G.R. No.
225623 The Facts
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
LORENZO RAYTOS Y ESPINO, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal 1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the
Decision 2 dated February 26, 2016 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Nineteenth
(19th) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 01556. The questioned Decision affirmed the
Decision3 dated November 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. C-2010-1748 (RTC Decision), finding herein accused-appellant
Lorenzo E. Raytos (Raytos) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Information4 charging Raytos with Murder states as follows:
That on or about the (sic) 12:00 midnight, more or less, of February 1, 2010 at Barangay
Nagcaduha, Municipality of Villareal, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, which qualifies the offense to murder, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab DAVID ARAZA with the
use of a short bladed weapon, which accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby
inflicting and hitting the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
wounds caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon his arraignment, Raytos entered a plea of "not guilty," 6 and during the pre-trial
conference, Raytos invoked self-defense. 7 Trial ensued with the defense presenting its
evidence first.
The factual narrations, for both defense and prosecution, were summarized by the CA, as
follows:
Version of the Defense
Raytos testified that he knew the victim, David Araza, since birth, who was residing in Brgy.
Igot, Villareal, Samar, which is 300 meters away from his residence in Brgy. Nagcaduha,
Villareal, Samar. On February 1, 2010, at around 8:00 in the evening, he was in Purok 1, Brgy.
Nagcaduha Villareal, Samar, coming from his cousin's place, when he was invited by Indo
Sabio to partake on some leftovers from the fiesta and to join them as a dance session was
being held. He joined the table where Indo Sabio, Anita Sabio, Kanor Sabio, Domingo Sabio,
Romeo Nacase and Edgar Papiona were seated. Seated on the other table beside them were
Indo Sabio's wife, a certain Tina, Elsa Sabio, Rudy Araza and Rudy's wife. At around 11:30 in
the evening, David Araza (victim), coming from Purok 2, passed by Purok 1 and was
approached by Edgar Papiona, and the two danced. After they danced, the victim approached
the table where Anita Sabio was seated and invited her to dance, but the latter refused.
Thereafter, the victim and Edgar Papiona danced again. After dancing, the victim approached
again Raytos' table and asked who was brave enough while drawing a knife tucked in the
waistband of his pants. Raytos tried to escape by moving backwards and, while doing so, he
got hold of the victim's right hand. Raytos twisted the victim's arm, got hold of the knife and
then stabbed the victim several times on the chest. He delivered three (3) successive stabbing
blows in a quick and swift manner because he panicked. He ran away immediately and
surrendered himself to the barangay officials and they proceeded to the police station.
Dionisio Mado y Bardaje (hereafter Mado) testified that he knew Raytos because the latter
often comes to Brgy. Guintarcan, where Mado resides. He also knew the victim personally.
On February 1, 2010, at around 10:00 in the evening, he was at Brgy. Nagcaduha, Villareal,
Samar, watching the dance session being held, and he saw the victim enter the dance area
and challenge the people seated on one table to a fight. When the victim saw Raytos, he
pointed at Raytos and said "You are the one I want" and Raytos answered saying "I [h]ave no
fault against you." Then, the victim drew a knife from his waist and stabbed Raytos but the
latter was able to parry the stabbing blow and wrested possession of the knife from the victim.
Mado recalled that Raytos used both his hands in parrying the stabbing blow delivered by the
victim and when Raytos got hold of the knife, he stabbed the front portion of the victim's
body. Mado did not see anything more because Raytos ran away after the incident, and a
commotion then ensued. 8
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three witnesses, Edgardo Papiona, Romeo Nacase and Francisca
Araza, whose testimonies constitute the following version:
Edgardo Papiona y Hermo (hereafter Papiona), a resident of Brgy. Nagcaduha, Villareal,
Samar, testified that he knew both the victim and Raytos. On February 1, 2010, at around
12:00 a.m., he was in front of his house with Raytos and ten (10) others occupying three (3)
tables and having a dance session as it was just the day after their barangay fiesta. While he
was dancing with the victim, Raytos approached them and said that he wanted to dance with
the victim. Papiona acceded and went to the side of the road just an arm's length away from
the dance area. From his position at the side of the road, he saw Raytos stab the victim when
the latter turned his back from Raytos while dancing. Papiona recalled that he saw Raytos
hold the right back shoulder of the victim and stab the latter's back several times with the use
of a knife measuring 8 inches in length. Raytos then went to a hilly portion of their barangay
while Papiona helped in loading the victim on a truck and in bringing the latter to the hospital.
He did not hear any argument from both the victim and Raytos prior to the incident. Three
days later, the victim died.
Romeo Nacase y Tarayo (hereafter Nacase), testified that he is a resident of Brgy. Nagcaduha,
Villareal, Samar, and knew both the victim and Raytos. On February 1, 2010, at around 9:00
in the evening, he was having a drinking spree with the victim and a certain Dado Nacase.
Soon thereafter, he saw the victim and Edgar dancing and while the two danced, he saw
Raytos pull a knife from his pocket and approach the victim from the back. When the victim
was about to tum around, Raytos took hold of the victim's shirt and stabbed the victim in the
back. He was about 4 Yi meters away when the incident happened. He did not hear the victim
and Raytos argue or talk before the stabbing incident.
Francisca Araza y Macasalabang (hereafter Francisca), wife of the victim, is left with eleven
(11) children. She presented and identified official receipts as proof of the expenses incurred
for the hospitalization and other medical expenses of her husband amounting to ₱4,986.00
and a certification from Rendeza Funeral Parlor for embalming services amounting to
₱8,000.00. With the death of her husband, she felt sadness, the heavy weight and of present
future difficulties, and longing for him that even the amount of ₱l,000,000.00 will be an
insufficient compensation. Her deceased husband used to earn an average monthly income
of ₱2,000.00.9
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the R TC found Raytos guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by
treachery:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused LORENZO RAYTOS Y ESPINO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim David Araza the following amounts:
1. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. ₱12,896.00 as actual damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 10
Raytos appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal dated December 10, 2012. 11 Raytos then filed
his Brief dated March 16, 2015, 12 while the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its Brief dated October 14, 2015. 13 In a Manifestation dated November
9, 2015, Raytos waived his right to file a Reply Brief. 14
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed Raytos' conviction while modifying the award of
damages. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 33, Calbiga,
Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-2010-1748 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Lorenzo
Raytos y Espino is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Raytos is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
following: civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00, moral damages of ₱50,000.00, exemplary damages
of ₱30,000.00 and temperate damages of ₱25,000.00. The amounts of damages awarded are
subject further to interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
they are fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 15
On March 14, 2016, Raytos brought the instant case before this Court via Notice of
Appeal 16 of even date.
In lieu of supplemental briefs, Raytos and plaintiff-appellee filed separate manifestations
respectively dated February 9, 2017 17 and January 30, 2017, 18 foregoing their right to file the
same.
Issue
In the instant appeal, Raytos seeks to reverse the questioned Decision based on the following
assignment of errors:
[WHETHER OR NOT THE CA] ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER AND NOT APPRECIATING THE SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
[WHETHER OR NOT THE CA] ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. 19
Simply put, the basic issue for the Court's resolution is whether Raytos' guilt for the crime of
Murder was sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the appeal lacking in merit.
In this case, the opposing sides are incessant on the truthfulness of their version of the story,
which differ in material points of fact; the State, on one hand, has successfully presented
strong evidence of guilt for Murder, while Raytos, on the other hand, maintains his innocence
based on his plea of self-defense.
At this point, it bears noting that the issue of whether the accused acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact. 20 The RTC's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
accorded great weight and respect, especially when affirmed by the CA.21 This is a rule borne
out of necessity given the distinct vantage point of the trial court in observing and assessing
the witnesses while undergoing the rigors of direct and cross-examination; it is only in the
crucible of this exercise that the trial court is able to extract incommunicable evidence from
the witnesses based on their demeanor on the stand.22 Hence, in the absence of a clear
showing that the lower courts erred in their appreciation of the facts, or in their application
of the pertinent laws and jurisprudence to such facts, their findings will no longer be disturbed
on appeal.
In fine, given the concurrent findings of guilt made by both the RTC and CA, the Court finds
that no cogent reason exists to reverse Raytos' conviction.
Raytos Failed To Establish TheElements Of Self-Defense
A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly,
the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified - failure to
discharge which renders the act punishable.23
Thus, to exonerate himself, the accused must establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression
by the victim; (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were
reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. 24 Of the three,
unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated. 25
After poring over the records of this case, the Court is convinced that Raytos failed to establish
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, David Araza (Araza). Necessarily, Raytos' claim
of self-defense has no more leg to stand on.
In his version of the incident, Raytos claimed that Araza drew a knife from his left waist
following a brief exchange of words between them. 26 Raytos then moved back, allegedly
intending to escape, but instead ended up wresting possession of the knife from
Araza. 27 After doing so, Raytos Araza stabbed numerous times, leading to the latter's
demise.28
The Court finds this narration of events to be incredible. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense
easy to concoct. 29Testimonial evidence, to be believable, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible following common experience and
leading to the inference of its probability under the circumstances.30Here, it is difficult to
imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza's
hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick
succession:
Q - So, Mr. Witness, when you saw this David Araza drew a knife from the left side tucked in
his belly, what did you do?
A - At the time when he drew his knife tucked on his left waist, and at the same time said
"who was braver", I moved backward and even the chair almost fall (sic), I decided to escape
by moving my body backward and I even got hold of his right hand.
Q - So, upon holding the right hand of David Araza, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A - After I got hold of his hand, I twisted his hand, that's why I was able to got (sic) hold the
possession of the knife.
xxxx
Q - Do you remember, Mr. Witness, in what particular part of the body did you stab David
Araza?
A - I think, he was hit on the chest, at this area. (Witness touching his chest with his right arm
and said) Somebody even told me that David Araza sustained six (6) wounds.
Q - Mr. Witness, setting aside what this person had told you, from your own recollection, how
many stab thursts (sic) did you in-fact inclict (sic) on the victim?
A – What I could remember, I stabbed him several times. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
But even if the Court were to believe this version of the events, it is evident that no unlawful
aggression can be deduced. Stated differently, there was clearly no imminent danger on the
person of Raytos as would justify his killing Araza.
Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger -
not merely a threatening or intimidating action. 32 In People v. Dulin,33 the Court had the
occasion to elaborate on the kinds andnature of unlawful aggression, viz.:
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression;
and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening
attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as
if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied
by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.34
In People v. Escarlos,35 the Court ruled that the mere drawing of a knife by the victim does not
constitute unlawful aggression, whether actual or imminent, as the peril sought to be avoided
by the accused was both premature and speculative:
In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their
argument. Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that
the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the
weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he was
legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to wait for the
knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend himself would be asking too much,
he argues.
The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated
the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an
unlawful aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase.
The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged
drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger.
The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not
merely threatening and intimidating action. Uncertain, premature and speculative was the
assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely
drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just
speculative. 36 (Italics omitted; emphasis supplied)
Following a similar ratio, in People v. Borreros,37 the Court likewise held that the act of
drawing a gun from the waist could not yet be categorized as unlawful aggression.
Applying the foregoing to this case, Araza's alleged act of simply drawing a knife from his waist
fell short of the threshold required by law and prevailing jurisprudence. 38 At that point, and
as correctly observed by the courts below, there was yet no actual risk or peril to the life or
limb of Raytos. 39
Parenthetically, the Court notes the testimony of Dionisio B. Mado (Mado ), the other witness
for the defense, who supplied additional details on the incident. In his narration of events,
Mado was purporting to show unlawful aggression on the part of Araza, claiming that the
latter actually delivered stabbing blows to Raytos:
Q - Mr. Witness, when the victim challenged Lorenzo Raytos for a fight, what was the distance
of David Araza with respect to Lorenzo Raytos?
A - At this distance. (Witness stood up from where he is seated and pointed to the distance
where the defense counsel is standing which measures four (4) feet in distance.[)]
Q - After David Araza challenged Lorenzo Raytos for a fight, what did Lorenzo Raytos do after
that?
A - Lorenzo Raytos answered: "I have no fault against you."
Q - After that answer from Mr. Lorenzo Raytos, what did David Araza do?
(The witness demonstrated while he was standing and getting something from his waist and
as if holding something moving his right hand forward in the level of his waist doing a stabbing
blow forward)
A - David Araza drew his fan knife from his waist and stabbed Lorenzo Raytos, ma'am.
xxxx
Q – In what particular body (sic) was the victim, David Araza was (sic) stabbed by Lorenzo
Raytos?
A - What I saw only was the front portion of his body, ma'am.
(Witness demonstrated by holding his chest and rolling his palm around his
chest).40 (Emphasis supplied)
Despite such positive testimony, however, this was not given any weight by the RTC in arriving
at a judgment of conviction, 41 even noting certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. 42 The following material portions in Mado's cross-examination sheds light
on his credibility as a witness for the defense:
Q – Do you have an acquaintance by the name of Juanito Rado, Mr. Mado?
A - Yes. [H]e is my friend and compadre.
Q - And this Juanito Rado is related to Elisa Rado, the wife of Lorenzo Raytos? A - Bardaje-Jesus.

A - I am not aware if they were related? Q - This is not the first time that you testified before this Honourable Court, [a]m I right, Mr.
Mado?
Q - But they have the same surname?
A - It's my first time.
A - I am not certain; maybe they have the same surname.
Q - Are you sure of that, Mr. Mado?
Q - Is it not a fact that it was Juanito Rado who requested you to testify before this Honourable
Court to help Lorenzo Raytos in his case? A - Yes, ma'am.

A - He did not ask me for such. Q - Is it not a fact Mr. Mado that you were here before this Honourable Court years ago to
testify in favour of one in accused the name of Pablo Hilvano?
Q - Who then, contacted you to testify before this Honourable Court, since Lorenzo Raytos is
already detained at Samar Provincial Jail? A - Yes, ma'am. It was long (sic) time ago.

A - Nobody, ma'am. Q - And that Pablo Hilvano was even acquitted on that case because of your corroborative
testimony?
Q - Meaning, you come (sic) here on your own to testify?
A - Yes, ma'am.
A - I just came here alone to testify in favour of Lorenzo.
Q - So, it is now clear and you are changing your answer that it is not the first time you testified
COURT:
before this Honourable Court.
Q - How did you come to know that this case will be heard on 11, November 2010, for you to
A - Yes, ma'am.
testify?
Q - So, your previous answer was a lie?
A - I was informed by a friend in Guintarcan that this case will be tried on that day, your Honor.
A - Yes, ma'am.
PROS. NAVAL:
Q - You likewise claim Mr. Mado that during the incident on February 1, 2010, you saw the
Q - So, that friend was Juanito Rado?
accused Lorenzo delivered stab blows on the front portion of the body of the victim David.
A - No, ma'am. Did I get it right?

