Far East Bank Appeals Dismissal of Employee for Fraud

G.R. No.
187491, July 08, 2015
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. LILIA S. CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Respondent Lilia S. Chua (Chua) was dismissed by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Far East Bank)
due to a finding that she engaged in multiple kiting transactions which was a serious violation of Far East
Bank's Code of Conduct. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. This was reversed by the
National Labor Relations Commission. Chua participated in the appeal proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Commission.
The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's ruling, stating that Far East Bank's
appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission was not perfected.
We are asked in this Petition to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Chua was employed as a bank executive by Far East Bank, rising through the latter's ranks and holding the
position of Assistant Vice President from October 1, 1997 until the termination of her employment.1 reda rclaw
It is not disputed that on July 1, 1999, Chua's employment was terminated as Far East Bank found Chua to
have engaged in multiple kiting transactions,2 which are fraudulent transactions "involving the] drawing out
[of] money from a bank account that does not have sufficient funds [in order] to cover [a] check."3 redarclaw
Assailing Far East Bank's basis for terminating her employment, Chua filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City of the National Labor
Relations Commission.4 redarclaw
In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Arbitration Branch, the parties were ordered to submit
their respective Position Papers. Despite an extension having been given to Far East Bank, it failed to timely
file its Position Paper.5 re darclaw
On April 25, 2000, Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto III (Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto) rendered a
Decision6 finding Chua to have been illegally dismissed. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the
complainant Lilia S. Chua by respondent FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) ILLEGAL,
thereby entitling her to reinstatement and full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits
computed from the time her compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her actual
reinstatement.
Respondent FEBTC is hereby ordered to pay the backwages of the complainant until April 25, 2000 (date of
this decision) and her other benefit [sic] as above-discussed for the interim total of ONE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR PESOS & 19/100 (P1,181,804.19).
All other additional claims of the complainant as discussed above are still to be substantiated inorder [sic]
for Us to arrive at an accurate computation.
SO ORDERED. 7 cralawlawlibra ry
On the same date, Far East Bank filed a Motion to admit its Position Paper. On May 15, 2000, this Motion
was denied.8 redarclaw
On May 25, 2000, Far East Bank directly filed its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the
National Labor Relations Commission.9 reda rclaw
On April 30, 2001, the National Labor Relations Commission Fifth Division issued a Resolution10 reversing
and setting aside the April 25, 2000 Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto.11 It held that Far East Bank's
delay of "a few days"12 in filing its Position Paper was excusable, especially considering that it and its
counsel were based in different cities, Cotabato City and General Santos City, respectively.13 It added that it
was successfully shown by Far East Bank that Chua "had indeed committed irregular acts in relation to his
[sic] position as Assistant Vice President[,]"14 "acts that would constitute for [sic] loss of trust and
confidence[,]"15 thereby justifying the termination of her employment.
Chua then filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 dated May 25, 2001, relying on the following grounds:
ALTHOUGH THE HONORABLE COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN THE ORDER OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
ISSUES IN THAT THE 1st WAS "WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF INEXCUSABLE DELAY
AND NEGLECT FOR FAILURE TO SUBMIT THEIR POSITION PAPER BEFORE THE ARBITRATION BRANCH OF
ORIGIN[,]" BECAUSE IF THE ANSWER IS IN THE NEGATIVE, THEN THE APPEAL SHOULD BE CONFINED ONLY
TO THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE RAB XII, YET, NOT ONLY WAS THIS ISSUE SKIPPED BY THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION, BUT IN RESOLVING THIS ISSUE, THE HONORABLE COMMISSION DEPENDED ON
THE POSITION PAPER OF APPELLANTS, WHICH WAS THE VERY FIRST ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION. 17 redarc law
SINCE WHAT IS THE SUBJECT OF THE APPEAL IS THE DECISION OF THE RAB XII, IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN
WHAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE REVIEWED AS AN APPELLATE BODY YET NOT ONLY
WAS THE DECISION OF RAB XII SKIPPED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION BUT IN DETERMINING THE
FACT [sic] OF THE CASE THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ENTIRELY DEPENDED ON THE MATTERS
PRESENTED IN THE POSITION PAPER OF RESPONDENTS, THE ADMISSION OR THE DENIAL OF ADMISSION
OF THE SAME WAS NOT ONLY THE FIRST ISSUE BUT THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH WAS SKIPPED BY THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION.18 redarclaw
EVERY MATERIAL POINT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN ITS POSITION PAPER THE ADMISSION AND DENIAL
OF WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS BEEN TOUCHED IN THE
DECISION OF THE RAB XII, WHICH IS THE CENTERPIECE OF REVIEW, AND THE POSITION PAPER OF
APPELLEE WHICH LEGALLY, FORMS PART OF THE RECORD[S] OF THE CASE, AND THE LEAST THAT THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION COULD HAVE DONE WAS TO REVIEW BOTH THEN COMPARE IT WITH THE FACTS
AS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR POSITION PAPER WITH THE DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE ON
HAND AS CONFIRMATORY EVIDENCE, AND HAD THIS BEEN DONE, UNDOUBTEDLY, THE CONCLUSION THAT
WOULD HAVE BEEN ARRIVED AT WAS THAT THE CASE OF APPEALLEE [sic] IS MERITORIOUS. 19
In the Resolution dated December 21, 2001, the National Labor Relations Commission denied Chua's Motion
for Reconsideration.20 re darclaw
Aggrieved, Chua filed a Petition21 for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the
Court of Appeals. Chua averred the following issue in this Petition:
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ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE DIRECTLY FILED UNPERFECTED APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS 22
Specifically, Chua claimed that the National Labor Relations Commission should not have entertained Far
East Bank's appeal for the following reasons: first, it failed to "pay the appeal fee of P100.00;"23 second, it
failed to "post the appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award;"24 third, it failed to "attach
a certification of non-forum shopping[;]"25 and fourth, it "directly filed its appeal with public respondent
[National Labor Relations Commission] contrary to the requirements of Rule VI, Section 326of the New Rules
of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission."27 redarclaw
In its assailed June 30, 2008 Decision,28 the Court of Appeals Twenty-third Division declared the April 30,
2001 and December 21, 2001 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission null and void and
reinstated Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto's April 25, 2000 Decision.29 reda rclaw
Citing Rule VI, Sections 3 and 430 of the 1999 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission31 which were then in effect, the Court of Appeals stated that it "is clear and unambiguous that
the memorandum on appeal must be filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch which rendered the
decision sought to be appealed."32 As Far East Bank's Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal were
both directly filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (rather than being filed before the
Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato City), the Court of Appeals concluded that "no appeal before
public respondent [National Labor Relations Commission] could have been perfected."33Thus, Executive
Labor Arbiter Cueto's April 25, 2000 Decision "has attained finality[.]"34 reda rclaw
In its assailed March 20, 2009 Resolution,35 the Court of Appeals denied Far East Bank's Motion for
Reconsideration.36 re darc law
Hence, this Petition37 was filed.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether Executive Labor Arbiter Quintin B. Cueto Ill's April 25, 2000
Decision attained finality in light of petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Co.'s direct filing of its appeal before
the National Labor Relations Commission, rather than before the Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Cotabato
City.
Petitioner admits to directly filing its Memorandum of Appeal before the National Labor Relations
Commission.38 However, it banks on what it claims was the National Labor Relations Commission's
"discretion to admit appeal[s] directly filed with it on reasonable and meritorious grounds[.]"39 It argues
thus that "[i]n accepting the appeal memorandum which petitioner directly filed with it, the [National Labor
Relations Commission] was guided by its own policy that, in line with the jurisprudence set by the Supreme
Court, technicalities in labor cases must yield to substantial justice."40 reda rclaw
Apart from this, petitioner faults respondent for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in her Rule
65 Petition before the Court of Appeals. It asserts that because of respondent's failure to timely raise this
matter while petitioner's own appeal was still pending before the National Labor Relations Commission,
estoppel set in and respondent could not belatedly repudiate the adverse decision by only then invoking the
issue of jurisdiction.41 reda rclaw
Petitioner's contentions are well-taken. A mere procedural lapse in the venue where petitioner filed its
Memorandum of Appeal is not fatal to its cause. This is especially so in light of how respondent estopped
herself in failing to raise the issue of jurisdiction while petitioner's appeal was pending before the National
Labor Relations Commission. Respondent is bound by her inaction and cannot belatedly invoke this issue on
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
II
In a long line of cases, this court has held that "[a]lthough the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be
barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel."42 redarclaw
The rule is stated in La'O v. Republic of the Philippines and the Government Service Insurance System:43
While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it
on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who
has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be
permitted to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape liability.44 (Citations omitted)
The wisdom that underlies this was explained at length in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.:45
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. In
the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated � obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) � to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse � as well as in Pindangan etc. vs. Dans et al., G. R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs.
the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p.
277.46 (Citations omitted)
III
The rationale that animates the rule on estoppel vis-a-vis jurisdiction applies with equal force to quasi-
judicial agencies as it does to courts. The public policy consideration that frowns upon the undesirable
practice of n submitting a case for decision only to subsequently decry the supposed lack of jurisdiction is as
compelling in cases concerning the National Labor Relations Commission as it is to courts of law.
In this respect, it is of no consequence that distinctions may be drawn between administrative agencies, on
the one hand, and judicial bodies, on the other.
Courts derive their authority from the Constitution's recognition that they shall be the sole and exclusive
investees of judicial power. This, even as the Constitution leaves to the legislature the authority to establish
lower courts, as well as "to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts[,]"47 except
of this court. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
For their part, administrative agencies are statutory constructs. Thus, they are limited by the statutes which
created them and which spelled out their powers and functions. "It is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof[.]"48 Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-judicial powers,
but only to the extent warranted by administrative action. They may not exercise judicial functions. This is
illustrated in Philex Mining Corporation v. Zaldivia, et al.,49 which distinguished between judicial questions
and "questions of fact."50 It is only the latter � questions of fact � which was ruled to be within the
competence of the Director of Mines to resolve:
We see nothing in sections 61 and 73 of the Mining Law that indicates a legislative intent to confer real
judicial power upon the Director of Mines. The very terms of section 73 of the Mining Law, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4388, in requiring that the adverse claim must "state in full detail the nature, boundaries
and extent of the adverse claim" show that the conflicts to be decided by reason such adverse claim refer
primarily to questions of fact. This is made even clearer by the explanatory note to House Bill No. 2522,
later to become Republic Act 4388, that "sections 61 and 73 that refer to the overlapping of claims are
amended to expedite resolutions of mining conflicts. . . ." The controversies to be submitted and resolved by
the Director of Mines under the sections refer therefore only to the overlapping of claims, and administrative
matters incidental thereto.
As already shown, petitioner's adverse claim is not one grounded on overlapping of claims nor is it a mining
conflict arising out of mining locations (there being only one involved) but one originating from the alleged
fiduciary or contractual relationship between petitioner and locator Scholey and his transferees Yrastorza
and respondent Zaldivia. As such, the adverse claim is not within the executive or administrative authority
of the mining director to resolve, but in that of the courts, as it has been correctly held, on the basis of the
doctrine stated in Espinosa vs. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Unlike courts, the National Labor Relations Commission's existence is not borne out of constitutional fiat. It
owes its existence to Article 213 of the Labor Code:
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Art. 213. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National Labor Relations Commission
which shall be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination
only, composed of a Chairman and fourteen (14) Members. (Emphasis in the original)
So, too, its jurisdiction (as well as those of Labor Arbiters) is spelled out by Article 217 of the Labor Code:
Lawlib raryofCRAlaw
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
1. Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of
stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural: Lawl ibra ryofCRAlaw
1. Unfair labor practice cases; chanRobles virtua lLawl ibra ry
2. Termination disputes; chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file
involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment; chanRo blesvi rtua lLaw lib rary
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations: Lawlib raryofCR Alaw
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters.
3. Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements

and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (Emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, there is no basis for distinguishing between courts and quasi-judicial agencies with respect to
the effects of a party's failure to timely assail errors in jurisdiction. These effects have nothing to do with the
distinction between the competencies of courts and quasi-judicial agencies as spelled out by the Constitution
and statutes.
In a long line of cases, this court has held the rule on estoppel vis-a�-vis jurisdiction, as initially articulated
in 1968 in Tijam to be equally applicable to cases involving the National Labor Relations Commission (and its
related agencies).
By way of example, in Philippine Overseas Drilling and Oil Development Corporation v. Hon. Ministry of
Labor,52 this court stated:
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Petitioner is now barred by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisdiction, regardless of its merits. In the
case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, the Court laid down the rule of estoppel to raise
the question of jurisdiction. This rule was reiterated in numerous cases enumerated in the decision in the
case of Solicitor General vs. Colomapromulgated on July 7, 1986. In the case of Akay Printing Press vs.
Minister of Labor and Employment, the Court ruled as follows:
Lawlib raryofCRAlaw
When the illegal dismissal case was pending before the MOLE Regional Director, petitioner did not raise the
issue of jurisdiction either during the hearing or in its subsequent motion for reconsideration. Its defense
was a stout denial of the dismissal of private respondents, who were averred instead to have abandoned
their work. After the adverse decision of the Regional Director and upon the elevation of the case on appeal
to the Ministry of Labor and Employment, still no jurisdictional challenge was made. It was only when
petitioner moved to reconsider the MOLE decision of affirmance that it assailed the jurisdiction of the
Regional Director. But then, it was too late. Estoppel had barred him from raising the issue, regardless of its
merits. (December 6, 1985, 140 SCRA 381, 384)53
Likewise, as stated in M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor and Employment:54
Moreover, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director, having previously
invoked it by filing a motion to dismiss. As has been held:
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[A] party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated � obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court . . . And in
Littleton vs. Burges, Wyo, 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.55
IV
Article 218 of the Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the authority to adopt
procedural rules:
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Art. 218. Powers of the Commission. The Commission shall have the power and authority: Lawlib raryofCRAlaw
1. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before
it and its regional branches, as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Code[.]
It is consistent with this power that the National Labor Relations Commission adopted the rules that are at
the core of the present controversy. Rule VI, Section 3 of the 1999 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission that were in effect when petitioner appealed from Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto's
Decision provides for the requisites that must be satisfied in order that an appeal from a decision of a Labor
Arbiter may be perfected:
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Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. � (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required
appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in
support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed
decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop the running of
the period for perfecting an appeal.
(b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office or in the POEA where the
appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of appeal, not later than ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of the
appeal to file his answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to file the
same.
(c)� Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance with these rules,
the Commission may limit itself to reviewing and deciding specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
(Emphasis in the original)
Rule VI, Section 4 of the same rules stipulates where appeals must be filed:
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Section 4. Where Filed. � The appeal in five (5) legibly typewritten copies shall be filed with the respective
Regional Arbitration Branch, the Regional Office, or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
where the case was heard and decided. (Emphasis in the original)
This venue for filing appeals is unequivocal. The Court of Appeals was thus correct in stating that it "is clear
and unambiguous that the memorandum on appeal must be filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch which
rendered the decision sought to be appealed."56 redarc law
It is not disputed that this rule was violated by petitioner. In the present Petition, petitioner categorically
admitted that it "filed its memorandum of appeal directly with the [National Labor Relations
Commission.]"57 redarclaw
Thus, there is basis for positing, as respondent and the Court of Appeals did, that "no appeal before [the
National Labor Relations Commission] could have been perfected[.]"58 The logical consequence of this
position, assuming it is correct, is that Executive Labor Arbiter Cueto's April 25, 2000 Decision "has attained
finality[.]"59 reda rclaw
This conclusion, however, fails to consider that the error committed by petitioner pertains to the place for
filing appeals and not the requisites for perfecting an appeal which Rule VI, Section 3 enumerates. The place
where appeals must be filed is governed by a distinct provision (i.e., Section 4) and is thus a matter that is
different from the requisites for perfecting appeals. Per Section 3, only the following are necessary in order
that petitioner may perfect its appeal:
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(1) Filing within the applicable reglementary period as provided by Section 1;60 re darc law
(2) That the appeal was under oath;
(3) That the appeal fee must have been paid;
(4) That the appeal bond must have been posted;
(5) A memorandum of appeal which states: Lawlibra ryofCRAlaw
a. the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support of the appeal; chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
b. the relief sought; and
c. a statement of the date when the assailed decision was received; and
(6) Proof of service of the appeal on the adverse party.

