COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act
of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the
strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and
reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. To support the implementation of such
scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from
savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution
No. A98-062 the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in
the body to provide additional source of funding for said
staffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were:
one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three
Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting
Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno
denied the request. In light of the DBM’s disapproval of
the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-
National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum
recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval
of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of
petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to
affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only
agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to
evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions. The CSC-Central
Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and
reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office
that the upgrading scheme be censured.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights validly
implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without
the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
HELD:
CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the CSC-
Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHR’s alleged
blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create
positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to
such scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that
the CSC and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed
that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial
matters are concerned, particularly with regard to the
upgrading and reclassification of positions therein. The
CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded
fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.as the
law’s designated body to implement and administer a
unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The
interpretation of an administrative government agency,
which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great
respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we
echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies.
Francisco vs House of the Representatives
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by House Representatives against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules
on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution
Rulings:
This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is
beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it
is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of
Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would
by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend
the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act
of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of
this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November
28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Self Executing Statutes
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL,
respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or
an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid
security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the
national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the
petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right
it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject
is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If
the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of
national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and
letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While
it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened
in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the
highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to
be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision
of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.
To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this
policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors
which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his
rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws
of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when
there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the
foreign group is to insist that government be treated as
any other ordinary market player, and bound by its
mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus,
the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary
clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
October 31, 2011
194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials –
Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions subject to limitations set therein.
The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring
that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of
EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of
the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government
are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices
or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the
people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided
in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate
opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed separate
opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on
Elections as having been elected senators and
representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after
the opening of the first session of Congress following the
elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their
election. The eight representatives since their election had
not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take
part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the
House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition
for prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three
senators and eight representatives did not take part in the
passage of the congressional resolution, designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to
the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths
vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The
petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement
of said congressional resolution, as it is allegedly contrary
to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and
the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular
Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the
irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation
of authorities that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the
courts by express constitutional or statutory provision.
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the
separation of powers, a principle also too well known to
require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty
lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always
in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. If a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to
the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of
that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political
question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The two steps complement each other
in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to
be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from the
other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge
by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is
even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public
interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.
KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the
authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to
establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. After learning that the PCSO was interested in
operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten
largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been
long engaged in lottery operations in Asia, became
interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As
an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its
individual nominees) organized with some Filipino
investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as
the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC),
which was intended to be the medium through which the
technical and management services required for the
project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.
Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request
for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line
lottery system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC
were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its
Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President
announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the
country's on-line lottery system and that the
corresponding implementing contract would be submitted
for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.
On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to
Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting
up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious
moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners also submit
that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed
Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an
arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct
the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits
the PCSO from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities
"in collaboration, association or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity, foreign or
domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in
connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as
"lotto."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner
was valid.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged
Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and
invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be
resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be
of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it
raised are of paramount public interest and of a category
even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people even in the remotest barangays of the country and
the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes
aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried
to take advantage of.
On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section
1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is
indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege
"to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot
exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture"
with any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of
Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B,
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and
is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.
Tolentino Vs Comelec
FACTS:The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into
being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of
delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention
held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning
of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic
Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION
AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18."
On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to
follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the
said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for
prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution
No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in
so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-
incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that
the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.
HELD:NO.All the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the
ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be validly
held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole
In the present context, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present
to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement.
Sanidad vs COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by
the President of his present powers. Twenty days after,
the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031,
amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD
No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued
PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the
people’s continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission
on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as
they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that
the question is political in nature hence the court cannot
take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose
amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true
in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition
(Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power
to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars.
1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course
has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people
in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,
the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written
in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the
validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within
the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2)
Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..”
The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction
not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the
Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is
vested with that authority to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able
to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.
The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:
11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.
BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the
special election.
Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court
therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
HELD:
The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer
for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents
from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much
as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP
883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the
issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable
issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is
no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.
Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986
FACTS:

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.
President and Vice President earlier than the regular
BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that
President to continue holding office after the calling of the
the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
special election.
President effective only when the election is held and after
the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of
taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy
required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
President and Vice President earlier than the regular
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that
turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
President effective only when the election is held and after
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted
taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.”
that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
ISSUE:
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and
turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted
that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme
Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the
issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable
issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is
no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new presidentANA VS. EXECUTIVE
SCRETARY
JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme
Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed
this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for
himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had
announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction
in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of
the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed
constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the
election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a
free election, hence null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of
Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore
non-justiciable.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been
acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the
people.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971
Constitutional Convention in force.
HELD:First. To determine whether or not the new
constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the
said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with
the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well
settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to
the constitution should be settled applying the provisions
of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged
ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has
been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article
XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence
here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935
Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or
anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution
the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the
proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings
held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications
prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there
is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than
21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those
of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is
void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally
or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the
early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics,
namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by
the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,
when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been
conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The
point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held
took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with the provisions of the Election
Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No.
73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that
there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of
the returns filed by the officers who conducted said
plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of
the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are
claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of
ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places
COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not
even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the
alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in
Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither
the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or
City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments
had certified to the President the alleged result of the
citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to
my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have
been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila
and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the
Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts
the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in
line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its
own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another.
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do
not constitute congressional recognition, unless the
members have performed said acts in session duly
assembled. This is a well-established principle of
Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law
government does not constitute acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to
declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation
No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of
Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or
many of which have admittedly had salutary effects,
issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The
intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled
bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President for his action under
the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective
Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative
measures approved by said Houses. Whereas,
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring
the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an
act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the
executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other
respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given
due course, there being more than prima facie showing
that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either
strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed
Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land,
without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification
or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the
1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised
Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the
premise stated in their votes on the third question that
they could not state with judicial certainty whether the
people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and
myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result,
there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.
Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano, petitioner
vs.President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
Facts:On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption
of power by stating that the “new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines.”
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal
because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party
must show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the provisional It was the people that made the judgement
and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme
Court held its legitimacy.
Rulings:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. The holding that petitioners did
not have standing followed from the finding that they did
not have a cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. And the people have
made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government
Defensor Santiago Vs COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to
amend Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials,
by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control
and supervise said people’s initiative the signature-
gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you
approve of lifting the term limits of all elective
government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4
) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8
of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least
12% total number of registered voters in the country, it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the
petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of
the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on
initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s
initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations
for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on
amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it does
not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to
Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution
has recognized or granted the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution via PI,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of
the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution”
therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of
the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not
include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. The argument
that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national
in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not
based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its
nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a
national law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which only
legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of
tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of
emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the
people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and
[5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body
exercising quasi judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable – to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements
in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to
the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not
have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin’s
movement and volunteers in establishing signature
stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of the unsigned
proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA
6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the
required number of voters. Without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under
RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of
paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order
of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file
their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions.
In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its
time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to
constitutional amendment.
SALONGA vs PAÑO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally
protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been
established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a
member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which
occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns
Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated
petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent
the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary Investigation”
in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating that “the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at
2:30 o’clock p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the
charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to
file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to
the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and
despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any
copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-
called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an
amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated
12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other
accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD
885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel
for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani
Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4
January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the
filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-
Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including
Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the
present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of
Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by
the prosecution to justify the filing of an information
against him. He states that to sanction his further
prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him
would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the
Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual
case
2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still
deserves a decision from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this
case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment had been
arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for
concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on
January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted
the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to
drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of
petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the
information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution
and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia
from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to
place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for
further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the
filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the
prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the
case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several
occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases
where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not
preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear
and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of
lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the
Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created
through an executive order was mooted by Presidential
Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the
President’s legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional
mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino
culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,
Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA
183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did
not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic
function from promulgating one of the most voluminous
decisions ever printed in the Reports.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,vs.EDGARDO ANGARA, et
al, respondents.
Facts:This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada,
together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the
growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign
markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are
the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and
as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market”
espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the
provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is
an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation
that would be good for national interest and general
welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO
Agreement.
Issues:Whether or not the petition present a justiciable
controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’
cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement
impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’
implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy controlled by
Filipinos, does notnecessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages
to protect weak and developing economies, which
comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the
UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are
made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests
more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-
one negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus,
the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.”
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make
in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary
to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard
to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be
free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own
internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of
legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with
all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of
the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power.
Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
“the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of
Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same
time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend
to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services
and investments into the country, it does not prohibit
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power
in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals,
live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown
by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion
of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with
due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed
concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what
it was concurring in as shown by the members’
deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of
the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was
concurring in.
SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [421 SCRA 656;
G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-
hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the
AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On
August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring
the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec.
18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and
that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as
anexercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive
Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was
usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.
Issues:

(1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional?
(2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring
state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the
President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for
theexercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of
proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of
the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts.
The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring
a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article VII, as opposed to thedelegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear
on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person
may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as
this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is beingchallenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutionalquestions. Based on
the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
David V Arroyo
489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch –
Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take
Over Power – Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order
No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring
down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate
EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded
to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions
against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the
state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration
of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the
emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of
natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
power and take over power. comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and
‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
operative because there are parties still affected due to
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
constitutional in part and at the same time some
state regulation.
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in
the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the
in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
examination of whether such power was exercised within
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such
calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’
events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
criterion has been met.
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to
simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
must not stifle liberty. Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail
analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’
the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a
personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
provision is similar to the power that granted former
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather
it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out
a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial
Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration
and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the
calling out power of the president by the president.
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that
the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for
its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear
as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of
military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated
in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad
and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.
If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
frustrated. government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very
G.R. No. 169838
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
April 25, 2006
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
right as organizations and individuals were violated when
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall
the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community
Pambansa No. 880.
or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human
or safety, and general welfare of the people.
rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They
argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would
expression clause as the time and place of a public
use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not
assembly form part of the message which the expression is
make it content-based because assemblies really have to
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
not apply to mass actions in support of the government.
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words
The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or
“opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances
influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum
cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of
against the government because they are being tolerated.
the content of the expression in the rally.
As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During
of clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the
public convenience, public morals or public health. This is
interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew
a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even
the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September
20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6,
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise
establishment or designation of at least one suitable
by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution
Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior
provides that no law shall be passed abridging the
permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every
city or municipality that has not yet complied with section
15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive
response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from
or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and
respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and
to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other
respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No.
880 is SUSTAINED
H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC, GR No. 188456, 2009-09-
10
Facts:
Harry L. Roque... uing as taxpayers and concerned citizens,
seek to nullify respondent Comelec's award of the
2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to
the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic)... and to permanently prohibit
the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing... and/or
implementing the corresponding contract-award.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing
the adoption of an automated election system (AES)... in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards
On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369... ssed
authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES
In
2008Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM),... hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008
elections paved the way for Comelec,... to prepare for a
nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local
polls
Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider,
executed a contract... for the lease of goods and services...
petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all
intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to
nullify the
Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation
contract adverted to... petitioners would have the
Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation
contract nullified since, in violation of the Constitution, it
constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll body's
constitutional mandate for election law enforcement.
the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the
ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in
Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of Smartmatic and
TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to be used...
constitutionality and statutory flaw of the automation
contract itself.
Ruling:
contention is not well taken.
The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution...
and the Omnibus Election Code for that matter--relates to
the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public
office to ensure a free,... orderly and honest electoral
exercise.
By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract...
upervision and control of the system to be used for the...
automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of
control, as may be deduced from the ensuing exchanges,
arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding
possession of what in IT jargon are the public and private
keys pair The Court is not convinced.
3.3
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the
greater track record in automated elections, shall be in
charge of the technical aspects of the counting and
canvassing software and hardware
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture
partner in charge of the technical aspect of the counting
and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without
more, to ceding control of the electoral process to
Smartmatic.
Art. 6.7 of the automation contract
, providing:... the entire processes of voting, counting,
transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall
be conducted by COMELEC's personnel and officials,...
With the view we take of the automation contract, the
role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply
the goods necessary for the automation project, such as
but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic
transmission devices and related equipment, both
hardware... and software, and the technical services
pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the
corporation and its operators would provide assistance
with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec
which, at the end of the day, will be... conducting the
election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would
infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because...
the voter would be confronted with a "three feet" long
ballot
Surely,... the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to
insure that the voter can write his preference in relative
privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments,
the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy... of
his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same
token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have
a way to make his vote known.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a
distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not... be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in
the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It
should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would
enable it to accomplish the great objective for... which it
was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and
peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions
to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of
the election and in the process the voice of... the people
This independent constitutional commission,... it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable
latitude in the discharge of its functions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT OF
PHILIPPINES, GR No. 196231, 2014-01-28
Facts:
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled
that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court,
however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)... found Gonzales
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply
sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her,
solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her
to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the
continuation of the proceedings against her... after
upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770.
In view of the Court's ruling, the OP filed the present
motion for reconsideration through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major
General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the
Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On
May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which
the prosecution opposed. The
Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on
January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the
prosecution's evidence against Garcia.
Issues:
Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy
Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the
Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.
On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the
draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On May 6,
2010, he completed his review of the draft, approved it,
and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for
final approval. Since the draft... order on Mendoza's
motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels
of preparation, review and approval, the period it took to
resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he
himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9)
calendars days from his receipt of... the order.
Ruling:
On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the
Court votes to grant Gonzales' petition and to declare
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect
to the Office of the Ombudsman.
a. The Philippine Ombudsman
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the
"protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and
corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau.[36] This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to
make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and
guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the
1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to
further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary
powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of
the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of
the Ombudsman is a very powerful government
constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above
other grievance-handling investigative bodies."[39] It has
powers, both constitutional... and statutory, that are
commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing
accountability of public officers.[40]... b. "Independence"
of constitutional bodies... vis-a-vis the Ombudsman's
independence
Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal...
autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the
Constitution intended that these "independent" bodies be
insulated from political pressure to the extent that the
absence of "independence" would result in the
impairment of their core functions.
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
Commission on Audit highlighted the... developments in
the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the
Commission on Audit from political pressure.
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior but is similar in
degree and kind to the independence similarly guaranteed
by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions
since all these offices fill the political... interstices of a
republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and
proper functioning.
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 vesting... disciplinary
authority in the President... over the Deputy Ombudsman
violates... the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman and is thus... unconstitutional... we rule that
subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and
removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
place at risk the... independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials,
all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying
out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the...
constitutionally-granted independence is what Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman,
but inevitably with the principle of checks and... balances
that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and
necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not
as... independent as she is, if only because they are subject
to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need
for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still
in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and
corruption is still a major problem... for the
government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.
he statements made by Commissioner Monsod
emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power
to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would
result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the
Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the
integrity and competence of the very persons who can
remove or suspend its members.
e. Congress' power determines the... manner and causes
for the removal... of non-impeachable officers is not... a
carte blanch authority
Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[53]
Congress is empowered to determine the modes of
removal from office of all public officers and employees
except the President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who
are all impeachable officials.
he intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing
that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2, Article
XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more...
stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" to
favored public officers
While the manner and cause of removal are left to
congressional determination, this must still be consistent
with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the
right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security... of tenure; the
principle of separation of powers; and the principle of
checks and balances.
a. The Office of the President's... finding of gross
negligence has... no legal and factual leg to... stand on... b.
No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency
Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August
23, 2010, the records of the case were already pending
before Ombudsman Gutierrez.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other... persons
may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[71]
Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him
within nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP[72]
relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7
(or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series
of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have
acted on Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration within
five days:
Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation:
Grounds Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained
if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision or
order by the party on the basis of any of... the following
grounds:
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation
shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the
same within five (5) days from the date of submission for
resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours]
Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the
period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a
Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the
case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the
initial resolution of the motion.
c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates
The facts do not show that Gonzales' subordinates had in
any way been grossly negligent in their work. While GIPO
Garcia reviewed the case and drafted the order for more
than three months, it is noteworthy that he had not
drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to... review
the case for the first time.[77] Even the Ombudsman
herself could not be faulted for acting on a case within
four months, given the amount of cases that her office
handles.
The point is that these are not inordinately long periods
for the work involved: examination of the records,
research on the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and
exercise of legal judgment and discretion.
d. No undue interest... he fact that Gonzales had
Mendoza's case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of
the alleged victim's father. The Constitution empowers
the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or... manner against any
public official or employee of the government.[78] This
provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No. 6770,[79] and
by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series
of 1990, as amended.[80]
Constitution.n the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a
vote of 8-7,[108] the Court resolved to reverse its
September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales
is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2)
of RA
No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary
jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in
violation of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve
the complaint only on the basis of the unverified affidavit
of Kalaw.
we cannot deduce undue interest simply because
Gonzales' decision differs from the decision of the PNP-IAS
(which dismissed the complaint against Mendoza).
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held
liable for our own misdeeds; we can be made to account
only... for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that
of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least time
nine days followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia
the writer of the draft took less than four months, and the
Ombudsman, less than four months... until the kidnapping
incident rendered Mendoza's motion moot.
D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue
However, by another vote of 8-7,[109] the Court resolved
to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally
within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to
the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This
ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but
is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to...
conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into
the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman
Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules
and regulations.

Thus, by constitutional design, the Special

Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but

one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in
the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation
and prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not

expressly made part of the composition of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic
component of that Office militates against a differential
treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one...
hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the
other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally
true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser
officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of... her duties.

Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason

to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with the
Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous
disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy
the same grant of independence under the