Q - Who would that be? A – Yes ma'am, because they were into wrestling and grappling over the weapon and it was
David that was wounded.
A - Someone from Guintarcan.
Q - Here at the front?
Q - Can you name that person?
(Prosecutor is pointing on the front of her body upon asking question)
A - Yes, ma'am.
Q - Are you sure of that? You will not change your answer?
A - I will not change my answer.
Q - Is it not because you said that David was hit at the front portion of the body because it
was what Lorenzo Raytos told you that David was hit at the front portion?
A - No, I actually saw that?
Q - You will not change your answer Mr. Mado, even if I will tell you before this Honourable
Court that the victim did not sustain any single injury on the chest?
A - I will not.43 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, nowhere in his testimony did Raytos make mention of any threatening behavior from
Araza, aside from the drawing of the knife, which would have necessitated immediate
retaliation on his part. Worse, Mado's testimony was unsupported by the Medico Legal
Report44 dated February 4, 2010. Were the testimony of Mado true, i.e., that Araza actually
delivered stabbing blows to Raytos, such material detail would certainly have been mentioned
by the latter during his testimony, especially considering that his freedom was hanging in the
balance. Unfortunately, notwithstanding numerous opportunities to supply details on the
incident, Raytos' testimony was utterly silent on such matter. Accordingly, the Court affirms
the uniform findings of the RTC and CA and adopts the latter's appreciation of the evidence
on record.
Further on this point, even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression was present on the
part of Araza, there was no longer any danger on Raytos' person from the moment he
disarmed the former by wresting possession of the knife. Raytos' admission during his cross-
examination dispels all doubt:
Q - Now, you said you were able to wrestle the knife from the victim when he first delivered
the stab blow at your direction, is that correct?
A - Yes, your Honor.
Q - In other words, when you wrestled the knife from the possession of the victim, you were
no longer in any danger?
A - Yes, your Honor, but I do not know what I have done.
Q - In other words, because the victim was no longer in possession of any weapon, there was
no more reason for you to stab him?
A - Your Honor, it was so sudden and that's all I remember.
Q - And despite the fact that the victim was no longer in possession of the weapon, you
continued stabbing him for three (3) times in succession?
A - When I got hold and wrestled the knife from him, he did not move apart, he was just very
close and I immediately stab (sic) him successively. That's all I remember. 45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Time and again, this Court has held that when an unlawful aggression that has begun has
ceased to exist, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right fo kill or even to wound the
former aggressor. 46 Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting
defense of one's self.47
Here, Raytos admitted that after obtaining possession of the weapon, he no longer had any
reason to stab Araza as in fact, there was no showing that the latter persisted in his alleged
purpose of wanting to hurt Raytos. Thus, based on his own statements, Raytos overstepped
the acceptable boundaries of self-preservation when he deliberately inflicted fatal injuries on
Araza, even when the purported aggression had already ceased. 48 By killing Araza, Raytos was
no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the former. 49

\ All told, the Court finds the evidence sorely lacking in establishing self-defense on the part of
Raytos.
COURT:
The Qualifying CircumstanceOf Treachery Was SufficientlyEstablished By The Evidence
To alleviate his conviction, Raytos contends that there was a dearth of evidence to show that
the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.50 Raytos specifically
avers that had he wanted to ensure that no risk would come to him, he would have chosen
another time and place to stab Araza instead of inside the dancing area, where many people
were around. 51
The Court disagrees.
Treachery or alevosia, is present when the offender adopts means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the felony that ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 52Alevosia is characterized by a deliberate,
sudden and unexpected assault from behind, without warning and without giving the victim
a chance to defend himself or repel the assault and without risk to the assailant. 53
In appreciating such circumstance, the RTC disposed as follows:
The victim was dancing when he was attacked. There was no confrontation. No forewarning.
His dancing partner was even misled into believing that accused only wanted to dance with
the victim. But of course, it was just an excuse, so that it would be easier for the accused to
attain his purpose. It was so sudden that even the others were unprepared to do anything to
prevent the attack or at least minimize the injuries. It was an unexpected occurrence right in
the middle of a celebration which was intended to be a joyous one.
The medico legal report shows the following wounds:
(+) stab wound, scapular area, (R) 2 cm.
(+) stab wound, posterior axillary line (R), 3 cm.
(+) stab wound, (R) flank area, 3.5 cm.
(+) stab wound, infrascapular area, (L)
These wounds clearly disprove the claim of accused that he was suddenly able to stab the
victim because he wrestled with him, because actually, there was no fight that preceded the
attack. There was plainly, murder. 54
To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were unwavering as to the
manner of killing - that Raytos suddenly stabbed Araza from the back while holding the latter's
shoulder. Further, that there were other people around that could have lent their help to
Araza is inconsequential as treachery considers only the victim's means of defense at the time
of the attack. Thus, so long as the accused deliberately employed means to ensure the
commission of the crime without risk to himself from retaliation by the victim, treachery can
be properly appreciated.
On this point, the Court's ruling in People v. Rellon55 finds relevance. In that case, the victim
was stabbed from behind while he was watching the singing and dancing during
the Sinulog festival. Interestingly, the accused therein, as in this case, claimed self-defense in
stabbing the victim. Said the Court:
The accused Eugenio Rellon took the witness stand claiming self-defense. He narrated that on
January 16, 1983 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, while walking towards his house at Tres de
Abril, accused saw Arsenic Ram sitting at the roadside when the latter suddenly stood up,
took his knife and thrust it towards Rellon. Accused was able to ward off the thrust by holding
the deceased's arm and grappled for the possession of the knife. Having succeeded in getting
the knife, accused accidentally stabbed the deceased in the right chest. After the stabbing
incident, the accused left the scene.
The principal question, as in most criminal cases, is the credibility of witness. A review of the
records of the case, however, shows that the evidence undoubtedly supports the findings and
conclusions of the trial in court its judgment and conviction.
Through the testimony of Virginia Lusareto, the lone eyewitness to the crime, it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant stabbed Arsenio Ram at the back with a
butcher's knife.j
The trial court held that the crime committed was murder. It appreciated treachery when it
took note of the fact that the victim was suddenly stabbed from behind while he was watching
the Sinulog dance. The trial court stated:
x x xx
Treachery was appreciated in cases where the victim while sitting on the ground unarmed
and absolutely unprepared, and without the least suspicion of the danger he was incurring
was suddenly and abruptly assaulted by the 2 accused, without a word being uttered, and the
first blow hit him on the nape of the back, knocking him backwards to the ground, and as he
tried to get up he was stabbed in the abdomen x x x. The same thing happened in the case at
bar. The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of alevosia is the deliberate, sudden
and unexpected attack of the victim from behind, without any warning and without giving
him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault x x x.
When appellant stabbed the victim, the latter was sitting on a bench watching the singing and
dancing during the Sinulog festival. The victim was engrossed in the merrymaking when
suddenly appellant stealthily stabbed him from behind. An attack from behind is treachery x
x x. 56 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn the concurring findings
of the R TC and the CA with respect to the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta, 57 the damages awarded in the
questioned Decision are hereby modified, increasing the civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages to ₱75,000.00 each. The temperate damages are likewise increased to
₱50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 01556, finding accused-
appellant Lorenzo E. Raytos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs
of David Araza the amountof Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as temperate
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
GOMEZ v. GOMEZ-SAMSON
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
This age-old question has spurned millions of debates in scientific and religious
circles, and has stimulated the imagination of generations of children and adults. Many
profess that they are certain of the answer, and yet their answers are divergent.
The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question, but in significantly lesser
proportions of philosophical mystery. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of
Donation he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted down before the
bodies of the Deeds were typewritten. Respondents maintain that the bodies of the
Deeds were encoded first, and then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and
circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioners expert claims she is certain of the answer:
the signature came first.Respondents expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible
to determine which came first accurately. As both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of respondents, petitioner is furious how these courts could
adopt an opinion that was neither here nor there.
However, as it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is the person certain of which
came first necessarily the one who is more credible?
 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] dated 4 September 2002 and 27 November 2002, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases No. 36089
and No. 36090.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner] instituted these cases, to wit: (1)
Civil Case No. 36089, entitled: Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of
the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Maria Rita Gomez-
Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus B. Gomez, and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig
and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants; and (2) Civil Case No. 36090, entitled:
Augusto Gomez, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo
Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr.,
Defendants, both in the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel, all surnamed Gomez, were
sister and brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-Samson, JESUS
Gomez and ARISTON Gomez, JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while
AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint
that CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979, was the owner of the
following real properties:
(a) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in her name, x x x;
(b) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818 in her name, x x x,
(c) A parcel of land, with all the improvements
thereon, situated in Pasig, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 268396 in her name, x x x;
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants Rita and Jesus fraudulently
prepared and/or caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in
the said document, Consuelo donated the above described properties to
defendants Rita and Jesus; that the said defendants forged or caused to be
forged the signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgement on the said document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that
on the basis of the said document defendants sought the cancellation of the
certificates of title in the name of Consuelo and the issuance of new ones in
the names of defendants Rita and Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed that the Deed of
Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be
nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 268396 be reinstated or be
replaced by titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez; and,
that defendants be ordered to pay damages, by way of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation plus costs.
On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and nominal defendants Registers of
Deeds of Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common answer, denying the
material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of the deed of
donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as
early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a forgery or
otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being valid, the
properties covered therein passed in ownership to private defendants, as early
as April 20, 1979; that defendants have the perfect and absolute right to cause
the cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and 26839 and request for the
issuance of new certificates of titles in their respective names; that they have
the right to use, enjoy, possess, dispose and own these properties; that no law
was violated by the nominal defendants when the old certificates of title were
cancelled and new certificates were issued in the name of the private
defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of action against the nominal
defendants neither has the court jurisdiction over the foregoing issue.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00;
compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages
of P500,000.00; attorneys fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be
made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
(2nd case)In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff alleged in his complaint
that Consuelo was also the sole and absolute owner of the following personal
properties:
(a) Seventy-five (75) common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty,
Inc. with a total par value of P75,000.00 and covered by Stock Certificate No.
003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight hundred fifty three (11,853) common
shares of stock of First Philippine Holdings Corporation with a total par value
of P118,530.00 covered by Stock Certificates Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares)
and A-02613 (2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370 shares);
(c) Jewelries and collectors items, contained in Consuelo Gomezs
Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI Bank, Marikina Branch, which were
inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of the Court in Special Proceedings
No. 9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978 Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No.
11593810-050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893, Plate No. A6-252
and LTC Registration Certificate No. 0140373 valued at P200,000.00, more
or less at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979 Toyota Corona with Motor No.
12RM-031643, Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No. B-09-373 and
LTC Registration Certificate No. 0358757, valued at P50,000.00, more or less
at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) including
accrued interests on money market placement with the BA Finance
Corporation per its promissory note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9, 1978.
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants fraudulently prepared and/or
caused to be prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that in the said document
Consuelo donated the above described properties to defendants Ariston, Sr.
and Ariston, Jr.; that the said defendants forged or caused to be forged the
signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the notarial acknowledgment on the said
document was antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis of the said
document defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978, effected or tried to
effect a change of the LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles; that defendant
Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-terminated the money market placements with BA
Finance and received checks in the sums of P187,027.74 and P4,405.56; that
with the exception of the jewelries, which are with the bank, defendant
Ariston, Sr., has benefited and will continue to benefit from the use of the two
(2) vehicles and from the dividends earned by the shares of stocks.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff prayed that the Deed of
Donation Intervivos be declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or be
nullified; that defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver the stock
certificates, jewelries, collectors items, and vehicles in his possession plus all
the cash dividends earned by the shares of stock and reasonable compensation
for the use of the two (2) motor vehicles; that defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered
to pay the amount of P191,533.00 received by him from BA Finance, with
interest from the time he received the amount until he fully pays the plaintiff;
and, damages, by way of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr. and Ariston Jr., filed their answer,
denying the material allegations in the complaint and asserting that a copy of
the Deed of Donation was submitted to the Notarial Section of the CFI of
Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979; that the said document is valid and not a
forgery or otherwise subject to similar infirmity; that the said document being
valid, the properties covered therein passed in ownership to defendants, as
early as April 20, 1979; and that defendants have the perfect and absolute right
to use, enjoy, possess and own these properties.