Likewise, this conclusion presupposes that procedural rules in labor cases must be adhered to with
uncompromising exactitude. This is misguided. The same rules which respondent and the Court of Appeals
rely on allow for the liberal application of procedural rules. In Rule VII, Section 10, it states:
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Section 10. Technical rules not binding. � The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law procedure,
all in the interest of due process.
In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be represented by legal counsel but it shall be
the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding commissioner or Commissioner to exercise complete control of the
proceedings at all stages.
The need for liberality in this case is underscored by how the National Labor Relations Commission
acquiesced to the filing of an appeal directly before it. As pointed out by petitioner, not only did the National
Labor Relations Commission admit its Memorandum of Appeal, it also "required petitioner to pay the appeal
fee and to post the required bond."61 As the agency statutorily vested with jurisdiction over petitioner's
appeal, petitioner could very easily have mistaken that the filing of its Memorandum of Appeal was rightly
made before the National Labor Relations Commission. If at all, the provision that filing of a Memorandum of
Appeal must be made before the Regional Arbitration Branch is merely a delegation of a function more
appropriately pertaining to the appellate body itself.
In any case, the National Labor Relations Commission could have very easily advised petitioner if there was
anything irregular with its direct filing of a Memorandum of Appeal. Its silence on this matter would have
induced in petitioner no other reasonable conclusion than that direct filing before the National Labor
Relations Commission was in keeping with the procedural requirements for filing appeals.
Not only did the National Labor Relations Commission acquiesce to the direct filing of an appeal before it, so
did respondent. The matter of the propriety of the National Labor Relations Commission's assumption of
jurisdiction was never raised by respondent before the Commission. Even after petitioner's appeal had been
initially decided against her and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent totally overlooked this
matter. As was evident from the recital of grounds62 invoked in her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent's
contentions centered merely on the National Labor Relations Commission's supposedly erroneous reliance on
petitioner's Position Paper.
The Court of Appeals thus failed to account for the crucial fact that the issue of jurisdiction was invoked by
respondent only upon her elevation to it of the case. It failed to recognize that respondent had all the
opportunity to raise this issue before the very tribunal whom she claims to have had no competence to rule
on the appeal, but that it was only after the same tribunal ruled against her twice � first, in its initial
Resolution and second, in denying her reconsideration � that she saw it fit to assail its jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals failed to see through respondent's own failure to seasonably act and failed to realize that
she was guilty of estoppel by laches, taking "an unreasonable . . . length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier[.]"63 reda rclaw
Respondent cannot now profit from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings and
vigorously argued her case before the National Labor Relations Commission without the slightest indication
that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those proceedings. It is thus but appropriate to
consider her as acceding to and bound by how the National Labor Relations Commission was to resolve and,
ultimately did resolve, petitioner's appeal. Its findings that the requisites of substantive and procedural due
process were satisfied in terminating respondent's employment now stand undisturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The June 30, 2008 Decision and the March
20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69361-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The April 30, 2001 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry
G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016
AYALA LAND, INC. AND CAPITOL CITIFARMS, INC., Petitioners, v. SIMEONA CASTILLO, LORENZO
PERLAS, JESSIELYN CASTILLO, LUIS MAESA, ROLANDO BATIQUIN, AND BUKLURAN MAGSASAKA
NG TIBIG, AS REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, SIMEONA CASTILLO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To grant this Motion for Reconsideration is to reverse several doctrines that build up a stable judicial system.
First, the doctrine of finality of judgment. The doctrine is grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law.
On 29 August 1995, the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 85960 and 92610 allowed the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, as receiver, to sell the assets of the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC), including the subject
property, to a third party.1 It may be recalled that the property was earlier mortgaged to the MBC by Capitol
Citifarms, Inc. (CCFI), and was later awarded to the former in an auction sale. Pursuant to the Court's
Resolution, a "Deed of Absolute Sale"2 over the property was executed in favor of Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) in
December 1995.3
In a Resolution dated 27 July 1999, the Court considered G.R. Nos. 85960 and 92610 closed and
terminated.4
On 13 August 2003, Case No. A-9999-04-CV-203-00 � or the Petition for Revocation filed by Lamberto
Javier et al. � was also deemed closed as far as the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was
concerned.5 The Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance was also directed to issue a Certificate of Finality of the
Order dated 26 September 2002 issued by former DAR Secretary Hernani Braganza reversing the revocation
of the Conversion Order.
Second, the rule that he who alleges must prove. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, places the
burden of proof on the alleging party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish the
claim or defense.
It is simply not the role of the Court to apply the missing Notice of Acquisition in perpetuity. Even the
Dissent concedes that the records are bereft of any trace of the Notice of Acquisition. This is not a case of a
feudal landowner unjustly enriched by the hard work of a long-suffering tenant. ALI is in the precarious
position of having been that third-party buyer that offered the terms and conditions most helpful to,
ultimately, the BSP. Prior to that acquisition, there was absolutely no relationship between ALI and the
farmers. Respondents, on the other hand, are residents who have not yet established any claim � let alone
substantial rights � over the land. On the contrary, what has been duly established is that they have
received disturbance compensation.6
Respondents never raised the issue regarding the existence or effect of a Notice of Acquisition.
Their arguments revolved on the alleged illegality of the sale and the submission of
a Sangguniang Bayan resolution, instead of an ordinance. Their brief was primarily on the form in
which the local government's action was contained. We also note that they were specifically
ordered by the Court of Appeals (CA) to submit a copy of the Notice of Acquisition, but they failed
to comply.7
They made no attempt at all to explain their inability to present a copy of the Notice of
Acquisition.
Third, the duty of the Court to correct reversible errors of law committed by the CA. It was a grave error on
the part of the CA to base its ruling on a conclusion of fact that is not supported by the records of the case.
It is settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings below ought not
to be considered by a reviewing court. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court are barred by estoppel. Especially, as in this case, when the document being cited
is not in the record.
Fourth, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We reiterate what has been said in the Decision. That is, even
assuming that the Notice of Acquisition did exist, considering that CCFI and ALI have had no chance to
controvert the CA finding of its legal bar to conversion, this Court is unable to ascertain the details of the
Notice of Acquisition at this belated stage, or rule on its legal effect on the Conversion Order duly issued by
the DAR, without undermining the technical expertise of the DAR itself. This whole controversy was reviewed
and the Conversion Order validated by no less than two DAR Secretaries.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination would require the
expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resorting to the courts, even if the matter may well be within the latter's
proper jurisdiction.
Fifth, the great weight and respect accorded to factual findings of administrative agencies. The factual
findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific
matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect. Except for a justifiable reason, these findings ought not
to be altered, modified or reversed.
FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECISION
On 15 June 2011, this Court promulgated a Decision8 granting the Petition for Review on Certiorari9filed by
ALI and CCFI, and reversing the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86321.10 The Court thereby upheld the
Conversion Order11 issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao on 31 October 1997, as well as the
Decision12 of the Office of the President (OP) affirming the Order.
Respondents Simeona Castillo et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 presenting the same arguments
they raised in their Comment,14viz
a. The CARP coverage is not a new issue or matter on appeal, as it was previously raised
before the DAR and the OP, hence, the CA is not barred from entertaining the claim.
b. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1994 (DAR A.O. 12-94), the guiding
principle is to preserve prime agricultural land.
c. The Petition for Revocation is not barred by prescription.
d. Petitioners committed a misrepresentation, because there was no reclassification zoning

