the cause of death. It is a managerial assessment of
whether the cause of death was more likely to be intentional or non-intentional, based on
applying the Ovenstone criteria adapted for the railways, and requires objective evidence of
intentional self-harm for the fatality to be classified as suspected suicide rather than accidental.
The classification is wholly for management statistical purposes and is not:
• For the purpose of passing judgement on the particulars of any case
• For use outside the Railway Group
• For any other purpose
The classification is a matter for local railway management judgement, based on all available
evidence (for example, eyewitness accounts of the person’s behaviour – which may be the train
driver’s own account – BTP findings or the coroner’s findings).
The criteria for suspected suicide

Each of the following, on its own, may be treated as sufficient evidence of suspected suicide, in
the case where the coroner has returned an open or narrative verdict, or has yet to return a
verdict:
• Suicide note
• Clear statement of suicidal intent to an informant
• Behaviour demonstrates suicidal intent
• Previous suicide attempts
• Prolonged depression
• Instability; that is, a marked emotional reaction to recent stress or evidence of failure to
cope (such as a breakdown)
In the absence of evidence fulfilling the above criteria, the fatality should be deemed accidental.
A classification should always be reviewed whenever new evidence comes to light (such as
during investigations or at a coroner’s inquest).
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Level crossing types
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 5. Level crossing types

Active crossings: Manual
Manually controlled gate (MCG): This crossing

is equipped with gates, which are manually
operated by a signaller or crossing keeper
either before the protecting signal can be
cleared, or with the permission of the signaller
or signalling system. At the majority of these
crossings, the normal position of the gates is
open to road traffic, but on some quiet roads
the gates are maintained ‘closed to the road’
and opened when required if no train is
approaching.
Manually controlled barrier (MCB): MCB

crossings are equipped with full barriers, which
extend across the whole width of the roadway,
and are operated by a signaller or crossing
keeper before the protecting signal can be
cleared. Road traffic signals and audible
warnings for pedestrians are interlocked into
the signalling system.
Manually controlled barrier with obstacle detection (MCB-OD): MCB-OD are full barrier crossings equipped
with an obstacle detection system as a means of detecting any obstacles on the crossing prior to signalling
train movements. The obstacle detection system comprises of RADAR and scanning laser obstacle detectors.
The lowering sequence is instigated automatically upon detection of an approaching train. MCB-ODs are
equipped with road traffic lights and audible alarms. The barriers, road traffic signals and audible warnings
for pedestrians are interlocked with the signalling system. The signaller typically does not participate in
operation of the crossing and does not have a view of it. Indications on the state of the crossing warning
lights, barriers and obstacle detection system are provided to the signaller and the barriers can be lowered
and raised manually if required.
Manually controlled barrier protected by

closed circuit television (MCB-CCTV):
Similar to MCB crossings, except that a
closed circuit television (CCTV) is used to
monitor and control the crossing from a
remote location.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Active crossings: Automatic

Automatic half-barrier (AHB): AHB crossings are
equipped with barriers that only extend across the
nearside of the road (so that the exit is left clear if the
crossing commences operation when a vehicle is on it).
Road traffic signals and audible warnings are activated a
set time before the operation of the barriers, which are
activated automatically by approaching trains. The
barriers rise automatically when the train has passed,
unless another train is approaching. Telephones are
provided for the public to contact the signaller in case
of an emergency or, for example, to ensure it is safe to
cross in a long or slow vehicle. These crossings can only
be installed where the permissible speed of trains does
not exceed 100mph.
Automatic barrier locally monitored (ABCL): As far as

the road user is concerned, this crossing looks
identical to an AHB crossing. The difference is that
train drivers must ensure that the crossing is clear
before passing over it. Train speed is limited to 55mph
or less.
Automatic open crossing remotely monitored (AOCR): The AOCR is equipped with road traffic signals and
audible warnings only: there are no barriers. It is operated automatically by approaching trains. Telephones
are provided for the public to contact the signaller in an emergency. Only one crossing of this type remains on
NRMI, at Rosarie in the Scottish Highlands.
Automatic open crossing locally monitored (AOCL): Like
the AOCR, this crossing is equipped with road traffic
signals and audible warnings only and is operated
automatically by approaching trains. A physical
difference apparent to the user is that no telephone is
provided. An indication is provided to the train drivers to
show that the crossing is working correctly, they must
ensure that the crossing is clear before passing over it
and train speed is limited to 55mph or less. If a second
train is approaching, the lights continue to flash after the
passage of the first train, an additional signal lights up,
and the tone of the audible warning changes.
Automatic open crossing locally monitored with barriers (AOCL-B): AOCL-B is a simple half barrier overlay to
previously commissioned AOCL crossings.
User-worked crossing with miniature warning lights (UWC-