Defendants thereafter prayed for moral damages of P2,000,000.00;
compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages
of P500,000.00; attorneys fees of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff be
made jointly and severally liable with the estate of Consuelo Gomez.
On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Consolidate, in both cases,
which the trial court in Civil Case No. 36090 granted in its Order dated June
6, 1980. Whereupon, the records of Civil Case No. 36090 were transmitted to
the RTC, Branch 23.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda thirty (30) days from their receipt of the transcript
of stenographic notes.
In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the trial court dismissed the
complaints.[3]
The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:
1. That the instant complaints be dismissed;
2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223, 2224, 2225, and 2226 of the
Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated be cancelled;
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez,
jointly and solidarily, should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorneys fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and
attorneys fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.[4]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The latter
affirmed the RTCs Joint Decision in the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.[5]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
Court of Appeals in the assailed Resolution dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, bringing forth
before us the following issues for our consideration:
1) Whether or not the instant petition presents several exceptions to
the general rule that an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise
questions of law and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Honorable Court;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts and on inferences that are manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding
of fact that Consuelo Gomez herself paid the donors tax of the properties
subject of the donation on 09 October 1979when the evidence on record point
to the contrary;
4) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in giving
credence to the testimony of former judge Jose Sebastian, the Notary Public
who notarized the assailed Deeds of Donation;
 5) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing
the irregularities apparent on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation as
mere lapses of a non-lawyer who prepared them;
6) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in totally
disregarding the very unusual circumstances relative to the alleged totally
execution and notarization of the assailed Deeds of Donation;
7) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is
manifestly mistaken in inferring that respondents were able to sufficiently and
substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent
properties covered by the assailed Deeds of Donation;
8) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred and is
manifestly mistaken in not giving due weight to the expert opinion of the NBI
representative, which the lower court itself sought; and
9) Whether or not the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not finding
that the totality of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner produced a
single network of circumstances establishing the simulation and falsification
of the assailed Deeds of Donation.[6]
As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the trial court, especially
when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court.[7] Petitioner,
however, seeks refuge in the following established exceptions[8] to this rule:
1) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible.[9]
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts.[10]
3) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[11]
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion;[12] and
5) Where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence of record. [13]
Weight and Credibility of the Expert
Witnesses
The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower courts, is whether petitioner
was able to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets
of paper signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on this matter is the testimony
of Zenaida Torres, Document Examiner[14] of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own expert witness, Francisco
Cruz, Chief of Document Examination[15] of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other
direct evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies positively stating that
the Deeds of Donation were signed by Consuelo in their completed form in the presence
of Notary Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose Sebastian himself,
and that of several of the respondents including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who
allegedly drafted said Deeds of Donation.
As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most important evidence of
petitioner, it is imperative to examine the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing
her testimony, and the contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.
 Zenaida Torress testimony, as noted by the trial court, was that she had
examined the two Deeds of Donation, denominated as Documents No. 401 and No.
402, and her findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those of
Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were not typed
or prepared in one continuous sitting because the horizontal lines had some variances
horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical lines did not show any
variance.
Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to Document No. 401, the
typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez were typed after the handwritten signature
Consuelo C. Gomez. This is based on her analysis of the letter o in the handwritten
signature, which touches the letter n in the typewritten name Consuelo C. Gomez. She
could not, however, make any similar findings with respect to Document No. 402,
because the typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez and the handwritten signature
Consuelo C. Gomez do not even touch in the latter document.
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that the Deeds of Donation
were not prepared in one sitting:
To start with, it is very significant that Torres herself admits that the
signatures of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 are genuine.
(This is contrary to the allegations of Augusto in his complaint;
wherein he alleged that the signatures of Consuelo were forged. In fact, as per
the allegations, in Augustos complaint, the signatures were forged, after the
death of Consuelo).
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to shift the thrust of his attack, to a
scenario wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two papers in blank, and
thereafter, said Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
Furthermore, Torres fell apart during, cross-examination. Torres
admitted that she had not taken any specialized studies on the matter of
Questioned Documents, except on one or two seminars on Questioned
Documents. She admitted that she had not passed the Board Exams, as a
Chemist; she further admitted that she has not written any thesis or similar
work on the subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one continuous sitting, she admitted that she
had never seen the typewriter used to type the Donations 401 and 402, nor
even tried to get hold of it, before she made the report; that there were no
variances insofar as the vertical alignments of the typewritten documents were
concerned; that there were only variances insofar as the horizontal alignments
are concerned; she admitted that if anybody had wanted to incorporate a
document into a blank sheet of paper, on top of a signature, the normal step to
be taken would be to be careful on horizontal alignment, which can be seen
via the naked eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the vertical alignment,
as admitted by her, was perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is possible that if the paper roller is
loose, the horizontal alignment will have a variance; whereas, the vertical
alignment would have no variance, and there would be nothing sinister about
this. She had to admit this, because she was confronted with an authority on
the matter, more particularly the book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit
17).She admitted that she had not used bromide when she took the photographs
of the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which photographs she later on
enlarged. She admitted that when she had taken the photographs of the two (2)
Donations, she had not put the typewritten pitch measure on top. She admitted
that when the photographs were enlarged, the alignment of the typewritten
words became distorted; more so when a typewriter pitch measure is not used,
when photographing the documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of typewriting in one sitting or not, is
concerned, the testimony of Torres was completely discredited (Vide TSN of
May 19, 1986).[16]
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the testimony of Francisco Cruz:
 Cruz testified on this point that the Donations 401 and 402 were both
typed in one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly on how he arrived at this
conclusion.
To start with, he was able to determine that the typewriter used was
the elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when his typewriting measuring the
instruments were placed over the documents, there were twelve (12) letters
that went inside one inch, which is a characteristic of an elite typewriter.
Secondly, he noticed that the color tone of the typewriter ink is the
same, thru the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another indication that the Donations 401 and 402
were prepared in one continuous sitting, because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter
is used one time and sometime after that, the typewriter is used again, the color
tone will most probably be different.
He further concluded that both the horizontal and vertical alignments
are in agreement. He explained how he arrived at this conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument which is a typewriting measuring
instrument produced by the Criminal Research Co., Inc. in the USA and
placing said instrument to test the vertical alignment from the top down to the
bottom, there is a perfect vertical alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took photographs of the documents, he
had already placed the typewriting measuring instrument over the document
and he showed to the court the enlarged photographs, indicating clearly that
all the vertical alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal and vertical alignments are in
agreement.
He explained that the slight variances as to the spacing of the words
Know All Men By These Presents and the words That I Consuelo C. Gomez,
single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident of 24 Pine Street, New Marikina
Subdivision, Marikina, there is a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not in
the alignment.
He explained that the normal reason for such discrepancy in the
spacing is because the typist sometimes tries to push the variable spacer; the
[button] on the left side of the roller, and if you press that round [button], there
will be a variance spacing namely one space, two spaces, and three spaces; and
these are not attached so there is a variable in the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing of the variable paper by the typist.
Furthermore, he emphasized that the left margins are aligned and this
signifies that there was typing in one continuous sitting, because if you type
on a paper and re-insert it again, there are differences in the left hand
margin. All of his findings appear in the blow up photographs which were
marked as Exhibits 31 to 34.
He even pointed out the differences in the Jurat wherein admittedly,
Judge Sebastian inserted the date 21st and 1 (page number), 401 (document
number), I (book number), and 82 (series); and also his signature Jose R.
Sebastian and his PTR Number (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25, 1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to discredit the testimony of Cruz on
this issue, proved futile.[17]
As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the signature Consuelo C. Gomez
was written before the typewritten name Consuelo C. Gomez. In this second round of
analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and Francisco Cruz, the trial
court arrived at the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRESS] FINDINGS ARE BASED SOLELY ON A
SINGLE HANDWRITTEN LETTER O, WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT
EVEN INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER N. BASED ON THIS,
WITHOUT MORE, TORRES CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN
NAME CONSUELO C. GOMEZ CAME AFTER THE HANDWRITTEN
SIGNATURE CONSUELO C. GOMEZ.
We need but cite authorities on the matter (with which Authorities
Torres was confronted and which authorities she had to admit), which read as
follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with Typescript. It is
often stated that is possible to determine whether an ink line
which intersects typescript was written before or after the
typing. The theory is simple; most typewriter inks are greasy
and an ink line tends to shrink in width as it passes over a
greasy place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink line is observed
to suffer a distinct reduction in width every time it intersects
the typescript it may safely be concluded that the ink line was
written after the typescript.
In practice, however, ink lines written across
typescript are rarely seen to suffer any appreciable shrinkage
in width, since the amount of oily medium transferred from
the ribbon to the paper is rarely sufficient to have any
effect. Indeed, if the ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink,
instead of shrinking, may spread out into the typescript to
increase the width of the inkline at the intersection. In the case
the proof that the ink followed the typescript would be the
presence of a swelling rather than a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is rarely possible for any
definite opinion as to the order of appearance on the paper for
intersecting ink lines and typescript to be justified on the
[meager] amount of evidence which generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be found to hold for
carbon paper and waxer; which have much in common with
typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they make on paper
react with intersecting ink lines. (Wilson, Suspect Documents;
Exhibits 19; 19-A; 37; 37-D; underscoring ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres on the matter, states as follows:
Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may have distinctive
patterns, depending upon the order of writing the lapse of time
between the two writings, the density of the two strokes and
the kind of inks, writing instruments, and paper used. With a
binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier aided by skillfully
controlled light and photography, the true order of preparation
may be revealed and demonstrated to a lay observer.
What appears to be the obvious solution may not
always be the correct answer. For example, the line of deepest
color usually appears on top even if it was written first.Careful
study and testing is necessary before reaching a
conclusion. Some of the more common criteria for
determining sequence are considered in the following
paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of two writing
strokes or the intersection of writing and typewriting the
majority of problems are covered. Substantial, repeated
intersections of two writings offer a higher probability of
success than a single indifferent intersection, such as a weak
stroke crossing another which only very infrequently can
produce a clear indication of the order of writing. (Exhibits V
and V-1 (underscoring ours).[18]
The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who testified, citing
authorities,[19] that it is impossible to determine accurately which came first, because
there were no intersections at all.[20] The trial court added: [i]n fact, common sense,
without more, dictates that if there are no intersections (between the typewritten and
the handwritten words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which came first.[21] The Court of Appeals found nothing erroneous in these findings
of the trial court.[22]
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida Torres, having positively
maintained that the handwritten signatures Consuelo C. Gomez in both Deeds of
Donation were affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez, cannot
possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz that was neither here not
there.[23]
Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida Torres was a court-appointed
expert, as opposed to Francisco Cruz who was merely designated by
respondents. Petitioner also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground that
he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.[24]
Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon
originals of both Deeds of Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial
Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz conducted his tests, with
respect to Document No. 401, on the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
On the first point, we agree with petitioner that positive evidence[25] is, as a
general rule, more credible than negative evidence.[26] However, the reason for this rule
is that the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten what actually
occurred, while it is impossible to remember what never existed.[27]
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and object evidence precisely
to testify on their findings in court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness
to forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently, whereas faulty memory may
be the reason for the negative testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is
unlikely to be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore, cannot say that
positive evidence does not carry an inherent advantage over negative evidence when it
comes to expert witnesses,[28] the process by which the expert witnesses arrived at their
conclusions should be carefully examined and considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the ordinary expert witness, in
perhaps the larger proportion of the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not
a knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually reproduces, literally or in
substance, conclusions of others which he accepts on the authority of the eminent
names responsible for them.[29] In the case at bar, the expert witnesses cited sources as
bases of their observations. Francisco Cruzs statement that no finding or conclusion
could be arrived at,[30] has basis on the sources presented both by him and by Zenaida
Torres. Both sets of authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the
typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez barely touch and do not intersect the
handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in Document No. 401. In Document No.
402, said typewritten words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony that no finding or conclusion
can be arrived at, was found to be more credible than the expert testimony positively
stating that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the Deeds of Donation. The
former expert testimony has proven to be more in consonance with the authorities cited
by both experts.
As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres conducted her tests on the carbon
originals of both Deeds of Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco
Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of Ariston, Jr. with respect to
Document No. 401, suffice it to say that this circumstance cannot be attributed to
respondents. After the examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire razed
the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds were among the documents
burned in the fire. Petitioner never rebutted respondents manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioners attack on the entire testimony of
Francisco Cruz (including the part concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one
continuous sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida Torres was
court-appointed, Francisco Cruzs testimony was solicited by respondents, one of whom
had previously solicited such testimony for another case.
In United States v. Trono,[31] we held:
Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting
consideration, although not exclusive on questions of a professional
character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their
findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weigh them, and they
can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even
counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which
may have been adduced during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of Appeals[32] and Salomon v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[33] this Court held:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the
ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion,
his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study or observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case
and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect(20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of
the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion
of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. (Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, while the expert witness possible bias in favor of the side for whom he or
she testifies, and the fact that he or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial
court, the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence adduced during trial,
as well as with the witness deportment, actions, ability, and character upon the witness
stand. The trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all these
circumstances in its determination of the expert witness credibility, as it is in a better
position than the appellate courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there
is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in such determination,
the latter is not reviewable by this Court.
Alleged patent irregularities on the face
of the assailed Deeds of Donation
As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida Torres constitutes the only
direct evidence presented by petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely
intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner, however, also presents the
following circumstantial evidence and arguments to prove the same, claiming that there
are patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of Donation:
1) Both deeds are each one-page documents contained in a letter size (8
x 11) paper, instead of the usual legal size (8 x 14) paper, and typed
single spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides;[34]
2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in two different
municipalities were purportedly donated to two donees in the same
document;[35]
3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two corporations, jewelries and
collectors items in a bank deposit box, two registered cars, cash and
money placement in another bank, and a bodega were donated to
three donees in the same document;[36]
4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not owned by
Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by Consuelo, she would surely
have known this fact as she was the treasurer of V-TRI Realty
Corporation;[37]
5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the signature of Consuelo
on both documents appear almost in the same place;[38]
6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial
acknowledgement portion and the TAN Numbers and Residence
Certificates of the signatories, were typed with only one
typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have been typed with a
different machine are the date (21st) below the acknowledgement and
the filled-in numbers of the Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page No.
___ portion, the name Jose R. Sebastian above the words NOTARY
PUBLIC and the PTR Number with date and place of issue;[39]
7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue appear in the right
hand side of the name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of
below it;[40]
8) The inserted date (which was typed with the same machine used for
typing the name of notary public Jose Sebastian) is different from
the date of the clause In WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto
set their hands in Quezon City, on the 20th day of April/1979 (which
was typed with another machine; the one used in typing the body of
the deed and the body of the acknowledgment);[41]
9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence Certificate Numbers of the
purported donor and donees have already been typed with the same
machine that was used in typing the body of the deed and the body
of the acknowledgement;[42]
10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-educated person like
Ariston Gomez, Jr. would not have thought of preparing at least five
copies of each document as there were four donees and one donor.[43]
The Court of Appeals ruled:
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of the deeds of donation
above the supposedly priorly affixed signature of CONSUELO on a blank
sheet of bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a letter size paper,
typed single space with barely any room left on the top, bottom and left and
right margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has been explained that
the same was due to the fact that the said documents were prepared by
defendant ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the way such
documents should be executed and in how many copies. x x x.
xxxx
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone as unfamiliar and
inexperienced in preparing a deed of donation, or any deed of conveyance for
that matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents that are the subject
matter of the case at bar in the manner that he did.[44]
Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities do not relate to the proper
construction or manner of writing the documents as would necessitate the expertise of
a lawyer.Rather, they relate to matters as basic as observing the proper margins at the
top, left, right and bottom portions of the document, using the appropriate paper size
and number of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing and proper
placement of the words in the document.
All these alleged irregularities are more apparent than real. None of these
alleged irregularities affects the validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes
fraud or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or
forged.[45] However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our personal examination of the
exhibits, had revealed such a questionable physical condition.
 Legal documents contained in 8 x 11 paper are neither unheard of, nor even
uncommon. The same is true with regard to single-spaced legal documents; in fact,
petitioners Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.
That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have conveyed numerous
properties in two sheets of paper does not militate against their authenticity. Not all
people equate length with importance. The simplicity and practicality of organizing the
properties to be donated into real and personal properties, and using one-page
documents to convey each category, are clearly appealing to people who value
brevity. The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner to make a single-spaced
Supplemental Memorandum whose only object was to summarize the arguments he
has laid down in the original twice-as-long Memorandum,[46] an endeavor that we, in
fact, appreciate.
The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter to encode both Deeds of
Donation, including the notarial acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence
certificates, is purely paranoia. Being in the legal profession for many years, we are
aware that it is common practice for the parties to a contract to type the whole
document, so that all the notary public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and the
numbers pertaining to his notarial registry.
The use of single-paged documents also provides an explanation as to why the
PTR number and the date and place of issue are found in the right-hand side of the
name and signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with respondents
that it is irrational, impractical, and contrary to human experience to use another page
just to insert those minute but necessary details. Such use of single-paged documents,
taken together with the fact that the Deeds of Donation are of almost the same length,
are also the reasons why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo appear at
around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed, we would have been suspicious had
these documents been of varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same
portions in both.
The only observations concerning the physical appearance of the subject Deeds
of Donation that truly give us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small
margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof, and the alleged inclusion
in Document No. 402 of a bodega allegedly not owned by Consuelo. However, these
doubts are not enough to establish the commission of fraud by respondents and to
overturn the presumption that persons are innocent of crime or wrong.[47] Good faith is
always presumed.[48]It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the burden to prove the
same,[49] who, in this case, is the petitioner.
The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while indicative of
sloppiness, were not necessarily resorted to because there was a need to intercalate a
long document and, thus, prove petitioners theory that there were only two pieces of
paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use of one sheet of paper for
both Deeds of Donation was intentional, for brevitys sake. While the ensuing litigation
could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for his decision to sacrifice
the margins for brevitys sake, there still appears no indication that he did so
maliciously. Indeed, law professors remind bar examinees every year to leave margins
on their booklets. Despite the importance examinees put into such examinations,
however, examinees seem to constantly forget these reminders.
The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.), Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita
Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that there
were one original and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No. 402. Of these
documents, it was the original of Document No. 402 and a duplicate original of
Document No. 401 which were actually presented by petitioner himself before the trial
court, through the representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon City, who testified
pursuant to a subpoena.The latter two documents were submitted to the NBI for
examination by petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
 Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of the two Deeds of Donation
with the Bureau of Records Management. He, however, was able to find certified true
copies of these documents with the Register of Deeds and the Land Transportation
Commission.[50]
According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original of Document No. 401
was separated from the brown envelope, containing the other copies of the Deeds of
Donation, which Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to fit the
same into a certain red album. On the other hand, Maria Rita testified that one copy
each of the duplicate originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria
Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to visit her sister in Palma
de Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr., gave her the brown envelope, containing
duplicate originals of the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in Palma
de Mallorica.[51] Maria Rita explained in detail how her handbag was stolen as she was
praying in a chapel while waiting for the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de
Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate originals of the said
Deeds of Donation, but also other important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita
presented the police report of the Spanish police authorities[52] and her letter to the
Valley National Bank of U.S.A.,[53] regarding these losses.
Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of the Deeds of Donation in
his files. Jose Sebastian explained that he did so because Consuelo wanted two copies
of each document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the Notarial Registrar
duplicate originals of the document, he had to photocopy the same to keep as his own
copies, and transmit to the Notarial Registrar whatever duplicate original copies he
had. Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a duplicate original of
Document No. 402, what was left with him was the original.[54]
While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate incidents and accidents presented
by respondents do arouse some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita,
and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial court, which found them
to be credible. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court
respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before
the court. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would materially affect the result of
the case, this Court will undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.[55]
All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to instill doubts in our
minds. While such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal
cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of fact and
credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. It must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a conviction of
the lower court based on reasonable doubt, overturning judgments in civil cases should
be based on preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification that, when
the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court should find for the defendant.[56]
Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the person they claim to have
prepared said Deeds of Donation, was never confronted during the trial with all these
alleged irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such, the trial court was
never given a chance to determine whether Ariston, Jr. would have given a rational,
logical and acceptable explanation for the same.
Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities do not, on their faces,
indicate bad faith on the part of respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront
respondents with these observations. Respondents would not have thought that the
Deeds of Donation would be impugned on the mere basis that they were written on
short bond paper, or that their margins are small. Respondents were thus deprived of a
chance to rebut these observations by testimonies and other evidence, and were forced
to explain the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts, where these
observations started to crop up. It would have been different if the date of the
documents had been after Consuelos death, or if there had been obvious alterations on
the documents. In the latter cases, it would have been the responsibility of respondents
counsel to see to it that Ariston, Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment of donors tax before the death
of Consuelo
In ruling that there had been no antedating or falsification of the subject Deeds
of Donation, the Court of Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1)
the finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid the donors tax of
the properties subject of the donation, as evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount of P119,283.63, and (2) the testimony
and certification dated 22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents
were acknowledged before him on 21 April 1979.[57] Respondents had presented
evidence to the effect that Consuelo made an initial payment of P119,283.63 for the
Donors Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr., supplied the deficiency
of P2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact
that Consuelo herself paid the donors tax of the properties subject of the donation on 9
October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donors Tax was paid on 4
December 1979, or a month after Consuelos death.[58] Petitioner thereby calls our
attention to his Exhibit O, a certificate dated 4 December 1979 issued by Mr. Nestor
M. Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR, confirming the payment
of the donors tax.The certificate reads:
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
December 4, 1979
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez
St., Makati, Metro Manila, paid donors tax on even date in the amount
of P121,409.45 inclusive of surcharge, interest and compromise penalties as
follows:
RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896956 P119,283.63
RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt No. 2896957 2,125.82
---------------
T o t a l P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7[59]
Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax Receipts (RTRs) and the
Confirmation Receipts for the payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October
1979 and by respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December 1979 bore consecutive numbers,
despite being issued months apart. Petitioner also points to the fact that the tax was
stated in the certification to have been paid on even date -- meaning, on the date of the
certification, 4 December 1979.
Petitioner presented further the check used to pay the Donors Tax, which,
petitioner himself admits, was signed by Consuelo.[60] Petitioner draws our attention to
the words RECEIVED BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10 DEC.
4. Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company Bank, Cubao Branch, received
the check on 4 December 1979 as a collection agent of the BIR.
Respondents, on the other hand, presented the following documents to prove
payment of the Donors Tax before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:
 1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner dated 24 September 1979 and
prepared by Mariano A. Requija, accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which
included the Donors Tax Return for the properties covered by the two Deeds of
Donation. The letter was stamped received by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October
1979;[61]
2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed by Mariano A. Requija
containing the breakdown of the donations received by the BIR on 8 October 1979;[62]
3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24 September 1979 and which was
also received by the BIR on 8 October 1979, enumerating all the donated properties
included in the Deeds of Donation.[63]
4) The Donors Tax Return covering the properties transferred in the two Deeds
of Donation filed, received, and receipted by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October
1979;[64]
5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-73211 issued by
Consuelo in favor of the BIR Commissioner in the amount of P119,283.63.[65]
6) An Authority to Issue Tax Receipt issued by the BIR Commissioner on 21
October 1979 for a total amount of P119,283.63.[66]
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum
probandum[67] petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged intercalation of
the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of
Consuelo. The factum probans[68] this time around is the alleged payment of the
Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum probans, even
if successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum probandum. As intimated by
respondents, payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo does not
necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of
paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum.
Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself physically and personally
delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead testified that the check
was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he, Ariston, Jr.,
physically and personally delivered the same to the BIR.[69] On the query, however, as
to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the death of Consuelo, petitioner
and respondents presented all the conflicting evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner, however,
merely formulated conjectures based on the evidence he presented, and did not bother
to present Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he
meant with the words on even date in his certification. Neither did petitioner present
any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or antedated,
thus, letting the presumption that a public official had regularly performed his duties
stand. This is in contrast to respondents direct evidence attesting to the payment of said
tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents evidence, all that
petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by evidence:
the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been given to the testimony of
the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this
Court had dismissed from the service in Garciano v. Sebastian.[70] Petitioner posits that
the dismissal of Judge Jose Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his
credibility as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the administrative
proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead the investigator, as well as employed
others to distort the truth.
Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on the 22
November 1979 Certification by Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the
questionable circumstances surrounding such certification. Said certification, marked
as petitioners Exhibit P, reads:
November 22, 1979
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
Executive Judge
CFI Quezon City
Sir:
In connection with the discrepancies noted by the Acting Clerk of Court in my
notarial report pertaining to another document submitted to the Notarial
Section last July 2, 1979 I have the honor to certify that documents Nos. 401
and 402 referring to Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor Consuelo C.
Gomez in favor of Donees Ma. Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my
presence by all the parties and their instrumental witnesses on April 21,
1979 in my office. I hereby further certify that said two documents among
other documents were reported by me in accordance with law on July 2, 1979,
for all legal intents and purposes.
In view of the above, it is respectfully requested that the certified true copies
of the said two documents officially requested by one of the Donees be issued.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN
Notary Public[71]
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made after the death of Consuelo,
and claims that the same appears to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an
opportunity for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of Donation intervivos,
despite the plain fact that the latter had utterly no relation to the matter referred to by
Jose Sebastian in the opening phrase of the letter.[72]
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of Appeals, Jose Sebastian was
originally a witness for petitioner Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules
of Court prohibits petitioner from impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect
to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared
by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to the
witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an
adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as
if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad
character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse
party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who produces a witness vouches
for him as being worthy of credit, and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the
witness would enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against him, and to
make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with the means in his hands of destroying
his credit, if he spoke against him.[73]
 Neither had there been declaration by the court that Jose Sebastian was an
unwilling or hostile witness. Jose Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an
officer, director nor a managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an adverse party.[74]
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been declared by the court as an
unwilling or hostile witness, the third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in
relation to Section 11[75] of the same Rule, only allows the party calling the witness to
impeach such witness by contradictory evidence or by prior inconsistent statements,
and never by evidence of his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastians subsequent dismissal
as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in this case.
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez,[76] which, in turn cited Cordial v.
People,[77] that:
(E)ven convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying in
court so long as, having organs of sense, they can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a
witness; the testimony of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized
in exactly the same way the testimony of other witnesses must be examined
for its relevance and credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as Jose
Sebastian has never been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but
was instead administratively sanctioned eleven years after such
testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and
the Court of Appeals did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top of
this, Jose Sebastians testimony is supported by the records of the notarial registry,
which shows that the documents in question were received by the Notarial Registrar
on 2 July 1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo on 6 November
1979.
Alleged unusual circumstances relative
to the execution and notarization of the
subject Deeds of Donation
The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner to prove the
alleged intercalation of the subject Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by
Consuelo are the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the execution
and notarization of the said deeds. According to petitioner:
1. The signing and acknowledgement of the Deeds of Donation on 21
April 1979 is highly improbable and implausible, considering the fact
that Consuelo left the same day for the United States on a pleasure
trip;[78]
2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April 1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And
even assuming that the flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by
respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures require Consuelo to be
at the airport at least two hours before flight time, or 11:00
a.m.. Petitioner points out that respondents alleged time frame (from
7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is not enough to accomplish the following
acts: respondents and Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and
arriving at the notary public Jose Sebastians house at Pag-asa, Q.C. at
about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose
Sebastian examining the documents; Jose Sebastian having a closed
meeting with Consuelo to discuss the documents; Jose Sebastian
reading the documents to respondents line by line and asking the latter
whether they accepted the donation; Jose Sebastian typing the notarial
entries; the parties signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately
with Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his services; Ariston
Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and other respondents back to Marikina,
and dropping the other respondents at their respective residences;
 picking up Consuelos luggage; and Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing
Consuelo to the Manila International Airport;[79]
3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo and respondents not
to make a prior arrangement with the notary public Jose Sebastian and
instead take a gamble on his being in his office;[80]
4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution of the donations when
she was in fact planning to come back from her pleasure trip shortly,
as she did;[81]
5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is highly suspect,
when Consuelo and respondents reside in Marikina. It is also illogical
that Consuelo would have chosen a notary public whom she met only
on the same day she executed the Deeds, especially when Consuelo
had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she availed of only two
weeks before her death;[82]
6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose Sebastian in cash, for there is
no reason for her to carry much cash in peso when she was about to
leave for the United States in that same morning;[83]
7. Maria Ritas residence certificate was obtained from Manila when she
is a resident of Marikina. Also, Maria Rita obtained said residence
certificate on 20 April 1979, and yet Maria Rita testified that she was
surprised to know of the donation only on 21 April 1979.[84] Also
suspicious are the circumstances wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr. obtained
a residence certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he knew
of the schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, and Consuelo had
two residence certificates, as she used different ones in the Deeds of
Donation and the document notarized two weeks before her death;[85]
8. If Consuelo was really frugal, she could have also made a will;[86]
9. All the instrumental witnesses of the Deeds of Donation are biased,
being themselves either donees of the other Deed of Donation, or a
relative of a donee;[87] and
10. Respondents were not able to sufficiently and substantially explain the
belated transfer of the properties covered by the assailed Deeds of
Donation. Petitioner points to Maria Ritas testimony that the real
properties were transferred after the death of Consuelo. While
respondents assert that the personal properties were transferred to them
prior to Consuelos death, evidence shows otherwise.[88]
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a person wanting to transfer her
properties by donation to her loved ones before leaving for abroad via an
airplane. While many believe these days that taking the plane is the safest way to travel,
this has not always been the case. The fear that planes sometimes crash, now believed
to be irrational, has always been at the back of the minds of air travelers. Respondents
maintain in their testimonies before the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the
satisfaction of Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have the
documents signed and notarized before she left for abroad.
The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice
removed, and thus cannot be given any weight. Petitioner claims that he was told by
his twelve-year old son that Consuelo was leaving at 11:00 a.m. on 21 April 1979, such
son having learned about this from the maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelos
house that day.[89] This is in contrast to Maria Ritas positive testimony that the flight
time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same day.[90] Maria Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.
As regards petitioners claim that respondents alleged time frame in the morning
of 21 April 1979 was insufficient, this Court is not convinced. As held by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner did not present any proof that it had been impossible to perform
those alleged acts within three hours.[91] As argued by respondents, the one-paged
documents can be read aloud without difficulty within five to ten minutes each. We can
also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic is usually very minimal on Saturday
mornings, and was much less of a problem in 1979.
Respondents and Consuelos decision not to make a prior arrangement with
notary public Jose Sebastian does not surprise us either. Respondents explain that, since
the telephone lines of Marikina were inefficient in the year 1979, they decided to take
a calculated gamble. It is not at all unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be
at his house on a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.
With respect to the choice of a notary public from Quezon City, we find the
explanation relative thereto satisfying. We quote:
Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed that they could not have gone to
the notary public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew because she did not want
to go to said notary public since our cousins whom she didnt like had access
to him and she wanted to keep the execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:
Q: And also you know for a fact that your auntie had
a regular Notary Public for the preparation and notarization of
legal documents in the name of Atty. Angeles, now
Congressman Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He
was a regular Notary Public, but way before that date. But
after that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not
anymore that regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of graces
of your auntie, year before that?
A: I dont specifically remember but what I do know
is such confidential document like this, we would not really
go to Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
xxxx
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This
confidential nature, no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more
Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about Atty.
Angeles.
Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with
Atty. Angeles in connection with the latters performance of
his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
xxxx
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that
after the execution of the two documents in question dated
April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your
auntie and you added that as a consequence, your auntie did
not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when it
comes to confidential matters, is that correct?
 A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the
documents are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt spell
out what these confidential matters are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was
under the category confidential.
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of notarizing
this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie such that she
made known to you this falls under confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie
that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave that
idea or information that these documents should be notarized
by other notary public other than Angeles, because it is
confidential?
A: It came from her.
Q: Yes, did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
Thats what he said. It came from her.
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie
told you that these two documents are of confidential matters?
A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be notarized,
she said more or less, ayaw ko kay Atty. Angeles.
Q: She said that?
A: Thats correct.
Q: And you were curious to know why she told you
that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that
Atty. Angeles.well, my cousins whom she didnt like have
access to Atty. Angeles.[92]
The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the belated transfer of the
properties does not affect the validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the
credibility of respondents factual assertions:
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the defendants were able
to sufficiently and substantially explain the reason for the belated transfer of
the pertinent properties, i.e., after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the
testimony of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real properties are concerned,
the following:
Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that as
early as when you went to the States in the company of your
auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land together with
the improvements consisting of a house were transferred to
you, you did not exert efforts after your arrival from the States
to effect the transfer of these properties?
A: No, I did not.