ordinance.
e. Conversion is not a legal mode to exempt the property from the coverage of CARP.
cralawlawl ibra ry
In a Resolution15 dated 3 August 2011, the members of the Special Third Division referred the case to the
Court En Banc. On 16 August 2011, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the case.16 The Court then issued
a Resolution17 requiring petitioners, the BSP and the DAR, which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), to file their respective Comments on the Motion for Reconsideration.
On 10 January 2012, the general counsel of the BSP submitted a Manifestation.18 It explained that its
interest in the case stemmed from its receivership-liquidation of the MBC, particularly the settlement of the
latter's obligations to the BSP.19 As discussed in our Decision, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85960 allowed
petitioner CCFI, as the mortgage debtor of MBC, to sell its assets, including the subject landholding, "at their
fair market value, under the best terms and condition and for the highest price under current real estate
appraisals."20 Counsel for the BSP posited that its interest in the case ended upon the sale of the subject
land to ALI, after which the BSP entered into settlement scheme with MBC.21
On the same date, petitioner ALI filed its Opposition22 to the Motion for Reconsideration. The OSG's
Comment23 was filed on 10 February 2012; respondents' Comment,24 on 14 May 2012.
We note, as a preliminary matter, petitioner ALI's Manifestation and Motion25 apprising the Court that
several individuals who affixed their signatures to the verification portion of the Motion for Reconsideration
were NOT petitioners in the Petition for Revocation filed with the DAR.26 According to petitioners, these
repeated defects in the pleadings filed by respondents show a blatant disregard for the rule requiring proper
verification, and which justify the outright denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.27
Respondents failed to this address issue of improper verification in their Comment. Instead, they merely
rehashed their arguments in the Motion for Reconsideration. However, since the ends of justice would be
better served if the core issues are squarely addressed, this Court writes finis to the present controversy on
substantive grounds.
We DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.
With the repeated refutation of their theory that the Conversion Order should be revoked because the sale
between CCFI and ALI was illegal and CCFI committed misrepresentation in its application for conversion,
respondents have based their arguments by simply latching on to a baseless phrase found in the CA
Decision: "no less than the cited DAR Administrative Order No. 12 enjoins the conversion of lands directly
under a notice of acquisition."
A careful reading shows that the CA did not discuss or even refer to the provision that allegedly disallows
applications for conversion. It may have relied on paragraph VI, subparagraph E of A.O. No. 12-94, which
reads
VI. POLICIES AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
xxxx
E. No application for conversion shall be given due course if 1) the DAR has issued a Notice of Acquisition
under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) process x x x cralawlawlib rary
In our Decision, we have emphatically ruled that a mere principle cannot be interpreted as an absolute
proscription on conversion. From a reading of subparagraph E in isolation, it may be culled that what bars
conversion is a notice of acquisition, not a notice of coverage. Assuming arguendo that a conver order may
be revoked if a notice of acquisition has already been issued, we still cannot grant respondent's MR, because
what has been presented before the DAR, the OP, the CA, and this Court is just the notice of coverage.
I. The CA committed reversible