MWL): This crossing has gates or full lifting barriers, which the
user must operate prior to crossing. Red/green miniature
warning lights, operated by the approach of trains, inform the
user whether it is safe to cross.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Passive crossings
User-worked crossing (UWC): This crossing has gates

or, occasionally, full lifting barriers, which the user
must operate prior to crossing. The user is responsible
for ensuring that it is safe to cross; hence there must
be adequate visibility of approaching trains. Once
clear, the user is required to close the gate or barriers.
These crossings are often found in rural areas, for
example providing access between a farm and fields.
They often have an identified user, some of whom
keep the crossing gates padlocked to prevent
unauthorised access.
User-worked crossing with telephone (UWC-T):

These are similar to the standard user-worked
crossing, but a telephone is provided. In some
circumstances (for example when crossing with
livestock or vehicles) the user must contact the
signaller for permission to cross, and report back
when they are clear of the track. They are provided
where visibility of approaching trains is limited, or
the user needs to cross over the railway on a regular
basis.
Open crossing (OC): At open crossings, which are

sited when the road is quiet and train speeds are low,
the interface between road and rail is completely
open. Signs warn road users to give way to trains.
Road users must therefore have an adequate view of
approaching trains. The maximum permissible speed
over the crossing is 10mph or the train is required to
stop at a stop board before proceeding over.
Footpath crossing: These are designed primarily for pedestrians

and usually include stiles or wicket gates to restrict access. The
crossing user is responsible for making sure that it is safe to cross
before doing so. In cases where sufficient sighting time is not
available, the railway may provide a ‘whistle’ board, instructing
drivers to sound the horn to warn of their train’s approach, or
miniature warning lights. A variant is the bridleway crossing, which
is usually on a public right of way, although some are private and
restricted to authorised users. Some footpath crossings are in
stations and these can be protected by a white light (which
extinguishes when a train is approaching) and are generally only
used by railway staff. All these crossing types, some of which have
automatic protection, are analysed as a single group in this report
because of concerns over the accuracy of crossing type data in
SMIS.
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: ASPR accident groupings
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 6. Accident groups used within the ASPR

Accident grouping Description of the types of event contained within grouping
Train accidents: Collisions between trains, buffer stop collisions and derailments
collisions and (excluding those caused by collisions with road vehicles at level
derailments crossings).
Train accidents: Includes derailments.

collisions with road
vehicles at level
crossings
Train accidents: Collisions between a train and another object, including road vehicles
collisions with objects not at level crossings and trains hit by missiles. Excludes derailments.
Train divisions, train fires, train explosions, structural damage

Train accidents: other
affecting trains.
All types of assault, verbal abuse and threat. Also any incidence of
Assault and abuse unlawful killing, murder or manslaughter and any incidence of lawful
killing in self-defence.
Any injury involving contact with objects, not covered by another

Contact with object
category.
Injuries due to bumping into, or being bumped into by, other people.
Contact with person
Excludes assaults.
Generally speaking, uninterrupted falls of more than 2m. Excludes

Falls from height
falls down stairs and escalators.
Fires and explosions Fires or explosions in stations, lineside or other locations on NRMI.
(not involving trains)
Lean or fall from train Injuries resulting from accidental falls from trains, or from leaning
in running from trains.
Injuries from power tools, being trapped in machinery, or track

Machinery/tool maintenance equipment. Does not include injuries due to arcing.
operation Does not include injuries due to being struck by things thrown up by
tools or from carrying tools/equipment.
Manual Strains and sprains due to lifting or moving objects, or awkward

handling/awkward movement. Excludes injuries due to dropping items being carried,
movement which are classed under contact with objects.
All injuries on trains, excluding train accidents, assaults, and those