Q: Why?
A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I
am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me akin na iyon but I did
not transfer it in my name. Siempre nakakahiya.
Q: That was your reason for not effecting the transfer
of the properties in your name?
A: Yes, that was my reason.
Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly
executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos,
meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
A: I do not know the legal term donation inter vivos. I
have also my sentiment. Tita Elo was very close to us but I
did not want to tell her: Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan SA
akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko. It is not my character to
be very aggressive.
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and
by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and
intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts,
by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription.
Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of the defendants is not
the mode by which they acquired ownership of the properties, but rather the
fact that the same were donated to them. The circumstance that aforesaid
properties were actually transferred in the names of the donees only after the
death of the donor, although the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979,
does not by itself indicate that the said documents were antedated.[93]
Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility one which experience tells
us is not a rare occurrence at all that donations are often resorted to in place of
testamentary dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such properties
usually remain in the donors possession during his or her lifetime, despite the fact that
the donations have already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of utilizing donation
as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.
Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of Jose Sebastian in cash, the
suggestion that Consuelo should have also made a will, and the claim that all the
instrumental witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.
In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented by petitioner had failed to
comply with the strict requirements in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While the above provision seems to refer only to criminal cases, it has been
pointed out that in some jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal
actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a proposition by circumstantial
evidence. In such jurisdictions the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances
established must not only be consistent with the proposition asserted but also
inconsistent with any other rational theory.[94]
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to raise doubts in our
minds. Again, while such approach would succeed if carried out by the accused in
criminal cases, plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn findings of
fact and credibility by the trial court, especially when the same had been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioners evidence could only produce a mere
equipoise:
When the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for
the defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weaknesses of the defendants claim. Even if the evidence of the
plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in
itself to establish his cause of action.[95] (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners liability for damages
The last part of the trial courts decision, which was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals, involves the award of damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held
Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo jointly and solidarily liable for
moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
The trial court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff was so desperate for evidence to
support his charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed the defendants themselves;
at the risk of presenting evidence contradictory to his legal position and which
actually happened, when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez Jr., Ariston
Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was motivated not by a sincere desire
to insure the totality of the estate of Consuelo, but rather by his desire to cause
injury to defendants, and to appropriate for himself and the rest of the Gomez
brothers and nephews, other than the donees, properties which were clearly
validly disposed of by Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos.[96]
Our own examination of the records of the case, however, convinces us of the
contrary. Respondents never assailed the authenticity of petitioners evidence, and
merely presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As previously stated,
petitioners evidence had successfully given us doubts as to the authenticity of the
subject Deeds of Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge petitioners
burden of proof, they are enough to convince us that petitioners institution of the
present case was carried out with good faith. The subpoenas directed against
respondents merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioners counsel to represent
its client, which can neither be taken against the counsel, nor against its clients.
While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on two
blank sheets of paper signed by Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the
opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the respondents. Having failed to
discharge this burden to prove bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case,
petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be held liable for moral
damages.
 This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages, no exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary damages
are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of damages mentioned.[97]
The attorneys fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the
consequence of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding by the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the assailed Decision, the
Petition is DENIED. The Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in
Civil Cases No. 36089 and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the following portion
be DELETED:
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo Gomez,
jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorneys fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all the amounts, except on costs and
attorneys fees, commencing from February 15, 1980, until fully paid.
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.
Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.
Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial
court in a petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The
witness testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not
the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing
the contents of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she
is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent
de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes,
Karl Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the
couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In 1973,
they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz
prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978,
presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the
ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at
the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz
before the trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground
that it violated the rule on privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any
evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged
communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among
others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false,
fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since
resided after their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose
the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz'
Statement for the Record. 8
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that —
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the
respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the
respondent had been suffering from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the said
psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not object thereto on
the ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient and physician. What
was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was irrelevant. So, the Court
feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether the respondent
as alleged in the petition was suffering from psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric
report is very material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without
prejudice on the part of the respondent to dispute the said report or to cross-examination
first the petitioner and later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be
presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4,
1991, and directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the
record. A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On
5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the
psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part
of the records of the case. She argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity,
"WITH MORE REASON should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular
instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters between a physician and
patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician
which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a
patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is —
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his physician of
all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end that the physician
may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric
evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets
circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the
relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what cannot be done directly should
not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she
asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her
Answer was filed. She maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple
pleading and is not as it has never been intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of
there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to expunge it from the records. his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the
physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable
confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by
communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner." 16In fact, according to
encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a
him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against his wife
psychotherapist.
in a civil case filed by one against the other.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the
Appeals 22 clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully
person entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege
consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal
is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
and declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that petitioner
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the
also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the
information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded
(formerly character) of the patient.
or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity
to the evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits
wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this
that this in reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent
does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a
provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of
with the Rules is proper.
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on
physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making
the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May
communications between physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence
1991, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony
in the patient and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms
as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that
and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information
it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the
that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. 18 For, the patient
evidence offered may be admitted.
should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his reputation
tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The
allegations contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private
respondent's declarations which may be denied or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already
lapsed and private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude
his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to
act with deliberate speed in resolving the main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that
may further delay this case. If all lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion
of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals depthless issues, there will be no
end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever be clogged with
inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court
rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed,
there is no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the
agony of the wedded couple who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a
renewed blissful life either alone or in the company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELEUTERIO DE LEON and REYNALDO MANAYAO, accused. ELEUTERIO DE
LEON, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Eleuterio de Leon seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 finding him and his co-
accused, Reynaldo Manayao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim jointly in the amount of P50,000.00; and to pay the victim's wife the amounts of
P180,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages. Accused Reynaldo
Manayao chose not to appeal from the decision.
In an information filed with the trial court on 10 November 1992, the accused were charged
with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That at or about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1992, in the Municipality of Angat,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with Armalite rifles and Caliber .45 pistols, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with common design, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, employing means to the [sic]
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity, and with evident
premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ambush, attack and shoot from behind Marcelino Santiago who was hit at the head while he
was driving his owner-type jeep, and as a result he died instantaneously to the prejudice and
damage of his legal heirs.
Contrary to law. 2
Accused Eleuterio de Leon was arrested on 13 April 1993,3 and afterwards, he filed a motion
to fix bail. 4 Accused Reynaldo Manayao, on the other hand, was arrested on 24 May 1993.5
Upon their separate arraignments, 6 the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the
court conducted hearings on the motion to fix bail with the express agreement between the
parties that the evidence to be presented at such hearings would be considered as evidence
on the merits of the case.7
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano,
a farmer from Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2
Alfredo Bartolome. The substance of their testimony was that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of
23 August 1992 in the vicinity of the Robal Transit Terminal in Angat, Bulacan, they saw the
accused gun down Marcelino Santiago, one of the managers of Robal Transit, while the latter
was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction that the jeep was
headed, 8 while Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell
the latter something. 9
The victim's jeep had already passed Mariano when the shots were fired. Turning around,
Mariano saw the accused shooting the victim, with de Leon holding an Armalite at waist level
and Manayao, a .45 caliber pistol at shoulder height. 10 Mariano heard six shots in all. As he
was only about ten meters away from the accused, he could still see the gun barrels emitting
smoke. After shooting the victim, both accused, joined by a third male whom Mariano could
not identify, left the area by leisurely walking towards an alley, which was right in front of
Mariano. Mariano immediately recognized the two accused because they were his
townmates. Mariano went home at once. It was only after the funeral that he told the wife of
the victim that he knew her husband's killers. He then gave his statement to the police. 11
Chavez was on the street in front of the bus terminal and about six meters from the accused
when the latter fired at the victim. Because of fear, Chavez went inside the bus terminal, only
to return to the scene of the crime later to assist in carrying into the funeral parlor's vehicle
the body of the victim, which was then slumped sidewise in his jeep. The jeep had swerved to
the sidewalk after the victim was hit. Later that day, Chavez informed the victim's wife that
he had witnessed the commission of the crime. 12
SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome, a police investigator, took down the statement of Simon Mariano
on 24 August 1992. 13
Immediately after the termination of the testimony of Bartolome, the trial court orally denied
the application for bail because the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. 14 It then
required the prosecution to present its other witnesses. 15
The prosecution forthwith presented Dr. Rosauro Villarama, the Municipal Health Officer of
Angat, Bulacan, who performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Marcelino Santiago,
at 11:00 a.m. of 23 August 1992. 16 He found one gunshot wound on the victim's head, the
entry point being above the right ear and the point of exit, "slightly above 3 in. front of left
ear," causing a fracture and laceration. He concluded that the cause of the victim's death was
"cerebral hemorrhage, gunshot wound, head." 17 This gunshot wound was caused by an
Armalite. 18
After Dr. Villarama completed his testimony, the trial court dictated an order 19 formally
denying the petition for bail because "[s]ufficient evidence has been established to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong."
Three additional witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely, Eduardo Valencia,
Chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division of the Angat Police Station; Senior
Inspector Carlito Feliciano, Chief of the Angat Police Station; and Mrs. Mercedes Villarama-
Santiago, widow of the victim.
Valencia declared that upon receiving a report from PO3 Enriquez about a shooting incident
at the bus terminal of Sta. Maria Liner, he, together with two other companions, went to the
terminal and found the jeep of Marcelino Santiago on the right side of the road going to
Bustos with the corpse of Santiago bathed in blood. They tried to run after the assassins.
Failing to catch the latter, they returned to the scene of the crime where they found empty
cartridges from an Armalite. Thereafter, they called their district office, which sent
investigators to whom Valencia turned over the empty cartridges. During the investigation,
Simon Mariano told him that the assassins were the accused herein. Valencia then prepared
a spot report. At the trial, he submitted a case folder of accused Reynaldo Manayao showing
that the latter had pending cases for illegal possession of firearms, robbery in band, extortion,
and destruction of property. 20
Senior Inspector Feliciano testified on the arrest by his team of accused Reynaldo Manayao,
who was included in their order of battle, being a leader of an "organized syndicated crime
group." 21
Mrs. Santiago declared that she and the victim were married in 1966 and were blessed with
five children. She believed that her husband was killed because of his having testified on the
Tuesday preceding his death in a civil case involving the lot rented by Robal Transit or because
of business competition between Robal Transit and Sta. Maria Liner. Her husband earned
from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month as operations manager of Robal Transit and as a
farmer. For his burial, she spent P50,000.00 for the casket; P60,000.00 for the burial lot; and
P70,000.00 as miscellaneous expenses. She left to the discretion of the court the
determination of the monetary value of the moral shock and anxiety she suffered as a
consequence of the death of her husband. 22
The appellant interposed alibi as his defense. He presented three witnesses to corroborate
his story, namely, Elmer Tosoc, Manuel Santos, and Cezar Santos. He declared that in the
morning of 23 August 1992, he was waiting for his salary to be paid at the house of Architect
Elmer Tosoc in Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan. The latter employed him as a custodian of
construction materials at job sites. He did not leave the Tosoc residence at any time on the
date in question. He further claimed that prosecution witness Simon Mariano bore a grudge
against him, as he (appellant) fathered a child with Mariano's niece seven years prior and did
not marry the woman. 23
On cross-examination, the appellant admitted that Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan, was only about
eight kilometers away from Angat, Bulacan, and that it would take approximately half an hour
to traverse the distance by bus or passenger jeep. 24 He also admitted that he had known
Simon Mariano for about seven years and that if Mariano saw him during the day, Mariano
could easily recognize him. 25
On 23 March 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein it gave full
faith and credence to the prosecution's evidence and declared the alibi offered by the defense
to be feeble. Thus:
Alibi is not a proper defense where it is not impossible for the accused to be at the scene of
the crime and no improper motive was shown against the witnesses who identified the
accused.
Again, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses and because it was not physically impossible for said accused to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of commission considering the proximity of the place where
the accused were, hence, the defense of alibi is rejected. The testimony of the eyewitnesses
are sufficient for conviction. Mariano's and Chavez' testimonies were sufficient to convict
both accused because it was given unhesitatingly in a straight forward manner and it was full
of details which by their nature could not have been merely invented. The Court again
considered the fact that alibi is one of the weakest defense[s] an accused can invoke, easily
lending itself to concoction and embroidery. It must invariably be viewed with suspicion and
may be considered only when established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence to be
given credence. It must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some
other place but only that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, both accused testified that they are only
about 5 minutes away from the scene of the incident and has all the time and opportunity to
perpetuate the crime.
In addition thereto, there maybe some few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution but they refer to minor details and do not in
actuality touch upon the basic aspects of the why's and where of the crime committed, thus,
credibility is not impaired. 26
As earlier adverted to, only appellant Eleuterio de Leon appealed from the decision. In his
Brief, he assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING HIM GUILTY ONLY OF HOMICIDE.
We find no merit in the appeal.
In his first assigned error, the appellant invites our attention to alleged material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses.
First, he alleges that Mariano's testimony regarding the relative positions of the victim and
the appellant is contradictory. He cites Mariano's initial testimony that the two accused were
behind the victim when they shot him. Then, he proceeds to point out that under questions
from the court, Mariano said that the two accused were facing the jeep when they shot the
victim; yet, the medico legal officer testified that the bullet entered the victim's right ear,
clearly showing that the assailants were on the right side of the victim. 27
This alleged inconsistency is more apparent than real for the appellant is merely confused as
to the juxtaposition of the accused and the victim. The Appellee, however, has put things and
people in their proper place and explains:
Facing the victim's jeepney does not mean that the gunwielders were right in front of the
victim's jeep and they shot the victim frontally. It only means that the gunwielders were facing
towards the jeep (not necessarily the front portion thereof) when they shot the victim. But as
the physical evidence indicates the gunwielders must [have] be[en] facing towards the rear
side of the jeep when they shot the victim as the latter was actually hit from behind. 28
Second, the appellant calls this Court's attention to the portion of Mariano's testimony that
the appellant was more or less six to seven meters away from the victim, while Chavez
testified that the appellant was approximately twelve meters away from the victim. These
estimations, the appellant concludes, are "incredible" in light of the medico-legal officer's
testimony that the gunman must have been about one meter away when he fired the
shots. 29 Such a conclusion is baseless and can only stem from a misreading of the transcript
of the stenographic notes to mislead this Court. It is based on a single clarificatory question
propounded by the lower court to the medico-legal officer, viz.,
Q One (1) meter?
A Yes, sir. 30
The appellant clearly overlooked the immediately preceding question and the corresponding
answer of the medico-legal officer which indubitably showed that the distance was more than
one meter. Thus:
Q Can you determine the distance of the gunman?
A It is possible that the gunman is more than 1 meter [away]. 31 (emphasis supplied)
Third, the appellant points out that at first Mariano testified that he had heard six shots, but
later he said that he had heard only three shots. 32 This inconsistency was never shown to be
of crucial importance as to affect the credibility of the witness. It is to us a minor, if not trivial
one.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight
of their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than
weaken their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event would see differently
some details of a startling occurrence. Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses,
such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward,
and spontaneous testimony. 33
The appellant next contends that Mariano could not have clearly seen the incident, as
Mariano "was already several meters away not to mention the fact that it was a busy street
then being a Sunday and at a time when people were on the street attending to their Sunday
obligations. 34 The contemplation lacks any semblance of substantiation. There is unrebutted
evidence that the street was not bustling with activity that fateful morning when the crime
was committed. Thus:
Q Do I understand Mr. witness, that . . . the street there [sic] was a busy street meaning that
there were so many vehicles that were parked along the highway?
xxx xxx xxx
A At that time there was [sic] none, sir.
Q Not even a Sta. Maria Liner parked along the highway?
A None, sir. 35
The appellant admitted during cross-examination that Mariano could have easily recognized
him, since Mariano and the appellant had known each other for at least seven years. 36 The
veracity of the positive identification is strengthened by the trial court's efforts to satisfy itself
with the certainty of the eyewitnesses' identification of the perpetrators of the crime as
shown by the following questions it asked them and their answers thereto:
Court: [addressing eyewitness Mariano]
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, the 2 accused both are charged with a grave offense and you are pointing your finger
at them as the culprit[s]. Since the penalty here is very grave, you must be sure of your
statement? Now, I will ask you, are you sure that these 2 accused were the ones who shot
Santiago?
[Sections 21, 22, 23, 20, and 25], all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in
the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not
be a ground for disqualification. Clearly, the mere pendency of a criminal case against a
person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness. As a matter of fact, conviction of a
crime does not disqualify such person from being presented as a witness unless otherwise
provided by law. 40
The appellant's claim that Mariano bore a grudge against him because he (appellant)
impregnated Mariano's niece was not established by credible proof.