error when it decided an issue raised
for the first time on appeal and based
its ruling merely on respondents'
self-serving allegation.
Respondents argue that they raised the issue regarding the Notice of Acquisition in their Petition for
Revocation, particularly in paragraph 5 thereof, which states
That the subsequent application for conversion filed by respondents was a mere ploy to cover up the said
illegal transaction and to evade the coverage of the property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).28 cralawlawlibra ry
Respondents cannot gloss over the fatal defect of its claim from the nonexistence of the Notice of Acquisition
just by reducing the issue to "CARP coverage." As stated above, they are contending that petitioners'
application for conversion was a ploy to cover up the illegality of the Deed of Absolute Sale and Partial
Redemption between CCFI and ALL What they repeatedly claimed was that ALI fraudulently concealed the
sale agreement from the DAR. Three DAR Secretaries, including Secretary Garilao who issued the
Conversion Order, rightly found these allegations baseless. This point was also raised and judiciously passed
upon in the OP Order dated 26 September 2003. In contrast, the Notice of Acquisition is a separate issue
altogether which has never been raised in the proceedings below.
The grounds relied upon by respondents in their Petition for Revocation are as follows
3. That the respondents29 grossly violated the Conversion Order because instead of developing the land
within five years from the issuance of the Order, it sold said land to the present possessor, Ayala Land, Inc.
xxx30
xxxx
6. That the respondents likewise committed gross misrepresentation of the fact in that they made it appear
before the DAR that the landholding in question has been duly reclassified from agricultural uses such as
residential, commercial and industrial, when in truth and in fact, the Municipality of Silang does not have an
approved town plan/zoning ordinance as of 24 October 1997 as per Certification issued by CAROLINA A,
CASAJE, Officer-In-Charge, Board Secretariat of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).31
xxxx
8. That the respondents likewise failed to comply with the undertaking to pay/effect complete payment of
the disturbance compensation of tenant-farmers in the subject landholding xxx32 c ralawlawl ibra ry
While the Decision has extensively discussed the error committed by the CA in passing upon and ruling on a
new issue on appeal, we did not grant the Petition for Review on this technical ground alone. We went over
the records and found no admissible proof presented to support respondents' claim that a Notice
of Acquisition had been issued. What was attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CA was a
mere photocopy of the Notice of Coverage. The purported Notice of Acquisition was never offered in
evidence before the DAR and never became part of the records even at the proceedings a quo. Hence, we
found that the CA committed reversible error when it gave credence to a mere assertion of the tenant-
farmers.
As a prelude to our ruling that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, we contemplated the
scenario in which the farmers had submitted the proper document to the CA. We then said,
assuming arguendo they did, the appellate court could not have reversed the OP Decision based on nothing
more than this submission, as the issue of the Notice of Acquisition had never been raised before the
administrative agency concerned.
As contended by the OSG and as exhaustively discussed in our Decision, the CA decided an issue raised for
the first time on appeal. It held that the DAR had issued a Notice of Acquisition, which served as a perpetual
ban on the conversion of the subject lands. However, respondents never attached a copy, certified or
otherwise, to their 1) Petition for Revocation, 2) Motions for Reconsideration in the proceedings a quo, or 3)
Appeal Memorandum to the OP. This is because they never raised the purpose of the notice as an issue in
their Petition for Revocation of the Conversion Order or in their Motion for Reconsideration before the OP.
What they repeatedly argued was that fraud had been perpetrated by CCFI and ALL
Respondents expressed their agreement with the point made by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. in his
Dissenting Opinion that the coverage of the land under CARL was confirmed by the following documents
(1) the stipulation/condition in the Deed of Partial Redemption and Deed of Absolute Sale, both dated
August 25, 1995, in which CCFI undertook to obtain DAR approval for CARP exemption or conversion to non-
agricultural use;
(2) CCFI's letter-request dated May 7, 1996 addressed to the DAR Regional Director for the lifting of the
Notice of Acquisition;
(3) BSP's request in 1995 made in behalf of MBC for exemption of the subject property from CARL coverage,
and the letter-denial of DAR Secretary who directed the distribution of the land to qualified farmer
beneficiaries;
(4) the Decision dated October 11, 1996 of Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres on the appeal of BSP from
the DAR Secretary's denial of its request for exemption, in which the DAR was directed to defer proceeding
with the distribution of lands already covered by CARL and petitioner was granted the opportunity to present
proof that the lands are qualified for exemption or conversion; and
(5) MBC's request for DAR clearance in October 1997 to sell its landholdings placed under CARL coverage,
which includes the subject property.33 c ralawlawli bra ry
With the exception of item 2, there was no reference to a Notice of Acquisition in any of these documents.
According to the Dissent of Justice Villarama, considering the attendant circumstances, the letter-request of
CCFI for the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition constituted an admission against interest of the fact that the
notice was issued.
The concept of admissions against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which provides
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. cralawlawli bra ry
The above rule considers admissions against interest as admissible evidence, but does not dispense with the
requirement that the admission be offered in evidence. In this case, precisely because respondents did not
raise the issue at all, petitioners did not have any opportunity to inspect or question the authenticity and
due execution of the documents. It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due
process to suddenly reverse the decisions of three DAR Secretaries and the Office of the President based on
an alleged document - especially if that document has not been presented, authenticated, or offered in
evidence � without giving the other party any opportunity to contradict the purported admission.
CCFI, much less ALI, cannot be bound to whatever inference is being made only now on the purported CCFI
letter requesting the lifting of the Notice of Acquisition. They had never been apprised throughout the
administrative proceedings of its alleged existence, nor of the inference sought to be drawn therefrom. They
were never given the chance to inspect the document as any piece of evidence should be so subjected.
Further, it must be noted that the letter does not identify the document itself, i.e., the Notice of Acquisition,
as to date, as to signatory, as to amount tendered. It only asks that the Notice of Acquisition be lifted. It is
probable, if this letter is genuine, that the alleged representative of CCFI was referring to the Notice of
Coverage, which is an admitted fact, and is precisely the reason why the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas had to
ask for, and was granted, permission by this Court in G.R. Nos. 85960 and 92610 to sell the land.
It is serious error for the CA to base its ruling on a conclusion of fact not supported by the records of this
case - whether before us, the CA, the OP, or the DAR. This point becomes all the more crucial, as the CA
admitted it would have upheld the findings of the DAR and the OP, were it not for the Notice of Acquisition
At the concluding part of its discussion, it alluded to another memorandum circular of the DAR
(Memorandum Circular No. 11-79) that land use conversion may be allowed when it is by reason of the
changes in the predominant land use brought about by urban development. It then pointed to the fact that
the close proximity of the province of Cavite to Metro Manila has opened it to the effects of modernization
and urbanization. It warned that we would only succeed in hindering progress if under these conditions we
would still insist on CARP coverage.
The argument is valid if the agricultural land is still not subjected to compulsory acquisition
under CARP. But as we saw, there has already been a notice of coverage and notice of
acquisition issued for the property.34 (Emphasis supplied.) cralaw lawlib rary
The OP rightly ruled that
xxx Appellants' lapses in not raising the issues before the DAR which has the expertise to resolve the same
and in a position to conduct due hearings and reception of evidence from contending parties pertaining to
the issue, puts the appellants in estoppel to question the same for the first time on appeal. Jurisprudence
dictates the following
The petitioner for the first time, to allow him to assume a different posture when he comes
before the court and challenge the position he had accepted at the administrative level, would be
to sanction a procedure whereby the court - which is supposed to review administrative
determinations - would not review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question not
raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted, for the same reason that underlies the
requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative authorities the prior
authority to decide controversies within its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial
level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Aguinaldo Industries
Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue & Court of Tax Appeals, 112 SCRA 136).35 (Emphasis
supplied.)c ralawlaw lib rary
This Court has already established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the
proceedings below ought not to be considered by a reviewing court. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by estoppel.36 The rule becomes crucial
in this particular case. Here, DAR is the most competent agency that can make a factual determination
regarding the Notice of Acquisition and its effect on the Conversion Order long issued by Secretary Garilao.
As it stands, none of the DAR Secretaries was ever given the opportunity to dwell on this issue. On the
contrary, Secretary Pagdanganan issued an Order on 13 August 2003 ruling that Secretary Braganza's Order
affirming the conversion had become final.
Basic considerations of fairness and due process also impel this rule, which according to the Court, is but a
logical effect of the regard for due process
A perusal of the questions raised in the SAC and the CA shows that the issue on the existence of a
consummated sale between the DAR and petitioners was not among the issues therein. Hence, this issue is
being raised for the first time on appeal.
It is a fundamental rule that this Court will not resolve issues that were not properly brought and ventilated
in the lower courts...An issue, which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the
trial in the lower courts, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because it would be
offensive to the basic rule of fair play and justice, and would be violative of the constitutional
right to due process of the other party.37 cra lawlawlib rary
II. Assuming that respondents