On-board injuries
occurring during boarding or alighting, or whilst leaning from trains.
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: ASPR accident groupings
_________________________________________________________________
Accident grouping Description of the types of event contained within grouping
Platform-train Accidents occurring whilst getting on or off trains. Includes falls

interface between train and platform where it is not known if the person is
(boarding/alighting) boarding or alighting.
Accidents that involve falls from the platform (with or without trains
Platform edge
being present) or contact with trains or traction supplies at the
incidents (not
platform edge. Excludes accidents that take place during boarding or
boarding/alighting)
alighting.
Road traffic accident Accidents occurring directly as a result of road vehicle usage.
Generally speaking, falls of less than 2m anywhere on NRMI (except

Slips, trips, and falls
on trains), and falls of any height down stairs and escalators.
Struck/crushed by All incidents involving pedestrians struck/crushed by trains, excluding

train trespass, platform edge and boarding and alighting accidents.
All first-party injuries arising from suicide, suspected suicide and

Suicide
attempted suicide.
First-party injuries resulting from people engaging in behaviour

involving access of prohibited areas of the railway, where that access
was the result of deliberate or risk-taking behaviour. This includes
actions such as deliberately alighting a train in running (other than as
Trespass
part of a controlled evacuation procedure), accessing the track at
stations to retrieve items, or climbing on the outside of overbridges
etc. Errors and violations at level crossings are not included in this
category.
Witnessing suicide or Shock/trauma or other third party injuries arising from witnessing or
trespass otherwise being affected by suicide and trespass fatalities.
Electric shock involving third rail, OLE, or non-traction supply.