A Yes, sir. 37 In an attempt to discredit the other eyewitness, Chavez, the appellant contends that the
former "is only an afterthought witness to shore up the sinking ship of Simon Mariano" as
Court: [addressing eyewitness Chavez] evidenced by the fact that he "informed the authorities . . . only nine (9) months after the
xxx xxx xxx killing and was an employee of the company owned by the victim." 41

Q Do you know that if you are testifying falsely, these two (2) persons might go to jail and
taste a life sentence?
A Yes, sir.
Q You still claim that they were the killers?
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Q Walang kargo de konsiyensiya, hindi ka nagkakamali?
A Hindi po.38
Fast realizing that his cause lacks the proverbial "leg to stand on," the appellant capitalizes on
Mariano's admission that he was charged with homicide or murder before another court. He
then submits that no credence could be given to Mariano because the latter was himself
accused of having killed somebody. 39 Such a submission fails to impress us. Section 20, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided for in the succeeding sections
We are not persuaded. We agree with the following counter-arguments of the Appellee, thus:
As regards Ramon Chavez, he substantially corroborated the testimony of Simon Mariano on
all significant points. The fact that he stepped forward as [an] eyewitness only after nine
months following the incident, does not per se destroy his credibility. People's natural
hesitation to get involved in cases, whether civil or criminal, is a matter of public knowledge.
Also, the fact that Ramon Chavez was a subordinate employee of the victim . . . does not
diminish his truthfulness as a witness. On the contrary, being an employee of Robal Transit,
Ramon Chavez would only be interested to punish the real wrongdoer in the murder of his
boss . . . .42
The natural reticence of most people to get involved as a witness in a criminal case is of judicial
notice. Their failure to submit to an investigation by any public authority or to execute a sworn
statement does not by itself diminish or impair their credibility. 43 We need only to reiterate
here what we stated in People vs. Kyamko: 44
Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the
expectation of mankind. Human nature teaches us that people may react differently to the
same situation. One person's spontaneous or unthinking, or even instinctive, response to a
horrid and repulsive stimulus may be aggression while other's may be cold indifference. We
have taken judicial notice of the fact that witnesses in our country are reluctant to volunteer
information to the authorities. In any event, [the witness] did in fact immediately inform the
victim's mother of the stabbing incident. This was sufficient to remove any doubt that he had
witnessed the commission of the crime.
Chavez testified that he did not go to the police because he was afraid. 45 It was only on 31
May 1993, or a week after the arrest of accused Manayao but a day before the court started
hearing the case, that he went to see Prosecutor Alberto Vizcocho and volunteered to testify
in this case. 46 Anyhow, the fact remains that he told the victim's wife on the day the shooting
incident took place that he had witnessed the killing. 47
With respect to the presence or absence of an ulterior motive, this Court has had occasion to
rule that the relation of superior and subordinate, by itself, does not constitute such ulterior
motive:
[A] witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even
render it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating
the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Nor is the testimony of a witness
discredited by the mere fact that he is an employee of the complainant. 48
Having now come full circle, this Court is left with no recourse but to reject the defense of
alibi invoked by the appellant.
We have time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate
and difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
witnesses. 49 Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time the same was committed. 50
In the instant case, such physical impossibility was not shown to have existed. By the
appellant's own admission, the place where he claimed to be was only about eight kilometers
away from the scene of the crime and that it would have taken only half an hour to traverse
the distance by bus or passenger jeep. 51 Such distance was not so great as to preclude his
having been at the scene of the crime when the shooting occurred.
The appellant's second assigned error must also fail. The trial court appreciated against the
appellant the qualifying circumstances of treachery and use of superior force and armed men,
which are alleged in the information. We agree in its appreciation of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might
make. 52 As correctly contended by the Appellee:
The factual milieu of the case undeniably shows that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
attended the killing of the victim. The attack was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, with
the assailants each armed with high-powered weapons. In fine, the attack was carried out in
such a manner that the victim was totally helpless and in no position to either fight back or
escape. Moreover, in view of the fact that the assailants fired at the victim as the latter was
driving his jeep, the inescapable conclusion is that the attack was coolly and deliberately
adopted . . . to ensure its accomplishment without risk to themselves arising from the defense
which the victim might put up. 53
We are in full accord with the said contention. Given the attendant circumstances, it cannot
be disputed that the appellant employed means and methods in the execution of the crime
which directly and especially insured such execution without the slightest risk to themselves,
since the victim did not have the slightest chance to defend himself.
The trial court, however, should not have appreciated the other qualifying aggravating
circumstance of "use of superior force and armed men." In using this phrase, the trial court
must have had in mind the qualifying aggravating circumstances of (a) with the aid of armed
men and (b) taking advantage of superior strength, which are distinct from each
other. 54 Taking advantage of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, i.e., it cannot be
estimated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is present. 55 There
is, as well, no factual basis for the other aggravating circumstance which, of course,
presupposes the presence of armed men other than the accused themselves.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of Branch 15 of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 2320-M-92 is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its
Decision1 dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and imposes
upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
[P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00 actual damages,
and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This court has no jurisdiction over
Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in
BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was
being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon),
Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified that on said
night, they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours,
while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran3 (Jerome), the
accused-appellant’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist
Mercado when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-
appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were
outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and
shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back.
It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from where
Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the
accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple
gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted
that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. Heand
Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was located and they only heard the
gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accused-appellant’s defense, with Edgar
Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and that it was some other unknown
person, and not the accused-appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating
that he was with the accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the
commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-appellant
was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder.6 The RTC also
rejected the accused-appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also
ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision8 dated July
27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTC’s
conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and that
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. According to the CA, the was in fact shot by some other person.20 At this juncture, the Court notes that the testimony
information failed to contain the allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for the of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants – the accused-appellant and his brother,
prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the accused-appellant ganged up on the Jerome; however, it was only the accused-appellant who was charged with the death of
victim.10 Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21