properly raised the above issue
before the DAR, the proscription
on conversion is a mere guiding
principle, because DAR A.O. 12-94
specifies that it is not applicable to
lands which have not been proven
to be "prime agricultural lands."
Respondents reassert their stand that the guiding principle of DAR A.O. No. 12-1994 is to preserve prime
agricultural lands, which under paragraph VI-D is considered non-negotiable for conversion. In our view, this
principle alone does not justify reversing the conversion order. Even if we ignore the lapses of the CA and
assume that a Notice of Acquisition did exist, it cannot serve as a perpetual bar on conversion, which is
merely a guiding principle; and second, this principle applies only to prime agricultural lands.
The claim that a prior notice of acquisition bars the issuance of a conversion order is found under paragraph
VI (e) of DAR A.O. 12-94. Yet the said paragraph falls under heading VI, "Policies and Guiding
Principles." By no stretch of the imagination can a mere policy or principle be interpreted as an absolute ban
on conversion, such policy having been formulated by the same agency which ordered the conversion.
Paragraph VI-E cannot operate to diminish the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR over the land.
As rightly pointed out by the OSG and respondents themselves, the guiding principle governs only prime
agricultural lands.38 The findings of the DAR - which are binding on this Court - and those of the Central
Land Use Planning Policy and Implementation (CLUPPI), as well as the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), are as follows
a) The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road.
b) The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark.
c) The topography of the landholding is hilly and has an average slope of more than 18%. It is undeveloped
and mostly covered with a wild growth of vines, bushes, and secondary growth of forest trees.
d) The dominant use of the surrounding area is its industrial/ forest growth as the landholding is sitting on a
mountain slope overlooking the Sta. Rosa Technopark.
e) The area is not irrigated and no irrigation system was noted in the area.39cralawlawlib rary
Clearly, the DAR had long investigated and ruled that the property was not suitable for agricultural use, as it
had remained undeveloped without any source of irrigation. Hence, it is not "prime agricultural land" as
contemplated under A.O. 12-94. Additionally, Republic Act 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Law states
that all lands with a slope of 18% and over, and undeveloped, shall be exempt from the Act.40 If the said
landholding has been developed for any other purpose - e.g., residential, commercial, or industrial - then it
will not fall under the coverage of CARP.41
This Court has held that before the DAR could place a piece of land under CARP coverage, there must first
be a showing that the land is an agricultural land, i.e., devoted or suitable for agricultural purposes.42 In this
determination, we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the DAR.
To do so would run counter to another basic rule that courts will not resolve a controversy involving a
question that is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the latter's resolution of that
question. Since the DAR's findings herein are supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed by the OP,
our only course is to sustain it. In Heirs of Castro, Sr. v. Lozada,43 the Court held as follows
It has been peremptorily determined by OP and, before it, by the DAR, acting on investigations reports of its
provincial (Batangas) office, as reviewed and validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the
disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established that the lands covered are not primarily devoted
to rice and corn and that the tenancy relationship has not been clearly established. Absent palpable error by
both agencies, of which this Court finds none, their determination as to the use of the property and/or to the
dubious status of petitioners as de jure tenants is controlling.
x x x[I]t is settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even
finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this
case. The factual findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, who, by reason of his official
position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect,
and without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed. (Emphasis supplied.)
cralawlawl ibra ry
On the issue of conversion, this Court must respect the findings of the DAR, which is the only agency
charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion.44 The CA Decision
effectively enfeebles the Orders of no less than three Secretaries of the DAR and the policy pronouncements
of the OP. The rule that conversion orders, once final and executory, may no longer be questioned is
contradicted by the actions of respondents: accepting disturbance compensation for the land; seeking
petitioners' compliance with the terms of the Conversion Order; then reversing themselves by assailing the
Order itself long after the proper period has prescribed.
III. The Petition for Revocation was barred by prescription.
The argument of respondents that the Petition for Revocation was not barred by prescription was anchored
on the interpretation of Secretary Morales in his Order dated 18 December 2000. He opined therein that the
provisions of DAR A.O. No. 1, series of 1999 (DAR A.O 1-99), particularly Section 3445 on prescription, was
not applicable. He quoted the Civil Code provision on the non-retroactivity of laws. On the other hand, the
Dissent volunteered that DAR A.O 1-99 expressly provides for the remedy of cancellation or revocation of a
conversion order within a five-year period, if the petition is based on a violation of relevant rules and
regulations of the DAR.
As to respondents' contention, we reproduce and underscore the relevant portion of the Decision
Respondents assume that the rule to be applied is that prevailing at the time of the issuance of the
Conversion Order. This is incorrect. The rule applicable in determining the timeliness of a petition for
cancellation or withdrawal of a conversion order is the rule prevailing at the time of the filing of that petition,
and not at the time of the issuance of the Conversion Order. It is axiomatic that laws have prospective
effect, as the Administrative Code provides. While A.O. 01-99 was not yet promulgated at the time of the
issuance of the Conversion Order, it was already published and in effect when the Petition for Revocation
was filed on 19 May 2000.
Regarding the question on when the one-year prescription period should be reckoned, it must be still be
resolved in conformity with the prospective character of laws and rules. In this case, the one-year period
should be reckoned from the date of effectivity of A.O. 1-99, which is 31 March 1999. Therefore, no petition
for cancellation or withdrawal of conversion of lands already converted as of 30 March 1999 may be filed
after 1 March 2000.
cralawlawl ibra ry
The Petition for Revocation was filed on 19 May 2000.
We now address the contention raised in the Dissent. The alleged violations of rules and regulations of the
DAR pertain to the "non-compliance with the condition of developing the area within five years, the illegal
sale transaction made by CCFI to evade coverage under CARL, and CCFI's gross misrepresentation before
the DAR that the land subject of conversion had already been reclassified to non-agricultural uses." These
violations, according to respondents, paved the way for the extended prescriptive period of five years. It
must be noted, however, that Secretary Morales gave due course to, and even granted, the Petition for
Revocation. He resolved the substantial issues raised and made a categorical factual finding that there had
been no misrepresentation.46 As regards the alleged illegal sale, we have extensively discussed the issue in
the Decision.
IV. Conversion was still possible