Workforce electric
Includes burns from electrical short circuits. Does not include injuries
shock
due to arcing, which are classed under ‘other’.
Other Any other event not covered by another category.
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Definitions
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 7. Definitions
Term Definition
Assault SMIS records incidents in which ‘in circumstances related to their work,
a member of staff is assaulted, threatened or abused, thereby affecting
their safety or welfare.’
BTP records and categorises criminal assaults in accordance with Home
Office rules. For the majority of RSSBs work, BTP crime codes have been
grouped into higher level categories to facilitate analyses and
comparisons with SMIS records.
Child A person under 16 years of age.
Fatalities and The aggregate amount of safety harm.
weighted injuries
One FWI is equivalent to:
(FWI)
one fatality, or
10 major injuries, or
200 Class 1 minor injuries, or
200 Class 1 shock/trauma events, or
1,000 Class 2 minor injuries, or
1,000 Class 2 shock/trauma events.
Fatality Death within one year of the causal accident. This includes subsequent
death from the causes of a railway accident. All are RIDDOR reportable.
Freight train A train that is operated by a freight company.
Note that this includes freight locos which do not have wagons
attached.
Hazardous event An incident that has the potential to be the direct cause of safety harm.
HLOS A key feature of an access charges review. Under Schedule 4 of the
2005 Railways Act, the Secretary of State for Transport (for England and
Wales) and Scottish Ministers (for Scotland) are obliged to send to ORR
a high level output specification (HLOS) and a statement of funds
available (SoFA). This is to ensure the railway industry has clear and
timely information about the strategic outputs that Governments want
the railway to deliver for the public funds they are prepared to make
available. ORR must then determine the outputs that Network Rail
must deliver to achieve the HLOS, the cost of delivering them in the
most efficient way, and the implications for the charges payable by
train operators to Network Rail for using the railway network.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Infrastructure A member of workforce whose responsibilities include engineering or
worker technical activities associated with railway infrastructure. This includes
track maintenance, civil structure inspection and maintenance, S&T
renewal/upgrade, engineering supervision, acting as a Controller of Site
Safety (COSS), hand signaller or lookout and machine operative.
Level crossing A ground-level interface between a road and the railway.
It provides a means of access over the railway line and has various
forms of protection including two main categories:
Active crossings– where the road vehicle user or pedestrian is given
warning of a train’s approach (either manually by railway staff, ie
manual crossings or automatically, ie automatic crossings)
Passive crossings – where no warning system is provided, the onus
being on the road user or pedestrian to determine if it is safe to cross
the line. This includes using a telephone to call the signaller.
The different types of crossing are defined in Appendix 5.
Major injury Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public as defined in
schedule 1 to RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012. This includes losing
consciousness, most fractures, major dislocations, loss of sight
(temporary or permanent) and other injuries that resulted in hospital
attendance for more than 24 hours.
Minor injury Class 1
Injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public, which are neither
fatalities nor major injuries, and:
- for passengers or public, result in the injured person being taken to
hospital from the scene of the accident (as defined as reportable in
RIDDOR 1995 amended April 2012).
- for workforce, result in the injured person being incapacitated for
their normal duties for more than three consecutive calendar days, not
including the day of the injury.
Class 2
All other physical injuries.
National Reference NRVs are reference measures indicating, for each Member State, the
Values (NRVs) maximum tolerable level for particular aspects of railway risk. NRVs are
calculated and published by the European Railway Agency, using
Eurostat and CSI data.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Network Rail All structures within the boundaries of Network Rail’s operational
managed railway, including the permanent way, land within the lineside fence,
infrastructure and plant used for signalling or exclusively for supplying electricity for
(NRMI) railway operations. It does not include stations, depots, yards or sidings
that are owned by, or leased to, other parties. It does, however, include
the permanent way at stations and plant within these locations.
Operational An irregularity affecting, or with the potential to affect, the safe
incident operation of trains or the safety and health of persons.
The term operational incident applies to a disparate set of human
actions involving an infringement of relevant rules, regulations or
instructions.
Ovenstone criteria An explicit set of criteria, adapted for the railway, which provides an
objective assessment of suicide if a coroner’s verdict is not available.
The criteria are based on the findings of a 1970 research project into
rail suicides and cover aspects such as the presence (or not) of a suicide
note, the clear intent to take their life, behavioural patterns, previous
suicide attempts, prolonged bouts of depression and instability levels.
See Appendix 4.
Passenger A person on railway infrastructure, who either intends to travel on a
train, is travelling on a train, or has travelled on a train. This does not
include passengers who are trespassing or who take their life – they are
included as members of the public.
Passenger train A train that is in service and available for the use of passengers.
Note that a train of empty coaching stock brought into a terminal
station, for example, becomes a passenger train in service as soon as it
is available for passengers to board.
Pedestrian This refers to a person travelling on foot, on a pedal cycle, on a horse or
using a mobility scooter.
Possession The complete stoppage of all normal train movements on a running line
or siding for engineering purposes. This includes protection as defined
by the Rule Book (GE/RT8000).
Potentially higher- Accidents that are RIDDOR-reportable and have the most potential to
risk train accidents result in harm to any or all person types on the railway. They comprise
(PHRTA) train derailments, train collisions (excluding roll backs), trains striking
buffer stops, trains striking road vehicles at level crossings, trains
running into road vehicles not at level crossings (with no derailment),
train explosions, and trains being struck by large falling objects.
Precursor A system failure, sub-system failure, component failure, human error or
operational condition which could, individually or in combination with
other precursors, result in the occurrence of a hazardous event.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Precursor Indicator An RSSB-devised model that measures the underlying risk from train