The CA, however, sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery.11 The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that "the cause of death
was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was admitted during
The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution failed to
the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.22 And even assuming that the
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant argued that
cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accused-appellant liable for the death of
the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant and his culpability.13
Sareno on the basis of the Court’s ruling in People v. Pilola.23
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
the accused-appellant’s argument.
Factual findings of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive
to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA.14 The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and
admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health
criminal.15In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple
crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony
stab wound scapular area."24 Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the
of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant’s argument that it was
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all
impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show
agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced
that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only
in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the
three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them.
accused.25 In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the
Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangon’s attention. He even
prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the
immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police investigation, and
defense failed to object to its admission.26 Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal
there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that the accused-
health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of
appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the
death of the victim.27 Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the
accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and
following:
denial.17 Such positive identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on
the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.18 CAUSES OF DEATH

The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder committed Immediate cause : DOA
by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous
death.19 The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno
 Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW
Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L)28
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death.29
More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter,
it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s
death. In Quinto v. Andres,30 the Court stated that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy
and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or
diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result.
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give
immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x
x[.]31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that the killing of Sareno
was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are
shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the
person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.32 Treachery is
not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the
part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at
the spur of the moment.33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting
and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that
happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant
and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. In
fact, what was revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent
bystander who unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and Jerome’s
rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of
Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the penalty
of reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years.34 In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period,35 or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,36 the maximum of
the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal medium,37 and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the RPC for the offense,38 or prision mayor in any of its periods, which
ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.39 There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) moral damages, as these
are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00)
attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on
record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in
the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed under the circumstances provided
for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,42 and absent any evidence supporting its grant, the same
must be deleted for lack of factual basis.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty
of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often
(10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's
fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ILISAN V PEOPLE
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the August 23, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
29937, which affirmed with modification the June 14, 2005 decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, finding petitioner Romeo Ilisan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide.
The RTC and the CA similarly arrived at the following factual findings:
On February 3, 2002, a baptismal celebration was held at the residence of Ricky Silva
in Barangay Nagkaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City. Among those who attended were
petitioner and one Joey Gaton (Gaton). They belonged to different groups of guests.[3]
While Gaton and petitioner were having a drinking spree with their respective groups,
one of petitioners companions apparently got irked by the way Gaton looked at him. This
prompted petitioner and his companions to maul Gaton. A melee then ensued; in the course of
which, petitioner shot Gaton at the abdomen, causing the latters instantaneous death.[4] The gun
used by petitioner was a .45 caliber pistol.
On February 7, 2002, an Information for murder was filed against petitioner with the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, viz.:
That on or about 3rd day of February, 2002, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation and with use of superior strength assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon the person of one JOEY GATON Y GARALDE, by
then and there shooting him with a gun hitting him on his trunk, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of JOEY
GATON Y GARALDE.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
When arraigned on March 18, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.[6]
Evidence for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of Gabriel Gaton, the victims
brother, Marlon Dellamas, and Edgardo Dag-um, both neighbors of the victim, who all
positively identified petitioner as the gunman. Gabriel Gaton was summoned to the place of
the incident while his brother was being mauled; Marlon Dellamas went to the scene of the
incident to look for his brother Jojo; and Edgardo Dag-um was at the place where the mauling
and shooting transpired.
In his defense, petitioner and his witnesses, Jomarie Ilisan and Jaime Escasinas,
petitioners brother and cousin, respectively, claimed that another guest, Chito Partisala, a jail
guard in Bicutan, was the assailant. The defense also presented Engineer Leonard Jabonillo,
Forensic Chemist of the Central Police District Crime Laboratory, who testified that petitioner
tested negative for gunpowder residue when paraffin tests were conducted on him a day after
the incident.
In its June 14, 2005 decision, the RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses over the declarations of the defense. There being no adequate proof that
treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing of Gaton, the RTC convicted
petitioner of homicide, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused ROMEO
ILISAN y PIABOL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a term ranging from eight years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amounts of P75,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 for the death of the
victim and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The period during which said accused was under detention should be deducted
from the service of his sentence. Let a mittimus order be issued for service of
sentence.[7]
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
who allegedly harbored ill motive against him because they were either related to the victim or
to one of the participants in the commotion. Petitioner also argued that the negative results of
the paraffin residue test conducted on him strongly indicate his innocence.[8]
In a Decision dated August 23, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTCs finding of guilt, but modified
the amount of actual damages awarded and the maximum period of the penalty imposed by
adding one (1) more day thereto, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the trial courts Decision dated June 14, 2005 is affirmed, subject to
the modification of the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, and the reduction of the award of actual damages to P58,520.00.[9]
Hence, the present petition wherein petitioner reiterates the issues he raised before the
CA.
We deny the petition.
The Court generally defers to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witness
and their testimonies, for it is in a better position to decide questions of credibility, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their attitude and deportment during trial.[10] In the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and
circumstances which would alter a conviction, we are doctrinally bound by the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses.[11] The application of this rule becomes even more
stringent when such findings are sustained by the appellate court,[12] as in the present case.
 We see no misappreciation of facts committed by the courts a quo, which were uniform
in their reliance on the prosecutions version. Both were correct in concluding that the identity
of petitioner and his actual shooting of Gaton were established beyond moral certainty through
the testimonies of three (3) witnesses, namely: (i) Gabriel Gaton, who was summoned to the
place of the incident while his brother Gaton was being mauled; (ii) Marlon Dellamas, who
went to the scene of the incident to look for his brother; and (iii) Edgardo Dag-um, who was in
the vicinity when the shooting transpired. Their ensuing testimonies are notable:
Gabriel Gaton:
Q: When Helen Dellamas went to your house and told you that your brother
was being mauled, what did you do, if you did anything?
A: We went to the place and we saw a person holding a gun.
Q: You said that you went to the place, where was this place located?
A: Near our house, sir.
Q: Now, you said that you saw a man when you went there, what else did you
see?
A: I saw him pointing a gun at my brother Joey.
Q: How far were you when you saw that man who was pointing a gun at your
brother Joey?
A: (Witness indicating a distance of 10 meters more or less.)
Q: And how far was the man with a gun from your brother Joey?
A: (Witness indicating a distance of 2 meters.)
Q: What was the position of your brother Joey when the man was pointing his
gun to your brother Joey?
A: Sidewise, sir.
Q: What happened after you saw the man pointing a gun at your brother?
A: I shouted: Dont (Huwag naman) but he ignored me and then the gun went
off.
Q: What happened after the gun went off?
A: After firing the gun, he pointed the gun to the bystanders.
Q: What happened to your brother?
A: He fell down, sir.[13]
Marlon Dellamas:
Q: Please tell this Honorable Court what [you were] doing [at] that time?
A: I was looking for my brother Joey Dellamas.
Q: If you can remember, were there many people on that alley?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And what was the [lighting] condition of that alley at that time?
A: It was very bright at that time.
Q: At that time and place, was there any unusual incident that transpired on
that place?
A: Yes maam, there was. They were arguing.
Q: You said that they were arguing, tell this Honorable Court who was
arguing, could you please be specific?
A: The visitors of the owner of the house, maam.
xxxx
Q: What happened after they entered the gate which you said was opened?
A: The person who was armed with a gun shot at Joey Gaton.
Q: How far were you when this person shot Joey Gaton, how far were you to
this person?
A: I was very near, maam. I was about a meter only away from them.
 Q: Mr. Witness, you said a while ago that Joey Gaton was already dead, how
xxxx did he die?
Q: And what happened after this person who you just identified as Romeo A: He was shot, sir.
Ilisan shot Joey Gaton, what happened?
A: Joey Gaton fell down, maam.[14] Q: Who shot him?
A: Romeo Ilisan, sir.
Edgardo Dag-um:
xxxx
Q: While you were enjoying yourself with your companions, do you recall of Q: You pointed to Romeo Ilisan as the person who shot Joey Gaton, how far
any unusual incident that happened? were you when Romeo Ilisan shot Joey Gaton?
A: Yes, sir, we heard shouts. A: About two (2) meters away sir.

Q: Where did [those] shouts c[o]me from? Q: What kind of firearm did this Romeo Ilisan use in shooting Joey Gaton?
A: From outside. A: .45, sir.[15]

Q: When you heard [the] shouts, what did you do?

A: We went out the premises of the house of my sister. The fact that Gabriel Gaton is the victims brother does not impair his credibility as a
witness. Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive,
xxxx
Q: And what did you see outside? nor does it ipso facto diminish the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. On the
A: There were persons quarrelling, sir. contrary, a witness relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her testimony
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime
Q: Do you know that persons who were quarrelling [at] that time?
to accuse somebody other than the culprit. The natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives
xxxx of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from
A: I saw my brother-in-law Jojo Dellamas and Joey Gaton being mauled by implicating persons other than the true culprits.[16]
some male persons.

xxxx
Q: And when you saw people attacking your brother-in-law and Joey Gaton,
what else happened?
A: When some of the neighbors were approaching the scene of the incident,
those male persons who were mauling my brother-in-law entered the
yard of the house of Jaime E[s]casinas.
There is likewise no indication that Marlon Dellamas and Edgardo Dag-um were
improperly motivated when they testified against petitioner. As aptly observed by the Office
of the Solicitor General in its Comment,[17] aside from the prosecution witnesses relationship
with the other participants in the fight, petitioner failed to show any other basis for the ill motive
he imputes against them. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for

prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists,
and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.[18]
Petitioners reliance on the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on him the
day after the fateful event must fail. Our ruling in People v. Manalo,[19] is apropos:
[E]ven if he were subjected to a paraffin test and the same yields a negative
finding, it cannot be definitely concluded that he had not fired a gun as it is
possible for one to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates
as when the hands are washed before the test. The Court has even recognized
the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces on the hand if, as in
the instant case, the bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol.
Indeed, paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court.
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved extremely unreliable. It
can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand; still, the test alone
cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm.
The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a
[20]
probability but not of infallibility that a person has fired a gun. Conversely, the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on petitioners hands, the day after the incident, does not conclusively
establish that he did not fire a gun; neither are the negative results yielded by the paraffin test
an insurmountable proof of his innocence.
The courts a quo also correctly rejected the version of the defense as a mere
afterthought intended to exculpate petitioner, viz.:
If it is true that they saw Chito Partisala sh[o]ot Joey, why they did not tell the
policeman who arrived at the crime scene immediately that Partisala was the
gunman. Why did Jomarie wait until somebody pointed to the accused as the
gunman before he told them that it [was] Partisala who shot the victim. [21]
Thus, the positive, clear, and categorical testimonies of the three eyewitnesses to
the crime deserve full merit in both probative weight and credibility over the negative results
of the paraffin test conducted on petitioner and his witnesses anomalous claims.
We now go to the penalty imposed. Homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal.[22] There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance proven in the case at bar,
the penalty should be applied in its medium period of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.[23]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty will be selected from
the above range, with the minimum penalty being selected from the range of the penalty one
degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor (six [6] years and one [1] day to
twelve (12) years). Hence, the indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, imposed by the RTC, and affirmed with modification by
the CA, is correct.
The civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC and the CA were also in
order and consistent with current jurisprudence.
 Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime.[24] Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award
[25]
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is proper.
Moral damages must also be awarded because these are mandatory in cases of
[26]
homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. The award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages[27] is correct.
We must, however, modify the actual damages awarded by the CA. Actual damages
pertain to the actual expenses incurred by the victims heirs in relation to his death, i.e., burial
and funeral expenses. To justify an award therefor, it is necessary for a party to produce
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts. [28] In this case, the actual
expenses incurred for the wake and burial of the victim were duly shown by receipts marked
[29]
as Exhibits K, L, M, and M-1 in the aggregate amount of P88,520.00. But the CA awarded
only P58,520.00, which, after a perusal of the records, appears to have been caused by the non-
inclusion of Exhibit L, a receipt for P30,000.00 paid by the victims wife to La Funeraria
Novaliches for the deceaseds autopsy and embalming treatment, and use of mortuary
equipment for the interment. Having convincingly proved the nature of the expense in the
amount of P30,000.00 in Exhibit L, it is only right to increase the actual damages awarded to
the victims heirs to P88,520.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The August
23, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification that the award of
actual damages is increased to P88,520.00.
The presence of the nitrate (CM) does not prove bans hich is the discharge of the gun.
BSB v. GO
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600[1] dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and
set aside the September 13, 2004[2] and November 5, 2004[3] Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36[4] in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The
said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the
suppression of the testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security Bank account,
and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein
representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to
as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company
as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and account for the payments made by
the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint
for estafa and/or qualified theft[5] against respondent, alleging that several
[6]
checks representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys
customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the companys
coffers, indorsed by respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account
maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila
Branch.[7] Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city
prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against respondent.[8]
 Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 36, in an Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic)
between January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent [to] gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount
ofP1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by
RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with
grave abuse of confidence, being then employed as cashier by said
complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as such she
was entrusted with the said amount of money.
Contrary to law.[9]
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.[10] The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts
thereof to her personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or records custodians
of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch.[11] The trial court
granted the motion and issued the corresponding subpoena.[12]
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed
to Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there
was no mention made of the said bank account, to which respondent, in addition to the Security
Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds of the
supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as
irrelevant to the case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security
Bank account mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly
willing to address the allegations with respect thereto.[13]
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank
account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank.[14] To this, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the Metrobank
account under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405.[15] The trial court did not sustain
respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.[16]
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita
Marasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans
testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier
at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the company by its
customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit
account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented
to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks received by respondent,
endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank.[17] But before the
testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] seeking the exclusion
of Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the
subject Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the
privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.[19] A
motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated
November 5, 2004.[20] These two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it
did, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed
[21]
orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. The decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
orders dated September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken
from the records.
SO ORDERED.[22]
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,[23] petitioner is now before the Court pleading
the same issues as those raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition[24] under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of
Appeals had seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect
striking out Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents deposit account with Security
Bank.[25] It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to the
subject matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the
exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality under R.A. 1405.[26] Petitioner believed that what
constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be determined by the allegations in the
information and, in this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of the trial
court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was
contained in the information.[27]
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank
account was neither relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the criminal
information suggested that the money therein deposited was the subject matter of the case. She
invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information which averred that she
has stolen and carried away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced
the notion that the term cash money stated in the Information was not synonymous with the
checks she was purported to have stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal banking
account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as well as the
testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating
respondents right to due process.[28] More in point, respondent opined that admitting the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence pertaining to the Security Bank account, would
violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.[29]
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for
qualified theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits
that through Marasigans testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the checks
involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor,
had indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter
to her personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash
money stolen by respondent and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash
amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by respondent, but also the checks
themselves.[30]
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether
the testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and
whether they are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits and,
hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence
thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence
to be indeed inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive
acts of the offense must be established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because
this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. [31] Theft is present when a person,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
takes the personal property of another without the latters consent. It is qualified when, among
others, and as alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence. [32] The
prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a)
there was taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking was done with intent
to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done
with abuse of confidence.[33] In turn, whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes
the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass the test of relevancy and
competency in accordance with Section 3[34] Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought to be suppressed in this case the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been stolen and deposited in
respondents Security Bank account are relevant, is to be addressed by considering whether
they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an
inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.[35]
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount
of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks
to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that respondent,
at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her personal account
with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of
cash in the Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the
checks and deposited the same in her banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon
the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and check for purposes of prosecuting
respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by
another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended party has already
ensued from such act of execution.[36] The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that
evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money
belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a
connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in the
Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the checks in her own
name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to
establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa.
 Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other
instances. In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check,
is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; a check,
after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a
substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of
appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does with the check subsequent
to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing
one.[37] In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may establish its
cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best
evidence to establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of
[38]
the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the same in his own name.
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in
this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent
has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof
in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigans testimony on the
particulars of respondents account with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence
of the checks allegedly deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable inquiry under
R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically
addressing privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our
jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The source of this
right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405, [39] otherwise known as the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. [40]
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at
the same time encourage the people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it
may be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby assist in economic
development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains
to be a basic state policy in the Philippines.[42] Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy
by characterizing as absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with
banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature
and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery
or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Subsequent statutory enactments[43] have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy
yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally
recognized zones of privacy.[44] There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these primary
and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether
governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry
into bank accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.[45]
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking
Corporation v. Ortega.[46] That case principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition
against an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a
judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant
portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which
later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A.
No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose
of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the
amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the
deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that
the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report
on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977which later became Republic
Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks
deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should
like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case.He is
being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)]
or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this
the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the
court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine
whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a
proper assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not
allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and
under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is
a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by...
the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere
investigation into the existence and the amount of the
deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x
[47]
xx
In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the
instant case posits that the account maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the
proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under
one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that the money kept in said account is
the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v.
[48]
Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical
facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands, chattels and the like, in relation to which
the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the money deposited in the
Security Bank account.[49] On the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid to
a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This,
because, while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did
so only to determine whether the class suit in that case was properly brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A.
No. 1405 has been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court
[50]
of Appeals, in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under
R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the
[51]
subject of the action. Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action
in the case at bar is to be determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the
offense, and not from the evidence sought by the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In
the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly and in plain
language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence and
stealing cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation
that in some material way involves the checks subject of the testimonial and documentary
evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said Information make mention
of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly been
kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security
Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly
expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the subject matter of the
action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by
respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in
evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no
other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of
such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution
at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which
is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to
suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised
before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents
supposed bank account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the
checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation
of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to
have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing the assailed orders of
the trial court.
 A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel[1] filed
include an individuals financial privacy rights and personal financial matters, there is an on January 20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to laws infringing such Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB,
rights.[52] Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the following documents
deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must during the hearings scheduled on January 22 and 27, 2003:
be resolved in favor of the former. This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse
I. For Trust Account No. 858;
the general state policy respecting the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.[53] 1. Account Opening Documents;
2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;
3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in 4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of the following:
CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November
a. Bank of Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount
5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-
of P2,000,000.00;
202158, is AFFIRMED. b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the
amount of P10,875,749.43;
c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount
of P42,716,554.22;
d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the
amount of P54,161,496.52;
EJERCITO V SANDIGANBAYAN
5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999:
The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito
Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT
dated February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercitos Motions to Quash
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and
Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his 6. Ledger of the SPAN # 858.
Motion for Reconsideration of the first two resolutions.
II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
SPAN No. 858
The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, People of
1. Signature Cards; and
the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al., for plunder, defined and penalized in R.A.
2. Statement of Account/Ledger
7080, AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
 III. Urban Bank Managers Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Managers Check
Application Forms, as follows:
1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P70,000,000.00;
2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P2,000,000.00;
4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts in the
name of Jose Velarde and to testify thereon.
The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21, 2003 and
subpoenas were accordingly issued.
The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the President of EIB or his/her
authorized representative to produce the same documents subject of the Subpoena Duces
Tecum dated January 21, 2003 and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27
and 29, 2003 and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request was likewise
granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly
issued on January 24, 2003.
Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution Panel
had requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank accounts belonging to
him, attended the hearing of the case on January 27, 2003 and filed before the Sandiganbayan
a letter of even date expressing his concerns as follows, quoted verbatim:
Your Honors:
It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of
subpoenaing the undersigneds bank account which I have learned through
the media.
I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone
supposed to observe. But, instead of prosecuting those who may have breached
such laws, it seems it is even going to use supposed evidence which I have
reason to believe could only have been illegally obtained.
The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and
identifies specific documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally
released confidential information.
If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can still
shock our family. Nor that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.
But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that affects
every bank depositor in the country and should interest the bank itself, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and maybe the Ombudsman himself, who may
want to investigate, not exploit, the serious breach that can only harm the
economy, a consequence that may have been overlooked. There appears to
have been deplorable connivance.
xxxx
I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services
of a lawyer to help me protect my rights and those of every banking depositor.
But the one I have in mind is out of the country right now.
May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the
subpoena be held in abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take
appropriate legal steps in connection with the prosecutions request for the
issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts. (Emphasis supplied)
 February 3 and 5, 2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas
with the exception of the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount of P2,000,000 as
From the present petition, it is gathered that the accounts referred to by petitioner in
Bank of Commerce MC #0256256 in the amount of P200,000,000 was instead
his above-quoted letter are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.[2]
requested. Moreover, the request covered the following additional documents:

In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:
Edilberto Sandoval, advised petitioner that his remedy was to file a motion to quash, for which 1. Account Opening Forms;
he was given up to 12:00 noon the following day, January 28, 2003. 2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and
3. Statements of Account.

Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the
[3]
President of the EIB dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A.
No. 1405 (The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions
stated therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned
subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an
earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank.
The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum bearing the same date, January 31, 2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice
President-CR-II of the PDIC for her to produce the following documents on the scheduled
hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003:
1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special Private
Account Number] 858;
2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;
3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not 4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of P36,
572, 315.43;
be allowed to make use of the information.
5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P107,191,780.85; and
Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed
another Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring
supplied)
31, 2003, again to direct the President of the EIB to produce, on the hearings scheduled on
 2. Whether petitioners Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-
17345-9 are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and
The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan
on January 31, 2003. 3. Whether the extremely-detailed information contained in the Special Prosecution
Panels requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of
petitioners bank accounts, in violation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an Urgent Motion
to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena dated January
Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 858[5] may be inquired into, not
31, 2003 directed to Aurora Baldoz be quashed for the same reasons which he cited in the
merely because it falls under the exceptions to the coverage of R.A. 1405, but because it is not
Motion to Quash[4] he had earlier filed.
even contemplated therein. For, to respondent People, the law applies only to deposits which
strictly means the money delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor relationship is
On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
created between the depositor and the bank.
petitioners Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28,
2003.
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term deposits, as used in R.A.
1405, by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor
Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term deposits used therein
denying petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum
is to be understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
dated February 7, 2003.
relationship between the depositor and the bank.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
reconsideration of the Resolutions of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been denied by
Resolution of March 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present petition.
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking institutions
Raised as issues are: and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be properly utilized
by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the
1. Whether petitioners Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term deposit as used country. (Underscoring supplied)
in R.A. 1405;
 If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to
third persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement
between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit, placement
or investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.[6] The money deposited
under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but
to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405
would encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other
ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term deposits was
intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature
and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or
in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery
or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any restrictive interpretation of
deposits. Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law
applies not only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further
shows that the law was not intended to apply only to deposits in the strict sense of the
word. Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.
The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized
exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions
apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases
of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is
the subject matter of the litigation.
Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his
accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v.
Gancayco[7] holds otherwise:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted
from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot
be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion
that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his
duty, is open to public scrutiny.
 Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080 states so.
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million
pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from
holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer
in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
An examination of the overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080 would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since
bribery is essentially included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes.
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each
case, it may be said that no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted
from the rule making bank deposits confidential.[8]
The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed
by public officers, and in either case the noble idea that a public office is a public trust and any
person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny applies with equal force.
Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases
of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
Respecting petitioners claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the subject
matter of the litigation, the meaning of the phrase subject matter of the litigation as used in
R.A. 1405 is explained in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the cause of
action with the subject of the action. In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, petitioner
points out, this Court distinguished the two concepts.
x x x The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened
or committed, while the object of the action is to prevent or
redress the wrong by obtaining some legal relief; but the
subject of the action is neither of these since it is not the wrong
or the relief demanded, the subject of the action is the matter
or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen,
concerning which the wrong has been done, and this
ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject matter,
or the thing in dispute.
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the difference
between the subject of the action from the cause of action. We also find
petitioners definition of the phrase subject matter of the action is consistent
with the term subject matter of the litigation, as the latter is used in the Bank
Deposits Secrecy Act.
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank
inadvertently caused the transfer of the amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of
only US$1,000.00, the Court sanctioned the examination of the bank
accounts where part of the money was subsequently caused to be
deposited:
x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405] allows the disclosure
of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject matter
of the litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed at
recovering the amount converted by the Javiers for their own benefit,
necessarily, an inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired
amount extends to whatever is concealed by being held or recorded in
the name of persons other than the one responsible for the illegal
acquisition.
Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was
the subject matter of the litigation since the money deposited was the very
thing in dispute. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry
into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph
Estrada.
In light then of this Courts pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the
litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but
must include those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion
thereof was alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the
subject matter of the litigation.
In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid
and may not be enforced, petitioner contends, as earlier stated, that the information found
therein, given their extremely detailed character, could only have been obtained by the Special
Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials concerned. Petitioner thus
claims that, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.
Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People, the
extremely-detailed information was obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials
concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against President Estrada, such
inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal.
Petitioner relies on Marquez v. Desierto[10] where the Court held:
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account
must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the
pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel
and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection,
and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
(Underscoring supplied)
As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of
competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner
concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may
not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.
Petitioners attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case
fails. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank
accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of
R.A. 1405 only states that [a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction,
to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand
pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The case of U.S. v. Frazin,[11] involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978
(RFPA) of the United States, is instructive.
Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression
remedy, it would not be appropriate for us to provide one in the exercise of our
supervisory powers over the administration of justice. Where Congress has
both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, we
would encroach upon the prerogatives of Congress were we to authorize a
remedy not provided for by statute. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306,
1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977).
The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:[12]
x x x When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its
acts, courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary balancing of
interests in determining what the appropriate penalty should
be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1466.
Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the
courts to read such a provision into the act.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to
cases involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case.
 Clearly, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[13] presupposes a violation of law. If
there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no poisonous tree
to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.
How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts of petitioner is
recounted by respondent People of the Philippines, viz:
x x x [A]s early as February 8, 2001, long before the issuance of the Marquez ruling,
the Office of the Ombudsman, acting under the powers granted to it by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, and acting on information obtained from
various sources, including impeachment (of then Pres. Joseph Estrada) related
reports, articles and investigative journals, issued a Subpoena Duces
Tecumaddressed to Urban Bank. (Attachment 1-b) It should be noted that the
description of the documents sought to be produced at that time included that
of numbered accounts 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858 and included such
names as Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy
Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin
Garcia. The subpoena did not single out account 858.
xxxx
Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a certification
as to the availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858 and T/A 858 and
the non-availability of bank records as to the other accounts named in
the subpoena. (Attachments 2, 2-1 and 2-b)
Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsman on February
16, 2001 again issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Ms. Corazon dela
Paz, as Interim Receiver, directing the production of documents pertinent to
account A/C 858 and T/C 858. (Attachment 3)
In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela Paz, as
interim receiver, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of
documents under cover latter dated February 21, 2001:
1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99,
11-22-99, 1-07-00, 04-03-00 and 04-24-00;
2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B
Placements of Various Branches as of February 29, 2000 and as
of December 16, 1999; and
3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.
Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies a white copy which
showed set up information; and a yellow copy which showed reversal
information. Both copies have been reproduced and are enclosed with
this letter.
We are continuing our search for other records and documents
pertinent to your request and we will forward to you on Friday, 23
February 2001, such additional records and documents as we might
find until then. (Attachment 4)
The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the mangers checks, detailed
in the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001. (Attachment 5)
PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7,
2001 and provided copies of the managers checks thus requested under cover
letter dated March 16, 2001.(Attachment 6)[14] (Emphasis in the original)
The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of respondent People.[15] The Court
finds no reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Sandiganbayan.
The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of
petitioners bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent
jurisdiction, was lawful.
 For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner
about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.
While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to
R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it
was originally passed, the rule is not absolute.
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[16] teaches:
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification
that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law in Marquez, that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction, it was, in fact, reversing an earlier
doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima[17].
Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan,[18] in the course of its preliminary
investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the
Tanodbayans issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other
than the one who was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630,[19] Section 10, the relevant part of
which states:
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give
sworn testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan
deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,
held that The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and
subpoenae duces tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not
admit of doubt.[20]
As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary
investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue
subpoenas duces tecum for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite
the fact that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same
as that under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman
to
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take
testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine
and have access to bank accounts and records;