despite the nonexistence of a zoning
ordinance.
Respondents insist that there was a clear misrepresentation committed by CCFI when it submitted a
resolution instead of an ordinance. They proffer the argument that the submission of a zoning ordinance as
approved by the HLURB was a requirement for the approval of the application for conversion under DAR A.O.
No. 12-94.47 They quote paragraph 6, Part VII (A) of the administrative issuance
A. Requirements for all applicants
xxxx
6. Zoning Certification from the HLURB Regional Office when the subject land is within a city/municipality
with a land use plan (zoning ordinance approved and certified by the HLURB (LUC Form No. 2, Series
1994). cralawlawl ib rary
They, however, conveniently ignore paragraph 4 of Part VI (B), which states
4. If the city/municipality does not have a comprehensive development plan and zoning ordinance duly
approved by HLRB/SP but the dominant use of the area surrounding the land subject of the application for
conversion is no longer agricultural, or if the proposed use is similar to, or compatible with the dominant use
of the surrounding areas as determined by the DAR, conversion may be possible. c ralawlawl ibra ry
Respondents themselves point to a certification48 dated 23 July 2003 by the board secretary of the HLURB
stating that, to date, the Municipality of Silang does not have an approved town plan/zoning
ordinance/comprehensive land use plan.49 They also admit that the submission of an ordinance was
by recommendation of the CLUPPI-1, and that the ordinance has not been adopted by Secretary Garilao.50
V. The property is exempt from CARL coverage.
Respondents "beg the kind indulgence" of the Court to take judicial notice of Section 2051 of R.A. 7160 that
land covered by CARP shall not be affected by the reclassification and conversion of that land.
Respondents insist that the land in question is covered by CARP. However, the DAR has already conclusively
found that the topography is hilly and has an average slope of more than 18%. Hence, the land is exempt
from CARP coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. �Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds, and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm
stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and
pilot production centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers
appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually
worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) cra lawlawlib ra ry
The Court is not a trier of facts. It relies on the expertise of administrative agencies. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,52 it declared the DAR to be in a better position to resolve a petition for revocation. DAR is
the primary agency that possesses the necessary expertise on the matter
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner's petition for revocation,
being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to
determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this court. (Emphasis supplied.)
cralawlawl ibra ry
Lastly, respondents claim that their failures are mere technicalities that cannot prevail over their substantive
rights as farmers, who should have "more in law." This statement is a gross oversimplification of the issue.
The Notice of Acquisition which was mentioned in passing and only at a late stage, has no evidentiary
support available in the records. The DAR and the OP have both ruled for CCFI and ALI, and the CA itself has
admitted that the stand of CCFI and ALI would have been valid if not for the issuance of the alleged Notice
of Acquisition. The CA should have therefore been more circumspect in verifying whether anything on record
remotely supported the self-serving claim of the farmers. Even the Notice of Coverage that they presented
does not vest substantive rights, as it does not automatically transfer ownership of the land to them. A
notice of coverage does not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land reform area.53
In Puyat & Sons v. Alcaide,54 both a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition were already issued over
the subject property. More crucially, the existence of the Notice of Acquisition was properly raised and
proved before the trial court. Yet, the CA Decision favoring the farmer-beneficiaries was reversed on the
ground that they must still comply with procedural rules
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing
in which the right to appeal is lost. cralaw lawlib rary
We understand the plight of prospective farmer-beneficiaries all over the country; nevertheless, we cannot
see the alleged injustice in this particular case. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities,
it is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that petitioners in this case be duly
apprised of a claim against them before judgment may be rendered.55
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
No further pleadings or motions will be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
G.R. Nos. 197096-97, December 07, 2015
ANTONIO Z. KING, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO

SANTOS, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO A. ROBLES, ANTONIO T. DATU, RENE A. MASILUNGAN,
RESTITUTO S. SOLOMON, RODRIGO MENDOZA, ROMEO MENDOZA REYNALDO DATU, JOSEPH TIU,
TERESITA TIU, ROGELIO GEBILAGUIN AND PRESCILLA GEBILAGUIN, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review in Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the August 29, 2008 Joint
Resolution2 and November 17, 2010 Joint Order3 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-02-0339-F
and C-C-02-0340-F. The Ombudsman dismissed for lack of probable cause the cases for Robbery, Violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) and Falsification of Public Documents filed by Antonio Z.
King (King) against Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles (Arbiter Robles), Antonio T. Datu, Rene A. Masilungan,
Restituto S. Solomon (Deputy Sheriffs), Rodrigo Mendoza (Rodrigo), Romeo Mendoza (Romeo), Reynaldo
Datu, Joseph Tiu (Joseph), Teresita Tiu (Teresita), Rogelio Gebilaguin (Rogelio), Prescilla Gebilaguin and the
other private respondents.
The Antecedent Facts
In a Decision4 dated February 28, 1997 rendered by the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally
dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full
backwages from the time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision became final
and executory. On November 19, 2001, Arbiter Robles issued a writ of execution5commanding the execution
arm of the NLRC "to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at
J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum of x x x
P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio's] backwages and 13th month pay. In case you fail to collect said amount
in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the movable or immovable properties of the
respondent not exempt from execution."6
In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a Notice of
Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties7 upon the representative of therein respondents on March 5,
2002. Personal properties found inside the compound of Azkcon at No. 220 Lias Road, Lambakan Street,
Marilao, Bulacan were levied upon. Meanwhile, on March 13, 2002, Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication
Corporation (PMAFC, one of the companies represented by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim8 before Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC filed a
Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property and to Inhibit Sheriffs.9PMAFC
contended that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to PMAFC worth P12 million and that the
Deputy Sheriffs intended to sell the said properties for a measly sum of P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed
that the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be
disqualified. In an Order10 dated April 18, 2002, Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity
Bond in an amount double the judgment award.
On April 26, 2002, Arbiter Robles approved Rogelio's Sheriffs Indemnity Bond, directed the Deputy Sheriffs
to obtain physical possession of the levied properties, sell them at public auction, and apply the proceeds
thereof for the satisfaction of the judgment award.11 Rogelio, through his attorney-in-fact, Rodrigo Mendoza,
emerged as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted on May 2, 2002. After the Certificate of Sale
was issued, Rodrigo and his workers started to pull out and haul the sold properties.
Contending that the value of the properties taken and hauled by Rogelio through his attorney-in-fact were
worth more than the monetary award of the NLRC, petitioner King, claiming to be the President of Azkcon
Metal Industries, Inc., Azkcon Refrigeration Industries, Inc., Azkcon Construction Development Corporation,
Azk Trading and PMAFC, filed criminal complaints for Robbery, Violation of RA 3019 and Falsification of
Public Documents against respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0339-
F and C-C-02-1340-F. He alleged that respondents conspired in the unlawful taking of the machineries and
equipment which caused him and the aforesaid companies undue injury. King claimed that the properties
were owned by PMAFC inasmuch as the Azkcon Group of Companies is not a registered corporation; that in
the Notice rescheduling the auction sale, the Deputy Sheriffs misleadingly indicated the address as 220
Lambakin St., Marilao, Bulacan, when the correct address of Azkcon is 220 Lias Road, Bo. Lambakin,
Marilao, Bulacan; that the Deputy Sheriffs did not actually hold a public auction consistent with respondents'
intention to rob Azkcon; and that Joseph and Teresita conspired with the other respondents when they
allowed the safekeeping of the hauled machineries and equipment in their compound. The National Bureau
of Investigation whose assistance was sought by petitioner likewise filed similar charges against the
aforenamed accused before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and docketed as I.S. No. 02-
05-1059 and I.S. No. 02-06-1406.
Ruling of the Ombudsman

After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties' respective position, the Ombudsman in its Joint
Resolution dated August 29, 2008 dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable
cause.
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's evidence failed to establish the four elements of the crime of
robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is the owner of the
subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale issued to him. Thus,
Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another.
The Ombudsman likewise ruled that the sale of the levied properties through auction was not made with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or gross inexcusable negligence. The Deputy Sheriffs' actions were
done pursuant to the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment.
With respect to the charge of Falsification of Public Documents, the Ombudsman found no record to show
that respondents falsified any pertinent document in this case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed Joint
Order dated November 17, 2010.
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. King insists that probable cause exists to charge
respondents with Robbery, Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.
On July 20, 2011, we resolved to require respondents to file comment.12 Respondents Romeo and Rodrigo
filed their Comment13 maintaining that King failed to prove that there was probable cause to charge them
with the foregoing crimes. They also posit that King did not establish conspiracy among them. Moreover,
they maintain that Arbiter Robles and the Deputy Sheriffs were only performing their duties as mandated by
law. Also, the withdrawal of the properties was done by authority of the law and by virtue of the Certificate
of Sale. King thereafter filed his Reply.14 To date, the other respondents failed to comment. Hence, they are
deemed to have waived their right to file comment.
Issue
Whether the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents for trial.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to
investigate on its own or on complaint by "any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."15 By constitutional fiat and
under RA 6770,16 the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on
offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.17Because of the
endowment of broad investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the
sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it
may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it18 except when
the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.19
"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility."20 A perusal of the Petition shows that petitioner failed to
demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charges against
respondents for lack of probable cause. On the contrary, a review of the records readily reveals that the
Ombudsman's assailed Joint Resolution is based on substantial evidence. From the well-explained Joint
Resolution, in our view, petitioner's Affidavit/Complaint is bereft of sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crimes imputed on respondents have been committed and that they are probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion warranting
the Court's intervention, in dismissing the charges against respondents.
Petitioner complained of procedural flaws in the enforcement of the writ of execution arguing in the main
mat the value of the levied and hauled properties were much more than the monetary award of the NLRC.
This we believe is not an adequate ground to reverse the action of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner's bone of contention in the present Petition boils down to the appreciation and determination of
factual matters. The question of whether there was indeed an over levy of properties is one that is
essentially a factual concern as it goes into the determination of the fair market value of the properties
levied upon vis-a-vis the value of the properties hauled and taken out of the company's premises.
Obviously, petitioner invites an evaluation of the evidentiary matters which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. Besides, this Court is not a trier of facts. Matters pertaining to proofs and evidence are
beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 Petition except in the presence of some
meritorious circumstances, none of which is availing in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Joint Resolution dated August 29, 2008 of the Office of the
Ombudsman and its Joint Order dated November 17, 2010 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Far East Bank Appeals Dismissal of Employee for Fraud

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G.R. No.

187491, July 08, 2015

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH

Hence, this Petition37 was filed.

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

1. Unfair labor practice cases; chanRobles virtua lLawl ibra ry

2. Termination disputes; chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and

3. Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements

(2) That the appeal was under oath;

(3) That the appeal fee must have been paid;

(4) That the appeal bond must have been posted;

(5) A memorandum of appeal which states: Lawlibra ryofCRAlaw

b. the relief sought; and

(6) Proof of service of the appeal on the adverse party.

G.R. No. 178110, January 12, 2016

SERENO, C.J.: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

FACTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECISION

c. The Petition for Revocation is not barred by prescription.

d. Petitioners committed a misrepresentation, because there was no reclassification zoning

We DENY the Motion for Reconsideration.

I. The CA committed reversible

The OP rightly ruled that

II. Assuming that respondents

a) The property is about 10 kilometers from the Provincial Road.

b) The land sits on a mountainside overlooking Santa Rosa technopark.

III. The Petition for Revocation was barred by prescription.

The Petition for Revocation was filed on 19 May 2000.

IV. Conversion was still possible

A. Requirements for all applicants

They, however, conveniently ignore paragraph 4 of Part VI (B), which states

V. The property is exempt from CARL coverage.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

G.R. Nos. 197096-97, December 07, 2015

ANTONIO Z. KING, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO

The Antecedent Facts

Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

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