Model (PIM) accidents by tracking changes in the occurrence of accident precursors.
See Section 6.7 for further information.
Public (members Persons other than passengers or workforce members. This includes
of) passengers who are trespassing (eg when crossing tracks between
platforms), and anyone who commits suicide, or attempts to do so.
RIDDOR RIDDOR refers to the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations, a set of health and safety regulations that
(The Reporting of
mandate the reporting of, inter alia, work-related accidents. These
Injuries, Diseases
regulations were first published in 1985, and have been amended and
and Dangerous
updated several times. In 2012, there was an amendment to the
Occurrences
RIDDOR 1995 criteria for RIDDOR-reportable workforce minor injuries
Regulations)
from three days to seven days. For the purposes of the industry’s safety
performance analysis, the more-than-three-days criterion has been
maintained, and the category termed Class 1 minor injury. In the latest
version of RIDDOR, published 2013, the term ‘major injury’ was
dropped; the regulation now uses the term ‘specified injuries’ to refer
to a slightly different scope of injuries than those that were classed as
major. Again, for consistency in industry safety performance analysis,
the term major injury has been maintained, along with the associated
definition from RIDDOR 1995.
Risk Risk is the potential for a known hazard or incident to cause loss or
harm; it is a combination of the probability and the consequence of that
event.
Running line A line shown in Table A of the Sectional Appendix as a passenger line or
as a non-passenger line.
Safety A national database used by railway undertakings and infrastructure
Management managers to record any safety-related events that occur on the railway.
Information SMIS data is accessible to all of the companies who use the system, so
System (SMIS) that it may be used to analyse risk, predict trends and focus action on
major areas of safety concern.
Safety Risk Model A quantitative representation of the safety risk that can result from the
(SRM) operation and maintenance of the GB rail network.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Shock/trauma Shock or traumatic stress affecting any person who has been involved
in, or has been a witness to, an event, and not suffered any physical
injury.
Shock and trauma is measured by the SRM and reported on in safety
performance reporting; it is within the scope of what must be reported
into SMIS. However, it is never RIDDOR-reportable.
Class 1 Shock/trauma events relate to witnessing a fatality, incidents
and train accidents (collisions, derailments and fires).
Class 2 Shock/trauma events relate to all other causes of shock/trauma
such as verbal assaults, witnessing physical assaults, witnessing non-
fatality incidents and near misses.
Signal passed at An incident where any part of a train has passed a stop signal at danger
danger (SPAD) without authority or where an in-cab signalled movement authority has
been exceeded without authority.
A SPAD occurs when the stop aspect, end of in-cab signalled movement
authority or indication (and any associated preceding cautionary
indications) was displayed correctly and in sufficient time for the train
to stop safely.
SPAD risk ranking A tool that gives a measure of the level of risk from each SPAD. It
tool enables the industry’s total SPAD risk to be monitored and it can be
used to track performance, and inform SPAD investigations. The score
for each SPAD ranges from zero (no risk) to 28 (a very high risk) and is
based on both the potential for the SPAD to lead to an accident and the
potential consequences of any accident that did occur. SPADs with risk
rankings between 16 and 19 are classified as potentially significant, and
those with risk rankings of 20 and above are classified as potentially
severe.
Suicide A fatality is classified as a suicide where a coroner has returned a
verdict of suicide.
Suspected suicide The classification used for fatalities believed to be a suicide and which
have not yet been confirmed by a verdict from a coroner.
Trackside A collective term referring to the running line and yards, depots and
sidings.
Train Any vehicle (with flanged wheels on guided rails), whether self-
powered or not, on rails within the GB rail network.
Train accident Reportable train accidents are defined in RIDDOR. The main criterion is
that the accident must have occurred on, or affected the running line.
There are additional criteria for different types of accident, and these
may depend on whether the accident involves a passenger train.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Collision between This term describes collisions involving two (or more) trains. Accidents in
trains which a collision between trains results in derailment or fire are included
in this category.
Roll back collisions occur when a train rolls back (while not under
power) into a train on the same line (including one from which it has
decoupled).
Setting back collisions occur when a train making a reversing movement
under power collides with a train on the same line, usually as part of a
decoupling manoeuvre.
Shunting movement/coupling collisions arise when the locomotive or
unit causing a collision is engaged in marshalling arrangements. While
they characteristically occur at low speed and involve the rolling stock
with which the locomotive or unit is to be coupled, accidents may
involve a different train that could be travelling more quickly.
Coming into station collisions occur between two trains that are
intended to be adjacent to one another (for example, to share a
platform) but are not intended to couple up or otherwise touch.
Normally, but not always, the collision speed will be low, because one
train is stationary and the approaching train will be intending to stop
short of the stationary train (rather as for a buffer stop). This operation
is known as permissive working.
In running (open track) collisions occur in circumstances where trains
are not intended to be in close proximity on the same line. The speed of
one or both of the trains involved may be high.
Collisions in a possession occur where there is a complete stoppage of
all normal train movements on a running line or siding for engineering
purposes. These collisions are only RIDDOR-reportable if they cause
injury, or obstruct a running line that is open to traffic.
Derailment This includes all passenger train derailments, derailments of non-
passenger trains on running lines and any derailment in a siding that
obstructs the running line. Accidents in which a train derails after a
collision with an object on the track (except for another train or a road
vehicle at a level crossing) are included in this category, as are accidents
in which a train derails and subsequently catches fire or is involved in a
collision with another rail vehicle.
Train fire This includes fires, severe electrical arcing or fusing on any passenger
train or train conveying dangerous goods, or on a non-passenger train
where the fire is extinguished by a fire brigade.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Train striking road All collisions with road vehicles on level crossings are RIDDOR-
vehicle reportable. Collisions with road vehicles elsewhere on the running line
are reportable if the train is damaged and requires immediate repair, or