A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D. 1630 clearly shows
that it is only more explicit in stating that the power of the Ombudsman includes the power to
examine and have access to bank accounts and records which power was recognized with
respect to the Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.
The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly
inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine.[21] Hence, it may not be
retroactively applied.
The Ombudsmans inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before
a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted.
Likewise, the Marquez ruling that the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this
case. This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a judge-
[22]
made law which, as People v. Luvendino instructs, can only be given prospective
application:
x x x The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is
not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first
announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. Enrile and reiterated on 20
March 1985 in People v. Galit. x x x
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of
the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino
for the requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. (Emphasis
supplied)
In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence,
invocation of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is misplaced.
AT ALL EVENTS, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is
not barred from requiring the production of the same documents based solely on information
obtained by it from sources independent of its previous inquiry.
In particular, the Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already possessed information
giving him grounds to believe that (1) there are bank accounts bearing the number 858, (2) that
such accounts are in the custody of Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank
accounts of former President Joseph Estrada who was then under investigation for plunder.
Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible for the Ombudsman
to issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena duces tecum addressed to the President and/or Chief
Executive Officer of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof as follows:
(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank
accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits,
etc) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni
Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin
or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing number 858 was, according to
respondent People of the Philippines, obtained from various sources including the proceedings
during the impeachment of President Estrada, related reports, articles and investigative
journals.[23] In the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered by respondent
must be upheld. To presume that the information was obtained in violation of R.A. 1405 would
infringe the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the above independent information, may now proceed
to conduct the same investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually obtain
the same information previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an inescapable fact that the
bank records of petitioner are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for the reasons already
explained above.
Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure of the
same documents to the Ombudsman, this Court, in avoidance of what would be a time-wasteful
[24]
and circuitous way of administering justice, upholds the challenged subpoenas.
Respecting petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to due process
as he was neither notified of the requests for the issuance of the subpoenas nor of the grant
thereof, suffice it to state that the defects were cured when petitioner ventilated his arguments
against the issuance thereof through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan
and when he filed his motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan.
IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to petitioners Trust Account No.
858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 for the following reasons:
1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there
being two exceptions to the said law applicable in this case, namely: (1) the examination of
bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President
Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the
money deposited in petitioners bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the
same plunder case.
2. The fruit of the poisonous tree principle, which states that once the primary source
(the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A.
1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis for applying
the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding petitioners
bank accounts the investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman was lawful.
3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the
Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it
earlier conducted last February-March 2001, there being a plunder case already pending against
former President Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would, therefore, be pointless
since the Ombudsman may obtain the same documents by another route. Upholding the
subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
February 7 and 12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are upheld.
If there is evidence even if it is illegally unearthed, is not excluded If there is NO
LA excluding it.
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST OTELIA LYN G. MACEDA, COURT
INTERPRETER, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, PALAPAG, NORTHERN SAMAR,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
An anonymous complainant, claiming to be a student at the University of Eastern
Philippines (UEP), filed a letter-complaint1 dated June 28, 2010 before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) charging Otelia Lyn G. Maceda (Maceda), Court Interpreter,
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Palapag, Northern Samar, of falsifying her attendance in court
so she could attend her law classes at UEP in Catarman, Norther Samar. The complainant
wrote:
I am questioning her status now because she is enjoying the privilege of a regular
employee and at the same time a regular student at the College of Law. She's been going
to school for more than 4 years now, for this is just being tolerated by the Clerk of Court.
She has been habitually tardy and absent from her office because she leaves the office
everyday before 3:00 p.m. to catch up her classes, since the travel time from her office to
her school is more or less 3 hours. The mode of transportation in going to her school is by
means of water and land vehicles with a distance of about 50 to 70 kilometers away from
Palapag, Northern Samar, where the court is to the University of Eastern Philippines in
Catarman, Northern Samar.
Your honors, is this allowed in our esteemed Highest Court that an employee is leaving
the office early everyday and makes it appear in her Daily Time Records that she is still in
office until 5:00 p.m. when in fact she is already in school? Under Civil Service Law and
Rules, falsification of DTR is an act of dishonesty a grave offense, we know. With all due
respect we believe that this act or conduct would dissipate and diminish public trust and
confidence in the courts.
In a 1st Indorsement2 dated November 10, 2010, the OCA referred the aforementioned
letter-complaint to Executive Judge Jose F. Falcotelo (Judge Falcotelo), Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 22 of Laoang, Northern Samar, for investigation and report.
Judge Falcotelo submitted his Report3 dated April 5, 2011.
According to the Report, Judge Falcotelo personally spoke to Maceda. Maceda admitted
that she has been enrolled at UEP since 2004 and that she is an irregular student. She
also averred that she requested permission to continue her law studies from then MTC
Presiding Judge Eustaquio C. Lagrimas (Judge Lagrimas), and that Judge Lagrimas
granted her request.
Judge Falcotelo reported further that UEP in Catarman is about 70 kilometers away from
the MTC in Palapag. From Palapag, one has to ride a motorboat to Barangay (Brgy.) Rawis
in Laoang, Northern Samar, where the terminal for all passenger vehicles going to
Catarman is located. From Brgy. Rawis, it will still take a one-hour jeepney ride to get to
UEP, excluding the waiting time for the jeepney to fill up with passengers before leaving
the terminal. Judge Falcotelo calculated that Maceda would have to leave Palapag at 4:00
p.m. or earlier to be able to attend her 5:30 p.m. classes at UEP.
In the end, Judge Facoltelo recommended the dismissal of the letter- complaint against
Maceda, considering that Maceda pursued her law studies for self-improvement and that
Maceda merely relied on Judge Lagrimas’s permission for her to attend her classes at
UEP.
Upon receipt of Judge Falcotelo’s Report, the OCA directed Maceda to file her comment
on the letter-complaint against her.
In her letter-comment4 dated May 3, 2012, Maceda made a general denial of any
wrongdoing in the performance of her job and reporting of her official time. She had
properly reported her daily attendance to the extent that she had already consumed all of
her leave credits and she experienced working without pay/salary. Her only intention was
to enrich her knowledge in relation to her work in the judiciary by pursuing her law studies,
for which she was granted permission by the presiding judge of her court.
The OCA submitted its Report5 dated August 16, 2012 with the following
recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court that:
1. the instant administrative matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular complaint for
Dishonesty against O[t]elia Lyn G. Maceda, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial
Court, Palapag, Northern Samar; and
2. respondent Ms. Maceda be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and be SUSPENDED
for six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
On October 15, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution6 re-docketing the case as a regular
administrative matter and requiring the parties to manifest within ten (10) days from notice
if they are willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
Maceda filed her Manifestation7 dated February 5, 2012, stating that she was not willing to
submit the instant case for decision or resolution by the Court based on the
records/pleadings filed, for the reasons quoted below:
a.The anonymity of the complainant supposedly a college student of the University of
Eastern Philippines is a mere façade devised to conceal its (sic) true identity and thus
avoid or elude from the disciplining power of this Court, as this scheming anonymous
complainant may turn out to be a staff of the Municipal Trial Court of Palapag, N. Samar
who has been interested in the position of the Branch Clerk of Court held at that time by a
retirable officer which is now declared vacant but still not posted in the court’s bulletin
board or any public place for no reason at all;
Respondent had been recommended by the former Branch Clerk of Court to such position
as the most qualified next in rank officer. However, the presiding judge has withheld his
recommendation for the respondent as he favors another employee who is not qualified
and should be disqualified;
b.The Annexes attached to the complaint, namely: 1) a photocopy of respondent’s
Certificate of Registration (COR) from the UEP Registrar’s Office for the 2nd semester of
school year 2009-2010;
2)a photocopy of respondent’s Student Grades Evaluation from the Office of the Registrar
of UEP for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year subjects, and 3) photocopies of respondent’s Daily
Time Record from the Offices of the Branch Clerk of Court and/or of the Presiding Judge
which may have apparently been the basis for initiating an investigation. These documents
obtained by a supposed anonymous college student of UEP were definitely in violation of
the rules of the Registrar’s Office of UEP and the Office of the Clerk of Court and/or of the
presiding judge of MTC of Palapag, N. Samar who have custody thereof, respectively,
because respondent did not and has not authorized anybody to procure for said personal
records neither did said respective officers in custody of said documents officially allowed
such releases unless these officers or a member of their staff had assisted or conspired
with the scheming anonymous complainant;
c.During the investigation of this case conducted under the Office of the Court
Administrator, respondent was not represented by counsel. In the instant case, respondent
invokes her right to counsel as this regular administrative matter has and will still affect her
present employment with the Judiciary, her law studies, her future and her very own life
and that of her relatives. For this, respondent prays to this Honorable Court to give her
sufficient time to engage the services of a counsel.
In a Resolution dated June 17, 2013, the Court required the OCA to comment on Maceda’s
foregoing Manifestation.
The OCA filed its Memorandum8 dated September 4, 2013 recommending as follows: (1)
Maceda’s Manifestation be noted, and (2) Maceda be found guilty of Less Serious
Dishonesty and be suspended for six
(6) months and one (1) day without pay, effective immediately, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
We first address Maceda’s arguments in her Manifestation.
First, Maceda questions the anonymity of the complainant and suspects that the
complainant is not really a student at UEP but another court employee, who is Maceda’s
rival for the same vacant Clerk of Court position. The complainant is concealing his/her
true identity to avoid the disciplining authority of the Court.
At the outset, we stress that an anonymous complaint is always received with great
caution, originating as it does from an unknown author.
However, a complaint of such sort does not always justify its outright dismissal for being
baseless or unfounded for such complaint may be easily verified and may, without much
difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence.9 As this Court
ruled in Anonymous Complaint Against Gibson A. Araula10:
Although the Court does not as a rule act on anonymous complaints, cases are accepted
in which the charge could be fully borne by public records of indubitable integrity, thus
needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by complainant, whose identity and
integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest. x x x.
Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish or even
just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be
countenanced.11 Hence, anonymous complaints of this nature should be acted upon by this
Court.
Second, Maceda contests the admissibility of the documentary evidence attached to the
letter-complaint, particularly, the photocopies of her certificate of registration at UEP; her
grades for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year law subjects; and her Daily Time Records (DTRs)
filed with the court, for said documents were obtained without her authorization/consent or
that of the officers who are in custody of the documents. Maceda even insinuates the
possibility of a conspiracy between the complainant and the custodian of the said
documents.
Maceda’s opposition to the documentary evidence against her was grounded on how the
documents were obtained, but not on the falsity of the said documents or their contents.
Maceda argues that her consent was necessary for the release of copies of the documents
attached to the letter- complaint but she did not specifically cite the relevant court and
school rules to this effect. In so far as Maceda’s DTRs are concerned, these formed part
of her employee records, which the OCA and the Court can freely access even without her
consent.
Moreover, proceedings in administrative investigation are not strictly governed by the
technical rules of evidence. They are summary in nature.12
As we have declared in Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar13:
It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to
administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense." It is enough that the party is given the chance to
be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice
but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. (Citations omitted.)
Maceda cannot claim that the admission and consideration of the documentary evidence
attached to the letter-complaint violated her right to due process. She undeniably had the
opportunity to contest the truth of the documents and/or submit controverting evidence to
the same, but she failed to do so.
Lastly, Maceda prays for additional time before resolution of this administrative matter so
she can engage the services of a lawyer to represent her. She points out that she was not
assisted by counsel in the earlier proceedings.
Maceda has knowingly and voluntarily participated in the administrative investigation
conducted by Judge Falcotelo, by the OCA, and finally, by this Court. The administrative
investigation began as early as November 10, 2010, but it was only in Maceda’s
Manifestation dated February 5, 2012 before this Court that she insisted on engaging the
services of a legal counsel. We can no longer accommodate Maceda’s request this far
along into the proceedings. Being a court employee and law student, Maceda is capable
of understanding the charges against her and adducing her defenses herself.
We already clarified in Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission 14 the extent of the right to
counsel, thus:
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary
1âw phi 1
rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made
in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges
and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative
in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service. (Emphasis ours, citations omitted.)
Maceda was accorded her right to due process during the administrative investigation
conducted in the instant case. She was given an opportunity to answer and be heard on
the charges against her, and that, it has often been said, is the essence of procedural due
process.15
Now, we proceed to determining Maceda’s liability for falsification of her DTRs.
We see no reason to disturb the finding of the OCA that Maceda did indeed falsify her
DTRs and is, therefore, guilty of dishonesty.
Judge Falcotelo stated in his Report that for Maceda to make it on time to her law classes
at UEP, she would have to leave the MTC at 4:00 p.m. or even earlier. Maceda’s Summary
of Scholastic Records, submitted by UEP College Secretary Alfredo D. Tico, showed that
Maceda had law school subjects for the school years 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 which
started at 5:30 p.m. Hence, it was impossible for Maceda to have left the MTC only at 5:00
p.m. as she had consistently logged in her DTRs during the months she was also attending
her classes.
Specifically, Maceda’s Summary of Scholastic Records for the Second Semester of school
year 2009-2010 stated that her Criminal Law II class was scheduled every Friday, from
5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. However, according to Maceda’s DTRs, she logged out at 5:00 p.m.
for the following Fridays of the said time period: October 23, 2009; November 6, 2009;
November 13, 2009; November 20, 2009; November 27, 2009;16 December 4, 2009;
December 11, 2009; December 18, 2009; January 8, 2010;17 February 5, 2010; February
12, 2010; February 19, 2010; February 26, 2010; March 5, 2010; and March 12, 2010.18 It
can hardly be believed that Maceda could have traversed the 70-kilometer distance
between the MTC and UEP, which would have necessitated a boat ride and a jeepney
ride, in just 30 minutes.
Maceda only offered a general denial of any wrongdoing and asserted that someone at
the MTC was just trying to destroy her reputation. She did not offer a clear explanation on
how she could have attended her 5:30 p.m. classes in UEP on time even when she
supposedly left the MTC at only 5:00 p.m. Maceda’s repeated assertion that she continued
her law school classes for self-improvement and with the permission of the MTC Presiding
Judge does little to exculpate her of administrative liability. These are not acceptable
excuses for not properly declaring the time she logged-off from work in her DTRs. Time
and again, the OCA and this Court have underscored the importance of court employees
truthfully and accurately recording in their DTRs the time of their arrival in and departure
from office.
Maceda’s falsification of her DTRs is dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as the
"(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."19
Resolution No. 06-0538 dated April 4, 2006 of the Civil Service Commission, also known
as the Rules on the Administrative Offense of Dishonesty, further classifies the offense
into Serious Dishonesty, Less Serious Dishonesty, and Simple Dishonesty, depending on
the attendant circumstances.
The presence of any of the following attendant circumstances in the commission of the
dishonest act would constitute the offense of Less Serious Dishonesty:
1.The dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not
so serious as to qualify under the immediately preceding classification.
2.The respondent did not take advantage of his/her position in committing the
dishonest act.
3.Other analogous circumstances.20
Less Serious Dishonesty is deemed a grave offense punishable by suspension of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense.21
Considering that Maceda has not been previously charged with an administrative offense
in her eleven (11) years in government service and that there is no proof of her being
remiss in the performance of her duties as court interpreter or causing specific damage or
prejudice to the court for her dishonest act, we find Maceda to be guilty of Less Serious
Dishonesty, for which the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is
proper.
WHEREFORE, we find Otelia Lyn G. Maceda GUILTY of the offense of Less Serious
Dishonesty and impose upon her the penalty of
SUSPENSION for SIX (6) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY, effective immediately. We further
issue a STERN WARNING to Maceda that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
There is no rule that requires consentfor admissibility of the evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PH V. FELAN
His own daughter commenced the prosecution of Avelino Felan for qualified rape
through her complaint dated May 30, 1996.[1] The information subsequently filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Ormoc City alleged:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1995, at around 10:00
oclock in the evening, at Brgy. Tambulilid, Ormoc City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused AVELINO
FELAN, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his very own
daughter, AAA,[2] a fourteen (14) years old lass, against her will.[3]
The Prosecution showed that at about 10:00 p.m. on February 12, 1995, the accused
roused his daughter AAA, the complainant, then 14 years old, from sleep inside their house;
that he told her not to be afraid; that he removed her panty, spread her legs, and went on top of
her; that she resisted but he overpowered her; that he inserted his penis into her vagina and
made pumping movements until he satisfied himself; that she cried due to vaginal pain; that
she left the house and stayed with her friends, who advised her to report the rape to Mrs. Charito
Aris, a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Ormoc
City; that Mrs. Aris later brought her first to the police station for reporting of the rape, and
then to Dr. Gloria Esmero Pastor, City Health Officer of Ormoc City, for medical examination;
that Dr. Pastor found that AAAs hymen was torn; and that Dr. Pastor concluded that the
hymenal laceration could be caused by sexual intercourse.
The accused denied the accusation, branding it as the fabrication of AAA out of anger
at him for not giving her basic needs and for admonishing her to stop using illegal drugs.
After trial, on November 26, 1997, the RTC convicted the accused of qualified rape
and imposed the death penalty. He was also ordered to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.[4]
On July 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the criminal and civil liabilities
of the accused after finding him guilty of simple rape on account of AAAs minority not being
established beyond reasonable doubt. The CA lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
sentenced him to pay an amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00.[5]
 In his appeal to this Court, the accused contends that the RTC and the CA erred in
relying mainly on AAAs testimony, despite her not being a credible witness and although her
testimony was doubtful by reason of her having used illegal drugs and having engaged in
prostitution, aside from possessing a poor memory. He insists that he could control his sexual
[6]
urge.
The appeal lacks merit and persuasion. We affirm the conviction.
The law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659,[7] which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The State competently and sufficiently established these elements beyond reasonable
doubt. AAA rendered a complete and credible narration of her ordeal at the hands of the
accused, whom she positively identified. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
[8]
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. Here, the
victims testimony was even corroborated on material points by the testimonies of Mrs. Aris
and Dr. Pastor as well as by the documentary evidences adduced.
It is notable that the RTC and the CA both found and considered AAA as a credible
witness whose testimony should be believed. We accord great weight to the trial judges
assessment of the credibility of AAA and of her testimony because the trial judge, having
personally observed AAAs conduct and demeanor as a witness, was thereby enabled to discern
if she was telling or inventing the truth.[9] The trial judges evaluation, when affirmed by the
CA, is binding on the Court, and it becomes the burden of the accused to project to us facts or
circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted which, when
duly considered, would materially affect the disposition of the case differently. [10] We do not
vary from this rule now, however, considering that the accused did not make any showing that
the RTC, in the first instance, and the CA, on review, ignored, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted facts or circumstances supportive of or crucial to his defense.
The denial of the accused, being worthless, was properly disregarded. It was both self-
serving and uncorroborated. It could not, therefore, overcome the positive declarations against
the accused and the positive identification of the accused by AAA,[11] whose good motive to
impute such a heinous act to her own father was not disproved or refuted. We do consider to
be highly inconceivable for a daughter like AAA to impute against her own father a crime as
serious and despicable as incest rape, unless the imputation was the plain truth. In fact, as we
observed before, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to
concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame.[12]
The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal drugs and of
her having engaged in prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all, AAAs use of illegal
drugs and engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her credibility as a witness or
negate the rape. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the victims moral character was immaterial in
the prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape, there being absolutely no nexus between WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision promulgated on July 14, 2006 in CA-
it and the odious deed committed.[13] Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman of loose morals G.R. CR. H.C. No. 00158.
[14]
could fall victim of rape, for she could still refuse a mans lustful advances.

The CA correctly pronounced the accused liable for simple rape and properly punished
him with reclusion perpetua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, supra, rape is qualified and punished by death if it is
alleged and proved that the victim was a minor during the commission of the crime and that
the offender was her parent.[15] Although the information alleged that the victim was only 14
years of age at the time of the rape, the State did not duly establish such circumstance because
no birth certificate, or baptismal certificate, or other competent document showing her age was
presented. Her testimony regarding her age without any independent proof is not
sufficient.[16] As a result, the penalty for simple rape was properly reclusion perpetua.

Prevailing jurisprudence leads us to affirm the CAs ruling that AAA was entitled
to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,[17] and P50,000.00 as moral damages,[18] without need of any
pleading and proof. Similarly correct was the CAs grant of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. [19] In People v. Mira,[20] we observed that when either one of the qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the
information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In
this case, the relationship between the victim and the accused is an aggravating circumstance
because it was alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. Thus, conformably
with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, which provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary
damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstance, we ratify the award of exemplary damages.