if there was a possibility of derailment.
Open door collision This occurs when a train door swings outward, coming into contact with
another train.
Buffer stop This occurs when a train strikes the buffer stops. Accidents resulting in
collision only superficial damage to the train are not reportable under RIDDOR.
Trains running into This includes trains running into or being struck by objects anywhere on
objects a running line (including level crossings) if the accident had the potential
to cause a derailment or results in damage requiring immediate repair.
Trains striking This includes all collisions with large-boned animals and flocks of sheep,
animals and collisions with other animals that cause damage requiring
immediate repair.
Trains being struck This includes trains being struck by airborne objects, such as thrown
by missiles stones, if this results in damage requiring immediate repair.
Train Protection A safety system that automatically applies the brakes on a train which
and Warning either passes a signal at danger, or exceeds a given speed when
System (TPWS) approaching a signal at danger, a permissible speed reduction or the
buffer stops in a terminal platform.
A TPWS intervention is when the system applies the train’s brakes
without this action having been taken by the driver first.
A TPWS activation is when the system applies the train’s brakes after
the driver has already initiated braking.
TPWS reset and continue incidents occur when the driver has reset the
TPWS after an activation (or intervention) and continued forward
without the signaller’s authority.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Term Definition
Trespass/ Trespass occurs when people intentionally go where they are never
Trespasser authorised to be.
This includes:
Passengers crossing tracks at a station, other than at a defined crossing.
Public using the railway as a shortcut.
Passengers accessing the track at station to retrieve dropped items.
Public using the running lines for leisure purposes.
Public committing acts of vandalism / crime on the lineside.
Passenger / public accessing the tracks via station ramps.
Public inappropriate behaviour on other infrastructure resulting in a fall
onto the railway.
Public jumping onto railway infrastructure.
On train passengers accessing unauthorised areas of the train (interior
or exterior).
Note: Level crossing users are never counted as trespassers, providing
they are not using the crossing as an access point into a permanently
unauthorised area, such as the trackside.
Workforce Persons working for the industry on railway operations (either as direct
employees or under contract).
Notes:
‘Under contract’ relates to workforce working as contractors to (for
example) a railway undertaking or infrastructure manager (either as a
direct employee or a contractor to such organisations).
Staff travelling on duty, including drivers travelling as passengers, are to
be regarded as workforce. When travelling before or after a turn of
duty, they are to be treated as passengers.
British Transport Police (BTP) employees working directly for a railway
undertaking or infrastructure manager on railway operations should be
treated as workforce.
On-board catering staff (persons on business, franchisees’ staff etc) and
any persons under contract to them on a train (for example, providing
catering services) should be treated as workforce.
_________________________________________________________________
Appendices: Glossary
_________________________________________________________________
Appendix 8. Glossary
Acronym Expansion
ABCL automatic barrier crossing locally monitored
ADEPT Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport
AHB automatic half-barrier crossing
ALCRM All Level Crossing Risk Model
AOCL automatic open crossing, locally monitored
AOCR automatic open crossing, remotely monitored
ASPR Annual Safety Performance Report
ATOC Association of Train Operating Companies
ATP automatic train protection
AWS automatic warning system
BAA British Airports Authority
BTP British Transport Police
CCTV closed-circuit television
COSS controller of site safety
control period; we are currently in the fifth period, CP5, which runs from April
CP
2014 to March 2019
CSI common safety indicator
CST common safety target
DRSG Data and Risk Strategy Group
EC European Commission
ECS empty coaching stock
ERA European Railway Agency
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System
ESOB Emotional Support Outside Branch
EU European Union
FOC freight operating company
FWI fatalities and weighted injuries
FWSI fatalities and weighted serious injuries
GB Great Britain
GBH grievous bodily harm
GIS geographic information system
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
HEM hazardous event movement
HEN hazardous event non-movement
HET hazardous event train accident
HLOS High Level Output Specification
HSE Health and Safety Executive
HWPG Health and Wellbeing Policy Group
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Acronym Expansion
ILCAD International Level Crossing Awareness Day
IOSH Institution of Occupational Safety and Health
ISLG Infrastructure Safety Liaison Group
LC level crossing
LCRIM Level Crossing Risk Indicator Model
LCSG Level Crossing Strategy Group
LED light emitting diode
LENNON Latest Earnings Networked Nationally Overnight (system)
LIDAR light detection and ranging
LOEAR Learning from Operational Experience Annual Report
LSCG Level Crossing Strategy Group
LUL London underground
LX level crossing
MCB manually controlled barrier crossing
MCG manually controlled gate crossing
MWA moving weighted average
MWL miniature warning lights
NR Network Rail
NRMI Network Rail managed infrastructure
NRT National Rail Trends
NRV national reference value
NSA National Safety Authority
NFSG National Freight Safety Group
NTS National Travel Survey
OC open crossing
OD obstacle detection
OLE Overhead line equipment
ONS Office for National Statistics
ORBIS Offering Rail Better Information Services
ORCATS Operational Research Computerised Allocation of Tickets to Services (system)
ORR Office of Rail and Road
OTP on-track plant
PHRTA potentially higher-risk train accident
PIM Precursor Indicator Model
PTI platform-train interface
PTSRG People on Trains and Stations Risk Group
RADAR Radio Detection And Ranging
RAIB Rail Accident Investigation Branch
RDG Rail Delivery Group
RID Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail
RIDDOR Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Acronym Expansion
ROGS The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems
RRG Road Risk Group
RRUKA Rail Research UK Association
RSSB Rail Safety and Standards Board
RTS Rail Transport Service
RV road vehicle
SMIS Safety Management Information System
SMS safety management system
SPAD signal passed at danger
SPDHG Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group
SRM Safety Risk Model
SRR SPAD Risk Ranking
SSRG System Safety Risk Group
TOC train operating company
TORG Train Operations Risk Group
TPWS Train Protection and Warning System
TRG Trespass Risk Group
TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability
UK United Kingdom
UWC user-worked crossing
UWC-T user-worked crossing with telephone
YDS Yards, depots and sidings
_________________________________________________________________

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Annual Safety

Published: July 2016

4 Working on or about the running line .................................................................... 67

7.4 Trend in harm at level crossings ................................................................. 120

Appendix 1. Key safety statistics............................................................................. 165

Headline statistics for 2015/16

Assaults on passengers and members of the public

Trespass and suicide

Benchmarking the rail industry

Scope of the report

Where the data comes from

How safety is analysed in the report

Number of injuries weighted

Major injury 0.1 10

Minor injury 0.005 (Class 1) 200

Shock/trauma 0.005 (Class 1) 200

Modelled risk versus recorded harm

1 Fuller descriptions of the different classes of injury are provided in Appendix 7.

System safety at a glance

Weighted injuries Fatalities

Passengers Workforce Public

2.1 Risk in context

Chart 1. Risk in context (SRMv8.1)

Public injuries on the

The railway’s risk profile

Slips, trips and falls 27.2

Assault and abuse 9.6 Fatalities

Slips, trips and falls 10.1

Struck by train 1.9

Train accidents 4.0

2.2 Trend in overall harm

Chart 3. Accidental fatalities and weighted injuries

Shock and trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities

Fatalities and major injuries due to suicide or suspected suicide

Improved classification of suicide/trespass figures

2.3 Passenger safety

Passenger fatalities in 2015/16

Date Location Accident type Territory Description of incident

Shock and trauma

Trend in accidental harm to passengers

Chart 4. Passenger harm by injury degree

Shock & trauma Minor injuries Major injuries Fatalities Value

FWI per billion passenger journeys

9.6 9.9 10.2

2.4 Workforce safety

Shock and trauma

Trend in accidental harm to the workforce

Chart 5. Workforce harm by injury degree

25 10.0 9.3 1.8 25

2.5 Members of the public

Public fatalities in 2015/16 not due to suicide, trespass or level crossings

Date Location Accident type Territory Description of incident

Trend in accidental harm to members of the public

Chart 6. Trend in public harm by accident type

2.6 Long-term historical trends

Chart 7. Fifty-year trend in train accidents with passenger or workforce fatalities

Average number over preceding 10 years

Causes of historic train accidents

Chart 10. Trends in rail usage over the past 50 years

2.7 Relative safety of travel on different transport modes: fatality

2.8 Common Safety Targets and National Reference Values

The second set of NRVs

NRV and CST definitions and values 4